











SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

OF THE

JOINT COMMITTEE

ON

THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR,

---

SUPPLEMENTAL TO SENATE REPORT NO. 142, 38TH CONGRESS, 2D SESSION.

VOLUME I.

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WASHINGTON:  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.  
1866.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, *June 18, 1866.*

*Resolved*, By the Senate, (the House of Representatives concurring,) that there be printed for the use of the members of the Thirty-ninth Congress, the reports of Major Generals W. T. Sherman, George H. Thomas, John Pope, J. G. Foster, A. Pleasanton, and E. A. Hitchcock, made to the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, together with such other reports as may be received by the commencement of the next session of Congress, the same number, and in the same style, as were printed of the reports heretofore made by said committee.

Attest:

J. W. FORNEY, *Secretary.*

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IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES,

*June 20, 1866.*

*Resolved*, That the House concur in the foregoing resolution of the Senate in relation to the printing of the reports of Major Generals Sherman, Thomas, Pope, Foster, Pleasanton, and Hitchcock, made to the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, &c.

Attest:

E. McPHERSON, *Clerk.*

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## REPORTS

MADE TO THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR,

BY

MAJOR GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,  
MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS  
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN POPE,  
MAJOR GENERAL J. S. FOSTER,  
MAJOR GENERAL A. PLEASANTON,  
MAJOR GENERAL E. A. HITCHCOCK,  
MAJOR GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN,  
BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES B. RICKETTS,  
COMMUNICATION OF NORMAN WIARD,  
MEMORIAL OF NORMAN WIARD.

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REPORT

OF

MAJOR GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, U. S. A.,

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

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# REPORT

OF

TO THE

HON. COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

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COMMITTEE ROOM, CONDUCT OF THE WAR,  
*Washington, D. C., May 22, 1865.*

GENERAL: The Committee on the Conduct of the War have found it impossible to take testimony heretofore in regard to the many important campaigns in which you have been engaged since the commencement of the rebellion.

In order to place upon record some reliable account of those campaigns, the committee have decided that the best way was to submit to you some questions in writing which are herewith enclosed, and request you to prepare answers to them, and forward the same to the chairman at any time prior to the next session of Congress, for publication.

The committee desire that you will make your statement as full and detailed as may be necessary to a clear understanding of the subject of inquiry in every respect, and for that purpose they would like to have you submit copies of the enclosed interrogatories, with such others as may suggest themselves to you, to those of your subordinates in any campaign whom you may deem best qualified to furnish information; their statements to be forwarded with your own.

I remain, yours, respectfully,

B. F. WADE,  
*Chairman of Committee.*

Major General W. T. SHERMAN.

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## *Questions.*

No. 1. Please state what positions you have held and what commands you have exercised since the commencement of the rebellion, giving the periods during which those commands respectively have been exercised by you.

No. 2. Please state such particulars as you may deem necessary to a proper understanding of the several campaigns in which you have been engaged; setting forth the orders and instructions under which those campaigns were conducted, and the principal orders and instructions given by you, with such incidents and circumstances as you consider will be of interest to the public; appending to your statement copies of your reports and those of your principal subordinates, and keeping the account of each campaign by itself as far as convenient.

*Answers.*

No. 1. On the first day of June, 1861, I was a citizen of St. Louis, Missouri, residing there with my family, and engaged in business as president of the Fifth street railroad. On a summons from my brother, John Sherman, I proceeded to the city of Washington, and, on the eighteenth day of June, received from the Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, an appointment as colonel of the 13th regiment United States regular infantry, reported for duty, and by Special Orders No. 105, of June 20, 1861, was assigned to duty at the headquarters of the army, Lieutenant General Scott commanding.

On the 30th of June, was ordered to report for duty to Brigadier General McDowell, commanding department northeast Virginia, and by Special Order No. 16 from those headquarters was ordered to relieve Colonel D. Hunter in command of Fort Corcoran; relieved him same day, and proceeded to prepare the troops there for field service.

On the 21st July, commanded a brigade in General Tyler's division at the battle of Bull Run, official report of which, dated July 25, 1861, is on file in the Adjutant General's office, Washington, D. C.

About the middle of August, 1861, General Robert Anderson, about to be assigned to command the department of the Cumberland, sent for me to meet him at Willard's hotel, when he notified me he had applied for myself, Brigadier Generals Thomas, Burnside, and Buell, to act under him in his new command. I then expressed to him, and also to President Lincoln, that I did not wish to be placed in any conspicuous position, but would attempt any amount of work.

On the 15th of August, received an appointment of brigadier general of United States volunteers. August 28, 1861, was relieved of command at Fort Corcoran by General Fitz John Porter, pursuant to Special Order No. 11, August 28, 1861, of Major General McClellan, and ordered to Cincinnati, Ohio, to report in person to General Robert Anderson; by him was sent on a tour to the governors of Indiana and Illinois, and to confer with Major General Frémont, at St. Louis, and summoned back to Louisville, Kentucky, in time to take command of a detachment of volunteers and militia sent out to Muldroagh Hill to check the advance of the rebel army on Louisville; remained out in command of that force until summoned back to Louisville to be placed in chief command of the department, by reason of General Anderson's health compelling him to return east. Earnestly remonstrated against being placed in chief command, and, considering the President pledged not to put me in any prominent command, urged it with earnestness, and was relieved pursuant to Special Orders No. 305, Adjutant General's office, Washington, D. C., November 13, 1861, and ordered to report to Major General Halleck for duty in the department of Missouri. Reported at St. Louis, November 24, 1861, and by Special Order No. 8 was assigned to special inspection duty, as therein defined; and subsequently, by Special Order No. 87, of December 23, 1861, put in command of the post of Benton barracks. Remained there in command until February 17, 1862, when I was sent, by a telegraphic order from General Halleck, to Paducah to control the movement of supplies and troops for General Grant, then operating up the Tennessee river. Remained there until about the 9th of March, 1862, when, by General Halleck's order, I made up a division of twelve (12) new regiments, just arrived, with which to take the field.

March 10, 1862, moved in transports up the Tennessee river, and reported for duty to Major General C. F. Smith, at Savannah, Tennessee; was sent up the Tennessee to break the Memphis and Charleston railroad at or near Burnsville, Mississippi. Failed, by reason of the high water, and, by verbal order of Major General Smith, still in command at Savannah, Tennessee, landed at Pittsburg Landing, March 16, 1862. Marched out to Monterey, ten (10) miles.

and, by orders, drew back and made camp at Shiloh meeting-house. Remained there, drilling and organizing, and, April 6 and 7, 1862, took part in the battle of Shiloh, under command of Major General U. S. Grant, and afterwards moved on Corinth, Mississippi, with the grand army commanded by Major General H. W. Halleck, (April 29, 1862.)

May 1, 1862, promoted to major general of United States volunteers.

May 30, 1862, entered Corinth, and, by order of Major General Halleck, moved my own and Major General Hurlbut's division to Chewalla, Mississippi, thence along the Memphis and Charleston railroad, repairing it, until July 21, 1862, we entered Memphis, Tennessee; assumed command and remained there until September 24, 1862, when, by Major General Grant's Order No. 83, took command of the first district of West Tennessee.

November 25, 1862, pursuant to orders of General Grant, moved out of Memphis, for Tchulahoma, to report to him at Holly Springs, to attack and drive the enemy, then in force along the line of Tallahatchie river; December 3, 1862, crossed the Tallahatchie at Wyatt's, and December 5, 1862, met General Grant at Oxford, Mississippi. By his order, returned to Memphis, Tennessee, December 12, 1862, leaving all my command but one division. Organized out of the new troops there and at Helena, Arkansas, a special command, to move by water, and by a sudden coup de main carry Vicksburg. Embarked December 20, 1862, and from December 25, 1862, to January 1, 1863, made repeated attacks on the bluffs between Vicksburg and Haines's Bluff, but failed. January 4, 1863, was relieved of the command of the expedition by Major General John A. McClernand, and assumed command of the 15th army corps, January 13, 1863, then first organized out of the troops with me, in compliance with General Orders, No. 210, War Department. Had taken part under General McClernand in the capture of Arkansas Post, January 11, 1863, and returned with that expedition, January 22, 1863, to Young's Point, Louisiana, opposite the city of Vicksburg, where, soon after, General Grant assumed immediate command of the entire army operating against that place. Was in command of the 15th army corps during all the operations against Jackson and Vicksburg.

Vicksburg was surrendered to General Grant July 4, 1863, and the same day I was ordered to push back Joe Johnston's rebel army, that was near us for the purpose of relieving the garrison of Vicksburg; drove him into Jackson, and beyond, and by General Grant's orders dropped back to the Big Black, and went into camp for the summer months. July 4, 1863, appointed brigadier general in the regular army. September 22, 1863, in camp on Big Black, received orders from General Grant to send one of my divisions to Memphis, Tennessee, thence to go east, to the assistance of General Rosecrans; next day received orders, in person, to go myself with the 15th corps, and such of the 16th corps about Memphis as could be spared; left Memphis October 11, 1863; *en route*, at Iuka, Mississippi, October 24, 1863, received orders assigning me the command of the department and army of the Tennessee; reached Chattanooga November 15, 1863, in advance of my troops; conferred with General Grant, got his orders, and returned to Bridgeport, Alabama, to meet my command. November 17, conducted them as rapidly as possible to the points assigned me, and took part in the battle of Missionary Ridge, November 24 and 25, 1863, and pursued the retreating enemy to Greyville, Georgia, and sent a detachment to Red Clay, Georgia, between Dalton and Cleveland, to break the railroad. November 28, 1863, at Greyville, Georgia, General Grant consented that I might conduct my command up to the Hiawassa river for forage, and afterwards, December 1, he sent me orders to assume command of all troops moving north, and hasten to Knoxville to relieve General Burnside, then hard pressed by the rebel General Johnston. Moved rapidly, and entered Knoxville December 6, 1863; gave General Burnside the re-enforcements he needed, and returned by easy marches to Chattanooga and Bridgeport, where, on December

19, I put in motion my corps (the 15th) for their winter camps along the railroad from Stevenson to Decatur, Alabama, and in person proceeded to Nashville, Tennessee, where General Grant had made his headquarters. Thence, with his consent, proceeded via Cairo to Memphis and Vicksburg to inspect that part of my department, and to drive the enemy back and out of Mississippi.

February 4, 1864, having collected at Vicksburg the necessary forces, marched to Jackson the 6th and Meridian 14th February, destroyed all the railroads thereabouts, and drove the enemy's infantry beyond the Tombigbee river; remained at Meridian until February 20, and returned to Vicksburg, reaching there February 28; and to assist Major General Banks in a similar move west of the Mississippi, I hastened to him at New Orleans for conference, and left him March 3, 1864, with the promise to put ten thousand (10,000) infantry for him at Alexandria, Louisiana, March 17. This was done.

I proceeded up the river to Memphis, where I received General Grant's letters of March 4, 1864, calling me to Nashville, notifying me that he had been nominated Lieutenant General of the armies of the United States, which would take him east, and that he designed to devolve on me the command of the military division of the Mississippi. Reached Nashville March 17, 1864, and next day assumed command of the military division of the Mississippi, of which I have had command, with changed boundaries, ever since.

August 12, 1864, before Atlanta, Georgia, received notice of appointment as major general in the regular army on that day, my present commission.

Of all the above events the most minute official details have been given and are now on file in the Adjutant General's office, Washington, District of Columbia, and are too voluminous to repeat; but the campaign of Atlanta, Savannah, and the Carolinas having proven so conclusive, I hereto subjoin complete details, composed mostly of the correspondence between myself, the Secretary of War, General Halleck, Lieutenant General Grant, and my subordinate commanders, which will form rather the crude material for history than history itself.

Answer No. 2. To give all the orders made and all the details of events prior to the Atlanta campaign would be more voluminous than the committee can possibly expect, and I venture to confine myself purely to matters illustrative of the campaigns where I was in chief command. In pursuance of which, I send a printed copy of my orders since assuming command of the military division of the Mississippi, and the compilation of letters and instructions during the same period. To give matter illustrative of other times when I was not in chief command, would doubtless confuse rather than throw light on those events.

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## LETTERS.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,

*Vicksburg, March 4, 1864.*

GENERAL: By an order this day issued you are to command a strong well appointed detachment of the army of the Tennessee sent to reinforce a movement against the Red river line, but more especially the fortified positions of Shreveport.

You will embark your command as soon as possible, but little encumbered with wagons or wheeled vehicles, but well supplied with fuel, provisions and ammunition. Take with you the twelve (12) mortars with their ammunition and all the thirty (30) pounder Parrots the ordnance officer will supply. Proceed to the mouth of the Red river and confer with Admiral Porter; confer with him, and in all the expedition rely on him implicitly, as he is the approved friend of

the army of the Tennessee, and has been associated with us from the beginning. I have undertaken with General Banks that you will be at Alexandria, Louisiana, on or before the 17th day of March, and you will, if time allows, co-operate with the navy in destroying Harrisonburg, up Black river, or the Washita; but as I passed Red river yesterday I saw Admiral Porter, and he told me he had already sent an expedition to Harrisonburg, so that I suppose that part of the plan will be accomplished before you reach Red river, but in any event be careful to reach Alexandria about the 17th of March.

General Banks will start by land from Franklin, in the Teche country, either the fifth or seventh, and will march *via* Opelousas to Alexandria. You will meet him there, report to him, and act under his orders. My understanding with him is, his forces will still move by land *via* Natchitoches, &c., to Shreveport, whilst the gunboat fleet is to ascend the river with your transports in company. Now Red river is very low for the season, and I doubt if the boats can pass the falls or rapids at Alexandria. What General Banks proposes to do in that event I do not know, but my own judgment is that Shreveport ought not to be attacked until the gunboats can reach it. Not that a force marching by land cannot do it alone, but it would be bad economy in war to invest the place with an army so far from heavy guns, mortars, ammunition and provisions, which can alone reach Shreveport by water.

Still I do not know about General Banks's plans in that event; but whatever they may be, your duty will be to conform in the most hearty manner.

My understanding with General Banks is that he will not need the co-operation of your force beyond thirty days from the date you reach Red river. As soon as he has taken Shreveport, or as soon as he can spare you, you will return to Vicksburg with all despatch, gather up your detachments, wagons, tents, transportation, and all property pertaining to so much of the command as belongs to the 16th army corps, and conduct it to Memphis, where orders will await you. My present belief is, your division entire will be needed round with the army of the Tennessee about Huntsville or Bridgeport; still I will have orders with General Hurlbut at Memphis for you on your return.

I believe if water will enable the gunboats to cross the rapids at Alexandria, you will be able to make a quick, strong and effective blow at our enemy on the west, thus widening the belt of our territory and making the breach between the confederate government and its outlying trans-Mississippi department more perfect.

It is understood that General Steele makes a simultaneous move from Little Rock on Shreveport or Natchitoches with a force of about 10,000 men. Banks will have seventeen thousand (17,000) and you ten thousand (10,000.) If these can act concentrically and simultaneously, you will make short work of it, and then General Banks will have enough force to hold as much of the Red river as he deems wise, leaving you to bring to General Grant's main army the seven thousand five hundred (7,500) men of the 16th corps.

Having faith in your sound judgment and experience, I confide this important and delicate command to you, with certainty that you will harmonize perfectly with Admiral Porter and General Banks, with whom you are to act, and thereby insure success.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General A. J. SMITH,  
*Commanding Expedition up Red river, Vicksburg, Miss.*

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,

*Vicksburg, March 6, 1864.*

SIR: By my order of to-day it is provided that your present command be moved by water to Cairo, thence up the Tennessee river to some convenient point, and thence by land to join General Dodge's command, near Athens, Tennessee.

To enable you to fulfil these orders you can take passage by regiments and detachments in steamers bound up the Mississippi and disembark at Cairo. There the quartermaster will be instructed to charter a sufficient number of boats to carry your command at one trip up the Tennessee river, and in selecting boats he will be governed by the stage of water in the Tennessee.

If the stage of water be low you will disembark your command at Savannah and march for Pulaski, and report in advance by courier to General Dodge; but should there be a good stage of water, and should Colbert shoals be passable, you may proceed up to Florence and disembark there; but if there be the least doubt on this subject it will be better to land at Savannah, or Waterloo, opposite Eastport. Draw your supplies at Cairo, and so calculate the quantity that your wagons will be able to haul everything belonging to you from the point of disembarkation to Pulaski and Athens.

Report by telegraph and mail your progress to my headquarters at Huntsville, Alabama.

On arrival at your destination you will assume command of your entire division, subject to the command of General Dodge, till the corps headquarters are removed from Memphis to that army in the field.

Impress on your colonels and subordinate officers the importance of preserving good discipline, cleanliness and a soldierly appearance on board the boats at Cairo, or wherever the command may be.

Leave no men behind, but reduce your camp and garrison equipage to the smallest, as the weather is now moderate and winter is past.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General J. C. VEATCH,

*Commanding 4th Division, 16th Army Corps.*

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,

*Vicksburg, Mississippi, March 7, 1864.*

DEAR ADMIRAL: I received last night the despatches, and was delighted at the result. Taking the guns at Trinity, the burning at Harrisonburg, and general driving away the force there, gives you the initiative, and if you only had water enough you could alone follow it up to Shreveport. But in a day or two I will have with you General A. J. Smith, with ten thousand good infantry, which can land and act in concert with you.

The lowness of water in the Mississippi and Red rivers is most extraordinary, and will embarrass us; but at all hazards, and at whatever cost, we should meet General Banks at Alexandria on the 17th instant. I will instruct my quartermaster to use small boats as far as possible, and suggest that you put some of your light iron-clads up as far as Alexandria *anyhow*, and wait there for a rise. General Banks will move so as to turn the position at De Russey, so that a mere display of force on its water front will, connected with the movement of our troops on land, lead to an evacuation of the fort, and, it may be, the surrender of its armament and garrison. At all events, I think we should not let General Banks arrive at Alexandria without finding our Red river party there. You

have bounced them from the Washita, and, conjointly with my infantry, which will join you in a day or two, can also open up the Red river as far as Alexandria. Beyond that point, I agree with you, and authorize you to use my name with General Banks, that a further move ought not to be attempted above Alexandria, unless the Red river admits the navigation by your first-class iron-clads and large transports, viz: seven (7) feet water on the "rapids" of Alexandria.

I must hurry around to my command in the field at Huntsville, but send A. J. Smith to co-operate with you in Red river and leave General McPherson here on the Mississippi. With these I know you will take pleasure in conferring and co-operating harmoniously.

I am, with great respect,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General, Commanding Department.*

Admiral D. D. PORTER,

*Commanding Mississippi Squadron, Red River.*

#### HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,

*Vicksburg, Mississippi, March 7, 1864.*

GENERAL: I think it important I should hasten somewhat to my command at Huntsville, Alabama; I am therefore compelled again to leave you to the exercise of this most important command, but assure you I do so with absolute confidence. You may rely on my cordial support at all times.

You know the plans and purposes of your superiors for some months to come, but, to be more certain, I will repeat their leading points. The river Mississippi must be held sacred, and any attempt of the enemy to make a lodgement anywhere on its banks must be prevented by any and all means. Also its peaceful navigation must be assured; any firing on boats or molestation of them when engaged in a legitimate and licensed traffic should be punished with terrible severity. I believe that our expedition, in which we destroyed absolutely the Southern railroad and the Mobile and Ohio, at and around Meridian, will prevent the enemy approaching the river with any infantry or heavy artillery, but he will, of course, reoccupy Mississippi with his marauding cavalry, that can in no wise influence the course of the grand war. I would heed this cavalry but little; still it may unite and threaten Memphis, in which event I want you to act promptly, by embarking as heavy a force as you can spare to ascend the Yazoo as far as Greenwood or Sidon, and strike at Grenada. This would take Forrest in the rear, and compel him to fall back on Pontotoc. I cannot believe cavalry will ever trouble you at or near Vicksburg, but may attempt to reach the river at some point above or below. An expedition up the Yazoo is the remedy for the river above; and if we could garrison Harrisonburg and operate up Washita and Tensas, it would have a similar effect on that side; but this is not in our command, and we have not the force to spare.

Encourage by all means the packet and through trade on the river as auxiliary to its defence, and also encourage trade with the interior not contraband of war. Such trade will keep the people dependent on the luxuries and conveniences of life, and to that extent shake their love for the impoverished rebel concern. Let the treasury agents manage this trade, and keep your officers aloof from all interest in it. I think the attempt to cultivate plantations premature, and all the protection we can promise is to buy their corn, facilitate their supplies, and give incidental protection; we cannot try to guard their estates.

The Red river expedition is designed to last but thirty days. Manage your veterans as to furlough so that this detachment of yours may return before all

the veterans are spared. Nearly the whole of General Hurlbut's corps will be needed over on the Tennessee river, so that, in fact, your corps will have to look to the whole river.

The gunboats and General Ellett's fleet can do all ordinary patrolling, and you will only be called on when the enemy attempts some more extended operation than he has hitherto done. Make the regular reports to my headquarters, and when you have no special instructions, act with the full confidence of a separate commander. I know you want to be in the field, and I will accomplish it if possible, but this command is of vital importance to our cause.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

Major General McPHERSON,

*Commanding District of Vicksburg.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,

*En route for Memphis, March 8, 1864.*

GENERAL: I had the honor to receive, at the hands of General Butterfield, General Grant's letter of February 18. I had returned from Meridian by the time I had appointed; but the condition of facts concerning the Red river expedition being indefinite, I took one of the marine boats, the *Diana*, and went down to New Orleans to confer with General Banks. En route I saw the admiral, and learned he was ready, and a large and effective gunboat fleet would be at the mouth of Red river for action March 5. At New Orleans I received the general's (Grant's) letter, with enclosures, and was governed by it in my interview with General Banks.

General Banks is to command in person, taking with him seventeen thousand (17,000) of his chosen troops, to move by land from the end of the Opelousas railroad, *via* Franklin, Opelousas, and Alexandria; Steele is to move from Little Rock on Natchitoches; and he (Banks) asked of me ten thousand (10,000) men in boats to ascend Red river, meeting him at Alexandria the 17th of March. I enclose copies of General Banks's letter to me, and my answer, which are clear and specific.

I have made up a command of ten thousand (10,000) men—seven thousand five hundred (7,500) of Hurlbut and two thousand five hundred (2,500) of McPherson. General A. J. Smith goes in command of the whole, and will be at the mouth of Red river by the 10th, and at Alexandria on the 17th. These ten thousand (10,000) men are not to be gone over thirty (30) days, at the expiration of which time General McPherson's quota will return to Vicksburg, and General Hurlbut's come to Memphis, whence, if all things remain as now, I can bring them rapidly around to Savannah, Tennessee, and so on to my right flank, near Huntsville. I think this will result as soon as the furloughed men get back.

Inasmuch as General Banks goes in person, I could not with delicacy propose that I should command; and the scene of operations lying wholly in his department, I deem it wisest to send General A. J. Smith, and to return to Huntsville in time to put my army in the field in shape for the coming spring campaign.

I have ordered five regiments, under General Veatch, to join General Dodge at once, and I feel sure I can safely draw General A. J. Smith's division, of full five thousand men, to the same point in April.

General McPherson and General Hurlbut are both instructed to furlough their veterans at once, and many regiments are already off. I have inspected Natchez and Vicksburg, and feel sure they can now be held safe with comparatively small garrisons, and the river is patrolled by gunboats and the marine brigade.



I will inspect Memphis, and in a few days will hasten to Huntsville to put myself in command of my troops in that quarter, and will be ready for work at once, as I am in no manner fatigued. Indeed, the men I took with me to Meridian are better fitted for war now than before we started.

I send by General Butterfield my official report, with copies of orders, letters, &c., giving you full information of all matters up to date.

I am, with much respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Brig. Gen. JOHN A. RAWLINS,  
*Chief of Staff of General Grant, Nashville, Tennessee.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, February 18, 1865.*

Enclosed I send you copy of despatches between General Halleck and myself relative to a movement up Red river on your return from your present expedition. Whilst I look upon such an expedition as is proposed as of the greatest importance, I regret that any force has to be taken from east of the Mississippi for it. Your troops will want rest for the purpose of preparing for a spring campaign, and all the veterans should be got off on furlough at the very earliest moment. This latter I would direct, even if you have to spare troops to go up Red river.

Unless you go in command of the proposed expedition, I fear any troops you may send with it will be entirely lost from further service in this command. This, however, is not the reason for my suggestion that you be sent. Your acquaintance with the country, and otherwise fitness, were the reasons.

I can give no positive orders that you send no troops up Red river, but what I do want is their speedy return if they do go, and that the minimum number necessary be sent. I have never heard a word from Steele since his department has been placed in the military division. Do not know what he proposes nor the means he has for executing. The time necessary for communicating between here and Vicksburg being so great, you will have to act in this matter according to your own judgment, simply knowing my views.

I send this by special messenger, who will await your return to Vicksburg, and who will bear any letters you may have for me.

U. S. GRANT, *Major General.*

Major General W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Commanding Expedition against Meridian.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,  
*Steamer Diana, (under way,) March 4, 1864.*

GENERAL: I had the honor to receive your letter of the 2d instant yesterday at New Orleans, but was unable to answer except verbally, and I now reduce it to writing.

I will arrive at Vicksburg the 6th instant, and I expect to meet there my command from Canton, out of which I will select two divisions of about ten thousand (10,000) men, embark them under a good commander, and order him—

1. To rendezvous at the mouth of Red river, and, in concert with Admiral Porter, (if he agree,) to strike Harrisonburg a *hard* blow.

2. To return to Red river and ascend it, aiming to reach Alexandria on the 17th of March to report to you.

3. That this command, designed to operate by water, will not be encumbered with much land transportation—say two wagons to a regiment, but with an ample supply of stores, including mortars and heavy rifled guns to be used against fortified places.

4. That I calculate, and so have reported to General Grant, that this detachment of his forces is in no event to go beyond Shreveport, and that you spare them the moment you can, trying to get them back to the Mississippi in thirty days from the time they actually enter Red river.

The year is wearing away fast, and I would like to carry to General Grant at Huntsville, Alabama, every man of his military division as early in April as possible, as I am sure we ought to move from the base of the Tennessee river to the south before the season is too far advanced—say April 15 next.

I feel certain of your complete success, provided you make the concentration in time, to assure which I will see in person to the embarkation and despatch of my quota, and I will write to General Steele conveying to him my personal and professional opinion that the present opportunity is the most perfect one that will ever offer itself to him to clean out his enemies.

Wishing you all honor and success, I am, with respect, your friend and servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Major General N. P. BANKS,  
*Commanding Department of the Gulf, New Orleans.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,  
*Vicksburg, March 6, 1864.*

GENERAL: I am just arrived. My troops are all in, and I shall embark ten thousand (10,000) men for Red river to-morrow and next day.

General Banks will surely march from Franklin on Opelousas, reaching Alexandria by the 17th instant. My force will meet him there at that date. He expects you to co-operate from Little Rock, and you certainly will never again have so good a chance to clear your front as now. Besides, your forces are deemed an essential part of the programme. Mine ought to hasten round to General Grant at once, and I only can spare them for thirty (30) days. I saw Captain Dunham on his way down, and read your letter to him, and must confess I feel uneasy at your assertion that you can only move with seven thousand (7,000) infantry, and that you prefer to wait until after the election of the 14th. If we have to modify military plans for civil elections we had better go home.

I repeat that General Banks will surely move on Shreveport *via* Alexandria, reaching that point March 17, expecting you to co-operate from the north in time.

Admiral Porter has now a magnificent fleet up Red river, and his guns were at work on Harrisonburg as I passed up the river. He too will meet General Banks at Alexandria, March 17. Colonel Woodroe comes to you with despatches, and I send by him my former letter and this.

Nearly all our command is of re-enlisted veterans, but they cheerfully defer their furloughs to enable us to make these blows, and I feel assured yours would also.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General FREDERICK STEELE,  
*Commanding Department of Arkansas.*

On the 10th of March I reached Memphis. En route I met Captain Badeau, of General Grant's staff, and the following letters passed:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,  
ON BOARD STEAMER WESTMORELAND,  
*Near Memphis, March 10, 1864.*

GENERAL: Captain Badeau found me yesterday on board this boat and delivered his despatches.

I had anticipated your orders by ordering General Veatch's division of General Hurlburt's corps at once to General Dodge, via the Tennessee river, and had sent General A. J. Smith up Red river, with ten thousand (10,000) men, to be absent not over thirty (30) days, when I designed General Smith's division of about six thousand (6,000) men also to come round.

We must furlough near ten thousand (10,000) men, and by the time they come back the Red river trip will be made, and I can safely re-enforce my army, near Huntsville, with fifteen thousand (15,000) veterans.

I send by General Butterfield full details of all past events and distributions, which I hope will meet your approval.

As to the negroes, of course, on my arrival at Memphis, I will cause your orders to be literally executed. A clamor was raised by lessees by my withdrawal of Osband's four hundred (400) men from Skipwith's and General Hawkins's brigades, and two thousand one hundred (2,100) men from Goodrich's. I transferred them to Haines's Bluff, to operate up the Yazoo, and the effect was instantaneous. Not a shot has been fired on the river boats since. I also designed to put a similar force at Harrisonburg, Louisiana, to operate up the Washita, which would secure the west bank from Red river to the Arkansas line.

Admiral Porter has already driven the enemy from Harrisonburg, so that project is immediately feasible. I assert that three thousand (3,000) men at Haines's Bluff, and three thousand (3,000) at Harrisonburg, would more effectually protect the plantation lessees than fifty thousand (50,000) men scattered along the shores of the Mississippi. You know the geography so well that I need not demonstrate my assertion.

I understand General Lorenzo Thomas has passed down to Vicksburg, and am sorry I did not see him, but as soon as I reach Memphis to-day I will send orders below, and show him how much easier it will be to protect the Mississippi by means of the Yazoo and Washita rivers than by merely guarding the banks of the Mississippi.

After awaiting to observe the effect of recent changes I will hasten round to Huntsville to prepare for the big fight in Georgia. Fix the time for crossing the Tennessee, and I will be there.

Your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Major General U. S. GRANT,  
*Comd'g Division of the Mississippi, Nashville, Tenn.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, March 4, 1864.*

You will be able better than I to judge how far the damage you have done the railroads about Meridian will disable the enemy from sending an army into Mississippi and West Tennessee, with which to operate on the river, also what force will now be required to protect and guard the river. Use the negroes, or negro troops more particularly, for guarding plantations, and for the defence of

the west bank of the river. The artillerists among them, of course, you will put in fortifications, but most of the infantry give to Hawkins, to be used on the west bank. Add to this element of your forces what you deem an adequate force for the protection of the river, from Cairo down as far as your command goes, and extend the command of one army corps to the whole of it. Assemble the balance of your forces at or near Memphis, and have them in readiness to join your column on this front in their spring campaign. Whether it will be better to have them march, meeting supplies sent up the Tennessee to Eastport, or whether they should be brought round by steamers, can be determined hereafter. Add all the forces now under Dodge to the two corps or to one of the two corps you take into the field with you.

Forces will be transferred from the Chattanooga and Nashville road to guard all the roads now protected by your troops. If they are not sufficient, enough will be taken from elsewhere to leave all yours for the field.

I am ordered to Washington, but as I am directed to keep up telegraphic communication with this command, I shall expect, in the course of ten or twelve days, to return to it.

Place the marine brigade under the command of the corps commander left on the Mississippi river. Give directions that it be habitually used for the protection of leased plantations, and will not pass below Vicksburg, nor above Greenville, except by order of the corps commander or higher authority.

U. S. GRANT, *Major General.*

Major General W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Commanding Department Tennessee.*

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[Private.]

NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, *March 4, 1864.*

DEAR SHERMAN: The bill reviving the grade of lieutenant general in the army has become a law, and my name has been sent to the Senate for the place.

I now receive orders to report to Washington immediately, *in person*, which indicates either a confirmation or a likelihood of confirmation.

I start in the morning to comply with the order, but I shall say very distinctly, on my arrival there, that I accept no appointment which will require me to make that city my headquarters. This, however, is not what I started out to write about.

Whilst I have been eminently successful in this war, in at least gaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more than me how much of this success is due to the energy, skill, and the harmonious putting forth of that energy and skill of those who it has been my good fortune to have occupy a subordinate position under me.

There are many officers to whom these remarks are applicable to a greater or less degree proportionate to their ability as soldiers, but what I want is to express my thanks to you and McPherson, as *the men* to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I have had of success. How far your advice and suggestions have been of assistance you know. How far your execution of whatever has been given you to do entitles you to the reward I am receiving you cannot know as well as me. I feel all the gratitude this letter would express, giving it the most flattering construction.

The word *you* I use in the plural, intending it for McPherson also; I should write to him, and will some day, but starting in the morning, I do not know that I will find time just now.

Your friend,

U. S. GRANT, *Major General.*

[Private and confidential.]

NEAR MEMPHIS, *March 10, 1864.*

DEAR GENERAL: I have your more than kind and characteristic letter of the 4th. I will send a copy to General McPherson at once.

You do yourself injustice, and us too much honor, in assigning to us so large a share of the merits which have led to your high advancement. I know you approve the friendship I have ever professed to you, and will permit me to continue, as heretofore, to manifest it on all proper occasions.

You are now Washington's legitimate successor, and occupy a position of almost dangerous elevation; but if you can continue, as heretofore, to be yourself—simple, honest, and unpretending—you will enjoy through life the respect and love of friends, and the homage of millions of human beings, that will award you a large share in securing to them and their descendants a government of law and stability.

I repeat, you do General McPherson and myself too much honor. At Belmont you manifested your traits; neither of us being near. At Fort Donelson also you illustrated your whole character; I was not near, and General McPherson in too subordinate a capacity to influence you.

Until you had won Donelson, I confess I was almost cowed by the terrible array of anarchical elements that presented themselves at every point, but that admitted the ray of light which I have followed since.

I believe you are as brave, patriotic, and just as the great prototype, Washington; as unselfish, kind-hearted, and honest as a man should be; but your chief characteristic is the simple faith in success you have always manifested, which I can liken to nothing else than the faith a Christian has in a Saviour. This faith gave you victory at Shiloh and Vicksburg. Also, when you have completed your best preparations, you go into battle without hesitation, as at Chattanooga—no doubts, no reserves; and I tell you it was this that made us act with confidence. I knew, wherever I was, that you thought of me; and if I got in a tight place you would come if alive.

My only points of doubt were in your knowledge of grand strategy and of books of science and history; but I confess your common sense seems to have supplied all these.

Now as to the future. Don't stay in Washington. Halleck is better qualified than you to stand the buffets of intrigue and policy. Come west; take to yourself the whole Mississippi valley. Let us make it dead sure, and I tell you the Atlantic slopes and Pacific shores will follow its destiny as sure as the limbs of a tree live or die with the main trunk. We have done much, but still much remains. Time and time's influences are with us. We could almost afford to sit still and let these influences work. Even in the seceded States your word now would go further than a president's proclamation or an act of Congress. For God's sake and your country's sake come out of Washington. I foretold to General Halleck before he left Corinth the inevitable result, and I now exhort you to come out west. Here lies the seat of the coming empire, and from the west, when our task is done, we will make short work of Charleston and Richmond, and the impoverished coast of the Atlantic.

Your sincere friend,

W. T. SHERMAN.

General GRANT.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,  
*Memphis, March 11, 1864.*

GENERAL: I arrived here yesterday. En route I met Captain Badeau, of General Grant's staff, who bore me two letters, copies of which I enclose herewith.

I answered both fully by General Butterfield, who left in a swift packet last evening, and will find General Grant in Washington, or wherever he may be.

I think General Grant is making a mistake in taking all the negro troops and marine brigade to cover plantations; or, in other words, that the plan of distributing these troops along the west bank of the river will be less effective than the plan I had initiated of defending the Yazoo and Washita rivers, which would cover the plantations from the rear. But this will manifest itself in time.

Please order General Hawkins and his brigade of blacks to reoccupy the west bank of the Mississippi in such manner as he deems best to protect the plantations and replace his troops at the bluff, or leave it vacant, as you may judge best.

I suppose Adjutant General Thomas is with you; and if so, confer with him and let him have the blacks, *i. e.*, all such as are not in actual occupation of the forts at Vicksburg and Natchez.

When the marine brigade returns from Red river, it also should receive orders as indicated by General Grant. In the meanwhile such of the marine boats as have not gone up Red river can cover the plantations from Vicksburg up as high as Greenville. I enclose herewith a letter for General Thomas, which you can read and cause to be delivered. \*

I have reflected on the proposition you made me before leaving Vicksburg, and will adopt it substantially. After you have satisfied yourself that no force but Jackson's cavalry followed us back to this side of Pearl river, you may furlough all your veterans and dispose the remainder as garrisons for Vicksburg and Natchez. Place good commanders at each place, then in person come to Memphis and give minute returns of each to General Hurlbut, whom we will leave to command the district of the Mississippi, embracing that of Memphis and Vicksburg, then proceed to Cairo, where you can leave some of your staff to receive and organize your veteran regiments as they return, when you may take a twenty (20) days' leave, getting back to Cairo in time to make two divisions of about ten thousand (10,000) men, which I will order up the Tennessee, and across from Savannah to Pulaski and Huntsville. I will give you four No. 1 divisions, and if times out here justify it, I will draw further to embrace General A. J. Smith's division.

I will leave Hurlbut here until you come up, and if the garrisons left at Vicksburg and Natchez seem small, I will instruct General Hurlbut to stop General Tuttle's division at Vicksburg, and bring General A. J. Smith here when the Red river trip comes out. I send this by a bearer of despatches, who will bring me your answers. I await them here. Make the figures as exact as possible.

I think General Hurlbut will be required, as commander on the river, to make his headquarters at Vicksburg. I want your opinion on this. I dislike to break up corps, but can't help it.

Truly your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding Department.*

Major General J. B. McPHERSON,

*Commanding Vicksburg.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,

*Memphis, March 11, 1864.*

DEAR GENERAL: I have a letter from General Grant of date March 4, a copy of which I send by bearer of despatches to General McPherson, and which is subject to your perusal. I have ordered General McPherson accordingly. I wanted to see you, and am sorry I missed you. I fear you think

I do not protect lessees of plantations. I know my action inland and the move up the Yazoo more effectually covered the east bank of the Mississippi river above Vicksburg than could have been done by ten thousand troops on its very banks.

I know also a similar disposition up the Washita would in like manner cover the west bank from Red river up to the Arkansas. I shall still advise the perfection of the plan. Osband's force at Skipwith's, and Hawkins's at Goodrich's, may have protected a radius each of say ten or fifteen miles, but no more; whereas by putting Hawkins's brigade at Haines's Bluff, with facilities for operating up Yazoo, and a similar brigade at Harrisonburg to manœuvre up Washita and Tensas, you can cover the river perfectly.

But I have ordered McPherson to put Hawkins's brigade west of the river to be disposed of according to your wishes, and he can add to Hawkins's command any other black troops not actually employed in the forts at Vicksburg and Natchez. He will also direct such of the marine brigade as are not up Red river to protect the river between Vicksburg and Greenville, to protect the planters and lessees, and when all the brigade of Ellet's is back, which will be in a month, they also will be devoted to the same end. As a speculation, this is a bad one. Every pound of cotton raised will cost the United States five hundred dollars, and so far as effect is concerned, it will not have one particle of effect on the main war.

As a matter of course I dislike to see such a mistake made at this period of the war, when we should at least have learned something by experience of our own. It would be far wiser to pension the lessees of the plantations.

In the end we must defend the Mississippi from the Yazoo and Washita, and if you agree with me, I will promise seven thousand (7,000) men on those rivers to cover and protect the plantations more perfectly than fifty thousand (50,000) could distributed along the banks of the Mississippi.

Since I sent up Yazoo not a shot has been fired from the east bank of the Mississippi; and now that Admiral Porter has taken Trinity and Harrisonburg, the same could be done west. Transfer the fighting to the Yazoo and Washita, and you have peace on the Mississippi; but leave them uncovered, and twenty guerillas will break up any plantation you establish. Nevertheless, I have instructed General McPherson to execute General Grant's orders, and when I meet General Grant I will explain to him what I was about.

I will await the return of this courier, and should like to hear from you. Then I must hasten to Huntsville to resume command of the army in the field. I will leave Hurlbut to command on the river with three (3) full divisions and the local garrisons of Memphis, Vicksburg and Natchez.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Brigadier General LORENZO THOMAS,  
*Adjutant General U. S. A., Vicksburg, Mississippi.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,  
*Memphis, March 11, 1864.*

SIR: I venture to address you on a point in which you may be disposed to differ from me.

Before marching from Vicksburg for Meridian, I detailed an expedition up the Yazoo to take advantage of the opportunity to inflict on that country a punishment merited for the connivance of its inhabitants in the attacks on the steamboats navigating the Mississippi river.

I ordered the commanding officer to bring to Vicksburg one thousand (1,000)

bales of cotton, to be deposited with your special agent at Vicksburg, coupled with the request that its proceeds should be applied to indemnify owners of steamboats in whole or part damaged by the public enemy.

I had no power over such agent, and I also knew that he had no right to make such a distribution, and only used the language to assure steamboat owners of my earnest desire to remunerate them, so far as it lies in my power, for damages sustained when in pursuit of a lawful commerce, and one which aids us materially in the exercise of the war power. The one thousand bales of cotton have been taken and are now in the hands of your special agents at Vicksburg, and I ask you to appropriate the proceeds of its sale to the purposes I have indicated. I know that such prompt indemnification will do good, more good than to throw the parties on Congress by way of petition for relief.

I contend that as a military commander I have a right by the laws of war, in no wise qualified by acts of Congress, to make similar acts of restitution in kind, but not in money. Thus, if a good, worthy Union man is robbed of his horse or his cotton because he is our friend, I contend I have a perfect right to take another horse or equivalent quantity of cotton from a confederate or accomplice of the robber or enemy and make immediate restitution. I have done so, and will continue to do so, for *that* is war.

Again, although the orders are that, when practicable, we shall aid the treasury agents to collect abandoned or enemy's property, when I find it resorted to to influence military movements, or to corrupt wagon-masters, steamboat agents, and even officers, I must check it, for the reason that war is the main object of our army, and anything that tends to corrupt it does more public harm than is compensated by the thing obtained. I make these general points because I know some of your agents regard me as hostile to their office. It is not so. My orders are clear and specific that officers and soldiers must leave all matters of trade to your agents. I don't want them to exercise a supervising or concurrent action. I want the army to be far above the contaminating influences of trade and gain. Let the merchant count his gain, but the soldier is lost if he dreams of a cent beyond his pay.

We are getting along well and fast enough in this quarter. Peace and prosperity exist wherever our foothold is secure, and each point is becoming the centre of an extending circle. I am willing to use commerce as a means to war, to corrupt and demoralize an enemy, to make him dependent on us, and to loosen his affection for the impoverished section to which he clings with a love which we should emulate. But our army must keep hands off. No fees, no gain, no association with contaminating trade, till war is over and peace supreme.

With great respect,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Hon. S. P. CHASE,  
*Secretary United States Treasury, Washington.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,  
*Memphis, March 14, 1864.*

DEAR GENERAL: I wrote you at length on the 11th by a special bearer of despatches, and now make special orders to cover the movements therein indicated. It was my purpose to await here your answer, but I am summoned by General Grant to be in Nashville on the 17th, and it will keep me moving night and day. I must rely on you. You understand that we must re-enforce the great army at the centre as much as possible, at the same time not risk any point on the Mississippi fortified and armed with heavy guns. I want you to push matters as rapidly as possible, and do all you can to put two handsome



divisions of your own corps at Cairo, ready to embark up the Tennessee by the 20th or 30th of April at the very furthest. I wish it could be done quicker, but these thirty-days furloughs in the States of enlistment, though politic, are very unmilitary. It deprives us of our ability to calculate as to time. But do the best you can. Hurlbut can do nothing until Smith returns from Red river and matters settle down, when I will order him to occupy Grenada temporarily, to try to get those locomotives that we need here. I may also order him with cavalry and infantry towards Tuscaloosa at the time we move from the Tennessee.

I don't know as yet the grand strategy, but on arrival at Nashville I will soon catch the points and advise you. Steal a furlough and run to Baltimore *incog.*, but get back and take part in the next move.

Write me fully and frequently of your progress. I have ordered the quartermaster to send as many boats as he can get to facilitate your movements. Mules, wagons, &c., can come up by transient boats.

I am truly your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General McPHERSON,  
*Commanding, &c., Vicksburg, Mississippi.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,  
*Memphis, Tenn., March 14, 1864.*

GENERAL: I am somewhat suddenly called by General Grant to Nashville. I must leave at once; and after full reflection on the state of affairs in the department since our Meridian trip, I am sure we can safely spare fifteen thousand (15,000) men from the river to re-enforce the army in the field, headquarters at Huntsville. I have, therefore, ordered General McPherson to assemble two divisions of his corps at Cairo, Illinois, ready for embarkation up the Tennessee, to join me at Huntsville; and, as you know, the fragment of Veatch's division is also in motion for the same destination. I leave you to command on the river, and, without disturbing the corps organizations, I give you command of all my troops on the river. You can make your headquarters anywhere you choose on the river, from Memphis to Natchez; but it may be Memphis, for the present, is best, on account of its proximity to Cairo, through which point all communications must pass.

I know, and you know, that the enemy cannot now maintain an army in Mississippi, and we also believe that the movement up Red river, now in progress, will extend our empire to the west.

I want you to make sure the defence of Memphis, Vicksburg, and Natchez against any possible contingency; to encourage and protect the navigation of the river; and lastly, to encourage the change in feeling towards us and our government by the citizens of West Tennessee and Mississippi. I do not mean by political combination and conciliation, but by the exercise of that power, strength, and confidence that indicates a permanent change in the affairs in this region.

Truly yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HURLBUT, *Memphis.*

I reached Nashville March 17, and found General Grant there busy in closing up his business preparatory to going to Washington. I accompanied him as far as Cincinnati, on the 19th, in order to confer with him fully on many

points he had not had time to write of. We parted at Cincinnati on the 22d, he for Washington and I for Nashville, where, on the 25th, I began a rapid inspection of our lines, beginning with Decatur, Alabama, and extending up to Knoxville, Tennessee. General McPherson had reached Huntsville, and had assumed command of the army of the Tennessee—right wing. Major General George H. Thomas was at Chattanooga, in command of the army of the Cumberland—centre; and General J. M. Schofield was at Knoxville, in command of the army of the Ohio—left wing. Returned to Nashville April 2, and the following letters passed:

[Original by mail; copy by telegraph, in cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, Tenn., April 2, 1864.*

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT, *Washington, D. C.:*

After a full consultation with all my army commanders, I have settled down to the following conclusions, to which I would like to have the President's consent before I make orders:

1st. Army of the Ohio, three divisions of infantry, to be styled the 23d corps, Major General Schofield in command, and one division of cavalry, Major General Stoneman, to push Longstreet's forces well out of the valley; then fall back, breaking railroad, to Knoxville; to hold Knoxville and Loudon, and be ready by May 1, with twelve thousand (12,000) men, to act as the left of the grand army.

2d. General Thomas to organize his army into three corps; the 11th and 12th to be united under General Hooker, to be composed of four divisions. The corps to take a new title, viz: one of the series now vacant. General Slocum to be transferred east, or assigned to some local command on the Mississippi. The 4th corps, Granger, to remain unchanged, save to place General Howard in command. The 14th corps to remain the same. Thomas to guard the lines of communication, and have, by May 1, a command of 45,000 men for active service, to constitute the centre.

3d. General McPherson to draw from the Mississippi the divisions of Crocker and Leggett, now *en route*, mostly of veterans on furlough, and of A. J. Smith, now up Red river, but due on the 10th instant out of that expedition, and to organize a force of thirty thousand (30,000) men to operate from Larkinsville or Guntersville as the right of the grand army; his corps to be commanded by Logan, Frank Blair, and Dodge.

I propose to put Newton, when he comes, at Vicksburg.

With these changes, this army will be a unit in all respects, and I can suggest no better.

I ask the President's consent, and ask what title I shall give the new corps of Hooker, in place of the 11th and 12th corps, consolidated. The lowest number of the army corps now vacant will be most appropriate.

I will have the cavalry of the department of the Ohio reorganize under Stoneman, at or near Camp Nelson, and the cavalry of Thomas, at least one good division, under Garrard, at Columbia.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, April 2, 1864.*

Major General SCHOFIELD, *Knoxville:*

Am back at Nashville. Telegraph me daily any matters of interest. I have asked the President the necessary authority to announce you as the commander

of the 23d corps. As soon as you can spare Stoneman, order him to go to Kentucky and assemble all the cavalry, mounted and dismounted, of your department at or near Lexington, and to put it in fine order, drawing supplies from Cincinnati and the country. Hovey marches to-morrow, and will report to you his progress. As soon as you can spare Thomas's troops, let them go below the Hiwassee, and keep yours above.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, April 2, 1864.*

Major General THOMAS, *Chattanooga* :

Am at Nashville. Have telegraphed to Washington for authority to make the changes we agreed on. To-night the railroad superintendent, (Anderson,) Colonel Donaldson, and I, will meet and arrange about the railroad management. I will also compel the beef contractor to drive cattle. Unless we devote the railroad solely and exclusively to the use of dead freight, we cannot accumulate the surplus required for our plans. Watch Joe Johnston close. Your weak point is Cleveland. As soon as Schofield can ascertain, certain, that Longstreet is no longer in force in East Tennessee, he will let your troops come below the Hiwassee. I will make the order the moment I hear from Washington.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, Tenn., April 2, 1864.*

General McPHERSON, *Huntsville* :

Am back to Nashville. Telegraph me daily anything of interest. I will give my personal attention to the question of accumulation of supplies. Have you made up your mind which is your best point—Huntsville or Decatur? I want to send Corse down the Mississippi to give life to Hurlbut's movements against Forrest. I want the regulars here as headquarters guard. I will assign Newton to you, with a view to his assignment to Vicksburg. I would not give orders about Forrest, who is in your department, only the matter involves Kentucky also. As soon as he is disposed of, I will leave all matters in your department to you. Veatch is posted near Purdy to cut off escape by the head of Hatchee. Hurlbut, with infantry and cavalry, will move towards Bolivar with a view to catch Forrest in flank as he attempts escape. Brayman will stop a few veteran regiments returning, and will use them out as far as Union City. If you will control the movements I will desist.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, April 2, 1864.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL, *Washington, D. C.* :

Inform the commander-in-chief that Schofield's infantry occupies Bull's Gap, and his cavalry is scouting beyond. The enemy is all beyond Jonesboro' and

probably beyond the Wautauga, having burnt both railroad and other road bridges, and carried off telegraph wire, but otherwise have not destroyed the railroad. I will not advance the infantry beyond Bull's Gap, as our line is now pretty long and weak.

General Schofield thinks Longstreet is gone to Virginia, leaving about three thousand five hundred cavalry to protect the salt works.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, April 3, 1864.*

Colonel S. G. HICKS, *Paducah* :—

Your defence of Paducah was exactly right. Keep cool and give the enemy a second edition if he comes again. I want Forrest to stay just where he is, and the longer the better. Don't credit any of the foolish and exaggerated reports that are put afloat by design. I know what Forrest has, and will attend to him in time. Whenever you get a chance, strike any small detachments.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[General Memoranda.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, April 3, 1864.*

1. The posts of Columbus, Cairo, and Paducah to be held in force, and mere excursions sent out to occupy the attention of Forrest.

2. General Veatch to occupy a point near Purdy and to strike Forrest in flank as he attempts to pass out.

3. General Hurlbut to operate from Memphis with his infantry and cavalry, guarding the passes of Big Hatchie and communicating with General Veatch.

4. General A. J. Smith to return from Red river, pause at Vicksburg to replenish supplies, and to push up Yazoo to Greenwood and Sidon, disembark, march rapidly on Grenada, and operate in Forrest's rear.

If Forrest is escaped, broken up or captured, all the troops to resume the *statu quo*, and General Smith to conduct his force by steady marches across to the Tombigbee and up to Decatur, Alabama, whence General Dodge will move out to meet him. General Smith to send word round by Cairo, giving his route of march and indicating the probable time of his arrival. This column to move light as to wagons and artillery, depending for forage, corn, meal and meat on the country, reckoning for supplies only at Vicksburg and Decatur; General Smith taking with him the two tried generals, Corse and Mower. If General Smith calls for cavalry, General Hurlbut will send as much as he can spare from Memphis, to meet him at some point of the Tallahatchie, and General Smith may call on the commanding general at Vicksburg for enough cavalry to serve as advance guard.

5. General Corse may order in my name any subordinate details to carry out these plans and the instructions of the commanding general.

Copies of this to be sent to Generals McPherson, Veatch, Brayman, Hurlbut and McArthur, and to the commanding officers at Paducah and Columbus, with express orders of secrecy.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, April 4, 1864.*

Major General MCPHERSON, *Huntsville* :

I will order the balance of Garrard's division of cavalry to rendezvous at Columbia. I wish you would keep scouts and mounted detachments well out to the Tennessee river, towards the mouth of Duck river. I don't care if Forrest does cross to this side, only we should have timely notice. I have sent down General Corse to communicate with Paducah, Cairo, Memphis and Vicksburg, and then to go on to Red river and bring A. J. Smith's command, by a route that will be indicated to you by a confidential messenger. This will divert from Vicksburg a part of your command which you may have designed to form a part of McArthur's command. If this be so, please arrange McArthur's division, so that the men now up Red river will belong to Crocker and Leggett. One division of the 16th and one of the 17th corps, with the black troops, must suffice to protect Memphis and Vicksburg, and the gunboats must keep the river clear. Forrest is supposed to be at Jackson, Tennessee, but I think he will try to get south as soon as possible.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, Tennessee, April 4, 1864.*

General BURBRIDGE, *Louisville* :

I do not believe the enemy will move far into Kentucky, through Pound Gap, unless as a cavalry raid. You should concentrate all your troops at Lexington, with cavalry well out to give notice. Grant designs a move in southwest Virginia which will check any such move, and by way of East Tennessee we can get to the rear of Pound Gap. Longstreet is reported as going back to Virginia, and would naturally send a small force through the gap to cover the movement. Forrest is now reported at Jackson, Tennessee. I have an infantry force at Purdy, and if Hurlbut acts with energy, Forrest will have trouble in getting out. You may send that Ohio regiment of cavalry to re-enforce General Sturgis. As soon as certain things are done in East Tennessee, General Stoneman will come to Kentucky. In the mean time you must collect all your detachments at some point near Lexington. In case of any formidable invasion of east Kentucky, we can call down from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois a large force of fur-loughed veterans, who could reach the threatened points sooner than troops could come from the front, where they are needed.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, Tennessee, April 4, 1865.*

GENERAL : Since my return to Nashville I have made the complete circuit, going with McPherson to Decatur, Larkin's Ferry, Chattanooga, and Knoxville. This enabled me to see all my corps and division commanders, and to learn the actual state of affairs. I have made few or no changes, but have suggested some by telegraph, a copy of which I enclose, as it is yet unanswered. I am sending all of Hovey's infantry to Schofield, to enable him to return to Thomas

Granger's troops that are properly his. I am assembling Garrard's division of cavalry on the right flank near Columbia, and will give Stoneman all the cavalry of Schofield's department, to organize in Kentucky, say near Lexington to move to the front when there is grass, and when I have forage enough at the front. At present the railroads supply bountifully the troops there, but make no surplus. I am making troops march, cattle do the same, and am cutting down sutlers, and private business, so as to gain cars for surplus stores and forage. I am endeavoring to persuade the railroad superintendent to run the cars in a circuit, so as to work as an endless chain, but the habit of running by a time-table is so strong that I find him disinclined. If I could see McCallum I could convince him that his present stock ~~could~~ do double the present work by making the round circuit by Stevenson and Decatur, all the cars running one way loaded, and bringing in the empty cars. I want to have on the line of the Tennessee by May 1 enough stores to enable me to move on, if General Grant so orders it.

To do this I calculate that Schofield should have twelve thousand (12,000) men; Thomas, forty-five thousand (45,000;) and McPherson, thirty thousand (30,000,) besides the railroad guards and depot garrisons. I propose that Schofield should be prepared to move from Cleveland, Thomas from Chattanooga, and McPherson from Gunter's Landing, on the Rome road; all my plans are subordinate to these general ideas.

Forrest got a severe rebuff by Hicks at Paducah, and still lingers somewhere between the Tennessee and Mississippi, and above the Hatchee. I want to keep him there awhile, when I hope to give him a complete thrashing. I order Paducah, Cairo, and Columbus to be held secure; have placed Veatch, with five regiments of infantry, at Purdy, and ordered Hurlbut, with all of Grierson's cavalry, and two thousand four hundred (2,400) infantry, to watch the line of the Hatchee, and to catch Forrest in flank as he attempts to pass out.

Last night I sent General Corse down the river in a steamboat, to touch at Paducah, Cairo, and Columbus, with orders and verbal explanations to all these commanders. He is then to push on to Memphis, explain the same to Hurlbut, and then hurry up the Red river to General A. J. Smith, and bring him with all despatch to Vicksburg, and up the Yazoo, and rapidly occupy Grenada. His appearance there with ten thousand (10,000) men, now hardened by our march to Meridian, and recent marching up the Red river, will be a big bomb-shell in Forrest's camp, should he, as I fear he will, elude Hurlbut. At Grenada Smith will do all the mischief he can, and then strike boldly across the country by Aberdeen, to Russellville and Decatur, there making his junction with McPherson. This with Crocker and Leggett's divisions, to rendezvous at Cairo after their furloughs, will make a large decrease of our Mississippi river forces, but I order McPherson to keep one white division at Vicksburg, and another at Memphis, which, with the black troops, the marine brigade, and the gunboats, should suffice to protect the river commerce; especially since we have so ruined Meridian that the enemy cannot supply an army near the river with either ammunition or provisions.

It is all nonsense about their repairing the break at Meridian. It is a simple impossibility. I would like to have General Grant's opinion as to this move of Smith's across from Grenada. I deem it safe, and its effects will in a measure compensate for the ill effects of Forrest's recent raid. With ten thousand (10,000) men, and two such dashing officers as Corse and Mower, A. J. Smith can whip all the cavalry and infantry (if any) in north Mississippi.

General Banks positively agreed with me that our troops should form a junction at Alexandria on the 17th of March. Mine were there on time, capturing Fort De Russey en route, and since it is reported they are up at Natchitoches, which is all right; but it seems Banks did not leave New Orleans till March 22. This is not right. This failure in time in conjoint operations is wrong,

because it endangers the troops that punctually obey orders. I suppose that Steele is moving on Shreveport with seven thousand (7,000,) and Banks with seventeen thousand (17,000.) These are enough to co-operate with the gunboats, and therefore I rightfully claim my ten thousand (10,000) with General A. J. Smith at the time agreed on, viz: thirty days after the time they entered Red river, which expires April 10, at which time General Corse should find them at Alexandria, and conduct them to their new field of operations. I will move heaven and earth to have my command ready for war as early in May as the furloughed men return, and this you can better expedite from Washington than I can from here. I will not bother the general at all, but will keep him well advised of all real movements. He must not be disturbed by the foolish rumors that will get into the newspapers, spite of all precautions.

Write me answers to my inquiries as early as possible, even if they have been answered by telegraph.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Brigadier General J. A. RAWLINS,  
*Chief of General Grant's Staff, Washington, D. C.*

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[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, Tennessee, April 4, 1865.*

General SCHOFIELD, *Knoxville:*

Your despatch received. I don't want your infantry to go beyond Lick creek. Our line is already too much drawn out, but with cavalry you can demonstrate as far as you please. If you can force the enemy to destroy Wautauga bridge, it will be a good thing. Don't destroy the railroad till I give you notice. I will arrange to give you plenty of time. Let Thomas have his troops as soon as you can safely do so, as I regard Cleveland as our weak point.

Hovey is marching to you with five thousand (5,000) infantry, and I will put five (5) new regiments of cavalry at Lexington for Stoneman as soon as possible.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[Confidential.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, Tennessee, April 5, 1865.*

DEAR COLONEL: Your letter of March 26 came to me on the 2d instant, and the mail brought me the map yesterday. The parcel had evidently been opened, and the postmaster had marked some additional postage on it. I will cause inquiries to be made lest the map has been seen by some eye intelligent enough to read the meaning of the blue and red lines. We cannot be too careful in these matters.

That map, to me, contains more information and ideas than a volume of printed matter. Keep your retained copies with infinite care, and if you have occasion to send out to other commanders any more, I would advise a special courier. From that map I see *all*, and glad am I that there are minds now at Washington able to devise; and for my part, if we can keep our counsels, I believe I

have the men and ability to march square up to the position assigned me, and to hold it. Of course, it will cost us many a hard day, but I believe in fighting in a double sense—first to gain physical results, and next to inspire respect on which to build up our nation's power.

Of course General Grant will not have time to give me the details of movement east, and the *times*. Concurrent action is the thing. It would be wise if the general, through you or some educated officer, should give me timely notice of all contemplated movements, with all details that can be foreseen. I now know the results aimed at; I know my base, and have a pretty good idea of my lines of operation. No time shall be lost in putting my forces in mobile condition, so that all I ask is notice of time, that all over the grand theatre of war there shall be simultaneous action. We saw the beauty of time in the battle of Chattanooga, and there is no reason why the same harmony of action should not pervade a continent.

I am well pleased with Captain Poe, and would not object to have half a dozen thoroughly educated young engineer officers.

I am, with respect, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Colonel C. B. COMSTOCK,  
*General Grant's Staff, Washington, D. C.*

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[Private and confidential.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*Washington, D. C., April 4, 1864.*

GENERAL: It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre. For your information I now write you my programme as at present determined upon.

I have sent orders to Banks by private messenger to finish up his present expedition against Shreveport with all despatch; to turn over the defence of the Red river to General Steele and the navy, and return your troops to you, and his own to New Orleans; to abandon all of Texas except the Rio Grande, and to hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand (25,000) men. To this I will add five thousand (5,000) from Missouri. With this force he is to commence operations against Mobile as soon as he can. It will be impossible for him to commence too early.

Gilmore joins Butler with ten thousand (10,000) men, and the two operate against Richmond from the south side of James river. This will give Butler thirty-three thousand (33,000) men to operate with; W. F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces, and Gilmore the left wing. I will stay with the army of the Potomac, increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five thousand (25,000) effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army wherever it may be found.

Sigel collects all his available force in two columns—one, under Ord and Averill, to start from Beverly, Virginia; and the other, under Crook, to start from Charleston on the Kanawha, to move against the Virginia and Tennessee railroad. Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about Saltville and move east from there to join Ord. His force will be all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand men of all arms.

You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up and to get



into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources.

I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply to lay down the work it is desirable to have done, and leave you free to execute in your own way. Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations.

As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he can. Gilmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the 18th instant, or as soon thereafter as practicable. Sigel is concentrating now. None will move from their places of rendezvous until I direct, except Banks. I want to be ready to move by the 25th instant if possible. But all I can now direct is that you get ready as soon as possible. I know you will have difficulties to encounter getting through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish it.

From the expedition from the department of West Virginia I do not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way I can take troops from there. With the long line of railroad Sigel has to protect he can spare no troops, except to move directly to his front. In this way he must get through to inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large force to prevent it. In other words, if Sigel can't skin himself, he can hold a leg whilst some one else skins.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,

*Lieutenant General.*

Major General W. T. SHERMAN,

*Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.*

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[Private and confidential.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*Nashville, Tennessee, April 10, 1864.*

DEAR GENERAL: Your two letters of April 4 are now before me, and afford me infinite satisfaction. That we are now all to act on a common plan, converging on a common centre, looks like enlightened war.

Like yourself you take the biggest load, and from me you shall have thorough and hearty co-operation. I will not let side issues draw me off from your main plans in which I am to knock Joe Johnston, and do as much damage to the resources of the enemy as possible. I have heretofore written to General Rawlins and Colonel Comstock, of your staff, somewhat of the method in which I propose to act. I have seen all my army, corps, and division commanders, and have signified only to the former, viz., Schofield, Thomas, and McPherson, our general plans, which I inferred from the purport of our conversations here and at Cincinnati.

First. I am pushing stores to the front with all possible despatch, and am completing the organization according to the orders from Washington, which are ample and perfectly satisfactory.

It will take us all of April to get in our furloughed veterans, to bring up A. J. Smith's command, and to collect provision, and cattle to the line of the Tennessee. Each of these armies will guard by detachments of its own their rear communications.

At the signal to be given by you, Schofield will leave a select garrison at Knoxville and Loudon, and with twelve thousand\* (12,000) men drop down to Hiwassee and march on Johnston's right by the old Federal road. Stoneman, now in Kentucky organizing the cavalry forces of the army of the Ohio, will operate with Schofield on his left front—it may be, pushing a select body of about two thousand (2,000) cavalry by Ducktown or Elijah and toward Athens, Georgia.

Thomas will aim to have forty-five thousand (45,000) men of all arms and move straight on Johnston, wherever he may be, fighting him cautiously, persistently, and to the best advantage. He will have two divisions of cavalry to take advantage of any offering.

McPherson will have nine divisions of the army of the Tennessee, if A. J. Smith gets in, in which case he will have full thirty thousand (30,000) of the best men in America. He will cross the Tennessee at Decatur and Whitesburg, march toward Rome and feel for Thomas. If Johnston falls behind the Coosa, then McPherson will push for Rome; and if Johnston then fall behind the Chattahoochee, as I believe he will, then McPherson will cross and join with Thomas. McPherson has no cavalry, but I have taken one of Thomas' divisions, viz., Garrard's, 6,000 strong, which I now have at Columbia, mounting, equipping and preparing. I design this division to operate on McPherson's right, rear or front, according as the enemy appears. But the moment I detect Johnston falling behind the Chattahoochee, I propose to cast off the effective part of this cavalry division, after crossing the Coosa, straight for Opelika, West Point, Columbus, or Wetumpka, to break up the road between Montgomery and Georgia. If Garrard can do this work good, he can return to the Union army; but should a superior force interpose, then he will seek safety at Pensacola and join Banks, or, after rest, act against any force that he can find east of Mobile, till such time as he can reach me.

Should Johnston fall behind Chattahoochee, I would feign to the right, but pass to the left and act on Atlanta or on its eastern communications, according to developed facts.

This is about as far ahead as I feel disposed to look, but I would ever bear in mind that Johnston is at all times to be kept so busy that he cannot in any event send any part of his command against you or Banks.

If Banks can at the same time carry Mobile and open up the Alabama river, he will in a measure solve the most difficult part of my problem—*provisions*. But in that I must venture. Georgia has a million of inhabitants. If they can live, we should not starve. If the enemy interrupt my communications I will be absolved from all obligations to subsist on our own resources, but will feel perfectly justified in taking whatever and whenever I can find.

I will inspire my command, if successful with my feeling that beef and salt are all that is absolutely necessary to life, and parched corn fed General Jackson's army once on that very ground.

As ever, your friend and servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT,  
*Commander-in-Chief, Washington D. C.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, April 11, 1864.*

GENERAL: Since my interview with you I have a letter from Grant, full, clear and explicit, which I well understand, but cannot now impart to you, but will in due time. The arrangements are begun, and the organizations are in exact accordance with the part assigned us, only the general fixes the time a little earlier than I did; yet I will risk my judgment that the time I named to you will be as soon as others will be ready.

Get your three corps well in hand, and the means of transportation as ready as possible. When we move we will take no tents or baggage, but one change of clothing on our horses, or to be carried by the men and on pack animals by company officers. Five days' bacon, twenty days' bread and thirty days' salt,

sugar, and coffee. Nothing else but arms and ammunition in quantity proportioned to our ability. Even this will be a heavy incumbrance, but is rather the limit of our aim, than what we can really accomplish. Draw your forces down from the direction of Knoxville, so as not to attract attention.

I read the reports of your scouts with interest. I usually prefer to make my estimate of the enemy from general reasoning, than from the words of spies or deserters. We will get prepared for the maximum force possible of the enemy. We must not be led aside by any raids. We will be much aided by a diversion in a different quarter, of which I prefer not to write, but may communicate by the first confidential opportunity.

Look well to our supply of beef cattle on the hoof and salt in large excess of the rations. Encourage drills by brigades and divisions, and let the recruits practice at the targets all the time.

Newton is still detained by sore eyes; keep a division for him, but in all else make up your organization to suit yourself and corps commanders. R. S. Gran-ger wants a leave—do you object? I suppose Rousseau could do district and post duty both.

Your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding Department of Cumberland.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, Tennessee, April 11, 1864.*

GENERAL: Yours of April 8 is received. Slocum's assignment to Vicksburg was made at Grant's suggestion. I did name Newton, having in mind his engineering qualities, but General Grant feared Newton might entertain a natural prejudice against the negro element which will hereafter enter so largely into the means of defence to the river.

Veatch's withdrawal from Purdy makes Forrest's escape from the trap in which he caught himself easy and certain; but if you have at Cairo anything that could go up the Tennessee, and move inland on Jackson or Paris even, it would disturb Forrest more than anything Hurlbut will do from Memphis. I take it Forrest is now scattered, some of his men on furlough, and at mischief, stealing horses and recuperating. He may cross over the Tennessee into Kentucky or Tennessee, but I don't care if he does. Should he break the railroad between this and Louisville it would not bother us, for we have vast supplies here; and if he comes over to the neighborhood of Pulaski or Columbia, we will give him more than he expects.

As our great problem is to whip Joe Johnston, we want a surplus of our best troops on the line of the Tennessee. When that is done, we can give more attention to the Mississippi as against the small bands that threaten it. Surely there is now nothing there that can touch Memphis, Vicksburg or Natchez, and it will not be long before Banks will turn against Mobile, when the confederates must look to the safety of their own lines on the Alabama.

Give your chief thoughts to the making up of your army of the Tennessee and getting everything necessary to make the move from your present line on Rome and the Coosa. You will have the longest marches, and it may be the hardest knocks, but you have the elements of the best kind. You will have nine (9) divisions, averaging from four to five thousand (4 to 5,000,) viz: Harrow's, Smith's (Morgan L.,) Osterhaus' (in which is Chas. R. Wood, a magnificent officer,) and Jno. E. Smith, composing the 15th corps, (Logan's,) Veatch, Sweeny, and A. J. Smith, under Dodge, and Crocker and Leggett under Frank Blair.

I am told that Blair will soon leave Washington. I wrote him he would be wanted by April 20, at Cairo; you may telegraph him.

You had better begin moving up to Clinton your regiments and wagons as fast as they accumulate at Cairo. You can get steamers plenty at Cairo and St. Louis.

Grant says he will be all ready April 25, and when he moves we must. Thomas and Schofield are progressing well in their preparations.

Your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General JAMES B. McPHERSON,  
*Comm'dg the Department of the Tennessee, Huntsville, Ala.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, Tennessee, April 12, 1864.*

DEAR GENERAL: Yours of March 30, from Natchez, is received, and I take pleasure in answering. I confess I fear to enunciate any plan that can reconcile all objections; but am willing to say that I will use all my official power and influence to carry out yours or that of the War Department. My objections to the plantation scheme are purely military. The Mississippi is a long, weak line, easily approached from the rear. Plantations of, say, three whites and fifty blacks to a mile of river, can be broken at any point by a guerilla band of one hundred with perfect impunity. You and I know the temper of the whites in the south.

I heard a young lady in Canton, educated at Philadelphia, who was a communicant of a Christian church, thank her God that her negroes, who had attempted to escape into our lines at Big Black, had been overtaken by Ross's Texas brigade, and killed. She thanked her God, and did so in religious sincerity. Now, a stranger to the sentiment of the south would consider this unnatural, but it is not only natural but universal. All the people of the south, old and young, rich and poor, educated and ignorant, unite in this, that they will kill, as vipers, the whites who attempt to free their slaves, and also the "ungrateful slaves" who attempt to change their character from slave to free.

Therefore, in making this change, which I regard as a decree of nature, we have to combat not only the organized resistance of the confederate forces, but the prejudices of the entire people of the south. I would prefer much to colonize the negroes on lands clearly forfeited to us by treason, and for the government to buy or extinguish the claims of other and loyal people in the districts chosen. I look upon the lands bordering the Mississippi, Steele's bayou, Deer creek, Sunflower, Bogue Phaliah, Yazoo, &c., in that rich alluvial region lying between Memphis and Vicksburg, of which Haines's Bluff, Yazoo City, and Grenada are the key points, as the very country in which we might collect the negroes, and where they will find more good land already cleared than in any district I know of, and it would enable the negroes at once to be useful.

If, however, the government prefer the "lessee" system, then I shall favor the occupation, by a black brigade, of Harrisonburg, and cover as well as may be the Mississippi country lying between the Washita and Yazoo. General Slocum will soon come down, and we believe he will co-operate with you with his whole heart. Of course, the possession of Vicksburg is a *sine qua non*. We don't want the task of taking it again; but if he can spare troops he will be instructed, in connexion with Natchez, to hold Harrisonburg, with one or more gunboats up the Washita and Tensas.

Steele is ordered to hold the line of Red river, but I must have Smith's command, which I loaned for but thirty (30) days, and I have reason to know that Banks must swing over against Mobile, so Steele will have only his Arkansas

command, and that may be insufficient; of this we cannot judge until we know what is already done. If Shreveport be taken before these orders reach Steele, he may hold that point; otherwise, all he should attempt would be Alexandria, in connexion with the gunboats.

We have, sure enough, a big job on hand, and the only way is to go on trusting to consequences, following naturally grand results. Lee and Johnston must be whipped, and it should not be deferred an hour beyond the first possible practicable moment.

I necessarily write in some haste, but you will catch the drift of my argument.

With respect, your friend and servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General LORENZO THOMAS,  
*Adjutant General U. S. A., Vicksburg, Mississippi.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, Tennessee, April 14, 1864.*

DEAR GENERAL: I send you a parcel of papers of the latest dates from the south. You will find them interesting. One set of my former scouts is just in from Memphis; having come from Memphis, Holly Springs, Pontotoc, Aberdeen, Columbus, Mississippi; Selma Montgomery, Opelika, West Point, and Columbus, Georgia; thence back to Selma, and up the railroad to Talladega, Jacksonville, and Blue mountain. The enemy is collecting at a place near Centreville, a camp to which Loring's division is to come from Demopolis. This force will be behind the Coosa, and is clearly designed by Johnston to watch McPherson as he advances against Rome. Forrest still is up between the Tennessee and the Mississippi, and is reported to-day crossing the Tennessee at Hamburg, also attacking Columbus. I admire his great skill, but he can't do all that. I am willing he should continue to attack our forts, and he may also cross the Tennessee. We have plenty of stores here; also we are pushing them to the front as fast as possible. I will not let Forrest draw off my mind from the concentration going on.

Longstreet is represented still up about Bristol and Abingdon, but I don't believe he will move into Kentucky by Pound Gap—road too bad and long. He may send some cavalry in, but he doesn't probably know that he can't interrupt our communications; because if the Louisville road is reached by a dash, we are not disturbed; and then for him to get out would be a question.

All well with us. I await McPherson's two divisions on furlough, and A. J. Smith from Red river.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

General RAWLINS,  
*Chief of Staff, Washington.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, Tennessee, April 13, 1864.*

General THOMAS, *Chattanooga:*

Continue to send me reports of scouts and rebel newspapers. Yours are most interesting. Two (2) of mine are in from Memphis, having come from Holly Springs, Pontotoc, Aberdeen, Columbus, Selma, Montgomery, West Point, back to Selma, up to Talladega and Blue mountain. The enemy is collecting a cavalry

force at Blue mountain, which is about twenty-five miles from Gadsden, on account of forage which comes up the railroad from Selma and Talladega; and it is believed that Loring's division is ordered to the same point from Demopolis. Johnston doubtless is trying to make up a force to watch that flank, which he must observe is being threatened by McPherson. Forrest is reported again to be attacking Columbus, Kentucky, and also trying to cross the Tennessee near Hamburg. He seems to be omnipresent, but I think his cavalry is scattered over between the Mississippi and the Tennessee stealing horses and feeding them. I would as lief have him there as anywhere else now. Newton is here and will come forward to-morrow. Keep a good division for him.

Keep on collecting your command, as we arranged, and unload your cars as fast as possible. I will push forward stores as fast as possible.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, April 18, 1865.*

General Grant has made the following orders:

He has ordered three regiments from St. Louis to Cairo, with which to re-enforce Paducah, Cairo, and Columbus, and to feel out to Union City. Union City must not be garrisoned, but simply visited by scouts and patrols.

As soon as possible, a division or strong brigade of McPherson's command, due from furlough about the 20th instant, General Gresham, if possible, will hasten up the Tennessee, leave its wagons and incumbances at Clifton, but proceed to Savannah and scout across by Purdy to the head of the Hatchee.

General Slocum has gone to Vicksburg to assume command there, and General Sturgis has started this morning to assume command of all the cavalry at and near Memphis, with which he will sally out and attack Forrest, wherever he may be. General Grierson may seize all the horses and mules in Memphis to mount his men, and be ready for the arrival of General Sturgis; and Buckland's brigade of infantry should be ready to move out with the cavalry. Mower's division, now at Red river, will be detained at Memphis on its way up the river, and A. J. Smith will come, as ordered, up the Tennessee. General C. C. Washburne is ordered to Memphis, and General Hunt to Columbus. General Hurlbut will take post for the present at Cairo, and Hicks remain in command at Paducah.

All the troops along the Mississippi must act with vigor against any portion of the enemy within reach. Paducah, Cairo, Columbus, Memphis, Vicksburg, and Natchez must be held, and all minor points exposed should be evacuated.

The troops at Memphis should act by land; those at Vicksburg should operate up Yazoo, at Yazoo city, and threatening Grenada.

All former orders will be modified to suit this general plan.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

General MCPHERSON, *Huntsville.*

General HURLBUT, *Memphis.*

General BRAYMAN, *Cairo.*

General SLOCUM, *Vicksburg.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, Tennessee, April 19, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have read with interest General Geary's report and your indorsements. With all the facts before me, especially the complete details of the facts given by your scouts, I have no doubt that Johnston's main army is on the

railroad at or near Dalton; that it is about forty thousand (40,000) strong, well commanded, and in good order, but it cannot move many days' march, except along the line of that road, front and rear; that he has a good force of cavalry, one part of which is kept to his right rear for food, and that another part, say four thousand (4,000) men, are on his left, over about the Blue Mountain depot, for the same purpose, and to watch the assemblage of the army of the Tennessee, which he knows threatens his left flank, and which has two good bridges with which to pass the Tennessee at pleasure. This cavalry, with some infantry supports, are seen often at Larkins's and at Decatur, and some skirmishing has been carried on with them, but we want to mask our force by the Tennessee till the right time. Of course, then, McPherson can sweep them from his front as a cob-web.

At Blue Mountain depot this cavalry gets corn, which is sent up from the line of the railroad and Selma, and this point is the present terminus of that railroad.

It is ten (10) miles south of Jacksonville, which is twenty-two (22) miles east by south of Gadsden, which is full forty-five (45) miles from Guntersville, the nearest point of the Tennessee. I have no apprehension of a raid on our right, for the reason that the enemy cannot pass the Tennessee, save at isolated points, and then only in small parties; besides, the stream of troops soon to come up the Tennessee from Cairo, and across to Huntsville, from Savannah and Clifton, will serve to cover that flank. Still we must push our measures to accumulate a surplus of all essentials to the front, so that a temporary interruption will not cripple us or delay our general plans, which remain unchanged.

The only real move I see for Joe Johnston is to strike your line at his nearest point, about Cleveland or Ooltewah, but this he cannot reach without first fighting the Ringgold force. I advise you to group your commands so as to admit of easy and rapid concentration at such point as your judgment approves, and be careful not to accumulate stores anywhere but inside of Chattanooga.

The season is now mild, and even surplus tents and all useless baggage should thus be placed, that the troops in camp could pack up and move at the shortest notice. Study all means to save wagons and transportation at all events till our advance passes the Coosa.

Please continue as heretofore the scout reports. I have two smart girls who have just come in from Memphis via Okalona, Columbus, Selma, Montgomery, West Point, back to Selma, up the railroad to Talladega, and Blue mountain, whence they crossed on foot by way of Gadsden, Black river, Will's creek, Tower creek, and Larkin's. They saw little or no infantry, and the only cavalry they saw was at the Blue mountains, and close up to the Tennessee river.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

Major General THOMAS,  
*Commanding Department of the Cumberland, Chattanooga.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
Nashville, April 19, 1865.

GENERAL: I received a despatch from General Grant asking me if the report that Johnston was sending off Hardee's corps was true. I have answered that Thomas thinks not. You know how easy such reports get currency. I have read every official report from all quarters very carefully, and the only one which even hints at such a thing is one from Thomas, the words of a deserter taken down by the usual provost marshal, under date of April 15, that there

was a camp rumor in Johnston's camp when he left that Hardee's corps was to be sent to Virginia, but subsequent reports describe minutely the position and strength of the rebel army as unchanged since you left, save that a heavy cavalry force is being collected near the Coosa, abreast of Guntersville, evidently for the purpose of watching McPherson; although I have daily the reports of thousands and tens of thousands marching and raiding all round the compass, yet I have now scouts in from Memphis who bring in passes and papers from Selma, Montgomery, West Point, Opelika, and Talladega, and from them I learn that things remain as above.

Thomas is gradually drawing down his command to a common focus, Chattanooga. Schofield has infantry force at Bull's Gap and a small cavalry force beyond, but is preparing to have about twelve thousand (12,000) infantry near Hiawassee at the time appointed, May 1, with his cavalry under Stoneman, remounting and refitting as fast as possible, near Lexington, Kentucky, whence at the right time I will move them to the Hiawassee.

McPherson has Decatur well fortified, and is examining the river carefully to ascertain the best point to cross over. He is still in doubt whether Guntersville or Whitesburg be the place. But one or the other is, and our bridges at Larkin's can on a short notice drop down. This will give him two good points of invasion. I am doing all I can to get forward the necessary stores, and more still to diminish the useless mouths that eat up our substance,

I enclose you two orders which are preliminary, but I am resolved, when General Grant gives the word, to attack Johnston in the manner I have heretofore described, if our men have to live on beef and salt. They will do it, if necessary, we know. As long as cavalry officers can let their horses run down to get a remount by a mere requisition, they will bankrupt any government. Grierson had seven thousand (7,000) horses when I made up the Meridian count, and Smith and he reported the capture of some four thousand (4,000) animals, and yet now the reason for not attacking Forrest is, that he can only mount two thousand four hundred (2,400) men. Even with that he should have attacked the enemy at Somersville, as it was then known Forrest was up about Paducah with a considerable part, and what was at Somersville was of course only a part, and should have been fought at all odds. At Memphis are Buckland's full brigade of splendid troops, (2,000;) three other white regiments, one of black artillery, at Fort Pickering, 1,200 strong; about one thousand (1,000) men floating, who are camped in the fort; near four thousand (4,000) black troops, three thousand (3,000) enrolled and armed militia, and all Grierson's cavalry, ten thousand nine hundred and eighty-three (10,983) according to my last returns, of which surely not over three thousand (3,000) are on furlough. Out of this a splendid force of about two thousand five hundred (2,500) well mounted cavalry and four thousand (4,000) infantry could have been made up, and by moving to Bolivar, could have made Forrest come there to fight or get out.

I have sent Sturgis down to take command and whip Forrest, and, if necessary, to mount enough men to seize any and all the horses of Memphis, or wherever he may go.

The forces of Fort Pillow are not on my returns. I broke it up, and the garrison was composed of a regiment of Tennesseans, enlisting, and four companies of blacks, of which I have no satisfactory report as yet, but have sent for full details.

I think everything hereabouts is working as well as I can promise, and if A. J. Smith is coming, and McPherson's two furloughed divisions reach us, I will be ready at the drop of a hat to cross the Tennessee and pitch in.

I sent for the governor of Kentucky, and he is well satisfied with all the steps taken, and undertakes by his militia and the troops now controlled by Burbridge to catch the wandering guerillas and keep peace in his State. But we



are independent of Kentucky, for there are here now all the essentials for an army of eighty thousand (80,000) men for six months. Railroad accidents are still happening, but as seldom as we could expect.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General JOHN A. RAWLINS,  
*Chief of Gen. Grant's Staff, Washington, D. C.*

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[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, Tennessee, April 20, 1865.*

Lieutenant General GRANT, *Washington :*

These are copies of my latest despatches from Chattanooga and Knoxville:

[From Knoxville, April 19, 1865.]

Major General SHERMAN:

I have information this evening that Longstreet's three divisions of infantry have gone east as far as Lynchburg; the last left Bristol on Wednesday, the 13th instant. My informant is a man who was employed on the railroad, and went from Bristol to Lynchburg on the 13th and returned on the 14th. He is believed to be loyal and truthful. Reports from other sources also corroborate this statement. Vaughn's cavalry brigade, from eight hundred to fifteen hundred strong, moved, at about the same time, from Kingsport towards North Carolina, by the road leading up the Watauga. This leaves the force in southwest Virginia little more than that which was recently driven through Pound Gap by Colonel Gallop. From all the information obtained while in command here, I estimate the effective strength of Longstreet's three divisions at twelve thousand five hundred (12,500.) General Foster's estimate was somewhat larger. I state this as it may be of importance to General Grant in Virginia at this time.

J. M. SCHOFIELD, *Major General.*

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[From Chattanooga, April 19, 1865.]

Major General SHERMAN:

There is no foundation for the report that Johnston is re-enforcing Lee. One of my most reliable men reports as follows: Dalton, April 12.—No change at Dalton. Resaca, April 15.—No change at Resaca or Dalton. Trains full of soldiers going and coming on furlough. Resaca, April 18.—No change in Dalton. Wash. Johnson and command left here for Dalton at 10 a. m. this morning; four hundred (400) Florida troops took their places. A large number of wagons, loaded with crackers at Calhoun, have been waiting orders some few days.

Besides the above-mentioned man, I have by the way of others who visit Dalton at least once a week each. They all confirm what he says regarding the position of the enemy there.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
Nashville, April 23, 1865.

General McPHERSON, *Huntsville* :

We must make calculations, leaving A. J. Smith out. Banks cannot spare him, as I feared.

Hurry up the two divisions from Cairo, and get ready as soon as possible, for I think Grant is pushing matters. I have news from Dalton to the 20th. A part of Polk's troops have arrived there.

We must not allow our chief attention to be drawn towards Mississippi, as that is what the enemy wants.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General*.

[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
Nashville, April 23, 1865.

General McPHERSON, *Huntsville* :

Colonel Comstock is here from General Grant, and we may have to move sooner than we are ready, but we can go as far as the Coosa. I will throw forward provisions enough to load your wagons, and they can be replenished at Ringgold.

If we move before Crocker gets up I will require you to move by Lebanon and Chattooga, to communicate with Thomas at Lafayette and Villanow. But I will write at length. If we move by May 1, the divisions at Scottsboro, Larkin's, and Woodville should cross at Larkin's. Dodge's force and Garrard should cross at Decatur and move to Guntersville, and a junction made at Lebanon. I do not propose to cross the Coosa till all are up, but we will gain time by a move in concert with Grant.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General*.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES IN THE FIELD,  
Culpeper C. H., Va., April 19, 1864.

GENERAL : Since my letter to you I have seen no reason to change any portion of the general plan of campaign, if the enemy remain still and allow us to take the initiative. Rain has continued so uninterruptedly until the last day or two that it will be impossible to move, however, before the 27th, even if no more should fall in the mean time. I think Saturday, the 30th, will probably be the day for our general move.

Colonel Comstock, who will take this, can spend a day with you, and fill up many a little gap of information not given in any of my letters.

What I now want more particularly to say is, that if the two main attacks, yours and the one from here, should promise great success, the enemy may, in a fit of desperation, abandon one part of their line of defence and throw their whole strength upon a single army, believing that a defeat with one victory to sustain them is better than a defeat all along their line, and hoping, too, at the same time, that the army, meeting with no resistance, will rest perfectly satisfied with their laurels, having penetrated to a given point south, thereby enabling them to throw their force first upon one and then on the other.

With the majority of military commanders they might do this. But you have had too much experience in travelling light and subsisting upon the country to be caught by any such ruse. I hope my experience has not been thrown away. My directions, then, would be, if the enemy in your front show signs of joining Lee, follow him up to the full extent of your ability. I will prevent the concentration of Lee upon your front if it is in the power of this army to do it.

The army of the Potomac looks well, and, so far as I can judge, officers and men feel well.

Yours, truly,

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

Major General W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.*

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[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, April 23, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD, *Knoxville :*

Colonel Comstock is here from General Grant. We may have to begin quite as soon as I first estimated, May 1. You will commence at once to break up railroad above Bull's Gap and either bend and twist the bars or carry them to Knoxville, and move down the infantry force about the Hiwassee. Stoneman will be able to overhaul us before we will need the flanking force.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher letter.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, April 24, 1865.*

General THOMAS, *Chattanooga :*

You may be as severe as possible with citizens who smuggle themselves into the cars. All are prohibited from going. I have more than doubled the number of cars per day. Yesterday we got off one hundred and ninety-three cars.

If you send a staff officer I will send you copies of General Grant's letters. They embrace the points of mine. Time is nearly up, and you cannot have your preparations too far advanced. For the first week out we will need but few wagons.

As McPherson will not have A. J. Smith's division, and some of his fur-  
loughed regiments will be late, you had better make ready with every man you can take along, and as McPherson's detachments come up your surplus forces can be sent back. I will come down as soon as possible.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, April 25, 1865.*

GENERAL : I have received your several despatches and letters touching the check on railroad travel. I have ordered the quartermaster to check the tendency of our military railroads sliding into a public convenience, but to keep it just as he would a train of army wagons. Nobody should travel in the cars

save officers and soldiers under orders entitling them to transportation. I left him to ease off by sending only such as were caught away from home by the change. I think it will in time come out all right. If we allow conductors to collect money we know they will little by little pick up way-travellers for their own profit. We have not the system of checks that would enable us to detect speculation and fraud. The officers of the army of the Tennessee have complained bitterly that in all matters pertaining to the railroad they were slighted, and there were some grounds, not intentional on your part, but calculated to raise a prejudice, that after they had come to the relief of the army of the Cumberland they were denied bread or any facilities from the road. Some even thought you shared this feeling, and had refused them even a passage to or from Nashville.

This resulted from the fact that the conductors and your guards were familiar with your passes, and were not with those of Logan or other commanders of that wing. This made my transportation order manifestly just, putting all department commanders on a just equality.

We have increased the daily cars from about eighty (80) to from one hundred and thirty (130) to one hundred and ninety (190.) If I can get the average to one hundred and fifty (150) the road will supply us, and make an accumulation. I wish you to increase the facilities for throwing stores forward to Ringgold, as McPherson, Schofield, and you will have to draw from that common depot. All I can now hope for is to get McPherson to Lafayette, or thereabouts, with twenty (20) days' bread, salt, &c., from Guntersville.

McPherson's two divisions are not yet at Cairo, and in many cases the furloughs were dated after a long delay in the State waiting for payment, so that I can't even tell when they will be up to Clifton; but we are pushing as hard as possible. I want McPherson to have thirty thousand (30,000) men, independent of Garrard's cavalry; but if we can't get these two divisions in time, his force will fall far short. As he and Schofield cover your flanks, I want to make your force as heavy as possible as far out as Dalton, Resaca, and Kingston. By that time we will have a better knowledge of what we will need, and can trim down and send back such as should remain to guard your rear. The only danger I apprehend is from resident guerillas, and from Forrest coming from the direction of Florence. I did want A. J. Smith on the Tennessee, about Florence, to guard against that danger, but Banks cannot spare him, and Grant orders me to calculate without him. General Corse is here from Red river. The battle up Red river resulted thus wise: The advance cavalry, incumbered with wagons, met the enemy in position four miles from Mansfield, where the road forks to Texas. Lee, who commanded the cavalry, sent back for supports. A brigade of infantry was sent, but both cavalry and infantry were driven back in disorder. Another brigade sent forward shared the same fate, the enemy pursuing struck Franklin, who held them till night. Next day A. J. Smith got up, and a hard fight ensued on the 9th, extending into night. Our troops had the advantage, but in the night both armies retired—ours forty miles back to Grand Ecore; and the enemy discovering first our retrograde, took advantage of it. So they have the victory. They took all the wagons of the cavalry, over two hundred, (200,) and some eighteen guns, two of which were recovered.

Banks was refitting on the 14th at Grand Ecore, preparing to advance. Nothing from Steele, who, at that date, should have been, near Shreveport, on the north and east bank of the river.

I am quite uneasy about Steele, as the movement up Red river has been so slow that all the Texas and Louisiana forces are assembled, and having defeated Banks, may turn against Steele; but still I hope Banks will not pause, but resume his march, and prevent Kirby Smith from crossing to the north side of Red river. Our joint forces are far superior to those of the enemy, and we have also the gunboats and transports in Red river.

The best fighting was evidently done by my troops, and Admiral Porter writes me that A. J. Smith's command saved Banks's army from utter rout. Banks should have seventeen thousand, (17,000,) Steele seven to nine thousand, (7 to 9,000,) and Smith ten thousand, (10,000.)

The joint force of the enemy is reckoned at twenty-five thousand, (25,000.) Grand Ecore is the river town of Natchitoches, a little back from Red river, but on one of the roads leading to Shreveport, and about forty (40) miles from Natchitoches.

I will be with you by May 1.

Truly, yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Major General GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding Department of the Cumberland, Chattanooga.*

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[Confidential.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, April 16, 1864.*

GENERAL: I telegraphed you last night that Colonel Comstock had come from General Grant with a letter, that he, General Grant, would be ready by the 27th to take the initiative, if in the mean time Lee did not, and, of course, he wants me to act at the same time; but Colonel Comstock tells me he does not think General Grant can do anything till May 2.

Of course the movement in Virginia is the principal, and ours is secondary, and must conform. We must be as far ready as possible.

First. Give Generals Slocum and Washburne orders to seem most active, to hold there all the enemy possible, even at a small risk to the river, for if we whip Joe Johnston good, everything lying west will feel the blow.

Second. Do all that is within the power of mortal to get up your two divisions from Cairo, with wagons, beef cattle, &c. I will write to Lieutenant Commander Shirk, United States navy, to watch the Tennessee, all that is possible, to prevent any damage to our roads from that quarter.

Third. You should at once move your effective force of the 15th corps to the neighborhood of Larkin's, or wherever you propose to cross the Tennessee, to be ready to move on Lebanon. Dodge's command should cross at Decatur, and brush away that cavalry, and move on Gunter'sville and Lebanon. From Lebanon your army should move as light as possible by Summerville or other good route toward Lafayette or Villanow, to communicate with Thomas. From Lafayette you can renew your supply of bread, salt, sugar, and coffee from Ringgold, to which point we have cars. We are accumulating stores as fast as possible at Chattanooga. If you can start with twenty days' supply, it is all that I now expect. I will explain to Comstock, and send word to General Grant how important it is that we should have the two divisions now at Cairo, and on furlough, and have him correspond by telegraph with them at Cairo, and judge when they can reach your right flank *via* Clifton.

You should have a force of about thirty thousand, (30,000,) exclusive of Garrard's cavalry, which will remain with your extreme right till we are beyond the Coosa, when it must strike for the Montgomery and Atlanta roads.

I think I understand the cavalry force in front of Dodge; it is a detachment from Joe Johnston, sent there to watch your operations; but the moment you cross the Tennessee in force, it will hasten to cover Rome and watch Johnston's left flank and rear.

The worst that we have to apprehend is, Forrest may come across to act

against our right flank; but this would be prevented if Washburne and Slocum threaten Grenada. I take it for granted that, unless Banks gets out of Red river and attacks Mobile, (which is a material part of General Grant's plan,) we will have to fight Polk's army as well as Johnston's. General Corse has returned. Banks would not spare Smith; indeed, it appears that Smith's force is the real substance of his army. He was whipped near Mansfield and retreated to Grand Ecore, forty miles, though Banks claims a victory; but from what General Corse tells me he might have made it a victory by going ahead, but by retreating he left the enemy in possession of wounded, dead, artillery, and trains; and worse, leaves Steele in danger. General Banks writes me that all is well there, but facts do not sustain him.

General Prince will go to Columbus, and you had better give Washburne command of all the river from Cairo down, to include the Memphis district. Grant thinks him a man of action. I will send your pontoon train down, and I think you had better have it at Scottsboro', with orders to follow as soon as facts demonstrate that Johnston will not fight us this side of the Coosa. Until that fact is demonstrated we should be as little encumbered as possible.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General J. B. McPHERSON,  
*Commanding Department of the Tennessee, Huntsville.*

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[Confidential.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, Tennessee, April 24, 1864.*

GENERAL: I now have a messenger out from General Grant, which convinces me that the army of the Potomac, from its shorter lines and superabundant supplies, will be ready sooner than we; but let come what may, we must attack Joe Johnston in position, or force him back of Coosa, at the moment the initiative is made in the east. I prefer that Johnston should not move at all, but receive us on his present ground. But I do not propose rushing on him rashly until I have in hand all the available strength of your, Thomas's, and McPherson's armies.

Supplies are the chief trouble; but if the worst comes to the worst, we can live on beef and salt, with such bread as our road ought to carry for us to Ringgold.

Of course there remains now in East Tennessee no rebel force that can come down on our flank that could seriously endanger us moving forward from Chattanooga; but I wish you to dispose your command to guard against that chance. Destroy a considerable section of the railroad above Bull's Gap, bending and twisting the rails or carrying them to Knoxville.

Leave Knoxville and Loudon well guarded, and assemble your effective force near Charleston on the Hiwassee, prepared by May 1, if possible, to move in concert with Thomas down by way of Varnell's station direct on Dalton.

Order Stoneman to move by the best route available to him so as to report to you. If Johnston refuses us battle, this cavalry will be sent by way of Spring Place, or it may be higher up by the copper mines, to threaten the enemy's right rear.

Order all your forces in Kentucky to be most active, even to feel out through Pound Gap into the valley beyond. I have no apprehension of the enemy interfering with our lines of communication in Kentucky, because we have here in Nashville the essential supplies for six months. Those in the western part of Kentucky ought to watch well the line, and to arrest all suspicious men hang-

ing about who have no honest employment; precaution may save us temporary annoyance. Such men are not prisoners of war, but simply men held by us rather than incur the risks of their mischievous acts.

It is useless for us to expect the new cavalry from Indiana. We cannot mount even the veteran cavalry, which should, of course, have precedence.

I will be at Chattanooga about May 1.

Truly yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General Commanding.*

Major General J. M. SCHOFIELD,

*Commanding Department of the Ohio, Knoxville.*

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[Confidential.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, Tennessee, April 24, 1864.*

GENERAL: I now have, at the hands of Colonel Comstock, of your staff, the letter of April 19, and am as far prepared to assume the offensive as possible. I only ask as much time as you think proper, to enable me to get up McPherson's two divisions from Cairo. Their furloughs will expire about this time, and some of them now should be in motion for Clifton, whence they march to Decatur to join on to Dodge.

McPherson is ordered to assemble the 15th corps near Larkin's, and to get Dodge and Blair at Decatur at the earliest possible moment; and from these two points he will direct his forces on Lebanon, Summerville, and Lafayette, where he will act against Johnston if he accept battle at Dalton, or move in the direction of Rome, if he give up Dalton, and fall behind the Oostanaula or Etowah. I see there is some risk in dividing our forces; but Thomas and Schofield will have forces enough to cover all the valley as far as Dalton; and should Johnston turn his whole force against McPherson, the latter will have his bridge at Larkin's, and the route to Chattanooga *via* Wills's valley and the Chattanooga creek; and if Johnston attempt to leave Dalton, Thomas will have force enough to push on through Dalton to Kingston, which would checkmate him. My own opinion is, Johnston will be compelled to hang to his railroad, the only possible avenue of supply to his army, estimated at from forty-five to sixty thousand (45 to 60,000) men.

At Lafayette all our armies will be together, and if Johnston stands at Dalton we must attack him in position. Thomas feels certain that he has no material increase of force, and that he has not sent away Hardee, or any part of his army. Supplies are the great question. I have materially increased the number of cars daily. When I got here they ran from sixty-five (65) to eighty (80) per day. Yesterday the report was one hundred and ninety-three (193,) to-day one hundred and thirty-four (134,) and my estimate is one hundred and forty-five (145) per day will give us daily a day's accumulation.

McPherson is ordered to carry in wagons twenty (20) days' supplies, and rely on the depot at Ringgold for the renewal of his bread ration. Beeves are now being driven to the front, and my commissary, Colonel Beckwith, seems fully alive to the importance of the whole matter.

Our weakest point will be from the direction of Decatur, and I will be forced to risk something from that quarter, depending on the fact that the enemy has no force available with which to threaten our communications from that direction.

Colonel Comstock will explain much that I cannot commit to paper.

I am, with great respect,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Lieutenant General GRANT,

*Comm'dg Armies of the United States; Culpeper, Va.*

[Confidential.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, Tennessee, April 24, 1864.*

GENERAL: I had the honor to receive yesterday, at the hands of General Corse, your letter of April 14, from Grand Ecore, and was glad to hear the specific account of your affairs up Red river.

We had become quite anxious from confused and conflicting accounts sent by the busy correspondents who always exaggerate things, good or bad.

I was and am disappointed, as I do sadly need that command of General A. J. Smith's, but I see that you could not spare it at that moment. I hope you pushed on at once, as otherwise the enemy must surely have availed themselves of the tempting opportunity to fall on Steele.

We have no later dates of any of our Red river forces than those brought by General Corse. I had a message from General Grant last night, and we must all soon pitch in, and, for weal or woe, battles must ensue more bloody than any which have heretofore characterized this war.

I hope you will soon finish up that job, and turn your attention to a more important work; but you are so far away that I can make no calculation upon your forces.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General N. P. BANKS,  
*Commanding Department of the Gulf, Red River.*

[Confidential.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, Tennessee, April 24, 1864.*

DEAR GENERAL: General Corse has returned. He brought no letter from you, but gave good accounts of you and your troops. I had hoped, from the rapid work you did up to Alexandria, that the whole expedition would go on in like manner. I want your command, but of course you could not leave under the circumstances by which you were surrounded on the 14th of April. General Corse says that in the second day's fight at Pleasant Hill the enemy were beaten and were retreating. I cannot understand why our army retraced its steps to Grand Ecore, when it was so important in time, in distance, more especially as Steele was known to be approaching from the north. But all will be explained in time. I have simply ordered that when you do come out of Red river, that Mower's division remain at Memphis, and yours come round by Cairo, and up the Tennessee to Clifton, and thence across to Decatur; but as time and circumstances may change, I will have orders meet you at Memphis. General McPherson now commands the department, and all our attention is engaged in the awful responsibilities that rest on us here. General Grant has ordered that Steele command on Red river, and he must order things according to the result of your expedition. I was in hopes it would have been made more rapidly, so that those troops could have taken part with us in the events soon to transpire.

You will, as soon as you can possibly be spared, come to Memphis, where orders will meet you.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Brigadier General A. J. SMITH,  
*Commanding Detachment on Red River.*



[Cipher.]

CULPEPER, *April 25—11.30 a. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Will your veterans be back to enable you to start on the second of May? I do not want to delay later.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

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[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, April 25, 1865.*

General THOMAS, *Chattanooga :*

General Grant telegraphs me to be ready May 2. Make dispositions accordingly. McPherson is least ready.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, April 25, 1864.*

General MCPHERSON, *Huntsville :*

General Grant telegraphs me to be ready by May 2. We cannot wait for the veterans. It may be well for your whole column to move from Scottsboro'. They could be moved to that point by rail. The two divisions expected up from Cairo would cover that flank and guard the roads, or join you *via Chattanooga*. Make every possible preparation.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, April 25, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD, *Knoxville :*

General Grant telegraphs me to be ready by May 2. Make preparations accordingly. Order Stoneman forward with all the cavalry that is ready ; the rest can follow.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, April 27, 1864.*

Lieutenant General GRANT, *Culpeper :*

In view of the fact that I will have to take the initiative with twenty thousand less men in McPherson's army than I estimated, I intend to order all

McPherson's disposable force, twenty thousand, (20,000,) and Garrard's cavalry, five thousand, (5,000,) to Chattanooga, to start from a common centre. I go forward to-morrow.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Nashville, April 27, 1864.*

GENERAL: General McPherson is now here, and on consultation, taking into consideration all the facts known to me of the strength and position of the enemy, we have concluded that McPherson's troops can reach their position at and near Lafayette more expeditiously by Chattanooga than by the contemplated road by Decatur, Gunter's, and Lebanon.

It is very desirable that the whole army should be at and in front of Chattanooga by May 5th. You may therefore put in motion your cavalry that is mounted and equipped, with the wagons needed for efficient action, and the rest as fast as horses are received, leaving, as heretofore arranged, your dismounted men at Columbia and along the road.

General Rousseau will send a regiment to hold the road down as far as Pulaski. Enough horses are now on hand to increase your mounted force to five thousand (5,000.) With these I want you at Chattanooga about the 5th of May; and as there is no necessity of your moving with Dodge, you can select your own route, and move by brigades and regiments as you please. On arrival at Chattanooga, take position near the extreme right of the whole army.

General McPherson will see you to-morrow. These orders may seem to you a little sudden, but are made necessary by orders from General Grant.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Brigadier General GARRARD,  
*Commanding 2d Division Cavalry, right wing.*

CULPEPER, VA., *April 28, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

Get your forces up so as to move by the fifth (5th) of May.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Chattanooga, Tennessee, April 29, 1864.*

General GRANT *Culpeper, Va.:*

I am here. Thomas is already in position. Schofield will be by May 2d; and McPherson is marching for Lafayette *via* of this place. All my effective cavalry is heading for Dalton, and I will be all ready by May 5th. I will write you fully to-night.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Chattanooga, April 29, 1864.*

General McPHERSON, *Huntsville, Ala.:*

Put everybody in motion at once for Chattanooga by roads north of the Tennessee, according to the figures we agreed on, viz: ten thousand of the 15th corps and ten thousand of the 16th corps and Garrard's cavalry. I have a despatch from General Grant wanting me to be all ready by May 5th. You know how I like to be on time. A steamboat has gone to Larkins' for the bridges. Make your orders for the two divisions at Cairo and Clifton as full as possible, and when all things are working well, come up.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Chattanooga, April 29, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD, *Knoxville, Tenn.:*

General Grant gives me to the 5th to be ready. I will expect your quota at or near Charleston by May 2d, where I will come to see you or get you to come here in person. Keep your movements from the press as much as possible. Let the enemy find out our movements through their own spies, not ours. Thomas is all right and McPherson is coming.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Chattanooga, April 29, 1864.*

General McPHERSON, *Huntsville, Ala.:*

General Grant wants me to be all ready by the 5th of May. To accomplish this the 15th corps could March here by that date, but we would have to push up Dodge's command in cars, leaving the wagons to follow and overtake them at some point to be hereafter fixed. Therefore order Dodge's march by roads that will carry them near the railroad. The cavalry must of course come all the way by the common road.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Chattanooga, April 29, 1864.*

General McPHERSON, *Huntsville, Ala.:*

I approve your suggestion as to the evacuation of Decatur, but it should only be as an alternative at the last moment. If it be possible to get any of the

Clifton force I would prefer to hold Decatur, as it is a constant threat to "north Alabama."

It is desirable to keep the rebel cavalry there as long as possible, and I would risk something. It is there merely to watch you.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Chattanooga, April 30, 1864.*

General GRANT, *Culpeper:*

I have news from Atlanta 24th, and Dalton 27th. Some of Polk's troops have arrived. By the fifth all of Thomas's and Schofield's troops will be within one march of Dalton, and I doubt not McPherson will be on time. All things working as smoothly as I could expect.

Rosecrans holds some of the Memphis dismounted cavalry to guard against some secret plot in St. Louis. I think the city police and militia could attend to all such machinations and leave us all our troops at this critical time.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Chattanooga, May 1, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD, *Charleston, Tennessee:*

Make all the preparations for your command to move to Cleveland and Red Clay. Run down to see me for a few hours, and we will go over all the maps and papers. Send orders for Stoneman and all your detachments to follow you, and get all your fighting force close in hand to move *via* Cleveland, Red Clay, &c.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Chattanooga, May 1, 1864.*

Hon. JAS. GUTHRIE,

*President Louisville and Nashville Railroad, Louisville, Kentucky:*

I am aware of the diminution of your stock, and only ask that you do all that is possible: the next ten (10) days will be the test. We have enough stores at Nashville. We prefer veterans to new troops. Allen might send some of the latter around by boats up the Cumberland.

I ask that you do the best possible with your facilities to forward veterans, whose absence breaks up regiments and brigades. I think the emergency would warrant the stoppage of all civil business for ten (10) days. Every car and every locomotive south of Nashville is busy. I think you should keep your repair shops busy night and day. The business of your road will double and quadruple as the Cumberland falls, and your road can well profit by the fact by enlarging its capacity.

McCallum is doing all that is possible to increase the stock, but the numerous smashes-up of trains consume cars and locomotives faster than he can get new ones.

A long pull and a strong pull may carry us over this tide; after which I hope all will be well.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Chattanooga, May 1, 1864.*

General GRANT, *Culpeper, Virginia:*

Schofield is now at Charleston, and will move to Cleveland. Thomas will concentrate at Ringgold, and McPherson's troops are all in motion towards Chattanooga, and by May 5th I will group them at Rossville and Gordon's Mills. The first move will be: Thomas, Tunnel Hill; Schofield, Catoosa Springs, and McPherson, Villanow. Next move will be battle.

I have Atlanta dates 29th of April. Enemy has a general idea of our plans, and are massing about Richmond and Dalton. Nothing new in the papers, except that General Polk reports, under date Demopolis, 23d April, that Wirt Adams had captured and burned a gunboat at Yazoo City, taking on shore eight 24-pounder guns. Weather fine; roads very good.

I leave John E. Smith's division at Huntsville and Decatur till Blair gets there with the 17th corps, when I will bring forward more men, according to the issues of our first battle. A good deal of the enemy's cavalry is hanging about north Alabama, and McPherson is uneasy about Decatur; but we must risk something. I have removed the bridge at Larkin's, and will try and get one of the new gunboats to patrol the river from Bridgeport down.

Thomas is here, but we will all go out on the 5th. I will expect further notice from you, but will agree to draw the enemy's fire within twenty-four hours of May 5th.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Chattanooga, May 2, 1864.*

General McPHERSON, *Huntsville, Alabama:*

Colonel McCallum is now here. I have arranged for him to bring forward Sweeny's command of five thousand (5,000) men from Larkinsville, at eight (8) a. m., on Wednesday, 4th instant, and Veatch's command of five thousand (5,000) from Woodville at the same hour. Let them be there accordingly. Bring by cars one (1) battery per division and one wagon per regiment, if possible; also, horses for field officers; five (5) days' rations. All else to follow by the road.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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CULPEPER, *May 2, 1864—3 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN, *Chattanooga, Tennessee:*

Move at the time indicated in my instructions; all will strike together.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieut. General.*

[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Chattanooga, May 2, 1864.*General GRANT, *Culpeper, Virginia :*

Despatch of to-day received; all right; we will be on time.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Chattanooga, May 4, 1864—8.45 a. m.*General GRANT, *Culpeper, Virginia :*

Thomas has just started for Ringgold; all his command will be there to-night. Schofield is at Cleveland, moving down to Red Clay, and closing on Thomas's left. McPherson is here, and by night three divisions will be at Rossville; the other two will be there to-morrow, and all move to Thomas's right.

Thomas will have forty-five thousand (45,000;) Schofield thirteen thousand (13,000;) McPherson twenty thousand (20,000.)

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*CLEVELAND, *May 4, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

I go to Red Clay this afternoon. Will have my troops all there to-morrow, except those from Kentucky, and will be ready to move on the morning of May 6, 1864.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Chattanooga, May 4, 1864.*General THOMAS, *Ringgold, Georgia :*

Dodge's two divisions are coming in by the cars. Logan's three divisions are closed up on Geary, who is crossing the mountain at Whitesides, the Coal Mines, Trenton, and Dug Gap, to Lafayette, there to join McPherson.

We are one day behind time, but I will get McPherson to Gordon's Mills before we make any real demonstration. In the mean time get your troops well into position.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*RINGGOLD, *May 4, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Your two despatches of this evening are received. My troops are all in position now, with the exception of Geary's division, and that will be up to-morrow.

GEO. H. THOMAS, *Major General.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Chattanooga, May 5, 1864.*A. LINCOLN, *President of the United States, Washington, D. C.:*

We have worked hard with the best talent of the country, and it is demonstrated that the railroad cannot supply the army and the people too. One or the other must quit, and the army don't intend to, unless Joe Johnston makes us. The issues to citizens have been enormous, and the same weight of corn or oats would have saved thousands of the mules, whose carcasses now corduroy the roads, and which we need so much.

We have paid back to Tennessee ten for one of provisions taken in war. I will not change my orders, and I beg of you to be satisfied that the clamor is partly humbug, and for effect; and to test it, I advise you to tell the bearers of the appeal, to hurry to Kentucky, and make up a caravan of cattle and wagons and come over the mountains by Cumberland Gap and Somerset, to relieve their suffering friends, on foot, as they used to do before a railroad was built. Tell them they have no time to lose. We can relieve all actual suffering by each company or regiment giving of their savings. Every man who is willing to fight and work gets a full ration, and all who won't fight or work should go away, and we offer them free passage in the cars.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Chattanooga, May 5, 1864.*General THOMAS, *Ringgold, Georgia:*

I will be out to-day; Schofield is at Red Clay; McPherson's head of column will be at Gordon's Mills to-night; everything is moving well.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Ringgold, Ga., May 5, 1864—7½ p. m.*General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

Telegraph to General Grant that I am here, and we have advanced our lines three (3) miles to-day. McPherson is one day behind. I will attack Tunnel Hill on Saturday, and in the mean time will occupy Johnston's whole attention.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher despatch.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Ringgold, Ga., May 5, 1864—7½ p. m.*General McPHERSON, *Chattanooga, Tenn.:*

Am here. Thomas has advanced his line three (3) miles. I want you all up at Gordon's Mills by to-morrow night. Don't leave Chattanooga till I give you full orders.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

CHATTANOOGA, May 5, 1864.

Major General SHERMAN, *Ringgold, Ga.:*

Despatch received. Dodge's command, I presume, is well down towards Gordon's Mills to-night. I have not heard from him yet. Harrow's division is encamped near Rossville. Morgan L. Smith is in Lookout valley, and Osterhaus just behind him.

J. B. McPHERSON,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Ringgold, Ga., May 5, 1864.*

SIR: The position of our troops to-morrow night, the 6th instant, will be: Schofield at Red Clay, you at Ringgold, and McPherson at Gordon's Mills.

The plan of action will be: You move in force on Tunnel Hill; secure it and threaten Dalton in front, but do not attack its defences until further orders, unless the enemy assume the offensive against either of our wings, when all must attack directly in front towards the enemy's main army, and not without orders detach to the relief of the threatened wing. At the time you move against Tunnel Hill, McPherson will move to Ship's Gap and Villanow, and secure possession of Snake Creek Gap, from which he will operate vigorously against the enemy's flank, or line of communications between Tilton Station and Resaca. I want you with cavalry or infantry to feel well up Dog Wood valley, and communicate with McPherson at Villanow.

Trains likely to embarrass our movements should not be taken east of Taylor's ridge till we have observed the effect of these first movements.

I expect to be all ready to move on Saturday, and wish you to make all preparations accordingly.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General THOMAS,  
*Comd'g Army of the Cumberland, Present.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Ringgold, Ga., May 5, 1864.*

GENERAL: The enemy still lies about Dalton, seemingly on the defensive, his preparations being mostly against our approach from the north and west. I wish to give him little time for preparations and to assume the offensive on Saturday.

Thomas will move straight on Tunnel Hill; McPherson will move from Gordon's mills, via Rocky Spring, to Ship's Gap and Villanow; thence he will occupy Snake Creek Gap, and from that point operate on the enemy's flank if in motion, or against the railroad at some point between Tilton and Resaca.

I want you to keep up communication with Howard, and as he moves toward Tunnel Hill you move on Varnell's Station, inclining to your right so as to hold the road between Varnell's and Catoosa Springs. If you have reason to apprehend encountering a force superior to your own, you can cross the hills to your right and make for Catoosa. As you perceive I do not propose to attack Dalton from the north, but the west and south, therefore the movements should continue to Varnell's except with almost a certainty of the case I make of a superior force there.

Keep your columns as light as possible, your wagons over towards Parker's Gap, till the issue of the first battle is determined.



As soon as Tunnel Hill is secured to us, I shall pause to give McPherson time for his longer march, but we must occupy the attention of all the enemy lest he turn his whole force on McPherson, which must be prevented. Therefore on the sound of heavy battle always close up on Howard and act according to circumstances. We will not be able to detach to McPherson's assistance, but can press the enemy so close from this direction that he cannot detach but a part of his command against him.

I have reason to believe Johnston has sent most of his cavalry to north Alabama; but still you should guard against a cavalry sweep on that flank, which can best be done by keeping your columns compact.

I am, with much respect, yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General Commanding.*

Major General SCHOFIELD,

*Commanding the Army of the Ohio, Red Clay, Georgia.*

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#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Ringgold, Georgia, May 5, 1864.*

SIR: The enemy still lies about Dalton, and from all appearances is on the defensive, guarding approaches mostly from the north and west. He occupies in some force the range of hills known as the Tunnel Hill.

By to-morrow night our forces will be about as follows: Schofield at Red Clay; Thomas at Ringgold, his left at Catoosa Springs, centre at Ringgold, and right (Hooker) near Wood's Station, and you at Gordon's Mills.

If you are all ready, I propose on Saturday morning to move against the enemy—Thomas directly on Tunnel Hill; Schofield at Varnell's, and the gap between it and Catoosa Springs, feeling towards Thomas. Hooker will move through Nickajack Gap on Trickum and threaten the road which runs from Buzzard Roost to Snake Creek Gap. As these are in progress, I want you to move via Rock Spring and Tavern road to the head of Middle Chickamauga, then to Villanow, then to Snake Creek Gap, secure it, and from it make a bold attack on the enemy's flank, or his railroad, at any point between Tilton and Resaca.

I am in hopes that Garrard's cavalry will be at Villanow as soon as you, for you know I have sent General Corse to meet him at Shell Mound and conduct him across the mountain to Lafayette and to you. But in any event his movement will cover your right rear, and enable you to leave all encumbrances either at Ship's Gap or at Villanow, as you deem best. I hope the enemy will fight at Dalton, in which case he can have no force there that can interfere with you; but should his policy be to fall back along his railroad, you will hit him in flank. Do not fail in that event to make the most of the opportunity by the most vigorous attack possible, as it may save us what we have most reason to apprehend, a slow pursuit, in which he gains strength as we lose it. In either event you may be sure the forces north of you will prevent his turning on you alone. In the event of hearing the sounds of heavy battle about Dalton, the greater necessity for your rapid movement on the railroad. If broken to an extent that would take them some days to repair, you can withdraw to Snake Creek Gap and come to us, or await the development according to your judgment, or the information you may receive.

I want to put this plan in operation, beginning with Saturday morning if possible.

I am, with great respect,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General Commanding.*

Major General J. B. MCPHERSON,

*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Ringgold, Georgia, May 6, 1864—8½ a. m.*

Meet one of my staff officers at Gordon's Mills this evening at sundown. I will send written orders and want a written reply.

Get your troops to Gordon's to night and be ready to move via Rocky Spring and the Tavern road to-morrow. I am not afraid of your not having wagons enough—I fear too many.

I have just heard that Steele's trains in Arkansas have been captured, and now I hope he will go ahead.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

General McPHERSON,

*Chattanooga, Tennessee.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Ringgold, Georgia, May 6, 1864*General McPHERSON, *Commanding Army of the Tennessee :*

GENERAL : I have been to Catoosa Springs and have seen all of Thomas's command. It will move on Tunnel Hill to-morrow. General Schofield will move down to near Varnell's.

I want you to-morrow night about the head of Middle Chickamauga, near the word "Gordon," on the Tavern road, about the intersection of the Gordon Spring Gap road with the main road lying along the west base of Taylor's ridge. Next day at Villanow and Snake Creek Gap. Hooker to-morrow will be through Nickajack Gap, about Trickum, and will control the road from Buzzard Roost to Villanow. Thomas will have Tunnel Hill. I have dates from Dalton of the 4th. Johnston is there expecting our attack from the north. Let me hear from you as often as possible.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE TENNESSEE,

*In the field, Ringgold, Georgia, May 6, 1864.*

GENERAL : The general commanding directs me to say to you that he has sent Major McCoy, A. D. C., to General Schofield, with instructions similar in general design as those given you under date of last night, and also has sent Captain Audenreid to General McPherson at Gordon's Mills with like general instructions, and that he wants you to move with your force against the enemy upon Tunnel Hill at sunrise on the 7th, (to-morrow.)

He will accompany you during the operations.

Respectfully, yours,

L. M. DAYTON, A. D. C.

Major General GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Commanding Army of the Cumberland, Ringgold, Georgia.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Ringgold, Georgia, May 6, 1864—9 $\frac{3}{4}$  p. m.*

GENERAL: The general-in-chief directs me to say that he has received full and satisfactory replies from General McPherson and General Schofield, in answer to his letters of instruction given this day and last night, and given substantially to you verbally and otherwise to-day. Both are in the positions indicated for them and are fully ready to take the positions assigned for them to-morrow, viz: General McPherson near Ship's Gap, and General Schofield between Catoosa Springs and Varnell's.

I am, general, with much respect, yours truly,

L. M. DAYTON, A. D. C.

Major General GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Commanding Army of the Cumberland, Ringgold, Georgia.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Tunnel Hill, Georgia, May 7, 1864—11 $\frac{1}{2}$  a. m.*

Major General SCHOFIELD, *Near Catoosa Springs:*

We are in possession of Tunnel Hill with little or no resistance. I do not propose any more to-day, as we must give time to McPherson. Hooker should be at Trickum. Let your men bathe and rest. If your cavalry can hold Varnell's it is well, but don't risk much on that flank. The tunnel is not injured. I will send you orders for to-morrow later in the day. Study well the lay of the country and roads; especially see if Rocky Face ridge can be reached from your position.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Tunnel Hill, May 7, 1864—2 p. m.*

General SCHOFIELD, *Near Catoosa Springs:*

Thomas took Tunnel Hill with scarcely any opposition. I have been all over it. It is a strong ridge, not as high as Taylor's, and looks right towards the break of Rocky Face ridge, through which pass the rail and common roads. In this gorge is the Buzzard Roost, which is the place where Johnston expects to fight us. To-night McPherson will be at Ship's Gap, and next day should strike or threaten the railroad. To-morrow I want to occupy all of Johnston's attention. Thomas will threaten in front. I want you to hold well the gap towards Varnell's, and reconnoitre up the point of Rocky Face, near Lee's, on the ridge towards Buzzard Roost.

If possible, get some point where you can see Dalton, and I want to guard against the possibility of Johnston's turning on McPherson. Hooker is about Trickum. Reconnoitre the ridge to-night, and make a lodgement to-morrow morning, but don't be drawn into a battle.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

*Memorandum of movements for May 8, 1864.*HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Tunnel Hill, Georgia, May 7, 1864.*

General Thomas to threaten the Buzzard Roost Pass; to occupy in force the Tunnel Hill ridge, the roads leading from Buzzard Roost towards Trickum and Catoosa, also to keep up communication with Villanow; the threats on Buzzard Roost not to lead to a battle unless the enemy comes out of his works; to get, if possible, a small force on Rocky Face ridge.

General Schofield to occupy the gap at Lee's and Varnell's, and to feel from Lee's along down Rocky Face to the enemy's signal station, if possible.

General McPherson to move through Villanow and to occupy Snake Creek Gap to its strongest point, and to get up Garrard's cavalry, if possible, for the next day's work.

If the enemy leave Buzzard Roost Gap, General Thomas will follow direct, and General Schofield through Lee's Gap towards Dalton, on the east side of Rocky Face ridge, viz., by Crow's Valley.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Tunnel Hill, Georgia, May 8, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

Despatch of to-day received. Am delighted at the arrangement, and it shall receive my most hearty concurrence. I will telegraph very full to General Canby to-day at Cairo.

I have been all day reconnoitring the mountain range, through whose gap the railroad and common road pass. By to-night McPherson will be in Snake Creek Gap threatening Resaca, and to-morrow all will move to the attack. Army in good spirits and condition. I hope Johnston will fight here, instead of drawing me far down into Georgia.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Tunnel Hill, Georgia, May 8, 1864.*

Major General CANBY,

*Commanding Division of West Mississippi, Cairo, Illinois:*

I am rejoiced that you are to command west of the Mississippi, and will heartily concur in anything that you may undertake.

A. J. Smith has his own division and the fragments of two others. I am willing you should have Smith permanently, but the other fragments should be sent to McPherson as soon as you can spare them. The garrisons of Columbus, Kentucky, Memphis, Tennessee, Vicksburg and Natchez, Mississippi, will be instructed, through General McPherson, commander of that department, to co-operate in anything you may undertake.

I can give you but little information, as Steele's reports are very meagre, and Banks does not report to me. Arkansas is the field of danger, and you should

hasten there to see General Steele. His wagons having been captured by the enemy, he will need more; but unless you have the control of the resources of Missouri and Kansas, you may not be able to cover them against raids. The firm possession of Alexandria and Little Rock would prevent the passage of the enemy to Missouri, but each point should be strong enough to act offensively. I would have no hesitation in seizing any horses and mules in the country and subsisting on the country, unless the people prevent raids and small guerilla operations. We must, of course, provide against organized armies, but can hold the country people responsible for the acts of guerillas. Such towns as Monroe, Alexandria, and Natchitoches should be held responsible for attacks on boats; for if they fire on boats with women and children in, we can fire and burn houses with women and children.

At Memphis and Helena you will get all the information possible of the state of affairs since I left.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Tunnel Hill, Georgia, 8 p. m., May 9, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.:*

We have been fighting all day against precipices and mountain gaps to keep Johnston's army busy, whilst McPherson could march to Resaca to destroy the railroad behind him. I heard from McPherson up to two (2) p. m., when he was within a mile and a half of the railroad. After breaking the road good, his orders are to retire to the mouth of Snake Creek Gap, and be ready to work on Johnston's flank in case he retreats south. I will pitch in again early in the morning. Fighting has been mostly skirmishing, and casualties small. McPherson has the army of the Tennessee, twenty-three thousand (23,000,) and only encountered cavalry, so that Johnston did not measure his strength at all.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Tunnel Hill, Ga., May 10, 1864—7 a. m.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

I am starting for the extreme front in Buzzard Roost Gap, and make this despatch that you may understand Johnston acts purely on the defensive. I am attacking him on his strongest fronts, viz., west and north, till McPherson breaks his line at Resaca, when I will swing round through Snake Creek Gap and interpose between him and Georgia. I am not driving things too fast, because I want two columns of cavalry that are rapidly coming up to me from the rear—Stoneman on my left and Garrard on my right; both due to-day. Yesterday I pressed hard to prevent Johnston detaching against McPherson, but to-day I will be more easy, as I believe McPherson has destroyed Resaca, when he is ordered to fall back to the mouth of Snake Creek Gap and act against Johnston's flank when he does start. All are in good condition.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Tunnel Hill, May 10, 1864.*

GENERAL: I think you are satisfied that your troops cannot take Rocky Face Ridge, and also the attempt to put our columns into the jaws of Buzzard Roost would be fatal to us.

Two plans of action suggest themselves:

1st. By night to replace Schofield's present command by Stoneman's cavalry, which should be near at hand, and to rapidly move your entire army, the men along the base of John's Mountain by the Mill Creek road to Snake Creek Gap, and join McPherson, while the wagons are moved to Villanow. When we are joined to McPherson, to move from Sugar Valley on Resaca, interposing ourselves between that place and Dalton. Could your army and McPherson's surely whip Joe Johnston?

2d. I cast loose from the railroad altogether and move the whole army on the same objective point, leaving Johnston to choose his course.

Give orders for all your troops to be ready with three days' provisions, and to be prepared to march to-night. I expect to hear from McPherson and Schofield as to their situation, also as to the near approach of Stoneman. He was at Charleston yesterday, and is apprized of the necessity for haste. Do you think any danger to McPherson should make us delay one day?

Please give me the benefit of your opinion on these points.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General THOMAS, *Present.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*Tunnel Hill, Ga., May 10, 1864.*

GENERAL: Keep your entire command ready to move to this place. McPherson did not break the railroad, although he reached Resaca, which he found fortified and manned. I may make one or two moves, and either or both very sudden, take up my whole command and move to Resaca, or leave you here with Stoneman's cavalry at the point now occupied by you, to cover this narrow outlet, and with Thomas to issue on the east of Rocky Face, at Sugar Valley, and interpose between Johnston and his base. The latter I prefer. If possible, hurry Stoneman, and write me your opinion.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SCHOFIELD,  
*Rocky Face, &c.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Tunnel Hill, May 10, 1864.*

GENERAL: I propose to leave hereabouts one (1) of your corps, say Howard's, the cavalry of Colonel McCook, and the cavalry of General Stoneman, to keep up the feint of a direct attack on Dalton through Buzzard Roost, as long as possible, and with all the remainder of the three armies to march to and through Snake Creek Gap, and to attack the enemy in force from that quarter.

You may at once commence the necessary preparations, and give orders that the force left here is to be under the command of the senior officer, who will strip his command light, sending all spare wagons to Ringgold; that the cars

run daily to this point with daily supplies, but the main stores to be at Ringgold; that the cavalry watch well the passes north of Tunnel Hill, and at Ray's Gap, and that in case the enemy detect the diminution of the force and attack, it gradually withdraw in the direction of Ringgold, but defend that point at all costs; that a locomotive and construction train be kept here with orders, and prepared, if this retrograde movement be made necessary; that the party shall take up at intervals rails, so as to make a repair train necessary to replace them; this that the enemy may not have the track to facilitate his movement in pursuit. A few rails should at once be removed at some point east of the tunnel that can again be put down when we want it done.

The pass at Snake creek is represented as very narrow. Please instruct a division to be there to-morrow, provided with axes and spades, so to widen the road as to enable the passage of wagons; also to facilitate the march of troops by roads and paths outside the wagon track.

General Stoneman will be at Varnell's to-night, and by to-morrow night all his command will be in, so that we will calculate all to go to Snake Creek and close up on General McPherson during the day after to-morrow. As soon as General Stoneman comes, I will cause him to relieve Colonel McCook on that flank, so that you may send him to replace General Geary at Ray's road. Let the troops move as much under cover as possible; wagons going round by Villanow, and the troops by the Mill Creek road. General Schofield will either go round by Villanow or follow General Newton.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General THOMAS,  
*Commanding Army of the Cumberland.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Tunnel Hill, Georgia, May 10, 1864.*

GENERAL: I shall attack Johnston through Snake Creek Gap. I will take your three infantry divisions along, but for the time will have to leave General Stoneman to guard the point now occupied by you, and to keep up a delusion as long as possible. I propose to leave General Howard here so light and so familiar with the ground that Johnston cannot strike him. I have made some orders accordingly, and without attracting too much attention you may prepare to move about the day after to-morrow by Villanow and the gap.

It may be necessary to start in the night to avoid being seen. Get all your wagons in the best order possible, and send for Stoneman to come over to see me. I want to give him some personal instructions.

I regret I cannot, under the circumstances, relieve General Hovey, because I know General Grant esteems him, and gave him the promise of this division. He was peculiarly noted in the affair at Champion Hills, and had quite a name as brigadier.

I do not propose to keep any supplies here, but to send all that are not issued back to Ringgold, and if the enemy are drawn here, we will make short work of them at Dalton. I propose to take McPherson, twenty-three thousand (23,000;) General Thomas, thirty thousand, (30,000,) and you twelve thousand, (12,000,) with Garrard's cavalry at Villanow; McCook between this and Villanow, and General Stoneman north of the tunnel. On the contrary, I am glad to have you at all times give me your unqualified opinion freely and fully.

Call in the regiment at Red Clay, and continue the force at Charleston to keep on the north bank and guard the bridge. General Thomas will instruct the Cleveland garrison, and I will have a construction train run down to Var

nell's and take up a train load of iron, and run it into Chattanooga, so that the enemy cannot use the road whilst we are south of them.

Chattanooga cannot be taken by Johnston with us on his heels. I will risk that.

I think all the chances are in favor of the move. General McPherson is already there; General Hooker has gone in support, and the defences of Dalton will not avail Johnston if we interpose between him and Georgia. Buzzard Roost is as hard to pass out as in.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General Commanding.*

Major General SCHOFIELD,

*Commanding Army of the Ohio.*

I wish you would have Stoneman come to see me the moment you can. He can bring his cavalry near you and send here for corn.

W. T. S.

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Tunnel Hill, May 10, 1864.*

GENERAL: The Buzzard Roost Gap is so well defined, and naturally is so strong, that I will undertake to attack Johnston through Snake Creek Gap in this manner:

General Hooker's corps is ordered already to support you; his troops will arrive to-morrow and next day, and will be instructed to widen and improve the road through the gap, so that wagons may pass going and coming and troops may march by paths alongside. You had better do this at your end of the gap at once. Another corps of General Thomas's (Palmer's) will follow and then General Schofield's. We expect all to be in motion the day after to-morrow, and to mask the movement as much as possible. General Howard will remain here with his corps, and will keep up the feint till the last moment, and if forced back will be prepared to do so, having sent back in advance all his supply wagons, and all incumbrances. He will have a small division of cavalry to watch the road between this and Snake Creek Gap, the same where General Geary now is, and Stoneman with two brigades of cavalry to his north and east.

This force will cover us to the north; Garrard's newly arrived cavalry will guard to the south and west, and we must take care of ourselves.

Once through the gap, I would interpose between Johnston and Resaca, and may, if it can be done quick, attack Resaca or Johnston. In the mean time, mask your own force as much as possible, but hold your own, and look well to secure the mountain range to the east and north. A single peak held by a regiment becomes a key to the whole range. I wish you to calculate to have ten days' supplies, and to send your wagons to the rear, not to come up till the time expires, or you order them.

I have a note from General Schofield, who says that one brigade of General Stoneman got to Cleveland to-day, and another will to-morrow, so that we may not be able to put our project in operation by the day after to-morrow, but we will get all ready. We can give you supplies here. If you think it practicable you may order General Kilpatrick to make a strike at the railroad. If Johnston passes down, can't you hit him in flank, or has he too many roads? Can't you get a road or find a way from the mouth of the valley across three or four miles north of Resaca? Do you think Johnston has yet discovered the nature of your force? Write me fully.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General Commanding.*

Major General McPHERSON,

*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*



[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Tunnel Hill, Georgia, May 10, 1864.*Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

General McPherson reached Resaca but found the place strongly fortified and guarded, and did not break the road. According to his instructions, he drew back to the débouche of the gorge, where he has a strong defensive position and guards the only pass into the valley of the Oostanaula available to us. Buzzard Roost Gap, through which the railroad passes, is naturally and artificially too strong to be attempted. I must feign on Buzzard Roost, but pass through Snake Creek Gap and place myself between Johnston and Resaca, where we will have to fight it out. I am making the preliminary move. Certain that Johnston can make no detachments, I will be in no hurry. My cavalry is just approaching from Kentucky and Tennessee, detained by the difficulty of getting horses and even now it is less than my minimum.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General Commanding.*HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Tunnel Hill, Georgia, May 11, 1864.*

GENERAL: I received by courier, in the night, yours of 5 and 6.30 p. m. of yesterday. You will also during the night have come to the same conclusion.

You now have your twenty-three thousand, (23,000,) and General Hooker is in close support, so that you can hold all Joe Johnston's army in check should he abandon Dalton. He can't afford to abandon Dalton, for he has fixed it up so well for us, and he observes we are close at hand waiting for him to quit. He can't afford a detachment strong enough to fight you, as his army will not admit of it.

Strengthen your position, fight anything that comes, and threaten the safety of the railroad all the time. But to tell the truth, I would rather he would stay in Dalton two more days, when he may find a larger party than he expects in an open field. At all events we can then choose our ground, and he will be forced to move out of his works. I do not intend to put a column into Buzzard Roost Gap at present.

See that you are in easy communication with me and all headquarters. After to-day the supplies will be at Ringgold.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*Major General MCPHERSON,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee, Sugar Valley, Georgia.*HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Tunnel Hill, Georgia, May 11, 1864.*

GENERAL: The indications are that Johnston is evacuating Dalton. In that event, Howard's and the cavalry will pursue, and all the rest will follow your route. I will be down early in the morning.

Try to strike him if possible about the forks of the roads.

Hooker must be with you now, and you might send General Garrard by Somerville to threaten Rome and that flank. I will cause all the lines to be felt at once.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*General MCPHERSON, *Sugar Valley.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Resaca, May 13, 1864—2½ p. m.*General THOMAS, *Commanding Army of the Cumberland :*

Until I hear that Joe Johnston is south of the Oostanaula, I would not cross at Lay's; we must first interpose between Dalton and Resaca, threatening the latter all the time. I want Hooker right and McPherson left strong until we encounter Johnston, who has not yet got below Resaca I think. If he retreat east we have the advantage. I want the pontoons up and to secure the railroad on Hooker's right. Palmer should join on to Hooker and Hooker should be strong.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Snake Creek Gap, May 13, 1864.*Major General THOMAS, *Commanding, &c. :*

I want the pontoon bridge laid at the best point near Lay's ferry, near the mouth of Lick or Snake Creek. I enclose a sketch made to-day by a seemingly intelligent officer.

As soon as I know the pontoons have started down the road, I will send all the cavalry here to cross the bridge and will order all of General Schofield's army to move as soon as it is demonstrated Johnston has actually retreated.

In the mean time turn the train toward the mouth of Snake Creek, and after an hour's work about daylight we can discover whether the rebel army proposes to fight us or not at or near Resaca.

Contemporaneous with laying the double bridge, I will order Garrard to move down to all the passes towards Rome to disturb them in flank.

Please give the necessary directions that the pontoon be carried down Snake Creek valley under a good escort, and to be held about a mile back of view till it be ordered to the bank. The sketch indicates Tanner's.

At daylight I want you from the extreme left of your army (General Palmer's) to swing into the railroad and General Hooker hold pretty strong on his own ground, and the instant my mind is clear that Johnston will not do his fighting here, I will turn General Schofield toward the pontoon at Lay's or Tanner's. Let your engineer copy this sketch and return it.

Send orders round to General Howard to pass down the valley, keeping his main force down by the Rome road and the cavalry down by the railroad.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Snake Creek Gap, May 13, 1864.*General STONEMAN, *Commanding Cavalry :*

Your note of to-day was received; very good indeed. Press down the valley strong and communicate with me. Your messenger will find me where there is most noise of artillery or near Resaca. You can safely move on parallel roads by brigades. Let your packs follow on the heels of the column. Pick up whatever of provisions and plunder you can.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Resaca, May 13, 1864—11 p. m.*

GENERAL: At daybreak send a regiment of infantry towards Dalton, about three (3) miles to the point near Swamp creek, where the Rome and Calhoun roads come together, and where General Palmer is ordered to send a regiment from this quarter. At the same time let a good staff officer with a regiment make a road across to us from the head of your column, to the left of our present line of battle, which you may estimate as on this (the Calhoun) road, two miles north of Resaca. In case of heavy battle, and your picket at the Swamp creek end reports no heavy force of infantry, come across to support General Thomas. In case you hear no sounds of heavy battle, get all ready to move with celerity down Snake Creek Valley to its mouth, near which, tomorrow, I will lay the double pontoon bridge. I propose you shall pass the Oostanaula first with your three divisions.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General SCHOFIELD,  
*Commanding Army of Ohio.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Resaca, May 14—1864.*

GENERAL: As I wrote you last night, I intended to cross the Oostanaula, south by your left, but Schofield has swung round so far to the north or left that time will be lost.

The pontoons will be in an hour or so at a point on Snake creek, near its mouth, with Captain Merrill, United States engineers, in charge. Send one division immediately with the necessary artillery, to effect a lodgement on the other side, under direction of your engineer, and as the day develops send other divisions in order, so as to march out from the Oostanaula, from about Lay's ferry on Rome, keeping the right. You may begin the march at once, and follow it up as fast as it is demonstrated that Johnston has retreated *in fact*. He left nothing at Dalton, and moves in too much order for a retreat. Therefore be duly cautious, but prompt to engage. If a part of your command gets into Resaca, withdraw it to General Thomas, who will continue to follow substantially the railroad to Kingston.

A division of cavalry under General Corse has already gone down along the Oostanaula to hold all the crossing places. I will send General Garrard from Villanow, by Dirt town and Dry creek, to cross the Oostanaula above Rome. All this cavalry will be on your right. Howard and Stoneman were last night close on the rear guard, about Swampy.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General McPHERSON,  
*Commanding Army of Tennessee.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Resaca, Ga., May 14, 1864—8½ a. m.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of this 7 a. m. is received. Your position is a good one and you may retain it, connecting strong with General Palmer or General Thomas.

I suppose General Howard will come on to your rear as support, in conse

quence of our line having swung around to the right. I will move south by the right flank. I have sent Captain Poe to explain, so you will remain as now, and General McPherson will secure a crossing at Lay's and operate on the enemy's line of retreat. All well here.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SCHOFIELD,  
*Commanding Army of Ohio.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Resaca, May 14, 1864.*

GENERAL: By the flank movement on Resaca we have forced Johnston to evacuate Dalton, and we are on his flank and rear, but the parallelism of the valleys and mountains does not give us all the advantage of an open country, but I will press him all that is possible. Weather fine and troops in fine order. All is working well and as fast as possible.

I have announced in orders Mr. Stanton's despatch as to the victory of Spottsylvania. Let us keep the ball rolling.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General HALLECK,  
*Washington, D. C.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Resaca, May 14, 1864—8 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*

We have had hard fighting all day. Johnston purely on the defensive. The place has small detached redoubts and an immense amount of rifle trenches. We have closed the enemy well in, gaining ground slowly, but surely, all day. The country is very rough and woody. I will renew the attack at all points to-morrow, and continue till Johnston retreats, and then shall follow. General Sweeney's division, 16th corps, with a pontoon train tried to cross the Oostanaula at Lay's ferry, below Calhoun, but was stoutly opposed by a heavy force in the dense timber, on the opposite bank. General Howard's corps followed the enemy down from Dalton, and his right now joins to our main line, and my forces are all united, the line extending from the Oostanaula above to below the town. General Stoneman's cavalry division is on the east of the river, and General Garrard's division of cavalry is sent round by the right to cross the Oostanaula above Rome, if possible, and break the railroad north of Kingston.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Resaca, May 14, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of 6½ p. m. is received, and the general-in-chief is well satisfied. If you can move your force to-morrow over on to the Coosawattee into a strong position, and send a force sufficient to break the railroad

below Resaca, you will please the general very much. He says not to risk your command too much, nor too much of it, but break the railroad good, if possible, and do the enemy all the damage you can.

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp.*

Major General STONEMAN,  
*Commanding Cavalry.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Resaca, May 15, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

We have been fighting all day, pressing the enemy, and gaining substantial advantage at all points. We will strengthen the line of circumvallation so as to spare a large force to operate across the Oostanaula, below Resaca. Two pontoon bridges are over at Lay's ferry. The enemy attacked the brigade thrown across to cover the bridge, but was handsomely repulsed, leaving forty (40) dead. I cannot estimate our dead and wounded, up to this hour, but it will not fall much short of three thousand, (3,000.) The cars now run down to within seven (7) miles of us, and we have every facility to provide for the wounded.

The troops fight well, and everything works smoothly. We intend to fight Joe Johnston until he is satisfied, and I hope he will not attempt to escape; if he does, my bridges are down, and we will be after him. The country is mountainous and heavily wooded, giving the party on the defensive every advantage, and our losses result mostly from sharpshooters and ambush firing.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Resaca, May 16, 1864.*

GENERAL: Despatch a good division down the old Rome road, which passes down the west of the Oostanaula, four (4) miles west of this, to Farmer's bridge, which is eight (8) miles north of Rome. There will be found General Garrard's train of artillery, which he will leave there while he operates against the flank of Johnston's retreating army.

Order the division to leave its train to follow its corps, and to cross the Oostanaula and move towards Kingston till it rejoins its own corps, whose route of march will be on Kingston. Take the division from that corps—say Palmer's, Baird's, or Jeff. Davis's—which will, I suppose, be your right flank as you move south, and can most easily effect its junction.

I want this division to move at once, and rapidly. The bridge is standing.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General THOMAS,  
*Commanding Army Cumberland, Present.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Resaca, May 16, a. m.*Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

We are in possession of Resaca. It is a strongly fortified position, besides being a strong natural position. We saved the common road bridge, but the railroad bridge is burned. The railroad is good to this point, and our cars will run here to-day. Our columns are now crossing the Oostanaula—General McPherson at Lay's ferry, General Thomas here, and General Schofield about New Town.

We will pursue smartly to the Etowah. Generals Stoneman's and Garrard's cavalry are trying to get in rear of the enemy, and I hope will succeed. Our difficulties will increase beyond the Etowah, but if Johnston will not fight us behind such works as we find here, I will fight him on any open ground he may stand at. All well and in high spirits. We have about a thousand prisoners and eight (8) guns.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Resaca, May 16, 1864.*

GENERAL: I will attend General Thomas's army to-morrow, and expect to be at or beyond Adairsville to-morrow night. I wish you to push somewhat, and to be as near abreast as possible. I expect you will cross Coosawattee by one or the other of the fords about Field's, and to move *via* Big Spring to near the point where so many roads seem to centre, about four (4) miles east of Alexandria.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SCHOFIELD,  
*Commanding Army of Ohio*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Resaca, May 16, 1864.*

GENERAL: I will attend General Thomas's army to-morrow, and hope to reach Adairsville. You had better mass your men a little in front of Calhoun, and when you know Thomas is advancing south of Calhoun, keep abreast or a little ahead of him. I presume you are all across the Oostanaula. You may order the pontoon train to take up the bridges and follow you to the Etowah. General Thomas has a trestle-bridge here, one pontoon, and one made on the wreck of the railroad bridge, yet the passage has been slower than I estimated. I will push the column to-morrow. General Hooker is off to the left, somewhere, but not at New Town.

The road laid down on the cloth map by McGuire's and Woodland is your true course, provided the enemy has, on my theory, retreated on Alatoona. Bear in mind that General Garrard's cavalry is in your front, and that General Jeff. Davis's division of the 14th corps is on the west bank of the Oostanaula, approaching a bridge eight (8) miles above Rome. His route will bring him by McGuire's and Woodland.

Be sure to communicate your position to-morrow night, and if you fire signal-guns, with five minutes intervals, I will understand it as your head of column.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General J. B. McPHERSON,  
*Commanding Army of Tennessee.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Resaca, May 17, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

Get Captain Merrill's map at the chief engineer's office, as I use it in my despatches.

General McPherson is all across the Oostanaula, at Lay's ferry, and is out abreast of Calhoun.

General Thomas is across here, where we have improvised three (3) bridges, and General Schofield has passed the Connasauga at Fite's ferry, and will pass the Coosawattee near Field's. To-night I propose my three heads of columns to be abreast of Adairsville. Johnston will be compelled to fight on this side of the Etowah, or be forced to divide his army, or give up either Rome or Alatoona. If he attempts to hold both, I will break the line at Kingston. If he concentrates at Kingston, I will break his railroads, right and left, and will fight him square in front. My belief is he will abandon Kingston and Rome, and retire on Alatoona, beyond the Etowah, in which case I will fix up my roads to Kingston, and then determine in what manner to advance beyond the Etowah. It will take five days to repair the railroad bridge here. We are abundantly supplied, and our animals are improving on the grass and grain fields, which now afford good pasture.

I start in person now for Adairsville. I think everything has progressed and is progressing as favorably as we could expect, but I know we must have one or more bloody battles such as have characterized General Grant's terrific struggles. Johnston has Hardee's, Hood's, and Polk's corps, with irregulars and militia on his lines of communication.

His cavalry outnumbered ours, but acts on the defensive.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Adairsville, May 17, 1864.*

GENERAL: It is probable, on reaching Adairsville in the early morning, we will find the enemy has retreated, *via* Cassville. If such be the case, I want you to put your head of column after him as far as Cassville, when I will determine whether to continue the pursuit as far as Cartersville, or let him go. I prefer he should divide between Rome and Cartersville, in which event you will march directly on Kingston. I will be with you in the morning, and only mention these points that you may instruct your leading division. I wish you would put one of your boldest division commanders to lead to-morrow, and explain to him that General McPherson is close on his right, and General Schofield on his left, and that two heavy columns of cavalry, Garrard's and Stoneman's, have

orders to strike the road; the one between Kingston and Rome, and the other between Kingston and Cartersville.

Instead of skirmishing only with the rear guard, it should be attacked promptly by his whole division, deployed in whole or part, according to the ground, but it should be preceded by the usual skirmish line.

A real battle to-morrow might save us much work at a later period.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General THOMAS,  
*Commanding Army and Department of Cumberland.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Near Adairsville, evening, May 17, 1864.*

GENERAL: I send my aid, Captain Audenreid, to you, who will tell you all you wish to know. I fear you have got your cavalry too far east to do much good at this time. Instead of going up the Selahquat, the Pine Log would have been better. I want you to-morrow night to strike the enemy in flank, between Cassville and Cartersville, or Etowah bridge, (railroad;) a small section of the road should be broken, enough to take a couple of days to mend.

It is also important that you should measure your fighting qualities with the enemy's cavalry about Cassville. I am sure you can beat them, but it should be done suddenly, so as to produce a salutary effect, and be a moral force to you in after operations. If you need it, General Schofield will give you McCook's cavalry, but whatever is done should be done to-morrow.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General STONEMAN,  
*Commanding Cavalry.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, evening, May 17, 1864.*

GENERAL: Captain Poe is here, and has explained your difficulties. I want your head of column up at the intersection of the roads, about four (4) miles east of Adairsville, as early as possible, always with the standing order, that if you hear the sounds of serious battle you turn toward it; otherwise, shape your course towards Kingston.

General Thomas's head of column is against a pretty stubborn rear guard, which fights at every point, and as he can present nothing but a head of column, the enemy delays us, and saves the time he needs to remove his stores and army. It may be to-morrow I will turn your column to Cassville, and the railroad due south of Cassville, with a view to strike the flank of a retreating army; but unless you get such orders from me, incline towards Kingston with your infantry, but send McCook's cavalry to Cassville and the railroad, giving him always your head of infantry as a *point d'appui* in case he encounters a very superior force; but tell McCook that it is all-important to the cavalry arm to impress the enemy with a fear of him, as it will be an element of strength in our future operations.

Kingston is our present objective point, and from there I will make new dispositions.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SCHOFIELD,  
*Commanding Army of Ohio.*



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
Near Adairsville, May 17, 1864—12 m.

General McPHERSON, *Commanding Army of the Tennessee*:

Come *via* Adairsville, but try and keep on some road west of the railroad. This road now is almost blocked with men, wagons, &c. I am not surprised that you were in doubt whether we were in battle or skirmish. Our troops will fire away so much powder; but it was pretty smart skirmishing, and has cost us over a hundred wounded, though I still believe it was a rear guard covering the movement of trains.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
In the field, near Adairsville, May 17, 1864—6½ p. m.

General McPHERSON, *Commanding Army of the Tennessee*:

Direct your march early to-morrow to Adairsville, and order Garrard and the cavalry of Colonel Murray to make a dash on the railroad between Rome and Kingston (if not already done) *to-night*.

General Stoneman is on the other flank, and will attempt to break the road between Kingston and Etowah bridge. If not done to-night there will be no use of doing it at all, as I take it the enemy is trying to make time to save his material from his army and from Rome. I take it for granted General Garrard is near you. We went go into Adairsville to-night.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
In the field, Adairsville, Georgia, May 18, 1864.

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*:

Johnston passed last night here. We overtook him at sundown yesterday, and skirmished heavily with his rear till dark. In the morning he was gone, and we are after him. By to-night all the heads of column will be near Kingston, whither Johnston is moving. Whether he proposes to fight there or not we cannot tell, but to-morrow will know, for I propose to attack him wherever he may be. Our cavalry has not yet succeeded in breaking the railroad to his rear.

I now have four heads of column, all directed on Kingston, with orders to be within four miles by night. Weather fine, roads good, and the country more open and less mountainous.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
In the field, 3½ miles from Kingston, May 18, 1864—10½ p. m.

GENERAL: Yours of 1 p. m. is at hand. I was in hopes you would be further ahead by to-night, but the roads are not suited to a concentric movement on Kingston, and we must approach the game as near as the case admits of.

All the signs continue of Johnston's having retreated on Kingston, and why he should lead to Kingston if he designs to cover his trains to Cartersville I do not see, but it is probable he has sent to Alatoona all he can by cars, and his wagons are escaping south of the Etowah by the bridge and fords near Kingston. In any hypothesis our plan is right.

All of General Thomas's command will follow his trail straight; let it lead to the fords or towards Alatoona. You must shape your course to support General Hooker and strike the line of railway to his left. As soon as you can march in the morning, get up to General Hooker and act according to the developments. If we can bring Johnston to battle this side of Etowah we must do it, even at the hazard of beginning battle with but a part of our forces. If you hear the sounds of battle, direct your course so as to come up to the left of General Thomas's troops. If Johnston has got beyond Etowah, we will take two days to pick up fragments from Rome to Etowah. You will, in that event, still bear to the left and help General Stoneman, who should now be on the railroad somewhere between Cassville and Cartersville. I will be at Kingston.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General SCHOFIELD,  
*Army of the Ohio, Montiller's Hill.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Kingston, Georgia, May 18, 1864—10½ p. m.*

GENERAL: Early in the morning drop your wagons under escort, and move your entire command ready to deploy forward for battle on Kingston, and it may be to one or more of the crossing-places of the Etowah near that place. General Thomas will continue to follow the broad, well-marked trail of Johnston's army, and you must act on his right, according to our general plan. Johnston may get his wagons across Etowah, and fight us this side, trying to fall on one or other of our columns. General Hooker is now within three miles of Cassville, and General Schofield is to his rear, with orders to come up on his left. Until we ascertain the course of the enemy after reaching Kingston, we cannot do better. The rear of Johnston's infantry could not have reached Kingston before one (1) p. m. to-day.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

General McPHERSON,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee, on Barnsley Creek.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Kingston, May 18, 1864—10½ p. m.*

GENERAL: Until we know exactly the course taken by Johnston from Kingston, I cannot make orders more exact than those already existing. You are now on the plain, well-marked trail of the enemy. You will early in the morning renew the pursuit, following this trail till it leads beyond the Etowah or gets to the eastward of Cassville, when you will relinquish pursuit unless otherwise ordered. General Schofield now is behind General Hooker, and is ordered early in the morning to close up and come up on his left. Let all your troops be in advance of all wagons, save ambulances and a moderate number of ammunition wagons, and order the enemy to be attacked if found. General

McPherson should now be at Woodland, and General Hooker about Two Run creek, and can easily join you at Kingston by eight (8) or nine (9) a. m. I hope Generals Garrard and Stoneman have done good work to-day. I will attend your column to-morrow. Order up the pontoons, and ascertain the whereabouts of General Jeff. C. Davis as soon as possible.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding

Major General THOMAS,  
Commanding Army of the Cumberland, Present.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Kingston, May 18, 1864—12 m.*

GENERAL: I despatched a courier to you at 10½, ordering you early in the morning to move on Kingston, to which point General Thomas will also move, and where I will meet you. I now have General Garrard's report, and hope he is right in his conclusion that many locomotives and cars are west of the break in the railroad. Let General Garrard send a detachment of about one hundred (100) men to Rome, and to hunt up General Jeff. Davis; also, in case of Rome being in our possession or evacuated, to scour the country west of Barnsley's creek as far as Oostanaula for prisoners, deserters, wagons, horses, &c.

Let General Garrard with all his cavalry, a section of guns, but no wagons, move at the same time with you on the point of Etowah river about two (2) miles west of Kingston, just below the mouth of Connasene creek, where a bridge or ferry is represented; then in succession the other bridges and ferries supposed to be south of Kingston, and as far east as the road leading from the Saltpetre cave to Euharlee mill, and as much further as he thinks he can achieve anything, trying at all those points to make captures and boats if possible. He may count on our attacking Kingston, if not already abandoned, as also Cassville and its railroad station.

General Stoneman should to-day have struck the same railroad near Cartersville, by which we cannot fail to make many captures of men and material to-morrow.

Tell General Garrard to ride hard and do much to-morrow, with the promise of a two days' rest, and plenty of forage up by the cars by the day after to-morrow. In the mean time, the pastures are all he could ask.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

General MCPHERSON,  
Commanding Army of Tennessee, Barnsley Creek.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Georgia, May 19, 1864.*

GENERAL: General Thomas is passing through Kingston to the east, and will put the head of his column four miles east of the town, where a mill is represented on Two Run creek. General Hooker will join him at that point. I want you to put the head of your column at Cassville depot, your line facing east, and if you are in communication with General Stoneman put him toward Etowah bridge, (Pettit's creek.) General Garrard will move south of the railroad,

and will come up on your right. General McPherson will halt here on Connasene for the present. Report to me your arrival, and also the distance to Pettit's creek, to Cartersville, and Etowah bridge.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General SCHOFIELD, *near Cassville.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, May 19, 1864.*

GENERAL: I feel certain that Johnston, after the affair at Resaca, does not want to fight us in the comparatively open ground this side of Cartersville.

I send with this, orders for General Schofield, which are a repetition of orders heretofore sent him by courier, to press down to the road, and to order General Stoneman to secure the passage of Pettit's creek this side of Cartersville. General Garrard's cavalry is now at the bridge across Etowah, and Murray is coming to you to connect with General Hooker. Do you want General McPherson forward? He has his troops so he can advance by two roads. Send me word. I will come forward in that event. Connect with General Hooker, and, if possible, crush or capture any force that is, as I think, caught between General Stoneman and you.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General THOMAS,  
*Commanding Army of Cumberland.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Georgia, May 20, 1864—1 a. m.*

GENERAL: My instructions for you to move toward Cassville depot were based on my theory, or supposition, that after passing "the Divide," or Gravelly plateau, the roads would divide naturally, one set leading to Kingston and one to Cassville depot. Knowing that General Hooker would take the one to Kingston, I wanted you to take the one toward Cassville, with some rapidity of movement, to increase the chances of interposing between the Etowah bridge and the enemy, falling back before General Thomas's head of column. Yesterday I was very anxious that General Stoneman or yourself should reach the road from Kingston to Etowah, for I saw by the singular manœuvring of the enemy, and the confusion of his wagon trains, how uneasy he was at fear of our capturing a part of his forces.

Had ten thousand (10,000) men reached the railroad any time after 10 a. m. yesterday, we should have had a signal success; whereas, Johnston will now encourage his men by his skilfully saving his army and baggage in the face of such odds. I know the difficulties of the roads and country, and merely mean to explain what I aimed to accomplish.

I did expect to catch a part of the army retreating before us, but I take it for granted that it is now impossible, and therefore wish simply to be assured that he has crossed Etowah, and that he there awaits our attack through the difficult pass of Alatoona.

I do not propose to follow him through that pass, but rather to turn south from here, leaving Alatoona to the north and east. I wish, therefore, that to-day (the 20th) you move so as to strike the railroad east of Cassville, and then

turn east and push the enemy past Cartersville and across Etowah or High Tower bridge.

I left General Thomas's head of column on the skirts of the village of Cassville. He is ordered to support your attack. I have no doubt the ground is very difficult between Cassville and the bridge, and that you can alone push back any force of the enemy remaining this side of the bridge. Still, you may call on Generals Thomas and Stoneman, of course, for support.

I will have the cars into Kingston and Cassville to-day. Shall replenish the wagons, and then on.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SCHOFIELD,  
*Commanding Army of Ohio.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Georgia, May 19, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

We entered Kingston this morning without opposition, and have pushed a column east as far as Cassville, skirmishing the latter part of the day with Hardee's corps. The enemy has retreated south of the Etowah. To-morrow cars will move to this place and I will replenish our stores and get ready for the Chattahoochee. The railroad passes through a range of hills at Alatoona, which is doubtless being prepared for us, but I have no intention of going through it. I apprehend more trouble from our long trains of wagons than from the fighting, though of course Johnston must fight hard for Atlanta.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Georgia, May 20, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

We have secured two good bridges and an excellent ford across the Etowah. Our cars are now arriving with stores. I give two days' rest to replenish and fit up. On the 23d, I will cross the Etowah and move on Dallas. This will turn the Alatoona Pass. If Johnston remain at Alatoona I shall move on Marietta, but if he fall behind the Chattahoochee, I will make for Sandtown and Campbellton, but feign at the railroad crossing.

General Davis's division occupies Rome, and finds a good deal of provisions and plunder, five iron-works and machinery. I have ordered the 17th army corps, General Blair's, to march from Decatur to Rome. My share of militia should be sent at once to cover our lines of communication. Notify General Grant that I will hold all of Johnston's army to busy too send anything against him.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Circular.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Kingston, Georgia, May 20, 1864.*

Inasmuch as an impression is afloat that the commanding general has prohibited the mails to and from this army, he takes this method of assuring all, officers and men, that on the contrary he encourages them, by all his influence and authority, to keep up the most unreserved correspondence with their families and friends wherever they may be. Army, corps, and division commanders should perfect their arrangements to receive and transmit mails, and all chaplains, staff officers, and captains of companies should assist the soldiers in communicating with their families.

What the commanding general does discourage is the maintenance of that class of men who will not take a musket and fight, but who follow the army to pick up news for sale, speculating on a species of information dangerous to an army and to our cause, and who are more used to bolster up idle and worthless officers than to notice the hard-working and meritorious, whose modesty is generally equal to their courage, and who scorn to seek the cheap flattery of the press.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Georgia, May 22, 1864.—8.30 p. m.*

General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

Weather hot, *very*, and roads dusty. We nevertheless by morning will have all our wagons loaded and be ready for a twenty days' expedition. I will leave a good brigade at Rome, a strong good point, about a thousand men to cover this point, but will keep no stores here to tempt an enemy, until I have placed my army about Marietta, when I will cause the railroad to be repaired up to that point.

I regard Resaca as the strong head of my line of operations till I reach the Chattahoochee. I have ordered the 17th corps to march from Decatur to Rome and to this point, to act in reserve till I call it forward. Returned veterans and regiments have more than replaced all losses and detachments, and we move tomorrow with full eighty thousand (80,000) fighting men.

General McPherson crosses the Etowah at the mouth of Connasene creek on a bridge, and moves for Dallas *via* Van Wert.

General Thomas crosses by a bridge four miles southeast of Kingston and moves for Dallas, *via* Euharlee and Huntsville. General Schofield crosses near Etowah cliffs on pontoons, and takes position on Thomas's left. I allow three (3) days to have the army grouped about Dallas, whence I can strike Marietta or the Chattahoochee, according to developments.

You may not hear from us in some days, but be assured we are not idle or thoughtless.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

*In the field, Kingston, Georgia, May 23, 1864.*General BLAIR, *Huntsville, Alabama :*

We are now all in motion for the Chattahoochee. Colonel Long telegraphs from Pulaski and should overtake you at Decatur or soon after leaving. Although you must move on Rome and Kingston by the direct road, still you can make believe you have designs on Gadsden and Talladega. Keep silent and the enemy will exaggerate your strength and purposes. Johnston has called to him all the infantry of the southwest and also the cavalry of Mississippi; so you must watch out for them. If they hang around you keep Long close in and watch the opportunity for him to charge with sabres.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Dallas, Georgia, midnight, May 26, 1864.*

GENERAL: Yours of to-day with Corse's is received, and is highly satisfactory. I have personally reconnoitred the ground, and am satisfied the enemy hold by hastily constructed rifle-pits the line of a creek, which is a branch of Pumpkin Vine creek and parallel with it. Your direction in the morning will be substantially down that creek, while General Howard's and Cox's will be up it. We find no trouble in fording it, and you will have less, as you must be near its head. The valley seems clear and cultivated.

Colonel McCook struck a column in flank about five miles northeast of this p. m., broke it in two, and at night was pressing the fraction toward Ackworth. He reports quite a fight and the capture of fifty-two (52) prisoners. Our skirmishing to-day has been comparatively harmless. I doubt if we find the enemy here to-morrow; but if we do, my orders herewith will govern. I will expect to hear of you on General Hooker's right by ten (10) a. m.

Yours, &amp;c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General MCPHERSON, *Dallas, Ga.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Dallas, Georgia, May 27, 1864.—11 a. m.*

GENERAL: If you can't drive the enemy from his position, work to the left, so as to connect with General Hooker.

We are working on the left of the line in front of us, and as soon as you are in connexion with General Hooker I will strengthen the left and work round in that direction, so we may, if we choose, march round their extreme right, and reach Marietta or Ackworth.

Yours, &amp;c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General MCPHERSON, *Dallas, Ga.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field near Dallas, May 27, 1864.—1.15 p. m.*

GENERAL: General Corse is here; we are pressing in front and General Thomas is working round by the left. We don't want to turn the enemy's left flank, but his right, so as to put our concentrated army between him and the

railroad, of which we want to make use. Therefore, instead of compassing the enemy's left, I wish you to work up so as to connect with General Hooker, when I will strengthen our movement to our left, the enemy's right. Use the Marietta road as far as possible, and then reach for General Hooker's right. We have two divisions to the right of the road, Geary's and Butterfield's, and Williams's in reserve. All the rest of this is north of this road.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General McPHERSON, *near Dallas, Ga.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Dallas, Ga., May 27, 1864—5 p. m.*

General SCHOFIELD:

Take position in front of the mill, facing south, and connecting with General Thomas's troops, holding one-third of your force in reserve, and concealing your flanks in the timber. I understand General Howard is moving off on your left. He is ordered to move in to connect with you. I will re-enforce that flank as soon as General McPherson makes his junction, which is expected this evening. It is useless to look for the flank of the enemy, as he makes temporary breastworks as fast as we travel. We must break his line without scattering our troops too much, and then break through.

See that General Stoneman is in close connexion with you, but you had better leave General Hovey to cover that point for the present.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Dallas, sundown, May 27, 1864.*

GENERAL: We have been busy with the enemy all along our front line. From description I think the hills in your front are stronger than the ground to our left, by which we can move toward Alatoona and Ackworth, or pound away till we find a weak place. We should have our army united, and therefore I think it best you should send your trains back across the Pumpkin Vine by moonlight, and let them park up to our rear, where General Palmer has a division; then by moving by the left flank you can put yourself in connexion with us, and we can act against some one point, or turn his right flank. No doubt Johnston's whole army is present, as we have felt him for four miles to the north and east. I don't think there is more than a mile from General Davis's left to General Hooker's right. General Corse is with you, and has been back and forth twice.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General McPHERSON, *near Dallas, Ga.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Near Dallas, May 28, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

The enemy discovered my move to turn Alatoona, and moved to meet us here. Our columns met about one mile east of Pumpkin Vine creek, and we



pushed them back about three miles, to the point where the road forks to Alatoona and Marietta. Here Johnston has chosen a strong line and made hasty but strong parapets of timber and earth, and has thus far stopped us. My right is Dallas, centre about three miles north, and I am gradually working round by the left to approach the railroad anywhere in front of Ackworth.

Country very densely wooded and broken; no roads of any consequence. We have had many sharp, severe encounters, but nothing decisive. Both sides duly cautious in the obscurity of the ambushed ground.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, May 29, 1864.*

GENERAL: I suppose General Blair to be now near Rome. I wish you to send a good staff officer to meet him there or at Kingston, and order him to replenish his stores and march for Alatoona Pass, east of the Etowah, to gain, if possible, its eastern terminus and then intrench his position. He had better march from Kingston four (4) miles southeast to the Free Bridge, cross the Etowah, and move for Alatoona, *via* Euharlee and Stilesboro'. This route will deceive the enemy as to his purposes till the latest moment possible. Once in possession of Alatoona, I wish him to order the railroad superintendent, who is already at Resaca, to repair the railroad up to Alatoona, including the Etowah or Hightower bridge. General Blair should also construct on the dirt road a trestle bridge at the same crossing.

I am, with great respect, yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General McPHERSON,  
*Commanding Army of Tennessee.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Dallas, May 29, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

Yesterday we pressed our lines up in close contact with the enemy, who has covered his whole front with breastworks of timber and earth. With the intention of working to my left, towards the railroad east of Alatoona, I ordered General McPherson, who is in advance of Dallas and forms my right, to send his trains to a point on Pumpkin Vine, about four miles north of his present position, and to withdraw his army and take General Thomas's present position, whilst all of General Thomas's and General Schofield's armies will be moved further to the east, working round the enemy to the left. The enemy, who had observed the movement of the train from his higher position, massed against General McPherson and attacked him at 4½ p. m. yesterday, but was repulsed with great slaughter and at little cost to us.

The enemy fled back to his breastworks on the ridge, leaving in our hands his dead and wounded. His loss twenty-five hundred, (2,500,) and about three hundred prisoners. General McPherson's men being covered by log breastworks, like our old Corinth lines, were comparatively unhurt, his loss not being over three hundred (300) in all. I give him to-day, Sunday, to gather in the wounded and bury the dead of both sides, and to-night and to-morrow will endeavor to gain ground to our left two or four miles.

General Blair is now supposed to be near Rome; I will order him to march

straight for Alatoona, which I infer the enemy has abandoned altogether, or left in the hands of militia. That point gained, I will move to the left and resume railroad communication to the rear. I have no doubt Johnston has in my front every man he can scrape, and Mobile must now be at our mercy if General Canby and General Banks could send to Pascagoula ten thousand men.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, May 30, 1864.*

GENERAL: General McPherson made several attempts to draw off his troops, but as often was assaulted so as to put him on the defensive. It is utterly impossible that our enemy can hold all his line in strength, and we must work to the left. There is no absolute necessity for undue haste, as time will soon give us the advantage of General Blair's troops. I will go in person to Dallas, and after inspecting the ground will begin the movement and see if the enemy will attempt to sally, and then judge whether we had not better draw him out and fight him. We must not remain on the defensive. Therefore, in this connexion, I wish you to have your troops well disposed, the skirmishers well out; the lines full, and the reserves well disposed to be removed. Judge of the best point or points to assault in case that you hear us more than usually engaged at Dallas.

I will bring Davis and McPherson up if possible to-day, so that your command may occupy all the front embracing the several Alatoona and Ackworth roads. I wish you to see that the high and commanding grounds near Picket's mill, which ought to overlook Leverett's, be occupied in force, and let the cavalry patrol the road up as far as possible. I will repeat my orders to General Stoneman to be active on that flank.

I will probably be absent all day, and in my absence you can command all in this part of the field, but preserve the general plan.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

Major General THOMAS,

*Commanding Army of the Cumberland.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Dallas, May 30, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

To move General McPherson up to the centre he has to make a retrograde of a mile or so owing to difficult ground. Every time he attempted to withdraw division by division the enemy attacked his whole line; it may be on the theory that we wanted to draw off altogether. These assaults were made in the night, and were all repulsed with comparatively small loss to us, but seemingly heavy to the enemy. If we can induce the enemy to attack us it is to our advantage.

Don't expect us to make much progress towards the Chattahoochee till Blair comes up and moves into Alatoona Pass.

If General Banks and Admiral Porter are all out of Red river, instead of acting offensively on West Louisiana, I advise that the same command that General A. J. Smith took with him, re-enforced by two or three thousand from Memphis and Vicksburg, be sent to Pascagoula to act against Mobile in concert

with Admiral Farragut, according to the original plan of the campaign. If this is feasible, I wish the orders to go direct from the general-in-chief to General A. J. Smith, giving him authority to make up his command to ten thousand (10,000) men, and at once proceed, *via* Pontchartrain, to Pascagoula.

I know that all of Polk's army and all the garrisons of Alabama and Florida are with Johnston, as we have prisoners who have been for two (2) years on local duties in those States, as well as from their active divisions, viz: Loring's, French's, and Maury's.

The movement of General Grant on Hanover Court House appears to me admirable, and it seems to me General Grant can force Lee to attack him in position or to move away towards Gordonsville and Lynchburg.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Dallas, May 31, 1864.*

GENERAL: You will observe that after full reflection and due observation, I have concluded to make the movement by the left. To effect this, so far as you are concerned, I advise you to-night to place one brigade of Dodge on the parapet of Jefferson C. Davis immediately opposite the mountain, and another at the new parapet in the large field this side of Dallas. Then, at daylight, draw off division by division of the 15th army corps, and let them march direct for this road by the most convenient route, and proceed at once to General Hooker and relieve him. The other division of General Dodge should then move by the road from Dallas toward Burnt Hickory, and halt at or back of Owen's mill.

After the movement is past the new parapet in the cleared field, the brigade first posted there should be moved to the Marietta road where General Davis's battery is. This will leave General Dodge to watch that flank, and the 15th corps to occupy General Hooker's present ground. As General Blair cannot be expected as soon as I had contemplated, I must use the cavalry to secure Alatoona Pass.

It should move by a road outside of the one first travelled by General Dodge's division, which goes to Owen's mill. If the enemy follows he will do so cautiously, and I feel no doubt will be easily repulsed.

I want General Hooker relieved as early in the day as possible, to give General Schofield time to attack on our extreme left.

As soon as the cavalry secures Alatoona Pass, I will relieve them by infantry, and recall the cavalry to our flanks.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

Major General McPHERSON,

*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Dallas, May 31, 1864.*

General GARRARD, *Commanding Division of Cavalry, Dallas:*

I did intend that General Blair's troops, expected from Decatur, should take the Alatoona Pass, but he will not be up in time. You should start your wagons for Burnt Hickory this evening, and, when General McPherson gives the word, move your cavalry by any road across Pumpkin Vine creek and outside the infantry up to the same point. Then start your wagons for Stilesboro' and

Kingston direct for forage and supplies. At Burnt Hickory take the road towards Cartersville, till it intersects the Alatoona road, and follow it briskly. If you find the pass occupied, attack the cavalry with cavalry, and the infantry with dismounted men, and force your way into and through the pass along the railroad till you secure some commanding position. Then report back to me what is done, and your supply train can come up to the Etowah bridge to your rear. Do not be deterred by appearances, but act boldly and promptly. The success of our movement depends on our having Alatoona Pass. After it is secured, I will recall you to General McPherson.

General Stoneman approaching from the front will shake any force in the pass.

I am yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, June 2, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your note of last evening did not reach me till this morning at 7 o'clock, but I heard from a scout in the night that you were in Alatoona. Get a very strong position, and feel forward across Alatoona creek, toward Ackworth. Send to Kingston word that you are in Alatoona, and that I want the railroad finished up to that point at once. General Garrard can come up to you from the rear, if necessary; otherwise he had better be about Stilesboro', to cover the road from the south. I apprehend no serious trouble from the north, nor do I suppose Johnston will try to dispossess you so long as we are working toward Marietta.

Spare your horses as much as possible, and let them feed on grass. The cars can bring you corn to Etowah bridge. Send me to-night the best topographical sketch of the country between you and us. There is a high and valuable trestle-work somewhere about Alatoona, that I want to save; look to it also.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

General STONEMAN,

*Commanding Division of Cavalry, Alatoona.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Dallas, June 3, 1864.*

GENERAL: I received your note in the night, and am not astonished that you could not hear the sounds of battle in the midst of the storm yesterday.

General Schofield felt forward from the position Burnt Church, steering due east, and found cavalry dismounted all through the woods. He advanced until about dark, when he encountered infantry and artillery, posted behind finished breastworks. To-day I will still work by the left, and get to the railroad without weakening my line too much. All I ask is, that when we do come in contact with the enemy, on anything like fair terms and proportions, we whip them more fully.

I now hold Alatoona, and shall aim to work across to the railroad as far east and south as I can, without too heavy a loss. If you do hear sounds of battle you will know that Johnston will naturally draw from his left (to your front) on the theory that we are there on the defensive. Therefore, when you do hear sounds of battle, hold the enemy there, or take advantage of his weakening that

flank. In my judgment, the point that furnishes you most advantages and cover is about where Butterfield's centre was, where a small stream comes from the east and crosses our line near where a cabin stood, and from which there is an open field, with dead timber to the front. If we can carry a single point and hold it, thereabouts, we gain advantage. General Dodge should intrench the main part of his command at the two points designated, but patrols and skirmishers should fill the woods to the south, especially where General Jeff. C. Davis was, in front of that hill. You should give great attention to the browsing of all animals, where there is a leisure moment, and empty wagons and caissons should be sent for growing wheat, barley, oats or rye, as well as grass, or such bushes as horses and mules eat. I may send a brigade of General Thomas up towards Alatoona, but I want General Blair to march up and through that pass, and on as far as he can. In the mean time I will hold it with cavalry.

Should any specific attack be required of you, I will send special orders; but in their absence act promptly, and with confidence on these general principles. Keep your pioneers at all times opening and improving roads from your rear up towards Alatoona and Burnt Hickory.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General McPHERSON,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field near head of Alatoona Creek, fourteen miles  
West of Marietta, June 4, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

My left is now well around, covering all roads from the south to the railroad about Ackworth. My cavalry has been at Ackworth, and occupies in force all the Alatoona Pass, and I have ordered the railroad to be finished across the Etowah up to Alatoona bridge. General Blair is not yet at Rome, but is hourly expected, and I await him to push on to Marietta and the Chattahoochee.

It has been raining for three days, making roads bad and swelling all the small mountain creeks, which, however, are easily bridged, and run out very soon. It is still raining. As soon as I hear of General Blair, I will swing east by north over to the railroad, leaving Johnston to my right. He is in force occupying blind and difficult ground, and we continue skirmishing along the whole front, each party inviting the other to attack.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Alatoona Creek, June 5, 1864.*

GENERAL: General McPherson reports the enemy gone from his front; he has advanced his skirmishers half a mile east of New Hope church, capturing a lieutenant and thirty men. If you feel your front, it too will be found abandoned, save by a small guard. The movement indicated in yesterday's orders will therefore be executed, and I have so instructed General McPherson. After feeling your front prepare to move your whole command by McCook's former headquarters, northeast across Alatoona creek towards Andersonville or Kene-

saw Station, connecting by pickets with General McPherson about Ackworth. I propose then to complete our line of railroad, replenish and prepare to follow the enemy to and beyond the Chattahoochee, according to the point Johnston selects for defence. General Schofield can remain where he now is until you have passed, and then join your right. The only thing that requires despatch is the bridge at the Etowah where the railroad crosses, and I wish you to get your pontoons there as soon as possible. I consider the road from the Burnt Church to Alatoona more safe than that by Burnt Hickory.

Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General THOMAS,  
*Commanding Army of the Cumberland.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Alatoona Creek, June 5, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C. :*

The enemy discovering us creeping around his right flank, abandoned his position and marched off last night. We captured about thirty of their pickets at daylight. General McPherson is moving to-day for Ackworth—General Thomas on the direct Marietta road, and General Schofield on his right. It has been raining hard for three days, and the roads are very heavy. The construction party is at work on the Etowah bridge, and should repair it in five (5) days, when I will move on to Marietta. I expect the enemy to fight us at Kenesaw Mountain, near Marietta, but I will not run head on his fortifications. An examination of his abandoned line here shows an immense line of works, all of which I have turned with less loss to ourselves than we have inflicted on him. The wheat fields of the country are our chief supply of forage, and we have in camp bread, meat, sugar, and coffee for many days, ample until the railroad will be complete to Ackworth.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Alatoona Creek, June 6, 1864.*

GENERAL: Captain Poe brought me late in the evening a sketch made by Colonel Asmussen, copy of which he says you have. This sketch clearly marks the strategic points in our advance. The place marked "court-house" must be the Golgotha of our map. I wish you to put your centre anywhere between the court-house and Mrs. Hall's, with your wings up the road towards Dr. Elliott's and Big Shanty, "Shandy Hotel," and toward the "Hard Shell church." Have a small picket at Peters's, the "White House," and General McPherson will connect with you there and about Dr. Elliott's.

Should the enemy be in force about Dr. Elliott's, we must strengthen the connexion by the road by J. McClain's, White House, Durham's, Davenport's, Chastine, &c.

I will go myself to-day to Ackworth and have the telegraph opened there, and give all orders for making Alatoona a strong fortified depot, with a place of issue at Ackworth. I think in three days we should be all ready to go to Marietta. I will have the main force of General McPherson on Proctor's creek

about Fitzgerald's and W. J. Phillips', with pickets and patrols forward to Dr. Elliott's.

I think General Schofield had better stay where he is until you get in a better position, when we can place him about the Hard Shell church or Williams', according to the developments of the enemy. He will be instructed to come at your call, or on the sound of battle.

Be careful to shift everything on our back track across to the Alatoona road.

I want to spare our cavalry as much as possible to get ready for the move on Opelika, if Johnston has gone beyond the Chattahoochee.

Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General THOMAS,  
*Commanding Army of the Cumberland.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Ackworth, Ga., June 3, 1864—12 m.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

I am now on the railroad at Ackworth Station and have full possession forward to within six (6) miles of Marietta. All well. Telegraph me all items of news to date. Has the movement on Mobile been ordered? General Canby telegraphs me that he can spare General A. J. Smith. All I ask is the co-operation of Farragut's fleet.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Ackworth, June 1, 1864.*

Major General BLAIR, *Kingston, Georgia:*

Instead of marching *via* Euharlee and Stilesboro' march direct for this place, *via* Cartersville and Alatoona. There is a pontoon bridge at the railroad crossing; leave a regiment at that bridge, and relieve General Garrard's cavalry, and the balance of a brigade at Alatoona, relieving General Stoneman's cavalry.

I want you to have ten (10) days' supply on arrival, ready for the Chattahoochee. Now is the time for big licks, so be alive night and day. At the pontoon try and manage that your command crosses between midnight and daylight, when it is not occupied by the supply trains. I want to go to Marietta on Wednesday or Thursday, and feel down to the Chattahoochee next day. Order the brigade left at Alatoona to be provided with tools, and to intrench both ends of the pass very strong. General McPherson is here with his command.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Ackworth, June 7, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

I have been to Alatoona Pass, and find it admirable for our purposes. It is the gate through the last or most eastern spur of the Alleghanies. It now becomes as useful to us as it was to the enemy, being easily defended from either

direction. My left, General McPherson, now lies on the railroad, in front of Ackworth, seven miles southeast of Alatoona; centre, General Thomas, three miles south, on a main Marietta road; and right, General Schofield, two miles further, a little refused.

The cars now come to the Etowah river, and we have sent back to replenish our supplies for a ten days' move, to commence on Thursday, the 9th instant. Colonel Wright reports it will take him ten days, eight of which yet remain, to have cars come to Ackworth.

General Blair was at Kingston last night, and will be across the Etowah to-night, and will be up with us to-morrow. We have three pontoon bridges at Etowah. I will leave a brigade in the pass, covering the bridge and its eastern debouche, and have sent Captain Poe, United States engineers, to lay out the works. The roads here into Georgia are large and good, and the country more open.

The enemy is not in our immediate front, but his signals are on Lost mountain and Kenesaw. I have had the cavalry at Alatoona Pass to get forage, but on the 9th will bring it forward. Colonel Long's brigade is with Blair, and will re-enforce our cavalry by two thousand horses.

I send you by mail to-day copies of my orders up to date, with Atlanta papers of the 5th.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Ackworth, June 8, 1864,*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

General Blair arrived to-day with two divisions of the 17th army corps, about nine thousand (9,000) strong, having left about fifteen hundred (1,500) in the Alatoona Pass to fortify and hold it. Colonel Wright, railroad superintendent, reports he will have the Etowah bridge done by the 12th instant.

To-morrow I will feel forward with cavalry, and follow up with infantry the moment the enemy develop his designs.

If he fight at the Kenesaw mountain, I will turn it; but if he select the line of the Chattahoochee, then I must study the case a little more before I commit myself.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Ackworth, June 10, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington D. C.:*

Our cavalry yesterday developed the position of the enemy in a line along the hills from Kenesaw to Lost mountain. We are now marching by three roads, all towards Kenesaw, and shall feel the position in force to-day, prepared to attack or turn it to-morrow. All well.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Big Shanty, June 11, 1864.*

General HALLECK *Washington, D. C.:*

Johnston is intrenched on the hills embracing Lost mountain, Pine Hill, and Kenesaw. Our lines are down to him, but it has rained so hard, and the ground is so boggy, that we have not developed any weak point or flank.

I will proceed with due caution, and try and make no mistake. The Etowah bridge is done, and the construction train has been to our very camps. Supplies will now be accumulated in Alatoona Pass, or brought right up to our lines.

One of my chief objects being to give full employment to Joe Johnston, it makes but little difference where he is, so he is not on his way to Virginia.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Big Shanty, June 13, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

We have had hard and cold rains for about ten days. A gleam of sunshine this evening gives hopes of a change. The roads are insufficient here, and the fields and new ground are simply impassable to wheels. As soon as possible I will study Johnston's position on Kenesaw and Lost mountain, and adopt some plan to dislodge him, or draw him out of his position. We cannot risk the heavy losses of an assault at this distance from our base. Cars now come to our very front camps. All well.

There are troops enough in Kentucky to manage Morgan, and in Tennessee to watch Forrest, should he make his appearance, as Johnston doubtless calculates.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY,  
*June 13, 1864—9.10 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN:

Morgan entered Kentucky with nearly three thousand (3,000) men, through Pound Gap, June 4. June 7 I started in pursuit from the mouth of Beaver on Big Sandy; attacked him at Mount Sterling at daylight June 9. Rebel loss nearly six hundred (600) prisoners, ours about twenty-five (25) killed, and one hundred wounded. I drove him *via* Lexington to Cynthiana, where I attacked at daylight yesterday a. m., gaining a complete victory. Rebel loss three hundred (300) killed and four hundred (400) prisoners, besides wounded. I captured over one thousand (1,000) horses, and recaptured most of General Hobson's command taken by Morgan the day before. Our loss about one hundred and fifty (150) killed and wounded. The rebel force is scattered, and small squads without arms or ammunition, and wholly demoralized, are being pursued and picked up in every direction.

S. G. BURBRIDGE,  
*Brigadier General United States Volunteers.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Big Shanty, June 14, 1864.*Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

I have just received the news of the defeat of our party sent out from Memphis, whose chief object was to hold Forrest there and keep him off our road. Of course, it is to be deplored, but we must prepare for all contingencies. I have ordered A. J. Smith not to go to Mobile, but to go out from Memphis and defeat Forrest at all costs. I know positively that all of Polk's command is here from Mississippi, viz : Loring's and French's divisions, and three (3) brigades of cavalry—Ferguson's, Ross', and Stark's. Forrest has only his own cavalry, which had started for North Alabama, and the militia under Gholson. I cannot understand how he could defeat Sturgis with eight thousand (8,000) men. Our troops must resume the offensive from Memphis.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Big Shanty, Ga., June 15, 1864.*

DEAR GENERAL : In further explanation of my orders of the day, I will add, I will be with General McPherson up to near noon ; after that with General Thomas's troops, near Howard's left, on Palmer's right, on the Burnt Hickory road. Of course, if an assault must be made on the enemy's lines, it devolves rightfully on the strongest army, and where it will do most good. A breach sufficient for me to pass the head of two columns about midway between Kenesaw and Pine mountains will be best ; although, if possible, one near the Sand Town road would be very good. Of course, the enemy is strongest on his right, and I doubt whether his left exceeds one division, and some cavalry. I infer from an intercepted despatch that Jackson's cavalry is sent, or will be to-day, on an errand to our rear. Now if you can mask a column anywhere about Cox's left, as near the Sand Town road as possible, and post it under cover, and secure some hill that will enable you to approach nearer the enemy than you now are, will be a great point gained, and I prefer you should work in your own way, but try and draw to your extreme right flank as much of the enemy as you can first. A brigade passing over the barricade near General Davis's house, half seen to the enemy, and deploying well off to your right towards Lost Mountain, taking all the cover possible and moving about with considerable eccentricity, would have the desired effect, while the rear column, as also that of General Stoneman, should act as much under cover as possible. A couple of brigades could hold your lines against any probable attack.

Although I did not clearly see the ground yesterday, I inferred that the skirmishing party you sent out the first day had crossed the main Alatoona creek. The lodgement, unless made across east of Alatoona creek, would not improve your present position ; but it is manifest your lines, where they now are, do not threaten the enemy.

He must regard them as precautionary or defensive, and, therefore, is at liberty to draw off from that quarter everything but skirmishers. To lessen the force in front of General Thomas you should, before two (2) p. m., force the enemy to strengthen that part of his line at the expense of his centre.

Of course, the position at Hard Shell church is your chief aim, but as that may be and is doubtless impossible now, I prefer one anywhere about the head of one of the branches of Alatoona creek, between Hard Shell and Hart.

I have just learned that General Howard is in possession of Pine Hill. This makes our movement more easy and necessary.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

General SCHOFIELD, *Mt. Olive Church.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Big Shanty, June 15, 1864.*

GENERAL: After the long storm had cleared away I examined carefully our whole front, and found the enemy occupying the series of broken ridges and hills which form the water-shed between the Etowah and Chattahoochee, embracing three prominent peaks—Kenesaw, Pine Hill, and Lost Mountain. Pine Hill is about four (4) miles southwest of Kenesaw, and was the apex of the triangle, the salient of the enemy's position. All seemed well fortified and connected by lines of breastworks in the midst of dense chestnut woods. I first ordered Thomas to push Palmer's and Howard's corps in the interval between Kenesaw and Pine Hill until they occupied a certain road, the batteries in front of Pine Hill occupying the attention of the enemy; one of the shots killed Bishop Polk. The movement was perfectly successful, and this morning Pine Hill was abandoned to us, strongly fortified. This morning I ordered Schofield, on the right, to threaten Lost Mountain, and McPherson to turn Kenesaw by the left, while Thomas pushed his whole army to break the centre. Schofield carried the first line of the enemy's works, left exposed by the loss of Pine Hill, and has some fifty prisoners. McPherson carried a hill to his left front, taking the fourteenth Alabama regiment entire, three hundred and twenty (320) strong, and Thomas has pushed the enemy back about a mile and a half, and is still moving. I hope he will pass the dividing ridge, in which case the enemy's position will be untenable. I left him about sundown, but the ground was so obscured by bushes that we could not discern whether the enemy had a second line of earthworks connecting Kenesaw and Lost Mountain, and I don't want to give them time to form one. From Pine Hill we can see Marietta. Losses to-day very small, it having been one grand skirmish extending along a front of eight miles. An intercepted despatch reports the death, by a cannon shot, of Bishop Polk, and is confirmed by the prisoners.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HALLECK,  
*Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, June 16, 1864.*

GENERAL: Continue to work toward the lower Marietta road, aiming to reach nearly the same point that Thomas heads for, viz., Hart's; but with small detachments and skirmishers keep all the time feeling over about Lost Mountain; it is not necessary to keep up connected lines. We are not on the defensive, except as to our wagons and supplies, and should invite the enemy out. Send word to General Stoneman and have him to feel well around Lost Mountain. The enemy have had no signal on it for some days; still I know they are sensitive about that flank. Get all your guns to the front, where they can converge on some point of the enemy, knock away the obstructions and make a breach. I will try the same at General Thomas's front.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General SCHOFIELD, *Present.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

*In the field, Big Shanty, June 16, 1864.*General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

General Thomas did not make the progress last night I expected. He found the enemy strongly intrenched on a line slightly advanced from a straight line connecting Lost Mountain and Kenesaw. I have been along it to-day, and am pressing up close; shall study it, and am now inclined to feign on both flanks and assault the centre. It may cost us dear, but in results would surpass an attempt to pass round. The enemy has a strong position and covers his road well, and the only weak point of his game is in having the Chattahoochee to his rear. If by assaulting I can break his line, I see no reason why it should not produce a decisive effect. I know he shifts his troops about to meet our supposed attacks, and thereby fatigues his men, and the woods will enable me to mask our movements.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Big Shanty, June 17, 1864.*General HALLECK, *Washington:*

By last night we had worked our way so close to Johnston's centre that he saw that the assault must follow. He declined it, and abandoned Lost Mountain and some six miles of as good field-works as I ever saw. My right and centre are, in consequence, swung forward, so that my right now threatens his railroad to Atlanta. I worked hard to-day to get over to that road, but the troops seem timid in these dense forests of stumbling on a hidden breastwork. I therefore simply report good progress to-day—some hundred prisoners, and but few lives lost. We begin to find more fields and cleared land. McPherson still faces Kenesaw, covering our railroad. General Thomas is on a curve line from Kenesaw around to where the Sandtown road forks off from the lower road from Dallas to Marietta; and Schofield is massed on the Sandtown road, head of column at Nose's creek.

Enemy still holds Kenesaw in force, and lies back of Nose's creek, near the Atlanta road.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Big Shanty, June 18, 1864.*

GENERAL: As soon as the weather will permit, I propose to operate against the enemy's left from the position on the Sandtown road near the Darby Place, which is near Nose's creek, and where a main Marietta road makes off with a right angle from the Sandtown road.

General Schofield will move substantially by the Sandtown road, varying his direction eastwardly if he finds the enemy's flank. General Thomas will move directly against the enemy's left flank. Hooker is on his right, Howard centre, and Palmer left.

I will instruct General Thomas to push Palmer's line forward, close up to

Kenesaw, and then draw off by his right flank in case his whole corps is called on, but to leave a division or brigade to cover his lines; but if the enemy meets it with his whole force, it may be necessary to draw out all Palmer's corps. But this will demonstrate that the enemy's lines are weak, and no apprehension need be felt of their assuming the offensive against you. Still the contingency may arise that will compel your command, also, to move by the right flank, following, as it were, the movement of Palmer; although I should prefer you to advance by the direct road to Marietta.

I want you, by your staff officers, to examine the ground from your right around to the place I have described as Darby's, as also to watch closely the movements of the enemy, and at the earliest possible moment to secure a position forward on the ridge over which the railroad and main Marietta road pass, and pursue always in case of retreat. In any event, should you hear heavy fighting off to the right of Kenesaw, make the strongest possible demonstration on your whole front, and break through if our operations on that flank weaken the enemy.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General MCPHERSON,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Big Shanty, June 18, 1864.*

GENERAL: As soon as the weather will permit, I propose we shall attack and drive the enemy's left flank. I propose that General Schofield shall move in strong column down the Sandtown road, and vary his course to the right or left until he finds the flank; that you move, as it were, on a grand left wheel in the order your troops now stand. Draw from Palmer division by division, giving, if possible, McPherson notice when the last division (Davis's) is called out of position, that he may dispose accordingly. McPherson has orders to watch well the effect on the enemy, and at the first possible chance to push forward on the line of the railroad and main Marietta road, break through the enemy, and pursue him or secure a position on the commanding ridge over which these roads pass. It is barely possible that McPherson may be called on also to reinforce your movement by covering by his right flank, and I have instructed him to study the ground with that view; though, if it can possibly be obviated, I do not wish to uncover Big Shanty and our railroad.

I have just received Howard's report by signal, that he has carried two lines of the enemy, and has his batteries up within two hundred yards of his main line. I am very anxious to ascertain, at the earliest possible moment, if the enemy has any part of his main line this side of Nose's creek, and would like Palmer to feel forward with a very heavy line of skirmishers and supports until he finds the earthworks along the base of Kenesaw south of the railroad. Dodge and Osterhaus are up close to the base north of the railroad; but last night I followed Davis's pickets, and, though advanced during yesterday, they appeared to me still a long distance back from Kenesaw.

I suppose Hooker to be west of Mud creek and near its mouth, and that Howard is near brother Ballinger's or widow Ballinger's, and Palmer is from Britt's to Jack Smith's; what we want, then, is the ground from Cheatham's to Latimer's, Brand, and Wallace.

My impression is, the enemy's best forts will be found where the rail and main Marietta roads pass around the north end of Kenesaw, along the north base of Kenesaw, to some point behind Nose's creek, and then along back of Nose's

creek indefinitely. Until Schofield develops the flank, we should move with due caution; but the moment it is found, or we are satisfied the enemy has lengthened his line beyond his ability to defend, we must strike quick and with great energy.

The weather is villanously bad; but I hope to-morrow will be clear. Send me word if you can define on our map Hooker's and Howard's positions, assuming Schofield's to be on the Sandtown road near the forks.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General THOMAS,  
*Commanding Army of the Cumberland.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, June 20, 1864.*

General ROUSSEAU, *Nashville.*

The division of John E. Smith is ordered up from Huntsville to Kingston; it will leave the brigade of Dodge at Decatur for a short time, to wait and see what Forrest will do. I propose to keep him occupied from Memphis. He whipped Sturgis fair and square, and now I will put against him A. J. Smith and Mower and let them try their hand. But you should at all times have things so arranged that you are prepared for his appearance about Florence and Waterloo. You should keep scouts and parties out all the time to break up his posts in the centre to the west and south side of the Tennessee.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, June 20, 1864.*

GENERAL: It is manifest the enemy is manœuvring on our communications, and is reaching as far back as Dalton and Cleveland. I have ordered General McPherson to call up the division of John E. Smith from Huntsville, to take post at Kingston. That will give General Steedman three good detachments along the Etowah—Rome, Kingston, and Alatoona. I have instructed him to send to Rome a regiment of Alabama cavalry that is hanging round here of no use, with orders to scout across the Tennessee to Guntersville, towards Gadsden, &c. Now, as soon as these changes can be made—and they will be initiated at once—you had better give Lowe all cavalry back of the Etowah, and keep him off along the old Tennessee road, from Cartersville, Spring Place, &c., with orders, at his discretion, to venture out to Ellijay, Dahlonega, Cumming, &c.

General Steedman was here last night, and has returned. He wants train guard, and I have also ordered you to supply him a thousand men, which is the equivalent of present garrison of Kingston, which will be relieved by John E. Smith's division as soon as it can come from Huntsville.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General THOMAS,  
*Commanding Army of the Cumberland.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, June 20, 1864.*

GENERAL: General Blair's application for a mounted force of two companies is received. During our operations here, where infantry and artillery alone can act, our cavalry must all be kept on the grand flanks and on our communications; as it is, our cavalry is liable to be absorbed in orderly and courier duty, leaving our flanks and rear at the mercy of our enemy. This I must prevent. I insist on all organized cavalry being massed on our flanks and rear, at present, where it can act to accomplish some military result. I know there are plenty of officers and men mounted in all the corps and divisions, that can be collected and made into orderlies and couriers. I wish you to make this rule general in your army. The two companies ordered from General Blair to their regiment was at the earnest appeal of the cavalry officers.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General McPHERSON,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

NASHVILLE, *June 20, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

On recently leaving Washington, to organize colored troops in Kentucky, the Secretary of War desired me to proceed to Chattanooga and put myself in communication with you, and he expressed his strong desire that you would give facilities for organizations within your command. I request that you will send the negroes, who may come in or be gathered in by your forces, to this place, where they can the more readily be organized and provided for. If you desire to form regiments with your army, do so, and send me the roster of the officers appointed. I have seen your recent order respecting the enlistment of negroes, the practical working of which, it seems to me, will almost altogether stop recruiting with your army. I know not under what circumstances it was issued, but the imprisonment of officers for disobedience seems to me a harsh measure. Would it not be better to organize the negroes, and from them make the necessary details for the staff departments?

Of course, I do not wish to deprive you of any negroes you may require for service with your army, and have sent a copy of the order to the Secretary of War. I leave for Chattanooga this evening, where I shall be glad to hear from you.

L. THOMAS,  
*Adjutant General United States Army.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Big Shanty, June 21, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

This is the nineteenth day of rain, and the prospect of clear weather as far off as ever. The roads are impassable, and fields and woods become quagmires after a few wagons have crossed. Yet we are at work all the time. The left flank is across Noonday, and the right across Nose's creek. The enemy holds Kenesaw, a conical mountain, with Marietta behind it, and has retired his flanks to cover that town and his railroad. I am all ready to attack the moment the weather and roads will permit troops and artillery to move with anything like life.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, June 22, 1864.*

GENERAL: The rain having ceased, and a prospect of roads drying up, I have to instruct that you cause your cavalry to be most active down to the Sweetwater, both on the Powder Spring road and the factory road. Hold the place on your map called "Cheny's," and turn your head of column up the Marietta road until you support Hooker's right, and then act according to circumstances. If Johnston fights for Marietta, we must accept battle; but if he give ground, we must be most active, and for that reason I want you as long as possible to control the Sandtown road.

I will probably meet you to-day about "Mrs. Kulp's," on the Powder Spring and Marietta road.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General SCHOFIELD,  
*Commanding Army of the Ohio.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, June 22, 1864.*

GENERAL: I will start early to look at the position of McPherson, as near the north base of Kenesaw as I can safely do, and then come to Wallace's, or the house in front, and then over to Hooker. I have ordered Schofield to cross his whole command over Nose's creek and turn the head of his column up toward Marietta until he reaches Hooker; to support and co-operate on his right, but to keep his cavalry and a part of his rear infantry on the Sandtown road, prepared to regain it in case the enemy show signs of let go. I fear we will get our commands too close, but I suppose Schofield can find room to deploy south of the Powder Spring and Marietta road. You may order Hooker to extend to that road and leave Schofield beyond. If he can get possession of the ground up to Mrs. Kulp's, I wish him to do so, and the balance of your line to conform. I will explain McPherson's orders when I meet you.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General THOMAS,  
*Commanding Army of the Cumberland.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, June 22, 1864.*

GENERAL: I am starting for what I deem the point of most activity to-day, though the state of the roads won't admit of much activity. Yet we may gain possession of ground useful. I wish you to keep Garrard moving about, without breaking connexion with you entirely, so as to keep the enemy on his guard on his right flank; the same of Blair's corps, operating on a circle of small radius.

The 15th corps might wheel a little to the right, gaining ground and increasing the pressure on the enemy, holding fast all it makes, while Dodge's two divisions should be disposed so as best to cover Big Shanty as against a rally from Kenesaw on the road at its base. Keep the skirmish line in motion all the time, but hold the rear masses ready to re-enforce Thomas, should he become heavily engaged.



Thomas will keep pressing up to Marietta, his right on the Powder Spring road, and his left on the Burnt Hickory, contracting his lines as he advanced.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General MCPHERSON,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Big Shanty, June 22, 1864—9 p. m.*

GENERAL: When on the hill in front of your centre to-day, waiting for you, I signalled to General Hooker:

“How are you getting along? Near what house are you?”

“W. T. SHERMAN,  
“Major General.”

At this hour (9½) I have received this answer:

“KULP HOUSE—5.30 p. m.

“We have repulsed two heavy attacks and feel confident, our only apprehension being from our extreme right flank. Three (3) entire corps are in front of us.

“Major General HOOKER.”

I was at the Wallace house at 5.30 p. m., and the Kulp house was within two miles, and though I heard some cannonading, I had no idea of his being attacked, and General Hooker must be mistaken about three (3) entire corps being in his front. Johnston's army has only three corps, and I know there was a very respectable force along McPherson's front, so much so that this general thought the enemy was massing against him. I know there was some force in front of Palmer and Howard, for I was there. Still, it is very natural the enemy should meet Hooker at that point in force, and I gave Schofield orders this morning to conduct his column from Nose's creek, on the Powder Spring road, toward Marietta, and support Hooker's right flank, sending his cavalry down the Powder Spring road toward Sweetwater, and leaving some infantry from his rear to guard the fords. Captain Dayton says General Schofield receipted my orders, which were in writing. If later information shows that Schofield is not up, send a staff officer and notify him of the necessity, and, if need be, call off all of Palmer's, and notify McPherson, who has his orders for this very contingency. To-morrow, if need be, we must bring things to a crisis.

Cars and telegraph now all right. Some of John E. Smith's men are at Chattanooga, so that I think our road will be better guarded. The cavalry of Lowe should be out on the Tennessee road, patrolling from Cartersville to Spring place.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General THOMAS,  
*Commanding Army of the Cumberland.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Big Shanty, June 22, 1864.*

GENERAL: General Hooker, this p. m., advanced to the Kulp house, two and a half miles southwest of Marietta, and reports finding the enemy in as strong force as three (3) corps. He was attacked twice, and successfully re-

pulsed the enemy. General Thomas thinks that that will be the enemy's tactics, and that you ought to attack Marietta from that side of Kenesaw, but I judge the safer and better plan to be the one I indicated, viz: for you to leave a light force and cover that flank, and throw the remainder, rapidly and as much out of view as possible, to our right.

You may make the necessary orders, and be prepared for rapid action to-morrow. So dispose matters that the big guns of Kenesaw will do you as little mischief as possible.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Major General MCPHERSON,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Big Shanty, June 23, 1864.*

GENERAL: As the question may arise, and you have a right to the support of my authority, I now decide that the use of torpedoes is justifiable in war in advance of an army, so as to make his advance up a river or over a road more dangerous and difficult. But after the adversary has gained the country by fair warlike means, then the case entirely changes. The use of torpedoes in blowing up cars and the road after they are in our possession, is simply malicious. It cannot alter the great problem, but simply makes trouble. Now, if torpedoes are found in the possession of an enemy to our rear, you may cause them to be put on the ground and tested by wagon-loads of prisoners, or, if need be, by citizens implicated in their use. In like manner, if a torpedo is suspected on any part of the railroad, order the point to be tested by a car-load of prisoners, or citizens implicated, drawn by a long rope. Of course an enemy cannot complain of his own traps.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General J. B. STEEDMAN,  
*Commanding District of the Etowah, Chattanooga.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Big Shanty, June 23, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

We continue to press forward, operating upon the principles of an advance against fortified positions. The whole country is one vast fort, and Johnston must have full fifty miles of connected trenches, with abatis and finished batteries. We gain ground daily, fighting all the time. On the 21st General Stanley gained a position near the south end of Kenesaw, from which the enemy attempted in vain to drive him, and the same day General T. J. Wood's division took a hill which the enemy assaulted three times at night without success, leaving more than a hundred dead on the ground. Yesterday the extreme right, Hooker and Schofield, advanced on the Powder Spring road to within three miles of Marietta. The enemy made a strong effort to drive them away, but failed signally, leaving more than two hundred dead on the field.

Our lines are now in close contact and the fighting incessant, with a good deal of artillery. As fast as we gain one position the enemy has another all

ready, but I think he will soon have to let go Kenesaw, which is the key to the whole country. The weather is now better, and the roads are drying up fast.

Our losses are light, and, notwithstanding the repeated breaks in the road to our rear, supplies are ample.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

MEMPHIS, *June 22, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

All is going well. Forrest still remains at Baldwin and Tupello in large force. Smith's force consists of nine thousand (9,000) infantry, three thousand cavalry and four (4) batteries. They will move towards Corinth and endeavor to draw Forrest as far up as possible. He will no doubt concentrate everything this side of Grenada and will leave Mobile defenceless. If while Smith is engaging them, General Canby would send from New Orleans ten thousand (10,000) men to Mobile, *via* Pascagoula, that city would be easily captured. The force of Forrest is larger than you suppose, but should have been whipped.

C. C. WASHBURN,  
*Major General.*

CHATTANOOGA, *June 24, 1864.*

Captain DAYTON:

The enemy with squads of cavalry are making desperate efforts to cut our communications. The bridges are now all guarded, and mounted force patrolling both sides of the road. Will have tops of cars protected with plank so that guards can defend them. General Jno. E. Smith is at Larkinsville this morning; can reach Stevenson to-night.

J. B. STEEDMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Kenesaw, June 24, 1864.*

GENERAL: I am directed by the general commanding to acknowledge the receipt through you of General Rousseau's communication in copy, the original of which also came to hand.

The general commanding thinks quite favorably of the suggestions therein, and desires you to instruct General Rousseau to gradually collect his available force of cavalry and infantry at Pulaski, Athens and Decatur, upon the representation of protecting our roads against Forrest, but really to strike as proposed, the cavalry to be well fed, and the infantry stripped for light rapid movements, and to be ready to move at telegraphic notice from us. The time to do it will be when we have forced Johnston across the Chattahoochee. The general commanding has just received telegraphic information that General A. J. Smith moves from Memphis, *via* Corinth, to engage Forrest, (who is now at Baldwin,) anywhere between Corinth and Tupello. Smith has nine thousand (9,000) infantry and three thousand (3,000) cavalry.

I am, general, very respectfully, yours,

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp.*

Major General G. H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding, &c.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Kenesaw Mountain, June 25, 1864.*General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*:

I have nothing new to report; constant skirmishing and cannonading. I am making some changes in the disposition of our men, with a view to attack the enemy's left centre. I shall aim to make him stretch his line until he weakens it, and then break through.

Johnston has made repeated attempts to break our roads to the rear, and has succeeded in two instances, which were promptly repaired. General Steedman, at Chattanooga, reports that General Pillow approached from the south with three thousand (3,000) men, but was met at Lafayette by Colonel Watkins and repulsed; full details not yet received. I think the arrangements to protect our rear are ample against any probable danger.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Kenesaw, June 26, 1864, 10½ a. m.*

General SCHOFIELD:

I don't care about Colonel Riley succeeding; let him throw up a hasty parapet for his guns and fire away, and make all dispositions as though he intended to force a passage. Same with General Cox, up where he is. It should be done to-day, to induce the enemy to strengthen that flank to-night.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*Near Kenesaw Mountain, June 26, 1864.*General LORENZO THOMAS, *Louisville, Kentucky*:

I was gratified at the receipt of your despatch from Chattanooga. I would have answered sooner if our telegraph had not been broken so often of late. As I wrote you, I know all the people have left north Georgia for the region of the Flint and Apalachicola, with their negroes.

The regiments of blacks now in Chattanooga and Tennessee will absorb all the recruits we can get; but if you raise new regiments, they could be well employed about Clarksville, Bowling Green, and on the Tennessee river—say at the terminus of the northwest railroad. My preference is to make this radical change with natural slowness. If negroes are taken as soldiers by undue influence or force, and compelled to leave their women in the uncertainty of their new condition, they cannot be relied on; but if they can put their families in some safe place and then earn money as soldiers or laborers, the transition will be more easy and the effect more permanent.

What my order contemplated was the eagerness of recruiting captains and lieutenants to make up their quota in order to be commissioned. They would use a species of force or undue influence, and break up our gangs of laborers, as necessary as soldiers. We find gangs of negro laborers well organized on the Mississippi, at Nashville, and along the railroads, most useful, and I have used them with great success as pioneer companies attached to divisions, and I

think it would be well if a law would sanction such an organization, say, of one hundred (100) to each division of four hundred (400) men.

The first step in the liberation of the negro from bondage will be to get him and family to a place of safety, then to afford him the means of providing for his family, (for their instincts are very strong,) then gradually use a proportion, greater and greater each year, as sailors and soldiers. There will be no great difficulty in our absorbing the four millions (4,000,000) of slaves in this great industrious country of ours, and being lost to their masters, the cause of the war is gone, for this great money interest ceases to be an element in our politics and civil economy. If you divert too large a proportion of the able-bodied into the ranks, you will leave too large a class of black paupers on our hands. The great mass of our soldiery must be of the white race, and the black troops should for some years be used with caution, and with due regard to the prejudice of the races. As was to be expected, in some instances they have done well, in others badly; but on the whole the experiment is worthy a fair trial, and all I ask is that it be not forced beyond the laws of natural development. In Maryland, Missouri, and Kentucky, it may be wisely used to secure their freedom with the consent of owners.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Near Kenesaw Mountain, June 26, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD:

Is the brigade across Olley's creek, above the Sandtown road, or at the road? Describe to me well the situation of that flank, that I may advise Thomas and McPherson.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Kenesaw Mountain, June 26, 1864.*

Major General SCHOFIELD:

All right. Be careful of a brigade so exposed, but I am willing to risk a good deal.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Kenesaw Mountain, June 26, 1864.*

Major General SCHOFIELD:

Good bridge should be made to-night across Olley's creek, where the brigade is across, and operations resumed there in the morning early.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
Near Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864.

Major General SCHOFIELD :

I will be on Signal Hill to-day, where I will have a telegraph post. Keep some orderlies at your telegraph station, that my orders may reach you during the day.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
Near Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864.

General THOMAS :

I will be on Signal Hill to-day, where I have a telegraph station. Keep some orderlies at your telegraph office, who can reach you promptly with orders, and keep me well advised.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
Near Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864.

Major General McPHERSON :

I will be on Signal Hill, where I have a telegraph office. Leave some orderlies at your telegraph station, that orders may reach any part of your line with despatches. Keep me well advised, as I must work the flanks according to the progress of the centre.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
In the field, June 27, 1864—11.45 a. m.

General SCHOFIELD :

Neither McPherson nor Thomas has succeeded in breaking through, but each has made substantial progress at some cost. Push your operations on the flank, and keep me advised.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
In the field, June 27, 1864—11.45 a. m.

General THOMAS :

McPherson's column marched near the top of the hill through very tangled brush, but was repulsed; it is found almost impossible to deploy, but they still

hold the ground. I wish you to study well the positions, and if it be possible to break the line do it; it is easier now than it will be hereafter. I hear Leggett's guns well behind the mountain.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, June 27, 1864—1.30 p. m.*

General THOMAS:

McPherson and Schofield are at a dead lock. Do you think you can carry any part of the enemy's main line to-day? McPherson's men are up to the abatis, and can't move without the direct assault. I will order the assault if you think you can succeed at any point. Schofield has one division close up on the Powder Spring road, and the other across Olley's creek, about two miles to his right and rear.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, June 27, 1864—2.25 p. m.*

General THOMAS:

Secure what advantageous ground you have gained; but is there anything in the enemy's present position that if we should approach by regular saps he could not make a dozen new parapets before our saps are completed? Does the nature of the ground warrant the time necessary for regular approaches?

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, June 27, 1864.—4.10 p. m.*

General THOMAS:

Schofield has gained the crossing of Olley's creek on the Sandtown road, the only advantage of the day. You may order all ground of value gained to-day to be secured, and prepare batteries in the manner proposed by Davis. I doubt if we can resort to regular approaches.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, June 27, 1864.—4. 10 p. m.*

General SCHOFIELD :

Let Cox secure well the crossing at Olley's creek on the Sandtown road, and take all advantage of that flank should we move in that direction. Otherwise hold fast all you have and remain on the defensive.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*June 27, 1864.—6 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

The assault of the enemy's works in my front was well arranged, and the officers and men went to their work with the greatest coolness and gallantry. The failure to carry them is due only to the strength of the works, and to the fact that they were well managed, thereby enabling the enemy to hold them securely against the assault. We have lost nearly two thousand (2,000) officers and men, among them two brigade commanders—General Harker, commanding a brigade in Newton's division, and Colonel Dan McCook, commanding a brigade in Jeff. Davis's division—both reported to be mortally wounded, besides some six (6) or eight (8) field officers killed.

Both General Harker and Colonel McCook were wounded on the enemy's breastworks, and all say had they not been wounded we would have driven the enemy from his works.

Both Generals Howard and Palmer think that they can find favorable positions on their lines for placing batteries for enfilading the enemy's works. We took between ninety (90) and one hundred (100) prisoners.

Respectfully,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*Near Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864.*

General THOMAS :

Let your troops fortify as close up to the enemy as possible; get good positions for artillery, and group your command as conveniently as you can by corps and divisions, keeping reserves. Schofield has the Sandtown road within eleven miles of the Chattahoochee, and we could move by that flank. The question of supplies will be the only one. I regret beyond measure the loss of two such young and dashing officers as Harker and Dan McCook. McPherson lost two or three of his young and dashing officers, which is apt to be the case in unsuccessful assaults. Had we broken the line to-day it would have been most decisive, but as it is our loss is small compared with some of those east; it should not in the least discourage us. At times, assaults are necessary and inevitable. At Arkansas Post we succeeded; at Vicksburg we failed. I do not think our loss to-day greater than Johnston's when he attacked Hooker and Schofield, the first day we occupied our present ground.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*



[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Kenesaw, June 27, 1864.*

General HALLECK:

Pursuant to my orders of the 24th, a diversion was made on each flank of the enemy, especially on the Sandtown road, and at 8 a. m. General McPherson attacked at the southwest end of the Kenesaw, and General Thomas at a point about a mile further south; at the same time skirmishers and artillery, along the whole line, kept up a sharp fire. Neither attack succeeded, though both columns reached the enemy's works, which are very strong. General McPherson reports his loss about five hundred, and General Thomas about two thousand; the loss particularly heavy in general and field officers. General Harker is reported mortally wounded; also Colonel Dan McCook, commanding brigade, Colonel Rice, 57th Ohio, very seriously. Colonels Barnhill, 40th Illinois, and Augustine, 55th Illinois, are killed.

The facilities with which defensive works of timber and earth are constructed gives the party on the defensive great advantage.

I cannot well turn the position of the enemy without abandoning my railroad, and we are already so far from our supplies that it is as much as the road can do to feed and supply the army. There are no supplies of any kind here. I can press Johnston and keep him from re-enforcing Lee, but to assault him in position will cost us more lives than we can spare.

McPherson took to-day a hundred prisoners and Thomas about as many, but I do not suppose that we have inflicted heavy loss on the enemy, as he kept close behind his parapets.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Kenesaw, June 27, 1864.*

General McPHERSON:

Is General Blair back? Report to me fully his operations for to-day. Schofield's right division (Cox) has gained a good position on the other side of Olley's creek and at the head of Nickajack. If we had our supplies well up I would move by the right flank, but suppose we must cover our railroad for a few days.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*June 27, 1864.—9. p. m.*

General THOMAS:

Are you willing to risk the move on Fulton, cutting loose from our railroad? It would bring matters to a crisis, and Schofield has secured the way.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1864.—4 p. m.

Major General SHERMAN :

General Grant directs me to say that the movements of your army may be made entirely independent of any desire to retain Johnston's forces where they are. He does not think that Lee will bring any more additional troops to Richmond, on account of the difficulty of feeding them.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

• HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Kenesaw, June 29, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C. :*

Our loss on the 27th will not exceed fifteen hundred (1,500.) As usual, the first reports were overstated. General Harker is dead. The wounded are doing well, and most are already sent to the rear in cars. Some few of the dead and wounded were left in the enemy's hands, close to his parapet.

I am accumulating stores that will enable me to cut loose from the railroad for a time, and avoid the Kenesaw Hill, which gives the enemy too much advantage. I will aim to get to the railroad below Marietta by a circuit, or actually reach the Chattahoochee. Our right flank is now on the Sandtown road below Olley's creek.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Kenesaw, June 29, 1864.*

General ROUSSEAU, *Nashville, Tennessee :*

I have yours of the 27th. Of course go on and make all the preparations, but do not start until we know something definite of General A. J. Smith, and until I have pushed Johnson across the Chattahoochee. The points of importance are Montgomery, Opelika, and Columbus, Georgia. I have had forage placed at Pensacola in case of the party having to go there. Don't move until I give specific orders.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Kenesaw, June 30, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD :

General Thomas is here. He will study his ground well and prepare to relieve Hascall's division to-night, in which event I want you with your whole force to occupy between Olley's creek and Nickajack, to drive the enemy from the forks of the road, and picket as far down the Fulton road as Nickajack creek, and as far on the Sandtown road as possible. At the same time General

Stoneman's cavalry, supported by McCook, should move across Sweetwater by Powder Springs, and down the west side of Sweetwater creek to Sweetwater town, which crossing once secure, Stoneman to hold it and McCook to return to Lost Mountain.

General McPherson's command to remain where it is until our stores are complete, when his cavalry will guard the roads from Marietta towards Alatoona, while McPherson moves with his whole command down the Sandtown road to the Chattahoochee. If Johnston holds on to the Kenesaw, then we must strike some point on the railroad between Marietta and the bridge; but if he let go of Marietta, then we will swing across the railroad to a position that gives us again the use of the railroad.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Kenesaw, June 30, 1864.*

General ROUSSEAU, *Nashville, Tennessee:*

The movement that I want you to study and be prepared for is contingent on the fact that General A. J. Smith defeats Forrest or holds him well in check and after I succeed in making Joe Johnston pass the Chattahoochee with his army, when I want you to go in person or to send some good officer with 2,500 good cavalry well armed, and a sufficient number of pack-mules loaded with ammunition, salt, sugar and coffee, and some bread or flour, depending on the country for forage, meat and corn-meal. The party might take two light Rodman guns, with orders in case of very rapid movements to cut the wheels and burn the carriages, taking sledges along to break off trunnions and wedge them into the muzzles. The expedition should start from Decatur, move slowly to Blountsville and Ashville, and if the way is clear, cross the Coosa at the Ten Islands or the railroad bridge, destroying it after their passage, then move rapidly for Talladega or Oxford, and then for the nearest ford or bridge over the Tallapoosa. That passed, the expedition should move with rapidity on the railroad between Tuskegee and Opelika, breaking up the road and twisting the bars of iron. They should work on that road night and day, doing all the damage possible, toward and including Opelika. If no serious opposition offer, they should threaten Columbus, Georgia, and then turn up the Chattahoochee to join us, between Marietta and Atlanta, doing all the mischief possible. No infantry in position should be attacked, and the party should avoid all fighting possible, bearing in mind, for their own safety, that Pensacola, Rome, the Etowah and my army, are all places of refuge. If compelled to make Pensacola, they should leave their horses, embark for New Orleans and come round to Nashville again.

Study this well and be prepared to act on orders when the time comes. Selma, though important, is more easily defended than the route I have named.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO, *June 30, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

It occurs to me as a question worthy of consideration whether Johnston, in anticipation of your present movement, may not bring up to Marietta two or three weeks' supplies, close the gorge of his lines in rear of Marietta, and meet you there in a strongly intrenched position and with a greater amount of supplies than you can carry.

J. M. SCHOFIELD, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Kenesaw, June 30, 1864—8½ p. m.*

General SCHOFIELD:

Johnston may do as you suggest, but I hardly think, even in the event you conjecture, will he be willing to have me interfere between him and the rest of the confederacy. I am not bound to attack him in his position, after getting below him, but may cross the Chattahoochee and destroy all his railroads before he can prevent it, which will be a desperate game for us both. I am aware of all the chances, but we must take the initiative and risk something, or attack him where he now is.

Our communications are now secure, and the time more favorable for making a risk than if we wait looking at each other till he gets cavalry to our rear.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Kenesaw, June 30, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD:

I think I have contemplated every move on the chess-board of war, but am always much obliged for your full views. I regard each of my three armies as able to hold in check any attempt of the enemy to mass or overwhelm a part until the others come up, and try so to manage that each army is an unit. Should Johnston hold us in the new position aimed at, we still have the Alatoona and Etowah to our rear all safe, and more secure by a division of five thousand (5,000) men that has reached Chattanooga and Kingston from Huntsville.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Kenesaw, July 1, 1864.*

General STEEDMAN, *Chattanooga, Tennessee:*

To-morrow I propose to move in such a way that my communication with the railroad may be broken for some days, and great attention must be given to the line of the Etowah, especially Cartersville and Alatoona. Now that you have General John E. Smith's division, send to Alatoona and Rome the two regiments that belong there, that have been detained along the road. You will now have all of Lowe's division of cavalry for guarding off to the east; it has heretofore been tied down to Kingston, but should now be over about Adairsville and Talking Rock, scouting all the time.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Kenesaw, July 1, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

General Schofield is now south of Olley's creek and on the head of Nickajack. I have been hurrying down provisions and forage, and to-morrow night propose to move General McPherson from the left to the extreme right, back of General

Thomas. This will bring my right within three miles of Chattahoochee, and about five of the railroad. By this movement I think I can force Johnston to move his army down from Kenesaw to defend his railroad crossing and the Chattahoochee, when I will by the left flank reach the railroad below Marietta. But I cut loose from the railroad with ten (10) days' supplies in wagons. Johnston may come out of his intrenchments and attack General Thomas, which is what I want, for General Thomas is well intrenched parallel with the enemy, south of Kenesaw. I think Alatoona and the line of the Etowah are strong enough for me to venture on this move. The movement is substantially down the Sandtown road, straight for Atlanta.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Kenesaw, July 2, 1864.*

General ROUSSEAU, *Nashville, Tennessee :*

Now is the time for the raid to Opelika. Telegraph me whether you go yourself, or who will command. Forrest is in Mississippi, and Roddy has also gone there. All other rebel cavalry is here.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Marietta, July 3, 1864—6½ p. m.*

General McPHERSON :

Thomas has Hooker on the road out of Marietta, which is called an Atlanta road, but runs to the Sandtown road, crossing Nickajack at Ruff & Dunn's mill; he finds the enemy intrenched a mile this side of the mill. Howard is on the main Atlanta road, which is on the left of the railroad, and Palmer is intermediate, all finding the enemy near the line indicated by the crossroad from above Week's to the main road, about a mile and a half below Ruff's. I am convinced the enemy left Marietta in haste and confusion this morning. All the columns have taken many prisoners, and had the pursuit been vigorous we could have secured three or four thousand (3,000 or 4,000) prisoners and many wagons. Now the halt is of course to save time. If you ever worked in your life, work at day-break to-morrow on the flank, crossing Nickajack somehow, and the moment you discover confusion pour in your fire. You know what a retreating mass across pontoon bridges means. Feel strong to-night and make feints of pursuit with artillery. I know Johnston's withdrawal is not strategic, but for good reasons, after he crosses the Chattahoochee; but his situation with that river behind him is not comfortable at all. If you can get him once started, follow up and call on Schofield. Let him read this. You both see the whole game as well as I do. Let Stoneman threaten about Baker and Howell's ferries, and you secure, if you can, the bridge and crossing at Nickajack, opposite Thomas. I will send Logan to you to-morrow, but you have as many men as can operate in that pocket. I don't confine you to any crossing, but press the enemy all the time in flank, till he is across the Chattahoochee.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Marietta, July 3, 1864—6½ p. m.*

GENERAL THOMAS :

The more I reflect, the more I know Johnston's halt is to save time to cross his material and men. No general, such as he, would invite battle with the Chattahoochee behind him. I have ordered McPherson and Schofield to cross Nickajack at any cost, and work night and day to get the enemy started in confusion toward his bridges. I know you appreciate the situation. We will never have such a chance again, and I want you to impress on Hooker, Howard, and Palmer the importance of the most intense energy of attack to-night and in the morning, and to press with vehemence at any cost of life and material. Every inch of his line should be felt, and the moment there is a give, pursuit should be made by day with lines, and by night with a single head of column and section of artillery to each corps following a road. Hooker should communicate with McPherson by a circuit, if necessary, and act in concert. You know what loss would ensue to Johnston if he crosses his bridges at night in confusion, with artillery thundering at random on his rear.

I have reason to know that if our head of column had made for Ruff's instead of Marietta, we would have cut off two thousand (2,000) men and three hundred (300) wagons. But still we have now the best chance ever offered of a large army fighting at a disadvantage, with a river to his rear.

Send copies of this to Hooker, Palmer, and Howard. I have instructed McPherson, Schofield, and Garrard.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Marietta, Ga., July 3, 1864—10 a. m.*

General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C. :*

The movement on our right caused the enemy to evacuate. We occupied Kenesaw at daylight, and Marietta at 8½ a. m. Thomas is moving down the main road toward the Chattahoochee, McPherson toward the mouth of Nickajack, on the Sandtown road. Our cavalry is on the extreme flank. Whether the enemy will halt this side of Chattahoochee or not will soon be known. Marietta is almost entirely abandoned by its inhabitants, and more than a mile of the railroad iron is removed between the town and the foot of Kenesaw. I propose to press the enemy close till he is across the Chattahoochee river, when I must accumulate stores and better guard my rear.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, July 4, 1864.*

GENERAL: I am satisfied the enemy will attempt with his cavalry to cross the Chattahoochee about Roswell, and make an attempt on our communications. To counteract him you will move in that direction, and watch close, taking some position in which to rally our infantry, a brigade of which is at Marietta, a strong brigade at Alatoona, and General Thomas will be instructed to hold McCook's brigade ready to go to your assistance. You may draw out at once and go to Roswell, and if you can find your way to it you may gain a secure position,

from which you can watch that point. In case the enemy's cavalry get across, you must hurry to him, wherever opposition is possible, and send couriers rapidly to me, and to the point of the railroad threatened. In the mean time, report to me frequently, and use your cavalry as though you were preparing to cross yourself, or were only waiting for the waters to subside and make the ford practicable. You now understand the geography so well there that I have no doubt you can prevent Wheeler from doing much damage between Marietta and Alatoona. In case he passes down by Canton to go toward Cartersville send notice, and hang on his rear. We now have a full division of infantry at Kingston. Arrest every citizen in the country whom you find likely to prove a spy, and keep moving, so that your force cannot be computed.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General GARRARD,  
*Commanding Division of Cavalry.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, July 4, 1864.*

Major General THOMAS :

I have no doubt that the enemy will attempt to molest our rear with his cavalry, and that he has reserved Roswell fortified for that very purpose. To counteract his designs, I have ordered Garrard with his whole cavalry to proceed to Roswell, take the place if he can, otherwise hang near it, watching the river, opposing such a movement all he can, and giving us and all points of the railroad timely notice. I wish you would so hold McCook as promptly to re-enforce Garrard if need be. As soon as I ascertain the exact situation on the right, as to Turner's Ferry, and what progress McPherson has made, I will order Schofield round where Garrard now is. I will go to-morrow, and in the mean time I wish you to hold strong the points now at Howard's and Palmer's head of column, and merely picket light the road by which Garrard moved, as I feel sure the enemy will not attempt a sally there. Hooker need not hold the line from Palmer round to McPherson's, but draw in to his left, save by a line of videttes. I want you with your whole army to press steadily down on the enemy, while McPherson cuts in on his flank, Schofield to be held to re-enforce either part. Stoneman will threaten to cross the Chattahooche, and break the Atlanta and West Point road, especially if the enemy send cavalry against our line of road. Instead of occupying Ackworth, Big Shanty, and Marietta, I think we had better concentrate about the base of Kenesaw, near that water station, a point that could be defended against cavalry with great ease.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, three miles from railroad bridge, July 5, 1864—8 p. m.*

GENERAL: I have ordered Schofield over to this road, in rear of the centre, preparatory to moving him over to about the north of Rottenwood, or Roswell factory, according to reports I may receive from General Garrard. I was in hopes you would get control of the ridge commanding Turner's Ferry before the enemy could get across, but I think it is now too late, unless you have gained the ridge described as lying along the Chattahooche, above the mouth of Nickajack.

Do not attempt it unless it be certain of success, or unless you know that some part of Johnston's army or material is not yet across. My information is that Hood's and Polk's corps are across, and that Hardee remains on this side, occupying a line of intrenchments from the bridge down to Nickajack. I rather think the enemy will preserve this order of things until we develop our game. Stoneman will continue to threaten the river between Nickajack and Sweetwater, and you may co-operate and gain any substantial advantage you can, but be prepared to move whenever events may call. Hooker should be up nearer to Palmer. Howard's left is on the Chattahoochee, near Paice's Ferry, where the enemy had a pontoon bridge, which is cut loose and is swung to their bank. I understand he has two pontoon bridges at the railroad bridge. That bridge is still good, and was being very actively used to-day in passing trains. We have the road to within about two (2) miles of the bridge, including Vining's Station, where Johnston was last night.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General McPHERSON.

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee river, July 5, 1864.*

DEAR STONEMAN: I have your note, which is very satisfactory. I have heard of your general success from other quarters. I will instruct General Barry to give you a good four-gun battery if he can get one from some of the commands. Our left is now on the river above the railroad bridge. We find Hardee's corps intrenched on this side the river from the bridge down to the mouth of Nickajack; we hear the other two corps and militia are across. We can see Atlanta plain, but it will require hard fighting and science to take it. It must be done. Garrard is gone up to Roswell, and I hope to hear from him to-night. I think Johnston will send all his effective cavalry round by the north to strike our railroad, and must keep Garrard well on that flank with McCook to support him. I think you can whip anything that attempts to cross on your flank. Keep up the delusion of our crossing below Sandtown as long as possible, and I have reason to believe the enemy expects it. We have a nice game of war and must make no mistakes. We ought to have caught Johnston on his retreat, but he had prepared the way too well. We have killed and crippled a good number and have a couple thousand prisoners, some taken in fair fight and some gathered up straggling behind. He can no longer look into our camps as he did from Kenesaw. Try and pick up as many of his scouts as you can, and gather in every citizen of whom you entertain a suspicion. Schofield will move over to our left, up the Chattahoochee, about Roswell or below it. Write often. My headquarters are on the main road about three miles back from railroad bridge.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee river, July 5, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington:*

On the 3d we pursued the enemy by all the roads south till we found him in an intrenched position which had been prepared in advance; its salient on



the main Marietta and Atlanta road about five miles south of Marietta, and the wings behind the Nickajack and Rottenwood creeks. During the 4th, General Thomas pressed the salient, and McPherson and Schofield moved against Nickajack. By pressing close and threatening the Chattahoochee at Sandtown and below, Johnston retreated in the night, and now has his main force and wagons across the Chattahoochee, with Hardee's corps on this side strongly intrenched in a sort of *tête-du-pont* on a ridge of hills beginning at the railroad bridge and extending down the river to the mouth of the Nickajack. We have worked hard, and now Thomas' left is on the Chattahoochee, three miles above the railroad bridge at Paice's Ferry. Stoneman has been most active with the cavalry about Sweetwater, and is now on the Chattahoochee about Sandtown, and General Garrard started this morning for Roswell Factory. I have no report from him yet. I am now far ahead of my railroad and telegraph and want them to catch up, and may be here some days. Atlanta is in plain view nine miles distant. We have had continual skirmishing, but our losses are small, while we have inflicted more to the enemy. Our prisoners taken in the last two days will not fall much short of two thousand (2,000.) The extent of the enemy's parallel already taken is wonderful, and much of the same sort confronts us yet, and is seen beyond the Chattahoochee.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee River, July 6, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have just received your note announcing that you have possession of Roswell. This is important; watch well the crossing there, but not in force, keep your main force concealed somewhat. General McCook has just started for some point between Rottenwood and Soap creeks, where he will be near you. I intend to throw Schofield over on that flank the moment I propose to attempt a crossing. Fords are much better than bridges, and therefore have the river examined well as to fords. I am on the main road at the point where a branch goes to Vining's, on the railroad. Howard is at Vining's, and has possession of Paice's. McPherson's right is at Howell's Ferry, below Nickajack. The enemy holds this bank from the railroad bridge down to Nickajack, and seems to have it well fortified. Atlanta in plain view. Stoneman threatens the river down to Sweetwater. I will soon have a telegraph at Vining's, and you can thus communicate by Marietta. You will have rest for a few days, and should take advantage of all grain-fields.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General GARRARD.

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, on Chattahoochee, July 6, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

I have just received Secretary Stanton's despatch, and don't understand how Semmes and crew were allowed to leave the sinking Alabama in an English yacht.

I would have preferred the President had not proclaimed martial law in Ken-

tucky, but simply allowed the military commanders to arrest and banish all malcontents, while the honest and industrious stay-at-homes were encouraged by the increase of security. Johnston made two breaks in the railroad, one above Marietta, and one near Vining's Station. The former is already done, and Johnston's army has already heard the sound of our locomotives. The telegraph is done to Vining's, and the field wire is just at my bivouac, and will be ready to carry this to you as soon as translated into cipher.

I propose to study the crossings of the Chattahoochee, and when all is ready, to move quick. As a beginning, I keep the wagons and troops well back from the river, and display to the enemy only the picket line, with a few batteries along at random. Have moved General Schofield to a point where he can in a single march reach the Chattahoochee at a point above the railroad bridge, where there is a ford. At present the waters are turbid and swollen by the late rains, but if the present hot weather lasts, the water will run down very fast. We have pontoons enough for four (4) bridges, but, as our crossing will be resisted, we must manœuvre some. All the regular crossing-places are covered by forts apparently of long construction; but we shall cross in due time, and instead of attacking Atlanta direct, or any of its forts, propose to make a circuit, destroying all its railroads. This is a delicate movement and must be done with caution.

Our army is in good condition and full of confidence, but the weather is intensely hot, and a good many men have fallen with sun-stroke. This is a high and healthy country, and the sanitary condition of the army is good.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Chattahoochee River, July 6, 1864.*

General ROUSSEAU, *Nashville and Decatur :*

That cavalry expedition must now be off, and must proceed with the utmost energy and confidence. Everything here is favorable, and I have official information that General A. J. Smith is out from Memphis with force enough to give Forrest full occupation. Expeditions inland are also out from Vicksburg and Baton Rouge, as well as against Mobile. If managed with secrecy and rapidity the expedition cannot fail of success and will accomplish much good.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee, July 7, 1864—8 a. m.*

DEAR GENERAL: I send Major McCoy down to see you. I did intend to ride the lines to-day, but have my mind so intent on a crossing place that I want to be near. The cars now run into Marietta and down as far as a break, that will be repaired to-day, about four miles back of the bridge.

The enemy hold, as a *tête-du-pont*, the hills from Nickajack to a point about two miles above the bridge. I rather prefer this should be so, as he will have less on the other side. I wish you to display as much anxiety to cross as possible and as low down, but keep your masses ready to move to the real quarter when required.

I wish you to use artillery pretty freely, and if, as I understand, you have a

plunging fire on the extreme point of that range near Nickajack, get plenty of guns—say thirty—and give it thunder.

I send you a copy of an important despatch from Canby, in addition to which General Rousseau will start from Decatur for Opelika.

If you see Stoneman feel him, and see how he would like to work down the river, say thirty (30) miles, and also make a dash at Opelika, swinging back to us or to Rome for safety. A break of twenty miles from Opelika westward is perfectly practicable and would be a good blow. In the mean time, we can improve our communications and get a sure crossing at some point above.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding*

General MCPHERSON.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee, July 7, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your report is received and is most acceptable. I had no idea that the factories at Roswell remained in operation, but supposed the machinery had all been removed. Their utter destruction is right and meets my entire approval; and to make the matter complete, you will arrest the owners and employés and send them under guard, charged with treason, to Marietta, and I will see as to any man in America hoisting the French flag, and then devoting his labor and capital to supplying armies in open hostility to our government, and claiming the benefit of his neutral flag. Should you, under the impulse of anger, natural at contemplating such perfidy, hang the wretch, I approve the act beforehand.

I have sent General Schofield to reconnoitre over on that flank, and I want a lodgement made on the other bank as soon as possible, anywhere from Roswell down to the vicinity of Soap's creek. I have no doubt the opposite bank is picketed, but, as you say, the main cavalry force of Wheeler has moved to the other flank, and we should take advantage of it. If you can make a lodgement on the south bank anywhere, and secure it well, do so. General Schofield will be near to follow it up and enlarge the foothold. He had just started from Ruff's Station a few minutes before I received your despatch, but I telegraphed the substance to be sent to overtake him. Keep a line of couriers back to Marietta, and telegraph me very fully and often. I now have the wires to my bivouac.

By selecting some one ford, say the second or third below the mouth of Willeyoe creek on your sketch, and holding a force there concealed, say a brigade with your battery; then have the heads of each of your other two brigades cross at night at the nearest fords, and, without firing a gun, close in front of the brigade in position ready to cross with artillery. When across with artillery, the best position on a commanding hill should be fortified. I will see that the cavalry is relieved by General Schofield at once. I merely suggest this plan, and its execution about daylight to-morrow, and I prefer you should do it.

I assure you, spite of any little disappointment I may have expressed, I feel for you personally not only respect but affection, and wish for you unmeasured success and reputation; but I do wish to inspire all cavalry with my conviction that caution and prudence should be but a very small element in their characters.

I repeat my orders that you arrest all people, male and female, connected with those factories, no matter what the clamor, and let them foot it, under guard, to Marietta, whence I will send them by cars to the north. Destroy and make the same disposition of all mills, save small flouring-mills manifestly for local use, but all saw-mills and factories dispose of effectually, and usefull laborers,

excused, by reason of their skill as manufacturers, from conscription, are as much prisoners as if armed. The poor women will make a howl. Let them take along their children and clothing, providing they have the means of hauling or you can spare them. We will retain them until they can reach a country where they can live in peace and security.

In your next letter give me as much information as you can as to the size and dimensions of the burned bridge at Roswell across the Chattahoochee. We have plenty of pontoon bridging, but I much prefer fords for so large an army as we have.

I am, with respect, yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General GARRARD,  
*Roswell, Georgia.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee, July 7, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C. :*

General Garrard reports to me that he is in possession of Roswell, where were several valuable cotton and wool factories in full operation, also paper-mills, all of which, by my order, he destroyed by fire. They had been for years engaged exclusively at work for the confederate government; and the owner of the woollen factory displayed the French flag, but as he failed also to show the United States flag, General Garrard burned it also. The main cotton factory was valued at a million of United States dollars. The cloth on hand is reserved for the use of United States hospitals; and I have ordered General Garrard to arrest for treason all owners and employés, foreign and native, and send them under guard to Marietta, whence I will send them north. Being exempt from conscription, they are as much governed by the rules of war as if in the ranks. The women can find employment in Indiana. This whole region was devoted to manufactories, but I will destroy every one of them. Johnston is manœuvring against my right, and I will try and pass the Chattahoochee by my left. Ask Mr. Stanton not to publish the substance of my despatches, for they reach Richmond in a day, and are telegraphed at once to Atlanta. The Atlanta papers contain later news from Washington than I get from Nashville. Absolute silence in military matters is the only safe rule. Let our public learn patience and common sense.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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NEW ORLEANS, *June 27, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

General Washburn has sent me a copy of your despatch to him of the 14th instant. I had previously written to him that he should employ A. J. Smith's troops, and any others that he could reach, to pursue and, if possible, destroy Forrest's command. I have placed under his control all the militia from the northwestern States that were ordered to report to me, and several regiments of old troops from Missouri. This will enable him to give Smith an effective force of twelve (12) or fifteen (15) thousand men, and leave a reserve of five thousand (5,000) for other operations. I will start the expedition against Mo-

bile four days later. A cavalry expedition will start at the same time from Vicksburg, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the enemy from Smith's operations and those in this neighborhood. A large cavalry force will leave the river above Baton Rouge for the purpose of cutting the Mobile and Ohio road, and Steele will also be instructed to make a demonstration in the direction of Price's force. We have labored under great disadvantages in having no resources for water transportation on the river, but this will soon be overcome.

E. R. S. CANBY

*Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee, July 7, 1864.*

General E. R. S. CANBY, *New Orleans :*

Your despatch of the 27th June is received and is very agreeable news. I think Generals Smith and Mower can take care of Forrest. We have fought Johnston steadily back for a hundred miles over very difficult ground fortified at immense labor. I don't think our loss exceeds that of the enemy. It has been one immense skirmish, with small battles interspersed.

This army remains strong in numbers and spirit, and has been wonderfully supplied. Though repeatedly broken, our railroad and telegraph are in good order to the rear, and I have depots of supplies accumulated at fortified points to my rear.

Atlanta is in sight, and is defended by a well-handled army and a circle of finished redoubts; yet I shall not pause. The expeditions from Memphis, Vicksburg, and Baton Rouge are most important, and will keep employed the forces of the enemy that might be most mischievous to my rear.

Also, the move on Mobile will be most opportune, no matter in what strength, even if confined to a feint.

On the 9th I start a lightly equipped cavalry force of about three thousand, (3,000,) without wagons, from Decatur, Alabama, to Opelika, to break up the single track from Montgomery eastward, the effect of which will be to separate Alabama from Georgia. This force may be compelled to go to Pensacola. Please let the commanding officer at Pensacola look out for them about the 20th to 25th of July. If they make Pensacola, they will leave horses there and come back to Tennessee by water. Major General Rousseau will command.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee river, July 7, 1864.*

General ROUSSEAU, *Nashville and Decatur :*

I have no new instructions or information to convey to you, but expect you to leave Decatur on the 9th. If Roddy be about Tusculumbia you might send a small infantry force down to Waterloo to amuse him by threatening to cross and to burn the Bear Creek bridge, eight (8) miles back from Eastport and five (5) miles east from Iuka. You may give out that you are going to Selma, but be sure to go to Opelika and break up railroad between it and Montgomery. There is but a single road there that unites the Georgia roads with the Alabama roads. I am convinced General A. J. Smith will give full employment to Forrest, and I

will keep Joe Johnston fully employed, and Canby will look out for the Mobile garrison. When you reach the roads, do your work well, burn the ties in piles, heat the iron in the middle, and when red-hot let the men pull the ends so as to give a twist to the rail. If simply bent the rails may be used again; but if the rails are twisted or wrenched they cannot be used again. In retreating, you should take the back track; and if pursued, turn for me, or for Rome, or Kingston, or Alatoona.

Be sure to take no wagons, but pack some led horses. Travel early and late in the days, but rest at midday and midnight. Spare your horses for the first week, and keep them ready for the return trip. I think the only force in your route is Pillow's, about Oxford, or Jacksonville, or Gadsden. We are down to the Chattahoochee and will soon be across. All is well with us.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Chattahoochee, July 7, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD, *Ruff's Station* :

You may move to the neighborhood of the mouth of Soap's creek. Mask well your command, and make a lodgement across the Chattahoochee, but do not attempt it until you have a ford near by, by which to re-enforce the party first sent, or by which it may be necessary to retire. We can, after lodgement, make roads to the crossing, and may add pontoon bridges, of which we have enough for four bridges. After securing a point opposite Soap's creek, Roswell's will follow as a matter of course, and will be additional. The moment I hear that General Garrard has made a lodgement at Roswell's, I will send a division of General McPherson to hold fast all he makes. With Roswell's and mouth of Soap's creek, we have plenty of room, with Marietta as the depot.

I will go down to General McPherson's and stir them up in the morning by way of diversion.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Chattahoochee, July 8, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD, *Ruff's Station* :

It is all important I should know as soon as possible the general topography on the other side of the river, as to the practicability of the roads in every direction, especially toward Stone Mount and Decatur. If you can catch a few people who ought to know all about it send them to me.

I will go to the extreme right to-day. General Rousseau will start from Decatur for Opelika to-morrow, and General Stoneman may feign down as far as Campbellton. I think the railroad bridge was burned last night. No other news.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

DECATUR, *July 8, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

I am off to-day, after all sorts of petty annoyances composing delays. I hope to accomplish fully what you desire, and shall do my best. I go sixteen (16) miles to-day, and hope to reach the point in seven (7) to eight (8) days.

L. H. ROUSSEAU,

*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

*In the field, near Chattahoochee, July 9, 1864.*

General THOMAS :

I have an Atlanta paper of the 6th. I think its tone is changed, and it apologizes for the necessity of civilians quitting the place. By it I see that General Slocum is at Jackson, Mississippi, and have no doubt we will soon perceive the effect of General Smith's move in Mississippi, and General Canby's against Mobile.

If General Howard could get a cable over to that pontoon bridge and haul it into place, it would be a constant threat at that point.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Chattahoochee, July 8, 1864.*

General THOMAS :

General Garrard will effect a lodgment to-morrow morning at Roswell, and General Schofield about the mouth of Soap's creek. The moment I hear that General Garrard is successful, I will send one of General McPherson's corps up; but he is so far off that it may become necessary to re-enforce him (General Garrard) in the night to-morrow, in which case I will call for a division of General Howard, nearest to Roswell, to be relieved by General McPherson as soon as he can get there. At daybreak to-morrow make some display to assist in covering the movements.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

ROSWELL, *July 9, 1864—7 a. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

I have the ridge on the south bank of the river. The infantry should come up at once. I see no reason why I cannot hold it; but cannot tell what may occur before long.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

K. GARRARD,

*Brigadier General U. S. V.*

ROSWELL, *July 9, 1864—9 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

I have to report the arrival of General Newton with his division, 4th corps. All was quiet, and he relieved me about dark. My cavalry pickets are about

two miles from the river on the Atlanta road. There has been but slight opposition to-day, though my cavalry pickets stand opposite to those of the enemy, and have had some skirmishing. No sign of large force of the enemy's infantry. The ford is very rough, and about belly-deep. Wagons might be passed over, though it would be better to have the bridge built. Dimensions of old bridge: length six hundred and forty-two (642) feet; six (6) spans; good stone piers fourteen (14) feet from water.

K. GARRARD,  
*Brigadier General Commanding Cavalry.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee, July 9, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

I telegraph to you, and Mr. Secretary Stanton answers. Drop me a word now and then of advice and encouragement. I think I have done well to maintain such an army in this country, fighting for sixty (60) days, and yet my losses are made up by the natural increase. The assault I made was no mistake. I had to do it. The enemy, and our own army and officers, had settled down into the conviction that the assault of lines formed no part of my game, and the moment the enemy was found behind anything like a parapet, why, everybody would deploy, throw up counter-works, and take it easy, leaving it to the "Old Man" to turn the position. Had the assault been made with one-fourth more vigor, (mathematically,) I would have put the head of George Thomas's whole army right through Johnston's deployed line, on the best ground for "go ahead," while my entire forces were well in hand on roads converging to my then object, Marietta. Had Harker and McCook not been struck down so early, the assault would have succeeded, and then the battle would have all been in our favor, on account of our superiority in numbers and initiative. Even as it was, Johnston has been much more cautious since, and gives ground more freely. His next fighting line (Smyrna camp ground) he only held one day.

I have got General Schofield across the Chattahoochee with two good pontoon bridges without loss, and momentarily wait the news of my cavalry being across at "Roswell" factory, where is the best ford on the whole river; but before going ahead I will add there a good pier or trestle bridge, and will, at some point intermediate, convenient to roads, put down two more pontoon bridges, making five bridges and three fords, before I put the army across the Chattahoochee.

I call your attention to the enclosed paper in reference to the Roswell factories. They were very valuable, and were burned by my orders. They have been engaged almost exclusively in manufacturing cloth for the confederate army, and you will observe they were transferred to the English and French flags for safety; but such nonsense cannot deceive me. They were tainted with treason, and such fictitious transfer was an aggravation. I will send all the owners, agents, and employés up to Indiana to get rid of them here. I take it a neutral is no better than one of our own citizens, and we would not respect the property of one of our own citizens engaged in supplying a hostile army.

Write me a note occasionally, and suggest anything that may occur to you, as I am really in the wilderness down here; but I will fight any and all the time on anything like fair terms, and that is the best strategy; but it would not be fair to run up against such parapets as I find here.

Your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee, July 9, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD :

General Garrard is across at Roswell, and Dodge is moving to that point with orders to fortify a *tête de pont* and to build a good trestle bridge. I want from you a minute description of your position, and all information as to roads leading from it to the east about Stone mountain. I propose to operate some to the south to accumulate stores, and then go ahead.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee, July 9, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C. :*

General Schofield effected a lodgement across the Chattahoochee, near the mouth of Soap's creek last night, and has two good pontoon bridges. He captured the single gun that guarded the passage, but the guard fled. General Garrard crossed at Roswell factory, and has a secure lodgement at the Shallow ford. General Dodge is moving to that point to take Garrard's place, and has orders to build a good bridge there. These crossings will be strongly covered with forts. I will then endeavor to break the railroad south of Atlanta by an expedition from Decatur, under General Rousseau, and another from here. In the mean time will collect supplies, and secure better my rear, and then cross over the main army and go ahead. Weather is very hot, but the country is high and healthy.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near the Chattahoochee, July 9, 1864.*

GENERAL : We now have a good lodgement on the other bank of the river. Schofield at the mouth of Soap's creek, and Garrard opposite Roswell. I saw General Dodge to-day en route for Roswell, and explained to him the importance of the plan, and he understands it fully. He and Garrard can hold it secure whilst we manœuvre a little more on our right, and give time to collect stores at Marietta, and for Rousseau to get a good offing. We noticed a good deal of flutter in the enemy's camps to-day, troops and wagons moving rapidly east and north. Johnston sees I threaten Decatur and Stone mountain, and now is a good time for Stoneman to strike south. I want him, if possible, to secure a point at Campbellton, or below, and strike the West Point road. I do believe he can do it, for Johnston will spread his force so much that it will be weak at all points. I have told Stoneman that if he secures both banks at Campbellton, with its ferry-boats, he may call on you for a brigade to hold it whilst he strikes the railroad.

Of course we do not intend to attack the *tête de pont* of the enemy, and unless Johnston supposes I have scattered my force too much he will not venture to sally ; and if he does, our position is as strong against him as his against us, and I have no apprehensions on that score. Therefore, if Stoneman calls for a brigade send it.

Keep hammering away all the time, and the moment he lets go this bank occupy it; but if he holds on, as soon as the time comes we will let him stay on this side, and we will go over.

With Thomas things are *statu quo*. Railroad and telegraph all right.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

General MCPHERSON, *Army of the Tennessee*.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Near the Chattahoochee, July 9, 1864.*

GENERAL: In pursuance of our conversation of this day, I have to request that you proceed with your command to Campbellton to-morrow night, appearing suddenly before the place, and securing, if possible, the boats there, or forcing the enemy to destroy them. If you can possibly do it, get possession of those boats, and also of the other bank. I am very anxious that an attack or demonstration be made against the railroad below Atlanta, and will instruct General McPherson to have a brigade of infantry ready to come down and hold the river, whilst you, with cavalry, strike the road. I am satisfied that the crossing of Schofield and Garrard above will draw in that direction Johnston's chief army, and that what troops are left south of Atlanta will be strung out as far as West Point, where he will keep the chief force. The point where the road would be easiest reached will be, say, half way from Atlanta to West Point, but it would not be safe for you to pass Campbellton unless the ferry is well destroyed. The bridge at Franklin is almost too far down, but still it, too, might be reached by you, and either used or destroyed. A ford but little known or used below Campbellton and this side of the Franklin bridge will be the best, if such exist, and you may incur any risk, sure of my approval, for, whether you make a break of the road, or merely cause a diversion, you will do good.

Don't be absent more than four or five days, and keep me advised on all possible occasions.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding,

Major General STONEMAN,  
*Commanding Division of Cavalry.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee, July 10, 1864.*

General THOMAS:

Signal officers report railroad and all other bridges burning; of course, if such be the case the enemy has gone across; yet I hear firing of pickets. Report to me the truth as soon as ascertained.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee, July 10, 1864.*

General THOMAS:

Let Howard move up to supporting distance of Schofield to assist him in case the enemy attempt to dislodge him.

Detachments of Hooker and Palmer should occupy the redoubts this side, but keep your wagons and masses out of sight for the present.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

July 10, 1864—4. 45 a. m.

Major General SHERMAN :

The enemy has left my front and burned the railroad and wagon bridges over the river. I have ordered the skirmishers to feel up and ascertain if they are still on this side. I presume the firing we heard is the pickets exchanging shots across the river.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

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## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

July, 10 1864.

Major General SHERMAN :

Hooker and Palmer occupy the enemy's works in their fronts, and have skirmishers on the river bank. Their camps have not been moved. Howard has been ordered to move to supporting distance of Schofield.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

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## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Chattahoochee river, July 10, 1864.*

General DODGE, *Roswell* :

I have been out all day and just back. Have received General Garrard's and your despatches. I design that General McPherson's whole army shall come to that flank, and you are to prepare the way. General Newton will stay with you till you feel all safe, when he will rejoin his corps now in support of General Schofield, eight (8) miles below you. General Garrard will picket the roads, and I want you to fortify a *tête de pont* and bridge. General McPherson will operate to the right, and then, when all is ready, will come rapidly to your flank. Therefore, make all preparations to that end. General Schofield has a secure place opposite the mouth of Soap's creek. Keep me well advised by courier to Marietta and telegraph.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Chattahoochee river, July 10, 1864.*

General THOMAS :

General Schofield has a good bridge and position, but the road up the hill is narrow, crooked and steep. I think the road out from Powers's ferry is better and leads straight to the Cross Keys, the first point common to the roads out from Roswell, (McPherson,) Phillips's, (Schofield's,) and Powers's and Paice's, (yours.) General Dodge will make a good bridge at Roswell; General Scho-

field will make a bridge at Phillips's, and you can have your own and McPherson's pontoons at Powers's and Paice's. General Howard is close up to General Schofield, and General Newton will join him as soon as General Dodge has made his bridge and works. I think it would be well for General Howard to secure the hill at Powers's ferry, just below the crossing, and move the pontoons down as soon as General Schofield gets a trestle bridge done. I want General McPherson to feign strong at Turner's and cover General Stoneman's movements down the river, and I want you to make strong demonstrations at the railroad bridge, but keep in mind that you are to cross at Powers's and Paice's. All the roads back to Marietta are good, but the cross-roads are steep and hilly. The road from Powers's to Vining's is quite good—crosses Rottenwood at a mill-dam. All preparations should be made in three days.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee, July 10, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have pretty much made up my mind as to the next move, but would be glad to hear any suggestion from you.

I propose that General Stoneman shall attempt to break the road below Atlanta; to accumulate stores at Marietta, and increase our guards to the rear; then suddenly to shift you to Roswell, General Dodge in the mean time to get you a good *tête de pont* and bridge. General Schofield is already at Phillips's ferry, across and fortified; he, too, will make a good trestle bridge. General Thomas will group his at Powers's and Paice's ferries.

But for the next three days, while these preparations are being made, I want you to demonstrate as though attempting to cross at Turner's or below, and General Thomas the same at the railroad bridge. When General Stoneman is back, I will give you the word to shift rapidly to Roswell and cross over, and in anticipation you can get your wagons back to Marietta, except such as you need. General Thomas will need yours and his pontoons to cross at Powers's and Paice's. At the right time I will leave Generals Stoneman and McCook to cover the front and cross all the balance of the army and advance it with its right on or near Peach Tree creek, and the left (you) to swing towards Stone mountain. Johnston will be found to occupy his redoubts about Atlanta, and also Stone mountain and Decatur. We can manœuvre so as to compel him to weaken his centre or one of his flanks, when we can act. If he neglect his right or centre, we get on his Augusta road. If he neglect Atlanta, we take it. If he assume the offensive, we cover our roads and base, and can make as good use of Peach Tree as he. If General Stoneman could break the road, so much the better; but if he cannot, I calculate that General Rousseau will do so within a week, quite as early as we can be at or near Cross Keys.

The ground opposite still continues rough, but that we cannot help. I find all the roads leading back from Roswell, Phillips's and Powers's ferries to Marietta are good, but the cross-roads are hilly and sharp.

The advantage of this plan over the one of crossing to the south is that we are all between the enemy and our base; and now that he has destroyed his own bridges, he cannot get over without fighting us. Study your maps and be ready, but in the mean time stir up the enemy all you can on that flank and make feints as though designing to cross the Chattahoochee.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General MCPHERSON,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

HEADQUARTERS LEFT WING, 11TH ARMY CORPS,  
*Roswell, July 10, 1864—1.30 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

My troops are arriving and crossing. I have been here three hours, and in company with General Newton have thoroughly examined the country. I will occupy and fortify to-night a *tête de pont* one-half mile from the river and extending up and down one mile, covering the entire ford, bridge and roads leading to them. The ford is one-half mile or more in extent, very rough and impracticable, except for troops to bridge the stream. I will have to build over six hundred and fifty (650) feet in length. I shall use the old piers and trestle between, and we have a strong picket out three miles, covering the forks and road leading to McAfee's bridge, eight (8) miles up the river, and the road that leads to Atlanta. It is too far out to take the command until the river is easily passed by artillery and trains.

G. M. DODGE, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee river, July 11, 1864.*

General DODGE, *Roswell, Georgia :*

I know you have a big job, but that is nothing new for you. Tell General Newton that his corps is now up near General Schofield's crossing, and that all is quiet thereabouts. He might send down and move his camp to the proximity of his corps, but I think Roswell and Shallow Ford so important, that I prefer him to be near you until you are well fortified. If he needs rations, tell him to get his wagons up, and I think you will be able to spare him day after tomorrow. I know the bridge at Roswell is important, and you may destroy all Georgia to make it good and strong.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee river, July 11, 1864.*

GENERAL : The importance of your command to the success of my operations is, I know, already appreciated by you ; but when I suggest any additional work or experience, I beg you to consider it as resulting from my supposed large experience in the military art.

In the first place, I fear that our infantry officers suppose if cavalry comes about, they are excused from doing anything but to defend their own posts. This is not so. Infantry can always whip cavalry, and in a wooded and mountainous country can actually thwart it, and even at times capture it. Of course, as a general rule, a footman cannot catch a horseman on a fair road or country, but nothing is more awkward in a wooded and mountainous country than a command of cavalry forced to go through narrow defiles, across streams at particular fords or bridges, or up and down certain valleys which can be seen from the mountain tops and ambushes. I have not yet seen in this war a cavalry force of a thousand that was not afraid of the sight of a dozen infantry bayonets, for the reason that the cavalry, to be effective, has to have a road or smooth field ; whereas the infantry man steps into the bushes and is safe, or can block a road in five minutes and laugh at the man on horseback.

The moral I wish to inculcate by these simple illustrations is, by knowing

the country and thinking ahead, an infantry garrison can act against cavalry. Therefore, it is expected of the infantry guarding our road, that they are not to sit down and let cavalry prance all around them, but that they must ambush their roads, anticipate their passage at mountain passes and creek crossings, or can pursue them and catch them jammed in narrow roads or at bridges. Thus at Dalton a lookout should be kept all along Taylor's ridge to give notice of horsemen in the far off valleys, and then they should be waylaid. Rewards should be offered and paid to faithful citizens and negroes who give notice of the presence of parties of the enemy, but they should always be waylaid and pursued.

Another matter I will draw your attention to: officers and men naturally slip into houses and establish headquarters offices, &c., and are about as useless as if posted in Canada. Make a positive order that each garrison shall build *anew* a good stockade with earthwork, abattis, &c., not too strong, but to serve as a stronghold and rallying point, to hold a dash of cavalry in check, and more especially to allow a part of the garrison to hold the post while the greater portion goes forth to battle with the enemy. A fixed garrison is harmless and useless. Its only value is in its power of offence.

I think you had better embody some of these ideas, and such others as may suggest themselves to you, in a general order, and have it printed on pasteboard and hung up at every post, and then make your inspectors enforce it.

We are now in full possession of the country down to the Chattahoochee, and have two good crossings—one at Roswell, and the other at the mouth of Soap's creek, known as Phillips's, and I only await a few developments to go ahead. General Vandever telegraphs from Rome that Pillow's force has gone towards Meridian. If another attempt is made from that quarter, it should be counteracted by moving behind it from Rome and Gunter's landing.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

Major General STEEDMAN,  
Commanding District of Etowah.

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee river, July 11, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

The enemy is now all beyond the Chattahoochee, having destroyed all his bridges. We occupy the west bank for thirty miles, and have two heads of columns across—one at the Shallow ford, at Rossville, and the other at the mouth of Soap's creek, Phillips's. At these we are making good pier bridges. Water is shallow, rock bottom, but strong and rapid current. I propose to have another of pontoons lower down, about the mouth of Rottenwood or Island creeks.

The last works abandoned by the enemy were the strongest of all, embracing two detached redoubts, and extending along the river hills for about five miles, having in its whole extent finished abatis and parapet, with glacis obstructed with chevaux-de-frise and all manner of impediments. But the moment Johnston detected, I had ignored his fort, and secured two good lodgements above him, on the east bank, at Roswell factory and at Phillips's, he drew his forces across and burned all his bridges, viz: one railroad and trestle and three (3) pontoons.

We now commence the real game for Atlanta, and I expect pretty sharp practice ; but I think we have the advantage, and I propose to keep it.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee river, July 11, 1864.*

General THOMAS :

I have ordered General McPherson to send his pontoons here to-morrow. I will order them to Powers's ferry, and I will want you to effect a lodgement there to-morrow night and next day. There is no enemy of any size to our immediate front, and General Dodge reports the enemy's cavalry alone above Peach Tree creek, at Buckhead. He says he has an Atlanta paper of the 10th; that all the wealthy people are leaving, and that a council of war was held, when it was decided to fight for Atlanta. General Rousseau telegraphs from Decatur that he started that day, and would be on the Montgomery and Opelika road in eight (8) or nine (9) days. I think we should, as soon as possible, secure the opposite bank, from Roswell down to Peach Tree creek. I think the bridge across Peach Tree, near the railroad bridge, is still standing. I watched it close to-day ; I think I saw half a dozen men pass it, but, with that exception, there was no life visible. There was no danger in standing in full view in the redoubt to-day. The signal officer reports the absence of all camps from the other side to-day. I suppose Johnston will group his army about Atlanta and wait for us to develop our game. I only await news from Stoneman to put General McPherson in motion.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee river, July 12, 1864—2 a. m.*

GENERAL : I have received your despatches of last night. You may put in motion at once the 15th corps and trains for Roswell, leaving General Blair with such artillery and wagons as he may need to await the return of General Stoneman, and to make in the mean time the necessary demonstrations about Sandtown, Howell's and Turner's. The enemy, having destroyed his bridges, cannot come back on General Blair, and therefore he can strip light so as to follow you as little encumbered as possible when General Stoneman does get back or is heard from. Instruct General Blair fully on these points, and let him report to me direct while thus established. Let your troops move in the cool of the evening and by moonlight and in the morning, sparing men and animals as much as possible. You will then proceed to Roswell in person and take control of matters on that flank, giving the necessary orders to your own troops and to General Garrard's cavalry. I want everything done that is prudent and necessary at Roswell to make it a kind of secondary base for operations against Atlanta and the roads east towards Augusta and Macon. As you know, the bridges are under progress, and the telegraph will be there as soon as you. The ford there though rough, is always practicable in case of accident to ourselves or the bridge, and constitutes one of the reasons for its use as a point of departure and the roads to and from Roswell are old and much used. The country thereabouts is also represented as abounding in grass, grain, and cornfields, all of which will come into use.

Your wagons and artillery should move by Marietta and fill up with provisions, forage and ammunition, and I think that also is the best road for the troops, though a few miles could be saved by cutting across by Smyrna camp-ground.

If convenient, you might ride by the Turner's Ferry road, along the enemy's recent works, by General Thomas's and my headquarters, to confer with me and to compare maps.

I am, with respect, yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General McPHERSON,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattanooga river, July 12, 1864.*

DEAR GENERAL: I have written you but once since the opening of the campaign, but I report by telegraph to General Halleck daily, and he furnishes you copy. My progress was slower than I calculated, from two chief causes—an uninterrupted rain from June 2 to about the 22d, and the peculiar sub-mountainous nature of the country from the Etowah to the Chattanooga. But we have overcome all opposition and whipped Johnston in every fight when we were on anything like fair terms, and I think the army feels that way, that we can whip the enemy in anything like a fair fight; but he has uniformly taken shelter behind parallels of strong profile, made in advance for him by negroes and militia. I regarded an assault on the 27th of June necessary for two good reasons: 1st, because the enemy, as well as my own army, had settled down into the belief that "flanking" alone was my game; and 2d, that on that day and ground, had the assault succeeded, I could have broken Johnston's centre and pushed his army back in confusion and with great loss to his bridges over the Chattanooga. We lost nothing in morale in the assault, for I followed it up on the extreme right, and compelled him to quit the very strong lines of Kenesaw, Smyrna camp-ground, and the Chattanooga in quick succession.

My railroad and telegraph are now up, and we are rapidly accumulating stores in Marietta and Alatoona; that will make us less timid about the roads to our rear. We have been wonderfully supplied in provisions and ammunition; not a day has a regiment been without bread and essentials. Forage has been the hardest, and we have cleaned the country, in a breadth of thirty (30) miles, of grain and grass. Now the corn is getting of a size which makes it a good fodder, and the railroad has brought us grain to the extent of four (4) pounds per animal per day. I have now fulfilled the first part of the "grand plan;" our lines are up to the Chattanooga, and the enemy is beyond.

John Morgan failed in his Kentucky raid, and we have kept Forrest employed in Mississippi. The defeat of General Sturgis was unfortunate, still he kept Forrest away from us; and now General A. J. Smith is out from Memphis with a force amply sufficient to whip him. I hear of General Slocum at Jackson, Mississippi; and General Canby telegraphs me of a proposed raid from Baton Rouge, and another against Mobile, so that I am well satisfied that all my people are well employed. At this moment I have General Stoneman down the Chattanooga, with orders, if possible, to cross and strike the railroad between



Montgomery and West Point, and break it good; to return to the army of the Tennessee, if possible, but if headed off, to make for Pensacola.

The moment I got Johnston to the Chattahoochee I sent General Schofield to the ford above, and he effected a crossing without the loss of a man, and has two pontoon bridges. About the same time, General Garrard's cavalry crossed still above, at Roswell factory, and has been relieved by General Dodge's corps, so that I now cover the Chattahoochee, and have two good crossings well secured. By to-night I will have a third. As soon as I hear from General Stoneman, I will shift all of General McPherson's army to Roswell, and cross General Thomas about three (3) miles above the railroad bridge, and move against Atlanta—my left well to the east, to get possession of the Augusta road about Decatur or Stone mountain. I think all will be ready in three (3) days. I will have nearly one hundred thousand (100,000) men.

I feel certain we have killed and crippled for Joe Johnston as many as we have sent of our men to the rear; have sent back about six or seven thousand prisoners; have taken eleven (11) guns of Johnston, and about ten (10) in Rome; have destroyed immense iron, cotton, and wool mills; and have possession of all the nitre country.

My operations have been rather cautious than bold, but on the whole I trust are satisfactory to you. All of Polk's corps is still here; also Hardee's and Hood's, and the Georgia militia under G. W. Smith.

Let us persevere, trusting to the fortunes of war, leaving statesmen to work out the solution.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Lieutenant General GRANT,  
*Near Petersburg, Virginia.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Chattahoochee river, July 13, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

All is well. I have now accumulated stores at Alatoona and Marietta, both fortified and garrisoned points. Have also three points at which to cross the Chattahoochee in my possession, and only await General Stoneman's return from a trip down the river, to cross the army in force and move on Atlanta. Stoneman is now out two (2) days, and had orders to be back on the fourth (4th) or fifth (5th) day at farthest. Rousseau should reach Opelika about the 17th of July.

Before regulations are made for the States to send recruiting officers into the rebel States, I must express my opinion that it is the height of folly. I cannot permit it here. I will not have a set of fellows hanging about on any such pretences. We have no means to transport and feed them. The Sanitary and Christian commissions are enough to eradicate all trace of Christianity from our minds, much less a set of unscrupulous State agents in search of recruits. All these dodges are make-shifts that render us ridiculous in our own estimation. I must protect my army, and say beforehand I have no means to transport recruiting parties south of Nashville, or to feed them if they come here in spite of me.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

ROSWELL BRIDGE, *July 14, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

The bridge is finished, and the 15th army corps will cross the river this afternoon, and be in position by night on the left and a little in advance of General Dodge. Nothing new here.

J. B. McPHERSON,  
*Major General.*

ROSWELL BRIDGE, *July 14, 1864—5 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Would it not be a good move for Garrard to cross his division at McAfee's bridge; push one of his brigades out towards Cross Keys, and engage the cavalry there; and send his other brigade rapidly *via* Lawrenceville down to Covington on the railroad, and burn the bridge across Yellow river and other streams in the vicinity, and do all the damage they can?

The distance is forty (40) miles.

J. B. McPHERSON,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee river, July 14, 1864.*

General JOHN E. SMITH, *Alatoona :*

I regard Alatoona of the first importance in our future plans. It is a second Chattanooga. Its front and rear are susceptible of easy defence, and its flanks are strong. The post properly extends from the Etowah to Alatoona Depot, and its flanks the Pumpkin Vine and Alatoona creeks, embracing a space wherein can be accumulated supplies that would make a raid to our rear less to be feared, giving us the means of living till repairs could be made. I want you to study it in all its bearings. As long as our army is in front in good order, of course no enemy could threaten Alatoona; and then its garrison should scout the country for miles around, especially up the Pumpkin Vine and Euharlee creeks, and in the direction of Noonday and Canton. Everything in the nature of grain, forage, and vegetables should be collected. No suspicious citizens should be allowed near the railroad or in the country. The safety of this army must not be imperilled by citizens. If you entertain a bare suspicion against any family, send it to the north. Any loafer or suspicious person seen at any time should be imprisoned and sent off. If guerillas trouble the road or wires between Kingston and Ackworth, they should be shot without mercy. Rowland Springs, Laffing Gall, Canton, and Dallas should receive sudden and unexpected visits by night, by parties about two hundred (200) strong.

I will soon be in motion again, and will feel more confidence that I know you are at Alatoona.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee river, July 14, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington :*

If State recruiting agents must come into the limits of my command under the law, I have the honor to request that the commanding officers or adjutants

of regiments be constituted such agents, and that States be entitled to a credit for recruits they may enlist, who are accepted and mustered in by the regular mustering officers of their division and corps. This will obviate the difficulty I apprehend from civilian agents.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee river, July 15, 1864.*

General THOMAS :

A man came in last night from Columbus, Georgia, with a provost marshal's pass of July 4th, who had escaped from Anderson, and was captured the time I went to Meridian. He gives but little news, and says the guards at Columbus and West Point are not over five hundred (500) each. Heard nothing from Mobile or Montgomery on his way up. A scout in from Atlanta with dates to 3 p. m., 13th, says Bragg and staff had arrived, and Kirby Smith with twenty thousand (20,000) men was expected from Meridian—all bosh, of course. All newspapers have quit Atlanta, except the Memphis Appeal; that I suppose is tired of moving and wants to be "let alone."

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee river, July 15, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have just heard from General Stoneman, who says he will be at Sweetwater town to-night. I have ordered him to hurry and relieve you. Haul out of sight all your guns to-night, ready in the morning to move to Roswell. You can save much distance by coming by my headquarters, and taking a road near the Chattahoochee, but the main Marietta road is plainer and easier for wagons, and it may be is best. Choose for yourself. Don't go to Roswell town, but to the bridge, and across to where General McPherson is.

I am, sir, very respectfully, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General BLAIR, *Commanding 17th Corps.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Chattahoochee river, July 15, 1864.*

General MCPHERSON, *Roswell :*

I have heard from General Stoneman. He did not break the lower railroad, but burned a bridge over the Chattahoochee, near Newman. He will be in to-night, and I have ordered General Blair to move for Roswell to-morrow. You may, therefore, make all preparation to move out towards the Stone mountain the day after to-morrow. Notify General Garrard to move in connexion with you, sending his train to yours. That Augusta road must be destroyed and occupied between Decatur and Stone mountain by you and General Garrard.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Chattahoochee river, July 16, 1864.*

General THOMAS :

I am about moving camp to the vicinity of Powers, and will visit Generals Howard and Schofield, where I can be found in case of necessity.

I can't imagine what cavalry it is that General Granger reports at Clayville. What is the gunboat about? It should be at Guntersville at once. If Johnston has ordered this movement, he will not care about Huntsville or Decatur, but Stevenson and Bridgeport. The latter is of vital importance to us, and he knows it.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, on Chattahoochee river, July 16, 1864.*General MCPHERSON, *Roswell :*

Move in the morning according to Orders 35, but don't strike for the railroad till further orders. General Corse is here. General Blair started early to-day, and will be with you to-morrow. All well here.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

CITY POINT, VA., *July 16, 1864—10 a. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

The attempted invasion of Maryland having failed to give the enemy a firm foothold north, they are now returning with possibly twenty-five thousand (25,000) troops. All the men they have here beyond a sufficiency to hold their string of fortifications will be an element of weakness by eating up their supplies. It is not improbable, therefore, that you will find in the next fortnight re-enforcements on your front to the number indicated above. I advise, therefore, that if you get Atlanta, you set about destroying the railroad as far to the east and south of you as possible. Collect all the stores of the country for your own use, and select a point that you can hold until help can be had. I shall make a desperate effort to get a position here which will hold the enemy without the necessity of so many men. If successful, I can detach from here for other enterprises, looking much to your assistance or anything elsewhere.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

WASHINGTON, *July 16, 1864—4. 30 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Lieutenant General Grant wishes me to call your attention to the possibility of Johnston's being re-enforced from Richmond, and the importance of your having prepared a good line of defence against such an increase of rebel force. Also, the importance of getting as large an amount of supplies collected at Chattanooga as possible.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, on Chattahoochee, July 16, 1864.*

Generals THOMAS and McPHERSON :

Despatches from Generals Grant and Halleck to-day speak of the enemy having failed in his designs in Maryland, and cautioning me that Lee may in the next fortnight re-enforce Johnston by twenty thousand (20,000) men. It behooves us therefore to hurry, so all will move to-morrow as far as Nancy's creek.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Chattahoochee, July 16, 1864.*General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C. :*

I have yours and General Grant's despatches. I had anticipated all possible chances and am accumulating all the stores possible at Chattanooga and Alatoona, but I don't fear Johnston with re-enforcements of twenty thousand (20,000) if he will take the offensive, but I recognize the danger arising from my long line and the superiority of the enemy's cavalry in numbers and audacity.

Move to-morrow from the Chattahoochee towards Decatur and Stone mountain, east of Atlanta. All well. Copy of this to General Grant.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, east of Chattahoochee river, July 17, 1864.*General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C. :*

To-day we have moved out from the Chattahoochee to Nancy's creek. General Thomas on the right from Paice's ferry towards Atlanta, General Schofield on the centre near Cross Keys, and General McPherson on the left near General Schofield. To-morrow I propose to advance General Thomas to Peach Tree creek, about Buck Head, General Schofield on the Decatur road, and General McPherson to the vicinity of the railroad east of Decatur, and his cavalry division, under General Garrard, will break the railroad.

If we can break the railroad I propose to place the left wing across it near Decatur, and break up the railroad eastward as far as the cavalry can operate with prudence. To-day we encounter nothing but cavalry.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, lot No. 165 our map, east of  
Chattahoochee river, July 17, 1864.*

GENERAL: General Schofield has just been here and described his position as on Nancy's creek, his pickets on south side near Cross Keys, about lots 304, 15, and 16.

General McPherson is on the road from Roswell to Decatur; his advance

about lot 326, a mile above General Schofield. General S. says that the road represented on our map, as from Roswell to Buck Head, is a broad, well travelled road, and has a branch about lot No. 94, leading to Paice's ferry. This corresponds with what General Corse tells me, that you found a large road branching to the left soon after leaving Paice's ferry. It is well to mark this road, as it may be useful to us.

General Howard can take a good road from here to Buck Head, starting at his present front, and moving southeast to the main road from Roswell to Buck Head just before it crosses Nancy's creek. Approaching Buck Head from this quarter about the same time that Generals Schofield and McPherson get to the Peach Tree from the east will, of course, relieve any pressure you may encounter on the main road.

General Schofield will move early for the Peach Tree road, in front of Cross Keys, and take post about lots 239, 247, and 272, with pickets forward as far as 196, and General McPherson will seek for position in the valley of North Fork of Peach Tree, about 267, 266, 284, and 285, and send General Garrard to break the road and telegraph.

You should leave a corps in front of Donaldson's, and have the other two as early as possible at and in front of Buck Head. Then feel down strong to Peach Tree, and see what is there. A vigorous demonstration should be made, and caution your commanders not to exhibit any of the signs of a halt or pause, as in that event too much resistance would be made on the other flank. You know the reasons for the utmost activity, and I need not repeat them. Let all your commanders have full orders to-night, and before joining General Schofield in the morning I will point out to General Howard the road by which he can reach Buck Head in five (5) miles from here.

Give orders as soon as any head of column reaches Buck Head to feel up the Peach Tree road for General Schofield, who will surely be in position before your troops can be.

I am yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

Major General THOMAS,  
Commanding Army of the Cumberland.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field at San House, Peach Tree road,  
five miles northeast of Buck Head, Ga., July 18, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have reports from General McPherson to 2 p. m. He has reached the railroad at a point two (2) miles from Stone mountain and seven (7) miles from Decatur, had broken the telegraphs and road, and by five (5) p. m. will have four (4) or five (5) miles broken. To-morrow I want a bold push for Atlanta, and have made my orders, which, I think, will put us in Atlanta or very close to it. Hold on about Howell's Mill and the main road, and let your left swing across Peach Tree, about the South Fork, and connect with General Schofield, who will approach Decatur from the north, whilst General McPherson moves down from the east. It is hard to realize that Johnston will give up Atlanta without a fight, but it may be so. Let us develop the truth.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

Major General THOMAS, *Buck Head.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Cross Keys, Ga., July, 18, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington:*

We moved to-day rapidly, and General McPherson reached the Atlanta and Augusta road at a point seven (7) miles east of Decatur and four (4) miles from Stone mountain. General Garrard's cavalry at once set to work to break up the road, and was re-enforced by Brigadier General Morgan L. Smith's division of infantry, and they expect by night to have five (5) miles of road effectually destroyed. Thus far, we have encountered only cavalry, with light resistance, and to-morrow will move on Decatur and Atlanta.

I am fully aware of the necessity of making the most of time, and shall keep things moving.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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CITY POINT, VA., *July 19, 1864—10.30 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN:

I see by Richmond papers of yesterday that Smith has left Tupelo, and is moving towards Ripley. Although they call it a retreat, I judge from S. D. Lee's despatch that Forrest has been badly whipped. Smith, however, ought to be instructed to keep a close watch on Forrest, and not permit him to gather strength and move into Middle Tennessee.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

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NEW ORLEANS, *July 20, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

Your telegram of the 7th has been received. You have already been advised that the force intended for the operations against Mobile have been sent to the army of the Potomac. I am now preparing a smaller force to act, in co-operation with the navy, in an attack which Admiral Farragut will make on that harbor. This force will be ready in six (6) days, and, although much smaller than was contemplated originally, will, no doubt, have a good effect.

General Asboth at Pensacola has been advised of General Rousseau's expedition, and will be prepared for it. Forage and subsistence will be sent to Pensacola, and transportation held in readiness to be sent as soon as I hear of his arrival. The diversion of so large a force from this command will limit our movements very materially, but I will do whatever I can to facilitate you.

E. R. S. CANBY,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 20, 1864—9 p. m.*

General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

I have a despatch from General Grant. Answer him in my name that Major General A. J. Smith has the very order he suggests, viz: to hang on to Forrest, and prevent his coming to Tennessee. I will, however, renew the orders.

I advanced from the Chattahoochee in force on the 17th. On the 18th General McPherson and General Garrard's cavalry reached the Augusta road, and destroyed about five (5) miles of it east of Decatur. On the 19th the whole line crossed Peach Tree creek, General McPherson occupying Decatur. To-day we moved on Atlanta, and have been fighting all day. Our line now extends from a point on the railroad two and a half ( $2\frac{1}{2}$ ) miles east of Atlanta, round by north to the mouth of Peach Tree creek. We find the enemy in force, but will close in to-morrow. By the Atlanta papers we learn that Johnston is relieved, and that Hood commands; that Rousseau is on the railroad at Opelika; and that most of the newspapers and people have left Atlanta.

General Thomas is on my right, General Schofield in the centre, and General McPherson on the left; General Garrard's cavalry on the left rear of General McPherson, Generals Stoneman and McCook on the west bank guarding our right flank. The enemy still clings to his intrenchments. If General Grant can keep Lee from re-enforcing this army for a week, I think I can dispose of it. We have taken several hundred prisoners, and had some short, severe encounters; but they were partial. We have pressed the enemy back at all points, until our rifle shots can reach the town. If he strengthens his works, I will gradually swing round between him and his only source of supply—Macon.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 20, 1864—midnight.*

GENERAL: After destroying the bridge at McAfee's, which I suppose is already done, you will send to General McPherson's guard at the bridge at Roswell your wagons, led horses, and baggage, and proceed rapidly to Covington on the main wagon and railroad east—distance about thirty (30) miles from Decatur—take the road by Latimer, touching the road at or beyond Lithonia, and thence substantially along the railroad, destroying it effectually all the way, especially the Yellow river bridge this side of Covington, as well as the road bridge over Yellow river after you have passed. From Covington send detachments to destroy the rail and road bridges east of Covington over the Ucofauhatchee. Try and capture and destroy some locomotives and cars and the depots and stores at Covington; but of private property only take what is necessary for your own use, except horses and mules, of which you will take all that are fit for service, exercising, of course, some judgment as to the animals belonging to the poor and needy. On your return select your own route, but I would suggest that by way of Sheffield, Rock bridge, and Stone mountain, or even further north if you prefer. I want you to put your whole strength at this, and do it quick and well. I know it can be done. By passing Yellow river by the road bridge, and then pushing for the railroad bridges right and left, the guards will run or even burn their own bridges. You ought to catch some trains about Covington, as there is no telegraph to give them timely warning. I believe that the cavalry is mostly withdrawn from that flank of the enemy, and that you can ride roughshod over any force there; at all events, it is a matter of vital importance, and must be attempted with great vigor. The importance of it will justify the loss of one-quarter of your command. Be prepared with axes, hatchets, and bars to tear up sections of track, and make bonfires; when the rails are red-hot, they must be twisted. Burning will do for bridges and culverts, but not for ordinary tracks. Let the work be well done.



The whole thing should be done in two days, including to-morrow. I will notify General McPherson, that he may look out for his rear and trains.

I am, with respect, yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General GARRARD,  
*Commanding Cavalry Division.*

If the McAfee bridge is not already burned, you can send a messenger to the guard already there to do it, and move to Roswell. This need not delay your departure for Covington at once. S.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 21, 1864.*

GENERAL: After leaving you to-day I visited General Palmer, and saw his skirmishers advance well to his right flank. I am satisfied the enemy will not attempt to hold Atlanta and the fort at the railroad crossing of the Chattahoochee. There is a weak place in that line, and it can best be reached by advancing General Johnson on the direct road as far as possible, and bringing Generals Baird and Davis up on his right. I do not think the enemy will assume the offensive from the fort on the Chattahoochee, but it may be prudent to let General McCook watch him on both sides of the river. The front of General Hooker is very narrow; but I admit it is the point where your line should be strongest. General Howard's two divisions in this direction have advanced a good distance over a complete line of the enemy's defences, and I think both Generals Wood and Stanley are up to the main line of intrenchments; that from Wood's right rifled guns can reach the town. The enemy still holds the hill near where General Stanley's left and General Schofield's right are, and they keep up an infernal clatter; but it sounds to me like a waste of ammunition. General McPherson to-day charged and carried a hill, losing two hundred and fifty (250) men; but killing some and taking prisoners. From this hill he has an easy range of the town. We will try the effect of shelling to-morrow, and during it you had better make all the ground you can.

I do not believe the enemy will repeat his assaults, as he had in that of yesterday his best troops, and failed signally. Therefore I don't fear for your right flank; still it is well to be prudent. Our maps are all wrong, and the quicker we can get our surveys up and published the better. I will look to Schofield and McPherson to-morrow.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General THOMAS,  
*Army of the Cumberland.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 21, 1864.*

His Excellency President LINCOLN, *Washington, D. C.:*

Your despatch is received. I have the highest veneration for the law, and will respect it always, however it conflicts my opinion of its propriety. I only telegraphed to General Halleck because I had seen no copy of the law, and

supposed the War Department might have some control over its operations. When I have taken Atlanta, and can sit down in some place, I will convey by letter a fuller expression of my views in relation to this subject.\*

With great respect,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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WASHINGTON, July 21, 1864—9 a. m.

Major General SHERMAN:

Richmond Whig of the 20th learns from Macon Confederate that but little quartermaster or commissary stores remain in Atlanta, all having been moved to safer and more secure points. It also says that it has every reason to hope that Sherman's rear will be cut in the next ten days.

Johnston has been relieved, and Hood takes his place, much to the surprise of the army and the public; also that the change indicates that there will be no more retreating, but that Atlanta will be defended at all hazards, and to the last extremity.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

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(Cipher.)

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 21, 1864.*

GENERAL: Yesterday, at 4 p. m., the enemy sallied from his intrenchments and fell suddenly and heavily on our line in the direction of Buck Head. The blow fell upon General Newton's division of General Howard's corps; on General Ward's, General Geary's, and General Williams's divisions of General Hooker's corps; and General Johnson, of General Palmer's corps. For two hours the fighting was close and severe, resulting in the complete repulse of the enemy, with a heavy loss in dead and wounded. He left his dead and many wounded in our possession. We retained undisputed possession of all the ground fought over. General Newton reports he has buried two hundred (200) of the enemy's dead, and is satisfied he wounded at least twelve hundred (1,200.) His entire loss is only one hundred (100,) as his men were partially covered by a rail barricade. At the time of the attack General Hooker was in the act of advancing his lines, so that he fought his corps uncovered, in comparatively open ground, and on fair terms with the enemy. The contest was very severe. He has buried about four hundred (400) of the rebel dead, took seven (7) colors, and has collected many of the wounded and other prisoners. General Hooker thinks that the rebel wounded in his front fully equals four thousand (4,000,) but I don't like to make guesses in such matters; his own loss will be covered by fifteen hundred (1,500.) On the whole, the result is most favorable to us.

To-day we have gained important positions, so that Generals McPherson and Schofield, on the east, have batteries in position that will easily reach the heart of the city, and General Howard, on the north, also has advanced his lines about two (2) miles, being within easy cannon range of the buildings in Atlanta. He compelled the enemy to give up a long line of parapet which constituted an advance line of intrenchments. The city seems to have a line all round it, at an average distance from the heart of the town of one and a half ( $1\frac{1}{2}$ ) mile, but our shot passing over this line will destroy the town—and I doubt if Hood will stand a

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\* Recruiting agents in rebel States.

bombardment—still he has fought hard at all points to-day. I will open on the town from the east and northeast to-morrow, and General Thomas will advance his right from the mouth of Peach Tree creek to cross the railroad to the north-west of the town. I have sent General Garrard's cavalry eastward to Covington, to break railroad and destroy the bridge on Yellow river and the Ulcofau-hatchee creek.

In the action yesterday the rebel Generals O'Bannon and Stewart were reported killed, and among the dead were three colonels and many officers. Brigadier General Gresham was severely wounded yesterday, but is in no danger of life or limb.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General HALLECK,  
*Washington, D. C.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 23, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have heard of General Rousseau's return to Marietta. Please order him at once to relieve General Stoneman, on the other side of the river, and let General Stoneman come to me with his whole force. Please send the enclosed order for me at once. The attack on our left to-day has been desperate and persistent, and the losses on both sides quite heavy. I want you to relieve it to-morrow by an actual attack, or strong demonstration on the right. I will send word early in the day if it is renewed. I suppose it will be kept up as long as General Garrard is out. I want General Stoneman to move out to General Garrard's relief. You can use Generals McCook and Rousseau on your right.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General THOMAS,  
*Army of the Cumberland.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 23, 1864—2 a. m.*

General ROUSSEAU, *Marietta*:

Your despatch is received, and you have done well. I hate to call on you so soon for more service; but time is pressing. I want you to move down right away to the railroad bridge and relieve General Stoneman, who is watching the Chattahoochee below Turner's ferry. He will describe to you the country and what is needed. I want him relieved as soon as possible, that he may come over here. I hope to see you in a few days.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 23, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*:

General Rousseau reports from Marietta yesterday his safe return from Opelika, having destroyed that depot, thirty (30) miles of railroad towards Mont.

gomery, three (3) miles towards Columbus, and two towards West Point. His entire loss twelve (12) killed and thirty (30) wounded. He brings in four hundred (400) mules and three hundred (300) horses.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 23, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

Yesterday morning the enemy fell back to the intrenchments proper of the city of Atlanta, which are in a general circle of a radius of one and a half ( $1\frac{1}{2}$ ) miles, and we closed in. While we were forming our lines and selecting positions for batteries the enemy appeared suddenly out of the dense woods in heavy masses on our extreme left, and struck the 17th corps, General Blair, in flank, and was forcing it back when the 16th corps, General Dodge, came up and checked the movement; but the enemy's cavalry got well to our rear and into Decatur, and for some hours our left flank was completely enveloped. The fighting that resulted was continuous until night, with heavy loss on both sides. The enemy took one of our batteries, (Murray's, of the regular army,) that was marching in its place in column on the road, unconscious of danger. About 4 p. m. the enemy sallied against the division of General Morgan L. Smith, which occupied an abandoned line of rifle trench near the railroad east of the city and forced it back some four hundred (400) yards, leaving in his hands for the time two (2) batteries, but the ground and batteries were immediately after recovered by the same troops re-enforced. I cannot well approximate our loss, which fell heaviest on the 15th and 17th corps, and count it three thousand (3,000,) but I know that, being on the defensive, we have inflicted equally heavy loss on the enemy. General McPherson, when arranging his troops about 11 a. m., and passing from one column to another, unconsciously rode upon an ambuscade without apprehension, at some distance ahead of his staff and orderlies, and was shot dead. His body was sent in charge of his personal staff back to Marietta and Chattanooga. His loss at that moment was most serious; but General Logan at once arranged the troops and had immediate direction of them during the rest of the day. Our left, though refused somewhat, is still within easy cannon range of Atlanta. The enemy seems to man his extensive parapets and at the same time has to spare heavy assaulting columns; but to-day we will intrench our front lines, which will give me troops to spare to meet those assaults.

I cannot hear of the loss of more than a few wagons taken by the enemy's cavalry during his temporary pause in Decatur, whence all the trains had been securely removed to the rear of the main army under cover of a brigade commanded by Colonel Sprague.

During the heavy attack on the left, the remainder of the line was not engaged.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 23, 1864—8 p. m.*

GENERAL: I have this moment returned from an examination of our entire line. You know your own. The balance extends in a circle at about one

thousand (1,000) yards distant from the enemy's lines as far as Proctor's creek, the whole of Palmer's corps being east and south of the railroad. All have covered their fronts with parapets, so that the enemy will not attempt a sally. The question now is, what next? I will in person explain all that is necessary to produce the result aimed at as soon as General Garrard returns. You need not apprehend a renewal of the attack on the part of the enemy, but, on the contrary, you may begin to feel out with skirmishers and supports into the woods east of General Giles Smith's division and General Dodge's corps. In the morning early let General Wood's division move into Decatur, stay awhile, and return. Let details of men and pioneers begin at your very front and break up and destroy the railroad absolutely back to and including Decatur. Until we conclude upon the best manner of reducing Atlanta we cannot be better employed than in rendering the Atlanta and Augusta road useless; especially have the iron rails heated and twisted.

I want your skirmishers to feel out to-morrow early in front of General Dodge for a double purpose; to hold on that flank the cavalry of Wheeler, while we operate on General Thomas's flank and centre, a diversion for General Garrard, now on his return from his expedition.

I am, with respect,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General JOHN A. LOGAN,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 23, 1864—8 a. m.*

GENERAL: I have examined the line of circumvallation and have no fear of the enemy even attempting to test its strength. But until we get our cavalry in hand and position, I will not attempt anything serious. You may therefore keep things "statu quo," and look only to your supplies of food and ammunition.

I have seen General Rousseau, and am satisfied that he has made a break that cuts off Alabama for a month, and he has brought us in pretty fair condition some twenty-five hundred additional cavalry.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SCHOFIELD,  
*Commanding Army of the Ohio.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 24, 1864.*

GENERAL: It is my painful duty to report that Brigadier General James B. McPherson, United States army, major general of volunteers, and commander of the army of the Tennessee in the field, was killed by a shot from ambush about noon yesterday. At the time of this fatal shot he was on horseback, placing his troops in position near the city of Atlanta, and was passing by a cross-road from a moving column towards the flank of troops that had already been established on the line. He had quitted me but a few minutes before, and was on his way to see in person to the execution of my orders. About the time of this sad event the enemy had sallied from his intrenchments of Atlanta and by a circuit had got to the left and rear of this very line, and

had begun an attack which resulted in serious battle; so that General McPherson fell in battle, booted and spurred, as the gallant knight and gentleman should wish. Not his the loss, but the country's; and this army will mourn his death and cherish his memory as that of one who, though comparatively young, had risen by his merit and ability to the command of one of the best armies which the nation had called into existence to vindicate its honor and integrity.

History tells us of but few who so blended the grace and gentleness of the friend with the dignity, courage, faith and manliness of the soldier. His public enemies, even the men who directed the fatal shot, ne'er spoke or wrote of him without expressions of marked respect; those whom he commanded loved him even to idolatry; and I, his associate and commander, fail in words adequate to express my opinion of his great worth. I feel assured that every patriot in America on hearing this sad news will feel a sense of personal loss, and the country generally will realize that we have lost not only an able military leader, but a man who, had he survived, was qualified to heal the national strife which has been raised by designing and ambitious men.

His body has been sent north in charge of Major Willard, Captains Steele and Gile, his personal staff.

I am, with great respect,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General L. THOMAS,  
*Adjutant General U. S. A.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 24, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have pretty well surveyed the whole position, and by the aid of maps and my own observation, think I understand the case pretty well.

Our lines are now strong in front, and we compass Atlanta from the railroad on the east to the railroad west. The enemy having failed in his assault on your flank before it was covered by any defensive works, and having sustained most serious loss, will not again attempt it, but will await our action. I now enclose you a map made by General Schofield's engineer, which shows the roads to your present right rear. I sent Captain Poe to see you this morning, but from what Captain Hickenlooper says, I think I may have failed to convey to you my right meaning, which is this:

The only object in placing the army of Tennessee on that flank was, to reach and destroy the railroad from Atlanta towards Augusta. That is partially done, and the work of destruction should be continued as far as possible. I wish you to keep one division or more employed day and night in breaking and burning the road until General Garrard returns. I feel no doubt but that he has succeeded in breaking the bridges across Yellow river and the Ucofauhatchee, but he may have to fight his way back, and to relieve him I wish you to push your skirmishers out from General Dodge's front, and from General Blair's left, as though you were going to push your way by the east of Atlanta to the Macon road. To keep up this delusion you should send a column cautiously down one of those roads or valleys southeast and engage the enemy outside his works, but not behind his trenches.

As soon as General Garrard is back you can discontinue all such demonstrations and prepare for your next move. I propose to give you timely notice to send your wagons behind General Thomas, and then to move your army behind the present line, to the extreme right, to reach, if possible, the Macon road, which you know to be the only road by which Atlanta can be supplied. This will leave General Schofield the left flank, which will be covered by the

works he has constructed on his front, and he can use the abandoned trenches of the enemy to cover his left rear. You will no longer send your wagons by Roswell, but by Buck Head and Paice's ferry, and when you change you will draw from the railroad bridge to which our cars now run, and at which point we are now making a pier bridge, and also two pontoons. General Stoneman will surely be at Decatur to-day, and we will have two divisions of cavalry on our right, viz: Generals McCook's and Harrison's (General Rousseau's.)

Act with confidence; know that the enemy cannot budge you from your present ground, and act offensively to show him that you dare him to the encounter. You can understand that, being on the defensive, he cannot afford to sally, unless at great peril. General Schofield has so strengthened his front that I feel no uneasiness about that flank, and only study now to make the next move so quickly that we may reach East Point or its vicinity with as little loss as possible. My headquarters are now behind General Howard's corps, General Newton's division, on the main Marietta and Atlanta road, which crosses the Chattahoochee at Paice's ferry and passes through Buck Head. I am at a large white house near the enemy's old line of intrenchments, a prolongation of the same which passes from where I saw you yesterday, by General Schofield's position. I have just heard that General Garrard is back. Go on breaking that road good.

I am, truly, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General JOHN A. LOGAN,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 24, 1864—2 p. m.*

GENERAL; I am rejoiced to hear you are back safe and successful. General Rousseau has brought me two thousand five hundred (2,500) good cavalry, having been to Opelika and destroyed thirty (30) miles of road between West Point and Montgomery. I will give you time to rest, and then we must make quick work with Atlanta. I await your report with impatience, and in the mean time tender to you the assurance of my great consideration.

Your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General GARRARD, *Decatur.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 24, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

On making up reports and examining the field, I find the result of Hood's attack on our left more destructive than I reported. Our loss will not foot up two thousand (2,000) killed and wounded, whereas we have found over one thousand (1,000) rebel dead, which will make, with the usual proportion of wounded, a loss to the enemy of full seven thousand (7,000.) General Garrard also has returned perfectly successful, having completely destroyed the two large bridges near Covington, forty (40) miles towards Augusta, brought in two hundred prisoners and some good horses, and destroyed the public stores

at Covington and Conyer's stations, including two thousand (2,000) bales of cotton, a locomotive, and train of cars. Our communications are yet all safe and the army in good condition in all respects. As soon as my cavalry rests, I propose to swing the army of the Tennessee round by the right rapidly, and interpose between Atlanta and Macon, the only line open to the enemy.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 24, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

The sudden loss of General McPherson was a heavy blow to me. I can hardly replace him, but must have a successor. After thinking over the whole matter, I prefer that Major General O. O. Howard be ordered to command the army and department of the Tennessee. If this meets the President's approval notify me by telegraph, when I will put him in command, and name others to fill the vacancies created. General Logan, as senior, commands the army of the Tennessee for the present. After we have taken Atlanta I will name officers who merit promotion; in the mean time I request that the President will not give increased rank to any officer who has gone on leave from sickness or other cause than wounds in battle.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, July 25, 1864.*

GENERAL: I find it difficult to make prompt report of results coupled with some data or information without occasionally making some mistakes. General McPherson's sudden death and General Logan's succeeding to the command, as it were, in the midst of battle, made some confusion on our extreme left, but it soon recovered and made sad havoc with the enemy, who had practiced one of his favorite games of attacking our left when in motion and before it had time to cover its weak end.

After riding over the ground and hearing the varying statements of the actors on that flank, I directed General Logan to make an official report of the actual results, and I herewith enclose it.

Though the number of dead rebels seems excessive, I am disposed to give full credit to the report that our loss, though only three thousand five hundred and twenty-one (3,521) killed, wounded, and missing, the enemy's dead alone on the field nearly equal that number, viz, three thousand two hundred and forty (3,240.)

Happening at that point of the line when a flag of truce was sent in to ask permission for each party to bury its dead, I gave General Logan authority to permit a temporary truce on that flank alone, while our labors and fighting proceeded at all others.

I also send you a copy of General Garrard's report of the breaking of railroad toward Augusta.

Now I am grouping my command to attack the Macon road, and with that view will intrench a strong line of circumvallation and flanks, so as to have in



reserve as large an infantry column as possible to co-operate with all the cavalry to swing round to the south and east and control that road at or below East Point.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 25, 1864.*

Colonel JAMES HARDIE,  
*Inspector General, Washington, D. C. :*

I have your despatch of yesterday announcing the appointment of General Osterhaus as major general. I do not object to his appointment, but I wish to put on record this my emphatic opinion that it is an act of injustice to officers who stand by their posts in the day of danger to neglect them, and advance such as Generals Hovey and Osterhaus, who left us in the midst of bullets to go to the rear in search of personal advancement. If the rear be the post of honor, then we had better all change front on Washington.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 25, 1864.*

General WASHBURN, *Memphis :*

It was by General Grant's special order that General Smith was required after his fight to persevere and continue to follow Forrest. He must keep after him till recalled by me or General Grant, and if Forrest goes towards Tennessee, General Smith must follow him, aiming to reach the Tennessee river at Decatur.

We have had some hard fighting here, but have got the enemy in a tight place now inside of Atlanta. General Rousseau broke the road at Opelika and my cavalry has broken up the road towards Augusta for fifty (50) miles out. Only one railroad remains to the enemy, viz., that to Macon, and I am nearly ready to strike it, after which the enemy must come out of Atlanta to fight or be invested.

General Smith must keep well out after Forrest, and rather watch him closely than attempt to pursue him, but when he does fight he should keep the advantage. The railroad could supply him out as far as Grand Junction. It is of vital importance that Forrest do not go to Tennessee.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 25, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have your application for the services of General Corse, which I grant, because I want you to have good division commanders. But I beg you to see that no injustice is done to General Sweeney. I have noticed for some time a growing dissatisfaction on the part of General Dodge with General

Sweeney. It may be personal. See that General Dodge prefers specific charges and specifications, and you, as the army commander, must be the judge of the sufficiency of the charges. No one but the commander of an army can arrest and send away a general; it is a high power, but I construe the power to reside with the commanders of my three armies, because each has a command other than the troops here on the spot. You, as commander of the army of the Tennessee, should judge as to the cause of arrest and see that no injustice is done a general officer. You can see how cruel it would be to a brave and sensitive gentleman and officer to be arrested, deprived of his command and sent to the rear at this time. I do not believe General Dodge would willingly do an act of injustice, but still you are the one to judge.

I fear that General Sweeney will feel that even I am influenced against him to befriend General Corse, but it is not so. I give up General Corse because the good of the service demands that, at this crisis, you should have good division commanders.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General JOHN A. LOGAN,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 25, 1864—8 p. m.*

Lieutenant General GRANT, *Petersburg :*

Your despatch of 21st did not come till to-day. Johnston is relieved and Hood commands. Hood has made two attempts to strike hard since we crossed Chattahoochee, and both times got more than he bargained for. No doubt he expected to cut to my rear, but I have already cut to *his* rear, having broken his Augusta road out for fifty miles and his southern road at Opelika. None remains to him but the Macon road, and I think I will have that soon. I would rather that Hood should fight it out at Atlanta than to retreat further to Macon. If you can keep away re-enforcements, all well. My army is all in hand and the rear well guarded.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 26, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have received your letter of July 26, asking permission, after breaking good the railroad below McDonough, to push on, release the officers there, and afterwards to go to Andersonville and release the men confined there. I see many difficulties, but, as you say, even a chance of success will warrant the effort, and I consent to it. You may, after having fulfilled my present orders, send General Garrard back to the left flank of the army, and proceed with your command proper to achieve both or either of the objects named. I will keep the enemy busy, so that you shall have nothing to contend with but the cavalry; and if you can bring back to this army any or all those prisoners of war, it will be an achievement that will entitle you and your command to the love and ad-

miration of the whole country. Be careful to break telegraph wire and railroad when and wherever you go, especially the telegraph, as it will prevent the enemy following your movement.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General GEORGE STONEMAN.

*Commanding Division of Cavalry.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, before Atlanta, Ga., July 26, 1864.*

GENTLEMEN: As a part of the movement to-morrow, I wish, whilst the cavalry is moving out, say at 6 a. m., and General Logan's troops are shifting from left to right, that you send from some point of the front of each division in our line of circumvallation a bold party, of about a regiment strong, to push back the enemy's outlying pickets and feel their position. This will have the effect of holding them, and drawing there as large a body of the enemy as possible, as he will surely do on such a display.

Inasmuch as General Jeff. C. Davis's division is placed as a strong right flank, and, therefore, will be almost entirely in reserve when the army of the Tennessee gets to the right, I wish the demonstration to his front to be still more decided, viz: a whole brigade should move on the ridge due south from the hill intrenched beyond Proctor's creek, and should push back the enemy beyond any little rifle-pits to his main line which will be found upon the main ridge which extends from Atlanta to East Point. This brigade should move toward the old village of White Hall, about two and a half miles from Atlanta. These demonstrations should proceed slowly and deliberately, and last all day, and should be as bold and provoking to the enemy as possible, tempting him to sally out and test our present lines.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major Generals THOMAS and SCHOFIELD.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 26, 1864.*

General THOMAS:

General McCook represents the enemy's cavalry to his front intrenched behind good works extending from about White Hall down to the Chattahoochee, and he apprehends difficulty in breaking through. I have consented to his dropping down the west bank of the Chattahoochee to a point about Campbelltown, crossing there and striking out for the railroad. This will turn the position of the cavalry, and force them back to meet General McCook on more open ground.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 26, 1864.*

General THOMAS:

Major General Howard is ordered to the command of the army and department of the Tennessee. I want him in his new command at once.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 26, 1864.*General HALLECK, *Washington:*

To-morrow we begin to move against Atlanta, having strongly intrenched our front from the railroad east of Atlanta to a hill south of Proctor's creek. I move the whole army of the Tennessee to the right, extending the line south, threatening East Point, and forcing, as I think, Hood to abandon Atlanta, or allow us at small cost to occupy the railroad south of the town, that to the east being well destroyed. At the same time I send by night a force of about three thousand five hundred (3,500) cavalry under General McCook, and around by the left about five thousand (5,000) cavalry under Stoneman, with orders to reach the railroad about Griffin's. I also have consented that General Stoneman, after he has executed this part of his plan, if he find it feasible, may, with his division proper, about two thousand, (2,000,) go to Macon and attempt the release of our officers and prisoners there, and then to Andersonville to release the twenty thousand (20,000) of our men prisoners there. This is probably more than he can accomplish, but it is worthy of a determined effort.

Whilst these are in progress, I will with the main army give employment to all the rebel army still in Atlanta.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 27, 1864.*General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

My two cavalry expeditions are off to make a wide circuit and reach the Macon road well to the southeast of Atlanta, and the army of the Tennessee is shifted to the extreme right, reaching well towards the railroad, so that I think to-morrow must develop something. The cavalry will have to fight the enemy's cavalry, and we can hold the infantry and artillery to Atlanta and force them to extend and choose between Atlanta and East Point. I don't think the enemy can hold both. All are well pleased with General Howard's appointment but Generals Logan and Hooker. The former thought he ought to have been allowed the command of the army in the field until the end of the campaign, but I explained to him that a permanent department commander had to be appointed at once, as discharges, furloughs, and much detailed business could alone be done by a department commander. General Hooker is offended, because he thinks he is entitled to the command. I must be honest, and say he is not qualified or suited to it. He talks of quitting. If General Thomas recommends, I shall not object. He is not indispensable to our success. He is welcome to my place, if the President awards it, but I cannot name him to such an important command as the army of the Tennessee.

All is well. The enemy to-day offered no serious opposition to the changes of to-day, and our skirmishing and artillery was just enough to make things interesting.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 27, 1864.*

SIR: Your despatch of yesterday is received. I beg you will not regard me as fault-finding, for I assert that I have been well sustained in every respect during my entire services. I did not suppose my despatches would go outside the offices at the War Department; I did not suppose you were troubled with such matters. ——— and ——— are both worthy men, and had they been promoted on the eve of the Vicksburg campaign it would have been natural and well accepted; but I do think you will admit that their promotion, coming to us when they had gone to the rear—the one offended because I could not unite in the same division five infantry and five cavalry regiments, and the other for temporary sickness—was enough to occasion disappointment. You can see how ambitious aspirants for military fame regard these things. They come to me and point them out as evidences that I am wrong in encouraging them to a silent, patient, discharge of duty. I assure you that every general of my army has spoken of it, and referred to it as evidence that promotion results from opportunity, and not from actual service. I have refrained from recommending any thus far in the campaign, as I think we should reach some stage in the game before stopping to balance accounts or writing history. I assure you that I do think you have consistently acted throughout the war with marked skill in the matter of military appointments, and that as few mistakes have been made as could be expected. I will furnish all my army and division commanders with a copy of your despatch, that they may feel reassured.

With great respect,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

His Excellency PRESIDENT LINCOLN,  
*Washington.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 27, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington:*

General Hooker has applied to be relieved of the command of the 20th army corps, assigning as a reason the appointment of General Howard, his junior, to command the army of the Tennessee. General Thomas asks the following appointments:

General D. S. Stanley to command the 4th corps, vice Howard, transferred.

General H. W. Slocum to command the 20th corps, vice Hooker, relieved at his own request.

I approve these nominations, and ask orders, by telegraph, that General Slocum may be summoned from Vicksburg, where he now is.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 28, 1864.*

General THOMAS:

Try and thin your strong lines as much as possible to-morrow, so as to make good reserves for action. Let these reserves be ready to move at any moment. Our cavalry will surely reach the Macon road to-night, and to-morrow the enemy will do something desperate.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 29, 1864.*

General THOMAS :

Until the result of our cavalry movement is known, I want the utmost activity on our flanks. General Howard, by this time, must have his line strong. I wish you to take General Davis's division, and one of General Williams's, and operate from General Howard's right flank towards East Point. Don't form a line, but move so as to occupy or threaten the railroad. General Schofield will do the same on the left. I will stay at home to-day, to be convenient to the telegraph. Keep me well advised. Don't extend the line, but operate in the nature of a strong reconnoissance towards East Point, having General Howard's line as a point of departure and safety.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,  
*July 29, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

We have counted six hundred and forty-two (642) rebel dead, and there are still others in front of our lines and not yet recovered. It is fair to presume that their wounded are five or six times that number. We may count largely on their missing, great numbers having been seen going to the rear, and many stragglers are being picked up in the woods. A just estimate of their (enemy's) loss would, I believe, be not less than five thousand (5,000.) Our loss, as far as reported, less than six hundred.

O. O. HOWARD,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 29, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington :*

The result of the enemy's attack yesterday, chiefly on the 15th corps, is thus reported by General Howard :

We have counted six hundred and forty-two (642) rebel dead, and there are still others in front of our lines; it is fair to presume that their wounded are five or six times that of their dead. Over one hundred (100) prisoners are in hand, and others being gathered up in the woods. General Howard estimates the enemy's loss at five thousand (5,000,) and our loss at less than six hundred (600.)

General W. H. T. Walker was killed on the 22d, and it is now reported by prisoners that Wheeler was killed yesterday. We are so near the enemy's line that their intrenched artillery prevents our advancing the lines, so as to take full advantage of the battle, they gathering into the city their more remote dead.

The parapets of Atlanta present a will-filled line wherever we approach them. General Thomas is making to-day a strong reconnoissance in force towards East Point, and General Schofield on the left. Our cavalry has now been out three days, and must have done its work about Griffin.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*July 29, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

I have just returned from the right. I have intrenched Morgan on the Howell or Green's ferry road, to the right and southwest of Logan. He has complete command of that road, and has his skirmishers out half a mile to his front. They have driven the rebels into intrenched rifle-pits, and report intrenched lines heavily manned a short distance in rear of their skirmish rifle-pits. I also directed Ward to take position on Morgan's right, and refuse his right so as to make a strong right flank. Ward fronts the Howell's ferry road, and runs along it towards the Chattahoochee for half a mile, and then falls back this way. Howard had good ground to fight on yesterday. I saw several dead rebels that Ward's men were burying. If, after intrenching, Howard will thin out and extend to his right, Morgan and Ward can move still further to the right, and might perhaps overlap the enemy.

While Morgan and Ward made their advance, I had Williams, Johnson, and Baird make strong reconnoissances to their fronts. They all report their belief that the enemy has either retired altogether or has withdrawn the greatest part of his forces, and only now has a weak skirmish line covering his fortifications around the city. I have directed them to feel strongly to-night and determine whether the enemy has retired or not.

GEO. H. THOMAS, *Major General.*

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*July 29, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

I will send to General Morgan immediately for the strength of the 10th Illinois.

I take great pleasure in announcing the capture of an entire rebel regiment, one hundred and fifteen officers and men, by the first division, 20th corps, while advancing its lines in obedience to my orders of last night. The position obtained is very advantageous to us also, as it will enable me to shorten my lines considerably and have a better view of the ground in front.

G. H. THOMAS, *Major General.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,

*July 30, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

I have your despatch expressing your desire that I advance my picket line in front of the distillery near the road leading to Atlanta. I tried that on the 28th, and found it impracticable, for this reason, viz: The point referred to is in a large re-entering angle of the enemy's works, and the enemy's picket line in that vicinity is enfiladed by the artillery of both the adjacent salients. Neither the enemy's picket line nor even the main curtain in rear should be held by our troops until those salients are carried. One of them is three-quarters of a mile to my left, and hence beyond my reach; the other is somewhat to my right. I will see General Stanley and ascertain what can be done about this latter salient. Perhaps we can drive in the skirmishers around it and keep down its fire with our sharpshooters.

Respectfully,

J. M. SCHOFIELD, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 30, 1864.*

Colonel JAMES A. HARDIE, *Inspector General, Washington, D. C.:*

Be pleased to convey my thanks to the President for his prompt bestowal of the appointments as brigadier generals on the eight (8) most worthy colonels named in your despatch to-day.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 31, 1864.*

Generals THOMAS and HOWARD:

I am just back from an interview with General Schofield.

General Garrard is back. He was sent by General Stoneman to Flat Rock, where he was surrounded by Wheeler's cavalry, but he remained two days expecting General Stoneman to send him orders, when he broke out to Lattimore's, where he heard General Stoneman had gone to Covington and beyond. Not having further orders, he came home *via* the Peach Tree road. His fight was a small affair, being only one (1) officer and six (6) men wounded, and riding down one brigade of the enemy. He thinks Wheeler still remains on the right of Atlanta, extending the infantry line. I think General Stoneman has gone to Macon, east of Yellow river, and that it is well. I have ordered General Garrard in on our left, and to-morrow night will let him fill with a skirmish line General Schofield's position, and move all of General Schofield's to the right of General Howard, and with the divisions of Generals Davis and Ward kept in reserve on the right to strike a blow beyond our new right flank when intrenched. Our right flank must be advanced in close and absolute contact with the enemy, and with General Schofield on that flank, I think we can make him quit Atlanta, or so weaken his line that we can break through somewhere, the same as our Kenesaw move.

Study the road, so that Generals Schofield and Howard may have a line close up to the enemy—as close as possible. I will send a regiment of cavalry down the west bank of the Chattahoochee to feel for General McCook. I must have a bolder commander for General Garrard's cavalry, and want General Thomas to name to me General Kilpatrick, or some good brigadier, for the command.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 1, 1864.*

SIR: I am obliged for a copy of your letter to the honorable E. M. Stanton, of date July 22, as it will enable me to reply at once.

It seems Dr. Luke Miller, a commissioner of your State, has been denied a pass on the military railroad below Nashville, for the purpose of ministering to the wants of the sick and wounded soldiers of your State here at the front, and your letter is doubtless intended as an appeal to the Secretary of War to compel me to grant such a pass. You will be amazed when on this simple statement I must accuse you of heartless cruelty to your constituents; but such is the fact. You would take the very bread and meat out of your soldiers' mouths, that a State inspector might come and supervise the acts of other medical officers here on the spot, commissioned by yourself. You would load down our



cars with travellers, and limit our ability to feed our horses and transport the powder and ball necessary to carry on this war. I tell you that with the aid of the best talent our country affords, and by laboring night and day, one *single* track of railroad *cannot* supply us; and I have been compelled to lay by for days to accumulate supplies for another step in our progress. To be sure, a single passenger would be a small matter; but he is two hundred pounds avoirdupois, and his bulk and weight in bread and meat would feed one hundred men a day, or one man one hundred days; and you can make the same calculation for forage and cartridges.

Now, how many States are there with commissioners? And are medical commissioners the only ones who claim to come below Nashville? Why, sir, go to Nashville and see. Every State has one, every congressional district, and every county; then the sanitary agents and societies, and Christian Commission, with all their ramifications; and a still more numerous and appealing class—the parents, and brothers and sisters of soldiers, dead, or wounded, or sick, or refugees searching lost parents, families and children. Will you say which of these shall have preference over the very food our men eat? Now, every regiment has its colonel and field officers, its surgeon and chaplain, and all may and do write letters daily. We strain our every nerve the moment a soldier is sick or wounded to send him to the rear to the best hospitals, and you know that agents and commissioners are not essential at all, but, on the contrary, embarrass us in all the details; then, I repeat, that by trying to force me to transport your commissioners you unknowingly and unconsciously are guilty of the cruel act of taking the bread out of some poor soldier's mouth, or the corn necessary to feed our horses that they may work. Why not accord to us on the spot a credit for some good sense and feeling? Why, when we beg you for mercy's sake to allow us for the period of our brief campaign to have the exclusive use of our single track of rail, every foot of which we must guard, and every inch of which has cost us a precious life? Why do you mistrust our purpose, and appeal for compulsory process? I beg you will see how differently men regard the same state of facts from a different stand-point.

I see you regarded the refusal by General Webster of a railroad pass for your commissioner as a want of respect for your State and office. Be assured that for you personally and officially, and for the State of Minnesota, I feel the most profound respect; but if I am to be charged with this campaign, instead of relaxing my already stringent rules at Nashville, I will make them more and more severe, that I may better feed, clothe, and equip the army, whose life and success hang by that slender thread.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

To his Excellency STEPHEN MILLER,

*Governor of Minnesota, St. Paul.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*August 1, 1864—9 p. m.*

Colonel Brownlow reports that McCook destroyed twelve (12) miles of the Macon railroad and a bridge over the Whitewater longer than the Chattahoochee bridge. He also destroyed over five hundred (500) wagons—Hood's, Hardee's, and other headquarter wagons among them. Unfortunately, he then turned back on his old route, and commenced to destroy the West Point road, when he was attacked on the 29th, near Newman, by infantry and cavalry in overwhelming numbers, surrounded, and all who did not cut their way through were either killed or captured.

There are nearly five hundred now in Marietta, and Brownlow thinks many more will find their way in. The 1st Wisconsin was cut off near Campbellton, and returned two days ago. I will send you his report in the morning.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

Major General SHERMAN.

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 2, 1864.*

General WEBSTER, *Nashville;*

Too many citizens manage to come to the front. Be even more stringent than heretofore. Grant no passes beyond Chattanooga, and only the smallest possible number that far. Surgeons can fill the offices of the Sanitary Commission, and chaplains minister to the wants of the soldiers.

If any recruits are coming from the north I want them forwarded with despatch by the cars.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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THIRTEEN MILES SOUTHWEST OF DALLAS,  
*August 2, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

On the morning of the 29th I cut the West Point railroad at Palmetto, and thoroughly destroyed the Macon railroad for two (2) miles and a half. At Lovejoy's removed telegraph wire for five (5) miles and burned two trains. I also burned one hundred (100) bales of cotton, and over five hundred (500) wagons, including headquarters trains of nearly their whole army, Hardee's entire transportation and the cavalry command supply train; killed about eight hundred (800) mules and captured seventy-two (72) commissioned officers and three hundred and fifty (350) men. Wheeler was between McDonough and the road when I cut it. Fought Jackson's division near Lovejoy's and repulsed them; was forced to return by the way of Newman's, and found infantry there. I cut the railroad and telegraph, and four miles out was attacked by Jackson's, Wheeler's and Roddy's commands, and finally, by infantry, two brigades that had been stopped there on their way to Atlanta; smashed Ross's Texas brigade in trying to break through to the river, capturing General Ross, with all his horses and men. I was finally completely surrounded, and compelled to abandon everything that would impede me in order to cut my way through. I ordered Colonels Croxton and Torry to cut through with their brigades. I took Colonel Jones with me and got through twelve hundred (1,200) men by a charge in column and crossed the river below Franklin. I have not yet heard from Croxton or Torry's commands, but suppose they got out, as they made the attempt while I was fighting. Colonel Dow, Colonel Torry, Major Austin, wounded; Major Paine killed; Harrison missing, supposed a prisoner. My loss very heavy. No co-operation from Stoneman. I will be in Marietta to-morrow.

E. M. McCOOK,  
*Brigadier General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
*August 2, 1864—10 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN:

From all that I can see I judge that the enemy's infantry fire bends back opposite my left centre, and runs from that point nearly south behind a small branch of the creek in front of Howard and myself. The force in front of my right appears to be cavalry. To seriously threaten the enemy's flank and railroad communications it will be necessary to cross the creek in front of my fight, and reach the Sandtown road, which is about a mile beyond the creek. If this move can be made with a sufficiently large force the result must be very decisive. Please inform me if you desire me to push forward to-morrow, and also whether Morgan's and Ward's divisions will be absolutely under my command, or only to be called on when the necessity shall arise. At present they are within easy supporting distance; but if I move they should move with me.

Respectfully,

J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
*Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 3, 1864.*

General THOMAS:

I am just in from the right. General Schofield has one division across Utoy, and General Baird was crossing at 6 p. m.; pretty severe skirmish, but no battle. I came by General Logan, who has been fighting with artillery and picket lines all day; he carried a line and took fifty (50) prisoners. Enemy retook the pits, but our skirmishers got in safe. General Logan again took them, with one hundred and fifty (150) prisoners; his loss very small; he was still hammering away when I left him along his line, and this relieved the pressure on Generals Schofield and Baird. I think by morning he will have a lodgement across Utoy, on or very near the Big Sandtown road, that will seriously threaten the railroad. I have heard of General McCook and am well pleased. I heard very heavy firing up your way. Tell me all about it.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 3, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington:*

We have had pretty lively times to-day generally, closing in, taking some two or three hundred prisoners. Under the pressure I got two divisions across the head of Utoy creek, well towards the railroad, and to-morrow will push still more on that flank.

General McCook, after all, has got in, bringing twelve hundred (1,200) of his men; he reports that on the 29th July he broke the West Point road at Palmetto, and then crossed over the Macon road at Lovejoy's, where he took up two (2) miles of track; burned two trains and one hundred (100) bales of cotton and five (5) miles of telegraph. He fell upon the rebel wagon train and burned over five hundred (500) wagons and killed eight hundred (800) mules; he captured seventy-two (72) officers and three hundred and fifty (350) men;

but his progress eastward and north, according to the plan, was stopped by a superior force of cavalry, and he turned towards Newman, where he was completely surrounded. He ordered two of his small brigades to make their way to the Chattahoochee while he held the enemy. About five hundred (500) of them are in, but the balance, about one thousand, (1,000,) are doubtless captured or killed. He then with twelve hundred (1,200) men charged through in column, riding down Ross's Texas brigade and capturing Ross, the commander; but he had to drop all prisoners and encumbrances to save his command; he crossed the Chattahoochee below Franklin, and up by Dallas to Marietta. The plan was for him to meet General Stoneman at Lovejoy's, but he did not meet him. Prisoners report that Yankee cavalry was shelling Macon on the 1st instant; so I think General Stoneman has a chance of rescuing those prisoners. It was a bold and rash adventure, but I sanctioned it, and hoped for its success from its very rashness.

I think that all Georgia is now in my front, and Stoneman may meet with but little opposition and succeed in releasing those prisoners. The difficulty will then commence for them to reach me. My lines are very strong and cover well all our bridges across Chattahoochee. I will use my cavalry hereafter to cover the railroad, and use infantry and artillery against Atlanta. A large part of Hood's army is militia that cannot be trusted in the open field, and I think we have crippled the three fighting corps now commanded by Stewart, Stephen D. Lee, and Hardee. It is even whispered that Hardee has resigned, but this is as yet but the story of deserters.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS 4TH ARMY CORPS,  
August 3, 1864—8.30 p. m.

Major General SHERMAN:

I have the honor to report, in answer to your inquiry, that I carried the picket line on the whole corps front excepting Gibson's and Wood's divisions. Newton's men went within one hundred (100) yards of the Star fort. The rebels opened from at least twenty (20) pieces. The rebels rallied and drove back Hazen's skirmishers. We took about forty (40) prisoners. Three of Cheatham's brigades are certainly in our front. They say Cleburn is on the rebel right. We could see troops move in and deploy in the works during the fight. I send through General Thomas a "Chattanooga Rebel" of the 3d August. Stoneman was at Clinton on the 1st; he had destroyed Oconee bridge, burned cars, &c., on the Central railroad. I had thirty or forty (30 or 40) killed and wounded to-day. My belief is that the rebel force is quite strong on this front yet. Gibson met a destructive fire of musketry and canister.

D. S. STANLEY, *Major General.*

MARIETTA, August 4, 1864.

Major General SHERMAN:

Colonel Adams, commanding brigade of Stoneman's cavalry, is here with 1st and 11th Kentucky, about nine hundred (900) strong. He thinks that the balance of the command are prisoners, including General Stoneman. He cut the railroad south of Macon. The command was overwhelmed by the rebels between Monticello and Clinton.

SAM'L ROSS,  
*Colonel 20th Connecticut, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 4, 1864.*

General SCOFIELD :

I have notified other commanders that the attack will commence at three p. m. That will be early enough. In the mean time make all preparations, especially to look to your connexion with General Howard. I will be over. General Palmer will be ordered to report to you with his command.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 4, 1864.*

General PALMER :

You will during the movement against the railroad report to and receive orders from General Schofield. General Thomas will personally look to the front of Atlanta. General Howard will co-operate with General Schofield, and General Schofield, re-enforced by your corps, is charged to reach the railroad. Obey his orders and instructions. Acknowledge receipt.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 4, 1864.*

General GRANT, *City Point* :

General Stoneman only had two thousand three hundred (2,300) men. Nine hundred (900) have got in. I fear the balance are captured, as related in your despatch. General Stoneman was sent to break railroad, after which I consented he should attempt the rescue of our prisoners at Andersonville.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

MEMPHIS, August 4, 1864.

Major General SHERMAN :

Your telegram of the first instant just received. The force of Forrest is at Montgomery, stationed below Okalona, and I am moving in that direction, while Smith is after him with five thousand (5,000) cavalry and ten thousand (10,000) infantry. He will hardly go into Middle Tennessee. The country where Forrest's command is is full of corn and meat, and Smith can subsist there. I have ordered him to push after Forrest wherever he may be and to go as far as Columbus, Mississippi, in pursuit of him, if necessary, and have all railroads this side of there destroyed. I telegraphed you on the 2d, but if you do not approve of the plans there laid down I shall expect to hear from you by the time Smith reaches Oxford, and will move then as you may direct. If you approve of the plan there indicated, shall Smith, after penetrating as far down as Columbus, march north to Decatur or Tusculumbia, or return here?

Should he meet and effectually whip Forrest, should he not return here and be sent to Mobile?

C. C. WASHBURN,  
*Major General.\**

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 4, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD :

That is very well as to your left, but I want to assume the offensive on the right, and I wish you to order General Palmer to advance his left division till he reaches the Sandtown road, and its right supported by General Davis's division. General Johnson's division should reach the Sandtown road more to the right and close to the left on General Davis. The connexion between you and General Howard is not important. Slash down the timber in the valley of Utoy, and a single battery with a regiment of skirmishers will hold a mile against the whole of Hood's army. I want all of your army and General Palmer's corps to turn the enemy's left, and the sooner it is done the better. I wish you to make written orders, so that Generals Palmer and Baird cannot mistake them. Their delay this afternoon was unpardonable.

If the enemy ever gets a column through our lines we will let go our breast-works and turn on his flanks, and therefore I don't care about our line being continuous and uniform. If they sally it will be quick and by some well-defined road.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 4, 1864.*General GRANT, *City Point* :

I have your second despatch about General Stoneman. I have newspapers, with dates from Macon of the 1st, speaking of General Stoneman's capture as a rumor, but not as a fact. He started from here in connexion with two other parties that have got back; he had two thousand three hundred (2,300) men, and after breaking the Macon road he was to make an effort to rescue our prisoners. Colonel Adams with nine hundred (900) of his men got back to Marietta to-day, and telegraphs me Stoneman was attacked at Clinton, Georgia, by overwhelming numbers, and they fear he is captured. It may be so, but I hope he may, like General McCook, dodge and get in.

General Washburn is moving from Holly Springs on Columbus, Mississippi. He thinks that Forrest is dead of the wound he received in his battle with General Smith.

The country in which I am operating is very difficult for a large army, and the defensive positions very strong and hard to circumvent; but perseverance will move mountains.

I ought to be better advised of your plans and movements. I hear you have blown up the outer bastion of Petersburg, but don't know how near you are to getting full possession of the place, or its bearing on Richmond.

Hood uses his militia to fill his lines, and shows a bold front wherever I get at him.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

[Copy by telegraph.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 4, 1864.*General WEBSTER, *Nashville* :

As some confusion and misunderstanding has occurred relative to my orders as to newspapers and newspaper carriers, I will repeat that it is a small business

for me to attend to in the midst of an active campaign, and one that ought never to reach my notice.

The military railroad is to carry supplies for the army. It cannot carry all the supplies allowed by law and usage, and therefore preference must be given to some things over others: 1st, ammunition; 2d, clothing; 3d, provisions, for men; 4th, forage for horses; and as I cannot in person supervise the bills of lading or loading of trains, I leave this to the quartermaster at Nashville, who has the best knowledge of the state of supplies forward and at the depot, as well as the capacity of the cars. Newspapers are a kind of freight, and as such I do not object to the quartermaster at Nashville shipping any number of bundles consigned to any of the posts forward, because they occupy little space, and the bulk of such newspapers cannot materially affect the quantity of provisions shipped; but newsvenders, like any other merchants, must not travel in the cars to sell their goods any more than grocers or hucksters. They may send bundles of their papers in the cars by consent of the quartermaster who loads the cars. Every army commander can send his mail messengers daily each way, and these may carry papers as a part of the army mails, and the orders of Generals Thomas, Howard and Schofield, for officers and men are military orders of transportation that quartermasters will respect the same as mine. Passes to citizens, as far as Chattanooga, in very limited numbers, may be granted by the authority of either of these army commanders, and they may send to the rear car-loads of prisoners, refugees and citizens without limit, but I have ordered that on no pretence must citizens come this side of Chattanooga, for I find them useless mouths that I cannot afford to feed.

My orders also are that officers must live on the soldier's ration; yet if the quartermaster at Nashville can keep our supplies up, and also send supplies to officers above the rations without interfering with the regular freight, he may do so. In other words, I hold the officers of the quartermaster department responsible that the army stores take precedence of all other stores, and if he send anything else he cannot allege it as a reason for a failure to keep up the regular supplies. The railroad has supplied us well, better than I expected, and I am willing to continue to trust the regular quartermasters, who thus far have managed the business well.

There is and can be no conflict of orders. No one can question my orders when they are positive, but I do not choose to make orders touching freight absolutely positive, save in large articles, such as cotton and produce, that would, if attempted, soon absorb our cars, and thereby diminish the ability of our railroad to handle the vast amount of supplies on which we depend.

All I order as to newspapers is that no monopoly should be allowed, and officers can be supplied as in other mail matters, and venders may get the quartermaster at Nashville to carry their bundles, but not their carriers. These are superfluous.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 4, 1864—10.45 p. m.*

General PALMER:

From the statements made by yourself and General Schofield to-day, my decision is that he ranks you as major general, being of same date of commission, and by previous superior rank as brigadier general. The movements for to-morrow are so important that the orders of the superior on that flank must be regarded as military orders, and not in the nature of co-operation. I did hope

that there was no necessity of making this decision, but it is better for all parties interested that no question of rank should occur during active battle.

The Sandtown road and the railroad, if possible, must be gained to-morrow if it costs half your command. I regard the loss of time this afternoon as equal to the loss of two thousand (2,000) men.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 5, 1864.*

General THOMAS, *Army of the Cumberland* :

Yesterday General Palmer raised the question of rank with General Schofield. I went in person and found that General Schofield ranked General Palmer as a brigadier, but General Palmer was appointed and confirmed major general to date November 29, 1862. General Schofield was also nominated from same date, but the Senate would not confirm. But since that session the Senate has confirmed, and General Schofield has his commission of same date as General Palmer, and ranks him, therefore, by virtue of prior commission. I have so decided, and General Palmer asks to be relieved of his command and ordered north. I declined, and ordered him emphatically to go on to-day and execute the plan prescribed for yesterday in connexion with and under command of General Schofield. I have another letter from him asking to be relieved after to-day's operation. Now, what say you? General Davis is unwell, and General Johnson ranks him. That is the largest corps we have, and thus far has not sustained heavy loss in this campaign. It moves slowly and reluctantly, and there is something wrong. What are your plans and wishes?

General Schofield reports that General Johnson's division has reached the Sandtown road, well to the right, by a road I put it on last night. General Morgan's division also has reached it, and General Baird is swinging by a left wheel so his right flank will reach it. Generals Schofield and Palmer have both gone out to complete the movement, which involves a push towards the railroad till our right flank is near enough to the railroad to control it by short range artillery.

There was sharp firing for a few moments this morning, but it has ceased now, so that I begin to think we will succeed on that flank without the serious battle I apprehended. Still, keep your ears open, and if you hear heavy musketry over near Whitehall, either make a break into Atlanta, or so occupy the lines that the enemy may not detach too heavily against Generals Schofield and Palmer. Generals Howard and Schofield will connect by a shorter line across the head of Utoy creek. Our cavalry has scouted down to the mouth of Utoy creek.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 5, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD :

Despatch received. All right. Press that attack on the right. I will judge by the sound, and if I judge you are too hard pressed, will order Generals Thomas and Howard to assault somewhere. Get some part of your command where you can reach easily the railroad with short-range guns, and then intrench a strong flank. It is worth a battle, and the closer the first advantages are followed up the



better. The weakest point of the enemy must be mathematically at some point between Atlanta and East Point. Keep me often advised of your progress, and I will come over any minute you say, but can better handle the whole army from here by telegraph.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 5, 1864.*

General PALMER, *at the front* :

I have communicated to General Thomas the substance of our former notes and messages, and have received the following reply by telegraph : "I regret to hear that Palmer has taken the course he has, and as I know he intends to offer his resignation as soon as he can properly do so, I recommend that his application be granted."

Now, if General Schofield has a major general's commission going back to equal date with yours, though confirmed subsequently with retroactive effect, he ranks you by reason of former superior commission; and if you resign because you measure your number of men as greater than his, and your services in battle as giving you greater right to command, you commit the mistake of substituting your own individual opinion over the established law and military usage. The special assignment of General Schofield to the command of a separate army and department shows that he enjoys the confidence of the President even above his mere lineal rank. If you want to resign, wait a few days, and allege some other reason—one that will stand the test of time. Your future is too valuable to be staked on a mistake. Your case clearly falls under an old article of war : "When two or more commanders happen together, the officer highest in rank commands the whole." General Schofield ranks you by his commission, and it would not do for military men to discuss the nice question of how far back the President may give effect to a commission.

I again ask you not to disregard the friendly advice of such men as General Thomas and myself, for you cannot misconstrue our friendly feelings towards you.

I am, &c.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 5, 1864.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War, Washington* :

The time has now come that we must have the exclusive use of the north-western road from Nashville to Reynoldsburg. It has been substantially done for some time, but Governor Johnson retains the management of it for some reason, under your former orders; but to be of service to us in the present emergency it must be in the control of Mr. Anderson, superintendent of military roads, that trains may run continuously from the Tennessee river, at Reynoldsburg, to our camp.

This main road has been admirably managed, and has supplied this vast army, so that not a man, horse, or mule has been for a day without food, and with abundant supplies of clothing and ammunition. Our progress may be slow to you all at a distance, but if you ever cross this ground you will not accuse us of being idlers.

W. T. SHERMAN.  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 5, 1864.*

General THOMAS:

I telegraphed to General R. S. Granger this morning that he need not send the battery along with the infantry brigade. If not needed at Decatur, order General Granger to send it to Nashville in reserve.

I know that the slowness of the troops on the right was not the fault of the men, but the want of proper direction on the part of the commanders. First, was the question of rank; and next, the course taken was too far west away from the railroad rather than towards it. To-night General Schofield will put General Johnson in the trenches, take his out, and move perpendicular to the road, and not extend to the right more than is necessary, and will have Generals Baird and Morgan in support. If we can keep the forts of Atlanta full, with four (4) divisions in hand, we can whip any force outside of rebel intrenchments, and will have General Johnson near enough for support. All our line is well developed, but is generally strengthened by good abatis and parapet, and conforms pretty close to the enemy, so that if we force the enemy to stick in his trenches, General Schofield should surely reach the railroad and overcome any force the enemy has outside. I have no doubt by our delay the enemy is better prepared than he would have been could we have moved quick, as I ordered yesterday. Last night I could see the cars, say, a mile and a quarter due southeast, whereas Generals Baird and Johnson to-day moved southwest, or nearly due west, away from the enemy. But we will try again to-morrow, and persevere to the end. I have written to General Palmer at length, and asked him to come and see me very early in the morning, and if he wants to go I will assent, and in that event will make the recommendations you suggested this morning.

I have personally examined our line from right to left, and feel no uneasiness as to the enemy making a sally. I know it will be hard to make an assaulting column, but all I want is to force the enemy to hold troops at all points, so as not to mass too heavy on our right.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
*August 6, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

In my movement this morning I made a circuit to the right far enough to strike beyond what appeared to be, and probably was yesterday, the enemy's flank, but found intrenchments of ordinary strength, with extensive entanglements in front. Reilly assaulted gallantly and energetically, and I believe with more confidence on the part of himself and men, but the obstructions were so great that it was found impossible to reach the parapet. Reilly's loss about five hundred (500) men, including many valuable officers. After this failure I made a much larger circuit to the right, for the purpose of breaching the enemy's flank on a point of his line not protected by abatis. I struck the point where the Sandtown road crosses the main Utoy creek. Here the enemy's line makes a sharp salient, bending back along the north bank of the creek. The main line was prolonged by cavalry, with artillery, toward the Chattahoochee. General Hascall sent two brigades under General Cooper to clear this flank, which he did by crossing the creek, but too late for any further operations. We are intrenching the ground we have gained, and will be ready for work

in the morning. The losses in Cox's and Hascall's divisions are probably not more than one thousand (1,000) men. I have not thought it advisable to put in more than the 23d corps to-day, except in making demonstrations to draw the enemy from the points of attack.

General Johnson has been with me during the day, and has promptly executed all my orders. Colonel Warner, who left me late this evening, can explain to you more fully our situation. If you take the blue colored map of Atlanta and vicinity, the forks of the Utoy creek, southeast of the town of Utoy, is, I believe, Hascall's position. I will determine more accurately to-night.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,

*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 6, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington :*

We have now developed our lines along with the enemy from the Augusta railroad on our left to the Utoy Post Office on our right, and the enemy faces us at all points with equal force and superior works. General Schofield tried to break through at a point near our right, with a brigade, (General, Reilly's,) but his men were caught in the entanglement and lost, probably, five hundred (500.) We have skirmished heavily along the whole line, using artillery freely, but have made no impression. I will continue to work to the right to find the extreme flank and threaten the railroad, if possible, to draw him out of Atlanta, or force him to attack us. But our line is already too extended and weak. By means of his militia, of which he has the whole population of Georgia, he is enabled to use his three regular corps as reserves. Our losses to-day will foot up one thousand (1,000.) I will soon need re-enforcements, and if you can replace General A. J. Smith, at Memphis, with negro or fresh troops, I would order him here *via* Decatur; he must now be en route for Columbus, Mississippi. I have called forward a brigade from Decatur.

I am now convinced that General Stoneman surrendered near Macon with seven hundred (700) of his men, ordering two small brigades to break out and get in. One, Colonel Adams, with nine hundred (900) men, is in, but their time is out, and they will be discharged; the other brigade, Capron's, I fear was scattered and picked up in detail. His entire loss will be about thirteen hundred (1,300;) General McCook's loss five hundred (500.) Damage done roads, cars, and bridges was very large, but the enemy now runs cars into Atlanta from Macon.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 6, 1864.*

General THOMAS :

General Schofield has been at work to-day with his two divisions and holds General Johnson in support. He has just finished working up his measurement and locates himself at the fork of Utoy creek, two (2) miles west of East Point. Though our line is extended, we cannot do better than to contract and strengthen

by defences our present front and let General Schofield work so as to threaten East Point. I don't believe the enemy can defend so long a line, and he may be forced to choose between the two, Atlanta and East Point, unless he has repaired the Augusta road, of which there are no signs; or unless he can drive back General Johnson's flank, which controls that road, he will be compelled to give up Atlanta to secure East Point.

General Schofield asks for a couple of topographical engineers; he lost his only one yesterday. Can you spare him one or two? If so, order them to report to him.

He tried to break through the enemy's lines by a brigade to-day, but failed, losing five hundred (500) men. Instead of going round East Point, I would prefer the enemy to weaken so we may break through at some point, and wish you to continue to make such an effort. I will instruct General Howard to do the same about the head of Utoy creek, his right.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 6, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD:

I will try to send you some more engineers to-morrow. I will have to borrow of other armies. Continue to work to-morrow in such a manner as to best threaten the railroad at or below East Point, and keep your own and the 14th corps united so as to defend yourselves against the enemy, should he let go Atlanta and shift to his communications. If you can threaten that road he is bound to choose, and you know what choice he will make. I advise you to see to-night that the right, by which the Big Sandtown road comes out from the enemy to your line, is well covered, for he will, if at all, sally by well known roads. The valleys of the two forks of the Utoy can easily be held by a thin line and an entanglement of timber. General Thomas will continue to press Atlanta up the valley of Proctor's creek, and General Howard by Utoy.

The militia by which Hood holds his long lines of intrenchments are worthless save for that purpose, but they enable him to use his good troops, distributed, doubtless, by brigades to rush to threatened points. I don't think he will mass them all unless he gives up Atlanta and throws his force at one move to East Point.

If you be at the forks of the main Utoy, two (2) miles west of East Point, your cavalry should cross the upper fork and picket the crossing at Utoy Post Office. You should also open a more direct road to where your headquarters are, which serves as a key-point.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 6, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD:

I have your despatch. There is no alternative but for you to continue to work on that flank with as much caution as possible, and it is possible the enemy may attack us or draw out. He must defend that road.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

NEW ORLEANS, *August 6, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

The fleet under Admiral Farragut passed the forts at the entrance of Mobile bay at 8 a. m. yesterday. The monitor *Tecumseh* was blown up by a rebel torpedo and lost nearly all her crew. The rebel ram *Tennessee* and gunboat *Selma* were captured after an obstinate resistance. The other gunboats took shelter under the guns of Fort Morgan. Admiral Farragut expects to capture or destroy them to-day and to secure a landing east of Fort Morgan and in the bay for our troops. Fort Powell is reported abandoned and blown up; Fort Gaines was invested by the land troops under General Granger, and is reported to have surrendered, but this is not official. The loss in the fleet in killed, wounded, and drowned is about two hundred (200.) With the exception of the *Tecumseh* none of our vessels were lost, and the *Hartford* is the only one that is seriously injured. I am sending Granger all the forces I can collect. Kirby Smith, I have no doubt, is trying to send a part of his forces east of the Mississippi, but I think we will be able to prevent it.

E. R. S. CANBY,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*August 6, 1864—12 m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

The enemy has been feeling our lines from Williams's right toward the left, apparently to see whether we have weakened our lines or not. The skirmishing on the left is probably for the same purpose, but it will be well to ascertain whether he intends more serious work, which Stanley can do by sending Garrard to feel his flanks. Howard thinks he is trying to get out of Atlanta clear. That may be, but Stanley must be watchful and not give ground until he can see he intends to attack him, then have him withdraw gradually to rear line, and let him come on until he becomes well entangled in the abatis before opening fire on him, but not leave present position until he thinks it absolutely necessary.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 6, 1864.*General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C. :*

General Palmer has resigned his command of the 14th army corps, and General Thomas has relieved him of the command. General Thomas recommends the promotion of General Jeff. C. Davis as major general and assignment to the command of the 14th corps. In the event the President will not consent to this, General Thomas asks the promotion and assignment of General J. M. Brannan. I approve his recommendations, and ask a speedy return.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

WASHINGTON, D. C.,

*August 6, 1864—1.45 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

An order by the President, under the act of Congress for the military possession of the northwestern railroad, has been issued, and will be forwarded you by the Adjutant General. Do not imagine that we are impatient of your progress; instead of considering it slow we regard it rapid, brilliant and successful beyond our expectations. Take your time, and do your work in your own way. This department is only anxious to afford you every assistance within its power.

E. M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 7, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD :

That's right. Go on in your own way to accomplish the end, and keep your five (5) divisions so as to hold the enemy till a battle is fought. I will look a little closer at General Howard's front to see if there is not a weak place there in the enemy's line; there should be about the head of Utoy's north fork. I will then work my way down to you on the extreme right.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 7, 1864.*

Generals THOMAS and HOWARD :

The line assaulted yesterday was an incomplete one. By feeling its left, Bates's division evacuated and fell back to the real line, which is near the railroad. I ordered the skirmishers to be pushed in, and the strength demonstrated, and developed heavy musketry fire and artillery. We have gained valuable ground and full possession of the real Sandtown road. Our lines are close up and by morning will be intrenched, so we will keep on working by that flank; but I want the whole line advanced wherever it be possible, and that General Thomas bring from Chattanooga two (2) 30-pounder Parrotts, or siege carriages, and batter the town. The closer we advance our line, we contract and strengthen.

General Schofield's right does not yet really threaten the railroad, though a full mile nearer East Point than last night.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*August 7, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

I will keep the attention of the enemy fully occupied by threatening all along my front, but I have no hopes of breaking through his lines anywhere in my front as long as he has a respectable force to defend them. My troops are so thinned out that it will be impossible to form an assaulting column sufficiently strong to make an attack sure.

GEO. H. THOMAS, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 7, 1864.*

General GRANT, *Washington* :

I was gratified to learn that you were satisfied with my progress. Get the War Department to send us recruits daily as they are made, for we can teach them more war in our camp in one day than they can get at a rendezvous in a month. Also tell Mr. Lincoln that he must not make the least concession in the matter of the September draft. It is right and popular with the army, and the army is worth considering.

I am glad you have given General Sheridan the command of the forces to defend Washington. He will worry Early to death. Let us give those southern fellows all the fighting they want, and when they are tired we can tell them we are just warming to the work. Any signs of let-up on our part is sure to be falsely construed, and for this reason I always remind them that the siege of Troy lasted six years, and Atlanta is a more favorable town than Troy. We must manifest the character of dogged courage and perseverance of our race.

Don't stay in Washington longer than is necessary to give impulse to events, and get out of it. It is the centre of intrigue.

I would like to have General Mower made a major general. He is a real fighter.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 7, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington* :

Have received to-day the despatches of the Secretary of War and General Grant, which are very satisfactory. We keep hammering away here all the time, and there is no peace inside or outside of Atlanta. To-day General Schofield got round the flank of the lines assaulted yesterday by General Reilley's brigade, turned it, and gained the ground where the assault was, with all our dead and wounded. We continued to press on that flank, and brought on a noisy but not a bloody battle. We drove the enemy behind his main breastworks, which cover the railroad from Atlanta to East Point. We captured a good many skirmishers, which are of their best troops, for the militia hug the breastworks close. I do not deem it prudent to extend more to the right, but will push forward daily by parallels, and make the inside of Atlanta too hot to be endured.

I have sent to Chattanooga for two (2) thirty (30) pounder Parrotts, with which we can pick out almost any house in the town. I am too impatient for a siege, but I don't know but here is as good a place to fight it out as further inland. One thing is certain, whether we get inside of Atlanta or not, it will be a used-up community by the time we are done with it.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
*August 8, 1864—8.30 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Hascall only succeeded in getting one brigade across the creek and intrenched. The enemy is pretty strong in front of that brigade, and has used artillery freely

Hascall is making good roads and bridges across the creek. It seems clear that we are as near to the railroad as we can get on this side of the creek without breaking the rebel lines. To cross the creek, takes us around below East Point. Whether one division is sufficient force to make that move with seems extremely doubtful. Possibly, the demonstration may be sufficient to make Hood let go of Atlanta. I am satisfied Cox's right is not more than a mile from East Point.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
*Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*August 8, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

The 4½-inch guns have not yet arrived. They are not due until to-morrow. I have selected a very good point for them on Geary's left, where you can get a fair view of the town, and half a mile nearer than any other position. It was reported that they were to leave Chattanooga at 8 a. m. to-day. The position selected enfilades Whitehall street, upon which is General Hood's headquarters, and the battery is being built to-night.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 8, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD :

I have your despatch. Continue to press by the right. It is impossible for the enemy to extend much further. Generals Thomas and Howard will continue to press forward if Colonel Garrard watches all the passes of Utoy creek. I have no fears of that flank. If General Cox has a view of the railroad over clear ground to his right, distant only a mile, our rifle guns will reach it. Still, General Hascall should move straight towards it, and intrench as close as he can get. I think that open ground is below East Point, and the railroad you see is the East Point road, which the enemy does not use. I have your despatch of 8.30. See in person to the point occupied by General Hascall. Let good bridges and roads be prepared, and intrench the point as a flank to threaten below East Point. Strengthen the main line as much as possible, so that if the enemy will fight on that flank you may have as much force as possible to support; but explain to General Hascall, if they allow him to intrench, they will not attack him, but feign for the purpose of breaking out somewhere else.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
*August 10, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Either our maps or surveys, or both, are so evidently erroneous that I am very uncertain about the distance from Hascall's present position to the West Point railroad. But I have no doubt he can reach it without assaulting parapets, and by moving nearly in a southeasterly direction from his present position. The distance may be a little more than a mile, and it may be three miles. I think it probable that another corps on this flank would be able to prolong the line to the Macon railroad; or better, that one corps in addition to mine could swing



loose from the flank of the 14th, strike in the rear of East Point, and get a position crossing the railroad, from which we could not be driven.

The country south of Utoy appears less broken and much more cultivated than north of it. Hascall is on the main Campbellton road. There is said to be a big road a short distance in his front leading to East Point. I have not been able to learn of any others in that vicinity. Can you not take Proctor's creek for your left flank, bring supplies by Turner's ferry, and thus throw even two corps yet to the right? It appears to me that such a move, if made rapidly, ought to bring success.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 9, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington:*

General Schofield developed the enemy's position to below East Point. His line is well fortified, embracing Atlanta and East Point, and his redoubts and lines seem well filled. Cavalry is on his flanks. Our forces, too, are spread for ten (10) miles. So Hood intends to stand his ground. I threw into Atlanta about three thousand (3,000) solid shot and shells to-day, and have got from Chattanooga four 4½-inch rifled guns and will try their effect. Our right is below Utoy creek. I will intrench it and the flanks, and study the ground a little more before adopting a new plan. We have had considerable rain, but, on the whole, the weather is healthy. Colonel Caperton, of General Stoneman's command, with several squads of men, are at Marietta, and will reduce his loss below a thousand.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 10, 1864.*

General U. S. GRANT, *Washington:*

Your despatch of 9th is received. It is to replace our daily losses that I propose that all recruits made daily in the western States, instead of accumulating at depots, should at once come to Nashville, and be sent here on the cars, which can bring four hundred (400) a day without interfering with freights. I have ordered General Washburn, at Memphis, to have General A. J. Smith, who is now marching on Columbus, Mississippi, come to Decatur, Alabama, whence I can bring to this army certain regiments and fragments that properly belong here, and a division that I originally designed to form a part of this army. The balance of infantry and cavalry I would send back *via* Savannah and Jackson, Tennessee. My lines are now ten (10) miles long, extending from the Augusta road on the left, round to East Point on the south. I cannot extend more without making my lines too weak. We are in close contact, and skirmishing all the time. I have just got up four 4½-inch rifled guns, with ammunition, and propose to expend about four thousand rifled shot in the heart of Atlanta. We have already commenced it with our lighter ordnance. Since July 28 General Hood has not attempted to meet us outside his parapets.

In order to possess and destroy effectually his communications, I may have to leave a corps at the railroad bridge well intrenched, and cut loose with the balance and make a desolating circle around Atlanta. I do not propose to assault the enemy's works, which are too strong, or to proceed by regular approaches. I have lost a good many regiments, and will lose more by the expiration of service, and this is the only reason why I want re-enforcements. I have killed, crippled, and captured more of the enemy than we have lost by his acts.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 10, 1864.*

General THOMAS :

I have your last despatch. I hear the guns and shells also. The enemy's battery of 32-pounders rifled are firing on us here from the White Hall fort to draw off or divert our fire. Keep up a steady, persistent fire on Atlanta with the 4½-inch guns and 20-pounder Parrott's, and order them to pay no attention to the side firing by which the enemy may attempt to divert their attention. I think those guns will make Atlanta of less value to them as a large machine shop and depot of supplies. The inhabitants have, of course, got out.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 10, 1864.*

General THOMAS :

I hear General Brannan's guns at General Geary's battery, and hear the shells burst in Atlanta. Send word to the battery to work all night and not limit themselves to five (5) minute guns, but to fire slowly and steadily each gun as it is ready. Also order the guns at General Williams's front to be got ready and put to work with similar orders to-night. General Howard will get his 20-pounders near the same point, which he pronounces much better than that at General Geary's, which he visited with me to-day. General Williams's right and General Howard's left are on Proctor's creek, from which you look up the valley to what seems to be the heart of Atlanta; the ridge on which are the railroad and White Hall being plainly visible, as also that by which the Marietta road enters the town, the intervening angle being cleared ground, giving a fine field of fire. I think the 4½-inch guns on General Williams's right can demolish the big engine-house.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 10, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD :

Your report is received. Do you think General Hascall can reach West Point railroad from his position without assaulting parapets?

Do you think a further prolongation would enable us to reach the Macon road without cutting loose from our base?

How are the roads south of Utoy?

Do you observe any change in the character of the country?

We are now cannonading with 4½-inch rifle bolts, and have four thousand (4,000) of them on hand.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 10, 1864.*

General HOWARD :

I thank you for the suggestion. I am studying all the combinations possible, and beg you to think also and communicate to me; but be careful to keep your own confidence. I spoke of the same thing to-day to General Thomas, and he goes to look at the railroad bridge to see to a proper cover there for the wagons and a corps. I want to expend four thousand (4,000) heavy rifle shots on the town before doing anything new, and then will be prepared to act quick. General Schofield has been reconnoitring the right all day, and after he has answered a few more of my questions, I will give you the substance of his report.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 10, 1864.*

Generals THOMAS and HOWARD :

General Schofield has examined closely his whole line, which lies south, a little east, parallel with the enemy, one brigade being on the Campbelltown road, south of Utoy. He is not absolutely certain that his right is near the West Point railroad, and yet urges that another corps can reach the Macon road, and wants to make Proctor's creek our left flank, draw our supplies from Turner's ferry, and keep on extending. My own experience is, the enemy can build parapets faster than we march, and it would be the same thing by extending right or left. In a single night we would find ourselves confronted with parapets which we would fear to attack in the morning. He describes the country south of Utoy as more open and better cultivated. I want the 4½-inch and 20-pounder guns to hammer away, and I will think of the next move.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 11, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD :

I have read and considered your despatch. It is a physical impossibility for the enemy to ascertain the force which moves against the railroad, and to act against it with any more than one-third of his reserves. The other two-thirds will be from four (4) to eight (8) miles off. Colonel Garrard's cavalry passed along the flank to-day unopposed, and I do not think the West Point road more than two (2) miles from General Hascall's present flank. You will, therefore, make the expedition with one division, the other either placed intermediate or ready to act; of course without abandoning our present base, or dividing our force into two (2) equal parts. I have no other corps to give you. You may consider it a reconnoissance in force not to go over three (3) miles from General Cox's

present right. I know a full proportion of the enemy is on our left and centre, and if any change occurs in the night I will be sure to advise you. Our heavy ordnance, playing for the past thirty (30) hours from the Buck Head road into Atlanta, has kept to the parapets a full proportion of the enemy all the way round to your old position and beyond, and if I am to give weight to the testimony from official sources, the enemy at this moment exhibits most force on his present right. I have no idea that he can throw on you even a third of his reserve force, because he will look upon the movement as a decoy to weaken his line somewhat that we may break in. Besides, we know his line as well as ours is so stretched out that his reserves are not over one thousand (1,000) men per mile, for his infantry three (3) miles east of the Howard House, round to the main road below East Point, is full fifteen miles long, requiring at his parapets forty thousand (40,000) men, leaving him no reserve on that flank that can disturb two divisions. We must act. We cannot sit down and do nothing, because it involves risk. Being on the offensive, we must risk, and that is the flank on which we calculate to make the risk—indeed have been manœuvering to that end ever since the army of the Tennessee shifted from left to right.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

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[Cipher.]

HOLLY SPRINGS, MISSISSIPPI,  
August 11, 1864.

Major General SHERMAN:

Yesterday General Hatch attacked a force from Forrest's command, two thousand (2,000) strong, under General Chalmers, at Oxford, and drove him pell-mell towards Grenada, capturing three cannons. A large portion of A. J. Smith's forces are south of the Tallahatchee at Abbeville, but, owing to the very heavy rains for the last few days washing the railroad badly, there has been some delay in getting supplies forward. I hope that two days more may place everything on the south side of the Tallahatchee. There is reason to believe that they mean to fight us on this line between here and Grenada. As soon as they can be brought to bay and whipped effectually, General Smith will move to Decatur. In addition to his own force proper, ten thousand (10,000) strong, he has three thousand colored troops from Memphis, three Minnesota regiments sent me from St. Louis, and four thousand (4,000) cavalry. When he takes up his line of march for Decatur, shall he not send back to Memphis all but his own forces, as it will be perfectly safe to do so? My forces now at Memphis are all "hundred-days" men, whose time will expire on the thirtieth.

General Canby orders me at all times to keep a force on hand to assist General Steele, should he need help. When your orders and General Canby's conflict, whom am I to obey? I have been embarrassed by conflicting orders heretofore. To have obeyed General Canby would have defeated General Smith's last expedition. General Forrest is not dead, but was in Pontotoc four (4) days ago.

C. C. WASHBURNE, Major General.

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GENERAL STANLEY'S HEADQUARTERS,  
August 11, 1864.

Major General SHERMAN:

General Garrard just reports as follows:

Please tell General Sherman that men from Stoneman's command are daily coming in; that they came along the railroad, and that on Sunday nothing had been

done towards repairing the road. A large part of their cavalry is now in the neighborhood of Covington, and it is generally believed that they will soon make a grand raid to Tennessee or Kentucky. An officer who has just got in staid in that neighborhood three days, as he could not get out of way of their cavalry. He says he has never seen so much cavalry in one body. Persons from near Atlanta also report the rebel cavalry moving over towards Covington.

D. S. STANLEY, *Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 13, 1864—8 p. m.*

General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

We have now pressed the enemy's lines from the east around to East Point on the south. The nature of ground, with its artificial defences, makes it too difficult to assault, and to reach the Macon road by a further extension will be extra hazardous. I have ordered army commanders to prepare for the following plan: Leave one corps strongly intrenched at the Chattahoochee bridge in charge of our surplus wagons and artillery; with sixty thousand (60,000) men, reduced to fighting trim, to make circuit of devastation around the town, with a radius of fifteen or twenty miles.

To do this, I go on the faith that the militia in Atlanta are only good for the defence of its parapets, and will not come out.

I would like the utmost activity to be kept up in Mobile bay, and, if possible, about the mouth of Appalachicola; also to be assured that no material re-enforcements have come here from Virginia.

If I should ever be cut off from my base, look out for me about St. Mark's, Florida, or Savannah, Georgia.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 13, 1864.*

General Halleck, *Washington, D. C.:*

In making the circuit of Atlanta, as proposed in my despatch of to-day, I necessarily run some risk. If there be any possibility of Admiral Farragut and the land forces of Gordon Granger taking Mobile (which rebel prisoners now report, but the report is not confirmed by Macon papers of the 11th which I have seen,) and further of pushing up to Montgomery, my best plan would be to wait awhile, as now, and at the proper time move down to West Point, and operate into the heart of Georgia from there.

Before cutting loose as proposed, I would like to know the chances of our getting the use of the Alabama river this campaign. I could easily break up the railroads back to Chattanooga, and shift my whole army down to West Point and Columbus, a country rich in corn, and make my fall campaign from there.

I know Fort Morgan must succumb in time.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,

*August 14, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

The officer I sent to the right reports three strong batteries along the edge of the woods near East Point, all looking down the valley towards Hascall's position. The one most to our right is where you saw the enemy working day before yesterday. The others are visible from a point on the Campbellton road, a few hundred yards west of where you were. The batteries are connected by infantry parapet, which, however, is not visible south or west of the left battery. Probably the line there bends southeast through the woods. A large force is working on each battery, but very few men are seen elsewhere. There has been no indication of movement of troops there to-day.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,

*Major General.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 14, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD :

There is no doubt Wheeler is up about Dalton with a large cavalry force. I want our cavalry now to feel the enemy's flanks strong, and will order General Kilpatrick to cross at Sandtown and make a bold push for Fairburn, and General Garrard, in like manner, to feel well around the enemy's right flank. Let your cavalry go down in the morning to Sandtown and report for the expedition to General Kilpatrick.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*RESACA, *August 15, 1864—9.45 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

I can now give you the particulars of the Dalton affair. The town was seized about 6 p. m. yesterday. Colonel Leibold occupied the fort and declined to surrender. Early this morning General Steedman arrived there with one New York, and one Ohio, and six companies of negro regiments, and immediately attacked the enemy, and after four hours' fighting, drove them toward Spring Place. The enemy's loss heavy. We are collecting the dead and wounded. Colonel Leibold expects another attack. The enemy supposed to be six thousand (6,000) strong, with two batteries. I had two companies at the Water Tank,  $1\frac{3}{4}$  mile south of Dalton. They were attacked at daylight this morning, and after four hours' fighting, surrendered. The railroad is destroyed from the Tank north to Dalton. The enemy still in the neighborhood of Tilton.

General Smith, with two thousand (2,000) men, is due here at 11 o'clock. The cavalry at Calhoun, I think, should be ordered to this place to-night.

G. B. RAUM,

*Colonel Commanding Brigade.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 15, 1864.*

Generals THOMAS, HOWARD, and SCHOFIELD :

Colonel Raum, at Resaca, reports the enemy's cavalry on the railroad near Tilton, tearing up track. Give orders that will insure great economy in provi-

sions and forage, until we can estimate the time required to repair damages. I have nothing from beyond Resaca. General John E. Smith, at Cartersville, will collect all the infantry that can be spared from the defence of material points about Alatoona, and go up the road.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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CARTERSVILLE, *August 15, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

I am just starting up the road with about two thousand (2,000) men. Despatch received from Resaca says the rebel force is moving northeast from Dalton, burned a bridge below Dalton, and tore up the track. My cavalry not heard from.

JNO. E. SMITH, *Brigadier General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 15, 1864.*

Generals THOMAS, SCHOFIELD, and HOWARD:

General John E. Smith has gone up the road with two thousand (2,000) men in cars. Wheeler failed to take Dalton, and has gone northeast, where he cannot do us much harm. I will order that he be kept in that direction. He may disturb some of General Schofield's garrisons; but if he could not take Tilton or Dalton, he will not venture much, and all above will be on their guard, and prepared. As soon as this news is confirmed and ratified, I will put in execution our plans. So get ready. I want to hear of Generals Kilpatrick's and Garrard's explorations before making orders.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 15, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD:

There will be plenty of time to dispose of wagons after my orders are issued. I want to hear of Generals Kilpatrick and Garrard before making my orders, but I am more and more satisfied the movement we contemplate is the true one to be made. I think Generals Steedman and John E. Smith will drive Wheeler far away, and repair our road in two days. Give me the earliest news of the cavalry on your flank.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
*August 16, 1864—1.45 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN:

I have just heard from Kilpatrick through Colonel Garrard. His despatch is dated 12 m. Kilpatrick had moved up the Campbellton road toward the right of our infantry, to a cross-road leading to Mount Gilead church, where the rebel cavalry is encamped, with the intention of moving out and attacking them. My troops are ready to move at once, if the enemy send infantry against our cavalry.

J. M. SCHOFIELD, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
August 16, 1864.

Major General SHERMAN:

General Kilpatrick reports that he forced the enemy back into his camp near the railroad, five miles above Fairburn station; destroyed the station and public buildings, telegraph, and railroad, for about three miles. Jackson's division has thus far refused to give him battle. He anticipates an attempt will be made to prevent his return this morning, and feels confident he can destroy Jackson, provided cavalry alone meets him.

GEO. H. THOMAS, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 16, 1864.*

General THOMAS:

The news from General Kilpatrick is first-rate; he has acted so as to show the enemy that he will fight. I do believe he, with his own and General Garrard's cavalry, could ride right around Atlanta and smash the Macon road all to pieces. But I don't want to risk our cavalry; I don't fear the enemy's trying to cut off his return. General Schofield's position is such that infantry will not leave their lines to go down to Camp creek.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 16, 1864.*

GENERAL: It occurs to me that preliminary to a future report of the history of the campaign, I should record certain facts of great personal interest to officers of this command.

General McPherson was killed by the musketry fire at the beginning of the battle of July 22. He had in person selected the ground for his troops, constituting the left wing of the army, I being in person with the centre, General Schofield. The moment the information reached me, I sent one of my staff to announce the fact to General John A. Logan, the senior officer present with the army of the Tennessee, with general instructions to maintain the ground chosen by General McPherson, if possible, but if pressed too hard to refuse his left flank, but at all events to hold the railroad and main Decatur road; that I did not propose to move or gain ground by that flank, but rather by the right, and that I wanted the army of the Tennessee to fight it out unaided. General Logan admirably conceived my orders and executed them, and if he gave ground on the left of the 17th corps it was properly done by my orders; but he held a certain hill by the right division of the 17th corps, the only ground on that line, the possession of which by an enemy would have damaged us, by giving a reverse fire on the remainder of the troops. General Logan fought that battle out as required, unaided, save by a small brigade sent by my orders from General Schofield to the Decatur road, well to the rear, where it was reported the enemy's cavalry had got into the town of Decatur, and was operating directly on the rear of Logan; but that brigade was not disturbed, and was replaced that night by a part of the 15th corps, next to General Schofield, and General Schofield's brigade brought back so as to be kept together on its own line.

General Logan managed the army of the Tennessee well during his command, and it may be that an unfair inference might be drawn to his prejudice because he did not succeed to the permanent command. I am forced to choose a commander, not only for the army in the field, but of the department of the Tennessee, covering a vast extent of country with troops much dispersed. It



was a delicate and difficult task, and I gave preference to Major General O. O. Howard, then in command of the 4th army corps in the department of the Cumberland. Instead of giving my reasons, I prefer that the wisdom of the choice be left to the test of time. The President kindly ratified my choice, and I am willing to assume the responsibility. I meant no disrespect to any officer, and hereby declare that General Logan submitted with the grace and dignity of a soldier, gentleman, and patriot, resumed the command of his corps proper, (15th,) and enjoys the love and respect of his army and of his commanders. It so happened that on the 28th of July I had again thrown the same army to the extreme right, the exposed flank, where the enemy repeated the same manœuvre, striking in mass; the extreme corps deployed in line, and refused as a flank the 15th, Major General Logan; and he commanded in person, General Howard and myself being near, and that corps, as heretofore reported, repulsed the rebel army completely, and next day advanced and occupied the ground fought over and the road the enemy sought to cover. General Howard, who had that very day assumed his new command, unequivocally gave General Logan all the credit possible; and I also beg to add my unqualified admiration of the bravery, skill, and, more yet, good sense that influenced him to bear a natural disappointment and do his whole duty like a man. If I could bestow on him substantial reward it would afford me unalloyed satisfaction; but I do believe, in the consciousness of acts done from noble impulses and gracefully admitted by his superiors in authority, he will be contented. He already holds the highest commission known in the army, and it is hard to say how we can better manifest our applause.

At the time of General Howard's selection, Major General Hooker commanded the 20th army corps in the army of the Cumberland, made up for his special accommodation out of the old 11th and 12th corps, whereby Major General Slocum was deprived of his corps command. Both the law and practice are and have been to fill the higher army commands by selection. Rank or dates of commission have not controlled, nor am I aware that any reflection can be inferred unless the junior be placed immediately over the senior; but in this case General Hooker's command was in no manner disturbed. General Howard was not put over him, but in charge of a distinct and separate army. No indignity was offered or intended, and I must say that General Hooker was not justified in retiring. At all events, had he spoken or written to me I would have made every explanation and concession he could have expected, but could not have changed my course, because then, as now, I believe it right and for the good of our country and cause.

As a matter of justice, General Slocum, having been displaced by the consolidation, was deemed by General Thomas as entitled to the vacancy created by General Hooker's voluntary withdrawal, and has received it.

With great respect,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HALLECK,

*Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 16, 1864.*

Generals THOMAS, HOWARD, and SCHOFIELD:

We will commence the movement against the railroad about Jonesboro' Thursday night, unless something occurs in the mean-time to mar the plan. I will make my orders, and the preliminary preparations may be begun.

If Wheeler interrupts our supplies we can surely cut off those of Hood, and see who can stand it best.]

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Allatoona, August 16, 1864.*

General THOMAS :

General Schofield reports that General Kilpatrick did not find the enemy's cavalry at his old camp at Mount Gilead church, but I don't know where that church is. It is manifest that all the efficient cavalry of the enemy is to our rear. They will tear up the road beyond Cartersville; but I think Wheeler has been driven off towards East Tennessee, and trust that General John E. Smith will return to Cartersville; he has cars enough. There are three (3) regiments and eight (8) guns at Allatoona and Etowah bridge, and I have ordered General McArthur to send any re-enforcements he can spare, and call on us to replace them at Marietta. I do think our cavalry should now break the Macon road good. If we can save our rations at Marietta and Allatoona, and break the Macon road for many miles, we can wait as long as Hood.

What say you to letting General Kilpatrick have two of General Garrard's brigades, and then to strike across to the Macon road and tear it up good. He has scouted the country now, and knows it, and can act with confidence and due caution. General Schofield is well on that flank and makes a good cover. I like this plan better than to send General Garrard up to Cartersville, for the enemy will simply run off; but General Kilpatrick with two good brigades can reach across to the Macon road about Rough and Ready and tear up six or eight miles by to-morrow night or next day.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 17, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD :

I think I will defer the grand movement for a day or so, and precede it by a cavalry movement on the Macon road, between Rough and Ready and Jonesboro'. I propose to give General Kilpatrick his whole division and two of General Garrard's brigades, to move quietly down to Camp Creek, and then, by a rapid movement, strike and break thoroughly the Macon road; your infantry to co-operate and divert attention. We know that Wheeler is well to the north with a large part of the cavalry, and now is the time. I expect General Kilpatrick up. Any preparations for the infantry move will be all right, and we need only postpone the time of execution.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 17, 1864.*

Major General THOMAS :

I have a message from General Kilpatrick, enclosing a copy of his report to General Elliot. He thinks it not only possible, but comparatively easy, to break the railroad to Macon effectually. I do not want to move this vast army and its paraphernalia around Atlanta unless forced to do so, and it does seem the enemy has offered us the very opportunity we seek.

We know positively that Wheeler is above Dalton, and that he must have taken the very flower of his cavalry. He has and may do us harm, but that we cannot help. I do not think he can carry any point of our road that he can maintain, and his own necessities will force him back soon, with jaded and worn-

out horses. Now, ours can be quietly moved to Sandtown at a walk, and, according to General Kilpatrick, reach Red Oak, or any point below the enemy's infantry, and by a single dash can beat the remaining cavalry of the enemy, and break up many miles of that railroad. General Garrard, with one brigade, can amuse those on the east, and General Kilpatrick, with his own and the two brigades of General Garrard, under Colonel Long, could make in a single move a break that would disturb Hood seriously. The risk will be comparatively small, as General Schofield can act in support with his whole command. I am perfectly alive to the fact that the loss of our cavalry would be most serious, but I do think such an opportunity, if neglected, will never again appear. In this combination I would merely suspend the final execution of the movement of the whole army till the result of this move is reached. I think we could give General Kilpatrick such orders that he would not be rash, and General Schofield could move to his right a couple of miles, and make it certain that Hood would not attempt to use infantry to interpose to the return of our cavalry. Don't make any orders till you and I have perfectly agreed on this plan. In the mean time anything done towards the movement of the whole army will not be lost, as it simply amounts to sending to the bridge all the loose ends.

I have sent for General Kilpatrick to come up.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*August 17, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Information from all sources seem to confirm the report that Wheeler has taken off the greater part of his cavalry. I therefore think this will be as good a time as could be taken to make another raid on the Macon railroad ; but if you send Kilpatrick, I would insist on his taking the most practicable route, and avoid the enemy's infantry as much as possible.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
*August 17, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

The following is just received. The messenger will wait for your orders.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
*Major General.*

"HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION, D. C.,  
*"August 17, 1864.*

"To Major General SCHOFIELD :

"I send you the report of my operations yesterday by one of my aides to make certain that you get it. I am satisfied that, with two of General Garrard's brigades and my own division, I can break the Macon road effectually at any point the major general commanding may be pleased to indicate. Such an opportunity to strike the enemy a terrible blow has never been offered. If it is desirable to make the attempt, I should wish to see you, and will visit your headquarters for that purpose.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"J. KILPATRICK,  
*"Brigadier General Volunteers."*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 17, 1864.*

General THOMAS:

General Kilpatrick is here, and gives me a description of his position at Sandtown, that convinces me he can, in connexion with General Schofield, so effectually destroy the Macon railroad that it cannot be used in two weeks, and that, too, without risking his cavalry.

You will, therefore, order General Garrard to send to Sandtown, *via* Paice's ferry and the west bank, the two brigades of cavalry heretofore notified, with a battery of artillery to move to night and report on arrival to General Kilpatrick, at Sandtown. The horses should be well fed, and could take some wagons of shelled corn as far as Sandtown, when the wagons may return. Men provided with full ammunition, five (5) days' bread, sugar, coffee, and plenty of salt.

General Kilpatrick will keep his command concealed all day to-morrow, and move to-morrow night, cross the West Point road above Fairburn, reach the Macon railroad near Jonesboro', face towards East Point, and break road to the south.

The despatch I sent you an hour ago is conclusive that Wheeler is away, and but little rebel cavalry is left here.

General Kilpatrick will want a diversion day after to-morrow, and I will see that General Schofield makes one; and I wish you to have General Garrard's remaining brigade and General Stanley's division give full occupation to that flank. I will risk the other.

Instruct General Garrard to be sure to send the pioneers along with the cavalry, provided with tools to break up railroad.

General Kilpatrick represents forage abundant down there.

General Kilpatrick ranks General Garrard, and the latter may go along if you prefer.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 17, 1864.*

Generals THOMAS, SCHOFIELD, and HOWARD:

I now have positive and official information that General Wheeler has gone up into East Tennessee, beyond Spring Place. We will repair all damages to railroad and telegraph to-night. I will not move our infantry now, but break the Macon road all to pieces with our cavalry to-morrow night. Therefore, be active and demonstrate against Atlanta to occupy the entire front, and make them believe we will attack them in their trenches during to-morrow and next day.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 17, 1864.*

GENERAL: I beg you will convey the following orders to govern General Kilpatrick in his movement on the Macon road. It is not a raid, but a deliberate attack for the purpose of so disabling that road that the enemy will be unable to supply his army in Atlanta. He will have his own division of cavalry and two good brigades from General Garrard's division. With these he will move

to-morrow night, aiming to cross the West Point road between Red Oak and Fairburn. If he has time he should remove a small section of the road without using fire, simply to lessen the chances of an infantry force being sent to intercept his return. He should then move in force to the nearest point of the Macon road about Jonesboro', and should destroy as much of that road as he possibly can, working steadily until forced to take to his arms and horses for battle. He should avoid battle with infantry or artillery, but may safely fight any cavalry he encounters, because we know that the enemy has sent Wheeler with full six thousand (6,000) cavalry up into East Tennessee. I leave the extent of the break to General Kilpatrick, but will only say that he cannot destroy too much. Having fulfilled his task, he will return and resume his post on the right flank of the army, and send General Garrard's brigades back to their division on the left. General Schofield will be instructed to move to his right as far as prudent the day after to-morrow, and all the army should so engage the attention of the enemy that he cannot detach infantry as against General Kilpatrick.

Instruct the general to advise us at the earliest possible moment of his success.

I am, with respect, yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General THOMAS,  
*Commanding Army of the Cumberland.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 17, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington :*

Your despatch of yesterday is received. We must have the Alabama river, and if I remember the bay, the best river channel is on the Tensas side; but, of course, I must trust to Admiral Farragut and General Canby. I have a tight grip on Atlanta, and was on the point of swinging round to the southeast when Wheeler went to my rear with six thousand (6,000) cavalry; he has passed into East Tennessee, having damaged us but little. I will avail myself of his absence to reciprocate the compliment, and to-morrow night the Macon road must be broken good. General Kilpatrick will undertake it. Wheeler cannot disturb Knoxville or London. He may hurt some of the minor points, but, on the whole, East Tennessee is a good place for him to break down his horses, and steal new ones. All well.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, August 17, 1864.*

General CANBY, *New Orleans :*

Despatch of 6th received. Convey to Admiral Farragut my admiration of the bold and successful passage of Mobile fort. I am familiar with Fort Morgan, and would advise that a single gun-boat lay above Pilot Cove and prevent supplies going to Fort Morgan, and time will work its fall. To reduce Mobile I would pass a force up the Tensas and across to old Fort Stoddart, and operate in the direction of Citronelle. The Mobile and Ohio road broken and the river occupied, Mobile would be untenable to the rebels. If possible the Alabama

river should be possessed by us in connexion with my movements. I could easily open communication with Montgomery, but I doubt if you will have troops enough till the September draft. I am pressing Atlanta hard, but don't want Kirby Smith here. I can beat Hood in the open field, but not intrenched. I have repeatedly disabled his roads, but he manages to patch them up.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 18, 1864—7 a. m.*

Major General SCHOFIELD :

I wanted to come down to the extreme right to-day, and may still, but I must watch matters to our rear. Hood no doubt supposes he has put Wheeler on our line, and is demonstrating accordingly; he has small parties to cut our wires nightly. We cannot now get Marietta. Nevertheless, unless something very extraordinary takes place to-day, I want General Kilpatrick to start and break up that Macon road all to pieces. Keep your own cavalry as videttes on your right flank, and to-morrow they might venture as close East Point as possible, and break up some more of that railroad, whilst General Kilpatrick draws their cavalry towards Jonesboro', as they will be sure to watch if they don't fight him. Use your troops to-day as though investing and feeling their left flank, but to-morrow venture out a little. Keep me well advised of all facts that will enable me to divine Hood's scheme.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August, 18, 1864—11.30 a. m.*

General SCHOFIELD :

Our telegraph now works to Chattanooga. The conclusion my mind has arrived at is that Hood sent Wheeler's cavalry to occupy our road at Dalton; that he had re-enforced East Point with a division of his old corps, which last night was brought back, on the supposition that Wheeler had succeeded and we would begin to detach to our rear.

Now, of all times, this is the time for our cavalry to do its work well, and if you hear nothing of me before three o'clock, send a messenger to General Kilpatrick, with a note stating that all things are most favorable for his work; to break as much of the Macon road as he possibly can, and as he swings back, to rest on the West Point road at some point below Fairburn and make another big tear up. If he feels master of the situation on the road he cannot tear up too much track or twist too much iron. It may save this army making a long and hazardous flank march.

Tell him what you will do to-morrow to occupy the enemy's infantry on their flank, and assure him I will cause the same along our whole line, especially on our extreme left. I will see that General Garrard risks all he can to amuse what cavalry the enemy has about Decatur and Stone mountain.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 18, 1864—6 p. m.*General HALLECK, *Washington* :

We have been hammering away at Atlanta; and I was going to put a corps entrenched at the railroad bridge, and with the balance swing round by the south and east, but Hood has sent off his cavalry, which touched our road at two or three points, which are already repaired, and that cavalry has gone up into East Tennessee, leaving me now superior in cavalry; and I hope the opportunity thus given me will save me the risk and excessive labor of making a wide circuit in this hot weather. To-night General Kilpatrick will start for the Macon road with five (5) brigades of cavalry, which can whip all the enemy's cavalry present, and to-morrow I will demonstrate along my whole line to give General Kilpatrick time to make a good break in that road so vital to Hood. We all feel confident that we can succeed, and for that reason I do not regret that Wheeler has gone up into East Tennessee. I think we have force enough at Knoxville, the gap, and Kingston to hold vital points till necessity will force Wheeler to come back; but I will leave him to be attended to by those in my rear.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,

*August 18, 1864—6.45 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN:

I have extended my line more than a mile, substantially parallel to that of the enemy, and have a pretty good flank. The enemy's works appear to be occupied only in moderate force. They have shown no movement during the day. I propose to-night to draw out two brigades of each division of the 14th corps, leaving one brigade of each division, including Hascall's, to hold the present lines. This will give me a movable force of about eighteen thousand (18,000) men with which to make my movement against the enemy's left. This will, of course, make our lines very weak, but I reckon strong enough against any probable attack.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
*Major General.*

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,

*August 18, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

I have been along my entire line this a. m. Considerable artillery was developed by the demonstration, and a strong skirmish throughout. Not many men can be seen in the main works in front of General Logan, but I do not think they have been removed. The division previously reported consisted of seven regiments of infantry. When last seen they were moving opposite the left of the 15th corps, going towards our left. There were a great many stragglers.

O. O. HOWARD,  
*Major General.*

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, *August 18, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

Richmond papers of the 17th give it as the opinion of military men that Atlanta can hold out one month yet. In the mean time, like us, they expect something to turn up. If you can hold tight as you are now, and prevent raids upon your rear, you will destroy most of that army. I never would advise going backward, even if your roads are cut so as to preclude the possibility of receiving supplies from the north, but would work to command the accumulation of ordnance stores and supplies while you can; if it comes to the worst, move south, as you suggest.

I have forced the enemy to move a large force north of the James, and am now moving one corps by our left around Petersburg. I expect no great results, but will probably cut the Weldon road again, and will also demonstrate to the enemy that he has now the minimum garrison possible to hold his present lines with, and that to hold his roads he must re-enforce.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 19, 1864—10.45 a. m.*

General GRANT, *City Point*:

I have your two despatches of 14th and 16th, also that of 18th. I will never take a step backwards, and have no fears of Hood. I can whip him outside of his trenches, and think in time I can compel him to come out. I think at this moment I have a fine cavalry force on the only road which can feed him, and, if necessary, will swing my whole army across it also.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,  
*August 19, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

The skirmishing you hear is apparently between me and the 14th corps. Have not heard from my right yet.

O. O. HOWARD,  
*Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,  
*August 19, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

General Dodge is wounded in the side of the head by a musket ball; not seriously.

O. O. HOWARD,  
*Major General.*



## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,

*August 19, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

The firing to-night occurred in front of the right of the 15th corps. The enemy attempted to capture our working parties. They failed. General Lightburn was wounded in De Grass's battery, in a similar manner to General Dodge. The officers and men on the right of the 15th corps have observed fires in the direction of Macon since 6 o'clock. One of my staff just returned reports he saw the fires still burning.

O. O. HOWARD, *Major General.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, August 19, 1864—7 p. m.*General HALLECK, *Washington :*

I have Secretary Stanton's despatch announcing the promotion of Colonel Long, a hard-working and worthy cavalry officer. We have made heavy demonstrations all day, especially on our flanks, to hold the enemy while our cavalry is out after the Macon road. I hope this time the work will be better done than before. We control all other railroads.

General Dodge received a ball wound in his forehead, but it is pronounced not serious. All well.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*August 20, 1864—7.30 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

I forwarded General Stanley's report of operations since 3 a. m., about 1 o'clock to-day. He has kept the enemy fully occupied ever since yesterday noon. So has Garrard's brigade. We have made three captures of rebel scouts, and from papers found on one of them I infer Hood is exceedingly anxious to know where our left flank is and its strength.

Geary's signal officer reports having observed the light of a large fire last night in the direction of Rough and Ready station just before the storm came on.

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,

*August 21, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Prisoners captured by General Cox last evening report that Kilpatrick struck the railroad at Jonesboro' the morning after he started. Very distant artillery firing was heard in the direction of Macon from our right last evening. I have heard nothing further indicative of Kilpatrick's movements. Cox is making a demonstration on the right to aid him on his return. Enemy is using artillery quite freely in front of 14th corps this morning.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,

*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Georgia, August 21, 1864—10 a. m.*General HALLECK, *Washington* :

General Howard and I have talked over the affairs of the department of the Tennessee, and admit the wisdom of General Canby exercising command of all the troops on the Mississippi. To preserve organizations already existing, without materially diminishing the military force on the Mississippi, we ask that certain fragments of regiments and brigades, not exceeding in the aggregate twenty-five hundred (2,500) men, be allowed to come to their organization here. Also, if possible, that a division of the 17th corps, originally designated as part of General McPherson's column, but detained up Red river, be also allowed to come by any route deemed advisable by General Washburne. To accomplish these results General Howard sends to-day a staff officer to Louisville to confer with you by telegraph, and then to go to Memphis and accomplish whatever you may conclude. Be assured that General Howard and I both cheerfully concede anything that will produce good results. I think it would be well not to change the limits of the departments, but to have all troops now belonging to the department of the Tennessee still make returns to General Howard, but be subject to the military orders of General Canby, to whom they could make reports of effective force that would satisfy his purposes. All well. Expect to hear of General Kilpatrick every hour. Nothing further of Wheeler.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, August 21, 1864—8 p. m.*General STEEDMAN, *Chattanooga* :

I have your despatch of to-day, and if a gun-boat can get up to Kingston it would be well to send it. Wheeler cannot do us serious harm up there, and cavalry has not the industry to damage railroads seriously. General Schofield thinks Knoxville has provisions for three (3) months, and is very strongly fortified. So you need not bother Wheeler there further than to keep him watched by scouts and citizens, and let me know his future course. I don't want him to come back by way of the Oostonaula. Now is the time to get all your forces in good position to move rapidly against his flank if he comes back anywhere between Spring Place and Talking Rock. Dalton is the best point from which to watch him, and I think it would be well to make a bridge across the Connasauga, near the mouth of Cuoyehuttie, on the road from Dalton to Spring Place, and build a small, but strong, redoubt between the forks at the bridge, as a threat to that flank. I don't know the ground at Dalton or Spring Place, but by the maps. I know if you have a respectable force at Dalton and the Spring Place road, fortified as I describe, Wheeler will not dare to pass down this way. If he go into Kentucky by Cumberland gap or Somerset, there are forces enough to attend to him there. I feel confident General Grant will give Lee enough to do, so he cannot detach any considerable force towards Knoxville.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*August 22, 1864—7.30 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

General Kilpatrick is about to start for your headquarters. He reports having torn up four miles connectedly of railroad between Rough and Ready and Jonesboro', and ten (10) miles at intervals, and destroyed two trains, including the one destroyed by Kline. He virtually captured Ross's brigade, but could not bring the men away. He was attacked by Jackson's cavalry and a division of infantry, but effected his escape before the enemy could surround him, and brought off his own artillery, and one piece of the four captured. Two pieces and nine caissons were destroyed by him. He brought in about seventy (70) prisoners and three battle flags and all his own wounded; has ninety-seven (97) killed and missing. Among the missing four officers. Brigadier General Long was wounded in two places. He speaks in high terms of the behavior of his whole command. Captain Bartlett is well and on the road with him to your headquarters.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

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CHATTANOOGA, *August 22, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Wheeler is now between the Hiawassee and Little Tennessee rivers, both too high to ford. I think I can force him back through the mountains toward North Carolina by concentrating force at Charleston, and moving on him from that place. I have force enough and can concentrate them in time. I await your orders; concentrating at Dalton as you directed.

Respectfully,

JAMES B. STEEDMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 22, 1864—10 p. m.*

General HALLECK :

General Kilpatrick is back. He had pretty hard fighting with a division of infantry and three (3) brigades of cavalry. He broke the cavalry into disorder and captured a battery which he destroyed, except one (1) gun which he brought in, in addition to all his own. He also brought in three captured flags and seventy (70) prisoners. He had possession of a large part of Ross's brigade, but could not encumber himself with them. He destroyed three (3) miles of the road about Jonesboro', and broke pieces for about ten (10) miles more, enough to disable the road for ten days.

I expect I will have to swing across to that road in force to make the matter certain. General Kilpatrick destroyed two (2) locomotives and trains.

It has been very quiet with us here. Wheeler is about Athens, Tennessee, and General Steedman will move out against him from Chattanooga.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 23, 1864—1.30 p. m.*General BURBRIDGE, *Louisville:*

I don't believe Wheeler and Morgan are going into Kentucky; but should they, you should be prepared for them. Of course I cannot turn back for a cavalry raid. If Colonel Laibold held Wheeler at bay with four hundred (400) men at Dalton in a redoubt, you surely can hold him in Kentucky with General Ammen and General Tillson at Cumberland gap and Knoxville.

Get your people well in hand, and in no event allow alarm to spread in Kentucky. The enemy cannot spare a large force now to invade Kentucky. It is a raid designed to make clamor, and nothing more.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,

*August 23, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

I have on hand supplies for the grand movement, and only need long enough notice to send my baggage wagons to the rear. I will have the maps about Utoy, Red Oak, &c., completed this evening.

J. M. SCHOFIELD, *Major General.*

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*August 23, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

The teams of my command have only five (5) days' forage on hand; otherwise my command will be ready to commence the movement to-morrow. Colonel McKay tells me that in three days the whole army could be supplied with ten (10) days' forage.

GEO. H. THOMAS, *Major General.*

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*August 23, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

I would like to commence the movement without being hurried, and can do so by Thursday night. I think the cavalry ought to have a little rest and time to shoe up. I will be perfectly prepared by Thursday with provisions, and can arrange to get forage by Sandtown the day after, if forage comes down.

GEO. H. THOMAS, *Major General.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 23, 1864—11.30 p. m.*General HALLECK, *Washington:*

All well. Give currency to the idea that I am to remain quiet till events transpire in other quarters, and let the idea be printed, so as to reach Richmond in three (3) days. You understand the effect.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 24, 1864—8 a. m.*

Generals THOMAS, SCHOFIELD and HOWARD :

I will ride down to the bridge to-day to see the lay of ground and the character of the redoubts there. Go on and make all the preparations possible, so that our movement when begun may proceed rapidly and safely. Our maps should be compiled, and as many roads laid down between Red Oak and Jonesboro' as we can be sure of existence.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*August 24, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

A fire seems to be raging in Atlanta, direction ten (10) degrees south of east from my tree. Can see heated air rising in dense columns ; seems to be spreading. Town is filled with smoke.

I have directed my heavy guns to fire on the town.

O. O. HOWARD,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 24, 1864—7.15 p. m.*

General HALLECK, *Washington :*

Heavy fires in Atlanta all day, caused by our artillery. I will be all ready and will commence the movement round Atlanta by the south to-morrow night, and for some time you will hear little of me. I will keep open courier line with Chattahoochee bridge by way of Sandtown. 20th corps will hold the bridge, and I will move with the balance of the army provisioned for twenty (20) days.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 24, 1864—8 p. m.*

General R. S. GRANGER, *Decatur, Alabama :*

I am satisfied the enemy designs to make desperate attempts on our road. I have your despatch, and think it probable Roddy is over there ; also Clanton. Do the best you can and keep General Rousseau advised. Cavalry usually do so little damage to a road that it can be repaired faster than they damage it. Guard well the vital points, such as bridges and tunnels, and when the enemy scatters, as he is sure to do, pitch into his detachments.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near East Point, Ga., August 26, 1864—6.45 p. m.*General HALLECK, *Washington:*

I have moved the 20th corps to the Chattahoochee bridge, where it is intrenched, and with the balance of the army am moving for Jonesboro', on the Macon road. Last night we made the first move without trouble; to-night we make the second; and the third will place the army massed near Fairburn. If Hood attacks he must come out, which is all we ask. All well thus far.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Red Oak, Georgia, August 28, 1864—6.45 p. m.*

GENERAL: We will remain here to-morrow. I wish the railroad thoroughly destroyed as far forward as possible, and to the rear until you meet General Howard's troops. Let the destruction be so thorough that not a rail or tie can be used again. My own experience demonstrates the proper method to be to march a regiment to the road, stack arms, loosen two (2) rails opposite the right and two (2) opposite the left of the regiment, then to heave the whole track, rails and ties, over, breaking it all to pieces; then pile the ties in the nature of crib-work, and lay the rails over them; then by means of fence-rails make a bon-fire, and when the rails are red-hot let men give the rail a twist, which cannot be straightened without machinery. Also fill up some of the cuts with heavy logs and trunks of trees and branches, and cover up and fill with dirt. Please give minute instructions on this subject to-night, and have the work commenced as early in the morning as possible, taking proper precautions also to guard against attack on either of the working parties or the general position.

General Howard has received similar instructions, and General Schofield will be moved to your left front.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

Major General THOMAS, *Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Red Oak, Ga., August 28, 1864—6.45 p. m.*

GENERAL: Colonel Wilson is here. I wrote you by Captain Knox. Our movement has been slower on the left, on account of the proximity to the enemy and a necessity for greater caution. General Thomas is in position; his two corps crossing the railroad and facing Atlanta. General Schofield still remains about Mount Gilead church. We will remain on the road to-morrow and break it in the most thorough manner possible. General Thomas will work forward and break to you. I want you to do the best job of railroad destruction on record, using General Kilpatrick to cover you while at work, and to explore roads to the east, and make such reconnoissance towards Campbellton as will be useful to us in the future. Also fill up some cuts in the railroad with logs and trees, and cover with dirt, so we may rest perfectly satisfied as regards the use of this railroad during the remainder of this campaign.

It is more important that each bar of iron should be heated and twisted than that a great amount of imperfect work be done; for if the iron can be used again in this wooded country, ties can be easily supplied.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Major General HOWARD, *Commanding, &c.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Red Oak, Ga., August 29, 1864—8 p. m.*

Major General THOMAS, *Commanding Army Cumberland:*

I have seen General Howard. You will move to-morrow for Shoal Creek church and on to the road leading from Decatur to Fayetteville, half way from Morrow's mill and the Renfro place (Couch's.) Move the head of your column by Mrs. Long's place, taking care to leave room for General Schofield to pass the same point up towards Morrow's mill. Please report to me if Generals Davis or Stanley moved towards East Point far enough to secure the road by which I design General Schofield to move, viz: from D. Mim's, up along the railroad to the road represented as leading down to Mrs. Long's. General Howard starts at 7 a. m. I would like you to reach Shoal Creek church as early as 10 a. m. at farthest, to cover General Howard's movement, who will, if possible, reach Jonesboro' to-morrow.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Red Oak, August 29, 1864—8 p. m.*

Major General SCHOFIELD:

I have been down to General Howard. The railroad is well broken down two and a half ( $2\frac{1}{2}$ ) miles below Fairburn, which is six (6) miles from here. Several cuts are also filled with trees, rocks, and earth.

We will move to-morrow for our next objective. General Howard will move for Jonesboro'; General Thomas by way of Shoal Creek church, Mrs. Long's, and Couch's, on the road from Morrow's mill, towards Fayetteville. I want you to cover the movement with your two (2) divisions and the cavalry of General Garrard. It may be best for you to occupy the parapets made by Generals Stanley and Davis until your trains are well towards Shoal Creek church, and then move towards any strong position south and west of Morrow's mill, covering the Decatur road and in communication with General Thomas at Couch's. I don't know how far towards East Point Generals Stanley and Davis went to-day, but if you can I want you to gain your position *via* D. Mim's and the road across by Mrs. Long's. If you find this difficult, maintain a defensive position till the trains are well out, and then follow General Thomas's movement as far as Long's, and thence to the one described.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Couch's House, August, 31, 1864—8 a. m.*

General HALLECK :

At this time I would not suggest a change in the geographical lines of the departments of Ohio and Cumberland, because Generals Thomas and Schofield are now in actual battle and cannot give their attention to the necessary details. I will see both of them to-day, and will then communicate my opinion.

We reached the West Point road and broke up twelve miles of it thoroughly, then marched on a big left wheel for the Macon road; General Schofield, on the left, aiming for Rough and Ready; General Thomas's centre and General Howard's right aiming for Jonesboro'. The left and centre, as yet, have met with little or no opposition, but General Howard has fought two brigades of cavalry all the way from Fairburn. Last night darkness overtook him within a mile of Jonesboro', having pushed the cavalry so close that he secured the Flint river bridge.

To-day I press at all points, but expect to make a lodgement on the road at or below Jonesboro', when I propose to swing the whole army upon it, and break it all to pieces. I expect and am prepared for hard fighting, and have the army well in hand.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Jonesboro', Ga., August 31, 1864—11 p. m.\**

GENERAL: I wish you would instruct General Slocum at the bridge to feel forward to Atlanta as boldly as he can by the direct road leading from the bridge, and to send any cavalry force he can raise over towards Decatur, to watch the movements of the enemy in that quarter. Advise him fully of the situation of affairs here, and assure him that we will fully occupy the attention of the rebel army outside of Atlanta.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

Major General THOMAS,  
Commanding Army of the Cumberland.

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Jonesboro', September 1, 1864.*

GENERAL: In order that no doubt may exist as to future operations, I wish your army to press directly after the enemy, southward, with all the speed and vigor possible, till we reach Griffin, where I will make new orders. I regret to learn that General Stanley remained to-day for hours on the railroad awaiting orders when he heard firing heavy to his front and right. I may be in error, but such is reported to me by Captain Audenreid and Captain Poe. I knew you had given him orders, and think we should not overlook it. I don't know why Stanley could not have pushed along the railroad whilst General Davis was heavily engaged, and absolutely enveloped the enemy in Jonesboro'. Now he has time to fortify, and we may be compelled to modify all our plans. If General Stanley lost a minute of time when he should have been in action, I beg you will not overlook it, as it concerns the lives of our men and the success of our arms.



General Davis's attack, though some hours later than I expected, was still spirited and good, and was measurably successful.

I suppose now the rebel General Stewart has made his junction, which improves our chances at Atlanta, but gives us harder work out here.

Please renew your orders to General Slocum to make a dash at Atlanta before the enemy has time to haul off the artillery and stores.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General THOMAS,  
*Commanding Army of the Cumberland.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Jonesboro', Ga., September 1, 1864.*

GENERAL: From reports of my staff I think enough of the railroad has been broken, until we have conquered the army now lying at Jonesboro'. We had pretty hard fighting with them this afternoon, and I think had all our force been engaged we would have beaten them, but now Stewart's corps will effect its junction, and the enemy will fortify. Yet he may underrate our strength, and I wish you, to-morrow early, to get over to the northeast of Jonesboro' and approach from that quarter; and should the enemy retreat, follow him with energy, hanging on his left flank; follow roads east of the railroad as far as Griffin.

General Thomas will follow the railroad substantially, and Howard will keep to the right. I don't see why the enemy should elect to hold Jonesboro' defensively, as we have broken his road; so if you find him intrenched don't assault, but feel below the town. General Howard has General Blair's corps with Kilpatrick's cavalry across Flint river feeling out for the railroad below Jonesboro'. If you think Stewart's corps has passed round by the east from Atlanta and joined Hood at Jonesboro', you may order Garrard up to act with you around to the south of Jonesboro'; but if there be anything to our rear, keep him holding all roads by which Hardee or Hood (both are now represented as present) can receive re-enforcements from the rear. At all events, call Garrard close up, that he may be within reach, if needed, which will be the case if the enemy retreat to-morrow. His movements are so slow that you had better send to him to-night specific orders.

Now that the army is united, you are, of course, subject to no one's orders but mine. But if fighting occurs, or you have a chance to attack, the orders are always to attack. We don't care about Jonesboro', but we want to destroy our enemy.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SCHOFIELD,  
*Commanding Army of the Ohio.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Jonesboro', Ga., September 1, 1864—8 p. m.*

GENERAL: In order that you may act advisedly, I will merely state that Jonesboro' is of no value to us, but we are now trying to cripple and destroy the army now there. General Thomas will push him in the direction of the railroad south, General Schofield will operate on the east, and you on the west

of the railroad. If he retreats, we will follow without halt or delay, if possible, to Griffin. If he remains in Jonesboro', we must envelop him and destroy his communications south, as they are already destroyed north. Your troops are now well disposed, and General Blair can do good service by feeling out and reaching the railroad, if possible. He should not be content with a cavalry break, but one of some extent, and well done. Send word to Osterhaus to have his artillery officers listen for the cars to-night, and if heard, to open artillery on them at random.

If the enemy retreats, I think you could make best progress by marching rapidly to Fayetteville, and then toward Griffin, following on the flanks of the enemy. I suppose the bridge is destroyed, but General Thomas has a pontoon train that could reach there in a day. This train is at Renfrew's, (Renfro's,) eight (8) miles from Fayetteville, from which there are several roads across Flint river, the one fulfilling most conditions being the one towards Fayetteville station. Still, if you can learn of roads east of Flint river that will be available, and yet not bring you in contact with General Thomas's troops, it would be the safer, as all the army will then be together, and no part separated by an impassable stream. Should the enemy remain in Jonesboro' to-morrow hold your line as now, and give to General Blair's movements all the force you can.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HOWARD,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Lovejoy's, September 2, 1864—8 p. m.*

Major General SCHOFIELD :

I have strong evidence that the enemy blew up his magazines and abandoned the place of Atlanta to General Slocum. If this be so, it is unnecessary for us to go further at this stage. I have parties breaking up the railroad from Jonesboro' to our lines, and to-morrow wish you to feel for the McDonough road, so as to command it if possible, but keep up strong connexion with General Stanley, and do not assault works of the enemy. If he gives you a fair chance punish him. I have couriers back to ascertain the exact state of affairs in Atlanta, and will be governed by what I hear.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Lovejoy's, September 2, 1864—8 p. m.*

Major General HOWARD :

You know that General Garrard reports General Slocum in possession of Atlanta. I have sent couriers to learn the exact truth. If it be so, we do not care about pushing the enemy any further at this time.

Had we prevented him making intrenchments it would have been well, but as he has a strong line I do not wish to waste lives by an assault. You may, therefore, order the skirmishers close up, but hold your lines so as not to suffer much. If the enemy be gone in the morning, occupy his lines to your front, and await orders.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Lovejoy's, Ga., September 2, 1864—8 p. m.*

Major General THOMAS :

Until we hear from Atlanta the exact truth, I do not care about your pushing your men against breastworks. Destroy the railroad well up to your lines, keep skirmishers well up, and hold your troops in hand for anything that may turn up. As soon as I know positively that our troops are in Atlanta I will determine what to do.

I have ordered General Schofield to feel for the McDonough road, to prevent re-enforcements coming to the enemy from that direction.

Yours, &amp;c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher—By courier to Atlanta.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Lovejoy's Station, 26 miles  
south of Atlanta, September 3, 1864.*Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

As already reported, the army drew from about Atlanta, and on the 30th had made a good break of the West Point railroad, and reached a good position from which to strike the Macon railroad—the right, General Howard, near Jonesboro'; the left, General Schofield, near Rough and Ready; and centre, General Thomas, at Couch's. General Howard found the enemy in force at Jonesboro; intrenched his troops, the salient within a half a mile of the railroad. The enemy attacked him at 3 p. m., and was easily repulsed, leaving his dead and wounded. Finding strong opposition on the right, I advanced the left and centre rapidly to the railroad; made a good lodgement, and broke it all the way from Rough and Ready down to Howard's left, near Jonesboro', and by the same movement I interposed my whole army between Atlanta and the part of the enemy intrenched in and around Jonesboro'. We made a general attack on the enemy at Jonesboro' on the 1st of September, the 14th corps, General Jeff. C. Davis, carrying the works handsomely with ten (10) guns, and about a thousand prisoners. In the night the enemy retreated south, and we have followed him to another of his well-chosen and hastily constructed lines, near Lovejoy's. Hood, at Atlanta, finding me on his road, the only one that could supply him, and between him and a considerable part of his army, blew up his magazines in Atlanta, and left in the night time, when the 20th corps, General Slocum, took possession of the place. So Atlanta is ours, and fairly won.

I shall not push much further on this raid, but in a day or so will move back to Atlanta, and give my men some rest.

Since the 5th of May we have been in one constant battle or skirmish, and need rest. Our losses will not exceed twelve hundred, (1,200,) and we have possession of over three hundred (300) rebel dead, two hundred and fifty (250) wounded, and over fifteen hundred (1,500) well prisoners.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Lovejoy's Station, September 3, 1864.*Major General SLOCUM, *Atlanta, Georgia:*

Have all the stores moved forward from Allatoona and Marietta to Atlanta, take possession of all good buildings for government purposes, and see they are not used as quarters. Advise the people to quit now. There can be no trade or commerce until the war is over. Let Union families go to the north with their effects, and "secesh" families move on. Cotton must all go to Nashville as United States property, and pretended claimants may collect testimony for the pursuit of the proceeds of sale after they reach the United States treasury in money.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Lovejoy's, Ga., September 4, 1864.*General HALLECK, *Washington:*

The 20th corps now occupies Atlanta and the Chattahoochee bridges. The main army is now here, grouped below Jonesboro'. The enemy hold a line facing us, with front well covered by parapets, and flanks covered by Walnut creek on the right, and a confluent of Flint river on his left. His position is too strong to attack in front, and to turn it would carry me too far from our base at this time; besides, there is no commensurate object, as there is no valuable point to his rear till we reach Macon, one hundred and three (103) miles from Atlanta. We are not prepared for that, and I will gradually fall back and occupy Atlanta, which was, and is, our grand objective point already secure.

For the future, I propose that of the drafted men I receive my due share, say fifty thousand (50,000.) That an equal or greater number go to General Canby, who should now proceed with all energy to get Montgomery, and the reach of the Alabama river, above Selma, that when I know he can move on Columbus, Georgia, I move on La Grange and West Point, keeping to the east of the Chattahoochee; that we form a junction; repair roads to Montgomery, and open up the Appalachian and Chattahoochee rivers to Columbus, and move from it as a base straight on Macon. This campaign can be made in the winter, and we can safely rely on the corn of the Flint and Chattahoochee to supply forage.

If the Tensas channel of the Alabama river can be used, General Gardner, with his rebel garrison, could continue to hold Mobile for our use when we want it. I propose to move all the inhabitants of Atlanta, sending those committed to our cause to the rear, and the rebel families to the front. I will allow no trade, manufactories, or any citizen there at all, so that we will have the entire use of the railroad back, as also such corn and forage as may be reached by our troops.

If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will answer that war is war, and not popularity-seeking. If they want peace, they and their relatives must stop the war.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

CITY POINT, VA., *September 4, 1864*—9 p. m.

Major General SHERMAN:

I have just received your despatch announcing the capture of Atlanta. In honor of your great victory, I have ordered a salute to be fired with shotted guns from every battery bearing upon the enemy. The salute will be fired within an hour, amidst great rejoicing.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., *September 5, 1864*—10.55 a. m.

Major General SHERMAN:

I have the pleasure of transmitting to you the following orders which were made Saturday by the President on receipt of the news of the capture of Atlanta.

E. M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *September 3, 1864.*

The national thanks are tendered by the President to Major General W. T. Sherman and the gallant officers and soldiers of his command, before Atlanta, for the distinguished ability, courage, and perseverance displayed in the campaign in Georgia, which, under Divine favor, has resulted in the capture of Atlanta. The marches, battles, sieges, and other military operations that have signalized the campaign must render it famous in the annals of war, and have entitled those who have participated therein to the applause and thanks of the nation.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN,  
*President of the United States.*

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
*Washington, D. C., September 3, 1864.*

*Ordered*—1. That on Monday, the 5th day of September, commencing at the hour of 12 o'clock noon, there shall be given a salute of one hundred (100) guns at the arsenal and navy yard, Washington; and on Tuesday, the 6th of September, or on the day after the receipt of this order, at each arsenal and navy yard in the United States, for the recent brilliant achievements of the fleet and land forces of the United States in the harbor of Mobile, and in the reduction of Fort Powell, Fort Gaines, and Fort Morgan. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy will issue the necessary directions in their respective departments for the execution of this order.

2. That on Wednesday, the 7th of September, commencing at the hour of 12 o'clock noon, there shall be fired a salute of one hundred guns at the arsenal at Washington, and at New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Pittsburg, Newport, Kentucky, and St. Louis, and New Orleans, Mobile and Pensacola, Hilton Head and Newbern, the day after the receipt of this order, for the brilliant achievements of the army under command of Major General Sherman, in the State of Georgia, and for the capture of Atlanta. The Secretary of War will issue directions for the execution of this order.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN,  
*President of the United States.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Jonesboro', Ga., September 6, 1864.*General GRANT, *City Point, Virginia :*

I have received your despatch, and will communicate it to the troops in general orders. We are gradually falling back to Atlanta, feeding high on the cornfields of the confederacy. I will be in Atlanta in a day or two, and will communicate fully with you. I have always felt that you would personally take more pleasure in my success than in your own, and I reciprocate the feeling in its fullest extent.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Jonesboro', September 6, 1864.*Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Washington, D. C. :*

I have just received your telegram, and shall announce it to the whole army, preceded by the expression : "The general commanding announces to the army with pride and satisfaction," and followed by "all corps, regiments, and batteries may, without further notice, inscribe 'Atlanta' on their colors." We are moving back to Atlanta slowly, making good use of the cornfields, which our animals needed, and to prevent a boast of the enemy that we were in a hurry. I have burned a good deal of cotton, but will save enough to pay the expense of the salute.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 8, 1864.*General HALLECK, *Washington :*

General Thomas is in, and his troops are now grouping about Atlanta. General Schofield has also arrived, and has gone to place his troops in Decatur. I have not yet heard from General Howard, but suppose him to be at East Point. I have just ridden to see a portion of the enemy's lines, which are very strong, and demonstrate the wisdom of our mode and manner of attack.

I have but little news of Wheeler, except that last night General Steedman was at Athens, Alabama, and Wheeler was supposed to be crossing the Tennessee, towards the south, about Lamb's ferry. Generals Rousseau, Granger, and Steedman have enough troops to handle Wheeler, and I suppose the railroad will soon be repaired. We have enough stores for a month, and I feel no uneasiness on that score; yet if necessary I can send some troops to the rear. I telegraphed you yesterday that you could use General A. J. Smith, as proposed, to act against Price in Missouri. We are well, and have no doubt, after a short rest, will be impatient again to sally forth in search of adventure.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 8, 1864.*General WEBSTER, *Nashville*:

Don't let any citizens come to Atlanta, not one. I won't allow trade or manufactures of any kind, but will remove all the present population, and make Atlanta a pure military town. Give public notice to this effect.

General Thomas's army is now in and around Atlanta; General Howard at East Point, and General Schofield at Decatur. I want Wheeler cleaned out, the roads repaired, and everything to the rear made right. Send forward paymasters. If the Sanitary Commission have stores, let them be sent to the agent at Chattanooga, whence we can draw as fast as we need.

Hood's army retreated towards Macon, but will, I suppose, halt about Griffin. I was unprepared to follow below Lovejoy's, twenty-eight (28) miles south of Atlanta, for we have been fighting constantly since about the 7th of May, and the men need rest and quiet. Our last move was beautiful and perfectly successful, as you observe from our occupation of the famous Atlanta. We have already found nineteen (19) guns, and others are being found daily. At Jonesboro', at the battle, we took two four (4) gun batteries, and in the whole move have near three thousand (3,000) prisoners. We killed about five hundred (500) at Jonesboro', and wounded about twenty-five hundred (2,500.) Our entire loss since beginning the movement will not exceed fifteen hundred (1,500.)

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 9, 1864.*General HALLECK, *Washington*:

All our troops are now in position, comfortable and well. In a day or two I will have telegraphic communication from Roswell round to Sandtown, and can act promptly. A few of the enemy's cavalry followed us from Rough and Ready, and last evening General Hood sent in a flag of truce, asking to exchange prisoners. I have about two thousand (2,000) in hand, and will exchange if he will make a fair deal. I have sent out my inspector general to confer and agree and to make arrangements for the exodus of citizens. I am not willing to have Atlanta encumbered by the families of our enemies; I want it a pure Gibraltar, and will have it so by the first of October.

I think Generals Rousseau and Steedman are stirring Wheeler up pretty well, and I hope they will make an end of him, as Gillen has of Morgan. I have ordered renewed activity, and to show no mercy to guerillas or railroad breakers. It makes a world of difference if "my bull gores your ox or your's mine." Weather beautiful, and all things seem bright.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 10, 1864.*General CANBY, *New Orleans*:

Despatch of 29th received. I got Atlanta by a couple of good moves. You succeeded at Fort Morgan sooner than I expected. We must have the Alabama

river now and also the Appalachicola at the old arsenal, and up to Columbus. My line is so long now that it is impossible to protect it against cavalry raids ; but if we can get Montgomery and Columbus, Georgia, as bases in connexion with Atlanta, we have Georgia and Alabama at our feet. You ought to have more men, and it is a burning shame that at this epoch we should need men, for the north is full of them. They can raise a political convention any time of fifty to one hundred thousand (50,000 to 100,000) men, and yet they pretend they cannot give us what we want. But keep at it, and I only want to express my idea that I would not bother with the city of Mobile, which will simply absorb a garrison for you, but would use the Tensas channel, and notify General Gardner, of the rebel army, to maintain good order, &c., in the now useless streets of Mobile.

I will be ready to sally forth again in October, but ought to have some assurance that, in case of necessity, I can swing into Appalachicola or Montgomery and find friends.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,  
September 10, 1864.

Major General SHERMAN :

As soon as your men are properly rested and preparations can be made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced.

We want to keep the enemy continually pressed to the end of the war. If we give him no peace while the war lasts, the end cannot be far distant. Now that we have all of Mobile bay that is valuable, I do not know but it will be the best move for Major General Canby's troops to act upon Savannah, whilst you move on Augusta. I should like to hear from you, however, on this matter.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, September 10 1864—8 p. m.*

General GRANT, *City Point :*

I have your despatch of to-day. My command need some rest and pay. Our roads are also broken back near Nashville, and Wheeler is not yet disposed of. Still, I am perfectly alive to the importance of pushing our advantage to the utmost. I do not think we can afford to operate further, dependent on the railroad, it takes so many men to guard it, and even then it is nightly broken by the enemy's cavalry that swarms about us. Macon is distant one hundred and three miles (103) miles, and Augusta one hundred and seventy-five (175) miles. If I could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at Augusta or Columbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville and compel Hood to give up Augusta or Macon, and could then turn on the other. The country will afford forage and many supplies, but not enough in any one place to admit of a delay. In scattering for forage we have a great many men picked up by the enemy's cavalry. If you can manage to take the Savannah river as high as Augusta, or the Chatahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep the whole State of Georgia ; otherwise I would risk our whole army by going too far from Atlanta.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, September 12, 1864.*

General A. J. SMITH, *Cairo, Illinois :*

I have been trying for three months to get you and Mower to me, but am headed off at every turn. General Halleck asks for you to clean out Price. Can't you make a quick job of it and then get to me? Your command belongs to me and is only loaned to help our neighbors, but I fear they make you do the lion's share. However, do as General Halleck orders, and as soon as possible come to me. All well.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

*In the field, Atlanta, September 12, 1864.*

General GRANT, *City Point, Virginia :*

I have Macon papers of the 10th and 11th. Dick Taylor is in command of the department, including Mobile; Forrest and his men have reached Mobile. All well here. The exodus of people is progressing, and matters coming into shape. I will have all official reports of the campaign in and off for Washington by the 15th.

I don't understand whether you propose to act against Savannah direct from Fort Pulaski, or by way of Florida, or from the direction of Mobile. If you can take Savannah by a sudden *coup-de-main*, it would be valuable. The enemy is evidently concentrating all his Mississippi force at Mobile, and Hood is about ovejoy's Station watching me, apprehensive of big raids.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, September 12, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C. :*

I do not think I need at this time cavalry horses in undue proportion; I have st faith in cavalry raids, and our men take bad care of their animals. There a large abundance of forage in Alabama and Georgia, and independent columns of cavalry might operate by a circuit from one army to another and destroy the enemy's cavalry, which is more to be feared by us than their infantry. s soon as General Grant determines for me the next move on the chess-board, will estimate the number I will want, and in the mean time would not ask ore than a fair proportion for remount. Wheeler might have been utterly destroyed if we had had more cavalry in Tennessee, but that is now too late. In the ture we will have to use cavalry offensively, and trust to the enemy's corn-lds for forage. Our road is repaired and bringing forward supplies, but I ubt its capacity to do much more than feed our teams and artillery horses. ll well.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, September 12, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have yours of to-day. You asked to exchange prisoners, and I nsented as far as those which remained in my hands and this side of Chatta-

nooga. These I will exchange in the manner stated, and not otherwise. As you could not know those of our men whose terms of service have expired, I authorized Colonel Warner to say I would receive any number taken of this army between certain dates—say the last two thousand—or in any other single period ; but as a matter of business I offered terms that could not be misunderstood.

You have not answered my proposition as to the men “captured in Atlanta who are soldiers of the confederate army, detailed on extra duty” in the shops.

I think I understand the laws of civilized nations, and the “customs of war ;” but if at a loss at any time, I know where to seek for information to refresh my memory.

If you will give our prisoners at Andersonville a little more elbow-room, and liberty to make, out of the abundant timber, shelter for themselves, as also a fair allowance of food to enable them to live in health, they will ask nothing more until such time as we will provide for them.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General J. B. Hood,

*Commanding Army of the Tennessee, Confederate Army.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Georgia, September 13, 1865.*

GENERAL : I enclose you a couple of rebel papers of September 9th and 13th, which contain articles I would have you and Mr. Stanton to read. In the latter you will find General Hood has published my letter about moving the people of Atlanta and his answer. You will observe he characterizes this removal in somewhat harsh terms, and I feel sure he has made his answer public before it went to the Richmond government, as is required by their official usage. He has therefore appealed to the public as a demagogue, and hopes to make capital. Of course he is welcome, for the more he arouses the indignation of the southern masses, the bigger will be the pill of bitterness they will have to swallow. The people of Atlanta are going, and we will have the place for military uses, and not have to engage in a ceaseless wrangle every time we need a house or site for a battery. The present rebel line would require a garrison of thirty thousand (30,000) men, whereas we must contract it to the vital points, viz., the railroad and necessary storehouses, all of which can be embraced in a circle of quarter the radius ; and requiring less than a sixth part of that number. I can't use this line of reasoning to a people who have no right to gain such a clue to our future plans and purposes. At some future time I will submit to you the entire correspondence between General Hood and myself on this subject, as also of the special exchange of prisoners, not yet concluded ; and at the present I send you only my reply to his insinuations of unprecedented cruelty towards the families of a “brave people,” which I hardly expect he will publish. If his is widely circulated it might also be well to let the southern papers get mine through northern channels.

I will have all my official reports in by the 15th, which will dispose of the past and leave us free to think of and prepare for the future ; and now I will only renew the expression of the hope that our ranks will soon be replenished by a liberal supply of recruits.

Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 15, 1864.*

General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

My report is done, and will be forwarded as soon as I get a few more of the subordinate reports. I am awaiting a courier from General Grant. All well, and troops in fine, healthy camps, and supplies coming forward finely.

Governor Brown has disbanded his militia to gather the corn and sorghum of the State. I have reason to believe that he and Stevens want to visit me, and I have sent them a hearty invitation.

I will exchange two thousand (2,000) prisoners with Hood, but no more.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA,  
*September 17, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

Your despatch of the 10th has just been received. The operations you suggest have been in contemplation, and preparations are now in progress. I think I can give you the assurance that you will find friends in Mobile. If the trouble in Arkansas river should be soon ended, how far east of that will depend upon the re-enforcements that can be spared for this command.

E. R. S. CANBY.  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 17, 1864.*

President LINCOLN, *Washington, D. C.:*

I will keep the department fully advised of all developments as connected with the subject in which you feel interested.

A Mr. Wright, former member of Congress from Rome, Georgia, and a Mr. King, of Marietta, are now going between Governor Brown and myself. I have said that some of the people of Georgia are now engaged in rebellion, begun in error and perpetuated in pride, but that Georgia can now save herself from the devastation of war preparing for her only by withdrawing her quota out of the confederate army, and aiding me to expel Hood from the borders of the State; in which event, instead of desolating the land as we progress, I will keep our men to the high roads and commons, and pay for the corn and meat we need and take.

I am fully conscious of the delicate nature of such assertions, but it would be a magnificent stroke of policy if I could, without surrendering a foot of ground or of principle, arouse the latent enmity to Davis of Georgia.

The people do not hesitate to say that Mr. Stevens was and is a Union man at heart, and they feel that Jeff. Davis will not trust him, or let him have a share in his government.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 19, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your messenger has not yet arrived. Things remain *statu quo*. Most of the inhabitants are gone, and I am exchanging two thousand (2,000) prisoners with Hood on a special exchange, with the understanding that I get an equal number of my own men back, whom I can put right away to duty. He raised the question of humanity, but I am not to be moved by such tricks of the enemy. I have taken high ground with Hood on purpose. A deserter just in says Stewart's corps is moving back to Macon with a view of going to Virginia. I have ordered one of my female scouts from New Orleans to Augusta, and will send some out from here, and give you prompt notice of any of Hood's army going east. I can quickly bounce him out of Lovejoy's, but think him better there, where I can watch him, than further off. I await the arrival of your messenger with impatience. All well, but large numbers of our men and officers are being discharged, time out, and we must have recruits.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT,  
*City Point, Virginia.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Atlanta, Georgia, September 20, 1864.*

Major General O. O. HOWARD, *East Point:*

General Thomas will send two of Garrard's brigades to Kilpatrick, and order him to feel well down toward Fayetteville and Lovejoy's. Support him, if necessary, only so far as is consistent with the truce and to discover what Hood is about. I will have spies to-night at Macon to watch which way he goes. I think he will move back to Macon and send some men to Richmond.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Atlanta, Georgia, September 20, 1864.*

General GRANT, *City Point:*

Colonel Porter is just come, and I have read your letter with much interest. I will send east my official reports, and write more fully by Colonel Porter. In the mean time all is well, and I can watch your movements with interest. I hear that General Sheridan is now fighting.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 20, 1864.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War:*

Thank you for the appointment of Captain Coverdale. I hope General Sheridan will give Early a good, hard fight.

I think Hood is moving from Lovejoy's, but cannot yet form an intelligent guess as to the direction he will take. I will have some spies in his camp to-night, and have ordered Kilpatrick to feel his flanks about Fayetteville.

Everything continues well with us.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 21, 1864.*

GENERAL: Yours of the 20th instant, asking me to treat as a prisoner of war W. C. Glover, company H, fourth Tennessee regiment of cavalry, employed as a scout by your authority, and who is said to have been captured by me, and is about to be executed at Chattanooga as a spy or bushwhacker is received.

I confess I know nothing about the matter at all, but I will at once proceed to find out the facts and communicate them to you as early as possible; but I can relieve any undue anxiety on the part of the friends of Glover by assuring them that no one can be executed by us without a full and fair record trial by a sworn tribunal, at which the prisoner is always allowed to have his witnesses and counsel.

Since you left our service some few changes have been made in the laws of Congress and the powers of reviewing officers of courts-martial. The act of April 10, 1806, defining spies and their punishment, is materially modified by that of February 13, 1862. Also, by an act of Congress approved December 24, 1861, the commanding general of a division, or separate (detached) brigade, can assemble a general court-martial; but in case of the sentence of death, the case must be reviewed, and the necessary order be given by the officer commanding the army in the field or department to which the division or brigade belongs.

General George H. Thomas commands the department in which Chattanooga lies, and has the review of all such cases, and you must know that he would never order the execution of an innocent man.

I have no doubt, however, that a scout regularly detailed may push his operations so as to make him a spy. If found lurking around the "fortifications, encampments, posts, quarters, or headquarters of the armies of the United States, or any of them," he would clearly fall within the meaning of the laws and be liable to the penalty of death.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

General J. B. Hood,

*Commanding Confederate Forces.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Georgia, September 20, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge, at the hands of Lieutenant Colonel Porter, of your staff, your letter of September 12, and accept with thanks the honorable and kindly mention of the services of this army in the great cause in which we are all engaged.

I send by Colonel Porter all official reports which are completed, and will in a few days submit a list of names which I deem worthy of promotion.

I think we owe it to the President, to save him the invidious task of election among a vast number of worthy applicants, and have ordered my army commanders to prepare their lists with great care, and to express their preferences, based upon claims of actual capacity and services rendered. These I will consolidate and submit in such a form that if mistakes are made they will at least

be sanctioned by the best contemporaneous evidence of merit, for I know that vacancies do not exist equal in number to that of the officers that really deserve promotion.

As to the future, I am pleased to know your army is being steadily re-enforced by a good class of men, and I hope it will go on until you have a force that is numerically double that of your antagonist, so that with one part you can watch him, and with the other you can push out boldly from your left flank, occupy the South-Side railroad, compel him to attack you in position, or accept battle on your own terms.

We ought to ask our country for the largest possible armies that can be raised, as so important a thing as the self-existence of a great nation should not be left to the fickle chances of war.

Now that Mobile is shut out to the commerce of our enemy, it calls for no further effort on our part unless the capture of the city can be followed by the occupation of the Alabama river and the railroad down to Columbus, Georgia, when that place would be a magnificent auxiliary to my further progress into Georgia; but until General Canby is much re-enforced, and until he can more thoroughly subdue the scattered armies west of the Mississippi, I suppose that much cannot be attempted as against the Alabama river and Columbus, Georgia.

The utter destruction of Wilmington, North Carolina, is of importance only in connexion with the necessity of cutting off all foreign trade to our enemy, and if Farragut can get across the bar, and the move can be made quick, I suppose it will succeed. From my knowledge of the mouth of Cape Fear river, I anticipate more difficulty in getting the heavy ships across the bar than in reaching the town of Wilmington; but of course the soundings of the channel are well known at Washington, as well as the draught of his iron-clads, so that it must be demonstrated as feasible, or else it would not be attempted. If successful, I suppose that Fort Caswell will be occupied and the fleet at once sent to the Savannah river. Then the reduction of the city is the only question. It once in our possession, and the river open to us, I would not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with sixty thousand (60,000) men, hauling some stores and depending on the country for the balance. Where a million of people find subsistence my army won't starve; but, as you know, in a country like Georgia, with few roads and innumerable streams, an inferior force could so delay an army and harass it, that it would not be a formidable object, but if the enemy knew that we had our boats on the Savannah I could rapidly move to Milledgeville, where there is abundance of corn and meat, and I could so threaten Macon and Augusta that he would give up Macon for Augusta; then I would move to interpose between Augusta and Savannah, and force him to give me Augusta, with the only powder mills and factories remaining in the south, or let us have the Savannah river. Either horn of the dilemma would be worth a battle. I would prefer his holding Augusta, as the probabilities are, for then, with the Savannah river in our possession, the taking of Augusta would be a mere matter of time. This campaign would be made in winter.

But the more I study the game the more am I convinced that it would be wrong for me to penetrate much further into Georgia without an objective beyond. It would not be productive of much good. I can start east and make a circuit south and back, doing vast damage to the State, but resulting in no permanent good; but by mere threatening to do so I hold a rod over the Georgians, who are not over-loyal to the south. I will therefore give my opinion that your army and Canby's should be re-enforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington you strike for Savannah and the river; that General Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi river, and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either by way of the Alabama or Appalachicola; and that I keep Hood employed and put my army in fine order for a march on Augusta, Columbus, and Charleston; so be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to

commerce, and the city of Savannah is in our possession. I think it will be found that the movements of Price and Shelby west of the Mississippi are mere diversions. They cannot hope to enter Missouri save as raiders, and the truth is, General Rosecrans should be ashamed to take my troops for such a purpose. If you will secure Wilmington and the city of Savannah from your centre, and let General Canby have the Mississippi river and west of it, I will send a force to the Alabama and Appalachicola, provided you give me one hundred thousand (100,000) of the drafted men to fill up my old regiments; and if you will fix a day to be in Savannah, I will insure our possession of Macon and a point on the river below Augusta. The possession of the Savannah river is more than fatal to the possibility of a southern independence. They may stand the fall of Richmond, but not of all Georgia.

I will have a long talk with Colonel Porter, and tell him everything that may occur to me of interest to you.

In the mean time know that I admire your dogged perseverance and pluck more than ever. If you can whip Lee and I can march to the Atlantic, I think Uncle Abe will give us a twenty days' leave of absence to see the young folks.

Yours as ever,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT,

*Commander-in-chief, City Point, Va.*

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[By telegraph.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 21, 1864.*

Lieutenant General GRANT, *City Point, Virginia:*

Lieutenant Colonel Porter will start back in the morning and will bring you full answer to your letter, also all my official reports of the past. I prefer that General Canby and a part of Farragut's fleet should continue to threaten Mobile city, but not attempt its capture; that a small force with gunboats ascend the Appalachicola to the arsenal, and up to Columbus if possible; that you take the city of Savannah by a *coup-de-main*, at the same time or soon after your active movements about Petersburg and the mouth of Cape Fear river. Savannah in our possession and boats at liberty to work up the Savannah river, I am willing to start for Augusta in the manner I propose in my letter of last night, which Colonel Porter will bring. I beg you to give my personal congratulations to Sheridan, and my earnest hope that he will push Early back on Lynchburg. We can't do much up the Tennessee and Virginia valley. It is too long. Burbidge will attempt the capture and destruction of the salt-works about Abingdon, from Kentucky and Knoxville. Schofield has gone to Knoxville to make the arrangements. All well.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 21, 1864.*

Major General O. O. HOWARD, *East Point:*

The general wishes, if possible, that you put some persons on the track of Hood and find out where he is going. He has been trying to get out persons from here, but does not succeed in finding any person that is worth much or reliable.

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de Camp.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 21, 1864.*Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Washington, D. C.:*

Magnificent from General Sheridan, and his success will have an effect all over the country.

Hood is falling back from Lovejoy's, but I will not follow him now, but will watch his motions with my cavalry. I write very fully to General Grant by a special aide to-day. He will bring my report to Washington. My information from the interior of Georgia is all favorable to our cause. I send copies of your despatch about Sheridan to General Hood with my compliments, but I know it does not afford "comfort to the enemy."

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 21, 1864.*Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Washington, D. C.:*

In my despatch of to-day I reported that Hood was falling back. Reports just in seem to indicate that he has shifted from the Macon road, at Lovejoy's, over to the West Point road, about Palmetto station, where his men are intrenching. I will watch him, as I do not see what he designs by this movement.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 22, 1864.*

GENERAL: My latest authentic information from Andersonville is to the 12th, and from what I learn, our prisoners of war confined there, and being removed to Savannah, Charleston, and Millen, need many articles which we possess in superfluity, and can easily supply with your consent and assistance, such as shirts and drawers, socks, shoes, soap, candles, combs, scissors, &c.

If you will permit me to send a train of wagons, with a single officer to go along under a flag of truce, I will send down to Lovejoy's or Palmetto a train of wagons loaded exclusively with ten thousand (10,000) or fifteen thousand (15,000) of each of these articles, and a due proportion of soap, candles, &c., under such restrictions as you may think prudent to name.

I would like to have my officer go along to issue these things, but will have no hesitation in sending them if you will simply promise to have them conveyed to the places where our prisoners are and have them fairly distributed.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*General J. B. HOOD,  
*Commanding Confederate Army, Palmetto Station.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*Atlanta, Ga., September 22, 1864.*

DEAR SIR: Yours of September 14 is received, and I assure you the compliments you have lavished on me makes me fear that my services and abilities



are overrated. I don't want to be elevated an inch more than I can sustain myself, for pride will have its fall.

The condition of the prisoners at Andersonville has always been present to my mind, and could I have released them I would have felt more real satisfaction than to have won another battle. General Stoneman's trip was partly for that purpose, and I fear it failed partially because the general took a road east of Ocmulgee, instead of west, as I contemplated and ordered. I have frequent messages from them, and have sent word to the men to be of good cheer, that the day of their deliverance was approaching; but I now think that Jeff. Davis is removing them to Charleston, Savannah, and a point on the Macon and Savannah road, at Millen, where a branch puts off for Augusta. My last escaped prisoner left Andersonville on the 12th, at which date many train-loads had gone off eastward, and this reduction of the number will improve the condition of the balance.

I am now engaged in exchanging, with General Hood, a couple thousand of prisoners, but this is confined to the last two thousand captured from my army, who, of course, are not in as bad condition as those who have been longer confined. During the few days that must expire before the papers are completed, I will have occasion to write to General Hood, and will offer to send down some fifty or sixty tons of clothing and other necessities; but I doubt if he will consent. These confederates are as proud as the devil, and hate to confess poverty, but I know they are really unable to supply socks, drawers, undershirts, scissors, combs, &c., which our men need more than anything else to preserve cleanliness and health. Should, however, he assent, I will telegraph you to send me such articles as we do not have on hand, and will give credit to your commission for all I obtain. This appears to me the best manner in which I can carry out your humane, patriotic, and most worthy object.

With sentiments of great respect, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

JAMES E. YATEMAN,  
*President Western Sanitary Commission, St. Louis, Mo.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 24, 1864.*

General HOWARD, *East Point:*

I have no doubt Hood has resolved to throw himself on our flanks to prevent our accumulating stores, &c., here, trusting to our not advancing into Georgia. Some cavalry got possession of Athens yesterday. I think I will send a division from Thomas to Bridgeport, and the balance of the one you have at Rome, viz: Corse, so as to act in case the enemy puts himself up west of the Coosa. Let Corse get all ready.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 24, 1864.*

General HOWARD, *East Point:*

You may order General Corse to proceed to Rome by cars, and there unite his division against any force that may attempt to threaten Bridgeport from the direction of Gadsden. Let them march up to-morrow and take cars in the evening. The whole division will rejoin us before we take the field.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding,*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 25, 1864.*

GENERAL: Hood seems to be moving as it were to the Alabama line, leaving open to me the road to Macon as also to Augusta, but his cavalry is busy on our roads. A force, number estimated as high as eight thousand, (8,000,) are reported to have captured Athens, Alabama, as also a regiment of three hundred and fifty (350) sent to their relief. I have sent Newton's division up to Chattanooga in cars, and will send another division to Rome. If I was sure that Savannah would soon be in our possession, I would be tempted to make for Milledgeville and Augusta, but I must secure what I have.

Jeff. Davis is at Macon.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 26, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have re-enforced my line back as far as Chattanooga, but in Middle Tennessee we are weak, on account of the number of regiments out of time. I would like to have any regiments in Indiana or Ohio sent to Nashville, or recruits would do.

Jeff. Davis is on a visit to Hood at Palmetto.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*

[Cipher.]

CITY POINT,  
*September 26, 1864—10 a. m.*

Major General SHERMAN:

It will be better to drive Forrest from Middle Tennessee as a first step, and do anything else that you may feel your force sufficient for. When a movement is made on any part of the sea-coast, I will advise you. If Hood goes to the Alabama line, will it not be impossible for him to subsist his army?

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.  
*In the field, Atlanta, Georgia, September 26, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have your despatch of to-day. I have already sent one division (General Newton) to Chattanooga, and another (Corse) to Rome. Our armies are much reduced; and if I send back much more, I will not be able to threaten Georgia much. There are men enough to the rear to whip Forrest, but they are necessarily scattered to defend the road.

Can you expedite the sending to Nashville of the recruits that are in Indiana and Ohio? They could occupy the forts. Hood is now on the West Point road, twenty-four miles south of this, and draws his supplies by that road. Jeff. Davis is there to-day, and superhuman efforts will be made to break my road. Forrest is now lieutenant general, and commands all the enemy's cavalry.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT, *City Point.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Georgia, September 26, 1864.*

GENERAL: General Newton's division is now at Chattanooga, and General Corse at Rome. We can defend our roads below Bridgeport, and General Granger and the gunboats can protect those from Decatur to Stevenson. Rousseau should collect all the force he can and move straight for Pulaski and Florence. Call forward from Kentucky any troops that can be spared there, and hold all that come from the rear till Forrest is disposed of. Caution Rousseau to unite his movable force, and not let it be picked up in detail. Recruits should now be coming forward fast. Ask Rosecrans for me if he cannot spare A. J. Smith, and explain to him that he may be needed. I wanted him for this very contingency, which I foresaw. Use my name and concentrate at Nashville all the men you can. Recall Generals Steedman and Schofield if you know where they are.

The policy should be, small but well-commanded bodies in the block-houses and a movable force to act straight against Forrest, who must scatter for forage.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

General J. D. WEBSTER, *Nashville.*

[Cipher.]

CITY POINT,  
*September 26, 1864—6 30 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN:

Jeff. Davis was at Richmond on last Thursday. This I think is beyond doubt. I have evidence that General Sheridan's victory has created the greatest consternation and alarm for the safety of the city. I will give them another shake before the end of the week.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 27, 1864.*

GENERAL: Jeff. Davis was certainly at Macon on the 23d, for he made a very significant speech, which is given at length, and which I ordered to be telegraphed as far as Louisville.

Forrest has burnt the bridges over Elk, near Athens, but I think General Rousseau can keep him off the Chattanooga road. Still all recruits should be sent to Nashville with despatch.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT, *City Point.*

[Cipher.]

WASHINGTON, D. C.,  
September 27, 1864—9 a. m.

Major General SHERMAN :

You say Jeff. Davis is on a visit to General Hood. I judge that Brown and Stephens are the objects of his visit.

A. LINCOLN,  
*President United States.*

[Cipher.]

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,  
September 27, 1864—8.30 a. m.

Major General SHERMAN :

It is evident from the tone of the Richmond press, and all other sources, that the enemy intend making a desperate effort to drive you from where you are. I have directed all new troops from the west, and from the east, too, if necessary, if none are ready in the west, to be sent to you. If General Burbridge is not too far on the way towards Abingdon, I think he had better be recalled, and his surplus troops sent into Tennessee.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

[Cipher.]

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,  
September 27, 1864—10.30 a. m.

Major General SHERMAN :

I have directed all recruits and new troops from all the western States to be sent to Nashville to receive their further orders from you. I was mistaken about Jeff. Davis being in Richmond on Thursday last ; he was then on his way to Macon.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 28, 1864.*

GENERAL : I will send up the road to-night another division, and want you to call forward from the rear all you can get, so as to make a movable column. Ask General Tower to take charge of the forts, and distribute the men.

Bring close in all the camps, especially those of the 13th regulars, and assign each detachment to its post. I will send General Thomas to Stevenson to operate on Forrest's rear.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*General J. D. WEBSTER,  
*Nashville, Tennessee.*HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 28, 1864.*

GENERAL : I have just returned from General Howard. I think that a movement of all our cavalry not actually on picket should be made rapidly on

Carrollton, to interrupt any communication from Hood's army, at Palmetto, with his cavalry over about the Tennessee. After striking Carrollton, it should move boldly up towards Hood's army, and then draw back to Sandtown.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General.*

Major General G. H. THOMAS,

*Commanding Department of the Cumberland.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 28, 1864.*

President LINCOLN, *Washington, D. C.:*

I have positive knowledge that Mr. Davis made a speech at Macon on the 22d, which I mailed to General Halleck yesterday. It was bitter against Johnson and Governor Brown. The militia is on furlough. Brown is at Milledgeville, trying to get a legislature to meet next month, but he is afraid to act unless in concert with other governors. Judge Wright, of Rome, has been here, and Messrs. Hill and Nelson, former members of Congress, are also here now, and will go to meet Wright at Rome, and then go back to Madison and Milledgeville. Great efforts are being made to re-enforce Hood's army and to break up my railroad, and I should have at once a good reserve force at Nashville. It would have a bad effect if I am to be forced to send back any material part of my army to guard roads, so as to weaken me to an extent that I could not act offensively if the occasion calls for it.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 28, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your despatch is just received. I send back to Stevenson and Decherd General Thomas to look to Tennessee, and have ordered a brigade of the army of the Tennessee up to Eastport, and the cavalry across to that place from Memphis, to operate against the flank of any force going into Tennessee by any of the fords near Florence. I want Appalachiecola arsenal taken, also Savannah; and if the enemy does succeed in breaking up my roads, I can fight my way across to one or the other place; but I think it better to hold on to Atlanta and strengthen to my rear, and therefore am glad you have ordered troops to Nashville. Forrest has got into Middle Tennessee, and will, I feel certain, get on my main road to-night or to-morrow; but I will guard well from this back to Chattanooga, and trust to troops coming up from Kentucky to hold Nashville and forward to Chattanooga.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT, *City Point.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 29, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have your letter of September 27, and have telegraphed to St. Louis for combs, scissors, &c., and as soon as received, I will make up a train for Griffin, loaded with articles for our prisoners of war, and send it in

charge of an officer, to be turned over to one of yours, with invoices complete and blank rolls for issue. I will give you notice prior to starting the train. I will see the prisoners who are in, and learn from them more minutely the wants of our men, and make the invoice accordingly, but it will not exceed the quantity before stated.

I am, with respect, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

General J. B. Hood,  
*Commanding Confederate Army, Palmetto.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 27, 1864.*

SIR: Send me all the shirts, fine combs, and scissors for cutting hair, you can spare for our prisoners south. I will, on their receipt, send them out under an agreement with General Hood. I would like to get twelve hundred (1,200) fine combs and four hundred (400) scissors. Our commissary can supply soap and candles, and the quartermaster has shoes, socks, and under-clothing.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Mr. JAMES E. YATEMAN,  
*Sanitary Commission, St. Louis.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,  
*September 29, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

The indications are that Hood is moving across the Chattahoochee.

O. O. HOWARD,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 28, 1864.*

GENERAL: You cannot be too particular about Allatoona and about the Pumpkin Vine. It is reported Hood is about passing the Chattahoochee to the west, and I will watch him, and see if he will cross over to the Selma road, or try to get on to our road.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

General JOHN E. SMITH, *Cartersville.*

NEW ORLEANS,  
*August 29, 1864, via Cairo, September 9, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

Your despatch of the 17th has just reached me. The reduction of Fort Morgan was necessary in order to secure the ingress and egress of heavy vessels. It was handsomely done, but the fort is greatly injured. I have a reserve of twelve thousand men up the river to watch Kirby Smith. I do not think he can cross in any force without being discovered in time to prevent it, but I can-

not use this force against Mobile and prevent the passage. The route you suggest has been considered, and with twenty thousand men we could control the Alabama river from Mobile to Montgomery. Major General Frederick Steele is losing a good many men by expiration of service, and I cannot draw any from him. I asked some time ago that all the troops that could be spared from the west, and were not required for your army, should be sent to Memphis. I will keep the army about Mobile uneasy, and will act against the city and river the moment I can gather a sufficient force.

E. R. S. CANBY,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 29, 1864.*

General H. W. HALLECK, *Washington, D. C. :*

I have now effected the actual exchange of two thousand (2,000) prisoners of my own army. General Stoneman will be here to-morrow, and Colonel Harrison is already in. Our prisoners have been moved from Andersonville to Savannah, Millen, and Charleston; any change will be for the better. I have agreed with Hood to send to Griffin, to be forwarded to our prisoners, a supply of clothing, soap, combs, &c.; the latter will be furnished by the Sanitary Commission, and the former by the quartermaster. I take it for granted Forrest will cut our road, and I think we can prevent his making a serious lodgement; his cavalry will travel a hundred miles in less time than ours will ten. I have sent two divisions up to Chattanooga, and one to Rome, and General Thomas started to-day to clear out Tennessee, but our road should be watched from the rear, and I am glad General Grant has ordered reserves for me to Nashville. I prefer for the future to make the movement on Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah river. Hood now rests twenty-four miles south, his left on the Chattahoochee, and his right on the West Point road. He is removing the iron of the Macon road. I can whip his infantry, but his cavalry is to be feared.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 30, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have pretty clear information that Hood has a part of his infantry across the Chattahoochee, twenty-four miles south of us, and it may be all. I know that desperate efforts will be made to render our roads useless. Forrest is in Middle Tennessee, but I think will have his hands full, for I have sent up two divisions of Thomas, and Thomas went up himself yesterday. I may have to make some quick counter moves east and southeast. Keep your folks ready to send baggage into Atlanta and to start on short notice. Make your preparations quietly without attracting any notice. There are fine corn and potato fields about Covington and the Ocmulgee bottoms. We are well supplied with bread, meat, &c., but forage is scarce and may force us to strike out. If we make a counter move I will go out myself with a large force, and take such a route as will supply us, and, at the same time, make Hood recall the whole or part of his army.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

General Cox, *Decatur, Georgia.*

ROME, *September 30, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

The judge is here, waiting for the two gentlemen. He reports Hood's army across the Chattahoochee—a portion at Villa Rica; all moving on Blue mountain. Their cavalry at Carrollton.

JNO. M. CORSE, *Brigadier General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 30, 1864.*

Major General G. H. THOMAS, *Chattanooga :*

Your despatch is received. I have notified all army commanders to stop furloughs. Give orders to keep the telegraph line *via* Knoxville and Cumberland Gap in good order. There is no doubt some of Hood's infantry is across the Chattahoochee, but I don't think his whole army is across. If he moves his whole force to Blue mountain, you watch him from the direction of Stevenson, and I will do the same from Rome, and as soon as all things are ready I will take advantage of his opening to me all of Georgia.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*MARIETTA, *September 30, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Deserters and citizens report the following: Hood with his army in three columns crossed the Chattahoochee on Sunday last at Campbellton, and above and below. Citizens on their line of march told them that the soldiers (rebel) said they were going to Rome. I have sent scouts in that direction, and will soon hear from there. All quiet here.

J. McARTHUR, *Brigadier General.*

[Cipher.]

CHATTANOOGA, *September 30, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

My latest news up to 10 a. m. is, that Forrest was at Lynchburg, and Milroy's scouts reported that they heard some of Forrest's officers say that they would attack the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad to-day, and destroy it north as they did the other. I am getting Morgan's troops arranged, and hope he will reach there to-night. If Forrest does not break the road to-day, I hope it will be secure by to-night. Granger's information confirms Milroy's as to Forrest's position last night. I have heard from Rousseau at Wartrace; his cavalry to his front and right observing Forrest's movements. He also reports Forrest at Lynchburg, (Lynville.)

GEO. H. THOMAS, *Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., September 30, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have yours and Rousseau's despatches. Try and make a junction with Rousseau. I suppose Forrest will manage to break the road to-night; but leave defensive garrisons, and push right at him with as heavy a



force as you can get, and as soon as possible. He won't fight, but infantry can dog him. Take provisions and forage of the towns and people, and replace them after the work is done. If you can turn him towards Lamb's Ferry, Granger should make a redoubt, covering the ford, and hold him in check until the infantry can get up. We will never have a better chance at him than now. I will watch Hood here.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

General G. H. THOMAS,  
*Chattanooga, Tennessee.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,  
*October 1, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

The following just received.

O. O. HOWARD,  
*Major General.*

"MEMPHIS, *September 28, 1864.*

"Forrest made a speech at Tupelo on the 16th instant, and told his men he was going to Middle Tennessee to operate on Sherman's communications, and promised that he would compel Sherman to evacuate Georgia within sixty days; also promised all the horses they wanted. On the 20th he was at Cherokee, near the Tennessee, with most of his command. He probably has about five thousand (5,000) men. A small force has crossed the Tennessee lower down. Staff officer from you has not arrived. The information in regard to Forrest is entirely reliable. You are aware, I suppose, that I am now weak. All the 16th corps has gone, the one-hundred-day-men gone, and nearly half of my cavalry sent after Price and Shelby, and one regiment to St. Louis.

"C. C. WASHBURNE,  
*"Major General."*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., October 1, 1864.*

General G. H. THOMAS, *Chattanooga:*

Hood has evidently crossed the Chattahoochee to the west, but has not gone to Blue mountain. Kilpatrick, on the Sweetwater, reports he could hear drums at reveille. There is too much ostentation in this move of Hood's, and he may attempt to swing his cavalry on our road. I have ordered General Garrard over to Powder Springs. I will watch him close. Make as quick work with Forrest as you can, and get back to co-operate with me.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

CHATTANOOGA, *October 1, 1864—12 m.*

Major General SHERMAN:

General Granger reported last evening from Huntsville that the enemy had appeared before Huntsville, and had demanded the surrender of the town. He had no doubt but that he could hold the place, but asked for re-enforcements, as he

did not have force enough to assume the offensive. I have sent General Morgan's division to him this morning. I hear from General Rousseau, who says he has sent General Milroy with Calver's brigade to Decherd with instructions to send out cavalry scouts, and to report promptly anything of interest. Main cavalry force has been ordered to Winchester, with instructions to push out scouting parties on all roads west of railroad. From the best information, he does not believe the enemy is in the vicinity of Tullahoma or Decherd. The operator at Decherd reports an engine in from the tunnel, and all is quiet there. No excitement and no signs of the enemy. The indications are that the road is clear to Nashville. I am just about sending out a construction train for Nashville to test the road, and see if all is right. I will start the trains through again.

GEORGE H. THOMAS, *Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., October 1, 1864.*

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT, *City Point :*

Hood is evidently on the west side of Chattahoochee, below Sweetwater. If he tries to get on my road this side of the Etowah I shall attack him; but if he goes on to the Selma and Talladega road, why would it not do for me to leave Tennessee to the forces which Thomas has, and the reserves soon to come to Nashville, and for me to destroy Atlanta, and then march across Georgia to Savannah or Charleston, breaking roads and doing irreparable damage? We cannot remain on the defensive.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., October 1, 1864.*

Generals HOWARD and COX :

I have not yet heard from General Grant as to my proposed campaign; but it is well for you to bear in mind that if Hood swings over to the Alabama road, and thence tries to get into Tennessee, I may throw back to Chattanooga all of General Thomas's men as far down as Kingston, and draw forward all else, send back all cars and locomotives, destroy Atlanta, and make for Savannah or Charleston, *via* Milledgeville and Millen. If Hood aims at our road this side of Kingston, and in no manner threatens Tennessee, I will have to turn on him.

Keep these things to yourselves. The march I propose is less by two hundred (200) miles than I made last fall, and less than I accomplished in February, and we could make Georgia a break in the confederacy by ruining both east and west roads, and not running against a single fort until we get to the sea-shore and in communication with our ships.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., October 1, 1864—2 p. m.*

General G. H. THOMAS, *Chattanooga :*

I have your despatch of noon. Use your own discretion as to the matters north of the Tennessee river. If I can induce Hood to swing across to Blue

mountain, I shall feel tempted to start for Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah or Charleston, absolutely destroying all Georgia, and taking either Savannah or Charleston. In that event I would order back to Chattanooga everything the other side of Kingston, and bring forward all else, destroy Atlanta and the bridge, and absolutely scour the southern confederacy. In that event Hood would be puzzled, and would follow me; or if he entered Tennessee, he could make no permanent stay. But if he attempts the road this side of Kingston or Rome, I will turn against him. Forrest will not attack our forts—that is manifest—but will try and get possession of Decatur. All the infantry and cavalry not in forts or block-houses should be directed against him by roads—say the Shelbyville pike and Fayetteville.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., October 1, 1864.*

General CORSE, *Rome:*

General Hood has evidently crossed a part, if not the whole, of his army across to the west bank of the Chattahoochee, below Sweetwater. His soldiers think he is going for Blue mountain; I think not. He may attempt to get on our road this side of Allatoona or near Cassville. If at the latter, hold fast. If you hear of him this side of Allatoona, leave a small force to guard the bridge across Oostanaula, and join your forces to General John E. Smith's, and act against Hood from Allatoona. I will employ him from this quarter. He cannot tarry long, and will expose his flanks and trains, which should be harassed. We have more than a month's provisions, and a large well-appointed army, and can operate from this point. General Grant has ordered large reserves to Nashville, and General Thomas is there to manage them.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., October 2, 1864.*

Major General HOWARD:

To-morrow General Garrard will feel well out beyond Powder Springs, and I want Ransom to develop the nature of the force at Shadna. Tell him to use his skirmish line and supports in front, and feel the flank towards the west as though interposing between Shadna and the river. General Cox will have a division down to Flat Rock. General Thomas reported to-day that Forrest had made his appearance at Huntsville, and he had sent General Morgan's division there. The road and telegraph to Nashville in good order yet.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., October 2, 1864.*

Major General HOWARD, *Commanding Army of the Tennessee:*

There is a flood in the Chattahoochee, which has damaged our railroad bridge, and will of course carry away any of Hood's bridges. I want that reconnoissance pushed out boldly. As soon as it reaches Fairburn let me know, as I may

push it on to the rear of their bridge. All the valuable part of the enemy's cavalry is over beyond Sweetwater, and we can do them damage on this side now. The same cause which produced the rise in the Chattahoochee will affect the Tennessee, and Forrest will be in danger with a swollen river to his rear.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

MARIETTA, *October 2, 1864—4 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Rebels driven off and quiet restored ; have three cars burned ; road being repaired ; casualties not yet reported. Citizens, coming in for protection, report that Hood was to encamp near Grey's mills to-night. They also report that an attack will be made on Ackworth or Allatoona ; afterwards Rome. In the event of a repulse they will report by Blue mountain, Jacksonville, and Selma.

J. MCARTHUR,  
*Brigadier General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., October 2, 1864.*

General HOWARD, *Present :*

Let Ransom come in slowly ; and if the enemy approach, sally out and attack him fiercely.

General Davis will be in close support. I will then throw General Stanley across the Chattahoochee, and be prepared to put our whole force in motion, to interpose between Hood (who may attempt to mash our road about Marietta) and his bridges at Campbellton. Be prepared to send in all your trains to Atlanta, and to follow General Stanley. I would attack this corps in position, but presume it is strongly intrenched.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., October 2, 1864.*

General D. S. STANLEY:

Move your command, with orders for your wagons to follow with ten (10) days' rations, to Chattahoochee bridge, and in the direction of Marietta as far as the rebel intrenchments about Smyrna camp-ground. Open communication with General Elliott, who is over towards the Sweetwater and Nose's creek, and communicate with me promptly all matters of importance by telegraph from the bridge.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., October 2, 1864.*

General COX, *Decatur, Georgia :*

Make all preparations to send into Atlanta tents and baggage and to start for Chattahoochee bridge on short notice. Send word and recall that division at Flat Rock. Hood has evidently crossed the Chattahoochee with two corps, and left one on this side of the Chattahoochee river, near Campbellton. I propose to attack the force on the other side.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., October 3, 1864.*

Major Gen. JEFF. C. DAVIS, *Comm'dg 14th Corps, near Atlanta :*

Move your two (2) divisions by the nearest practicable route to the railroad bridge, cross above, and move on the left of General Stanley, about the old rebel line at Smyrna camp-ground, or Ruff's Station, looking to the west. If the reconnoissance in progress to-day confirms present appearances, we will have to strike the enemy over between that point and Dallas. Have your wagons to follow you only to the old rebel lines west of the bridge. Cross your men ahead of General Stanley's wagons, but his wagons will have precedence of yours. General Stanley passed here about 7 a. m.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., October 3, 1864.*

General CORSE, *Rome :*

Hood is meditating some plan on a large scale. One corps is intrenched below Cambellton and two corps are across below Sweetwater, about Powder Springs. I send Generals Stanley and Davis over to-day, and may follow to-morrow myself with a heavy force. I am willing he should go to Blue mountain, or to strike our road at Ackworth or Cassville.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., October 3, 1864.*

Major General O. O. HOWARD, *East Point :*

March your command to-morrow to Ruff's Station, towards Marietta. Do you know if Kilpatrick's dismounted men have come in from Sandtown? If not, send them word to come into Atlanta. Please answer.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

NASHVILLE, *October 3, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

I reached this place at 2 p. m. to-day, and found that Rousseau had organized and despatched his troops down the Alabama road as far as Franklin, and will continue after Forrest until he overtakes him, if Forrest does not cross the river before he reaches him. Major General Washburne is coming up the Tennessee river with ten thousand (10,000) cavalry and fifteen hundred (1,500) infantry. He was directed by Webster, before my arrival, to land his infantry at Johnsonville, to aid in the protection of the depot there, and to proceed up the river to Clifton (Fort Valley) with his cavalry, and move towards Athens for the purpose of striking Forrest's flank or cutting off his communication with Burbridge. General Morgan, as I despatched you last night, is moving from Athens upon Bainbridge; so it appears to me there is a fair chance of hemming Forrest in and destroying his command. The river is not fordable, and if we seize his means of crossing at Bainbridge he will be unable to cross anywhere else, and I think

Rousseau ought certainly to destroy him. Two Ohio and three Kentucky regiments of the re-enforcements have arrived and are being distributed along the railroad.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., October 3, 1864.*

COMMANDING OFFICER, *Allatoona* :

Hood has some infantry and cavalry about Powder Springs. I am watching him close. He might deceive us by his cavalry along Nose's creek, and slip up to Ackworth and Allatoona. I want the utmost vigilance there. If he go for Allatoona, I want him delayed only long enough for me to reach his rear. Of course, his cavalry can only run across the road and bother us, but his infantry would try to capture stores, without which Hood cannot stay where he is. If he moves up toward Allatoona I will surely come in force.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

CITY POINT, VA., *October 4, 1864—11.30 a. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

General Wilson has been ordered to report to you ; and that he may have rank to command your cavalry, I have asked that he be brevetted a major general and assigned with that rank. I believe Wilson will add fifty (50) per cent. to the effectiveness of your cavalry.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Smyrna Camp Ground, October 4, 1864.*

General SLOCUM, *Atlanta* :

I have reason to believe Wheeler is on our road above Resaca. Hood's main army is between me and Allatoona. I shall attack the latter in force, but advise you to work night and day in perfecting those intrenchments and in economizing provisions ; but if I live, you may count upon my coming to your rescue. The point of greatest danger is the bridge ; therefore, look to it.

Please answer.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

NEAR KENESAW, *October, 4, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Just received the following :

"MARIETTA AND DALLAS ROAD,  
"On branch to Big Shanty, *October 4, 1864.*

"General VAN DEVER :

"I found the enemy occupying our old line of works to the railroad in more force than dismounted cavalry can dislodge from them. I cover the Dallas

road. All my information leads me to believe that there is a large force of infantry with cavalry. Please communicate this to Generals Sherman and Stanley.

“ W. L. ELLIOTT.”

WM. VAN DEVER,  
*Brigadier General.*

NEAR KENESAW, *October 4, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Stanley at Marietta. The enemy in strong force in my front all the morning. This afternoon he moved off to Allatoona. General Elliott reports him in too strong force for dismounted cavalry. Prisoners say the force in my front was French's division. From top of Kenesaw heavy bodies of infantry, artillery, and cavalry could be seen going north. The movement to my right was a feint. My headquarters at foot of Kenesaw; a part of the command occupying the ridge north.

WM. VAN DEVER,  
*Brigadier General.*

LITTLE KENESAW MOUNTAIN,  
*October 4, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

We arrived here at 3.30 p. m., and have camped in the old rebel works in the vicinity and south of Little Kenesaw. From top of the mountain I could see the rebel troops burning the road, all of which has been reported to you from other sources. Prisoners sent in by General Elliott report that they still have six (6) days' rations. They say Stewart's corps is burning the road, and Hardee and Lee's corps are in the vicinity of Pine mountain.

D. S. STANLEY,  
*Major General.*

KENESAW MOUNTAIN, *October 5, 1864.*

Official to Major General SHERMAN :

The enemy in heavy force have moved north to Allatoona—infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Our cavalry advance is two (2) miles in his rear.

WM. VAN DEVER,  
*Brigadier General.*

Received Signal Station, Vining's hill.

A. S. COLE, *Captain and A. S. O.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Marietta, October 5, 1864.*

General ELLIOTT :

I have heard from Allatoona. All right. General Corse is there, but wounded. You need not send all of General Garrard's cavalry, but send a squadron. Let them make a circuit, and they will find nothing there.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

WIDOW ORR'S, ON ACKWORTH ROAD,

October 6, 1864—2 p. m.

Major General SHERMAN:

Your despatch is received. I have information, which seems reliable, that the enemy went back yesterday. We find no signs of them, except that a few scouts were here this morning. My advance, near Mount Olivet church, finds nothing more than here. The roads this side of Pine mountain are in places almost impassable, having evidently grown no better since we left in June. This has delayed me, as the artillery can scarcely get forward at all. I leave a brigade with the weak teams, and push on with the rest. Will observe your directions as to signals. Please send me word whether I shall endeavor to get my teams up as far as I go, or whether we shall calculate upon returning by same route.

J. D. COX, *Brigadier General.*

[Signal.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kenesaw, October 6, 1864.*General CORSE, *Allatoona:*

Let the Rome force return at once to Rome and protect the road. I will cover Allatoona.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

ALLATOONA, GA., October 6, 1864—2 p. m.

Captain L. M. DAYTON, A. D. C.:

I am short a cheek-bone and one ear, but am able to whip all hell yet. My losses are very heavy. A force moving from Stilesboro' on Kingston gives me some anxiety. Tell me where Sherman is.

JOHN M. CORSE,  
*Brigadier General.*

[Signal.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kenesaw, October 6, 1864.*General CORSE, *Allatoona:*

Am just in. Am very sorry at your wound, but all is right with you. If possible keep the enemy off your lines, and let me know at once what force you have, and what is at Kingston and Rome; also signal some account of your fight. Hood has retreated to Dallas.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

NEAR NEW HOPE CHURCH, October 7, 1864.

Major General SHERMAN:

General Garrard near New Hope church 11.30 a. m., skirmishing with rear. Armstrong camped where he then was, and French's division at church. Can't tell route taken; rumor says Dallas; citizens tell conflicting stories. Can't determine anything. Captured General Steele and a colonel wounded. A few prisoners.

W. L. ELLIOTT,  
*Brigadier General, &c.*



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kenesaw, October 7, 1864.*

General CORSE, *Allatoona* :

I received your report. I have so high an appreciation of your services and those of your command, as also that of Colonel Tourtellotte and garrison, that I shall make the defence of Allatoona the subject of a general order.

I will move my army one step north to-morrow, and want you to exercise a general care over the operations from Allatoona as far as Kingston. I will so place my command that in one day's work they will replace all the ties burned between Allatoona and Kenesaw, and leave the laying of the iron to the construction party. We have two million seven hundred thousand (2,700,000) rations of bread in Allatoona, and can afford to await repairs. My infantry is now near Dallas, and cavalry must be below it. General Garrard passed New Hope before noon, and General Kilpatrick at Powder Springs at 11½ a. m. Both are ordered to push the enemy and develop his route of movement. He is already too far south to make the Etowah bridge *via* Stilesboro'. Still too much care cannot be exercised. General John E. Smith should be down, and I will be much obliged if you can send to Generals Thomas and Webster notice that Allatoona is safe in our possession, the new and contracted line finished and ready for defence, so that General Slocum can hold it against Hood's whole army. The bridge across the Chattahoochee, which was carried away by the freshet, will be done by to-morrow, and I will put ten thousand (10,000) men at work at once to replace the ties burned by the enemy, thirty-five thousand (35,000,) and have the road ready for the iron by the time the construction train comes from the north. I almost share the pain of your wound with you, but you know for quick work I cannot get along without you, and ask you, spite of pain, to keep your head clear and leave others to do your bidding. Your presence alone saved to us Allatoona the day before yesterday, but this does not detract from the merit of the others. Keep me well advised, for I now think Hood will rather swing against Atlanta and the Chattahoochee bridge than against Kingston and the Etowah bridge; but he is eccentric, and I cannot guess his movements as I could those of Johnston, who was a sensible man and only did sensible things. If Hood does not mind I will catch him in a worse snap than he has been in yet. Rome is of no value at all save as a flank. Destroy its bridges and factories on the slightest provocation, and cover the vital points of our road.

W. T. SHERMAN.

*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kenesaw, October 7, 1864.*

General COX :

Call in all your detachments, save the one at Allatoona, and be prepared for a march. When all reports are in, say about midnight, will send you orders.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kenesaw, October 7, 1864.*

General HOWARD :

Don't move until further orders. I await further information from our cavalry.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

ATLANTA, *October 7, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Everything is perfectly quiet here ; the bridge will be finished to night. Are you willing I should send a strong foraging party northeast? I think it can be safely done.

H. W. SLOCUM,  
*Major General.*

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ROME, GA., *October 9, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Your despatch to General Raum and myself, signed Dayton, is just received. The bridges across the Etowah have been effectually destroyed yesterday evening. All intelligence I have indicates that Hood has not gone to Cedartown.

I have just finished a new pontoon bridge over the Etowah, and have sent a cavalry force to reconnoitre towards Cedartown. I have my flanks and front well patrolled, and can give you more information to-morrow.

JOHN M. CORSE,  
*Brigadier General.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Allatoona, October 9, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK :

General Hood crossed the Chattahoochee, and before I was convinced of his designs he had got across to Powder Spring. I immediately resolved to leave the 20th corps, General Slocum's, at Atlanta, and push for Marietta. I reached the Kenesaw mountain October 6, just in time to witness at a distance the attack on Allatoona. I had anticipated this attack, and had ordered from Rome General Corse, with re-enforcements, and the attack was met and handsomely repulsed, the enemy losing some two hundred (200) dead, and more than one thousand (1,000) wounded and prisoners. Our loss about seven hundred (700) in the aggregate. The enemy captured the small garrison at Big Shanty and Ackworth, and burned about seven (7) miles of our railroad, but we have at Allatoona and Atlanta an abundance of provisions. Hood observing our approach, has moved rapidly back to Dallas and Van Wert, and I am watching him in case he tries to reach Kingston or Rome. Atlanta is perfectly secure to us, and the army is better off out here than in camp.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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CARTERSVILLE, GA., *October 9, 1864.*Captain L. M. DAYTON, *A. D. C. :*

A despatch just received from Resaca states that one thousand (1,000) rebel cavalry are between Villanow and Snake Creek Gap, and one hundred (100) guarding the Gap. Information received from citizens. A train was run off track near Dalton to-night—I suppose a construction train sent down to convey cross-ties to Ackworth.

G. B. RAUM,  
*Brevet Brigadier General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Allatoona, October, 9, 1864.*

General CORSE, *Rome* :

I am now here, and have troops so disposed that I can move them rapidly to Rome or Kingston, if needed, but I do not wish to move them further to the rear. We have plenty of forage and provisions, and can repair the road long before our necessities call for more supplies.

Keep scouts and spies well out about Cedartown and Centre, and give me notice of Hood's movements. If he goes to Blue mountain, let him go.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

ROME, *October 9, 1864—7.30 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Your despatch received. The only indication of an enemy since my arrival here being the appearance of a cavalry force at Reynolds's ford, near Kingston. I am ready to fly there in case they should attempt a crossing. I promise to keep you advised of anything transpiring west of Kingston ; I can hardly say so much of the country around Canton.

JOHN M. CORSE,  
*Brigadier General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Allatoona, October 9, 1864.*

Major General THOMAS, *Nashville* :

I came up here to relieve our road. 20th corps at Atlanta. Hood reached our road and broke it up between Big Shanty and Ackworth, and attacked Allatoona, but was repulsed. We have plenty of bread and meat, but forage scarcer. I want to destroy all the road below Chattanooga, including Atlanta, and make for the sea-coast. We cannot defend this long line of road. Replace all the guards on the road down as far as Chattanooga, and have a reserve force for the defence of Tennessee, and bring back your divisions of Newton and Morgan. We can have the road repaired in a week, and have plenty of grub in the mean time, but I expect Hood will make a break at Kingston, Rome, or some other point soon. Sorry that Forrest escaped. I doubt the necessity of repairing the road about Elk river and Athens, and suggest that you wait before giving orders for repairs.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Allatoona, Ga., October 9, 1864.*

Lieut. General GRANT, *City Point, Va.* :

It will be a physical impossibility to protect the roads, now that Hood, Forrest, Wheeler, and the whole batch of devils, are turned loose without home or habitation. I think Hood's movements indicate a diversion to the end of the Selma and Talladega railroad, at Blue mountain, about sixty (60) miles southwest of Rome, from which he will threaten Kingston, Bridgeport, and Decatur, Alabama.

I propose that we break up the railroad from Chattanooga, and strike out with

wagons for Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah. Until we can repopulate Georgia it is useless to occupy it, but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people will cripple their military resources. By attempting to hold the roads we will lose a thousand men monthly, and will gain no result. I can make the march and make Georgia howl. We have over eight thousand (8,000) cattle and three million rations of bread, but no corn, but we can forage in the interior of the State.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

ROME, GA., *October 10, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

I have two (2) pontoon bridges—one across the Etowah, leading south, and one across the Oostanaula, leading west. I use the one across the Oostanaula to pass my infantry and cavalry pickets and patrols. I will push my cavalry out west and feel for the enemy strong. Upon their return I will have the bridge taken up at midnight and move it up into town, unless you think otherwise and order to the contrary. Then I will destroy it at once. Further information by an escaped prisoner indicates that Hood is crossing the Coosa with his whole army. Hood's headquarters at present are at Cave Springs.

JOHN M. CORSE,  
*Brigadier General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Allatoona, October 10, 1864.*

GENERAL: My last accounts put the enemy about Cedartown, and it is prudent we should be near him. You may march your army, embracing all detachments and wagons, to and beyond Cartersville, and in case of Kingston being threatened you will hasten to that place, but not beyond without other orders. The other armies will follow provided we get intelligence that makes it proper and necessary.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General Cox, *Com'dg Army of the Ohio.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Allatoona, October 10, 1864.*

General J. D. WEBSTER, *Nashville:*

I want all the recruits that arrive to be distributed to the three (3) armies in just proportion—say one-half to the Cumberland and one-quarter to each of the Tennessee and Ohio. New regiments may guard roads, but should be kept near Nashville—that is, above the post of Stevenson and Pulaski—so as to be easily united into a good reserve force in case I leave Tennessee to itself and push for the sea. I have now beef and bread enough, but want to repair roads so as to send my sick and wounded back. Hood is near Cedartown, south of Rome, and my impression is he will rendezvous at Blue mountain, the end of the Selma and Talladega road. He may strike at Kingston or Rome, or even

go up towards Bridgeport or Stevenson, but I rather think he will hang on our flanks as a threat. I will stay about here and Kingston till our road is finished or until Hood develops his game.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Cartersville, October 10, 1864.*

General CORSE, *Rome*:

Get your men into the strongest forts and hold them. All my army is marching hard, straight for Rome. The 23d corps is now near Cassville, and I will make the others march to-night. Is not the Oostanaula too deep to be forded? I doubt if Hood will put his army on this side the Oostanaula.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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CARTERSVILLE, *October 10, 1864.*

Captain L. M. DAYTON, *A. D. C.*:

Order the armies of the Cumberland and Tennessee to Kingston with trains; the former to leave the details to repair the railroad, and the latter to bring along fifteen hundred (1,500) head of cattle, to march well into the night, and aim to reach Kingston to-morrow. If any column on the march overtakes the rear of either, to take a road so as to pass round. Bring our headquarters to this place. Also order the cavalry to move to Kingston or Rome.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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ROME, GA., *October 10, 1864—6.25 a. m.*

Major General SHERMAN:

Negro just from Coosaville reports Hood crossing his army by pontoon bridges to west bank of Coosa. His pontoon trains arrived there last night about dark. Negro says infantry, artillery, and cavalry have all passed over it during the night. He thinks from what he can learn that they are coming to Rome. The prisoners captured say they are going to Kentucky, smashing our road as they go.

JOHN M. CORSE,  
*Brigadier General.*

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ROME, GA., *October 10, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

My spies and deserters report the following, which is corroborated in different ways: Hood arrived at Cedartown yesterday morning early, and remained till 12 m., cooking two days' rations. Commenced crossing on two pontoon bridges at Coosaville at daylight this morning. Wheeler crossed one-half his forces first, followed by Lee's corps and Hardee, leaving Stewart's and the balance of Wheeler's to cross to-morrow morning. Their destination is Huntsville, &c. They are to attack Rome at daylight, squelch me and get the stores; then continue the journey. I have had men and women in and through their camps to-day. They have various reports, some of which I will report. All headquarters transportation was sent to Blue mountain. The object of the trip is recruits

from Tennessee. They number ten thousand (10,000) cavalry and thirty thousand (30,000) infantry. They had twenty (20) days' rations when they left the Chattahoochee. I will hold them as long as men can stand and guns can shoot. They have pushed their forces up against my pickets to-night and are quite close. I will look to you for help and keep you advised. Have sent a few men to guide Garrard through.

JOHN M. CORSE,  
*Brigadier General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Cartersville, Ga., October 10, 1864.*

General CORSE, *Rome* :

Forrest has been driven out of Tennessee by way of Florence. Hood will hear of this and will not venture to attack you or to push up towards Lafayette. Still be all ready, and I will hurry up my men as fast as they can march.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Cartersville, October 10, 1864.*

General GRANT, *City Point* :

Despatch about Wilson just received. Hood is now crossing Coosa twelve (12) miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes over to the Mobile and Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas with the troops now in Tennessee to defend the State? He will have an ample force when the re-enforcements ordered reach Nashville.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Cartersville, October 10, 1864.*

General THOMAS, *Nashville* :

Hood has crossed the Coosa below Rome, and is now threatening that place. I am also marching for it. Collect all your command at some converging place, say Stevenson, and be prepared for anything. If he turns to Chattanooga, I will follow; but if he shoots off towards Tusculumbia, I will act according to my information of your strength. Call in all troops within your reach.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

NASHVILLE, *October 10, 1864—12.30 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Your despatches of 12 m. and 5 p. m. have been received. I cannot say positively that I can hold Hood with the present force I have and the re-enforcements expected, because I do not know how many re-enforcements are coming.

I will do my best, however, and, as you direct, will concentrate the infantry force about Stevenson and Huntsville, leaving a portion of the cavalry to watch the river between Decatur and Eastport. Have you given orders to Washburne, or am I to issue orders to him; and if under my command, where would you prefer that I should place his troops?

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Cartersville, Ga., October 10, 1864—4.5 p. m.*

General CORSE, *Rome*:

I am glad you have two bridges. Take up the one over the Oostanaula at the last moment of safety, and keep it, for I will want to use it. Hood would have attacked you before this if he intended to, for he must know I am near you. His cavalry at the Pumpkin Vine knew we were marching through the Pass. Watch his movements close, and I think he will only throw a force towards Rome, to cover his movement either over towards the Tennessee or back to Georgia. Look out for our cavalry south of the Etowah at daylight. To get at Rome he must cross the Oostanaula again, and that will take him a whole day, and that will give me all the time I ask. I do not think he will attack Rome.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, October 11, 1864—9.30 a. m.*

General THOMAS, *Nashville*:

Your despatch is just received. General Corse telegraphs that all is quiet at Rome, and he thinks the enemy gone, but don't know where. I will find out. If he goes back, of course I will also. If he goes to Blue mountain, I will remain here a short time. If he sends up towards Resaca or Lafayette, I will cut in behind from Rome. The bridges from Resaca to Atlanta are all down, and we can repair the break at Big Shanty in four (4) days.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, October 11, 1864—10 a. m.*

COMMANDING OFFICER, *Resaca*:

In case you are threatened you should concentrate your force at the forts at the bridge. Have abatis made at once on the land side. Keep a strong cavalry picket at Snake Creek Gap. As long as the Oostanaula is high, the troops at Adairsville and Calhoun should go to Resaca.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Kingston, October 11, 1864—10 a. m.*Lieut. General GRANT, *City Point, Va.:*

Hood moved his army from Pametto Station across by Dallas and Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa river south of Rome. He threw one corps on my road at Ackworth, and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta with the 20th corps, and have strong detachments along my line. These reduce my active force to a comparative small army. We cannot remain now on the defensive. With twenty-five thousand (25,000) men and the bold cavalry he has, he can constantly break my road. I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road and of the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city, send back all my wounded and worthless, and with my effective army move through Georgia, smashing things to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of being on the defensive, I would be on the offensive. Instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is full twenty-five (25) per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochee, (Appalachicola.) Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Kingston, October 11, 1864—12 m.*General J. E. SMITH, *Cartersville:*

Look at the condition of your trains, for I may pick up your division entire and make a move on a larger scale than my Meridian trip. I think Hood has gone or will go to Blue mountain. Don't accumulate much baggage or provision at your posts. As a rule, keep on hand only what you can haul.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

ROME, GA., *October 11, 1864—11.30 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN:

A scout has just arrived who was fourteen (14) miles out on Summerville road. He reports Martin's division as camping last night about 7 o'clock at Farmer's bridge, over the Armuchee river. Could hear of no other troops, but citizens say Hardee crossed the Coosa river at Coosaville, and that the movement on this place was merely a feint to cover other movements. A small party crossed the Oostanaula this morning inquiring for Calhoun. He knows of no force about Snake Creek Gap nor Villanow. Things are mixed. Take these reports for what they are worth and draw your own conclusions. As soon as I get further information, will advise you.

JNO. M. CORSE,  
*Brigadier General.*

KINGSTON, *October 12, 1864—11.30 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN:

Resaca was attacked to-day by the enemy's infantry. Colonel Watkins evacuated Calhoun and crossed his men to Resaca, leaving horses on this side. At 10 o'clock to-night musketry was still heard. I started from Calhoun to-



day and found road broke above Adairsville, and repaired it. Left Colonel Raum with three hundred and fifty (350) infantry at Calhoun to try to communicate. Loaded up all the abandoned commissary stores and brought them here with three locomotives and trains, that are now ready to take troops up the road if you desire to send any. I also placed garrisons in the block-houses that had been abandoned.

The summons to surrender is signed, "J. B. Hood, Gen'l," and closes by saying, "If the place is carried by assault no prisoners will be taken." Our men did not see it. If I hear anything more I will send you word. One regiment of enemy's infantry passed through Calhoun an hour before I got there.

E. M. MCCOOK,  
*Brigadier General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Rome, Ga., October 13, 1864.*

Colonel DEAN, *Kingston* :

Hold fast all supplies and guard them well until we know exactly what course things take. Don't send the cars until you give time for the troops to reach Adairsville. It will be morning, I suppose, before they reach there, though I will order General Howard to push a division to-night. Keep me well advised, and ask General Raum to do the same. I have already caused their cavalry to be driven below Coosaville, capturing two guns, and have no doubt the columns now out will disturb Hood. I want him to be held at Resaca until I get there, though I suppose he will succeed or be off.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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RESACA, *October 13, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

The enemy in heavy force are now around this place, their right resting on the river west, and their left on the river east. I have made such disposition as I feel sure will result in the defeat of the enemy. Instead of a brigade having been left by the 17th army corps to re-enforce this place, one regiment, the 10th Illinois, is with me. I trust that re-enforcements will be hurried here as soon as possible. I think, by placing a battery on the left bank of the river, opposite the right of the enemy, that his position will be enfiladed. A pontoon bridge is now over the stream. I have sent the cavalry horses, train and cars, under the protection of two hundred (200) cavalry.

G. B. RAUM,  
*Brevet Brigadier General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Rome, Ga., October 13, 1864.*

General HOWARD :

Start at once for Resaca. I have word from General Raum that he still holds the place, but needs help. He says you did not leave a brigade at Kingston, in consequence of which he has not been re-enforced.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Rome, Ga., October 13, 1864.*

General STANLEY :

March for Resaca at once, taking the road by Maguire's. I have word from Colonel Raum that he holds the place.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Rome, Ga., October 13, 1864.*

General COX :

I have word from Resaca. General Raum holds the place, but needs help. We must start at once. I suppose by the time you get this you will know if that bridge is gone. If so come, at once, and follow General Stanley, who marches by the Calhoun road.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Rome, Ga., October 13, 1864.*

General RAUM, *Resaca* :

Have as many bridges finished for our use as you can by to-morrow morning. Also gain all possible intelligence of the movements of the enemy. Ascertain if Snake Creek Gap be held in force or not, and, generally, everything that will enable me to arrive at a correct judgment.

Try and get a messenger through the mountains with as much verbal intelligence as possible of our movements. I will try and get through to-day.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

ATLANTA, October 13, 1864—4.15 p. m.

Major General SHERMAN :

I am convinced Hood has taken all his troops from our front except a small cavalry force left near Sandtown. I have sent four hundred (400) wagons for forage to South river, expect them in this evening; they are well guarded. If they come in safely, I shall send again at once. Our new line is well advanced and very strong. The cattle are here.

H. W. SLOCUM,  
*Major General.*

RESACA, October 13, 1864.

Major General SHERMAN :

I got those men into Resaca, and the railway and telegraph all right. I think all the enemy will have left here by daylight, and that they have gone north along the road, burning and destroying it as they go. All my cavalry will follow at daybreak to watch their movements.

General Raum is satisfied Hood was here in person with two corps.

E. M. MCCOOK,  
*Brigadier General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Resaca, Ga., October 14, 1864.*

Colonel DEAN, *Kingston* :

Yours to Colonel Ewing received. Enemy have left here, and are moving north, on the railroad, and are also in Snake Creek Gap. Cavalry has pursued them beyond Dalton. It is Hood's whole army.

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp.*

RESACA, October 14, 1864—6.50 p. m.

Major General SHERMAN :

Just received despatch from Dalton. Cavalry dashed in there and captured ten (10) prisoners. Stewart's corps one and a half ( $1\frac{1}{2}$ ) miles from there. Hood has divided his forces, one-half going towards the tunnel, tearing up the road, the other going towards Dug Gap.

E. M. McCOOK,  
*Brigadier General.*

RESACA, October 14, 1864.

Major General SHERMAN :

I am here and collecting my troops. Stanley has passed towards Tilton. Reconnoissance of infantry and cavalry has gone to Snake Creek Gap.

O. O. HOWARD, *Major General.*

CHATTANOOGA, October 14, 1864—9 p. m.

Major General SHERMAN :

I went to Dalton yesterday, but could get no further, and found the enemy advancing on that place. I returned to Cleveland, bringing the trains and public property. General Thomas then ordered me to concentrate at Chattanooga the troops of Cleveland, Ringgold, and intermediate posts, and to take command here. I am now acting under his orders. It is reported that Dalton was captured yesterday, but I doubt the truth of the report. The enemy does not appear to be advancing on this place. I will push out to-morrow and try to develop his strength and movements. There are now troops enough here to make the place secure, and more are expected to-night.

I forward despatches from General Grant.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Villanow, October 15, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD, *Chattanooga* :

Despatch received. I am pushing straight for Hood, wherever he may be. Do the same with whatever force you have, and let us run him down. I am now on his trail, and will follow it. We pushed Lee's corps through Snake Creek Gap to-day, and at Villanow I will find out where he is going to, and will follow him, no matter where.

Get in communication with me as soon as possible. We hold Atlanta and the road up to Resaca. The break at Big Shanty must be nearly done.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

ROME, *October 15, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

I sent two brigades, one section of artillery, and one regiment of cavalry towards Summerville, as directed. Struck the enemy three miles above there, at the bridge where they showed artillery and strong line. Captured General Allen, inspector general, who says there are three brigades of cavalry at the bridge, and Wheeler's command near Dirttown. Citizens report Hood is now coming back, and that there is infantry near Summerville. Will advise you further.

JNO. M. CORSE,  
*Brigadier General.*

CHATTANOOGA, *October 15, 1864—12 midnight.*

Major General SHERMAN :

I have information that the enemy, a corps of infantry and Wheeler's cavalry, moved west from Dalton yesterday. The railroad is destroyed to near Tunnell hill. Colonel Wright will start parties to repair it in the morning. I am disposing the troops to protect the road from this place to Bridgeport, and reopen the way to Resaca.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Villanow, Ga., October 16, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD :

We took Ship's Gap to-day, capturing a part of the 24th South Carolina. Two corps are represented at Lafayette, and one went south from Villanow. They obstructed Snake Creek pass to delay our trains, but by to-morrow I can move in any direction. I want the first positive fact that Hood contemplates an invasion of Tennessee. Invite him to do so. Send him a free pass in. Reoccupy the railroad, and put the construction corps to work to repair the break from the Tennessee to Resaca. I will get my trains up here and move according to the best information I can get.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Ship's Gap, Ga., October 16, 1864.*

General THOMAS, *Nashville :*

Send me Davis and Newton's old divisions. Re-establish the road, and I will follow Hood wherever he may go. I think he will move to Blue mountain. We can maintain our men and animals on the country.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Ship's Gap, Ga., October 16, 1864.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

I got the despatch in cipher about providing me a place to come out on salt water, but the cipher is imperfect, and I cannot make out whether Savannah or Mobile be preferred; but I also want to know if you are willing that I should destroy Atlanta and the railroad. Hood broke eight (8) miles of road at Big Shanty, and about fifteen (15) from Resaca to the tunnel. The break at Big Shanty is repaired, but the other will take some time. I now have a position where I don't care which way he moves. I think the rebels will now go back south.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

ATLANTA, *October 17, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

I have a Montgomery paper of the 12th. The despatches from Hood, as well as the editorials, state that Beauregard is with Hood, and that the army is going to cross the Tennessee river.

H. W. SLOCUM,  
*Major General.*

NASHVILLE, *October 17, 1864—10.30 a. m.*

Major General SHERMAN:

Your despatch from Ship's Gap, 5 p. m., just received. Schofield, whom I placed in command of the two divisions, Wagner's and Morgan's, was to move up Lookout valley this a. m. to intercept Hood should he be marching for Bridgeport. I will order him to join you with the two divisions and reconstruct the road as soon as possible. Will also re-organize the guards for posts and block-houses. The latter is a difficult undertaking, as several of the regiments on that duty are clamorous to be sent home to be mustered out of service, and new regiments and recruits don't arrive rapidly enough to relieve them. I am accomplishing the work, however, as fast as possible.

Mower and Wilson have arrived and are on their way to join you. I hope you will adopt Grant's idea of turning Wilson loose rather than undertake the plan of a march with the whole force through Georgia to the sea, inasmuch as General Grant cannot co-operate with you as at first arranged.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Ship's Gap, Ga., October 17, 1864.*

General SCHOFIELD:

Your despatch is received. Hood is not at Deer Head Cove. We occupy Ship's Gap and Lafayette. Hood is moving south *via* Summerville, Alpine, and Gadsden. If he enters Tennessee it will be to the left of Huntsville, but I think he has given up all such idea. I want the road repaired to Atlanta, the

sick and wounded sent north of the Tennessee, my army recomposed, and I will make the interior of Georgia feel the weight of war. It is folly for us to be moving our armies on the reports of scouts and citizens. We must maintain the offensive. Your first move on Trenton and Valley Head was right; the move to defend Caperton's Ferry is wrong. Notify General Thomas of these my views. We must follow Hood till he is beyond reach of mischief, and then resume the offensive.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Ship's Gap, Ga., October 17, 1864.*

General CORSE, *Rome*:

We occupy Ship's Gap and Lafayette, and will move to-morrow on Summerville. General Garrard is sent to Dirttown. I want you to show your cavalry and some infantry about Coosaville, and to keep up communication with General Garrard, and if a chance offers to your small force, to hit some part of Hood's army in flank. I think he will move *via* Summerville and Alpine on Gadsden.

At Chattanooga they expect him at Caperton's Ferry, which is absurd.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Ship's Gap, Ga., October 17, 1864.*

General THOMAS, *Nashville*:

Hood won't dare go into Tennessee. I hope he will. We now occupy Ship's Gap and Lafayette, and Hood is retreating towards Alpine and Gadsden. I am moving General Garrard to-day to Dirttown, and will move General Corse out to Coosaville, and with the main army move on Summerville.

If Hood wants to go into Tennessee, west of Huntsville, let him go, and then we can all turn on him, and he cannot escape. The gunboats can break any bridge he may attempt above Decatur. If he attempts to cross, let him do so in part, and then let a gunboat break through his bridge. I will follow him to Gadsden, and then want my whole army united for the grand move into Georgia.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Ship's Gap, Ga., October, 17, 1864.*

General THOMAS, *Nashville*:

To-morrow I move on Summerville. Hood is not going to enter Tennessee. Keep up enough force to watch the river below and at the shoals, and let all the rest march towards me, or to re-enforce the railroad. Order, in my name, the renewal of the attempt to get Eastport, and ask Admiral Porter, if necessary, to send up an iron-clad.

We should command the Tennessee river up to Muscle shoals perfectly. I will follow Hood to and below Gadsden. He cannot maintain an army north of

the Tennessee, especially if we hold Eastport, and thereby control or threaten the railroad from Corinth to Decatur, which I am told has been partially restored by Forrest, who is not now with Hood.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

CHATTANOOGA, *October 17, 1864—11 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN:

Unless I receive further orders from you, or such information as renders it unwise, I will march to-morrow with Morgan's and Wagner's division, *via* Rossville and Gordon's mills, and join you as soon as practicable. I will bring as many beef cattle as the troops can take care of. My scouts report no enemy west of Lookout mountain to-day. They report Bird and Dug Gaps held by rebel cavalry. Colonel Warner is here. I have no later information from you than what he brought.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

NEW ORLEANS, *October 18, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

I learn by intercepted despatch from Jeff. Davis to Kirby Smith, dated at Montgomery on the 30th, that the orders to cross the Mississippi had been received. I presume that duplicate of this despatch has reached Kirby Smith, as Magruder's force, about eighteen or twenty thousand (18,000 or 20,000) men, suddenly left General Steele's front and moved in the direction of the Washita river. I have sent a fast boat to communicate this intelligence to the troops and gunboats on the river, and, as I have now about eight thousand (8,000) troops afloat, and will at once increase the number, I think the crossing can be prevented. The crossing will probably be attempted in the neighborhood of Gaines's landing.

ED. R. S. CANBY,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

NASHVILLE, *October 18, 1864—1 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN:

I have received your despatch from Ship's Gap of yesterday noon. Am ready to carry out your orders should Hood attempt to come into Tennessee. General Wilson will take a duplicate of this to you, and will explain my views on your plan of operations. Telegraphed to General Grant and his replies and suggestions to you. There is one thing, however, I don't wish—to be in command of the defence of Tennessee, unless you and the authorities in Washington deem it absolutely necessary.

Major General Mower has arrived and has reported for orders. I have advised him to remain here until he hears from you, not knowing but that you may still wish to place him at Eastport. I heard from Generals Granger and Croxton last night, who report nothing new of the movements of the enemy. Morgan's and Wagner's divisions leave Chattanooga to-day to report to you, escort-

ing about eight thousand (8,000) beef cattle for the army. The necessary orders have been given for the repairs of the railroad. It will be completed as rapidly as possible. I have arranged with Lieutenant Green, commanding gunboat fleet on the lower Tennessee, to patrol the river as far up as Eastport. Lieutenant Grassford, commanding between Bridgeport and Decatur, patrols that portion of the river daily, and co-operates with me very cordially. I believe affairs north of the Tennessee river are getting into much better shape, and I hope to join you again very soon.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Summerville, Ga., October 19, 1864—12 m.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

Hood has retreated rapidly by all roads leading south. Our advance columns are now at Alpine and Mellville Post Office. I shall pursue him as far as Gaylesville. The enemy will not venture towards Tennessee, except around by Decatur. I propose to send the 4th corps back to General Thomas, and leave him with that corps, the garrisons and new troops to defend the line of the Tennessee, and with the rest to push into the heart of Georgia and come out at Savannah, destroying all the railroads of the State.

The break at Big Shanty is repaired, and that about Dalton should be in ten (10) days. We find abundance of forage in the country.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Summerville, Ga., October 19, 1864.*

General G. H. THOMAS, *Nashville, Tennessee:*

Make a report to me as soon as possible of what troops you now have in Tennessee; what are expected, and how disposed. I propose, with the armies of the Tennessee, the Ohio, and two corps of yours, to sally forth and make a hole in Georgia and Alabama that will be hard to mend. Hood has little or no baggage, and will escape me. He cannot invade Tennessee, except to the west of Huntsville. I want the gunboats and what troops are on the Tennessee to be most active up at the head of navigation. I want General Wilson and General Mower with me, and would like General McCook's division made up to twenty-five hundred (2,500) men mounted. I will send back into Tennessee the 4th corps, all dismounted cavalry, all sick and wounded, and all incumbrances whatever, except what I can haul in our wagons, and will, probably, about November 1, break up the railroad and bridges, destroy Atlanta, and make a break for Mobile, Savannah, or Charleston. I want you to remain in Tennessee and take command of all my division not actually present with me. Hood's army may be set down at forty thousand, (40,000,) of all arms, fit for duty; he may follow me or turn against you. If you can defend the line of the Tennessee in my absence of three (3) months, is all I ask.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*



[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Summerville, Ga., October 19, 1864.*

Colonel L. C. EASTON, *Chief Quartermaster, Chattanooga :*

Go in person to superintend the repairs of the railroad, and make all orders in my name that will expedite its completion. I want it finished to bring back to Chattanooga the sick, wounded, and surplus trash. On the 1st of November I want nothing in front of Chattanooga save what we can use as food and clothing and haul in our wagons. There is plenty of corn in the country, and we only want forage for the posts. I allow ten (10) days to do all this, by which time I expect to be near Atlanta.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Summerville, Ga., October 19, 1864.*

Colonel A. BECKWITH, *Chief Com. Sub. and Act'g Q. M., Atlanta, Ga. :*

Hood will escape me. I want to prepare for my big raid. On the 1st of November I want nothing in Atlanta but what is necessary to war. Send all trash to the rear at once and have on hand thirty (30) days' food and but little forage. I propose to abandon Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga, and sally forth to ruin Georgia and bring up on the sea-shore. Make all dispositions accordingly. I will go down the Coosa until sure that Hood has gone to Blue mountain.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Summerville, Ga., October 19, 1864.*

GENERAL: At some more leisure time I will record the facts relating to Hood's attack on my communications. He has partially succeeded, from the superior mobility of his columns, moving without food or wagons. I now have him turned back, and am pushing him until he will not dare turn up Will's valley without having me at his rear, and the Tennessee at his front. My opinion is he will go to Blue mountain, the terminus of the Selma and Talladega road, where he and Beauregard will concoct new mischief.

We must not be on the defensive, and I now consider myself authorized to execute my plan to destroy the railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city, (modified by General Grant from Dalton, &c.,) strike out into the heart of Georgia, and make for Charleston, Savannah, or the mouth of Appalachicola. General Grant prefers the middle one, Savannah, and I understand you to prefer Selma and the Alabama. I must have alternatives, else, being confined to one route, the enemy might so oppose that delay and want would trouble me; but, having alternatives, I can take so eccentric a course that no general can guess at my objective. Therefore, when you hear I am off have lookouts at Morris island, South Carolina, Ossabaw sound, Georgia, Pensacola and Mobile bays. I will turn up somewhere, and believe I can take Macon, Milledgeville, Augusta, and Savannah, Georgia, and wind up with closing the neck back of

Charleston, so that they will starve out. This movement is not purely military or strategic, but it will illustrate the vulnerability of the south. They don't know what war means; but when the rich planters of the Oconee and Savannah see their fences, and corn, and hogs, and sheep vanish before their eyes, they will have something more than a mean opinion of the "Yanks." Even now our poor mules laugh at the fine cornfields, and our soldiers riot on chestnuts, sweet potatoes, pigs, chickens, &c. The poor people come to me and beg us for their lives; but my customary answer is, "Your friends have broken our railroads which supplied us bountifully, and you cannot suppose our soldiers will suffer when there is abundance within reach."

It will take ten (10) days to finish up our roads, during which I will eat out this flank and along down the Coosa, and then will rapidly put into execution "the plan." In the mean time I ask that you give to General Thomas all the troops you can spare of the new levies, that he may hold the line of the Tennessee during my absence of say ninety (90) days.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
*Washington, D. C.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Summerville, Ga., October 19, 1864.*

General WILSON, *Chief of Cavalry, Nashville:*

General Garrard has about twenty-five hundred (2,500) cavalry, General Kilpatrick fifteen hundred, (1,500,) General McCook six hundred, (600;) there may be about one thousand (1,000) other cavalry with my army. These embrace all the cavalry ready for battle. I wish you would see Generals Johnston and Thomas, bring to me about twenty-five hundred (2,500) new cavalry, and then go to work to make up three divisions, each of twenty-five hundred, (2,500,) for the hardest fighting of the war. I am going into the very bowels of the Confederacy, and propose to leave a trail that will be recognized fifty years hence.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Summerville, Ga., October 20, 1864.*

GENERAL: I think I have thought over the whole field of the future, and being now authorized to act, I want all things bent to the following general plan of action for the next three months:

Out of the forces now here and at Atlanta I propose to organize an efficient army of sixty to sixty-five thousand (60,000 to 65,000) men, with which I propose to destroy Macon, Augusta, and it maybe Savannah and Charleston; but I will always keep open the alternatives of the mouth of the Appalachicola and Mobile. By this I propose to demonstrate the vulnerability of the south, and make its inhabitants feel that war and individual ruin are synonymous terms. To pursue Hood is folly, for he can twist and turn like a fox and wear out any army in pursuit; to continue to occupy long lines of railroads simply exposes our small detachments to be picked up in detail, and forces me to make counter-

marches to protect lines of communication. I know I am right in this, and shall proceed to its maturity. As to details, I propose to take General Howard and his army, General Schofield and his, and two of your corps, viz: Generals Davis's and Slocum's. I propose to remain along the Coosa watching Hood until all my preparations are made, viz: until I have repaired the railroad, sent back all surplus men and material, and stripped for the work. Then I will send General Stanley, with the 4th corps, across by Wills' valley and Caperton's to Stevenson, to report to you. If you send me five or six thousand (5,000 or 6,000) new conscripts, I may also send back one of General Slocum's or Davis's divisions, but I prefer to maintain organizations. I want you to retain command in Tennessee, and before starting I will give you delegated authority over Kentucky, and Mississippi, Alabama, &c., whereby there will be unity of action behind me. I will want you to hold Chattanooga and Decatur in force, and on the occasion of my departure, of which you will have ample notice, to watch Hood close. I think he will follow me, at least with his cavalry, in which event I want you to push south from Decatur and the head of the Tennessee for Columbus, Mississippi, and Selma, not absolutely to reach those points, but to divert or pursue according to the state of facts. If, however, Hood turns on you, you must act defensively on the line of the Tennessee. I will ask, and you may also urge, that at the same time General Canby act vigorously up the Alabama river.

I do not fear that the southern army will again make a lodgement on the Mississippi, for past events demonstrate how rapidly armies can be raised in the northwest on that question, and how easily handled and supplied. The only hope of a southern success is in the remote regions difficult of access. We have now a good entering wedge, and should drive it home. It will take some time to complete these details, and I hope to hear from you in the mean time. We must preserve a large amount of secrecy, and I may actually change the ultimate point of arrival, but not the main object.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

Major General THOMAS,  
Commanding Department of the Cumberland.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Gaylesville, Ala., October 21, 1864.*

General CORSE:

I have received your note, and am glad of the fair prospect of things both at home and with us. Hood retreated with more precipitancy than I had first supposed, and I learn that the day you and General Cox moved out of Rome we stampeded the train back to Blue mountain. I now have my infantry up to Little river and at Cedartown, and the mass about here. I will push cavalry well down towards Gadsden, and want a pontoon bridge at Cedartown. Send your spare one down with the knowledge that it will be destroyed when we are done with it. Inasmuch as the boats may be fired on, I want you to send your cavalry and one or two brigades of infantry down by Van's valley, Cave spring, and the Centre road, to cover the movement. As soon as I get the bridge I will occupy Centre, after eating out this Chattanooga valley, which we find rich in forage, and some potatoes, hogs, chickens, &c. I explain to the people that we have abundance of provision at the north; that we have good roads to our rear, and that we design to supply our own wants; but Hood has broken our road, and we must make it off the country. I think we can save enough forage to pay for the repairs. I don't want too much accumulation at

Rome or anywhere, for I design something else; but we will send our trains into and through Rome to meet us elsewhere in a few days. Telegraph to Chattanooga to send all mails and express matter to this army *via* Rome. I have ordered a courier line back. I want you to establish one forward, say to Coosaville. Order the boats in descending to destroy or bring along all boats, canoes, floats, &c., &c. Let them be armed and ordered to proceed with caution. Find for me, if you can, where the steamboats that are above the Ten Islands are now sunk. I may get them up or further destroy them. Continue to give daily budgets of news, and keep all the posts advised of our whereabouts.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Gaylesville, Ala., October 20, 1864.*

General SLOCUM, *Atlanta, Ga.:*

I have your despatch of the 18th. Use all your energies to send to the rear everything not needed for the grand march. I will take your corps along. We will need one and a half million rations of bread, coffee, sugar, and salt, half a million rations of salt meat, and all else should be shipped away. All sick and wounded should be sent to Resaca and Chattanooga as soon as the road is open. General Thomas and staff will remain in Tennessee. I will take two of the corps of the army of the Cumberland and send General Stanley's back. I want to be near Atlanta, and ready by November 1. Keep out strong foraging parties and keep the bridges well secured. Have the lightest pontoon bridges and trains ready. All else will be sent to the rear or destroyed. The enemy has retreated rapidly before us down the Coosa towards Gadsden.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Gaylesville, Ala., October 22, 1864.*

General GRANT, *City Point, Va.:*

I feel perfectly master of the situation here. I still hold Atlanta, and the road with all bridges and vital points well guarded, and I have in hand an army before which Hood has retreated precipitately down the valley of the Coosa. It is hard to divine his future plans, but by abandoning Georgia, and taking position with his rear to Selma, he threatens the road from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and may move up to Tennessee by Decatur. He cannot cross the Tennessee except at Muscle shoals, for all other points are patrolled by our gunboats.

I am now perfecting arrangements to put into Tennessee a force able to hold the line of the Tennessee whilst I break up the railroad in front of Dalton, including the city of Atlanta, and push into Georgia and break up all its railroads and depots, capture its horses and negroes, make desolation everywhere; destroy the factories at Macon, Milledgeville, and Augusta, and bring up with sixty thousand (60,000) men on the sea-shore about Savannah or Charleston. I think this far better than defending a long line of railroad. I will leave General George H. Thomas to command all my military division behind me, and take with me only the best fighting material. Of course I will subsist on the boun-

tiful cornfields and potato patches, as I am now doing, luxuriously. I have now all your despatches, and there will be time to give me further instruction.

Canby should be most active as against Selma from the direction of Mobile, and I will order similar movements from the Mississippi river and Decatur, provided Beauregard follows me, as he will be forced to do by public clamor.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General U. S. A.

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Gaylesville, Ala., October 23, 1864.*

General SLOCUM, *Atlanta, Ga.:*

Your despatch of the 20th received. Am delighted at your success in foraging. Go on, pile up the forage, corn, and potatoes, and keep your artillery horses fat; send back all unserviceable artillery, and, at the last moment, we can count up our horses and see what we can haul, and send back all else. One gun per thousand men will be plenty to take along. Hood is doubtless now at Blue mountain, and Forrest over about Corinth and Tuscumbia, hoping by threatening Tennessee to make me quit Georgia. We are piling up men in Tennessee enough to attend to them, and to leave me free to go ahead. The railroad will be done in a day or two. We find abundance of corn and potatoes out here, and we enjoy them much. They cost nothing a bushel. If Georgia can afford to break our railroad, she can afford to feed us. Please preach this doctrine to men who go forth and are likely to spread it. All well.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Gaylesville, Ala., October 23, 1864.*

General THOMAS, *Nashville, Tenn.:*

Despatch of 18th received. I wrote you in great detail by Colonel Warner. Hood is now at Blue mountain, and Forrest is evidently over about Tuscumbia. No doubt they will endeavor conjointly to make me come out of Georgia, but I don't want them to succeed. All Georgia is now open to me, and I do believe you are the man best qualified to manage the affairs of Tennessee and north Mississippi.

I want approximate returns of all troops subject to your orders, and, as I wrote you, I can spare you the 4th corps and about five thousand (5,000) men not fit for my purposes, but which will be well enough for garrison at Chattanooga, Murfreesboro', and Nashville. What you need is a few points fortified and stocked with provisions, and a good movable column of twenty-five thousand (25,000) men that can strike in any direction.

I await further reports from you before doing anything, but am making all preparations necessary. We find abundance of forage and stores down here, and have not the most distant fears of want or starvation. All my animals are improving, and General Slocum, at Atlanta, reports foraging most successful; four hundred (400) wagons on one occasion, seven hundred (700) on another, and six hundred (600) now out. If Hood breaks our road, Georgia must pay for it.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Gaylesville, Ala., October 24, 1864.*General H. W. HALLECK, *Washington*:

We have heard of General Sheridan's victory at Cedar creek. We can't afford to burn gunpowder, but our men can make up in yelling, which is just as good. We have pushed the enemy to Gadsden, and are now living on the country until the road is repaired, which will be done by Thursday, the 27th. I will send back all sick, wounded, and surplus property, ready to take up our baggage and march wherever it may seem best. General Wilson is here, and asks for time to make up a good cavalry force, but I will be governed by the movements of Beauregard. I send an order made by Beauregard on assuming command, which seems to be of enough importance to telegraph. General Slocum reports all well at Atlanta; he has gathered near two thousand (2,000) wagon-loads of corn and forage. All my animals here are improving on the cornfields of the Coosa; and you will observe my position at Gaylesville, Blue Pond, and a pontoon laid at Cedar Bluff, with a division at Alpine and Will's Valley Head, is very good to watch the enemy about Gadsden and Blue mountain.

Beauregard announces his theorem to be to drive Sherman out of Atlanta, which he still holds defiantly and dares him to the encounter, but is not willing to chase him all over creation.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Gaylesville, Ala., October 25, 1864.*

SIR: I do not wish to be considered as in any way adverse to the organization of negro regiments, further than as to its effects on the white race. I do wish the fine race of men that people our northern States should rule and determine the future destiny of America; but if they prefer trade and gain, and leave to bought substitutes and negroes the fighting, (the actual conflict,) of course the question is settled, for those who hold the swords and muskets at the end of this war (which is but fairly begun) will have something to say. If negroes are to fight, they, too, will not be content with sliding back into the status of slave or free negro. I much prefer to keep negroes yet, for some time to come, in a subordinate state; for our prejudices, yours as well as mine, are not yet schooled for absolute equality.

Jeff. Davis has succeeded perfectly in inspiring his people with the truth that liberty and government are worth fighting for; that pay and pensions are silly nothings compared to the prize fought for. Now, I would aim to inspire our own people also with the same idea—that it is not right to pay one thousand (1,000) dollars to some fellow, who will run away, to do his fighting, or to some poor negro who is thinking of the day of jubilee; but that every young and middle-aged man should be proud of the chance to fight for the stability of his country without profit and without price; and I would like to see all trade and manufactures *absolutely* cease until this fight is over; and I have no hesitation or concealment in saying that there is not, and should not be, the remotest chance of peace again on this continent till all this is realized, save the peace which would result from the base and cowardly submittal to Jeff. Davis's terms. I would use negroes as surplus, but not spare a single white man, not one. Any white man who don't and won't fight *now* should be killed, banished, or denationalized, and then we would discriminate among the noisy patriots and see who really should vote.

If the negroes fight and the whites don't, of course the negroes will govern. They won't ask you or me for the privilege, but will simply take it, and probably reverse the relation hitherto existing, and they would do right.

If, however, the government has determined to push the policy to the end, it is both my duty and pleasure to assist, and in that event I should like to have Colonel Bowman, now commanding the district of Wilmington, Delaware, to organize and equip such as may fall into the custody of the army I command.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.*

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[Cipher.]

NASHVILLE, *October 25, 1864—8.30 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

I have reports this evening from General Granger that Hood, with his army is moving down the Tennessee river, by the way of Guntersville and Summerville. Have you any information tending to confirm my reports received?

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Gaylesville, Ala., October 26, 1864.*

Major General THOMAS, *Nashville, Tennessee :*

A reconnoissance pushed down to Gadsden to-day reveals the fact that the rebel army is not there, and the chances are it has moved west. If it turns up at Guntersville I will be after it; but if it goes, as I believe, to Decatur and beyond, I must leave it to you at present, and push for the heart of Georgia. All I want is to get my sick and wounded back to a safe place. I start the 4th corps back to-morrow, *via* Winston's and Valley Head, ordering it to Bridgeport or Chattanooga, according to what orders Stanley may have from you. Stanley will have about fifteen thousand (15,000) men. Beauregard may attempt Tennessee from the direction of Muscle shoals, but when he finds me pushing for Macon, Milledgeville, &c., he will turn back. I send you a copy of my order giving you supreme command in my absence.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher.]

NASHVILLE, *October 26, 1864—2 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

General Granger telegraphs me again to-day that Hood's army is threatening to cross the Tennessee river at various places between Guntersville and Decatur. I have sent down to him all the re-enforcements I have to spare at this time. Have you any information that Hood has moved with his army in the direction indicated in these reports?

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

NASHVILLE, TENN., *October 26, 1864—10.30 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

General Granger reports that the enemy appeared in force in front of Decatur to-day about 3 p. m. His pickets were driven in, but no serious attack was made on him by the enemy. Have sent him all the re-enforcements I can get. From his report it would seem that Hood intends to attempt the crossing of the Tennessee river.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

NASHVILLE, *October 27, 1864—9 a. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Your despatch of 9 a. m. yesterday is received. I telegraphed you last night that the enemy had appeared in force in front of Decatur and drove in our pickets. Have ordered him to defend Decatur to the last extremity, and have ordered gunboats to patrol the river from Bridgeport to Decatur as well as they are able. I have also a small force at Whiteside, with artillery, and at Claysville. Have only been able to send Granger three new regiments, the others being necessary to place guards for block-houses on the railroad to Chattanooga and Pulaski. I have ordered forward the new regiments as fast as possible, but as yet there are eight regiments behind. Granger believes Hood's army is near Decatur for the purpose of crossing the Tennessee river. I would like to get the 4th corps as soon as you can spare it.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Gaylesville, Ala., October 27, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have sent the 4th corps, General Stanley's, back to Stevenson. This corps is about fifteen thousand (15,000) strong. I will also send all the men not suited to our long march, but they will answer for defending posts. These, with what General Thomas has, will enable him to hold Tennessee; and in a few days I hope to be all ready to carry into effect my original plan.

No doubt Hood has gone off toward the west about Decatur, and may attempt and succeed in crossing the Tennessee, although that river is high and patrolled by gunboats. If he attacks fortified places he will soon cripple his army so that Thomas can dispose of him. I will wait a few days to hear what headway he makes about Decatur, and may yet turn to Tennessee; but it would be a great pity to take a step backwards. I think it would be better even to let him ravage the State of Tennessee, provided he does not gobble up too many of our troops.

General Thomas is well alive to the occasion, and better suited to the emergency than any man I have. He should be strengthened as soon as possible, as the successful defence of Tennessee should not be left to chance.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HALLECK,  
*Washington, D. C.*



[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Gaylesville, Ala., October 28 1864.*

General THOMAS, *Nashville, Tennessee :*

I have your despatches of the 26th and 27th, announcing that Hood's force has appeared before Decatur. I have already sent the 4th corps, which should reach Wauhatchee to-morrow; use it freely, and if I see that Hood crosses the Tennessee, I will send Schofield. On these two corps you can engraft all the new troops; with the balance I will go south. Hood has little ammunition and cannot afford to attack fortified places. Caution all posts to defend themselves manfully, and Hood will soon exhaust himself. The greatest danger is of garrisons being cut off. Instruct them, and see that each has provisions to last until relief comes. If Hood crosses, it will be about Lamb's ferry or Bainbridge. Wilson is now well down toward Jacksonville, and appearances are that Hood has shifted his stores on to the Mobile and Ohio railroad. I will go to Rome to-morrow. Keep me well advised.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Rome, Ga., October 28, 1864.*

General STEEDMAN, *Chattanooga, Tennessee :*

Telegraph to General Granger he must hold on to the death. Hood has no ammunition to spare, and cannot afford to assault. Send Granger some ammunition, if you can safely do so, by a boat. The gunboats ought all to be there.

Movements will occur elsewhere that will make Hood quit Decatur. Tell Granger to delay Hood there as long as he can. Stanley's corps will reach Wauhatchee to-morrow, and I will also send up Schofield's corps. Let General Thomas re-enforce Granger, if necessary; but he don't want too many men.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Rome, Ga., October 28, 1864.*

Major General THOMAS, *Nashville, Tennessee :*

General Granger must hold as long as he can. Hood won't assault. Both Allatoona and Resaca beat him off, and neither was as strong as Decatur. General Granger don't want too many men; they would be in his way. The gunboats should be near him. Hood cannot spare ammunition to bombard. General Stanley will be at Wauhatchee to-morrow, and I may also send Schofield up from here. Notify all commanders of fortified places that numbers are nothing; they must hold their posts against a million. Let them get provisions and ammunition in now. If troops come from Missouri, Eastport would be a good place, unless Hood succeeds in crossing the Tennessee.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

WARRENSBURG, *Mo.*, October 29, 1864.

Major General SHERMAN :

Your despatch received. General Halleck says, in a despatch of to-day, General Grant thinks I can and ought to send you re-enforcements. I have looked upon General A. J. Smith's command as a loan from you. They are now near Kansas border, and will march toward St. Louis with all practicable speed, scouting the country. They will be provided with everything needful, and sent to you as soon as they can reach the Mississippi. I have no cavalry available. I would like very much to know your exact wants and situation.

W. S. ROSECRANS,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Rome, Ga., October 29, 1864.*

Major General THOMAS, *Nashville, Tennessee :*

General Stanley should reach Wauhatchee to-day. Schofield will be here to-night, and I will push him right away for Resaca, to go to Chattanooga if events call for it. Order all recruits and drafted men accordingly, viz: those for 14th, 15th, 17th and 20th corps to come to the front. Appoint some good man to organize and arm the convalescents I send back. I repeat, should the enemy cross the Tennessee in force, abandon all minor points and concentrate your forces at some point where you cover the road from Murfreesboro' to Stevenson.

Engraft on Stanley and Schofield all the new troops. Give Schofield a division of new troops. Give General Tower all the men you can to finish the forts at Nashville, and urge on the navy to pile up gunboats in the Tennessee.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Rome, Ga., October 29, 1864.*

Major General THOMAS, *Nashville, Tennessee :*

We have reconnoitred well down to Gadsdon and Jacksonville. Hood took with him all his infantry and a good deal of cavalry. He started for Bridgeport and Guntersville, but my movements have thrown him clear across to the Mobile and Ohio railroad. If he do not attack Decatur to-day he will not at all; but he will go to Tuscumbia and depend on the Mobile road. Now, I want you to be all ready for him if he enters Tennessee. He will work as fast as possible, for winter is coming; but he cannot have supplies, and will be dependent on the country. I have sent General Stanley back; give him as many conscripts as possible, and use him as the nucleus. I will send also Schofield back, who will relieve you of all that Knoxville branch; but, if necessary, break up all minor posts, and get about Columbia as big an army as you can, and go at him. You may hold all the cavalry and new troops, except new artillery assigned to the corps with me. I would like Dalton held, but leave that to you; Chattanooga, of course, and Decatur, in connexion with the boats. If, to make up a force adequate, it be necessary, abandon Huntsville, and that line, and the Nashville and the Decatur road, except so far as it facilitates an army operating toward Florence. Already the papers in Georgia begin to howl at being abandoned, and will howl

still more before they are done. Get, if you can, Generals A. J. Smith's and Mower's divisions, belonging to my army, from Missouri, and let them come to you *via* Clifton. Get the gunboats to fill the Tennessee river, and that will bother the enemy much; and if you can make a good lodgement at Eastport, Hood could not use the Corinth and Decatur road, for there are only seven (7) miles of good road from Eastport to Iuka. Schofield has not got in yet, but I will push him right on to Resaca. I will give you notice when I start. All preparations are now progressing, but I want to know Hood's movements, and how well you are prepared, before I start.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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WARRENSBURG, Mo., *October 29, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

I forgot to say that Winslow's cavalry, that came with General Mower, will be sent to Memphis as soon as it can be done. It is now on the Kansas border, has had a hard campaign, and must be remounted, which will be done as speedily as possible.

W. S. ROSECRANS,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Rome, Ga., October 29, 1864.*

Major General ROSECRANS, *Warrensburg, Mo. :*

I have your despatches to-day. I have pushed Beauregard to the west of Decatur, but I know he is pledged to invade Tennessee and Kentucky, having his base on the old Mobile and Ohio road. I have put Thomas in Tennessee, and given him as many troops as he thinks necessary, but I don't want to leave it to chance, and therefore would like to have Smith's and Mower's divisions up the Tennessee river as soon as possible. Could you get them on board of boats at Booneville, or higher up, and let the boats run to Paducah, where orders would meet them?

I propose, myself, to push straight down into the heart of Georgia, smashing things generally.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Rome, Ga., October 29, 1864.*

General THOMAS, *Nashville, Tennessee :*

I have your despatch. General Stanley has reached Chattanooga, and can, with the assistance of the cars, reach Athens in less than four days. I hear that the enemy has passed to the west of Decatur, and therefore will cross about Florence. I don't see how Beauregard can support his army, but Jeff. Davis is desperate, and his men will undertake anything possible. If necessary, draw heavy on Chattanooga, depending on Schofield to replace them. Schofield is not yet up, but I will push him right along to Resaca. With Decatur held,

and a good gunboat force up at the head of navigation, the enemy will be bold to enter Tennessee; but we must expect anything. If they wait to get supplies about Tusculum you will get the Missouri troops. Have your orders to meet them at Paducah.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

CHATTANOOGA, *October 29, 1864—8 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN:

The following has just been received from Decatur, dated October 24—4.40 p. m.:

"I told you we drove the rebs out of their rifle-pits yesterday, capturing one hundred and twenty, (120.) In the evening we made another sortie, spiking a couple of guns, and making fourteen (14) more prisoners. In this skirmish we lost forty (40) killed and wounded. Our loss altogether, up to this time, amounts to eighty (80.) We blew up four (4) caissons, and dismounted two (2) pieces of artillery. We killed and wounded a very large number of the enemy, full five hundred (500.) About four (4) o'clock this a. m., they began to leave in direction of Courtland. I have been probing them at different points all day, finding them in force until 4 o'clock this evening, when our forces carried their last line of rifle-pits; enemy evidently believing us to be in very strong force here, judging from what their prisoners have stated. I have endeavored to keep up this impression. I am picketing the river with all the cavalry in my possession, down to the mouth of Elk river. If gunboat returns, now some miles up river, I will send a regiment down the river to Brown's ferry. Negroes who escaped from them, and prisoners, say that Hood and Beauregard are both with them. Received a despatch from Athens; stated that two couriers from Florence reported that the enemy had crossed below Cypress creek in large force. I think this information is to the same effect as that forwarded by General Croxton.

"It will hardly be necessary now to report, any how. I will send you, however, all the information I can obtain.

"R. S. GRANGER,  
*"Brigadier General."*

Respectfully,

JAS. B. STEEDMAN,  
*Major General.*

CHATTANOOGA, *October 29, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

Just received the following:

"DECATUR, 29—9.30 p. m.

"I have conversed with a number of deserters, prisoners, and escaped negroes, and from their information I am led to believe it is the impression among the officers and men of Hood's army that they are bound to get into Middle Tennessee. The deserter who has just left me says that their first aim was to take this place, and fully expected to do so. He thought now they would certainly attempt to cross above or below. I am convinced their infantry forces left in the direction of Courtland, and they may send some cavalry to cross above. My guide, Harris, a sharp fellow, says, from what he has heard above, that they will try to cross above, near Whitesburg. I have sent him up there on the gunboat Thomas. I have also ordered, in addition to the force there al-

ready, five (5) companies of 181st Ohio, about four hundred and twenty (420) men. I have sent to Brown's ferry one hundred and fifty of the 10th Indiana, and will send the Stone River down there with one hundred (100) men of 181st Ohio. I think Hood will, if he intends to cross, make the effort between Elk River and Eastport. Instructed Colonel Lyon to guard all passes from mouth of Flint river to Triana, and scout river with cavalry.

"R. S. GRANGER,  
"Brigadier General."

—  
"29th—11 p. m.

"In my last telegram I omitted to mention another reason why I think Hood will go to Tusculumbia before crossing. He was evidently out of supplies; his men were all grumbling; the first thing the prisoners asked for was something to eat. Hood could not get anything if he should cross this side of Rogersville.

"R. S. GRANGER,  
"Brigadier General."

JAS. B. STEEDMAN,  
Major General.

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[Cipher.]

NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE,  
October 30, 1864—2 p. m.

Major General SHERMAN:

Your two despatches, of 12 p. m. (midnight) yesterday, received. One division of Stanley's troops has already left Chattanooga for Athens, and Tindall promises to have them all off by to-morrow. Have despatch from Croxton at 9 p. m. last night. He says nothing further of the crossing of the enemy at Florence, but he learns from a source he cannot doubt that Hood's whole army reached Town creek last night, and would cross there. Have already directed him to oppose Hood with his whole available force, reporting directly to Stanley, at Athens, and to me here *via* Pulaski. Ordered Hatch last night to re-enforce Croxton at once. Granger believes Hood has gone towards Tusculumbia, but thinks he will be compelled to wait a day or two to get provisions, as his troops were almost mutinous at not having food when he was before Decatur. If he delays two days he will have no chance to get across. Think General Schofield better remain at Resaca for a day or two, or until we get further information. Have directed General Steedman to push forward all recruits and drafted men belonging to regiments with you. Have repeated my application to Commander Pennock for gunboats to go up Tennessee river. Have telegraphed General Rosecrans at St. Louis to send A. J. Smith's and Mower's divisions to Eastport; cavalry to Memphis. I doubt if Rosecrans will send them.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
Major General.

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Rome, Ga., October 30, 1864.*

Major General THOMAS, Nashville, Tennessee:

Despatch of to-day received. I agree with Granger that Hood must delay for provisions. He cannot ford the Tennessee, and must pass his artillery by

a pontoon bridge, which can only be laid, in the reach about Florence, between Colbut's and Muscle shoals. Schofield is here, and moves to-morrow for Resaca to report to you. Jeff. Davis will move to Kingston and Howard to Marietta, *via* Vanwert and Dallas. I will keep all the horses, and will send Wilson with all the dismounted cavalry back to Tennessee, where he can make up a very heavy cavalry force, subject to your orders, in case I depart for the south. Hood must have seen Stanley moving to you, and has heard the result of affairs in Missouri and the Shenandoah, and will hesitate to put his army in Middle Tennessee at this season of the year, with the Tennessee river at his back; but I want you to keep me advised up to the last moment.

It may take five (5) days yet to get everything back, and during that time he may turn towards me, thinking I have divided my forces. General Rosecrans telegraphs me that he has ordered General Mower and Smith's divisions, to Tennessee, and I have asked him to embark them at Boonville or Lexington and send them in boats to the Tennessee river, reporting to you from Paducah.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

NASHVILLE, *October 30, 1864—9 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN:

General Granger reports enemy gone from his front, moving off towards Tusculumbia. He sent out force to follow up the rear of the enemy as he moved off, capturing some prisoners. He reports prisoners admit Hood's loss, killed and wounded, at Decatur, numbered in the neighborhood of one thousand, (1,000.) Colonels Doolittle and Morgan, who had just returned from the reconnoissance, report heavy firing down the river, at about the rate of eight shots per minute, continuing for about fifteen (15) minutes. It is probably General Croxton opposing the enemy at Bainbridge, as he reported last night that he had learned from a reliable source that the enemy intended crossing at that place. Have not heard from Croxton to-day. The whole of General T. J. Wood's division, 4th corps, left Chattanooga, on cars, at 10 a. m. to-day, for Athens, and General Stanley expects to have his other two divisions en route by to-morrow morning. I believe they will reach Athens in time to prevent the enemy from making further progress into the country. Have ordered an additional brigade of cavalry to scout from this place to-morrow morning to re-enforce Croxton.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

WARRENSBURG, MO., *October 30, 1864—11 p. m.*  
(through HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF MISSOURI,  
*St. Louis, Missouri, October 30, 1864—12 p. m.*)

Major General SHERMAN:

Your telegram of 29th, 12 p. m., received. The river is so low that General A. J. Smith can reach the Mississippi river sooner by marching. He leaves in the morning. It will require ten (10) days to reach the Mississippi river, where boats and complete supplies will await him. Whatever is possible will be done to enable you to make a sure thing against Beauregard. I hope you will be able to give that army a thorough defeat.

W. S. ROSECRANS,  
*Major General*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Rome, Ga., October 31, 1864.*Major General THOMAS, *Nashville, Tennessee :*

You must unite all your men into one army, and abandon all minor points, if you expect to defeat Hood. He will not attack posts, but march around them. Schofield is marching to-day from here to Resaca, where he will report to you for orders. His advance will be at Resaca to-night.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

NASHVILLE, *October 31, 1864—9.30 a. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

General Croxton reports enemy crossed Tennessee river, four miles above Florence. He reports, also, that he was unable to prevent enemy's crossing, but will resist their further progress as long as possible. Have ordered General Hatch to move to Lawrenceburg, between Hood and Columbia, and to co-operate with General Croxton in resisting enemy's progress. Have ordered Stanley's corps to Pulaski to hold that place. Can you send me General Schofield to take post at Columbia at once? I make this application because the force at Chattanooga is not sufficiently large or well organized to do more than defend that place.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

ATLANTA, *October 31, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Your despatch received. It will take more than one-half the available cars between here and Chattanooga to move the 23d corps. The removal of stores to the rear will have to stop in a great measure. The railroad has been open but two (2) days. Much has been done, but there is still more to do than can be done in seven days, with the usual rate of accidents. If the 23d corps move by cars it will take eleven (11) days to complete everything. We still require some hundreds of cars of stores to complete your supplies and outfit. Under the circumstances, shall cars be sent at once to move the 23d corps? Answer.

L. C. EASTON.  
A. BECKWITH.

[Cipher.]

NASHVILLE, *October 31, 1864—12 m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Have telegraphed to General Rosecrans at Saint Louis, and also to commanding officer at Paducah, but can hear nothing from them. Now that Hood has undoubtedly crossed the river, I think it important that General Schofield should be sent to Columbia as soon as possible, as I have no certainty of getting any other troops. There are still six regiments due from the north. If you approve this, please order General Schofield to proceed at once by rail to Columbia.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major General*

[Cipher.]

NASHVILLE, *October 31, 1864—6.30 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Am endeavoring to concentrate my troops as much as possible, and trying to place them at Pulaski—Decatur being held by Granger's forces—and shall therefore order General Schofield to come with all his corps, except one brigade, by rail, as speedily as possible. I am sure Stanley's force will not be large enough to drive Hood's whole army back. He has a large cavalry force. I can hear nothing of the troops from Missouri, and cannot, therefore, rely upon their reaching me. Neither can I hear anything of the new regiments expected.

I consider it absolutely necessary for General Schofield to come. There is no doubt but there is a large force of the enemy in West Tennessee, and now crossing the Tennessee, near Florence. I learn by telegram from Johnsonville that one gunboat and five transports were captured last night below Johnsonville. Commanding officer at Johnsonville expects to be attacked daily, and I have no troops to re-enforce him, unless the Missouri troops should accidentally get there in time to do so. The water in the Tennessee river having fallen very low, the enemy was expected to cross at three or four points, in spite of Croxton's efforts to prevent them.

If General Hatch does not disregard my orders for him to halt at Pulaski, he and Croxton, with Stanley, may be able to hold Hood at Pulaski until General Schofield can get up.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Rome, Ga., November 1, 1864.*

Major General GEORGE H. THOMAS, *Nashville, Tenn. :*

Despatch received. The fact that Forrest is down about Johnsonville, while Hood with his infantry is still about Florence and Tusculumbia, gives you time for concentration. The supplies about Chattanooga are immense, and I will soon be independent of them; therefore I would not risk supplies coming in transitu from Nashville to Chattanooga. In like manner, we have large supplies in Nashville, and if they be well guarded, and Hood can't get our supplies, he can't stay in Tennessee long.

General Schofield will go to you as rapidly as cars can take him, and I have no doubt, after the emergency is passed, and the enemy has done us considerable damage, re-enforcements will pour to you, more than can be provided for or taken care of. In the mean time do your best.

I will leave here to-morrow for Kingston, and keep things moving towards the south. Therefore hold fast all new troops coming to you, excepting such as are now at Chattanooga, to whom I will give orders.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Rome, Ga., November 1, 1864.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT, *City Point, Va. :*

As you foresaw, and as Jeff. Davis threatened, the enemy is now in the full tide of execution of his grand plan to destroy my communications and defeat



this army. His infantry, about thirty thousand, (30,000,) with Wheeler and Roddy's cavalry, from seven to ten thousand, (7,000 to 10,000,) are now in the neighborhood of Tusculumbia and Florence, and the water being low, are able to cross at will. Forrest seems to be scattered from Eastport to Jackson, Paris, and the lower Tennessee, and General Thomas reports the capture by him of a gunboat and five transports. General Thomas has near Athens and Pulaski Stanley's corps, about fifteen thousand (15,000) strong, and Schofield's corps, ten thousand, (10,000,) en route by rail, and has at least twenty to twenty-five thousand (20,000 to 25,000) men, with new regiments and conscripts arriving all the time, also. General Rosecrans promises the two divisions of Smith and Mower, belonging to me, but I doubt if they can reach Tennessee in less than ten (10) days. If I were to let go Atlanta and North Georgia and make for Hood he would, as he did here, retreat to the southwest, leaving his militia, now assembling at Macon and Griffin, to occupy our conquests, and the work of last summer would be lost. I have retained about fifty thousand (50,000) good troops, and have sent back full twenty-five thousand, (25,000,) and have instructed General Thomas to hold defensively Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur, all strongly fortified and provisioned for a long siege. I will destroy all the railroads of Georgia, and do as much substantial damage as is possible, reaching the sea-coast near one of the points hitherto indicated, trusting that Thomas with his present troops, and the influx of new troops promised, will be able in a very few days to assume the offensive.

Hood's cavalry may do a good deal of damage, and I have sent Wilson back with all dismounted cavalry, retaining only about four thousand five hundred (4,500.) This is the best I can do, and shall, therefore, when I get to Atlanta the necessary stores, move south as soon as possible.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

CITY POINT, November 1, 1864—6 p. m.

Major General SHERMAN:

Do you not think it advisable, now that Hood has gone so far north, to entirely ruin him before starting on your proposed campaign? With Hood's army destroyed, you can go where you please with impunity. I believed, and still believe, if you had started south while Hood was in the neighborhood of you, he would have been forced to go after you. Now that he is so far away, he might look upon the chase as useless, and he will go in one direction while you are pushing the other. If you can see the chance for destroying Hood's army, attend to that first, and make your other move secondary.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Rome, Ga., November 2, 1864.*

Major General THOMAS, Nashville, Tennessee:

Despatch of 7 p. m., 1st, received. I sent you yesterday copies of General Rosecrans's despatches, showing that Smith's and Mower's divisions are en route; but it will take ten (10) days for them to reach Paducah. It is now raining, and Beauregard will be very cautious in going north of the Tennessee at this season of the year. Schofield is on the railroad, and can be moved rapidly to

any point you indicate. Have you any positive knowledge that any part of Beauregard's infantry has passed the Tennessee? Wilson is also coming to you with Garrard's dismounted cavalry, and it would be well to have horses and equipments awaiting them. According to Wilson's account, you will have in ten (10) days full twelve thousand (12,000) cavalry, and I estimate your infantry force, independent of railroad guards, full forty thousand (40,000) men, which is a force superior to the enemy.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Rome, Ga., November 2, 1864.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT, *City Point, Va.:*

Your despatch is received. If I could hope to overhaul Hood, I would turn against him with my whole force; then he would retreat to the southwest, drawing me as a decoy from Georgia, which is his chief object. If he ventures north of the Tennessee, I may turn in that direction and endeavor to get between him and his line of retreat; but, thus far, he has not gone above the Tennessee. Thomas will have a force strong enough to prevent his reaching any country in which we have an interest, and he has orders, if Hood turns to follow me, to push for Selma. No single army can catch him, and I am convinced the best results will follow from our defeating Jeff. Davis's cherished plan of making me leave Georgia by manœuvring. Thus far I have confined my efforts to thwart his plans, and have reduced my baggage so that I can pick up and start in any direction; but I would regard a pursuit of Hood as useless. Still, if he attempts to invade Middle Tennessee, I will hold Decatur, and be prepared to move in that direction; but, unless I let go Atlanta, my force will not be equal to his.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Ga., November 2, 1864.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT, *City Point, Va.:*

If I turn back, the whole effect of my campaign will be lost. By my movements I have thrown Beauregard well to the west, and Thomas will have ample time and sufficient troops to hold him until re-enforcements meet him from Missouri, and recruits. We have now ample supplies at Chattanooga and Atlanta to stand a month's interruption to our communications, and I don't believe the confederate army can reach our lines save by cavalry raids, and Wilson will have cavalry enough to checkmate that. I am clearly of opinion that the best results will follow me in my contemplated movement through Georgia.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

CITY POINT, VA., *November 2, 1864—11.30 a. m.*

Major General SHERMAN:

Your despatch of 9 a. m. yesterday is just received. I despatched you the same date advising that Hood's army, now that it had worked so far north,

ought to be looked upon more as the object. With the force, however, you have left with General Thomas, he must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him. I really do not see that you can withdraw from where you are to follow Hood, without giving up all we have gained in territory. I say, then, go on as you propose.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Ga., November 2, 1864.*

Captain PENNOCK, *United States Navy, Mound City:*

I don't know what boats you have up the Tennessee now, but hear that Number Fifty-five has been captured by Forrest. I trust you will keep that river well patrolled, increasing the capacity of the boats according to the draught of water. If the present rains continue, one or two iron-clads would do most important service. In a few days I will be off for salt-water, and hope to meet my old friend Admiral Porter again. Will you be kind enough to write to him, and tell him to look out for me about Christmas from Hilton Head to Savannah? During my absence, please confer freely with General Thomas, who commands in my stead.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

NASHVILLE, *November 2, 1864—1.30 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN:

Your despatch of 8 a. m. to-day just received. I this morning received the first telegram from Rosecrans. Contents similar to the one you sent me. I have just heard from General Croxton, who despatched to me at 7 p. m. yesterday, who says he has been within two miles of Florence on the Huntsville side, and three miles on the Lawrenceburg side. The enemy is there with a large force intrenched. They have laid pontoons at Florence, and are reported still crossing. He finds no cavalry, but Forrest is reported crossing below Florence. I think he must be mistaken about Forrest crossing below Florence. It may be Wheeler. General Hatch should be with Croxton by this time, and, although the rain may have made the roads bad, I am in hopes that the balance of Stanley's troops will reach Pulaski to-day. It will not be possible for me to raise within the next ten days more than Stanley's and Schofield's corps, and Croxton's and Hatch's cavalry, unless I should withdraw railroad guards immediately, which should not be done so long as we must operate the road. The convalescents will, of course, only be fit to garrison Chattanooga, Whitesides, and Bridgeport. It will need all the troops Granger has to hold Decatur. General Steedman's troops, belonging to my army, are almost dwindled away by expiration of service. Eventually General Wilson can organize twelve thousand (12,000) cavalry from dismounted men now in Tennessee and coming from the front; but he can't do this in ten (10) days. We will all do the best we can. If Beauregard halts to fortify, I hope we shall be ready for him. It has rained some, but not a great deal, here.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Ga., November 2, 1864.*

Major General THOMAS, *Nashville:*

I have your despatch of to-day. If Granger will continue to demonstrate on the Moulton road with as strong a force as he can take out of Decatur, he will compel Beauregard to leave a similar force in observation. In like manner, Grierson at Memphis should be instructed to demonstrate out in the direction of Ripley or Corinth, to threaten the Mobile and Ohio railroad, on which he manifestly must depend. Then, having united Schofield and Stanley, and filled them as much as you can with your new troops, Beauregard will be checkmated; but if he advances from Florence, fight him cautiously, taking every advantage of your fortifications and the natural obstructions of the country. I think he will aim for Fayetteville and Shelbyville, but you know the country better than I do. General A. J. Smith reports himself en route from Warrensburg, Missouri. To make things sure, you can call on the governors of Kentucky and Indiana for some militia, cautioning them against a stampede, no matter what occurs. Try and avoid, as I know you will, all false alarms. I am pushing my arrangements, and will soon be off.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Ga., November 2, 1864.*

Lieut. General GRANT, *City Point, Va.:*

Despatch of 11.30 a. m. received. I will go on and complete my arrangements, and in a few days notify you of the day of my departure.

General Thomas reports to-day that his cavalry reconnoitred within three (3) miles of Florence yesterday, and found Beauregard intrenching. I have ordered him to hold Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur, all well supplied for a siege; all the rest of his army to assemble about Pulaski, and to fight Beauregard cautiously and carefully; at the same time for A. J. Smith and all reinforcements to get up to enable him to assume a bold offensive, and to enable Wilson to get a good mount of cavalry. I think Jeff. Davis will change his tune when he finds me advancing into the heart of Georgia instead of retreating, and I think it will have an immediate effect on your operations at Richmond.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

WARRENSBURG, Mo., *November 2, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN:

I am now under orders to join you with my command, and will lose no time in reaching St. Louis and embarking for destination en route. I have about five hundred (500) men in Memphis belonging to the first and third divisions, 16th army corps. They are in detachments, and in occupation of the forts in Memphis. I now most earnestly request that you will order all men belonging to the first and third divisions to be relieved from duty at once and sent to Cairo, Illinois, and to report to me by telegraph at St. Louis.

A. J. SMITH, *Major General.*

ROME, *November 2, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

General Howard reports last night at 6.30 at Cedartown, and nicely in camp. Says Hood took much, but left plenty of corn, and some pigs are left. Some scouting and observing parties of the enemy's cavalry about him. A captured letter from a citizen to Governor Brown complains bitterly of Hood's army and its lawlessness, and begs him to get orders from Jeff. Davis to stop it.

L. M. DAYTON, *A. D. C.*

[Cipher.]

NASHVILLE, *November 2, 1864—11.30 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Can't learn yet that Beauregard has started in any direction. He is across the river at Florence, but as yet has not moved from his intrenchments.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Ga., November 3, 1864.*Major General THOMAS, *Nashville, Tennessee :*

Your despatch received. Glad to learn the Venus was recaptured, and have no doubt gunboat 55 will be recaptured or destroyed. Don't fail to give me the earliest notice of Beauregard's starting north, for he is watching us and will be influenced by our movements. Now that Forrest is scattered is a good time for your cavalry to pitch into Wheeler if he ventures out from Florence.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Ga., November 3, 1864.*Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Headquarters Army, Washington, D. C. :*

The situation of affairs now is as follows : Beauregard, with Hood's army, is at Florence with a pontoon bridge, protected from our gunboats from below by the Colbert shoals, from above by the Muscle shoals. He has with him Wheeler's and Roddy's cavalry. Forrest's cavalry is down about Fort Herman. The country round about Florence has been again and again devastated during the past three years, and Beauregard must be dependent on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, which also has been broken and patched up in its whole extent. He purposes and promises his men to invade Middle Tennessee for the purpose of making me let go Georgia. The moment I detected that he had passed Gadsden, I detached the 4th corps, General Stanley, fifteen thousand (15,000) strong, who is now at Pulaski; and subsequently the 23d corps, General Schofield, ten thousand, (10,000,) who is now on cars moving to Nashville. This gives General Thomas two full corps and about five thousand cavalry, besides ten thousand (10,000) dismounted cavalry and all the new troops recently sent to Tennessee, with the railroad guards, with which to encounter

Beauregard, should he advance further. Besides which, General Thomas will have the active co-operation of the gunboats, both above and below the shoals, and the two divisions of Smith and Mower en route from Missouri. I therefore feel no uneasiness as to Tennessee, and have ordered General Thomas to assume the offensive in the direction of Selma, Alabama. With myself I have the 20th corps at Atlanta, the 15th and 17th near Kenesaw, and the 14th here. I am sending to the rear, as fast as cars will move, the vast accumulation of stuff that in spite of my endeavors has been got over the road, and am sending forward just enough bread and meat to enable me to load my wagons, destroy everything of value to the enemy, and start on my contemplated trip. I can be ready in five (5) days, but am waiting to be more certain that Thomas will be prepared for any contingency that may arise. It is now raining, which is favorable to us, and unfavorable to the enemy. Davis has utterly failed in his threat to force me to leave in thirty (30) days, for my railroad is in good order from Nashville to Atlanta, and his army is further from my communications now than it was twenty (20) days ago. I would advise the accumulation of all troops available up the Tennessee river (now in good boating stage) about Clifton, subject to General Thomas's orders, and that Canby leave the Mississippi river, to be watched by gunboats and local garrisons, and push, with about fifteen thousand (15,000) men, for the Alabama river and Selma. These co-operating movements would completely bewilder Beauregard, and he would burst with French despair. I propose to adhere, as near as possible, to my original plan, and on reaching the sea-coast will be available for re-enforcing the army in Virginia, leaving behind a track of desolation as well as a sufficient force to hold fast all that is of permanent value to our cause. When I leave Atlanta it will contain little that will be of use or comfort to the enemy.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

NASHVILLE, *November 3, 1864*—2.30 p. m.

Major General SHERMAN:

Your message, 9.30 a. m. yesterday, received. Will give instructions to Granger to continue his demonstrations between Decatur and Moulton. General Croxton still holds the two fords of Shoal creek, mentioned to you in a former despatch. I heard from him yesterday at 3 p. m. He reports he drove in the enemy's cavalry pickets. A scout had just returned from Town river, who reported that they were waiting for Hardee's corps and cavalry. Croxton intended to attempt to destroy their pontoon bridge last night. Have not yet heard result. If I can get Grierson's cavalry at Memphis, I will have it pushed out toward Mobile and Ohio railroad, and threaten Beauregard's communications. I propose to place General A. J. Smith's command, with the assistance of the gunboats, as near Eastport as possible, unless Beauregard gets start of me. But if he don't move before Sunday, I will have Generals Schofield and Stanley together at Pulaski, and he can then move wherever he pleases. Will fill up Stanley's and Schofield's corps as soon as possible, but at present almost entire transportation of the road is taken up by conscripts and recruits for commands at the front. Six of the new regiments are still due, and not heard from since starting. If it is not necessary for Generals Schofield and Stanley to move from Pulaski before I can get General A. J. Smith well up the Tennessee river, Beauregard will have to leave his present position, or be cut off from his railroad communications. I have six gunboats on Tennessee river now coming up. Lieutenant Shirk has no doubt but he can open river and raise blockade. Am afraid it will take longer for Wilson to reorganize and mount his cavalry than

he thinks. When he does complete it, we will be strong enough to restore quiet all along borders and undertake the expedition into Alabama. Have made great exertions to prevent stampeding, and so far have succeeded measurably well, but I find it hard work. Have just heard from General Schofield at Chattanooga. A portion of his troops have started on cars, and he has strong hopes of getting them all off by rail to-morrow evening.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Ga, November 4, 1864.*

Major General STEEDMAN, *Chattanooga, Tennessee :*

Your despatch of to-day is received, indicating that Beauregard has moved toward Corinth. I do not wish him in a better place. The trains on our railroad are not working to my satisfaction. Tell the superintendent I want him to stop running cars for the accommodation of travellers, but to make up a gang of three or four hundred cars to carry to Atlanta in one trip all we need, and take back all that is necessary. I want this done at once, as I propose to start as soon as the present storm clears away. The whole army is now distributed along the road so as to cover it perfectly. I would like to have you meet me here to confer and superintend the removal back to Chattanooga of all railroad stock and garrisons on the breaking up of the road. Answer.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

SMYRNA CAMP-GROUND, *November 5, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

My command is at this place.

O. O. HOWARD, *Major General.*

ATLANTA, *November 4, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

I am much disappointed in the working of the road. I have urged everybody and everything, but have been able to get in here only seventy-seven (77) cars in the last twenty-four (24) hours, all of which have been properly unloaded, reloaded, and started back. I am sorry to disappoint you, but am doing my very best. They have accumulated more plunder in the last two months than I supposed could have been got here in six. We have an abundant supply of grain, which I wish you would send animals here to eat up.

L. C. EASTON, *C. Q. M.*

[Cipher.]

CHATTANOOGA, *November 4, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

By 12 noon to-morrow there will be on the route to Atlanta and in that place three hundred and seventy (370) freight cars, two hospital trains, and two wrecking trains, loaded with all freight that has been ordered. There will be

one hundred (100) cars in to-night, which can be returned to-morrow if wanted. The storms have interfered very materially with the running of trains. I will come down to-morrow.

JAMES B. STEEDMAN,  
*Major General.*

ATLANTA, *November 5, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

I believe that I have now in the commissary depots at Atlanta everything we will require for the trip.

A. BECKWITH,  
*Chief Commissary of Subsistence.*

[Cipher.]

ATLANTA, *November 5, 1864—10 a. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

The superintendent, Mr. Taylor, reports this morning two hundred and fifty (250) cars between Chattanooga and Kingston, bound south, detained by small accidents. These cars should be detained in Atlanta till a sufficient number arrive, say five hundred in round numbers, to make everything perfectly safe and sure to clean up the entire road to Chattanooga. General Steedman should be directed to come with his troops and the balance of the stores immediately, bringing two hundred and fifty (250) cars. We propose that the whole five hundred (500) cars reach Atlanta before any trains be started back to Chattanooga. Our superintendent, Mr. Taylor, thinks he can work out your idea. Answer, if this meets your views, in order that there may be concert of action

L. C. EASTON, *B. G., &c.*  
A. BECKWITH, *Colonel and C. S.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Ga., November 6, 1864.*

COMMANDING OFFICERS *of all the posts and stations :*

Beauregard with Hood's army is at Florence and Tuscumbia, a country already devastated and stripped of provisions. Forrest is opposite Johnsonville, on the Tennessee river, and has done considerable damage to gunboats and transports, but has captured no provisions, and, as that is but one of three of our lines of supply, the temporary interruption will not be felt. I want the preparations heretofore ordered for this army to go on with as much speed as possible, but the possibilities are, time will be allowed in our present camp for the complete payment of all our troops, the sending back the soldiers' money, and the presidential election of Tuesday next. Also attention must be paid to getting the conscripts to their proper companies and have them properly armed and clothed.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*



[Cipher.]

NASHVILLE, *November 6, 1864—12.30 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN:

I received from General Croxton this a. m., at 10 o'clock, despatches to effect that enemy had attacked him in strong force, and had driven him across Shoal creek, on p. m. 4th instant, compelling him to fall back to Four-Mile creek. The following telegram, just received from him, I forward for your information:

“FOUR-MILE CREEK, *November 6, 1864—12.30 p. m.*

“Major General SHERMAN:

“Enemy recrossed Shoal creek last night. I had scouts on road twelve miles above Florence at 8 p. m., and at that time no rebels had appeared at that point except two, who returned to Baugh's mills at sundown, reporting cavalry force there. General Hatch was at Sugar creek at 3 p. m. yesterday morning, moving to Lexington, to which point I sent him full despatches last night. Have not heard from him, but as soon as do, will advise that we move down and occupy line of Shoal creek. I doubt if enemy meditates immediate advance. Think their cavalry are operating elsewhere, and they are waiting for it. Prisoner who belongs to 3d Virginia regiment, who helped to build their bridge, reports that Hardee's corps crossed Tuesday, and that they have no other force this side. They had about a division at the fight yesterday.

“JNO. M. CROXTON,  
“*Brigadier General.*”

I forward also following, just received from General Schofield:

“JOHNSONVILLE, *November 6, 1864—7 p. m.*

“Major General THOMAS:

“Have just arrived here. Colonel Gallop's scouts have returned. Report only small cavalry force enemy this side river. There appears also only to be small force and no artillery opposite here. Think Colonel Gallop's brigade will be sufficient for this place, but will examine ground in morning and report definitely. Think it would be well to detain all troops at Nashville except those which belong to Colonel Gallop's brigade.

“J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
“*Major General.*”

I shall concentrate all General Schofield's troops at Pulaski, with exception of Colonel Gallop's brigade, which, for present, will leave at Johnsonville. General Wilson has just arrived here and arranged with me this evening for a complete remount and thorough organizing of the cavalry. Think we shall have no further trouble with the cavalry excepting that attending getting horses to the front. Have just heard from General Granger at Decatur, who reports a reconnoissance from his post had just returned from within eight (8) miles of Courtland. Met eight hundred (800) enemy's cavalry, all Texas troops, at Fox's creek, drove them a mile beyond, but could obtain no information in addition to that heretofore reported. The outpost at Brown's ferry reports only few rebel cavalry on opposite shore, who made no attempt to cross. All of General Stanley's troops are now at Pulaski in position for enemy should he attempt to advance. The cavalry is well up to enemy's position, and will be able to give the earliest information of his movements north.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Ga., November 6, 1864.*

DEAR GENERAL: I have heretofore telegraphed and written you pretty fully, but I still have some thoughts in my busy brain that should be confided to you as a key to future developments.

The taking of Atlanta broke upon Jeff. Davis so suddenly as to disturb the

equilibrium of his usually well-balanced temper, so that at Augusta, Macon, Montgomery, and Columbia, South Carolina, he let out some of his thoughts which otherwise he would have kept to himself. As he is not only the President of the southern confederacy, but also its commander-in-chief, we are bound to attach more importance to his words than we would to those of a mere civil chief magistrate.

The whole burden of his song consists in the statement that Sherman's communications *must* be broken and his army destroyed. Now, it is a well settled principle that if we can prevent his succeeding in his threat we defeat him, and derive all the moral advantages of a victory. Thus far Hood and Beauregard conjointly have utterly failed to interrupt my supplies or communications. My railroad and telegraph are now in good order from Atlanta back to the Ohio river. His losses in men at Allatoona, Resaca, Ship's Gap, and Decatur, exceed in number ours at the block-houses at Big Shanty, Allatoona creek, and Dalton; and the rapidity of his flight from Dalton to Gadsden takes from him all the merit or advantage claimed for his skilful and rapid lodgement on my railroad. The only question in my mind is, whether I ought not to have dogged him far over into Mississippi, trusting to some happy accident to bring him to bay and to battle; but I then thought that by so doing I would play into his hands, by being drawn or decoyed too far away from our original line of advance. Besides, I had left at Atlanta a corps and guards along the railroad back to Chattanooga, which might have fallen an easy prey to his superior cavalry. I felt compelled, therefore, to do what is usually a mistake in war—divide my forces—send a part back into Tennessee, retaining the balance here.

As I have before informed you, I sent Stanley back directly from Gaylesville and Schofield from Rome, both of whom have reached their destination; and thus far Hood, who has brought up at Florence, is further from my communications than when he started; and I have in Tennessee a force numerically greater than his, well commanded and well organized; so that I feel no uneasiness on the score of Hood reaching my main communications.

My last accounts from General Thomas are to 9.30 last night, when Hood's army was about Florence in great distress about provisions, as it well must be, and that Devil Forrest was down about Johnsonville, making havoc among the gunboats and transports. But Schofield's troops were arriving at Johnsonville and a fleet of gunboats was reported coming up from below, able to repair that trouble. You know that that line of supplies was only opened for summer's use, when the Cumberland is not to be depended upon. We now have abundant supplies at Atlanta, Chattanooga, and Nashville, with the Louisville and Nashville railroad and the Cumberland river unmolested; so that I regard Davis's threat to get his army on my rear, or on my communications, as a miserable failure.

Now, as to the second branch of my proposition: I admit that the first object should be the destruction of that army; and if Beauregard moves his infantry and artillery up into the pocket about Jackson and Paris, I will feel strongly tempted to move Thomas directly against him, and myself move rapidly by Decatur and Purdy, to cut off his retreat. But this would involve the abandonment of Atlanta, and a retrograde movement which would be very doubtful of expediency or success; for, as a matter of course, Beauregard, who watched me with his cavalry and his friendly citizens, would have timely notice, and would slip out and escape, to regain what we have earned at so much cost. I am more than satisfied that Beauregard has not the nerve to attack fortifications, or to meet me in open battle; and it would be a great achievement for him to make me abandoned Atlanta by mere threats and manœuvres.

These are the reasons which have determined my former movements.

I have employed the last ten (10) days in running to the rear the sick and wounded and worthless, and all the vast amount of stores accumulated by

our army in the advance—aiming to organize this branch of my army into four well-commanded corps, encumbered by only one (1) gun to a thousand men, and provisions and ammunition which can be loaded up in our mule wagons, so that we can pick up and start on the shortest notice. I reckon that by the 10th instant this end will be reached, and by that date I also will have the troops all paid; the presidential election over and out of our way; and I hope the early storms of November, now prevailing, will also give us the chance of a long period of fine healthy weather for campaigning. Then the question presents itself: "What shall be done?" On the supposition, always, that Thomas can hold the line of the Tennessee, and very shortly be able to assume the offensive, as against Beauregard, I propose to act in such manner against the material resources of the south as utterly to negative Davis's boasted threat and promises of protection. If we can march a well-appointed army right through his territory, it is a demonstration to the world—foreign and domestic—that we have a power which Davis cannot resist. This may not be war, but rather statesmanship; nevertheless, it is overwhelming to my mind that there are thousands of people abroad and in the south who will reason thus: If the north can march an army right through the south, it is proof positive that the north can prevail in this contest, leaving only open the question of its willingness to use that power. Now, Mr. Lincoln's election, (which is assured,) coupled with the conclusion thus reached, makes a complete logical whole. Even without a battle, the results, operating upon the minds of sensible men, would produce fruits more than compensating for the expense, trouble, and risk.

Admitting this reasoning to be good, that such a movement *per se* be right, still there may be reasons why one route would be better than another. There are three from Atlanta—southeast, south, and southwest—all open, with no serious enemy to oppose at present.

*The first* would carry me across the only east and west railroad remaining to the confederacy, which would be destroyed, and thereby the communications between the armies of Lee and Beauregard severed. Incidentally, I might destroy the enemy's depots at Macon and Augusta, and reach the sea-shore at Charleston, or Savannah; from either of which points I could re-enforce our armies in Virginia.

*The second* and easiest route would be due south, following, substantially, the valley of Flint river, which is very fertile and well supplied, and fetching up on the navigable waters of the Appalachicola, destroying *en route* the same railroad, taking up the prisoners of war still at Andersonville, and destroying about four hundred thousand (400,000) bales of cotton near Albany and Fort Gaines. This, however, would leave the army in a bad position for future movements.

*The third*, down the Chattahoochee to Opelika and Montgomery, thence to Pensacola or Tensas bayou, in communication with Fort Morgan. This latter route would enable me at once to co-operate with General Canby in the reduction of Mobile, and occupation of the line of the Alabama.

In my judgment, the first would have a material effect upon your campaign in Virginia; the second would be the safest of execution; but the third would more properly fall within the sphere of my own command, and have a direct bearing upon my own enemy, "Beauregard." If, therefore, I should start before I hear further from you, or before further developments turn my course, you may take it for granted that I have moved *via* Griffin to Barnsville; that I break up the road between Columbus and Macon *good*, and then, if I feign on Columbus, will move *via* Macon and Millen to Savannah, or if I feign on Macon you may take it for granted I have shot off towards Opelika, Montgomery, and Mobile bay or Pensacola.

I will not attempt to send couriers back, but trust to the Richmond papers to

keep you well advised. I will give you notice by telegraph of the exact time of my departure.

General Steedman is here to clear the railroad back to Chattanooga, and I will see that the road is broken completely between the Etowah and the Chat-tahoochee, including their bridges, and that Atlanta itself is utterly destroyed.

I am, with respect,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT,

*Commander-in-Chief, City Point, Virginia.*

[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Ga., November 7, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C. :*

By the 10th the election will be over, the troops all paid, and all our surplus property will be back to Chattanooga. On that day or the following, if affairs should remain as now in Tennessee, I propose to begin the movement which I have hitherto fully described.

I can hear of no large force to our front, and, according to General Thomas, Hood remains about Tuscumbia, and he feels perfectly confident of his ability to take care of him.

You can safely communicate with me for the next three (3) days.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Ga., November 7, 1864.*

Major General G. H. THOMAS, *Nashville, Tennessee :*

Your despatch of to-day just received. I think Beauregard is checkmated. I will be all ready by the 10th, but will give you more positive notice in a day or two. Glad that A. J. Smith is heard from. All men belonging to his two divisions that are not in hospital you will order in my name from Memphis. I would like to know, if possible, if Hood's whole army is at Tuscumbia, or has gone towards Corinth.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Ga., November 8, 1864.*

COMMANDING OFFICERS of all posts :

This is the rain I have been waiting for, and as soon as it is over we will be off.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Ga., November 8, 1864.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Washington, D. C. :*

Despatch of to-day received. All my preparations will be completed by the 10th. It is now raining, which is favorable, as the chances are, after it clears away, we will have a long spell of fine weather for marching. General Thomas

has been instructed to assume the offensive as soon as possible, and I will send him a copy of your despatch, that he may know of the contemplated movement on the river by Hurlbut.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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CITY POINT, *Virginia*, 10½ p. m., 7th.

Major General SHERMAN :

Your despatch of this evening received. I see no present reason for changing your plan ; should any arise you will see it ; or if I do, I will inform you. I think everything here favorable now.

Great good fortune attend you. I believe you will be eminently successful, and at worst can only make a march less fruitful of results than hoped for.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.  
*In the field, Kingston, Ga., November 8, 1864.*

TYLER, *Louisville, Kentucky :*

Despatch me to-morrow night and the next night a summary of all news, especially of elections, that I may report them to Governor Brown, at Milledgeville, where I expect a friendly interview in a few days.

Keep this very secret, for the world will lose sight of me shortly, and you will hear worse stories than when I went to Meridian. Jeff. Davis's thirty (30) days are up for wiping us out, and we are not wiped out yet by a good deal. Ewing reached here to-day. All well.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

NASHVILLE, *November 9, 1864—9 p. m.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Your two despatches of 6 p. m., 8 and 9 a. m., to-day, are received. General Croxton, from Four-Mile creek, reports yesterday, 8 p. m., that river has risen more than two feet on shoals, enough to make six (6) feet below them. A scout from over the river reports the bulk of Hood's army still on that side ; and have also a report from General Granger, who says Elk river is still up, and that two couriers crossed in skiff last evening, who communicated with Rogersville. General Croxton still holds east bank of Shoal creek, but enemy have a heavy force on west bank, supposed to be one corps. The enemy is reported to have one at Florence, and one corps on south side of the river opposite Florence. It is also reported that Roddy has gone to Corinth. The contradictory nature of these reports indicate, plainly, however, that the entire infantry force of the enemy is in and about Florence and Tuscumbia. General Hatch reports yesterday from Taylor's Spring, Alabama, that he intended attacking enemy this morning along the entire line, to ascertain where the enemy is and the position he holds. Your despatch for Lieutenant General Grant, City Point, marked immediately and important, will go forward by special messenger by first train in the morning.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Ga., November 10, 1864.*

Brigadier General JOHN M. CORSE, *Rome, Georgia* :

In the execution of sealed orders No. 115, you will destroy to-night all public property not needed by your command, all foundries, mills, work-shops, warehouses, railroad depots, and other storehouses convenient to the railroad, together with all wagon shops, tanneries or other factories useful to our enemy. Destroy the bridges completely, and then move your command to-morrow to Kingston and beyond, passing General Davis's command, after which proceed by easy marches till you overtake your corps and report to its commander.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Ga., November 10, 1864.*

C. A. DANA, *Assistant Secretary of War, Washington* :

If indiscreet newspaper men publish information too near the truth, counteract its effect by publishing other paragraphs calculated to mislead the enemy—such as Sherman's army has been much re-enforced, especially in the cavalry, and he will soon move in several columns in a circuit so as to catch Hood's army. Sherman's destination is not Charleston, but Selma, where he will meet an army from the Gulf, &c., &c.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Ga., November 10, 1864.*

General THOMAS, *Nashville* :

Your despatch of 5 p. m. is received. All will be ready to start from here the day after to-morrow. Keep me well advised. I think you will find Hood marching off, and you should be ready to follow him. Decatur, Tuscaloosa, Columbus and Selma are all good points to forage and feed an army. Let me keep Beauregard busy, and the people of the south will realize his inability to protect them.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Ga., November 11, 1864.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

*Headquarters United States Army, Washington, D. C.:*

My arrangements are now all complete, and the railroad cars are being sent to the rear. Last night we burned all foundries, mills, and shops of every kind in Rome, and to-morrow I leave Kingston, with the rear guard, for Atlanta, which I propose to dispose of in a similar manner, and to start on the 16th on the projected grand raid. All appearances still indicate that Beauregard has got back to his old hole at Corinth, and I hope he will enjoy it. My army prefers to enjoy the fresh sweet potato fields of the Ocmulgee. I have balanced all the figures well, and am satisfied that General Thomas has in Tennessee a force sufficient for all probabilities, and I have urged him, the moment Beaure-

gard turns south, to cross the Tennessee at Decatur and push straight for Selma. To-morrow our wires will be broken, and this is probably my last despatch. I would like to have Foster to break the Savannah and Charleston road about Pocotaligo about the 1st of December. All other preparations are to my entire satisfaction.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

MARIETTA, November 11, 1864.

Captain L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp*:

Four deserters came in this morning; left Montgomery on 2d; came to Opelika on cars; left that place on 4th; passed Carrollton on 9th. Hood was at Corinth. All convalescent soldiers now being sent to that point. Some infantry and fifteen hundred (1,500) cavalry at Opelika. Three brigades of cavalry at Carrollton, and five regiments at Villa Rica. Small force at West Point and Newnan. Cars run to Newnan. No information regarding Atlanta and Macon railroad. Citizens from Carrollton, and other points in that direction, think we are retreating from Atlanta.

J. KILPATRICK,  
*Brigadier General.*

ATLANTA, November 11, 1864.

Major General SHERMAN:

The army of Tennessee have obtained and have got in their wagons all they can haul and all they want. Same of 20th army corps. There is great plenty of salt, coffee, salt meat, pepper and soap here. The 14th army corps may want a little more bread, and, perhaps, a little more sugar. I have about one hundred thousand (100,000) rations bread for 14th army corps; twenty-two thousand (22,000) rations sugar. I do not know how much General Davis may have on hand, but presume he has two hundred thousand (200,000) rations of bread. Everything is loaded in Atlanta save what is held for the 14th army corps. There are at least one million two hundred thousand (1,200,000) rations of the principal rations in hands of troops and available.

A. BECKWITH, *Colonel, &c.*

ATLANTA, GA., November 11, 1864.

Major General SHERMAN:

With what the army now has in its (provision) wagons, what is between here and Kingston, and what I have here in store, I think I can make out five (5) days' grain, commencing with to-morrow.

L. C. EASTON, *Chief Quartermaster.*

[Cipher.]

NASHVILLE, November 11, 1864—9 p. m.

Major General SHERMAN:

Following from Granger received to-day. It confirms previously reported position of the enemy:

DECATUR, 11th—10 a. m.

Two men from tenth Tennessee, made prisoners at Florence, escaped Saturday night from the rebels. They confirm report of two corps having crossed. One corps still on south bank.

They assert that enemy are still very badly off for clothing, many being barefoot, but they are expecting clothing by train. They say railroad is not completed to Tuscumbia, but only to Cherokee, fifteen (15) miles from there. They have train of wagons from Cherokee, and one pontoon bridge at the foot of the island above old railroad bridge. They say enemy are fortifying. Talk in their camps is, they are going to advance on Nashville.

R. S. GRANGER, *Brigadier General*.

Stanley from Pulaski reports nothing new. Water still very high. It is hoped the rise would carry off the enemy's bridge. They say it is trestled at both ends, with pontoons in the middle. Deserters say Georgia troops are disgusted and are deserting. Received despatch from General Washburne to-day, dated Memphis, 8th. He says advices from Corinth that but few troops there then; that cavalry had brought up a lot of conscripts, absentees from Hood's army, who went towards Tuscumbia. Also reports enemy repairing road from Cherokee to Tuscumbia. About 29th ultimo four thousand (4,000) rebel soldiers came down Blue Mountain railroad to Selma, and were sent to Hood by the way of Meridian and Corinth; also, ten (10) car-loads ammunition from Selma. The impression is that Beauregard intends to make Corinth his base, supplies being sent up constantly on the Mobile and Ohio railroad. He was to send out cavalry reconnoissance 9th, but says his force not strong enough to threaten Mobile and Ohio railroad much. Have not heard from General A. J. Smith's troops since last report, but daily expecting him here. No reports from Hatch or Croxton to-day. Rear-Admiral Lee informs me he is pushing to put one iron-clad on Tennessee river, one on Cumberland, with a third convenient to be placed on either, according to necessity of the case.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General*.

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, Ga., November 11, 1864*

Major General THOMAS, *Nashville, Tennessee* :

Despatch of to-night received. All right. I can hardly believe Beauregard would attempt to work against Nashville from Corinth as a base at this stage of the war, but all information seems to point that way. If he does, you will whip him out of his boots. But I rather think you will find commotion in his camp in a day or two. Last night we burned Rome, and in two more days will burn Atlanta, and he must discover that I am not retreating, but, on the contrary, fighting for the very heart of Georgia. About a division of rebel cavalry made its appearance this morning south of the Coosa river, opposite Rome, and fired on the rear guard as it withdrew. Also, two days ago some of Iverson's cavalry, about eight hundred, (800,) approached Atlanta from the direction of Decatur with a section of guns and swept round towards Whitehall, and disappeared in the direction of Rough and Ready. These also seem to indicate that Beauregard expected us to retreat. I hear of about fifteen hundred (1,500) infantry down at Carrollton, and also some infantry at Jonesboro,' but what numbers I cannot estimate. These are all the enemy I know to be in this neighborhood, though a rumor is that Breckinridge has arrived with some from West Virginia. To-morrow I begin the movement laid down in my Special Field Order 115, and shall keep things moving thereafter. By to-morrow morning all trains will be at or north of Kingston, and you can have the exclusive use of all the rolling stock. By using detachments of recruits and dismounted cavalry in your fortifications, you will have Schofield, and Stanley, and A. J. Smith, strengthened by eight or ten new regiments, and all of Wilson's cavalry, you could safely invite Beauregard across the Tennessee, and prevent his ever returning. I still believe, however, that the public clamor will force him to



turn and follow me, in which event you should cross at Decatur and move directly towards Selma as far as you can transport supplies. The probabilities are, the wires will be broken to-morrow, and that all communication will cease between us; but I have directed the main wire to be left, and will use it if possible, and wish you to do the same. You may act, however, on the certainty that I sally from Atlanta on the 16th with about sixty thousand (60,000) men, well provisioned, but expecting to live liberally on the country.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, November 12, 1864.*

General HOWARD, *Smyrna*:

I start this morning. As soon as all the trains have passed north you may begin the work on the railroad. I want your army across the Chattahoochee on the third day. J. E. Smith and Corse are marching to-day. Davis will leave here in a few hours.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kingston, November 12, 1864.*

General STEEDMAN, *Chattanooga*:

I start this morning. All the trains are here, and will be despatched north. As soon as the last one has passed Adairsville, draw in the garrisons and begin the work prescribed in order one hundred and fifteen (115.) Telegraph me to-night at Allatoona all information, and keep General Thomas well advised of your actions.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Cipher.]

NASHVILLE, November 12, 1864—8.30 a. m.

Major General SHERMAN:

Your despatch of 12 o'clock last night received. I have no fears that Beauregard can do us any harm now, and if he attempts to follow you I will follow him as far as possible. If he does not follow you, I will then thoroughly organize my troops, and, I believe, shall have men enough to ruin him unless he gets out of the way very rapidly. The country of middle Alabama, I learn, is teeming with supplies this year, which will be greatly to our advantage. I have no additional news to report from the direction of Florence. I am now convinced that the greater part of Beauregard's army is near Florence and Tusculumbia, and that you will at least have a clear road before you for several days, and that your success will fully equal your expectations.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major General.*

(This was the last despatch received before cutting communications and starting for Savannah.)

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Cartersville, November 12, 1864.*

Major General THOMAS, *Nashville*:

Despatch received. All right.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

(Here wires were cut and all communication ceased.)

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Atlanta, Ga., November 15, 1864.*

GENERAL: The general-in-chief directs me to say that, upon your arrival at Madison, he desires that you will, if it can be done without too much delay, send eastward to the Oconee river and destroy the railroad bridge. By looking at the map you will see that a force sufficient to do this work can be sent from Madison, and afterwards join you further on. It is important the bridge should be destroyed.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp.*

Major General SLOCUM,  
*Commanding Left Wing, &c.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Yellow River, Ga., November 18, 1864.*

Despatch received. All is well with this column, which will be to-night on the east side of the Ulcofauhatchee, and to-morrow will take the Milledgeville road, leaving you the Eatonton road. Don't be in a hurry, but break up that railroad as far as the Oconee, in the most thorough manner, so that every rail will be disabled; better do that work well now when there is no opposition and you will have to give it your personal attention, else it will be slighted by your officers; impress on them its great importance, and that if done well now, it will not have to be done over at some future time under less favorable circumstances. I had every man of Davis's command at work yesterday all day and into the night, and yet they slighted some of their work, but I will set them at work again to-day between the Yellow and Alcovy (Ulcofauhatchee) rivers, about Covington. Our own experience shows how easily roads may be relaid if we have iron; therefore I want each bar of iron actually twisted either around a tree or with one of the hooks.

One division will be amply sufficient to go down to the bridge on Oconee. If you reach Eatonton by Monday it will be early enough. Keep your men fresh, and devour large quantities of potatoes and corn along the route.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Major General SLOCUM,  
*Commanding Left Wing, &c.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Cobb's Plantation, November 22, 1864.*

GENERAL: I am directed by the general-in-chief to write you as follows: The march of this wing has been since leaving Atlanta in two columns, and

very successful up to this time. The 14th corps is now on the Hillsboro' road, ten (10) miles west of Milledgeville, and the 20th corps must now be in the capital, having marched by the Eatonton road. The Georgia railroad, from and including the Oconee bridge, west to Lithonia, is well destroyed. Troops in fine condition, having fed high on sweet potatoes and poultry. Stock is also doing well, though the roads have been very heavy. The general desires you will report to him at Milledgeville to-morrow, (where he will go early,) in detail, your operations since leaving Atlanta, and also the position of your command in view of his making further orders. In the mean time you cannot do too much permanent damage to that railroad east of Macon and about Gordon.

You will also notify General Kilpatrick a similar report is desired of him.

I am, general, respectfully yours, &c.,

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp.*

General HOWARD,

*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Milledgeville, Ga., November 23, 1864.*

Major General HOWARD,

*Commanding Army of the Tennessee :*

By instructions of the general-in-chief, I give you the following directions : continue to destroy the railroad eastward to the Oconee in the most complete and thorough manner, burning and twisting every rail, and the same for a distance to the west towards Macon ; also destroy the Oconee bridge. You may lay your pontoon over the Oconee, but do not cross any of your command until further orders. Hardee has probably swung around via Albany for Savannah, which the general says is all right, and he don't care particularly. Kilpatrick will be moved here or in this vicinity for the present. The probability is, we will concentrate at or near Sandersville. Prosecute the railroad destruction in the most thorough manner and communicate with the general-in-chief frequently.

I am, general, respectfully yours, &c.,

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Tennille Station, Ga., November 27, 1864—10.15 a. m.*

GENERAL : The general commanding is now at this point and has put in motion two (2) divisions of the 14th corps without wagons from Sandersville, by Fenn's bridge, to Louisville. The 20th corps with all the trains of the left wing will move to Louisville by the road passing through Davisboro'. He wishes you to move your two corps eastward on the two roads, starting from Irwin's Cross-roads, as follows : the right column crossing Ohoopce river, straight for Johnson's ; thence along the main Savannah road to the first point where it intersects the road from Swainsboro', through Canoochee, Bark Camp, and Rocky Creek church, to Waynesboro'. At that point the commanding officer should have instructions to turn towards Station No. 9, in the absence of other orders. The left column to take the road from Irwin's Cross-roads direct towards Louisville until it intersects the road from Sandersville, next south of the railroad and south of Williamson's Swamp creek until abreast of Station No. 10, (or Sebastopol,) where it is probable we will cross the Ogeechee. The general proposes to attend this latter column himself.

Please renew your instructions to the detail breaking up the railroad from

Oconee to Tennille not to be in too great a hurry, but to do their work well. From this point it can join its proper corps on either of the above named routes. The general finds it difficult to get information of roads, but those described exist on all our maps.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY HITCHCOCK,

*Major and Assistant Adjutant General.*

Major General O. O. HOWARD,

*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Ga., Station 9½, November 30, 1864—3 p. m.*

Major General SLOCUM, *Commanding Left Wing, &c.:*

Your despatch of 7 p. m., 29th, just received, and the general-in-chief directs that you move your whole command by all practicable roads in the direction of Millen, keeping well to the north in the neighborhood of Bark Camp, Birdsville and Buck Head church, making a lodgement on the railroad north of Millen, destroying a section of track in the direction of Augusta, and turning on Millen in case you hear the sounds of battle.

We are at Station 9½, marked Burton on our maps, and will finish the railroad up to Millen.

As we are a day ahead, you will have to march pretty briskly.

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Station 9, Georgia, December 1, 1864.*

GENERAL: Yours of this date from opposite No. 8 is at hand, which I acknowledge by direction of the general-in-chief.

He has read your order to General Blair, and says "all right." He does not wish you to move to-morrow further than abreast of No. 7.

General Slocum is now abreast of us here, and to-morrow will reach the vicinity of Buck Head church, where there will be some delay to us, while Slocum is swinging around, and you may calculate on staying at No. 7 a day or two for us to get up even. At present Wheeler is very active, and Kilpatrick is operating in connexion with General Slocum. You will make disposition to cross at No. 7, but whether it will be necessary to do so will depend on the dispositions of the enemy.

I am, general, yours, &c.,

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp.*

Major General HOWARD,

*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Station 9, December 1, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of 12 m. yesterday just received, and Captain Audenreid has also returned. Your operations have been entirely satisfactory to the general-in-chief. He wishes you to move on the flank of the left wing, holding your command well in hand for further work, but always giving the enemy all he wants when he offers you battle. As regards retaliation, you must

be very careful as to the correctness of any information you may receive about the enemy murdering or mutilating our men. You may keep the prisoners you have or turn any portion of them over to General Slocum's infantry to guard, and keep such as you may wish to retain for your own object. You may communicate with Wheeler by flag of truce, and notify him of the conduct of his command toward our men; and that you shall retaliate, which you may do until you feel satisfied. When our men are found and you are fully convinced the enemy have killed them after surrender in fair battle, or have mutilated their bodies after having been killed in fair battle, you may hang and mutilate man for man without regard to rank.

I am, general, respectfully yours, &c.,

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp*.

Brig. Gen. J. KILPATRICK,

*Commanding Cavalry Division.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Millen, Ga., December 2, 1864.*

GENERAL: The general-in-chief has made camp near the mouth of Buck Head creek and the troops are passing over into Millen. He wishes you to-morrow to make a good break of the railroad from Millen towards Augusta, to the right and left of the points crossed by the 14th and 20th corps, after which to move out and continue the march toward Savannah by two roads, leaving the one along the railroad for General Blair. The two roads indicated on our maps, the one passing near Millen and Hunters mills, and the other sweeping around by Sharpe's and Buck Creek post office, will answer; but if one can be found leading from the upper road through Sylvania towards Halley's ferry, on the Savannah river, it would answer our purpose better for your left corps. General Kilpatrick will be instructed to confer with you and cover your rear. Dress to the right on the 17th corps, whose progress you can rate by the smoke. General Blair will continue to burn the railroad as he marches, as far as Ogeechee church. The general wishes all the heads of columns to be on the road leading from Millroy to Halley's ferry on the fourth day, including to-morrow.

Communicate as often as possible with him; but failing to hear from him, always act in concert with General Blair's column, which alone is expected to meet opposition. General Howard, with the 15th corps, will continue on the south bank of the Ogeechee, ready to turn any position of the enemy in case he offer opposition to our progress.

I am, general, very respectfully, &c.,

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp*.

Major General H. W. SLOCUM,

*Commanding Right Wing.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Millen, Ga., December 2, 1864.*

GENERAL: The army will move on Savannah, delaying only to continue the destruction of the railroad from Millen as far as Ogeechee church. General Howard will continue to move along the south bank of the Ogeechee, General Blair along the railroad, and General Slocum by the two roads lying north of the railroad, between it and the Savannah river. The general wishes you to confer with General Slocum, to make a strong feint up in the direction of

Waynesboro, and then to cover his rear from molestation by dashes of cavalry. I send you copies of two letters from members of Wheeler's staff, which will interest you; after reading, please return them for file in this office.

I am, general, respectfully yours, &c.,

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp.*

General KILPATRICK,

*Commanding Cavalry Division.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Millen, Ga., December 2, 1864.*

GENERAL: The next movement will be on Savannah; your two corps moving along down the Ogeechee; General Blair to destroy the railroad as far as Ogeechee church; and the 15th corps keeping on the south and west bank, ready to cross over in case of opposition to General Blair; otherwise it will not cross until near Eden No. 2. General Slocum will take the two roads north of the railroad and between it and the Savannah river. As he will have to make a wide detour, we must allow him until the fourth day to reach the road from Millroy to Halley's ferry, on the Savannah river; this will make slow marching for you, but, as a general rule, the rear of the 15th corps should be about abreast of General Blair's head of column. The general has a Savannah paper of yesterday, from which he notices the enemy still remain in doubt as to our intentions, being divided between Macon, Augusta, and Savannah; and also that an expedition of gunboats has passed up the Broad river toward Coosawahatchee.

If at any time during your progress you judge it feasible, you might dispatch a small, bold party of scouts down towards Hinesville to burn some culverts, and tear up some track, and cut the telegraph wires in several places on the Savannah and Gulf railroad, over which the city of Savannah is now chiefly supplied. The fewer the men, and the sooner such a party start, the better. The country is very sparsely settled, and very favorable for such an expedition.

I am, general, &c.,

L. M. DAYTON, *Aid-de-Camp.*

Major General O. O. HOWARD,

*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, No. 5½, C. R. R., December 4, 1864—¾ p. m.*

GENERAL: Your note of 10 a. m. has been received. The day has been so good that General Blair has got to the point on our map indicated by the intersection of the main road with that leading through Sylvania, Hunter's Mills, and Paris Academy, viz: four (4) miles west of Halcyon Dale. He keeps three brigades breaking railroad abreast of him. His advance, on arrival here, was fired on, but by parties who took good care to fire at long range and take to their heels. My judgment is, that if any opposition is made to us this side of Savannah, it will occur near Ogeechee church; but Howard's movement south of Ogeechee, by Millroy, will turn that position.

You have nothing to apprehend on your front, but should look to your rear, especially on General Davis's flank, until you get in the neck between Ogeechee church and Halley's ferry. I want you to report to me frequently, but, in the absence of orders, to move your entire wing, with Kilpatrick's cavalry in the direction of Springfield and Monteith, getting your left flank on the,

Savannah and Charleston railroad about Saint Augustine creek. General Blair will continue to move along the railroad, and the 15th corps will continue on the west side of the Ogeechee until abreast of Eden No. 2.

We continue to find abundance of forage, and all our animals are in first-rate condition. Nevertheless, I want to impress upon all the importance of filling all empty wagons; for it may be to our interest to act rapidly, without waiting to draw supplies from our new base.

If our marching on this flank is too fast for you, please notify me, and I will check it, as I am aware you are moving on a large circle.

We heard the firing to-day which you report, which, from its rate of fire, I inferred to be from Kilpatrick, who is fond of using artillery.

I do not know that I reported to you that at Millen we got a despatch that Bragg proposed to follow us with ten thousand (10,000) men from Augusta. If we can draw him down towards Savannah, we can turn on him and send him off at a tangent.

I am, general, &c.

W. T. SHERMAN.

*Major General.*

Major General SLOCUM, *Commanding Left Wing, &c.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Ogeechee Church, Ga., December 5, 1864.*

GENERAL: Since sending the messenger to you this morning, General Blair has entered this place almost unopposed. Some field-works are fresh, and, so far as I have examined, would be such as would be thrown up by five thousand (5,000) inexperienced hands.

General Slocum reports he will be to-night at the point where his road next north of this intersects the one from here to Poor Robin; but he has not heard from Generals Davis and Kilpatrick since he heard their firing yesterday morning. Davis has orders to move from the point where he separated from Slocum, viz: Buckhead church to Halley's ferry, abreast of this on the Savannah, via Sylvania. I have sent a courier to General Slocum to communicate with Davis at once, and report to me at what moment he will be ready to move on.

You will observe that with Davis at Halley's, we threaten South Carolina, and to that extent will confuse our enemy; but I will not lose a moment, only we must move in concert, or else will get lost. You may make all the dispositions to cross at No. 3, but the point No. 2 is the true one, unless modified by local geography.

I will disturb the railroad but little south of this, as we may have use for it out this far; still, Blair can burn the bridges and culverts, and burn enough barns to mark the progress of his head of column. I don't want him to start until I know Davis is abreast.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General HOWARD,

*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, No. 4½ Ogeechee Church, December 6, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your report of December 5 has been received, and gives the general-in-chief great satisfaction. He begs you to convey to your command his thanks for their gallant and valuable services in driving the enemy in con-

fusion beyond Brier creek, and in destroying those bridges so useful to the enemy.

At your suggestion he has ordered each army corps commander to select from his command one hundred cavalry horses, with a sufficient number of negroes to lead them, and to conduct them for your use to General Slocum's column, which is now on the middle Savannah road where it crosses the Statesboro' and Halley's ferry road. A copy of that order is enclosed, and you can adopt your own course to secure them. You may always rely upon the general for cavalry horses, as, in order to keep you well mounted, he will dismount every person connected with the infantry not necessary for its efficient service, and take team horses, even if the wagons and contents have to be burned.

On this flank matters have moved smoothly, and as we are a good distance in advance, are lying by for General Davis and yourself to get up abreast. General Howard is now near Brannan's store, west of the Ogeechee, abreast of Springfield. General Blair is here at Ogeechee church, where McLaws, with about five thousand (5,000) men, had prepared quite an extensive line of intrenchments; but Howard's movement outflanked him and he quit without a fight, and is now supposed to be at Eden No. 2. General Slocum is about six miles north of Ogeechee church, waiting for General Davis to get up abreast on the Halley's Ferry road. As soon as all are up we will move on Savannah by the four main roads from Brannan's store, Ogeechee church, Springfield, and the Savannah river road. As Wheeler is disposed of, you might, for the sake of forage, divide your command, coming together say about Monteith. We find a great deal of forage, but presume our infantry trains consume it all; still they do not seem to know that rice in the straw, fed in moderation, is most excellent forage; and you can take advantage of it, as you will find an abundance along the Savannah and Ogeechee rivers. As you come down, make a good deal of smoke and fuss about Halley's (now Hutchinson's) ferry and Sister's ferry, as though threatening to cross into South Carolina; and should Ebenezer creek be up, send word to General Davis to leave his brigade down until you are across.

No news from the outside world of any interest, but the fleet is known to be watching for us, as the citizens report it sending up rockets every night.

I am, general, with much regard,

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp*.

General KILPATRICK,  
*Commanding Cavalry.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Ogeechee Church, December 6, 1864—3½ p. m.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of 1.30 p. m. is just received, as also yours of 7 a. m., which was answered. The general is pleased at the progress of General Davis, but not knowing where he was, it compelled the halting of this column here to close up. To-morrow the general-in-chief expects General Howard to be at Eden No. 2. General Blair at Guyton, and if General Davis's head of column reaches Ebenezer, and can lay a bridge over that creek, it will answer. He wishes you not to pass Springfield, but from there to communicate with him at Guyton; but in the absence of orders the movement for the day following should be such as to place General Davis at or in advance of St. Augustine creek; and the column you are with, at or near Monteith. General Blair will be at Eden No. 2, and Howard will cross the river (Ogeechee.)

I am, general, yours respectfully,

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp*.

Major General H. W. SLOCUM,  
*Commanding Left Wing.*



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Ogeechee Church, December 6, 1864—3.45 p. m.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of to-day is just received. Reports from General Slocum and General Kilpatrick have also been received; the former will camp to-night on Turkey creek, in advance of this column, with his command well closed up. The latter attacked Wheeler near Thomas's station, and drove him through Waynesboro' and across Brier creek in confusion, killing and wounding a number, and capturing a hundred of his men; he also burned all the bridges on Brier creek, including (for good) the railroad bridge. To-morrow the entire army will move, General Slocum's left corps reaching Ebenezer, himself Springfield, and the 17th corps Guyton. The general-in-chief desires you in conjunction to reach Eden, opposite No. 2, and while General Blair threatens No. 2 by moving on No. 3, (Guyton,) to effect a crossing at or below No. 2.

I am, general, yours with regard,

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp.*

Major General HOWARD,

*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, 2½ miles from No. 3, December 7, 1864.*

GENERAL: Owing to the rain General Blair did not reach Guyton to-day, but is at the point about two and a half (2½) miles northwest of Guyton. The bridge over the small stream, without name, is burned, and some obstructions there are now being removed, so that early in the morning his column will move right forward on the road which passes about two (2) miles west of Guyton, and about the same distance east of Eden, where your road and ours come together. It will be well if you can find a road passing from Springfield to Monteith and Pooler's, and General Davis should be instructed to reach St. Augustine and the vicinity of Cherokee Hill. We must first secure the road indicated from Cherokee Hill to Silk Hope and Litchfield. We hear that the enemy is fortifying in a semicircle around Savannah and about four miles from it.

I am, general, respectfully yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General SLOCUM,

*Commanding Left Wing.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, December 8, 1864—7 p. m.*

GENERAL: We are at a point on the road from Millen to Savannah, about two (2) miles north of No. 2, called Mount Zion church.

General Slocum is but a short distance from us, and will move, to-morrow, on a road which branches off from this road and comes into the Augusta road ten (10) miles north of Savannah, where he will effect a junction with General Davis, destroy that railroad, drive the enemy within his intrenchments, and then work to the right and form a junction with us on this road as near Savannah as we may get. General Blair will move on this road by Pooler's, and so on until we drive the enemy within the intrenchments of Savannah, wherever they may be.

The general wishes you to get down in the neighborhood of Beverly, Silk Hope, or Litchfield, so as to advance in the direction of the plank road until we

come together or communicate by the road which leads from Silk Hope to Cherokee Hill. He aims to push the enemy far enough into Savannah to have the use of the shell road as a route of supply. If you can possibly do so, he wishes you to send a note by a canoe down the Ogeechee, pass the railroad bridge in the night, and inform the naval commander that we have arrived in fine condition, and are moving directly against Savannah, but for the present do not risk giving any details.

I am, general, with respect, &c.,

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp.*

Major General HOWARD,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

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#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Pooler's No. 1, December 9, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your despatch from the canal bridge just received. The 17th corps moved at the usual hour to-day and found the enemy defending the position covered by the swamp, about fifteen miles from Savannah. There was some skirmish fighting and use of artillery on both sides, but General Mower, who was in advance, handsomely drove the enemy from his positions and works, and we reached this point in good season.

The 17th corps will move as usual to-morrow morning, and will proceed until it reaches the main line of the enemy's works, supposed to be about four (4) miles from Savannah, when it will work to the right and connect with you. The general-in-chief desires you to move on the direct road on Savannah as usual, making progress until the enemy's main line is developed. He also wishes you to communicate with the fleet if possible. General Kilpatrick's command is divided, covering this and General Davis's column, and reports positively that Wheeler is on the east side of the Savannah river.

If the Mr. Cuyler you have as a prisoner be R. R. Cuyler, brother of Surgeon Cuyler of the old army, or his son George, the general-in-chief wishes you to send him to us when practicable, and in the mean time treat him as well as possible. Present the general's best wishes to Mr. King, and say he regrets Brown had not the good sense to follow his advice.

The general thinks best for you to leave a brigade at the bridge at Fort Argyle, to hold and guard it, as we may need it. We have not heard from General Slocum direct, but the sound of his guns would place him at Cherokee Hill, or near there; we heard them at sundown.

I am, general, yours, &c.,

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp.*

Major General HOWARD,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

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#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Poolers, No. 1, December 9, 1864.*

GENERAL: As yet we have heard nothing from you to-day except your guns, nearly due north from us, at three to five p. m. General Howard has reported, and is in possession of the Gulf railroad; captured one piece of artillery and some prisoners and a train of cars. Both corps have met opposition, but have overcome it, and Howard will move the 15th *via* the plank road, and the 17th *via* this, the main road, on Savannah, in the morning. The general wishes you

to continue along the Savannah river in your movement on the city, making as much progress as you can, until the enemy's main line is developed.

I am, general, very respectfully, yours, &c.,

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp.*

Major General SLOCUM,  
*Commanding Left Wing.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Savannah, December 11, 1864—2 a. m.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of December 10, and also Special Field Order 191, are just received. The general-in-chief wishes you to secure the trains cut off on the Gulf road, and also describe to him what is the position of King's bridge and Dillon's ferry—neither are on the map. I have had couriers looking for you since five p. m., 10th, with orders, but they are unable to find your headquarters. I send enclosed another copy. The general understands the trains to be between Way's and Fleming's stations.

I am, general, very respectfully, &c.,

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp.*

Major General O. O. HOWARD,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Savannah, Ga., (General Howard's Headquarters,)  
December 15, 1864—2 p. m.*

GENERAL: The general-in-chief has just returned from a visit to Ossabaw and Wassaw sounds, and directs me to inform you in full terms of the result. After having opened communication by signal with the gunboats, and got possession of Fort McAllister, he went in person to the gunboat below Fort McAllister, which proved to be a messenger boat from the flag-ship lying at the mouth of Ossabaw sound. After making communications to Washington, &c., he returned to Fort McAllister, and was overtaken by a messenger from General Foster, just from Port Royal. The general went on board General Foster's boat, and proceeded with him down the bay in hope to meet the admiral, but did not find him till after running around into Wassaw sound. General Foster then proceeded to Port Royal at 12 m. yesterday, to return with a fleet of transports loaded with six hundred thousand (600,000) rations and ten (10) days' forage for forty thousand (40,000) animals, and promised to be here by to-night. He will also bring with him six 20-lb. Parrott guns and six 30-lb. Parrotts, with three hundred rounds of ammunition per gun. The general then transferred to the admiral's vessel and returned to Fort McAllister, whence the admiral accompanied him as far up as the rice mill, where he had left his horse. He is now at General Howard's headquarters, and has sent for his camp to be transferred to a point near this, which is not far from the seven (7) mile post on the main road leading west from Savannah to the Ogeechee, marked on our map as a plank road. This point is about five (5) miles from his present headquarters, on the Louisville road. General Foster has five thousand (5,000) men near the Charleston railroad, north of Broad river, and near enough to the railroad to command it, so that he feels sure that cars cannot pass either way, but he has been unable to reach the railroad itself with his men, on account of the enemy's force. The gunboats and General Howard occupy all other avenues of approach to Savannah, connecting with your right. Now, if you can close the Savannah river to navigation, and also get a force over the Savannah river to threaten in flank any dirt road leading out of Savannah, between the city and Coosahatchie, the

investment of the city will be complete, and the enemy will have no escape. The general wants to place the batteries expected from General Foster in position as near the heart of Savannah as possible, ready to bombard it as soon as possible. You may therefore send horses to the Ogeechee river, at King's bridge, ready to haul those guns to your right front, and as soon as they are well in position, ready to open on the city, he proposes to demand its surrender. In the mean time our stores of all kinds will come up Ossabaw sound and the Ogeechee river to King's bridge, and thence be hauled to the camps. The canal is admirably adapted to your use, and the general suggests that you send some competent staff officer over to the Ogeechee, and, in concert with General Easton, chief quartermaster, collect as many boats as possible to transport your stores from King's bridge through the canal up to your very camp. At Dr. Cheves' plantation, ten (10) miles from King's bridge, the general himself saw at least half a dozen fine large flats, built expressly to transport rice through the canal to Savannah—the very thing wanted—and he has no doubt on other plantations at least twenty or twenty-five (20 or 25) boats could be collected, each capable of transporting twenty (20) tons. In dry weather wagons will be best, but in case of rainy weather these boats would be admirable. As soon as possible the general wants your batteries which are nearest the city prepared to execute the foregoing plans, and he wants you to write to him in full to-night any ideas that may have been suggested by your closer observation of the ground in your immediate front, and you may at once give orders for hauling provisions and forage from King's bridge, as Admiral Dahlgren assured him this morning that he would have all torpedoes and obstructions removed in the course of to-day. There is also a steamboat load of mail for your army, Colonel A. H. Markland in charge, which will be at King's bridge the instant torpedoes are removed. Captain Merritt brings this to you, and can satisfy all your inquiries, as he has been with the general.

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
 HENRY HITCHCOCK,  
*Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

Major General H. W. SLOCUM,  
*Commanding Left Wing.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*City Point, Va., December 3, 1864.*

GENERAL: The little information gleaned from the southern press indicating no great obstacle to your progress, I have directed your mails, which previously had been collected in Baltimore by Colonel Markland, special agent of the Post Office Department, to be sent as far as the blockading squadron off Savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as heard from on the coast. Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain from congratulating you and those under your command until bottom has been struck. I have never had a fear, however, for the result.

Since you left Atlanta no very great progress has been made here. The enemy has been closely watched, though, and prevented from detaching against you. I think not one man has gone from here except some twelve or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry. Bragg has gone from Wilmington. I am trying to take advantage of his absence to get possession of that place. Owing to some preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler are making to blow up Fort Fisher, and which, while I hope for the best, do not believe a particle in, there is a delay in getting this expedition off. I hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that Bragg will not have started back by that time.

In this letter I do not intend to give you anything like directions for future

action, but will state a general idea I have, and will get your views after you have established yourself on the sea-coast. With your veteran army I hope to get control of the only two through routes, from east to west, possessed by the enemy before the fall of Atlanta. This condition will be filled by holding Savannah and Augusta, or by holding any other post to the east of Savannah and Branchville. If Wilmington falls, a force from there can co-operate with you.

Thomas has got back into the defences of Nashville, with Hood close upon him. Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads except the main one leading to Chattanooga.

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I hope Hood will be badly crippled or destroyed. After all becomes quiet, and the roads up here so bad that there is likely to be a week or two that nothing can be done, I will run down the coast and see you.

Yours, truly,

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

Major General W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Commanding Armies near Savannah.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*City Point, Va., December 6, 1864.*

GENERAL: On reflection, since sending my letter by the hands of Lieutenant Dunn, I have concluded that the most important operation toward closing out the rebellion will be to close out Lee and his army. You have now destroyed the roads of the south, so that it will probably take them months, without interruption, to re-establish a through line from east to west. In that time, I think, the job here will be effectually completed. My idea now is that you establish a base on the coast, fortify, and leave in it all your artillery and cavalry, and enough infantry to protect them, and, at the same time, so threaten the interior that the militia of the south will have to be kept at home. With the balance of your command come here by water with all despatch. Select yourself the officer to leave in command, but you I want in person. Unless you see objections to this plan which I cannot see, use every vessel going to you, for the purpose of transportation.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

Major General W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI  
*In the field, near Savannah, December 16, 1864.*

GENERAL: I received day before yesterday, at the hands of Lieutenant Dunn, your letter of December 3, and last night, at the hands of Colonel Babcock, that of December 6. I had previously made you a hasty scrawl from the tug-boat Dandelion in Ogeechee river, advising you that the army had reached the sea-coast, destroying all railroads across the State of Georgia, and investing closely the city of Savannah, and had made connexion with the fleet.

Since writing that note, I have in person met and conferred with General Foster and Admiral Dahlgren, and made all the arrangements which I deemed essential to reduce the city of Savannah to our possession; but since the receipt of yours of the 6th I have initiated measures looking principally to coming to you with fifty thousand or sixty thousand (50,000 or 60,000) infantry, and in-

cidentally to take Savannah, if time will allow. At the time we carried Fort McAllister so handsomely by assault, with twenty-two (22) guns and its entire garrison, I was hardly aware of its importance; but since passing down the river with General Foster, and up with Admiral Dahlgren, I realize how admirably adapted are Ossabaw sound and Ogeechee river to supply an army operating against Savannah. Sea-going vessels can easily come to King's bridge, a point on Ogeechee river fourteen and a half ( $14\frac{1}{2}$ ) miles due west of Savannah, from which point we have roads leading to all our camps. The country is low and sandy, and cut up with marshes, which in wet weather will be very bad; but we have been so favored with weather that they are all now comparatively good, and heavy details are constantly employed in double corduroying the marshes, so that I have no fear even of a bad spell of weather. Fortunately, also, by liberal and judicious foraging, we reached the sea-coast abundantly supplied with forage and provisions, needing nothing on arrival except bread. Of this we started from Atlanta with from eight to twenty (8 to 20) days' supply for corps, and some of the troops only had one (1) day's issue of bread during the trip of thirty (30) days; and yet they did not want, for sweet potatoes were very abundant as well as corn-meal, and our soldiers took to them naturally. We started with about five thousand (5,000) head of cattle, and arrived with over ten thousand (10,000,) of course consuming mostly turkeys, chickens, sheep, hogs, and the cattle of the country. As to our mules and horses, we left Atlanta with about two thousand five hundred (2,500) wagons, many of which were drawn by mules which had not recovered from the Chattanooga starvation, all of which were replaced, the poor mules shot, and our transportation is now in superb condition. I have no doubt the State of Georgia has lost by our operations fifteen thousand (15,000) first-rate mules. As to horses, Kilpatrick collected all his remounts, and it looks to me, in riding along our columns, as though every officer has three or four led horses, and each regiment seems to be followed by at least fifty (50) negroes and foot-sore soldiers riding on horses and mules. The custom was for each brigade to send out daily a foraging party of about fifty (50) men on foot, who invariably returned mounted, with several wagons loaded with poultry, potatoes, &c., and, as the army is composed of about forty (40) brigades, you can estimate approximately the quantity of horses collected. Great numbers of these were shot by my orders, because of the disorganizing effect on our infantry of having too many idlers mounted. General Easton is now engaged in collecting statistics on this subject; but I know the government will never receive full accounts of our captures, although the result aimed at was fully attained, viz: to deprive our enemy of them. All these animals I will have sent to Port Royal, or collected behind Fort McAllister, to be used by General Saxton in his farming operations or by the quartermaster's department, after they are systematically accounted for.

While General Easton is collecting transportation for my troops to James river, I will throw to Port Royal island all our means of transportation I can, and collect the balance near Fort McAllister, covered by the Ogeechee river and intrenchments to be erected, and for which Captain Poe, my chief engineer, is now reconnoitring the grounds; but, in the mean time, I will act as I have begun, as though Savannah city were my only objective, namely: the troops will continue to invest Savannah closely, making attacks and feints wherever we have firm ground to stand upon, and I will place some thirty (30) pounder Parrots, which I have got from General Foster, in position near enough to reach the centre of the city, and then will demand its surrender. If General Hardee is alarmed or fears starvation, he may surrender; otherwise, I will bombard the city, but not risk the lives of my own men by assaults across the narrow causeways by which alone we can reach it. If I had time, Savannah, with all its dependent fortifications, is already ours, for we hold all its avenues of supply. The enemy has made two desperate efforts to get boats from above to the city,

in both of which he has been foiled; General Slocum, whose left flank rests on the river, capturing and burning the first boat, and in the second instance driving back two gunboats, and capturing the steamer *Resolute*, with seven naval officers and a crew of twenty-five seamen. General Slocum occupies Argyle island and the upper end of Hutchinson island, and has a brigade on the South Carolina shore opposite, and he is very urgent to pass one of his corps over to that shore. But in view of the change of plan made necessary by your orders of the 6th, I will maintain things *in statu quo* till I have got all my transportation to the rear and out of the way, and until I have sea-transportation for the troops you require at James river, which I will accompany and command in person. Of course, I will leave Kilpatrick with his cavalry, say five thousand three hundred (5,300), and it may be a division of the 15th corps; but, before determining this, I must see General Foster; and may arrange to shift his force (now over about the Charleston railroad, at the head of Broad river) to the Ogeechee, where, in co-operation with Kilpatrick's cavalry, he can better threaten the State of Georgia than from the direction of Port Royal. Besides, I would much prefer not to detach from my regular corps any of its veteran divisions, and would even prefer that other less valuable troops should be sent to re-enforce Foster from some other quarter. My four (4) corps, full of experience and full of ardor, coming to you en masse, equal to sixty thousand (60,000) fighting men, will be a re-enforcement that Lee cannot disregard. Indeed, with my present command I had expected, after reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to you. But this would consume, it may be, six weeks' time after the fall of Savannah, whereas by sea I can probably reach you with my men and arms before the middle of January.

As to matters in the southeast, I think Hardee in Savannah has good artillery, some five thousand (5,000) or six thousand (6,000) good infantry, and, it may be, a mongrel mass of eight thousand or ten thousand (8,000 or 10,000) militia and fragments. In all our marching through Georgia, he has not forced me to use anything but a skirmish line, though at several points he had erected fortifications, and made bombastic threats. In Savannah he has taken refuge in a line constructed behind swamps and overflowed rice-fields, extending from a point on the Savannah river, about three miles above the city, around to a branch of the Little Ogeechee, which stream is impassable from its salt marshes and boggy swamps, crossed only by narrow causeways or common corduroy roads. There must be twenty-five thousand (25,000) citizens, men, women, and children, in Savannah, that must also be fed, and how he is to feed them beyond a few days I cannot imagine, as I know that his requisitions for corn on the interior counties of Georgia were not filled, and we are in possession of the rice-fields and mills which could alone be of service to him in this neighborhood. He can draw nothing from South Carolina, save from a small corner down in the southeast, and that by a disused wagon road. I could easily get possession of this, but hardly deem it worth the risk of making a detachment which would be in danger by its isolation from the main army.

Our whole army is in fine condition as to health, and the weather is splendid. For that reason alone, I feel a personal dislike to turning northward.

I will keep Lieutenant Dunn here until I know the result of my demand for the surrender of Savannah, but, whether successful or not, shall not delay my execution of your orders of the 6th, which will depend alone upon the time it will require to obtain transportation by sea.

I am, with respect, &c., your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General United States Army.*

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT,

*Commander-in-Chief, City Point, Virginia.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Savannah, Ga., December 17, 1864.*

GENERAL: You have doubtless observed, from your station at Rosedew, that sea-going vessels now come through Ossabaw sound and up Ogeechee, to the rear of my army, giving me abundant supplies of all kinds, and more especially of heavy ordnance necessary to the reduction of Savannah. I have already received guns that can cast heavy and destructive shot as far as the heart of your city. Also, I have for some days held and controlled every avenue by which the people and garrison of Savannah can be supplied, and I am therefore justified in demanding the surrender of the city of Savannah and its dependent forts, and shall await a reasonable time your answer before opening with heavy ordnance. Should you entertain the proposition, I am prepared to grant liberal terms to the inhabitants and garrison; but should I be forced to resort to assault or the slower and surer process of starvation, I shall then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and shall make little effort to restrain my army, burning to avenge the great national wrong they attach to Savannah and other large cities, which have been so prominent in dragging our country into civil war.

I enclose you a copy of General Hood's demand for the surrender of the town of Resaca, to be used by you for what it is worth.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

General WILLIAM J. HARDEE,  
*Commanding Confederate Forces in Savannah.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Savannah, Ga., December 18, 1864—8 p. m.*

GENERAL: In compliance with the plan I indicated to you some days since, I made a demand during yesterday on General Hardee for the surrender of the city of Savannah and its dependent forts, and to-day received his answer declining to accede. You are aware I am ordered to carry this army to Virginia by sea, but I hope still to get possession of Savannah before sufficient transportation can be had to enable me to comply with General Grant's order. The thirty (30) pounder Parrotts which you sent me are now being hauled to batteries prepared for them, and in about two days' time, if we can possibly get the ground to stand upon, we shall assault the enemy's lines at four or more points. It is all-important that the railroad and telegraph wire should be broken between Savannah and Charleston, and the very best point is where your forces are represented to be, viz., near the Tullafinny. It seems to me that our operations here, especially along the Savannah river, must have drawn away every man from that quarter that they could possibly spare, and a bold rush on the railroad would probably develop a weaker force there than is supposed to be, or it may be that you could diminish that force, and use the balance in a small handy detachment east of Tullafinny, over about Old Pocotaligo. I merely throw out these ideas, and reiterate that it would aid us very much in this quarter if that force of yours be kept most active, more especially if you succeed in breaking the railroad and the telegraph wire, the further toward Charleston the better. Even if nothing better can be done, let them whale away with their thirty (30) pounder Parrotts, and break the road with cannon balls. It is possible, as a part of the general movement, that I may send a force in co-operation



with the navy toward the Union plank-road from the direction of Bluffton. I will go over and see the admiral again to-morrow, and it may be that I will see you, as in your last note you said that you would return again.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General J. G. FOSTER,  
*Commanding Department of the South, Hilton Head.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Savannah, Ga., December 18, 1864.*

GENERAL: I wrote you at length by Colonel Babcock on the 16th instant. As I therein explained my purpose, yesterday I made a demand on General Hardee for the surrender of the city of Savannah, and to-day received his answer refusing. Copies of both letters are herewith enclosed. You will notice that I claim that my lines are within easy cannon range of the heart of Savannah, but General Hardee claims we are four and a half miles distant. But I myself have been to the intersection of the Charleston and Georgia Central railroad, and the three (3) mile post is but a few yards beyond, within the line of our pickets. The enemy has no pickets outside of his fortified line, which is a full quarter of a mile within the three (3) mile post; and I have the evidence of Mr. R. R. Cuyler, president of the Georgia Central railroad, who was a prisoner in our hands, that the mile-posts are measured from the Exchange, which is but two squares back from the river. But by to-morrow morning I will have six (6) 30-pounder Parrott's in position, and General Hardee will learn whether I am right or not. From the left of our line, which is on the Savannah river, the spires can be plainly seen, but the country is so densely wooded with pine and live-oak, and lies so flat, that we can see nothing from any other part of our lines. General Slocum feels confident that he can make a successful assault at one or two points in front of the 20th corps, and one or two in front of General Davis's (14th) corps. But all of General Howard's troops, the right wing, lie behind the Little Ogeechee, and I doubt if it can be passed by troops in the face of an enemy; still we can make strong feints, and if I can get a sufficient number of boats I shall make a co-operative demonstration up Vernon river or Wassaw sound. I should like very much, indeed, to take Savannah before coming to you; but, as I wrote to you before, I will do nothing rash or hasty, and will embark for the James river as soon as General Easton, who is gone to Port Royal for that purpose, reports to me that he has an approximate number of vessels for transportation of the contemplated force. I fear even this will cost more delay than you anticipate, for already the movement of our transports and the gunboats has required more time than I had expected. We have had dense fogs, and there are more mud banks in the Ogeechee than were reported, and there are no pilots whatever.

Admiral Dahlgren promises to have the channel buoyed and staked; but it is not done yet. We find only six (6) feet water up to King's bridge at low tide, about ten (10) up to the rice-mills, and sixteen (16) to Fort McAllister. All these points may be used by us, and we have a good strong bridge across Ogeechee at King's, by which our wagons can go to Fort McAllister, to which point I am sending the wagons not absolutely necessary for daily use, the negroes, prisoners of war, sick, &c., en route for Port Royal.

In relation to Savannah, you will remark that General Hardee refers to his still being in communication with his war department. This language he thought would deceive me, but I am confirmed in the belief that the route to which he refers, namely, the Union plank road, on the South Carolina shore, is

inadequate to feed his army and the people of Savannah, for General Foster assures me that he has his force on that very road near the head of Broad river, and that his guns command the railroad, so that cars no longer run between Charleston and Savannah. We hold this end of the Charleston road, and have destroyed it from the three (3) mile post back to the bridge about twelve (12) miles above.

In anticipation of leaving this country, I am continuing the destruction of their railroads, and at this moment have two divisions and the cavalry at work breaking up the Gulf railroad from the Ogeechee to the Altamaha, so that even I do not take Savannah, I will leave it in a bad way. But I still hope that events will give me time to take Savannah, even if I have to assault with some loss. I am satisfied that unless we take it, the gunboats never will, for they can make no impression upon the batteries which guard every approach from the sea. And I have also a faint belief that when Colonel Babcock reaches you, you will delay operations long enough to enable me to succeed here. With Savannah in our possession, at some future time, if not now, we can punish South Carolina as she deserves, and as thousands of people in Georgia hope we will do.

I do sincerely believe that the whole United States, north and south, would rejoice to have this army turned loose on South Carolina, to devastate that State in the manner we have done in Georgia, and it would have a direct and immediate bearing on your campaign in Virginia.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT,  
*City Point, Virginia.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Savannah, Ga., December 19, 1864.*

GENERAL: The general-in-chief has gone to the bay. He directs me to further instruct you to push the preparations for the attack on the defences of Savannah as rapidly as possible, and then await further directions before doing more.

He will endeavor to get co-operations from Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster, with whom he will confer before returning. If in the mean time anything should occur that you would wish to communicate to him, please to send to me and I will forward.

I am, general, with respect,

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp.*

Major General SLOCUM, *Commanding Left Wing.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI  
*In the field, near Savannah, Ga., December 19, 1864.*

GENERAL: The general-in-chief has gone to the bay. He wishes you to push the preparations for attacking Savannah with all possible speed, but to await orders for the attack. He will see General Foster and the admiral before returning, and will get co-operation from both if possible. Should anything occur that you would like to communicate to the general, I will forward for you.

I am, general, with respect,

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp.*

Major General O. O. HOWARD,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Savannah, Ga., December 22, 1864—5 a. m.*

GENERAL: The general-in-chief has just returned to his headquarters, having been somewhat delayed on his way back from Port Royal by high winds. You are no doubt already aware that the enemy has evacuated Savannah, and our troops are in full possession of the city. For the present, however, supplies will continue to be received *via* Ogeechee river and the King's bridge road. The general directs me to say that he wishes you, until further orders, to continue to guard the depot of supplies at King's bridge with your cavalry, on the west side of the river, in connexion with the brigade of infantry still remaining between Big and Little Ogeechee. He is anxious to hear as soon as possible from General Mower's force sent down the Gulf railroad, also from your cavalry sent towards the Altamaha, and desires that you will at once send him all information you have or may obtain respecting them. He will himself go into Savannah this morning, and remove his headquarters thither, and will send you further orders after going there.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY HITCHCOCK,

*Major and A. A. G.*

Brigadier General KILPATRICK,

*Commanding Cavalry Division, Army of Georgia.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Savannah, Ga., December 22, 1864.*

DEAR GENERAL: I take great satisfaction in reporting that we are in possession of Savannah and all its forts. At first I proposed to extend across the river above the city from Slocum's left, but the enemy had a gunboat and ram heavily armed that would have made the step extra-hazardous; also the submerged rice-fields on the northeast bank were impracticable. I then went to Hilton Head to arrange with General Foster to re-enforce his movement from Broad river, but before I had completed the move Hardee got his garrison across and off on the Union plank-road. Our troops entered at daylight yesterday, took about eight hundred (800) prisoners, over one hundred (100) guns, some of the heaviest calibre, and a perfect string of forts from Savannah around to McAllister; also twelve thousand (12,000) bales of cotton, one hundred and ninety (190) cars, thirteen (13) locomotives, three (3) steamboats, and an immense supply of shells, shot, and all kinds of ammunition. There is a complete arsenal here, and much valuable machinery. The citizens mostly remain, and the city is very quiet. The river below is much obstructed, but I parted with Admiral Dahlgren yesterday at 4 p. m., and he will at once set about removing them and opening a way. The enemy blew up an iron-clad, the Savannah, a good ram, and three tenders, (small steamers.) As yet we have made but a partial inventory, but the above falls far short of our conquests. I have not a particle of doubt but that we have secured one hundred and fifty (150) fine guns with plenty of ammunition.

I have now completed my first step, and should like to go on to you *via* Columbia and Raleigh, but will prepare to embark as soon as vessels come. Colonel Babcock will have told you all, and you know better than anybody else how much better troops arrive by a land march than when carried by transports. I will turn over to Foster Savannah and all its out-posts, with, say, one division of infantry, Kilpatrick's cavalry, and plenty of artillery. Hardee has, of course, moved into South Carolina, but I do not believe his Georgia troops, militia and fancy companies, will work in South Carolina. His force is reported by citizens at from fifteen to twenty thousand (15 to 20,000.)

The capture of Savannah, with the incidental use of the rivers, gives us a magnificent position in this quarter, and if you can hold Lee, and if Thomas can continue as he did on the 18th, I could go on and smash South Carolina all to pieces, and also break up roads as far as the Roanoke. But, as I before remarked, I will now look to coming to you as soon as transports are ready. We all well and as confident as ever.

Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT,  
*Com'dg Armies of the United States, City Point, Va.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, December 16, 1864.*

GENERAL: Lieutenant General Grant informs me that in his last despatch sent to you, he suggested the transfer of your infantry to Richmond. He now wishes me to say that you will retain your entire force, at least for the present, and, with such assistance as may be given you by General Foster and Admiral Dahlgren, operate from such base as you may establish on the coast. General Foster will obey such instructions as may be given by you. Should you have captured Savannah, it is thought that by transferring the water-batteries to the land side, that place may be made a good depot, and base for operations on Augusta, Branchville, or Charleston. If Savannah should not be captured, or if captured and not deemed suitable for this purpose, perhaps Beaufort would serve as a depot. As the rebels have probably removed their most valuable property from Augusta, perhaps Branchville would be the most important point at which to strike, in order to sever all connexions between the Virginia and the Northwestern railroads. General Grant's wishes, however, are that this whole matter of your future actions should be left entirely to your discretion.

We can send you from here a number of complete batteries of field artillery, with or without horses, as you may desire. Also, as soon as General Thomas can spare them, all the fragments, convalescents and furloughed men of your army. It is reported that Thomas defeated Hood yesterday, near Nashville, but we have no particulars, nor official reports, telegraphic communications being interrupted by a heavy storm. Our last advices from you were in General Howard's note, announcing his approach to Savannah.

Yours, truly,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

Major General SHERMAN,  
*Via Hilton Head.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, December 18, 1864.*

MY DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 13th, by Major Anderson, is just received. I congratulate you on your splendid success, and shall very soon expect to hear of the crowning work of your new campaign, in the capture of Savannah. Your march will stand out prominently as the great one of this great war. When Savannah falls, then for another wide swath through the centre of the confederacy. But I will not anticipate. General Grant is expected here this morning, and will probably write you his own views.

I do not learn from your letter, or Major Anderson, that you are in want of

anything which we have not provided at Hilton Head. Thinking it probable that you might want more field artillery, I had prepared several batteries, but the great difficulty of foraging horses on the coast will prevent our sending any, unless you actually need them. The hay crop this year is short, and the quartermaster's department has great difficulty in procuring a supply for our animals.

General Thomas has defeated Hood, near Nashville, and it is hoped that he will completely crush his army. Breckinridge, at last accounts, was trying to form a junction near Murfreesboro', but as Thomas is between them, Breckinridge must either retreat or be defeated.

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Orders have been issued for all officers and detachments, having three months or more to serve, to rejoin your army, *via* Savannah. Those having less than three months to serve will be retained by General Thomas. Should you capture Charleston, I hope that by *some* accident the place may be destroyed; and if a little salt should be sown upon its site, it may prevent the growth of future crops of nullification and secession.

Yours, truly,

H. W. HALLECK,

*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

Major General W. T. SHERMAN, *Savannah.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

*Washington, D. C., December 18, 1864.*

MY DEAR GENERAL: I have just received and read, I need not tell you with how much gratification, your letter to General Halleck. I congratulate you and the brave officers and men under your command on the successful termination of your most brilliant campaign. I never had a doubt of the result. When apprehensions for your safety were expressed by the President, I assured him, with the army you had, and you in command of it, there was no danger, but you would *strike* bottom on salt water some place. That I would not feel the same security, in fact would not have intrusted the expedition to any other living commander.

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Breckinridge is said to be making for Murfreesboro'. If so, he is in a most excellent place. Stoneman has nearly wiped out John Morgan's old command, and five days ago entered Bristol. I did think the best thing to do was to bring the greater part of your army here and wipe out Lee. The turn affairs now seem to be taking has shaken me in that opinion. I doubt whether you may not accomplish more toward that result where you are than if brought here, especially as I am informed since my arrival in the city that it would take about two months to get you here, with all the other calls there are for ocean transportation.

I want to get your views on what ought to be done and what can be done. If you capture the garrison of Savannah, it certainly will compel Lee to detach from Richmond, or give us nearly the whole south. My own opinion is, Lee is averse to going out of Virginia; and if the cause of the south is lost, he wants Richmond to be the last place surrendered. If he has such views, it may be well to indulge him until we get everything else in our hands.

Congratulating you and the army again upon the splendid results of your campaign, the like of which is not read of in past history, I subscribe myself, more than ever, if possible, your friend,

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

Major General W. T. SHERMAN,

*Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Savannah, Ga., December 23, 1864.*

DEAR GENERAL: Major Dixon arrived last night, bringing your letter of the 10th December, for which I am very much obliged, as it gives me a clear and distinct view of the situation of affairs at Nashville up to that date. I have also from the War Department a copy of General Thomas's despatch, giving an account of the attack on Hood on the 15th, which was successful, but not complete. I await further accounts with anxiety, as Thomas's complete success is necessary to vindicate my plans for this campaign, and I have no doubt that my calculations that Thomas had in hand (including A. J. Smith's troops) a force large enough to whip Hood in fair fight was correct. I approve of Thomas's allowing Hood to come north far enough to enable him to concentrate his own men, though I would have preferred that Hood should have been checked about Columbia. Still, if Thomas followed up his success of the 15th, and gave Hood a good whaling, and is at this moment following him closely, the whole campaign in my division will be even more perfect than the Atlanta campaign, for at this end of the line I have realized all I had reason to hope for, except in the release of our prisoners, which was simply an impossibility.

December 24.—I have just received a letter from General Grant, giving a detail of General Thomas's operations up to the 18th, and I am gratified beyond measure at the result.

Show this letter to General Thomas, and tell him to consider it addressed to him, as I have not time to write more now. I want General Thomas to follow Hood to and beyond the Tennessee, and not to hesitate to go on as far as Columbus, Mississippi, or Selma, Alabama, as I know that he will have no trouble whatever in subsisting his army anywhere below Sand mountain and along the Black Warrior. In the poorest part of Georgia I found no trouble in subsisting my army and animals, some of my corps not issuing but one (1) day's bread from Atlanta to Savannah.

Keep me fully advised by telegraph, *via* New York, of the situation of affairs in Tennessee. I will be here probably ten (10) days longer, and in communication for a longer time.

I am, very truly, yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

General J. D. WEBSTER,  
*Nashville, Tennessee.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Savannah, Ga., December 24, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your letter of December 18th is just received. I feel very much gratified at receiving the handsome commendation you pay my army. I will, in general orders, convey to the officers and men the substance of your note.

I am also gratified that you have modified your former orders, as I feared that the transportation by sea would very much disturb the unity and *morale* of my army, now so perfect.

The occupation of Savannah, which I have heretofore reported, completes the first part of our game and fulfils a great part of your instructions; and I am now engaged in dismantling the rebel forts, which bear upon the sea and channels, and transferring the heavy ordnance and ammunition to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, where they can be more easily guarded than if left in the city.

The rebel inner lines are well adapted to our purpose, and, with slight modifications, can be held by a comparatively small force, and in about ten (10) days I expect to be ready to sally forth again. I feel no doubt whatever as to our future plans. I have thought them over so long and well that they appear as clear as

daylight. I left Augusta untouched on purpose, because the enemy will be in doubt as to my objective point, after crossing the Savannah river, whether it be Augusta or Charleston, and will naturally divide his forces. I will then move either on Branchville or Columbia, by any curved line that gives me the best supplies, breaking up in my course as much railroad as possible, then ignoring Charleston and Augusta both. I would occupy Columbia and Camden, pausing there long enough to observe the effect. I would then strike for the Charleston and Wilmington railroad, somewhere between the Santee and Cape Fear rivers, and, if possible, communicate with the fleet under Admiral Dahlgren (whom I find a most agreeable gentleman, in every way accommodating himself to our wishes and plans.) Then I would favor Wilmington, in the belief that Porter and Butler will fail in their present undertaking. Charleston is now a mere desolated wreck, and is hardly worth the time it would take to starve it out. Still, I am aware that, historically and politically, much importance is attached to the place, and it may be that, apart from its military importance, both you and the administration would prefer I should give it more attention; and it would be well for you to give me some general idea on that subject, as otherwise I would treat it, as I have expressed, as a point of little importance, after all its railroads leading into the interior are destroyed or occupied by us. But on the hypothesis of ignoring Charleston and taking Wilmington, I would then favor a movement direct on Raleigh. The game is then up with Lee, unless he comes out of Richmond, avoids you and fights me, in which case I should reckon on your being on his heels.

Now that Hood is used up by Thomas, I feel disposed to bring the matter to an issue as quick as possible. I feel confident that I can break up the whole railroad system of South Carolina and North Carolina, and be on the Roanoke, either at Raleigh or Weldon, by the time the spring fairly opens; and if you feel confident that you can whip Lee outside of his intrenchments, I feel equally confident that I can handle him in the open country.

One reason why I would ignore Charleston is this: That I believe they will reduce the garrison to a small force, with plenty of provisions, and I know that the neck back of Charleston can be made impregnable to assault, and we will hardly have time for siege operations.

I will have to leave in Savannah a garrison, and, if Thomas can spare them, I would like to have all detachments, convalescents, &c., belonging to these four corps sent forward at once. I don't want to cripple Thomas, because I regard his operations as all important, and I have ordered him to pursue Hood down into Alabama, trusting to the country for supplies.

I reviewed one of my corps to-day, and shall continue to review the whole army. I don't like to boast, but I believe this army has a confidence in itself that makes it almost invincible. I wish you would run down and see us; it would have a good effect, and would show to both armies that they are acting on a common plan. The weather is now cool and pleasant, and the general health very good.

Your true friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT,  
*City Point, Virginia.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Savannah, December 24, 1864.*

GENERAL: I had the pleasure of receiving your two letters of the 16th and 18th instant to-day, and I feel more than usually flattered by the high encomiums you have passed on our recent campaign, which is now complete by the occupation of Savannah.

I am also very glad that General Grant has changed his mind about embarking my troops for James river, leaving me free to make the broad swath you describe through South and North Carolina, and still more gratified at the news from Thomas in Tennessee, because it fulfils my plans which contemplated his being fully able to dispose of Hood in case he ventured north of the Tennessee river. So I think, on the whole, I can chuckle over Jeff. Davis's disappointment in not turning my Atlanta campaign into a "Moscow disaster."

I have just finished a long letter to General Grant, and have explained to him that we are engaged in shifting our base from the Ogeechee over to the Savannah river, dismantling all the forts made by the enemy to bear upon the salt-water channels, and transferring the heavy ordnance, &c., to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, and in remodelling the enemy's interior lines to suit our future plans and purposes. I have also laid down the programme of a campaign which I can make this winter, which will put me in the spring on the Roanoke in direct communication with him on the James river. In general terms, my plan is to turn over to General Foster the city of Savannah and to sally forth with my army re-supplied, cross the Savannah, feign on Charleston and Augusta, but strike between, breaking en route the Charleston and Augusta railroad, also a large part of that from Branchville and Camden toward North Carolina, and then rapidly move to some point of the railroad from Charleston to Wilmington, between the Santee and Cape Fear rivers; then communicating with the fleet in the neighborhood of Georgetown, I would turn upon Wilmington or Charleston, according to the importance of either; I rather prefer Wilmington, as a live place, over Charleston, which is dead and unimportant when its railroad communications are broken. I take it for granted the present movement on Wilmington will fail. If I should determine to take Charleston I would turn across the country, (which I have hunted over many a time, from Santee to Mount Pleasant,) throwing one wing on the peninsula between Ashley and Cooper. After accomplishing one or the other of these ends, I would make a bee-line for Raleigh, or Weldon, when Lee would be forced to come out of Richmond or acknowledge himself beaten. He would, I think, by the use of the Danville railroad, throw himself rapidly between me and Grant, leaving Richmond in the hands of the latter. This would not alarm me, for I have an army which I think can manœuvre, and I would force him to attack me at a disadvantage, always under the supposition that Grant would be on his heels; and if the worst come to the worst, I could fight my way down to Albemarle sound or Newbern.

I think the time has come now when we should attempt the boldest moves, and my experience is that they are easier of execution than more timid ones, because the enemy is disconcerted by them—as, for instance, my recent campaign.

I also doubt the wisdom of concentration beyond a certain point, as the roads of this country limit the amount of men that can be brought to bear in any one battle; and I don't believe that any one general can handle more than sixty thousand (60,000) men in battle.

I think my campaign of the last month, as well as every step I take from this point northward, is as much a direct attack upon Lee's army as though I were operating within the sound of his artillery.

I am very anxious that Thomas should follow up his success to the very uttermost point. My orders to him before I left Kingston were, after beating Hood, to follow him as far as Columbus, Mississippi, or Selma, Alabama, both of which lie in districts of country which I know to be rich in corn and meat.

I attach more importance to these deep incursions into the enemy's country, because this war differs from European wars in this particular—we are not only fighting hostile armies but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies. I know that this recent movement of mine through Georgia has had a wonderful



effect in this respect. Thousands who had been deceived by their lying papers into the belief that we were being whipped all the time, realized the truth, and have no appetite for a repetition of the same experience. To be sure, Jeff. Davis, has his people under a pretty good shape of discipline, but I think faith in him is much shaken in Georgia, and I think before we are done South Carolina will not be quite so tempestuous.

I will bear in mind your hint as to Charleston, and don't think "salt" will be necessary. When I move the 15th corps will be on the right of the right wing, and their position will bring them naturally into Charleston first; and if you have watched the history of that corps, you will have remarked that they generally do their work up pretty well. The truth is, the whole army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all that seems in store for her. Many and many a person in Georgia asked me why we did not go to South Carolina; and when I answered that I was *en route* for that State, the invariable reply was, "Well, if you will make those people feel the severities of war, we will pardon you for your desolation of Georgia."

I look upon Columbia as quite as bad as Charleston, and I doubt if we shall spare the public buildings there as we did at Milledgeville.

I have been so busy lately that I have not yet made my official report, and think I had better wait until I get my subordinate reports before attempting it, as I am anxious to explain clearly not only the reasons for every step, but the amount of execution done, and this I cannot do until I get the subordinate reports; for we marched the whole distance in four or more columns, and of course I could only be present with one, and generally that one engaged in destroying railroads. This work of destruction was performed better than usual, because I had an engineer regiment provided with claws to *twist the bars* after being heated. Such bars can never be used again; and the only way in which a railroad line can be reconstructed across Georgia is to make a new road from Fairburn station, twenty-four (24) miles southwest of Atlanta, to Madison, a distance of one hundred (100) miles, and before that can be done I propose to be on the road from Augusta to Charleston, which is a continuation of the same.

I felt somewhat disappointed at Hardee's escape from me, but really am not to blame. I moved as quick as possible to close up the "Union causeway," but intervening obstacles were such that before I could get my troops on the road Hardee had slipped out. Still, I know that the men that were in Savannah will be lost, in a measure, to Jeff. Davis, for the Georgia troops under G. W. Smith declared they would not fight in South Carolina, and they have gone north, en route for Augusta; and I have reason to believe the North Carolina troops have gone to Wilmington; in other words, they are scattered. I have reason to believe that Beauregard was present in Savannah at the time of its evacuation, and I think that he and Hardee are now in Charleston, doubtless making preparations for what they suppose will be my next step.

Please say to the President that I received his kind message through Colonel Markland, and feel thankful for his high favor. If I disappoint him in the future, it shall not be from want of zeal or love to the cause.

Of you I expect a full and frank criticism of my plans for the future, which may enable me to correct errors before it is too late. I do not wish to be rash, but want to give my rebel friends no chance to accuse us of want of enterprise or courage.

Assuring you of my high personal respect, I remain, as ever, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General.

Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Savannah, Ga., December 28, 1864.*

GENTLEMEN: I have a copy of the resolutions adopted by you. They are surely strong enough and patriotic enough. I will aid you all that is possible, and do all in my power to encourage you and to defend you in your course. I do think we have been at war long enough for truth to reveal itself. We are fellow-countrymen, and bound by every principle of honor and honesty to maintain and defend the "Union" given us by Washington, and that is all I aim at; and the moment Georgia resumes her place in the Union, and sends her representatives to Congress, she is at once at peace, and all the laws, both national and State, are revived. If you will stay at home quietly and call back your sons and neighbors to resume their peaceful pursuits, I will promise you ammunition to protect yourselves and property. If rebel soldiers do any of you violence I will retaliate; and if you will bring your produce to Savannah I will cause it to be protected in transitu and allow it to be sold in market to the highest bidder, and our commissary will buy your cattle, hogs, sheep, &c.

It would be well to form a league and to adopt some common certificate, so that our officers and soldiers may distinguish between you and open rebels. I will be glad to confer with any of your people, and will do all that is fair to encourage you to recover the peace and prosperity you enjoyed before the war.

I am, with respect,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

MESSRS. P. J. STANFIELD, A. J. PAGITT, AND OTHERS,  
*of Liberty and Tatnall Counties, Georgia.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Savannah, Ga., December 29, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have read with pleasure your report just received, as well as those of your brigade commanders.

I beg to assure you that the operations of the cavalry under your command have been skilful and eminently successful. As you correctly state in your report, you handsomely feigned on Forsyth and Macon, afterwards did all that was possible towards the rescue of our prisoners at Millen, which failed simply because the prisoners were not there; and I will here state (that you may have it over my signature) that you acted wisely and well in drawing back from Wheeler to Louisville, as I had instructed you not to risk your cavalry command. And subsequently, at Thomas's station, Waynesboro', and Brier creek, you whipped a superior cavalry force, and took from Wheeler all chance of boasting over you. But the fact that to you, in a great measure, we owe the march of four strong columns of infantry, with heavy trains and wagons, over three hundred (300) miles through an enemy's country, without the loss of a single wagon, and without the annoyance of cavalry dashes on our flanks, is honor enough for any cavalry commander.

I will retain your report for a few days that I may, in my report, use some of your statistics, and then will forward it to the War Department, when I will indorse your recommendations, and make such others as I may consider necessary and proper.

I am, truly, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Brigadier General JUDSON KILPATRICK,  
*Commanding Cavalry Division, Army of Georgia.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Savannah, Ga., December 31, 1864.*

GENERAL: The steamer leaves with the mail this afternoon at 5 p. m. I write only to say that since my last to you there is nothing of importance to communicate. The city is perfectly quiet and orderly. The enemy appear to be making preparations to receive us over in South Carolina. As soon as I can accumulate a sufficient surplus of forage and provisions to load my wagons I shall be ready to start. We find the Savannah river more obstructed than we expected. It is filled with crib-works loaded with paving-stones, making mud islands, with narrow, tortuous and difficult channels. All our stores have to be lightered up from the ship's anchorage about Tybee.

I have been engaged in reviewing my troops, and feel a just pride in their fine soldierly condition and perfect equipment.

I propose at once to make lodgements in South Carolina about Port Royal, opposite this city, and up about Sister's ferry. When all is ready, I can feign at one or more places and cross at the other; after which my movements will be governed by those of the enemy, and such instructions as I may receive from Lieutenant General Grant before starting. I do not think I can employ better strategy than I have hitherto done, namely, make a good ready, and then move rapidly to my objective, avoiding a battle at points where I would be encumbered by wounded, but striking boldly and quickly when my objective is reached.

I will give due heed and encouragements to all peace movements, but conduct war as though it could only terminate with the destruction of the enemy and the occupation of all his strategic points.

The weather is fine, the air cool and bracing, and my experience in this latitude convinces me that I may safely depend on two good months for field work.

I await your and General Grant's answer to my proposed plan of operations before taking any steps indicative of future movements. I should like to receive, before starting, the detachments left behind in Tennessee belonging to these four corps; and it would be eminently proper that General Foster should be re-enforced by about five thousand (5,000) men, to enable him to hold Savannah without calling upon me to leave him one of my old divisions, which is too valuable in the field to be left behind in garrison.

I would also deem it wise so far to respect the prejudices of the people of Savannah as not to garrison the place with negro troops. It seems a perfect bugbear to them, and I know that all people are more influenced by prejudice than by reason.

The army continues in the best of health and spirits, and, notwithstanding the habits begotten during our rather vandalic march, its behavior in Savannah has excited the wonder and admiration of all.

I am, with great respect, very truly yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

*Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Savannah, Ga., December 31, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your note enclosing Mr. Cohen's of this date is received, and I answer frankly through you his inquiries.

First. No one can practice law as an attorney in the United States without acknowledging the supremacy of our government. If I am not in error, an

attorney is as much an officer of the court as the clerk, and it would be a novel thing in a government to have a court to administer law that denied the supremacy of the government itself.

Second. No one will be allowed the privileges of a merchant; or, rather, to trade is a privilege which no one should seek of the government without in like manner acknowledging its supremacy.

Third. If Mr. Cohen remains in Savannah as a denizen, his property, real and personal, will not be disturbed, unless its temporary use be necessary for the military authorities of the city. The title to property will not be disturbed in any event until adjudicated by the courts of the United States.

Fourth. If Mr. Cohen leaves Savannah under my Special Order No. 143, it is a public acknowledgment that he "adheres to the enemies of the United States," and all his property becomes forfeited to the United States. But, as a matter of favor, he will be allowed to carry with him clothing and furniture for the use of himself, his family, and servants, and will be transported within the enemy's lines, but not by way of Port Royal.

These rules will apply to all people, and from them no exceptions will be made.

I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General F. P. BLAIR,

*Commanding 17th Army Corps.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Savannah, Ga., December 31, 1864.*

DEAR ADMIRAL: Captain Breese has this moment arrived with your letter of December 29, and I assure you it does my heart good to feel that I am once more near you. I hope soon we will meet again in person.

I have already submitted to Generals Halleck and Grant a plan for a campaign which will bring my whole army to Wilmington, which I know I can take as easily, if not more so, than Savannah. I do not think you can take those shore-batteries with your gunboats, or do more than drive the gunners to the cover of their bomb-proofs. I have examined carefully many of the forts about Savannah, and find them so well covered by traverses and bomb-proof shelters that you might blaze away at them for a month, from the direction of the sea channels, without materially harming them. I have no doubt, however, from what you say, that Butler's men ought to have taken Fort Fisher in about three minutes, for its bomb-proofs cannot possibly shelter more than two hundred men, who would be, as you say, crouching in a defenceless position as against an attacking force. But even after you have got Fisher, then comes Caswell, Fort Johnson, and, I suppose, a string of forts all the way back to Wilmington. Now, I propose to march my whole army through South Carolina, tearing up railroads and smashing things generally; feign on Charleston, and rapidly come down on Wilmington from the rear, taking all their works in reverse. I submitted this plan to General Grant on the 24th, and shall expect his answer very soon, and will be ready to start the moment I can replenish my wagons with bread, sugar, coffee, &c.

At present the Savannah river is badly obstructed by heavy cribs filled with cobblestones, which have served to make islands of mud and sand, leaving narrow, difficult, and tortuous channels between. Through these channels all our stores have to be brought in launches and light-draught boats, of which we have an inadequate number, so that thus far we barely get enough for daily consumption. But all hands are hard at work, and I hope by the 10th of January to get enough ahead to load our wagons and be ready to start. It will

take some time for me to reach Wilmington, but I am certain that mine is the only mode by which the place can be taken effectually.

My army is a good one, but not large enough to make detachments from. I had to leave with Thomas enough men to whip Hood, and have written to General Grant to send to Foster enough men to hold Savannah while I move with my entire force.

It is very important that I should have two or more points along the coast where I can communicate with you, and where I could have some spare ammunition and provisions in reserve; say Bull's bay, Georgetown, and Masonboro.'

I think, when you come to consider my position, you will agree with me that my proposition is better than to undertake to reduce, in detail, the forts about Wilmington; and you can so manœuvre as to hold a large portion of the enemy to the sea-coast while I ravage the interior; and when I do make my appearance on the coast we will make short work of them all.

I have shown to Captain Breese my letters to Grant and Halleck, and will explain to him fully everything that will interest you, and as soon as I can hear from General Grant, will send a steamer to you advising you of the time of starting. I rather fear, however, that the President's anxiety to take Charleston may induce Grant to order me to operate against Charleston rather than Wilmington, though I much prefer the latter.—Charleston being a dead cock in the pit altogether.

I am, most truly, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Admiral D. D. PORTER,

*Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*City Point, Va., December 26, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your very interesting letter of the 22d instant, brought by the hands of Major Gray, of General Foster's staff, is just at hand.

As the major starts back at once, I can do no more at present than simply acknowledge its receipt. The capture of Savannah, with its immense stores, must tell upon the people of the south. All well here.

Yours, truly,

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

Major General W. T. SHERMAN,

*Savannah, Georgia.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*City Point, Va., December 27, 1864.*

GENERAL: Before writing you definite instructions for the next campaign I wanted to receive your answer to my letter written from Washington. Your confidence in being able to march up and join this army pleases me, and I believe it can be done. The effect of such a campaign will be to disorganize the South, and prevent the organization of new armies from their broken fragments. Hood is now retreating with his army broken and demoralized. His loss in men has probably not been far from 20,000 besides deserters. If time is given, the fragments may be collected together, and many of the deserters reassembled. If we can we should act to prevent this. Your spare army, as it were, moving as proposed, will do this.

In addition to holding Savannah, it looks to me that an intrenched camp ought to be held on the railroad between Savannah and Charleston. Your

movements towards Branchville will probably enable Foster to reach this with his own force. This will give us a position in the south from which we can threaten the interior without marching over long, narrow causeways, easily defended, as we have heretofore been compelled to do. Could not such a camp be established about Pocotaligo or Coosawhatchie?

I have thought that, Hood being so completely wiped out for present harm, I might bring A. J. Smith here with from ten thousand to fifteen thousand. With this increase I could hold my lines, and move out with a greater force than Lee has. It would compel him to retain all his present force in the defences of Richmond or abandon them entirely. This latter contingency is probably the only danger to the easy success of your expedition. In the event you should meet Lee's army you would be compelled to beat it or find the sea-coast. Of course I shall not let Lee's army escape if I can help it, and will not let it go without following it to the best of my ability.

Without waiting further directions, then, you may make preparations to start on your northern expedition without delay. Break up the railroads in South and North Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond as soon as you can.

I will leave out all suggestions about the route you should take, knowing that your information, gained daily in the progress of events, will be better than any that can be obtained now. It may not be possible for you to march to the rear of Petersburg; but failing in this, you could strike either of the sea-coast ports in North Carolina held by us. From there you could easily take shipping. It would be decidedly preferable, however, if you could march the whole distance. From the best information I have you will find no difficulty in supplying your army until you cross the Roanoke. From there here is but a few days' march, and supplies could be collected south of the river to bring you through. I shall establish communication with you there by steamboat and gunboat. By this means your wants can be partially supplied.

I shall hope to hear from you soon, and to hear your plan, and about the time of starting.

Please instruct Foster to hold on to all the property captured in Savannah, and especially the cotton. Do not turn it over to citizens or treasury agents without orders of the War Department.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

Major General W. T. SHERMAN,

*Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Savannah, Ga., January 2, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have received by the hands of General Barnard your note of 26th, and letter of 27th December.

I herewith enclose to you a copy of a projet which I have this morning, in strict confidence, discussed with my immediate commanders. I shall need, however, larger supplies of stores, especially grain. I will enclose to you with this letters from General Easton, quartermaster, and Colonel Beckwith, commissary of subsistence, setting forth what will be required, and trust you will forward them to Washington, with your sanction, so that the necessary steps may be taken at once to enable me to carry out this plan on time. I wrote you very fully on the 24th, and have nothing to add to that. Everything here is quiet, and if I can get the necessary supplies in my wagons I shall be ready to start at the time indicated in my projet, (January 15.) But until those supplies are in hand I can do nothing; after they are I shall be ready to move with

great rapidity. I have heard of the affair at Cape Fear; it has turned out as you will remember I expected. I have furnished General Easton a copy of the despatch from the Secretary of War. He will retain possession of all cotton here, and ship it as fast as vessels can be had to New York. I shall immediately send the 17th corps over to Port Royal, by boats furnished by Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster, without interfering with General Easton's vessels, to make a lodgement on the railroad at Pocotaligo.

General Barnard will remain with me a few days, and I shall send this by a staff officer, who can return on one of the vessels of the supply fleet. I suppose that now General Butler has got through with them, you can spare them to us.

My report of recent operations is nearly ready, and will be sent on in a day or two, as soon as some further subordinate reports come in.

I am, with great respect, very truly, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT, *City Point.*

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
*Washington, December 26, 1864.*

MY DEAR GENERAL SHERMAN: Many, many thanks for your Christmas gift, the capture of Savannah. When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic coast, I was anxious, if not fearful; but feeling that you were the better judge, and remembering that "nothing risked, nothing gained," I did not interfere. Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours; for I believe none of us went further than to acquiesce. And taking the work of General Thomas into the count, as it should be taken, it is indeed a great success. Not only does it afford the obvious and immediate military advantages, but, in showing to the world that your army could be divided, putting the stronger part to an important new service, and yet leaving enough to vanquish the old opposing force of the whole—Hood's army—it brings those who sat in darkness to see a great light. But what next? I suppose it will be safer if I leave General Grant and yourself to decide.

Please make my grateful acknowledgments to your whole army, officers and men.

Yours, very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Savannah, January 6, 1865.*

DEAR SIR: I am gratified at the receipt of your letter of December 26, at the hands of General Logan, especially to observe that you appreciate the division I made of my army, and that each part was duly proportioned to its work.

The motto, "Nothing venture, nothing win," which you refer to, is most appropriate, and should I venture too much, and happen to lose, I shall bespeak your charitable inference.

I am ready for the "great next" as soon as I can complete certain preliminaries, and learn of General Grant his and your preferences of intermediate "objectives."

With great respect, your servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

His Excellency President LINCOLN, *Washington.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Savannah, January 16, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have your reports of Saturday and yesterday, and am glad you got the position of Pocotaligo so cheaply. It is of great value to us in the future, and I wish you to have it thoroughly strengthened, and all water channels to its south and east reconnoitred. Don't seem to feel up the peninsula, but rather towards the Salkehatchie. Go on and accumulate supplies and stores, and get ready, as soon as possible, to sally forth with your whole wing, supplied as well as possible. I have ordered Slocum to push one division to Hardeeville and Puryburg, and to open up communication with you. I will try and get Davis started by Wednesday, but cannot hear of the troops from Baltimore, to relieve Geary here. I will not move from Pocotaligo till we get a good supply in our wagons, as that is the great point.

Truly yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General.*

Major General HOWARD,

*Commanding Right Wing, Beaufort.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Savannah, Ga., January 16, 1865.*

GENERAL: Since my letter of this morning, I have official reports from General Howard, commanding right wing. He crossed from Beaufort island on Saturday, the 14th, by Port Royal ferry, to the main land, with the 17th corps, General Blair, and marched for Pocotaligo. They encountered the enemy near Garden's corner, but soon outflanked him and followed, dislodging him from position to position, till he took refuge in a strong fort at Pocotaligo. This is described as a well-constructed enclosed work, pierced for twenty-four (24) guns, and the approaches covered by the peculiar salt-marsh points that guard this coast. Night overtook the command there, and Sunday morning the enemy was gone. Howard expresses great satisfaction thereat, as it was Sunday, and it saved him an assault which might have cost him some valuable lives. As it was, he lost Lieutenant Chandler, of General Leggett's staff, killed, and Captain Kellogg, of General Giles A. Smith's staff, wounded. He writes that eight or ten will cover his loss. He reports three guns captured at Garden's corner. We are therefore now in possession of good high ground on the railroad at Pocotaligo, with a good road back twenty-five (25) miles to Beaufort.

I will order Howard to forage toward Charleston, but proceed to get my army and trains across, and can start north the moment I can get my wagons loaded.

The weather at sea has been so stormy that vessels are behind, and it has been touch and go to get daily food. I have ordered Slocum to push a division up to Hardeeville and Puryburg, and think I can use the Savannah river up to that point. We are hard at work corduroying the roads across the rice-fields by the Union causeway.

The Secretary told me I would surely receive four thousand (4,000) men from Baltimore, to garrison Savannah. They are not heard of here yet.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT,

*City Point, Virginia.*



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Savannah, Ga., January 17, 1865.*

DEAR ADMIRAL: I am this moment in receipt of your letter of January 12, with the roll of maps, for which I am much obliged, and I hope you will succeed at Fisher, as it will set free much of your fleet for other purposes; but if Terry does not assault, he should occupy the peninsula at the narrow neck represented on the map, about four miles north of Fisher, with a strong line looking to the rear, and a battery of 20-pounder Parrotts commanding the channel of Cape Fear river. I know that the enemy would not naturally keep in Fort Fisher to exceed five or six hundred (500 or 600) men, and they could be held there; still, if he takes it, it settles that matter, and the majority of his troops could return to Grant, or re-enforce Newbern, and work out towards Kingston.

I will send my railroad man, W. W. Wright, up to Newbern, and can send any number of cars and locomotives, so that we can use that road back to Kings-ton and Goldsboro'. We have here also a good deal of railroad iron.

Pursuant to my plan, the 17th corps got Pocotaligo and the railroad on the 15th, and I would now be in motion for Branchville and Orangeburg, only stores have been delayed by the storms of the past month. But the possession of Pocotaligo and road back to Beaufort, as also from here forward to Hardeeville, gives us a clear start, and I will be off as soon as I can get bread enough to load my wagons.

The division of Grover, sent by Grant to hold Savannah, has begun to arrive, so I can take with me my entire army.

I have studied the maps well, and like the appearance of Newbern and Goldsboro', and would like Newbern held with all tenacity. If Lee sees the points, he may try to checkmate me there; and if you have anything to do with it, hold fast to Newbern with the tenacity of life. I explained, in person, its importance to the Secretary of War, who promised to run in there and attend to it.

I will make a good ready, and then stand from under. I shall account it a happy day if I stand once more on your deck. The world shall not be grieved at little jealousies, for we feel a just pride in the pure courage and patriotism of each other.

I will write you again before I again drive out of sight and hearing.

Very truly, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Admiral D. D. PORTER,

*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron, off Wilmington.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Savannah, Ga., January 17, 1865.*

DEAR ADMIRAL: I have this moment received your note of the 16th instant, with the letter and roll of charts from Admiral Porter. I send you, herewith, letter to Admiral Porter, which I beg you will send him at your earliest convenience, but it is not of enough importance to detach a ship.

I regret exceedingly the loss of the monitor Patapsco, especially that she carried down so many valuable lives.

Admiral Porter thinks he and General Terry can take Fort Fisher, or, at all events, occupy the peninsula above it, and cut it off from Wilmington. Of this we shall hear soon, as he proposes to renew the attack on the 13th or 14th; and in case of taking Fort Fisher he would send to Charleston all his fleet, save enough to blockade Wilmington, and keep up communication for the troops on shore; otherwise, he could hold on there to engage the attention of the enemy about there, to keep them from me.

You will have heard that we took Pocotaligo on the 15th according to my plans, and we now have the 17th corps, General Blair, strongly intrenched on the railroad. I would by this time also have had my left wing at Sister's ferry, but have been and still am delayed by the non-arrival of our stores necessary to fill our wagons.

The first instalment of General Grover's division, which is to garrison Savannah, has just arrived, and all will be in to-morrow.

I would prefer you should run no risk at all. When we are known to be in rear of Charleston, about Branchville and Orangeburg, it will be well to watch if the enemy lets go of Charleston, in which case Foster will occupy it; otherwise the feint should be about Bull's bay.

We will need no cover about Port Royal, nothing but the usual guard-ships. I think you will concur with me that, in anticipation of the movement of my army to the rear of the coast, it will be unwise to subject your ships to the heavy artillery of the enemy or his sunken torpedoes.

I will instruct Foster, when he knows I have got near Branchville, to make a landing of a small force at Bull's bay, to threaten, and it may be occupy the road from Mount Pleasant to Georgetown. This will make the enemy believe I design to turn down against Charleston, and give me a good offing for Wilmington. I will write you again, fully, on the eve of starting in person.

Your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Admiral J. A. DAHLGREN,

*Commanding South Atlantic Squadron, off Charleston.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Savannah, Ga., January 18, 1865.*

DEAR GENERAL: Your note of January 17, with enclosures, is received. It is best that all the 15th corps not yet off should march, and that you get your whole command in the neighborhood of Pocotaligo and Coosawhatchie, and make as many wharves as possible, that you may accumulate stores in your wagons.

Slocum has two (2) divisions at Hardeeville and Puryburg, and to-day a gunboat and two transports move up to that point, and it will be five days before Slocum can have Sister's ferry and Robertsville.

The division of Cuvier Grover is now arriving, and will occupy Savannah; this will relieve Geary's division.

Davis will start to-morrow for Sister's ferry, on the west bank of Savannah, with Kilpatrick's cavalry. I now have official notice that Terry carried Fort Fisher by assault, capturing seventy-two (72) guns and one thousand seven hundred and eighty (1,780) prisoners. This closes up Cape Fear river and helps us. I want them also to strengthen Newbern and work out the railroad towards Goldsboro'.

Get your command so as to move north as soon as possible, and get all the bread and forage accumulated you can.

As soon as possible we will cast off, and then for another cruise that will, in my judgment, do more to bring matters to a crisis than the last.

Choose the best points you can find to land stores for Pocotaligo. Don't cross the Salkehatchie, but hold all the ground up to it as though we intended to break across. The next movement I want the enemy to feel is from the left flank. Puryburg is reported a fine point, with deep river and a good bluff.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General HOWARD.

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Savannah, Ga., January 19, 1865.*

GENERAL: At my suggestion your command has been re-enforced by the troops serving in North Carolina and a division under command of Major General Grover. I have also turned over to you the city of Savannah and forts dependent, and beg now to indicate, in general terms, the course which I propose to pursue, and your share of the undertaking.

I propose to march, as soon as my wagons are loaded with forage and provisions, to the railroad leading from Augusta to Charleston, striking it to the west of Branchville, breaking up that road effectually. I will then move in compact order, and occupy that space of country lying in the triangle formed by Kingston, Columbia, and Camden. There I propose to devote some attention to Columbia and the railroads in that neighborhood. If I find sufficient forage and subsistence for my army, and meet with no reverse, I may move with rapidity to Florence, South Carolina, in hopes to rescue some ten thousand (10,000) prisoners confined there; at all events, breaking up the road there. I will move direct for Smithland, at the mouth of Cape Fear river, or to Newbern, North Carolina, according to the condition of my army at that time.

When you hear of our being in motion about Coosawhatchie, towards Barnwell, I want a diversion created at Bull's bay, against the Mount Pleasant and Georgetown road, about the twenty-four (24) mile post, to create the impression that my purpose is to swing down against Charleston by the peninsula between the Ashley and Cooper. I think one thousand (1,000) men, with the co-operation of the navy, will be sufficient to accomplish that end. At the same time the command at Morris's island should feel the forces on James's island, either to detect the diminution of the enemy's forces there, or to compel the enemy to keep as many troops there as possible. I regard any attempt to enter Charleston harbor by its direct channel, or to carry it by storm, or James's island, as too hazardous to warrant the attempt. Therefore, any demonstration in that quarter should be merely diversions, or to take advantage of anything they may neglect by reason of my appearance in their rear.

After I have passed the Santee, similar diversions should be made about Georgetown, and, if the opportunity presents itself, the fort there might be carried and dismantled; and I would like to have a good lookout kept by the navy for any boat or message I might send down the Santee or Peedee with a cipher despatch. I have already furnished Admiral Dahlgren with the key, which is the same used by our telegraphic operators, a copy of which you had better procure at once through the War Department from Washington.

In whatever you may do to aid me along the coast by diversions, I must leave you in a great measure to be guided by such information as reaches you from sources controlled by the enemy, of which you must be duly suspicious; but bearing in mind the foregoing, and knowing the strength and temper of my army, you can arrive at a pretty fair conclusion.

I take it for granted that Forts Fisher and Macon, on the North Carolina coast, will be held secure, and it would be well that you give to each commanding officer, from time to time, such instructions as will make them co-operate with the general movement to the extent of their power. I attach great importance to the point at Newbern, and think you had better send to that point an inspector general. Notify the commanding officer of the importance of the position, and if need be re-enforce him. Notify him, further, that the railroad from Morehead City to Newbern must be looked to with great care. I propose to send to Newbern an officer in whom I have great confidence, Colonel W. W. Wright, to examine the railroad, to ascertain the quantity of rolling stock, and to convey there, by the time I can arrive, increased stock and iron, with the necessary operatives to extend the road to Kingston and Goldsboro'. But, as a

matter of course, these preliminary preparations should be made so as to attract as little attention as possible. In this connexion, I would caution you, and by you to caution others, against the mischievous newspaper men who would sacrifice the whole army for a little personal notoriety. If any of them are about and likely to divulge so important a secret, don't risk them, but imprison them till the time is past. At this moment we have learned the capture of Wilmington, which may modify matters somewhat, but the general principles above indicated will be still applicable and sufficient for your guidance.

I would like to have you confer frequently with Admirals Dahlgren and Porter, apprise them of all movements, and call upon them for any assistance in the way of gunboats, &c.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General J. G. FOSTER,  
*Commanding Department of the South.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field Savannah, Ga., January 21, 1865.*

GENERAL: In fulfilment of my project, General Howard moved the 17th corps, General Blair, from Thunderbolt to Beaufort, South Carolina, and on the 14th, by a rapid movement, secured the Port Royal ferry and moved against Pocotaligo, which he gained on the 15th, the day appointed. By that course he secured the use of the ground in South Carolina up to the Salkehatchie, (Saltketcher,) and General Slocum was ordered, in like manner, to get his wing up about Robertsville, by the way of the Savannah river and the Union causeway.

The transfer of men, animals, and wagons by steamers is a very slow process, and on the 19th General Slocum had only two divisions of the 20th at Purysburg and Hardeeville, with open communications with Howard. John E. Smith crossed by the Union causeway, on which Slocum had put ten days' hard work, but the hard rains had raised the Savannah river, so that the whole country was under water, and the corduroy road, on the Union causeway, was carried away, cutting off one brigade of John E. Smith, one division of the 15th corps, (Corse's,) and all of the 14th corps, (General Davis's.) All were ordered to move up the west bank of the Savannah, to cross at Sister's ferry, but the rains have so flooded the country that we have been brought to a standstill; but I will persevere and get the army, as soon as possible, up to the line from Sister's ferry to Pocotaligo, where we will have *terra firma* to work on. Our supplies have come daily, that is, we have never had four days' forage ahead; but I will depend on enough coming to get me out to the neighborhood of Barnwell, where we will find some.

General Grover's division now occupies Savannah, which I had re-fortified, and I have turned over everything to General Foster, so that nothing now hinders me but water. I rather think the heavy rains in January will give us good weather in February and March. You cannot do much in Virginia till April or May; and when I am at Goldsboro', and move against Raleigh, Lee will be forced to divide his command or give up Richmond.

As soon as possible, if I were in your place, I would break up the department of the James. Make the Richmond army one; then when I get to Goldsboro' you will have a force to watch Lee, and I can be directed to gradually close in, cutting all communications. In the mean time Thomas's army should not be reduced too much, but he should hold Chattanooga, Decatur, and Eastport, collect supplies, and in all February and March move on Tuscaloosa, Selma, Montgomery, and back to Rome, Georgia, when he could be met from Chatta-

nooga. I take it for granted that Beauregard will bring, as fast as he can, such part of Hood's army as can be moved over to Augusta, to hit me in flank as I swing round Charleston. To cover the withdrawal, Forrest will be left in Mississippi and West Tennessee to divert attention by threatening the boats on the Mississippi and Tennessee rivers. This should be disregarded, and Thomas should break through the shell, expose the trick, and prevent the planting of corn this spring in middle Alabama.

The people of Georgia, like those of Mississippi, are worn out with care; but they are so afraid of their own leaders that they fear to organize positive resistance. Their motives of honor and fair play are that, by abandoning the cause now, they would be construed as mean for leaving their comrades in the scrape. I have met the overtures of the people frankly, and given them the best advice I know how.

I enclose copies of orders issued for the guidance of General Foster and other officers on this coast. These orders are made in conference with the Secretary of War.

I have been told that Congress meditates a bill to make another Lieutenant General for me. I have written to John Sherman to stop it, if it is designed for me. It would be mischievous, for there are enough rascals who would try to sow differences between us, whereas you and I now are in perfect understanding. I would rather have you in command than anybody else, for you are fair, honest, and have at heart the same purpose that should animate all. I should emphatically decline any commission calculated to bring us into rivalry, and I ask you to advise all your friends in Congress to this effect, especially Mr. Washburne. I doubt if men in Congress fully realize that you and I are honest in our professions of want of ambition. I know I feel none, and to-day will gladly surrender my position and influence to any other who is better able to wield the power. The flurry attending my recent success will soon blow over and give place to new developments.

I enclose a letter of general instructions to General Thomas, which I beg you to revise and endorse or modify.

I am truly yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT,  
*City Point, Virginia.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Savannah, January 21, 1865.*

GENERAL: Before I again dive into the interior and disappear from view, I must give you in general terms such instructions as fall within my province, as commander of the division.

I take it for granted that you now reoccupy in strength the line of the Tennessee from Chattanooga to Eastport. I suppose Hood to be down about Tuscaloosa and Selma, and that Forrest is again scattered to get horses and men, and to divert attention. You should have a small cavalry force, say two thousand (2,000) men, to operate from Knoxville through the mountain pass along the French Broad into North Carolina, to keep up the belief that it is to be followed by a considerable force of infantry. Stoneman could do this while Gillem merely watches up the Holston.

At Chattanooga should be held a good reserve of provisions and forage, and in addition to its garrison a small force that could on short notice relay the railroad to Resaca. Prepare to throw provisions down to Rome on the Coosa. You remember I left the railroad track from Resaca to Kingston and Rome with such a view. Then with an army of twenty-five thousand (25,000) infantry

and all the cavalry you can get, under Wilson, you should move from Decatur and Eastport to some point of concentration about Columbus, Mississippi, and then march to Tuscaloosa and Selma, Alabama, destroying fences, gathering horses and mules and wagons, to be burned, and doing all the damage possible, burning up Selma, that is the navy yard, the railroad back towards the Tombigbee, all iron foundries, mills, or factories. If no considerable army opposes you, you might reach Montgomery and deal with it in like manner, and then, at leisure, work back along the Selma and Rome road *via* Talladega and Blue mountain, to the valley of Chattanooga to Rome, or Lafayette. I believe such a raid perfectly practicable and easy, and that it would have an excellent effect.

It is nonsense to suppose that the people of the south are enraged or united by such movements. They reason very differently. They see in them the sure and inevitable destruction of all their property; they realize that the confederate armies cannot protect them, and they see in the repetition of such raids the inevitable result of starvation and misery. You should not go south of Selma and Montgomery, because south of that line the country is barren and unproductive.

I would like to have Forrest hunted down and killed, but doubt if we can do that yet. While you are thus employed I expect to pass through the centre of South and North Carolina, and I suppose Canby will also keep all his forces active and busy. I have already secured Pocotaligo and Gramsville, from which I have firm roads into the interior. We are all well.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

Major General GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Commanding army in the field, North Alabama, via Nashville.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Savannah, Ga., January 21, 1865.*

DEAR GENERAL: I have this moment received your letter of the 17th, enclosing the very full and complete returns, which give me all the data save only the gauge of your railroad, of which we are in doubt; one of my charts represents the gauge as 4 feet 10 inches, and the other at 5 feet. I shall send up my principal railroad man, Colonel W. W. Wright, to look at it and accumulate at Morehead City and Newbern iron and cars ready for use when the time comes. We can supply all those of the five-foot gauge out of captured stock. I don't want you to risk Newbern or Morehead City, and to take Kingston now would attract attention, and lengthen your line too much to be held with any degree of security. Therefore, don't attempt to hold more than you now have, until you know I am near at hand, and you can discover the effect of my approach.

I shall aim to reach Goldsborough, the effect of which will be threefold:

1st. With my army at Goldsborough the enemy could not remain at Wilmington.  
2d. I would have two railroads to the coast for supplies, viz: Morehead City and Wilmington.

3d. Goldsborough is the point from which to strike Raleigh.

If my army can fight its way across South Carolina and reach Goldsborough, these results will be certain.

I have already secured Pocotaligo, and am moving my army into position on a line from Sister's ferry, on the Savannah, across to Pocotaligo, whence I will move around Charleston and across the country to Fayetteville and Goldsborough or Wilmington, according to the supplies I find. General Foster will hold Savannah, &c., and will have a small force in hand to take advantage of

any let-go the enemy may venture to make. I would have been off before this, but am delayed by the rains, which have flooded the whole country. Don't attract attention, but hold Newbern and Morehead City (Fort Macon) secure as points for me to depend on. Don't risk anything; let me run the risk, but stand prepared to aid me as I approach. I leave my chief quartermaster and commissary here to follow me up with boats and supplies.

I do not think Grant will spare you any more men, nor do I think them necessary for the simple defensive position you should maintain. As I approach you I may aim for the railroad near where it crosses the Neuse, near Kingston. As I suppose there the enemy will oppose me, it may be prudent to open communication with you before I cross and attack the position at Kingston or Goldsborough. But Goldsborough is the strategic point I shall aim to secure in North Carolina.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

General INNIS N. PALMER,

*Commanding District of North Carolina, Newbern.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Beaufort, S. C., January 24, 1865.*

DEAR ADMIRAL: Weather now fine and promises us dry land. I will go to-day to Pocotaligo and Coosawhatchie; to-morrow will demonstrate on Salkehatchie, and would be obliged if you would feel up Edisto or Stono, just to make the enemy uneasy on that flank, and to develop if he intends to hold fast to Charleston and Columbia, or both. It will take five days for Slocum to get out of the savannas of Savannah, and during that time I will keep Howard seemingly moving direct on Charleston, though with no purpose of going beyond the Salkehatchie.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Admiral DAHLGREN.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Beaufort, S. C., January 24, 1865.*

GENERAL: I was directed this morning by General Sherman to write you by steamer Arago as follows:

He reached here yesterday from Savannah, and this morning went up to Pocotaligo to look to matters in person, and proposes to-morrow to secure Salkehatchie bridge as a demonstration, and also to reconnoitre until Slocum gets out to high ground from Sister's ferry. The storm has been severe and continuous for several days, delaying movements by bad roads; but now it is clear, the roads are improving rapidly, and it bids fair for good weather. I may hear from the general during the night, and will then despatch you further.

I am, with respect,

L. M. DAYTON,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Lieut. General GRANT,

*City Point, Va.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Pocotaligo, S. C., January 27, 1865.*

DEAR ADMIRAL: I have now reconnoitred all the country from the Salkehatchie bridge back to and including Coosawhatchie. The enemy had fortified every path leading from the various landings to the railroad, and could have bothered us a good deal had we not got Pocotaligo in the way we did, by the several diversions and the quick, prompt attack. From here we will find no trouble in getting an offing. I have official reports that Slocum got off for Sister's ferry on the 25th, and he should be there to-morrow. It will take him till Monday or Tuesday to cross over, load his wagons, and rendezvous at Robertsville, when we will be off. I hope this cold, clear weather will last for that time, as the roads here would cut to the hub after an hour's rain.

I have been feeling the Combahee ferry, and also at the bridge, but the river is over its banks and fills the swamps for a mile back—too deep at points to wade, and too shallow at others to use boats. I can only see a few rebels on the other bank, but a prisoner captured says there is a brigade back a short distance, and a considerable force about Green Pond, ten (10) miles east of this. We find no enemy this side of the Salkehatchie except cavalry, which is simply watching us, but I will clear it away in a hurry when we are ready to move. I will be sure to let you know the moment we are off, and will leave Hatch's division of Foster's command here to cover our movement.

I am, with respect, yours truly

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General.*

Admiral DAHLGREN,

*Commanding South Atlantic Squadron.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Pocotaligo, S. C., January 27, 1865.*

GENERAL: We had heavy and continuous rains up to and including the 24th instant, causing all the rivers, the Savannah included, to outflow their banks, and making the roads simply impassable. I came up to this point on the 25th, and with the troops here, the 17th corps, have been demonstrating against the Salkehatchie, but that stream is out of its banks, and we cannot cross. I only aim to drive the enemy over towards Edisto, a little further from our flank, when I move against the Charleston and Augusta road. I have in person reconnoitred the ground from the Salkehatchie bridge back to Coosawhatchie, and find the country very low and intersected by creeks and points of salt marsh, making roads very bad, but I am pushing to get the right wing here, and have official notice from General Slocum that he had the 20th corps, General Williams, on this side the Savannah, at Puryburg, and on the 25th the 14th corps, General Davis, would resume his march from Cherokee Hill, ten (10) miles out of Savannah, where he was caught by the rain-storm, so that I expect to hear of the left wing and cavalry marching to Sister's ferry to-morrow. A gunboat and fleet of transports will attend the left wing up the Savannah river, and General Slocum is ordered to replenish his wagons, rendezvous at Robertsville, and report his readiness to me.

I expect on Monday or Tuesday next, viz: February 1, to be all ready, when I will move rapidly up towards Barnwell, and wheel to the right on the railroad at Midway, leaving Branchville to the right; after destroying that road, I will move on Orangeburg, and so on to Columbia, avoiding any works the enemy may construct in my path, and forcing him to fight me in open ground if he



risk battle. I will use Hatch's division, of Foster's command, four thousand, (4,000,) to cover my movement, by posting it between this and Salkehatchie bridge. You will note that our position is now nearer Branchville than Charleston. I get a few deserters and have made some prisoners who report cavalry only between me and Barnwell, and infantry between us and Charleston. Of course I shall keep up the delusion of an attack on Charleston always, and have instructed General Foster to watch the harbor close from Morris island, and when he hears of my firing on the railroad near Branchville, to make a landing at Bull's bay, and occupy the Georgetown road, twenty-four (24) miles east of Charleston; Admiral Dahlgren will also keep up the demonstration on Charleston.

My chief difficulties will be to supply my army, but on this point I must risk a good deal, based upon the idea that where other people live we can, even if they have to starve or move away. Weather is cold and clear. I will write again.

W. T. SHERMAN, &

*Major General Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

*Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Pocotaligo, S. C., January 28, 1865.*

GENERAL: Yours of the 27th is received, and I am pushing my efforts to secure a departure by Monday or Tuesday next. I have in person reconnoitred the country from Salkehatchie bridge to Coosawhatchie. The country is very low and swampy, and impassable, save by the roads marked on our maps. I have no doubt this whole belt of land once formed the sea-coast, with its sound, islands and marsh, which, by the progress seaward of the beach, is left inland, but still possessing its character of sound islands, surrounded by fresh-water marsh. This is the first point of *terra firma*, and has better connexions inland. As near as I can learn, Gillisonville, on the south of Coosawhatchie, is a corresponding point of the main land, and Robertsville, of course.

Therefore, until I am surely between Augusta and Charleston it would be imprudent to let go this point. I have ordered General Hatch to move to a camp between this place (which is near Pocotaligo depot) and Salkehatchie bridge, and to picket Coosawhatchie fort and the fort back at Pocotaligo bridge. The latter is the key point for "defence," but for offence the line of the railroad is the proper one. I would, therefore, not reduce Hatch's force here till you have ascertained the effect on Charleston by my appearance west of Branchville. All Salkehatchie is under water for a mile on either side of the regular bed, and it is almost impossible to get to it.

The bridges have been burned by the enemy, who seems to occupy the opposite bank, but his force, if amounting to anything, is kept well back.

I could see a few men at the railroad bank, and what seemed a gun en embra-sure, but it was not fired, although our men stood in tempting groups on the railroad bank this side in easy 6-pounder range.

We find cavalry to our front towards Barnwell, and hear of some infantry, but I suppose the enemy simply is watching me, and keeps his main force where it can be thrown rapidly on exposed points.

Your demonstration on Willetton is right, but should not be more than a demonstration—that is, a lodgement seemingly to cover the disembarkation of a large body. The admiral's feeling up the Edisto and Stono is well, but my movement to the rear of Charleston is the principal, and all others should be accessory, merely to take advantage of any "let go."

Try and keep me well advised of Slocum's progress; he reports that Davis would move on the 25th, and he should be at Sister's ferry to-day. I shall cause him to be felt for to-morrow.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General J. G. FOSTER,

*Commanding Department of the South, Hilton Head.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Pocotaligo, S. C., January 28, 1865.*

GENERAL: Yours of yesterday came at night. If Easton did not give vessels to carry Logan's mules, it was for a most excellent reason, that he did not have them. Slocum reports that he had ordered Davis to move on the 25th, and he should reach Sister's ferry to-day; the rear can close on him while he lays his bridge. Slocum was to go by river, so as to meet Davis and Williams there. I confide in his energy and judgment to get his command across by Monday. You may now let Foster's troops occupy the old fort at Pocotaligo bridge, where the Charleston and Savannah turnpike road crosses; they will also hold Coosawhatchie fort, but the main body move to-day to a camp covering the Salkehatchie bridges, prepared to fall back on Pocotaligo fort, and the works at the depot now occupied by Mower and Leggett. You may now move your two corps to points in front, north of the railroad, and be ready to march by all the roads leading north, between the Coosawhatchie and Salkehatchie, with your wagons to close up the moment they are loaded. Roads are now comparatively good. Giles Smith's division should make room for Hatch, but Mower and Leggett can start from their present camps. The 15th corps should take position to the left or right front, according to your intention of giving one or the other the right of your movement. We will have to get nearly up to Barnwell before turning toward Midway. The point marked Heywardsville looks like a good point for the 15th corps, and could be reached from the position of John E. Smith's camp. Giles Smith could move to the point about four (4) miles north and west of the Salkehatchie bridge, when you would have your two corps already to move by separate roads, viz: one following substantially the Salkehatchie, and the other the Coosawhatchie, leaving Corse to make his junction as arranged at Hickory Hill. Hatch can supply his command by boats altogether, so as not to occupy our roads at all. You had better begin this movement to-morrow.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HOWARD,

*Commanding Right Wing.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Pocotaligo, S. C., January 28, 1865.*

GENERAL: The modifications you suggest in my general directions are approved, and the movements ordered for to-morrow will be deferred to Monday, provided the weather does not change. You should push matters now that the weather is fair, and better leave behind those who are not ready, as, do what you may, some will not be ready.

You cannot count on crossing Salkehatchie till you are in Barnwell district, nor is it practicable. Your right flank should aim for Midway and Columbia.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General O. O. HOWARD,  
*Commanding Right Wing.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Pocotaligo Depot, January 28, 1865.*

GENERAL: General Williams reports to me to-day, from Puryburg, that you have passed up the Savannah river to Sister's ferry, and, therefore, I infer you will be there, and that Davis can get out to Robertsville by Monday. On that day Howard will have the 15th corps at McPhersonville, and the 17th at a point north of the Salkehatchie bridge, ready to start the moment you are ready. Remember that every day's delay takes away one day's rations from Howard, and, if possible, be all ready to start on Tuesday from Robertsville. The 15th corps will keep along the east of Coosawhatchie, the 17th along the Salkehatchie, and will cross it at River's bridge, in Barnwell district; the order of march and general orders will be the same as on the Georgia march. Until we reach the Charleston and Augusta road, I want the most rapid possible movement, Kilpatrick to keep to your left front. Corse should cross to your rear to Hickory Hill, and fall in with his corps there. Work hard to load your wagons, and report to me here at Pocotaligo Depot your readiness to move on Tuesday, if possible. I think you can find two or more good roads, and these will improve as we go north unless the weather changes. It is very important that we hurry to our first point before Hood gets across and makes a junction about Columbia.

If you are all ready on Tuesday you may act on the supposition that Howard is equally so. Let Kilpatrick see this letter. I will shift over to see you up about the edge of Barnwell district.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SLOCUM,  
*Commanding Right Wing.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Pocotaligo, S. C., January 29, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have your letter of yesterday. Tell Admiral Dahlgren I regret the loss of the Dia-Ching, but can quote Admiral Porter, who told me once, that "ships were made to be lost." Your movement, by Edisto, is good; but understand me as of opinion, that if the enemy mans his works facing the sea, you cannot gain them, save at a disadvantage, but by demonstrating at points of land from which troops can move against the railroad by a rapid, quick march, you compel him to keep the entire railroad guarded from Charleston to Salkehatchie; but I don't care about the road being actually broken until the latter part of next week. If you know that the enemy falls behind the Edisto, you should break the railroad anywhere this side of him, and then you could reduce Hatch's command here to the number you calculated, viz: one thousand (1,000) men; but so long as McLaws (rebel) has the railroad, by which he can handle four or five thousand (4,000 or 5,000) men rapidly, it will be imprudent

to leave Hatch too weak. There is no use in a force here at all unless it is on the railroad. This point, Pocotaligo, is the most salient, and therefore best; but, if deemed unsafe at any time, the fort at Coosawhatchie would fulfil the same conditions, and its river is deeper and better. I have no doubt a steamboat could work up to the Coosawhatchie fort at high tide; flats drawn by barges could, certainly. I merely want a point of security here till I am surely beyond the Santee, and by a force here you better cover your island and the Savannah river than by any other disposition of your troops.

I expect from Tennessee a force of some five to eight thousand (5,000 to 8,000) men belonging to the four (4) corps with me here. Stop them at Hilton Head, and use them, unless they get there in time to reach me, which is very improbable. Out of them you can make up a good command to demonstrate on Charleston, Georgetown, and from Smithville, Cape Fear river, as I progress, aiming to join their respective commands when we touch the seaboard. If I break the railroad to Augusta and Columbia, it will be well to strike that to Wilmington, unless Wilmington, in the mean time, be taken by Terry. The easiest point to reach that railroad will be from Cape Fear river, to the south and west of Wilmington.

Make as much display on Edisto and about Stono, next Wednesday and Thursday, as possible, and cause the troops at Morris island to make a lodgement on James island, if possible. That is the vital part of Charleston harbor.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General J. G. FOSTER,  
*Commanding Department of the South.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*Washington, D. C., January 21, 1865.*

GENERAL: Your letters brought by General Barnard were received at City Point and read with interest. Not having them with me, however, I cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you on all points of recommendation, as I arrived here at 1 p. m. and must leave at 6 p. m., having in the mean time spent over three hours with the Secretary and General Halleck. I must be brief.

Before your last request to have Thomas make a campaign into the heart of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to Annapolis, Maryland, with his corps. The advance, 6,000 will reach the seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly as railroad transportation can be procured from Cincinnati. The corps numbers over 21,000 men.

\* \* \* \* \*

Thomas is still left with a sufficient force (surplus) to go to Selma under an energetic leader. He has been telegraphed to to know whether he could go; and if so, by which of several routes he would select. No reply is yet received. Canby has been ordered to act offensively from the sea-coast to the interior towards Montgomery and Selma. Thomas's forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of his troops will be sent to Canby. Without further re-enforcements, Canby will have a moving column of 20,000 men.

Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured. We have a force there of 8,000 effective; at Newbern about half that number. It is rumored through deserters that Wilmington also has fallen. I am inclined to believe the rumor, because, on the 17th, we know the enemy were blowing up their works about Fort Caswell, and that on the 18th Terry moved on Wilmington.

If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there; if it is not, he will be

sent to Newbern. In either event all the surplus forces at the two points will move to the interior, towards Goldsboro', in co-operation with your movements. From either point railroad communication can be run out, there being here abundance of rolling stock, suited to the gauge of those roads. There have been about 16,000 men sent from Lee's army south; of these you will have 14,000 against you if Wilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort Fisher having overtaken about 2,000.

All these troops are subject to your orders as you come in communication with them. They will be so instructed. From about Richmond I will watch Lee closely, and if he detaches much more, or attempts to evacuate, will pitch in. In the mean time should you be brought to a halt anywhere, I can send two corps of 30,000 effective men to your support from the troops about Richmond.

To resume: Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the gulf; A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it doubtful. A force of 28,000 or 30,000 will co-operate with you from Newbern or Wilmington, or both; you can call for re-enforcements.

This will be handed to you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who will return with any message you may have for me. If there is anything I can do for you in the way of having supplies on shipboard, at any point on the sea-coast ready for you, let me know it.

Yours, truly,

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

Major General W. T. SHERMAN,

*Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Pocotaligo, S. C., January 29, 1865.*

DEAR GENERAL: Captain Hudson has this moment arrived with your letter of January 21, which I have read with interest.

The capture of Fort Fisher has a most important bearing on my campaign, and I rejoice in it for many reasons, because of its intrinsic importance, and because it gives me another point of security on the seaboard. I hope General Terry will follow it up by the capture of Wilmington, although I do not look for it from Admiral Porter's despatch to me. I rejoice that Terry was not a West Pointer, that he belonged to your army, and that he had the same troops with which Butler feared to make the attempt.

Admiral Dahlgren, whose fleet is re-enforced by some more iron-clads, wants to make an assault *à la* Fisher on Fort Moultrie, but I withhold my consent for the reason that the capture of all Sullivan's island is not conclusive as to Charleston; the capture of James island would be, but all pronounce that impossible at this time. Therefore I am moving, as hitherto designed, for the railroad west of Branchville, then will swing across to Orangeburg, which will interpose my army between Charleston and the interior. Contemporaneous with this, Foster will demonstrate up the Edisto, and afterwards make a lodgement at Bull's bay, and occupy the common road which leads from Mount Pleasant toward Georgetown. When I get to Columbia, I think I shall move straight for Goldsboro' *via* Fayetteville. By this circuit I cut all roads and devastate the land, and the forces along the coast commanded by Foster will follow my movement, taking anything the enemy lets go, or so occupy his attention that he cannot detach all his forces against me. I feel sure of getting Wilmington, and maybe Charleston, and being at Goldsboro', with its railroads finished back to Morehead City and Wilmington, I can easily take Raleigh, when it seems that Lee must come out of his trenches or allow his army to be absolutely invested. If Schofield comes to Beaufort he should be pushed out.

to Kingston, on the Neuse, and maybe Goldsboro', or rather a point on the Wilmington road south of Goldsboro'. It is not necessary to storm Goldsboro', because it is in a distant region, of no importance in itself; and if its garrison is forced to draw supplies from its north, it will be eating up the same stores on which Lee depends for his command.

I have no doubt Hood will bring his army to Augusta, and Canby and Thomas should penetrate Alabama as far as possible, to keep employed at least a part of Hood's army; or, what would accomplish the same thing, Thomas might re-occupy the railroad from Chattanooga forward to the Etowah, viz: Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona, thereby threatening Georgia. I know that the Georgia troops are disaffected. At Savannah I met delegates from the several counties of the southwest that manifested a decidedly hostile spirit to the confederate cause. I nursed it along as far as possible and instructed Grover to keep it up.

My left wing must now be at Sister's ferry, crossing the Savannah river to the east bank. Slocum has orders to be at Robertsville to-morrow, prepared to move on Barnwell. Howard is here, all ready to start for the Augusta railroad at Midway.

We find the enemy on the east side of the Salkehatchie, and cavalry in our front, but all give ground on our approach and seem to be merely watching us. If I start on Tuesday, in one week I will be near Orangeburg, having broken up the Augusta road from the Edisto westward twenty or twenty-five miles. I will be sure that every rail is twisted. Should I encounter too much opposition near Orangeburg, then I will for a time neglect that branch and rapidly move on Columbia and fill up the triangle formed by the Congaree and Wateree, tributaries of the Santee, breaking up that great centre of the Carolina roads. Up to that point I feel full confidence, but from there I may have to manoeuvre some, and will be guided by the questions of weather and supplies. You remember I had fine weather all February for my Meridian trip, and my memory of the weather at Charleston is that February is usually a fine month. Before the March storms come I should be within striking distance of the coast. The months of April and May will be the best for operations from Goldsboro' to Raleigh and the Roanoke. You may rest assured that I will keep my troops well in hand, and if I get worsted will aim to make the enemy pay so dearly that you will have less to do. I know this trip is necessary to the war. It must be made sooner or later, and I am on time and in the right position for it. My army is large enough for the purpose, and I ask no re-enforcement, but simply wish the utmost activity at all other points, so that concentration against me may not be universal. I expect Davis will move heaven and earth to catch me, for success to my column is fatal to his dream of empire. Richmond is not more vital to his cause than Columbia and the heart of South Carolina.

If Thomas will not move on Selma, order him to occupy Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona, and again threaten Georgia in the direction of Athens.

I think the poor white trash of the south are falling out of their ranks, by sickness, desertion, and every available means, but there is a large class of vindictive southerners who will fight to the last. The squabbles in Richmond, the howls in Charleston, and the disintegration elsewhere, are all good omens to us; but we must not relax one iota, but, on the contrary, pile up our efforts.

I would ere this have been off, but we had terrific rains which caught me in motion, and nearly drowned some of my columns in the rice-fields of the Savannah, swept away our causeway which had been carefully corduroyed, and made the swamps hereabout mere lakes of slimy mud; but the weather is now good, and I have my army on *terra firma*. Supplies, too, came for a long time by daily dribbles instead of in bulk, but this is now all remedied, and I hope to start on Tuesday.

I will issue instructions to Foster based on the re-enforcement of North Caro-

lina; and if Schofield come, you had better relieve Foster, who cannot take the field and needs an operation on his leg; and let Schofield take command, with headquarters at Beaufort, North Carolina, and with orders to secure, if possible, Goldsboro', with its railroad communication back to Beaufort and Wilmington. If Lee lets us get that position he is gone up.

I will start with my Atlanta army, sixty thousand, (60,000,) supplied as before, and depending on the country for all excess of thirty (30) days. I will have less cattle on the hoof, but I hear of hogs, cows, and calves in Barnwell and the Columbia districts. Even here we found some forage. Of course the enemy will carry off and destroy some forage, but I will burn the houses where the people burn forage, and they will get tired of that.

I must risk Hood, and trust to you to hold Lee or be on his heels if he comes south. I observe that the enemy has some respect for my name, for they gave up Pocotaligo quick when they heard that the attacking force belonged to me. I will try and keep up that feeling, which is a real power.

With respect, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT,  
*City Point, Virginia.*

I leave my chief quartermaster and commissary behind to follow coastwise.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Pocotaligo, S. C., January 29, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have just received despatches from General Grant, stating that Schofield's corps, the 23d, twenty-one thousand (21,000) strong, is ordered east from Tennessee and will be sent to Beaufort, North Carolina. That is well; I want that force to secure a point on the railroad about Goldsboro', and then to build the road out to that point. If Goldsboro' be too strong to carry by a rapid movement, then a point near the Neuse, south of Goldsboro', but holding the bridge and position about Kingston, and fortify it strong. The movement should be masked by the troops already at Newbern. Please notify General Palmer that these troops are coming, and for him to prepare to receive them. Major General Schofield will command them in person, and is admirably adapted for the work. If it is possible I want him to secure Goldsboro' with the railroad back to Morehead City and Wilmington. As soon as General Schofield reaches Fort Macon, have him to meet some one of your staff to explain in full the detail of the situation of affairs with me, and you can give him chief command of all troops at Cape Fear and in North Carolina. If he finds the enemy has all turned south against me, he need not follow, but turn his attention against Raleigh; but if he can secure Goldsboro' and Wilmington, it will be as much as I expect before I have passed the Santee. Send him all detachments of men that have come to join my army. They can be so organized and officered as to be more efficient, for they are nearly all old soldiers who have been detached or on furlough. Until I pass the Santee you can better use these detachments at Bull's bay, Georgetown, &c.

I will instruct General McCallum, of the railroad department, to take his men up to Beaufort, North Carolina, and use them on the road out. I do not know that he can employ them on any road here. I did instruct him, while awaiting information from North Carolina, to employ them in building a good trestle bridge across Port Royal ferry, but I now suppose the pontoon bridge will do. If you move the pontoons be sure to make a good road out to Gar-

den's corner and mark it with sign-boards, obstructing the old road, so that should I send back any detachments they would not be misled.

I prefer that Hatch's force hereabouts should not be materially weakened until I am near Columbia, when you may be governed by the situation of affairs about Charleston. If you can break the railroad between this and Charleston, then this force could be reduced.

I am, with respect, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General J. G. FOSTER,  
*Commanding Department of the South.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Pocotaligo, S. C., January 29, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have well reconnoitred hereabouts, and am satisfied that it is not to our interest to reconstruct, at this time, any of the railroads out of Savannah. After securing all the property there, I wish you to transfer your men and tools to North Carolina, (Newbern,) unless Wilmington should fall into our possession, and prepare to make railroad communication to Goldsboro' by the middle of March. You need not build the bridge over Port Royal, which I requested of you at Savannah; that can be done by Foster's command.

General Grant advises me of heavy re-enforcements being sent to North Carolina. You may therefore at once transport Colonel Wright and his operators to Newbern or Wilmington, if that place be in our possession, and prepare timber, iron, cars and locomotives adapted to the roads of North Carolina, enough to build out to Goldsboro' when you can get possession of the road.

Let Colonel Wright report to General Schofield or other commanding officer he may find, who, on presenting this letter will furnish all aid.

General Easton will furnish the necessary transportation.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General McCALLUM,  
*Railroad Department, Savannah,*  
*In his absence, Colonel W. W. Wright.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Pocotaligo, S. C., January 29, 1865.*

GENERAL: I wish you to-morrow to send a detachment to the forks of the road this side of the Salkehatchie, and then make demonstrations as though preparatory to cross over to the east side. Try and make a pathway of fallen timber through the swamp so as to enable skirmishers to appear near the river bank at the railroad and wagon road bridges; also, if possible, let one or more horsemen try to pass through the water along the wagon road. I think the water must have subsided enough for this. Also let a party take tools and prepare, on the railroad causeway, a place (countersunk) for two guns en embraiture.

Report to me what is seen by night. I will remain here until I hear from General Slocum about Robertsville, when the whole army will move north, leaving you to cover this point. I deem it important to hold the position on the railroad for some time, say ten (10) days after I leave, and during that time to feel across the Salkehatchie in the direction of Charleston, so as to destroy the



railroad as far towards the Edisto as possible. As long as the railroad is intact up to Salkehatchie you will see an enemy may rapidly interpose between here and Port Royal, which might incommode us. At the same time General Foster will try and cut the road between this and Charleston, the effect of which will be to make the enemy guard the road in its whole length. After I have reached the Augusta road I do not think this road will be of much use to the enemy.

I am, with respect,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General HATCH, *Commanding Division.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Pocotaligo, S. C., January 30, 1865.*

GENERAL: The general-in-chief desires me to say that he is waiting anxiously to hear from General Slocum, that he may know all is ready, and will then give the order for moving. General Slocum has orders to report his readiness. He (General Sherman) wishes you to hold your command in readiness and prepared to reach Hickory Hill Post Office the next march; also to have General Blair reconnoitre with a view of learning if there be a practicable road for communication and marching from McPhersonville to Robertsville.

There is a lot of recruits, &c., here that will report to you to-night; the general says if you have arms you may put them to duty, but if not, and can't make good use of them, you may send them to Beaufort if you wish.

The general does not wish you to move beyond your present position until all are ready and orders made.

I am, with respect,

L. M. DAYTON, *A. A. G.*

Major General O. O. HOWARD,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Pocotaligo, S. C., January 31, 1865.*

GENERAL: Howard moves Wednesday morning *via* Hickory Hill and River's bridge. Communicate with me at Hickory Hill, and follow us as rapidly as possible by the old Orangeburg road, by Lawtonville, Duck Branch Post Office, and Beaufort bridge. Let Kilpatrick's cavalry keep on your left front.

I have not heard of your crossing the Savannah yet, but negroes report your pushing the enemy through Lawtonville.

Make the most possible of this fine weather.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Major General SLOCUM, *Sister's Ferry.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, 4 miles from Hickory Hill, February 1, 1865—1 p. m.*

GENERAL: Your letters of January 31 are received. I cannot modify my orders relative to General Saxton having the charge of recruiting blacks. The Secretary made that point. I think the impression at Washington is that both you and I are inimical to the policy of arming negroes, and all know that Saxton is not, and his appointment reconciles that difficulty.

If anything serious occurs correspond directly with Mr. Stanton, and make your points. Let Grant know I am in motion, and telegraph to Easton that I Slocum has to wait for provisions it will be dead loss, as we are eating up ours.

Let Hatch continually feel the Salkehatchie, and the moment the enemy lets go, get the railroad broken back to the Edisto.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General J. G. FOSTER,  
*Commanding Department of the South.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Hickory Hill, February 1, 1865.*

GENERAL: Your note of this morning is received. All right; get word over to Slocum that I have started and will be opposite River's bridge to-morrow. I may await him there, or go on to the railroad about Midway. He should push cavalry first, and corps by corps, as fast as ready. Keep feeling at the Salkehatchie bridge and the ferry, and if the enemy lets go, follow up to the Edisto. Let's coop him in Charleston, close. Foster will demonstrate about Edisto island.

Roads are very fair, obstructed at the swamps, but we cut away about as fast as a column marches. We find some hogs, bacon, and corn, but much has been carried off by Wheeler, who is ahead.

Open communication to-night with Slocum from Coosawhatchie to Robertsville.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Brigadier General JOHN P. HATCH,  
*Commanding Coast Division.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Hickory Hill, S. C., February 1, 1865—5 p. m.*

GENERAL: I have a letter from General Williams detailing your difficulties. I think you had better despatch Williams with his two divisions, and Kilpatrick's cavalry, by the road leading through Duck Branch Post Office, to Beaufort bridge, and overtake us and follow as soon as possible with the balance. I deem it important to get on the railroad as soon as possible. We will march slowly, say ten or twelve miles a day, towards Midway, and I want you to come up on our left, say at Blackville or Graham's. You will find some meat and forage. We have already found some.

Wheeler had a division of cavalry here, but they ran; they had obstructed the roads, but these were cleared out without delay. Tell Corse he may come by Hickory Hill or Duck Branch, as he finds most convenient. You might occupy roads to the left for convenience.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General H. W. SLOCUM,  
*Commanding Left Wing.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Hickory Hill Post Office, S. C., February 2, 1865—3 ½ a. m.*

GENERAL: I have just read your despatch. You may go on with two divisions and secure, if possible, Rivers's bridge. Let one division keep to Angle-

sey's post office by the south of Whippy. Logan will move so as to get his head of column on the road leading from Duck Branch post office to Anglesey's. That road (the old Orangeburg) is supposed to be on good, firm ground, and is an old road leading to Beaufort's bridge, which is the one I expect to use.

Wheeler's cavalry is mostly to our left. At Rivers's you will find rebel infantry and artillery in position.

Slocum is unable to cross the Savannah by reason of water over the banks; will have to bridge three-quarters of a mile, from four to six feet of water. We may have to go to the railroad without him. I have a cipher despatch from him, the contents of which, when translated, I will tell the bearer of this.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Major General O. O. HOWARD,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, 2½ miles north of Duck Branch Post Office,  
31½ from Pocotaligo February 2, 1865—7 p. m.*

GENERAL: I wrote you on the road yesterday touching the matter of General Saxton, and gave you my reasons for not changing my orders. I still adhere to that conclusion, but have no objection whatever that you should apply to the Secretary of War direct, and leave him to judge. But as to military discipline, I decide that General Saxton cannot go to a military post, and do anything which, in the judgment of its commander, is calculated to produce confusion and disorder. The commanding officer of a post is the proper person to see that it does not become encumbered with idle or worthless vagabonds of any color, sex, or kind. You may sustain General Grover in anything he may do as to maintaining good order and government at Savannah.

The Secretary of War is charged by Congress with the administration of the war policy, and we are bound to respect his authority and wishes, and these are contained in my orders. If General Saxton presumes on any special influences, let him alone and he will commit some breach of military propriety, when you will take action.

I consider he has no more control over organizations of colored troops after they are mustered and paid than the superintendent of the general recruiting service for white troops. During the inchoate existence of a regiment or company he may use it about his rendezvous for guard and police; but after troops are organized as companies, battalions, or regiments, mustered in and paid by the United States, they at once become, like any other part of your command, subject to your orders and details. Indeed, were I in your place I would prefer this disposition, as it relieves you of all the details of organization. As to Littlefield's duties, you can put him subject to Saxton, or you can give him the details of any other officers and men of your command at your own option. You may require him to apply for such details as he wants, and you can make them just as you would for the quartermaster.

As to the nomination of officers for negro regiments, that purely belongs to the appointing power, the President, who may delegate it to whom he sees fit. As to steamboats, I don't think General Easton has any feeling as to you, but I think he has an idea that Major Thomas, much his junior, is left to judge. If he knows that you give the subject your personal attention he will be content. It would be well for you to confer with him, for I have given him "*carte blanche*," and hold him accountable as to my immediate army.

My movements now will depend for a day or two on Slocum, but you had better be all ready for the steps I indicated. We find a good deal of cavalry on all the roads, but they do not delay our march. The infantry is behind the Salkehatchie, which is a swampy, ugly stream, all the way up to Barnwell. I am much obliged for the paper. All well.

Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General J. G. FOSTER,  
*Commanding Department of the South.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, February 3, 1865—5 p. m.*

General HOWARD :

Your note and orders of last night were not received until a few moments ago. General Logan got here last night, and to-day drove the enemy from a position on the other side of Duck creek. General Williams brought up five brigades of Slocum's troops, but no later news of Slocum; thinks he will have a hard time to get across Savannah river at all.

I ordered Wood's division to Anglesey's post office, and John E. Smith is between. To-morrow the 15th corps will move on Beaufort's bridge, which is also strongly defended, and I will order Williams toward Barnwell, to the point marked "Hayes."

I will myself stop at Anglesey's post office till I hear what progress is made to effect a lodgment across the Salkehatchie. General Wood's is now at Anglesey's, and will lead to Beaufort's to-morrow. If Slocum were up I would move him to Barnwell at once, but can use Williams to produce the same effect.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Duck Branch Post Office, February 3, 1865.*

GENERAL : Move your command to-morrow; two divisions to Beaufort's bridge, and one to Anglesey's post office. Better pursue the same order as now, and let all march—say at 6 a. m. That will bring the divisions of Wood and John E. Smith at Beaufort's, and Hazen's at Anglesey's. I will move Williams by our left rear around to Arnold church and Hayes.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General LOGAN,  
*Commanding 15th Corps.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Duck Branch Post Office, S. C., February 4, 1865—3 a. m.*

GENERAL : Enclosed I send you copy of report just received from Major General Howard, his operations giving full possession of the Salkehatchie.

General Sherman desires that you will move your command slowly to the point indicated in the instructions sent yesterday p. m., these operations giving you,

probably, a clear road ; it is reported that Wheeler has passed around our front across the Salkehatchie.

Please communicate with General Slocum the progress made and our present situation, and the fact of our being in possession of the Salkehatchie, given by Mower's assault to-day ; also such other items as will be of information to him. We will move as indicated.

I am, general, with respect,

L. M. DAYTON,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Brevet Major General WILLIAMS,  
*Commanding 20th Corps.*

P. S.—Send substance of this to Slocum. I think you had better send the bulk of your train, under small escort, by the direct road to Beaufort's bridge, to which point you may conduct your command around by Allendale post office and Arnold church, making as much display as possible. Take enough wagons and artillery with you to forage *good*, and try and be at Beaufort's bridge to-morrow night, so you can pass the Salkehatchie there without fail. Then, probably, we shall move without waiting for Slocum, though I want Kilpatrick up as quick as possible ; but he should swing round to Barnwell, but not further west without orders.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Beaufort's Bridge, S. C., February 5, 1865.*

GENERAL : General Kilpatrick is now up to Allendale post office, and will move to-morrow on Barnwell, and thence to join us about Bamberg.

I wish your wing to move now with all expedition consistent with due caution, and make a strong lodgement on the South Carolina railroad anywhere from Graham's to the Edisto.

I will instruct General Williams to cross here, and move four miles towards Barnwell, and thence follow cross-roads in the direction of Graham's station.

I suppose you will move the 17th corps direct on Midway, and the 15th corps on Bamberg. I will attend the 15th corps.

I am yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General HOWARD,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Beaufort's Bridge, S. C., February 5, 1865.*

GENERAL : Captain Newton has just arrived, and I am glad you are up. The enemy is all in the mist as to our movements, save they think Slocum's command has gone up to Augusta, and that I am moving on Branchville. We carried the position at Rivers's yesterday, and to-day have passed both corps across—17th at Rivers's, and 15th here at Beaufort's. I sent Williams round by Allendale to make a feint on Barnwell. To-morrow the 17th corps will move rapidly on Midway, and the 15th on Bamberg ; Williams will follow in reserve.

The enemy intended to defend the line of Salkehatchie, but are now falling back to the Edisto. Presuming you get to-day to Allendale Post Office, I want

you to-morrow to move rapidly on Barnwell, keeping up any feint you may please in the direction of Augusta. Next day strike the railroad where you please, from Blackville to Lowry's. If you can, get and destroy cars, locomotives, and depots, but don't delay long, but effectually destroy some piece of the track, enough to cut communication, and then turn to us about Duncanville or Bamberg. You will find plenty of corn and bacon. I think Wheeler's forces are scattered, and he has no idea where you are up to this moment, so you can act with a rush. Some cavalry retreated before General Williams to the northwest, towards Augusta, and other parts across the bridges of Salkehatchie. I don't care about your going into Barnwell, and only refer to it as the point where you will likely find cleared roads across the swamp. The bridges amount to nothing; the swamp is the worst, and you may cross it wherever you please. I expect to hear from you the night of February 7, or morning of the 8th, when I will be with the 15th corps not far from Duncanville or Bamberg.

On this side the Salkehatchie we find the roads fine, with farms and abundance of forage. None has been destroyed.

The farmers west of Salkehatchie were ordered to move their forage and stock to the east of Salkehatchie, the rebels expecting to hold that line.

Mystify the enemy all you can, but break that road while I move straight on it about Lowry's.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

General KILPATRICK,

*Commanding Cavalry, Allendale.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Beaufort's Bridge, S. C., February 5, 1865.*

GENERAL: The right wing of the army will move early to-morrow against the South Carolina railroad in the neighborhood of Bamberg.

I wish you to cross the Salkehatchie and move for the same point, but for convenience of movement suggest you take the Barnwell road to Ayer's, where a road leads to Blackville which intersects one coming into the direct Bamberg road from here, at the Little Salkehatchie. As you approach the Little Salkehatchie I think you can find some road to Bamberg, without coming into collision with the 15th corps, that will occupy ten miles of that road; I think such a road will be found from Nimmon's to Duncanville, crossing Little Salkehatchie, above or at Dowling's mill. I will be near the leading division of the 15th corps. Kilpatrick will be about Barnwell to-morrow night, and will strike the railroad next day between Blackville and Graham's.

If you can find any other road than the one I suggest, which is nearly parallel with the one travelled by the 15th corps, and not more than six or seven miles off, you can take it; always sending me word, and in case of hearing the sound of serious battle, change your course towards it.

I am, yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

General A. S. WILLIAMS, *Commanding 20th Corps.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Beaufort's Bridge, S. C., February 5, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have instructed General Howard to move the right wing, and make a lodgement on the South Carolina railroad, in the neighborhood of Bamberg. You may, therefore, in anticipation of the movement, make orders for

the 15th corps to take the direct road to Duncanville. Kilpatrick will move by Barnwell, and I have ordered General Williams to cross the Big Salkehatchie by this bridge ; thence to take the Barnwell road out as far as Ayer's, where a road branches to Blackville. He will follow that to about Nimmon's, trusting to find some road leading up to Graham's or Duncanville.

I would like, if possible, that Hazen should be on the north side of the Barnwell road by eight o'clock, so that Williams can pass him, and that the two armies should not get mixed at the place where Hazen's camp now is.

I am, yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General J. A. LOGAN,  
*Commanding 15th Corps.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, five miles from Bamburg, February 6, 1865.*

GENERAL : You may make your orders, and march to-morrow on Lowry's Station, South Carolina railroad, and make a strong lodgement and break up the road. Inasmuch as the enemy must, by this time, have detected our plan, you should be prepared for battle. You know that the 17th corps is approaching Midway by the road from Rivers's bridge, and should now be within eight miles. You have only five miles to Bamburg, and one more to Lowry's. Williams is just behind you, and Kilpatrick is supposed to be at Barnwell, and has orders to strike the railroad about Blackville and turn to Bamburg. Williams is ordered to move straight on Graham's Station, unless he hears you engaged, when he will turn to your left flank.

You had better march with two divisions, disencumbered of all wagons save a few with cartridges, and the ambulances, and let your train follow to any point you may select, about Bamburg or Lowry's, to be parked. As soon as you reach the railroad set to work to destroy it effectually, viz : every rail must be twisted.

Your advance should push out a mile or so beyond the railroad, towards South Edisto, on the Cannon's Bridge road. If you hear Howard engaged lean towards Midway, but get the road broken anyhow. I will be with you, but want you to fight your own battle, as I am a non-combatant. The enemy ought to fight us, but I don't believe he will.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General J. A. LOGAN,  
*Commanding 15th Corps.*

Have the left-hand road at the church clear for Williams by 8 a. m.

S.

[Cipher despatch.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Armies in the field, Lowry's Station, February 7, 1865.*

General FOSTER, *Hilton Head, S. C. :*

We are on the railroad at Midway. Weather bad ; water high, and roads bad. These may force me to turn against Charleston before crossing the Santee. Enemy has retreated east and north across the Edisto. We will break up fifty miles of this road towards Augusta, and then move over towards Columbia.

Watch Charleston close, and threaten Bull's bay. Hatch's force should now get across to Edisto, about Jacksonboro' and Willstown. Slocum is not yet up.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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[Cipher despatch.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Army in the field, February 7, 1865.*

Admiral DAHLGREN :

We are on the South Carolina road at Midway, and will break fifty miles from Edisto towards Augusta ; I then cross towards Columbia. Weather is bad and country full of water. This cause may force me to turn against Charleston. I have ordered Foster to move Hatch up to the Edisto about Jacksonboro' and Willstown, also to make that lodgement at Bull's bay.

Watch Charleston close ; I think Davis will order it to be abandoned lest he lose its garrison as well as guns. We are all well, and the enemy retreats before us. Send word to Newbern that you have heard from me, and the probabilities are that high waters may force me to the coast before I reach North Carolina, but to keep Wilmington busy.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Lowry's, February 7, 1865.*

GENERAL : We are on the railroad and the enemy has retreated across the Edisto. I propose to break up the road westward, so you may let Geary join Williams about Graham's, and let Davis take any road you may prefer to the left to reach the neighborhood of Blackville. You may send that corps (14th) through Barnwell for the sake of forage. We find plenty, but I fear we leave but little behind us. Weather is villanous, but we can't help it and must do the best we can.

Send back to Coosawhatchie fort, or any other point you may think best, the enclosed cipher messages to General Foster and Admiral Dahlgren. Send by several messengers and by secure roads.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Major General SLOCUM, *on the Road.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Lowry's Station, S. C., Railroad, February 7, 1865.*

GENERAL : Your note of 2 p. m. is received. We are all on the road, and will break road to-morrow and then move up towards Augusta. You can remain where you are and try and secure the bridge at the head of Young's island. I will pass the Edisto, above that point, and as high as Guignard's bridge. Make a good break while you are about it. If you feel confident you may move up the road, making occasional breaks, and meet us on your return about White



Pond in two days after to-morrow. I will order Davis's corps to come round through Barnwell to White Pond or Windsor's. Don't risk much, but keep your horses and men well in hand.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

General KILPATRICK, *Commanding Cavalry.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Lowry's Station, S. C., February 8, 1865.*

GENERAL: Yours of this date is received. Burn all cotton. The confederate congress has appropriated all cotton to its own use. It is the only cash article left to the enemy. I send you a letter to Wheeler in answer to his, which you can leave with the lady to be sent to Wheeler as best she can.

Destroy the railroad and its attachments, tanks, sheds, everything that facilitates its use. I will send you orders for to-morrow, which amount to moving up to Blackville. If you hear of Geary to-day in reach, turn him at once to Blackville; Slocum should move the 14th corps towards Williston. I think the left wing will cross the Edisto about Guignard's and Pine Log bridges. I want to get the left wing on the Orangeburg and Edgefield road as soon as possible. We are twisting the iron here beautiful. I will send the engineers up to you to-morrow, they do the work best.

W. T. SHERMAN

*Major General.*

General A. S. WILLIAMS, *Graham's.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, February 8, 1865.*

GENERAL: Yours addressed to General Howard is received by me. I hope you will burn all cotton and save us the trouble. We don't want it, and it has proven a curse to our country. All you don't burn, I will. As to private houses occupied by peaceful families, my orders are not to molest or disturb them, and I think my orders are obeyed. Vacant houses, being of no use to anybody, I care little about, as the owners have thought them of no use to themselves. I don't want them destroyed, but do not take much care to preserve them.

I am, with respect, yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General J. WHEELER,

*Commanding Cavalry Corps, Confederate Army.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Lowry's, February 8, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have just received your note in cipher. I send you a copy of orders for the next move which will give you the key to the whole. Wheeler writes to General Howard, offering not to burn cotton if we don't burn houses. I assured him that he would oblige me by burning cotton, as it saves us the trouble; that we don't burn occupied houses; but if people vacate their own houses, I don't think they should expect us to protect them.

You may burn all cotton. Spare dwelling-houses that are occupied, and teach your men to be courteous to women—it goes a great ways—but take all provisions and forage you need. Act as though you are, or are to be, followed by infantry.

I expect Hood's army will try and join the South Carolina army about Co-

lumbia, and I will try and interpose again at Orangeburg. I will order the 14th corps to Williston and Guignard's bridge or Pine Log bridge. Edisto is narrow and easily crossed up there. The Orangeburg and Edgefield road is the key line of South Carolina.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

General KILPATRICK, *Blackville.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Graham's Station, February 9, 1865.*

DEAR GENERAL: Your note of this morning is received. Williams moved hence for Blackville this morning. The Michigan engineers have been ordered to your flank to twist railroad iron. Tell Williams I have inspected his work here, and the bars are not twisted. Better do half the work and do it thoroughly; unless there be a warp the bar can be straightened again. All the cavalry is now, and has been, on your flank. Kilpatrick was last night up at Williston, where he whipped a division of cavalry, and is moving to break up railroad, partially, as far as Aiken.

I was in hopes you would turn Davis off below Coosawhatchie swamp through Barnwell to Williston or White pond. Get him as soon as possible at work on the railroad from Williston west, and in the mean time have the bridge at Guignard's and Pine Log examined so as to cross there, or at the head of Young's island. My orders of yesterday give the next movement.

To-day, Howard, with the 17th corps, is moving to Binnaker's bridge. Two divisions of the 15th corps are at the forks of the roads west of this, and the other at Holman's bridge.

Don't take any of Kilpatrick's cavalry to make escorts or orderlies, for he has to fight and contend now with double and nearly treble his numbers. For courier duty and orderlies pick up horses and mount drummers and non-combatants. If necessary to get horses break up teams and use mules for ambulances, burning up the empty wagons. Howard has no cavalry save one fragment of mounted infantry. By keeping on our left you will have, henceforth, good forage.

Pine Log ford will be the place for Kilpatrick to cross over the South Edisto. Your best points will be the head of Young's island and Guignard's.

We must all turn amphibious, for the country is half under water. Mower had to fight at the Salkehatchie with his men up to their arm-pits, he setting the example.

I think we can spend all of to-morrow on railroad-breaking, but next day we must be across Edisto. You can gain time on Howard as he swings against Orangeburg. Your wing will move on Columbia.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General SLOCUM, *Blackville.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Walker's House, near S. C. Railroad,*

*February 9, 1865—2½ p. m.*

GENERAL: An officer has just left me for Blackville, where Slocum will arrive with Geary's division, which completes the 20th corps at Blackville. Davis is moving for Barnwell, and will come up to the west of Blackville about Williston. I have ordered Slocum to put in to-morrow good on the railroad, and then look to crossing the Edisto at the head of Young's island and at Guignard's.

I want you to effect a crossing at or between Binnaker's and Holman's bridges. Do it in your own way, using all the 17th corps and one division of the 15th corps, sent by Logan to Holman's bridge. If you can secure a lodgement to-morrow and get to work on a bridge at Binnaker's, it will be time enough to cross day after to-morrow. All accounts appear that the road from Binnaker's to Orangeburg is better than from Holman's.

I am seven miles from Binnaker's, five from Holman's, and six from Blackville. I will probably go up to Blackville to-morrow to see Slocum.

Keep me well advised of your purposes. As soon as Logan completes the destruction of the railroad to Blackville he can move his two other divisions down to Holman's, or where you need them.

It is, to me, patent that the enemy has only cavalry at the Edisto, and we must keep it busy, that Kilpatrick may encounter less about Aiken. His movement on Aiken, besides the substantial damage, will disconcert the part of S. D. Lee's corps that did not get over the railroad.

Proceed to effect a lodgement on the north of the Edisto by cautious, but persistent, efforts; once across, the enemy will fall behind the Santee.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General HOWARD,

*Commanding Right Wing.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Graham's, South Carolina Railroad,*  
*February 10, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have just returned from Blackville, where I saw General Slocum. The 20th corps is all up and at work destroying railroad. The 14th corps, General Slocum thinks, will reach Williston to-night. I also learn that General Corse is close at hand. So all things are in readiness for the move on Orangeburg. General Slocum will have his two corps on the Orangeburg and Edgefield road, opposite the new bridge at the head of Fair's island and Guignard's, by the day after to-morrow. You had better move the 17th corps straight on Orangeburg, aiming to get within two or three miles, ready the next day to cross by pontoons above Orangeburg and make a lodgement on the road. The 15th corps should move to-morrow to Bull-fight pond, and next day to North Edisto, at the mouth of Mill Branch creek, or Caw Caw, according to the appearance about Orangeburg. I will accompany the 15th corps and camp with it to-morrow night.

I want to have the railroad broken good from about Orangeburg up above the State road, (Matthew's Post Office,) but would prefer that one corps should do the work, leaving the 15th corps to follow a course more to the west, in support of the left wing, in the event of Dick Taylor having got to Augusta with Hood's old army.

Slocum's orders will take him by the most direct road possible to Columbia, but making to the left about the Sand Hills in case he comes in contact with one of your columns. I have nothing from Kilpatrick to-day.

If to-morrow, or next day, we observe a concentration of force about Orangeburg, I can draw from Slocum by the Edgefield road.

I will notify General Logan to put his corps in motion to-morrow for Bull-fight pond.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

General O. O. HOWARD,

*Commanding Right Wing.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Walker's House, February 10, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have this moment written General Howard that he may begin his movement on Orangeburg. You may, therefore, in the morning early put your corps in motion for Bull-fight pond, on the Edgefield and Orangeburg road, and there await orders from General Howard or myself. I will accompany you, going from here direct to Holman's bridge.

I am, &c., yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN.

Major General JNO. A. LOGAN,  
*Commanding 15th Corps.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, February 10, 1865.*

GENERAL: Your note from Johnston's is just received. I cannot change my plans now, as they are in progress. I don't care about Aiken, unless you can take it with a dash, and, as Wheeler's attention is drawn to that quarter, you can let it work.

To-morrow the right wing moves on Orangeburg, and after breaking that railroad good, we will proceed as heretofore indicated. Davis should be at Williston to-night, or early to-morrow. Keep in communication with him, and conform to his movements.

It won't pay to have infantry chasing Wheeler's cavalry; it is always a bad plan, and is injurious to detach infantry, save for a day or a single occasion. You can see Davis when he comes up, and he can spare a brigade for a day or so; but I don't want a brigade of infantry to go off to the flank, when the whole army would have to wait for it, or it would be marched to death to catch up.

Wheeler or a part of his command was on the north side of South Edisto yesterday, and the concentration of the enemy is being made at Columbia, though I have no doubt that attention has been drawn towards Augusta; but I will not delay the main move an hour, and, therefore, want Davis to move on as soon as he can repair the bridge. Slocum will give him his orders, and I wish you to conform to the movements of the left corps, give it notice of danger from the direction of Augusta, and only attack Wheeler when he exposes himself. When operating near General Davis's corps, he will doubtless let you have a brigade of infantry, from time to time, but not as a permanent thing.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

General KILPATRICK,  
*Commanding Cavalry.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, 21 miles from Columbia, February 13, 1865.*

GENERAL: Yours of this date is received. I would like to have Blair try and stampede the guard at the Congaree bridge by a semblance of attack, for which purpose one division to the rear of his trains, and leaving one to advance on the bridge, burning only the trestles, while the other confines its attention to twisting bars.

Corse's and Wood's are now within five or six miles of Sandy creek. I think you can put all the 15th corps across Sandy creek to-morrow, and Blair's trains

and division to Sandy Creek Post Office, where the Orangeburg and State roads meet. One march, viz: the day after to-morrow, will bring us easily up abreast of Columbia.

Captain Audenreid, in riding ahead to-day, captured a rebel lieutenant just out of Columbia, and passing himself off as a rebel, extracted from him much information.

The force now at Columbia is small, and the people are not expecting us now, thinking that Augusta or Charleston is our objective. I think Slocum will be abreast of Columbia to-morrow. I will keep with the leading division of this corps.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

General HOWARD,  
*Commanding Right Wing.*

P. S.—If you want more roads beyond Sandy creek you can depend on any number to the left. The country is of poor pine lands, and is full of farm roads. To-day the road was perfect, and there seemed any number running to every point of the compass.

S.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, opposite Columbia, February 16, 1865.*

GENERAL: General Howard has to pass Saluda and Broad rivers at the same time, requiring more bridging than he has. I send this through him, that he may note on it how many boats he wants. I suppose you can spare ten, as you will be able to remove that over the Saluda before you pass the Broad.

In case Howard calls for any pontoons, he will conduct them to the point where he needs them.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SLOCUM,  
*Commanding, &c.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, opposite Columbia, S. C., February 16, 1865.*

DEAR GENERAL: I see the bridge over Broad burning. It is very important that you effect a crossing to-night. If necessary get over the Saluda the bulk of the 15th corps, then take up enough pontoons to finish one across the Broad.

Send an officer with the enclosed note to General Slocum, who can send you ten boats before daylight. Slocum can pass Broad river as high up as Alston, and thereby use his bridges at one day's interval.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HOWARD,  
*Commanding Right Wing.*

Send the enclosed by an officer to conduct the pontoons.

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Winnsboro', S. C., February 21, 1865—6 p. m*

DEAR GENERAL: Generals Slocum and Davis are here. Slocum sends his wagons and pontoons to-morrow straight for the ferry at Rocky Mount post office, by Gladden's grove; he will keep four divisions breaking up road as far as the Chester district line, and aim to cross his whole command day after to-morrow. Let Blair finish up the road good to this point, and then assemble at Poplar spring and effect a crossing of the Wateree, prepared to get all across the day after to-morrow. Slocum will assemble his command at Gladden's. Communicate with me there or at Rocky Mount. After crossing, Slocum will have the road from Lancaster to Chesterfield, and you from your ferry straight for Cheraw, dipping a little south to get on the Camden road. I will keep with the 20th corps, which is General Slocum's right.

Yours, &amp;c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HOWARD.

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Winnsboro', February 21, 1865.*

GENERAL: I presume you to be now about Lemon's or Buck-Head post office, and base my present calculations on that supposition. I would like you to move with your whole force to the neighborhood of Blackstock depot, or Springwell post office, taking position and manœuvring so as to seem to be the advance of the whole army, in the direction of Chesterville and Charlotte, and to cover General Davis's operations in breaking up the railroad as far as he can during to-morrow and next day. As soon as Davis withdraws to cross the Catawba, move with him and cross to the east bank of the Catawba (or Wateree) on Slocum's pontoons, which will be laid at Rocky Mount post office. I would like to have you all across during the night of the 23d, so you can move next day on Lancaster. I would like to have the railroad bridge across Broad river at the mouth of Tiger burned, and I think the enemy himself will burn it if you approach it or send a small party to threaten it; also several of the bridges and trestles on the same railroad below where it crosses Broad river about Ashford's ferry and about Dawkins's. I hope you have already damaged that road considerably. I wish, as a rule, whenever you are near a railroad, you will, unless cautioned otherwise, have your men burn bridges, depots and water-tanks, and break switches; also, all saw-mills should be destroyed—not only burned, but their engines and boilers disabled. Davis will be near you and be on hand in case of need, but I don't want you to be drawn off so that you cannot have your trains and men ready to pass the pontoons during the night of the 23d. Better caution your commanders so as to keep in your foragers, else they will be left behind, as some were about Columbia.

I will be with this wing some days and would like to see you either here, or, better, at the bridge in crossing the Catawba.

I enclose you General Slocum's orders for to-morrow and next day. General Howard will be at Poplar spring and Peay's ferry.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General KILPATRICK,  
*Commanding Cavalry.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Rocky Mount Post Office, February 22, 1865—9 p. m.*

GENERAL: Yours of to-day from Peay's ferry, has just been received. General Sherman desires me to say that he would like to have you put your whole command over the river with due expedition, and suggests it would be well to move out in the direction intended, some ten or twelve miles, say Russell Place, until the high or table land may be reached. He also wishes, you to reconnoitre for roads towards Cheraw well, and towards Camden.

Two divisions of the 20th corps, with the entire train of this wing, have reached this point, and are mostly in camp; the bridge is completed ready for crossing; the balance of the command is destroying railroad.

Yours, with respect,

L. M. DAYTON,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Major General HOWARD,

*Commanding Right Wing.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Rocky Mount, S. C., February 23, 1865.*

GENERAL: Yours of last night is received; your disposition of matters is all right. The bridge is laid and troops are crossing. I am anxious to get the wagons across and up on high ground before the rain comes. I wish you would keep your cavalry on roads to the north of the direct one by Gladden's grove, as that will be needed all day for infantry and wagons. You shall have the bridge as fast as your brigades arrive.

I regret the matter you report that eighteen of your men have been murdered after surrender, and marked that the enemy intended to kill all foragers. It leaves no alternative; you must retaliate man for man, and mark them in the like manner. Let it be done at once. We have a perfect war-right to the products of the country we overrun, and may collect them by foragers or otherwise. Let the whole people know the war is now against them because their armies flee before us and do not defend their country or frontier as they should. It is pretty nonsense for Wheeler, and Beauregard, and such vain heroes, to talk of our warring against women and children. If they claim to be men they should defend their women and children and prevent us reaching their homes. Instead of maintaining their armies let them turn their attention to their families, or we will follow them to the death; they should know that we will use the produce of the country as we please.

I want the foragers to be regulated and systematized, so as not to degenerate into common robbers; but foragers, as such, to collect corn, bacon, beef, and such other products as we need, are as much entitled to our protection as our skirmishers and flankers.

You will, therefore, at once shoot, and leave by the road-side, an equal number of their prisoners, and append a label to their bodies stating that man for man shall be killed for every one of our men they kill. If our foragers commit excesses punish them yourself, but never let an enemy judge between our men and the law. For my part I want the people of the south to realize the fact that they shall not dictate laws of war or peace to us. If there is to be any dictation we want our full share.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

Major General KILPATRICK,

*Commanding Cavalry.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Rocky Mount Post Office, February 23, 1865—10 a. m.*

GENERAL: I have just been down to the bridge. It will take all of to-day and to-morrow to get this wing across and out. You may go ahead, but keep communication with me.

I expect Kilpatrick here this p. m., and will send him well to the left. He reports that two of his foraging parties were murdered by the enemy after capture, and labelled "death to all foragers." Now, it is clearly our right to subsist our army on the enemy. Napoleon always did it; but could avail himself of the civil power he found in existence to collect forage and provisions by regular impressments. We cannot do that here, and I contend, if the enemy fails to defend his country, we may rightfully appropriate what we want. If our foragers are out under mine, yours, or other proper authority, they must be protected. I have ordered Kilpatrick to select of his prisoners man for man, shoot them, and leave them by the road-side labelled, so that our enemy will see that for every man he executes he takes the life of one of his own.

I want the foragers, however, to be kept within reasonable bounds for the sake of discipline. I will not protect them when they enter dwellings and commit wanton waste—as women's apparel, jewelry, and such things as are not needed by our army; but they may destroy cotton and tobacco, because these are assumed by the rebel government to belong to it, and are used as a valuable source of revenue. Nor will I consent to our enemy taking the lives of our men on their judgment. They have lost all title to property, and can lose nothing not already forfeited, but we should punish our own soldiers for a departure from our orders, and if the people resist our foragers I will not deem it wrong, but the confederate army must not be supposed to be the champions of any people.

I lay down these general rules, and wish you to be governed by them. If any of your foragers are murdered, take life for life, leaving a record of each.

I am, with respect,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HOWARD, *Commanding Right Wing.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Rocky Mount, February 23, 1865.*

GENERAL: Your note of to-day is received. I don't see that we can do better than to follow the roads you have indicated, although they carry you too far south. General Davis will cross to-morrow and get on the road from Lancaster to Cheraw, *via* Chesterfield. General Williams is now at Colonel Ballard's, but his trains are not yet across. Kilpatrick will cross at 7 p. m., move out five miles, and to-morrow move to Lancaster, and there await General Davis's coming. I will accompany General Williams, and expect to be about Hanging Rock to-morrow night; thence will find a road across to Chesterfield. I fear much the present rain will make the roads very bad. You will have better roads and should move slower. If circumstances warrant, you might send a small cavalry force into Camden and get more positive news of Charleston; it might save your being troubled by cavalry to burn the bridge. If you should calculate that you will reach Cheraw much in advance of us, you may threaten Florence, or actually break the railroad near there to divert attention from our real course.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*  
 General HOWARD, *Commanding Right Wing.*



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, 1 mile north of Warrenton,  
 15 miles south of Lancaster, February 24, 1865.*

GENERAL: General Davis is not yet across, and the roads are so very bad that I think it will take him all day and to-morrow to get well over and up on high land. The 20th corps is here. We can see the 17th corps passing eastward, about one mile south.

General Davis is ordered to take roads that will bring him into the direct road from Lancaster to Chesterfield, and the 20th corps will move by Hanging Rock, and thence by roads to the south of Davis. Unless the rain cease we will have a hard time. Don't push too fast, but gather as much food as you can *en route*. I think you could send into Camden with safety, but there is no object. When you get to Lynch's creek you might pass the 9th Illinois cavalry across, and push them toward Florence, with orders to break two or three bridges about Timmons ville, and then to rejoin you at Cheraw. I don't believe there is any cavalry of the enemy down there, and ours might pick up some good horses. The only object would be to prevent the shipment, by cars, of the garrison of Charleston to Fayetteville or Wilmington to oppose us. If, at the time, you suppose all of the Charleston garrison is east of Florence, the expedition would not be advisable.

I believe Foster is in possession of Charleston, because of the general belief to that effect, and the reports of the negroes you sent me. I have also just released a prisoner, captured yesterday by the 20th corps, who was a bright lad, sixteen (16) years old, son of Richard Bacot, who was at West Point with me, and whom I knew well at Charleston. This boy left Charleston last Thursday at 12 m., at which time he says our troops had been shelling the city for twenty-four hours from James's island. He was a hospital attendant, and was sent along with the sick from the hospitals to Florence, thence to be conveyed to the hospital at Cheraw. He said the orders for the evacuation had been published, and the garrison were to be rendezvoused along the Florence road at Porcher's and Bonneau's; they were removing the powder and ammunition, but would leave the heavy guns. The gunboats were to be blown up. He says the first orders were to go to Columbia, but they were changed.

If you can possibly employ a negro to go through to Charleston, make a cipher despatch, telling our general position and destination, and an order of liberal payment.

I think you will have good roads, and that there is no danger in our spreading out this side of Cheraw, thence to Fayetteville roads favor us, as also from Fayetteville to our destination. At both Cheraw and Fayetteville are bridges that can be secured by holding the towns responsible.

We find no enemy hereabouts, and suppose them all to be about Charleston and Salisbury. General Kilpatrick must now be at Lancaster; he crossed last night and was off this morning.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Major General HOWARD,  
*Commanding Right Wing.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, February 24, 1865.*

GENERAL: It is officially reported to me that our foraging parties are murdered after captured, and labelled "death to all foragers;" one instance of a lieutenant and seven men near Chesterville, and another of twenty "near a ravine

eighty rods from the main road," about three miles from Feasterville. I have ordered a similar number of prisoners in our hands to be disposed of in like manner.

I hold about one thousand prisoners captured in various ways, and can stand it as long as you, but I hardly think these murders are committed with your knowledge, and would suggest that you give notice to the people at large that every life taken by them results in the death of one of your confederates.

Of course you cannot question my right to "forage on the country." It is a war right as old as history. The manner of exercising it varies with circumstances, and if the civil authorities will supply my requisitions I will forbid all foraging. But I find no civil authorities who can respond to calls for forage and provisions, therefore must collect directly of the people. I have no doubt this is the occasion of much misbehavior on the part of our men, but I cannot permit an enemy to judge, and punish with wholesale murder.

Personally I regret the bitter feelings engendered by this war, but they were to be expected, and I simply allege that those who struck the first blow and made war inevitable ought not in fairness to reproach us for the natural consequences. I merely assert our "war right" to forage, and my resolve to protect my foragers to the extent of life for life.

Your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General United States Army.*

Lieut. General WADE HAMPTON,

*Commanding Cavalry forces, U. S. A.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Hanging Rock, February 27, 1865.*

GENERAL: Your letter is just received. It is all important that you keep me advised. Davis was slow in using the bridge, and it was carried away and was not mended until to-day. He will be all over to-night. The movement you describe is the proper one—to keep on the left rear of the left infantry corps.

I have word from Howard that will put him near Cheraw to-morrow night, and I will push to meet him, but must wait till General Davis gets along; probably will be about Horton's tavern to-morrow night. Keep feeling the different roads towards Charlotte till you hear General Davis is well towards the head of Lynch's creek and then draw off.

General Howard captured a good many horses and mules and some militia; he will send a division light to Florence simply to break that road, and prevent the removal of any more railroad stock.

There is little doubt our troops are in Charleston, and General Howard reports that a despatch reached Camden yesterday that we also had taken Wilmington. In that event the enemy will collect all his force about Raleigh as soon as he sees I am not coming to Charlotte.

Keep me advised daily. A despatch sent to the nearest corps to be forwarded will answer the purpose, but I think Hampton will draw off as soon as he feels General Howard's approach to Cheraw. General Howard is moving on the two roads from Young's and Tillersville.

General Slocum's 20th corps will probably pass at Blakeney's, and General Davis's at MacManus's. You will have no trouble with Lynch's creek, as it is passable anywhere above MacManus's.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General KILPATRICK, *Lancaster.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Finley's Bridge, Lynch's Creek, March 1, 1865.*

GENERAL: General Slocum has the 20th corps across Lynch's creek and a good bridge. General Davis is across the Catawba, and ought to be about fifteen miles behind us. To-morrow all will move forward fifteen miles, which will bring us near Chesterfield, next day at Cheraw; General Davis, in the mean time, closing his gap. Push General Blair straight on Cheraw. With the 15th corps move on the same point, careful to reach the railroad below Cheraw and break it; then on Cheraw. We will cross to the north of Cheraw. The enemy cannot hold Cheraw against us, because it is on a branch road, and we can insulate it. Johnston, if there, will not fight with a bridge behind him. We may have to cross the Pedee with a serious enemy in front, but we must not allow the confederates time to fortify Cheraw.

I know Hampton was, in person, above Lancaster, also Wheeler. I had an original communication from Wade Hampton yesterday, and he is still watching Kilpatrick, who is at Lancaster, till Davis gets past. Push with all energy straight on Cheraw, cutting its roads below, and I will be up on the 3d instant.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General O. O. HOWARD,  
*Commanding Right Wing.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, March 2, 1865.*

GENERAL: The 20th corps is now starting from Big Lynch's creek for Chesterfield, twenty miles distant. The 14th corps is now at Little Lynch's creek, behind us, and will march by MacManus's bridge towards Chesterfield.

General Howard was, on the 28th February, across Lynch's creek, at Tiller's, and General Blair within sixteen miles of Cheraw. All move on Cheraw, where it is said the Charleston and Wilmington garrison are expecting to meet us. I don't believe they will fight on this side the Pedee, but you may move on General Davis's left, near Chesterfield, and by the time you get there I can select the points of crossing; but if there be any enemy at Cheraw he will, of course, break the bridge there, and force us to use pontoons, in which case we will probably use Cheraw and Sneedsboro'.

General Howard sent his company of scouts from Tiller's towards the Charleston and Wilmington road, but they met two brigades of cavalry near Mount Elon Post Office, and were driven back. General Howard reports Hampton's headquarters at Darlington, but I doubt it. I don't think the enemy would leave his cavalry or any material part of it between us and the sea. Doubtless he is watching and using the railroad east and south of us, but to what extent I cannot conjecture until I know whether our people have Wilmington. I suppose that Schofield, by this time, must be on the railroad north of Wilmington at or near Goldsboro'.

Keep near General Davis's left, and act defensively till we know about Cheraw. I will be with the 20th corps, near Chesterfield, where the Lancaster road meets this, about four miles this side of Chesterfield. I will send infantry to Chesterfield to secure, if possible, the bridges across Thompson's creek, near that place. To-morrow at Cheraw.

You should be to-night on Lynch's creek, and to-morrow near Chesterfield.

Roads are sandy and good. Enemy leaves us good bridges, and thus far we find not even pickets. General Blair found some cavalry on his road, who gave ground easily.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General KILPATRICK, *near Lancaster.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Chesterfield, S. C., March 3, 1865—6 a. m.*

GENERAL: I got your despatch from Blakeney's last night. I want you to interpose between Charlotte and Cheraw until we are across. General Blair's head of column was thirteen miles southwest of Cheraw last night. General Jackson's division of the 20th corps pushed Butler's cavalry at a run through Chesterfield and across the bridges of Thompson's creek, saving the one on the Wadesboro' road, excepting one post, which the enemy had time to cut. The other bridge on the Cheraw road was burned. The balance of the corps is pretty well strung out by reason of the roads. I don't know exactly where General Davis is, but will direct him on Sneedsboro', and would like you to report to me the nature of the roads, especially the one from Mount Croghan, by Sinclair. By the way, what is your true position, and you should get a party over on the plank road on the line of Jones's creek, and cut off any courier line from Wadesboro'. I think Hardee will try and escape towards Wadesboro', and in that event you will strike his flank; anyhow I want you to let go everything and cut his column, reporting to me that I may throw infantry across; but until I hear the exact state of matters at Cheraw, will move the right wing on Cheraw and left wing on Sneedsboro'. I don't much care now what Beauregard does. He has no railroad now to circulate on, and must foot it, as we do; but he has not the trains that we have, and he can move more rapidly than we. I want, of course, to get across Pedee, and will then fight him where he pleases, and don't care for his Virginia re-enforcements; we have to meet them some time, and now as well as later. Only let me know in advance as much as possible the route or routes on which his infantry moves. His cavalry gives no clue by which I can judge. My belief, however, is, that Beauregard is tied to a railroad, and that railroad will be from Charlotte to Danville. I have no doubt that Wilmington is, or soon will be, in our hands, and, moreover, that Schofield will, or has, made a lodgement on the Goldsboro' road. A mere strong picket of observation towards Monroe to give General Davis notice of the approach of danger will suffice. The bulk of your force should be north of Thompson's creek from Burche's up towards Jones's creek. Reconnoitring parties should examine Pedee from Jones's creek down, but do nothing to show a purpose to cross.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Major General KILPATRICK,  
*Commanding Cavalry.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Chesterfield, S. C., March 3, 1865—7 a. m.*

GENERAL: General Kilpatrick reports that he is near Blakeney's, and will move to-day around the head of Thompson's creek, to the neighborhood of Sinclair, and reconnoitre well across to the Pedee. General Blair also reports

from his position thirteen miles from Cheraw, on the Camden road. General Howard halted him there until the 15th corps got up in supporting distance. The 15th corps has been delayed by all sorts of mishaps occasioned by high water, but General Blair, pursuant to my orders, is moving straight on Cheraw. I want you to finish up the two bridges here; get up your troops from the rear, and move the 20th corps towards Cheraw, north of Thompson's creek, until you know General Blair is in Cheraw, when it will work across to the plank road and up to Sneedsboro', where I design your wing and the cavalry to cross over. You may instruct General Davis to move on Sneedsboro' at once, but I don't see as he can do better than to come here and use your upper bridge, unless he gets better roads and more forage by Mount Croghan, Sinclair, MacQuaig's, &c.

I believe that Hardee is at Cheraw with his Charleston garrison, and it may be part of the Wilmington force, but I rather think these latter will be used to meet Schofield about Goldsboro', but I want Hardee attacked rapidly and boldly, if in any position this side of the Pedee. If he makes the mistake to fight on this side, we ought to catch him. I have instructed General Kilpatrick to get a brigade of cavalry across to the plank road at once, to observe and attack any force moving on that road from any direction. If Hardee tries to escape towards Wadesboro', we must let go our trains and attack him in flank. I think Beauregard without many wagons is tied to his Charlotte and Danville railroad. He would not dare depend on the coast road, held as it is and threatened at Goldsboro'. Let us get across the Pedee at all hazards, as soon as possible, and then we are all right with Fayetteville as our objective, and the Cape Fear river as an alternate base of operations.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General SLOCUM.

*Commanding Left Wing.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Chesterfield, S. C., March 3, 1865—2½ p. m.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of 3.30 p. m. yesterday from Black creek is just received. I wrote this a. m. to General Blair a letter to be sent to you, which may reach you before this, but will repeat.

General Slocum took Chesterfield yesterday, driving Butler's cavalry to and through the town, but the enemy broke one of the bridges and burned the other. Both are now repaired, and General Slocum will push one division down on the north bank so as to uncover your crossing; but send me word as soon as you are over that the 20th corps may cross over to the Pedee towards Sneedsboro', where I want his wing and the cavalry to cross. Of course I am a little impatient to get across Pedee before Beauregard can swing around from Charlotte and Salisbury and oppose our crossing. Once across the Pedee I don't fear the whole confederate army, for, if need be, we can swing in against the right bank of Cape Fear, and work down until we meet our people; but I shall aim to reach Fayetteville and Goldsboro', where I know Schofield must now be.

I have ordered General Davis from MacManus' bridge *via* Mount Croghan to Sneedsboro', and Kilpatrick is above him towards Wadesboro'. Roads are very bad up here, either quick-sand or red clay. The country is also poor; still, thus far we find forage, bacon, and corn-meal.

I met at Winnsboro' Mrs. Aiken, wife of the very Colonel Aiken you report as killed in the fight with Duncan. She was a Miss Gayle, of Mobile, sister of Mrs. General Gorgas, of the rebel ordnance department. In her conversation with me she said she supposed her husband would have to "submit" or get

killed, and I answered her that "such was the case," but I hardly thought so soon to be a prophet.

I will send your letter to General Slocum with instructions to read it, and push one or two divisions down towards Cheraw as fast as possible, leaving his wagons near the Sneedsboro' road. I will stay here to-night, and to-morrow go down in hopes to go into Cheraw. I don't believe Hardee will fight on this side the river, and it is now too late for him to slip out by way of Wadesboro'.

Your rear division will have plenty of time to close up while you are getting your crossing secured and bridged. I take it all the bridges across Thompson's creek are gone, unless it be the railroad bridge, which may have been spared for the sake of the rebel wounded that must still be there. I also feel confident that Wilmington is in our possession, and that none of its garrison is at Cheraw.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Major General HOWARD,  
*Commanding Right Wing.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Chesterfield, S. C., March 3, 1865—5.45 p. m.*

GENERAL: Your despatch from Cheraw to the general-in-chief is received. He has written you twice to-day, viz., once direct, and once through General Blair; and he desires me to say those letters contain his views and wishes as regards immediate operations, *i. e.*, for you to concentrate your command at Cheraw, and make a crossing of, and lodgement beyond the Pedee with all possible despatch, as it is all-important that we at once hold its left bank.

If you think you will have time, the general would like to have you send any kind of a force from the rear portion of your command, (probably mounted would be the best,) down to Florence, with directions to destroy everything of public property there. We will come into Cheraw to-morrow morning.

It is not probable there is much of an enemy at Florence.

I am, general, with respect, &c.,

L. M. DAYTON,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Major General HOWARD,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Chesterfield, S. C., March 3, 1865.*

GENERAL: To-morrow the general-in-chief will move into Cheraw and join the army of the Tennessee. He wishes you to proceed and cross the Pedee with your command at Sneedsboro', as soon as possible, and also directs me to say he will make full orders at Cheraw for the next movement.

I am, general, with respect, &c.,

L. M. DAYTON,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Major General H. W. SLOCUM,  
*Commanding Left Wing.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Cheraw, S. C., March 4, 1865—8 p. m.*

GENERAL: I got here at 10 a. m., and found the 17th corps in town, and laying a pontoon bridge across the Pedee. The 15th corps is also here, and their trains are coming in all safe. The bridge is down; one division (Mower's) is across, and is skirmishing about two miles out.

Hardee commanded here, and had, it is said, about fifteen thousand men, but I doubt if he had more than the Charleston garrison and S. D. Lee's corps, in all ten thousand. There was a gunboat here that had come up when the Yankees got Georgetown, but it was blown up to-day, about six miles down the river. There is a good deal of property here, such as guns, (25,) ammunition, &c., and more of a town than I expected to find.

General Howard has sent a mounted force to destroy property at and near Florence, which cannot return before the day after to-morrow, by which time I think he can have all his command across. Of course, the sooner we reach Fayetteville the better, but we must move in compact masses, as either column may encounter the whole of Hardee's command, and it may be re-enforced by some from Charleston. I have no doubt that Schofield is at work in North Carolina. I feel assured he is fully possessed of my views, and will have Goldsboro', with both the Wilmington and Newbern roads, done by the 15th instant, the day appointed. Still, it is but prudent to continue, as heretofore, to collect all the food possible, in case we are delayed thereabouts. There is a story afloat that six thousand of Schofield's men are already at Fayetteville, which will be a great success, better than we expected; but I know General Grant will spare no efforts to second us; he is fully alive to the importance of our movements.

Get your bridge down, and cross over as fast as possible, and stretch out on the roads you want, and I will order General Howard to conform to you. If you can get out ten miles during all Tuesday, it will be as much as I expect.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SLOCUM, *Commanding Left Wing.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Cheraw, S. C., March 4, 1865—8 p. m.*

GENERAL: I have just received your note, and the copy of your orders. I would not be surprised if it were true that some of Schofield's command were at Fayetteville. I know General Grant's anxiety for us, and he will move heaven and earth to co-operate. Your orders are all right. I have written to General Slocum, who is at Sneedsboro', and he will use the roads by Mark's creek and McFarland's bridge, and all roads north of it. It may be well for you to let General Slocum have a day's start, that the column may assume an echelon towards the north. General Slocum can hardly have all across earlier than Tuesday, and I have intimated that I would like him to be ten miles out during all Tuesday. The river with him seems to be wider than with you.

Get a good scout or two ready for me to send a message to Wilmington as soon as any of your heads of columns are across Lumber river.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding*

Major General HOWARD,  
*Commanding Right Wing.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Cheraw, S. C., March 5, 1865.*

GENERAL: I was on the point of making an order for the next movement, but on looking over my last, No. 16, I find it covers the ground up to our next objective. You have the choice of roads, and I understand from Captain Ludlow that you want McFarland's and Love's bridges. All right. Let General Davis lead into Fayetteville, holding the 20th corps in support, with the cavalry on his left rear. I will hold General Howard back, but close enough to come up if Johnston wants to fight. I will now fight him if he dare, and, therefore, wish you to act on that idea, keeping each corps ready to hold the enemy if he appears in force on your left, but his strength must be developed before other corps are called from their roads. I have notified General Howard of this order, and he has simply asked, instead of holding on here to make slow marches, to gather forage and meal. I send you a copy of his orders of march. I also send you an open letter for General Kilpatrick, which read and forward to him. Major Audenreid, of my staff, left him yesterday ten miles this side of Wadesboro', and my orders to him were to hold his command, covering all roads, especially the plank road between Wadesboro' and your troops. After you have got a covering force across the Pedee, let Kilpatrick have the bridge, and move out to your left front—say Rockingham. We have been badly treated by the weather, but I hope for a better spell henceforth.

I will get messages through to Wilmington the moment any head of column is across Lumber creek, and feel sure that Schofield will meet us in force at Goldsboro'. I will draw from Savannah, Charleston, and Wilmington at least twenty-five thousand men to re-enforce our army at Goldsboro', and will put them under Schofield, as the centre or reserve, restoring the organization of the Atlanta campaign. With that army replenished and refreshed we can make things move. Indeed, I feel confident that nothing can now stand before us. I find here additional signs of discomfiture; three thousand six hundred barrels of powder are among our spoils, and the surgeons of the confederate hospitals admit that Hardee left them without supplies, or even orders. Keep me well advised of progress, and I will make things conform to your movements.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SLOCUM,  
*Commanding Left Wing.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Cheraw, S. C., March 5, 1865.*

GENERAL: I was on the point of making a new general order of movement, but on examining my last, No. 16, I find it provides for the next stage. General Howard has crossed here, and is now passing trains and troops, but I will hold him back to allow General Slocum to lead to Fayetteville.

General Howard has sent some mounted infantry down to Florence to damage things there, and they cannot return until to-morrow. In the mean time General Slocum will pass over and move out on roads leading to McFarland's and Love's bridges. I will hold the right wing back, and in reserve, keeping on roads to the south of General Slocum. As soon as he has a covering force across the Peedee he will notify you and give you his bridge, when move out to Rockingham, and thence conform to his movements, getting up to Solemn Grove, and thence along down south of Little river to the roads coming into Fayetteville from Manchester.



There is a rumor here that General Schofield is already at Fayetteville. It is certain he took Wilmington not by the evacuation of the place, but by force, capturing Haygood's brigade. This simplifies our work very much, and will give me large re-enforcements as soon as I need them.

Hardee left here in haste and confusion, going across Pedee and burning the bridge, but we have already a pontoon bridge across, and two divisions out a couple miles. Butler's division of cavalry is with him. The enemy left here valuable stores, twenty-four good guns, three thousand six hundred barrels powder, two thousand muskets, the hospitals, and much ammunition and stores.

I don't think Joe Johnston will try to concentrate his forces this side of Raleigh.

Your, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General KILPATRICK,  
*Commanding Cavalry.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Cheraw, S. C., March 6, 1865.*

GENERAL: I shall, in person, to-day cross the Pedee, and go out on the main Fayetteville road about five miles, to the point of Phill's creek where are encamped two divisions of the 15th corps. There I shall await the fact that you are all across and off for Fayetteville, and will try and hold the right wing ready to turn to you in case Johnston attempts to strike you in flank, or to move on towards Fayetteville, aiming to arrive there at or near about the same time with your rear. I propose your command should first enter and occupy Fayetteville, and secure the bridge, if possible; otherwise to make a lodgement across with pontoons. En route break the railroad which is known as the Wilmington and Charlotte; but it is only partially down to Rockingham. It is of little importance, but being on it, we might as well use up some of its iron. At its depots you may find some corn and meal.

On approaching Fayetteville you may give out that if the bridge is destroyed we will deal harshly by the town; but if there be no positive resistance, and if the enemy spare the bridge, I wish the town to be dealt with generously. Of course we will dispose of all public stores and property, but will spare private houses. Use wheat, corn, meal, bacon, animals, wagons, &c., needed by your command, but try and keep the foragers from insulting families, by word or rudeness. It might be well to instruct your brigade commanders that we are now out of South Carolina, and that a little moderation may be of political consequence to us in North Carolina.

At Fayetteville, if we can secure boats of any kind, even coal-flats, I will send down Cape Fear river the bulk of the refugees, white and black, which swells our numbers and consumes the food necessary for our combatants. I have no doubt of having daily intercourse with you by courier or in person, and only name these points that you may initiate measures to accomplish these ends.

The enemy has abandoned many caissons loaded with ammunition, on his route of retreat, and if you can push or threaten him about Rockingham I doubt not he will drop more. The moment General Davis strikes the plank road he should push with all possible speed into Fayetteville.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SLOCUM,  
*Commanding Left Wing, Sneedsboro'.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Cheraw, S. C., March 6, 1865.*

GENERAL: A copy of your orders, issued at Easterling's for to-morrow's movement, enclosed to the general-in-chief, has been received. The general desires me to say the order is satisfactory to him, and in modification has only instructed General Logan to remain in his present camp until such time as the 20th corps, now passing, can get by him on to the left-hand road *via* Clark's creek.

I am, general, yours with respect,

L. M. DAYTON,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Major General HOWARD,  
*Commanding Right Wing.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Camp on Fayetteville Road,  
 13 miles from Cheraw, March 7, 1865.*

GENERAL: Yours of this date, 11 a. m., is just received. I am well pleased to learn that Hardee is making well north. Though willing to fight Joe Johnston, who now commands in chief, I would prefer to work over to the new base, to clear our columns of the impediments and make junction with Schofield, who is, doubtless, working up towards Goldsboro'. If I can get that point secure, with both railroads down to Wilmington and Newbern, you will perceive what a base I will have. Raleigh will be easy of conquest, and we can drive all Carolina north of the Roanoke, where the concentrated armies of the Confederacy will have contracted foraging ground. But of that hereafter. Now I will make for Fayetteville, and only ask you to keep up the seeming appearance of pushing after Hardee, but really keep your command well in hand and the horses and men in the best possible order as to food and forage.

To-morrow night I will send messengers with my orders for Schofield, but shall aim to reach Goldsboro'. I don't want to make southing. Our infantry columns are doing well. I will let Davis enter Fayetteville first, and if the people will spare the bridge, I want all to be easy on the citizens; but if they burn bridges or bother us, we must go the whole figure. In conversation with people evince a determination to maintain the Union, but treat all other matters as beneath a soldier's notice. Give us a whole country with a government, and leave details to the lawyers.

Deal as moderately and fairly by the North Carolinians as possible, and fan the flame of discord already subsisting between them and their proud cousins of South Carolina. There never was much love between them. Touch upon the chivalry running away, always leaving their families for us to feed and protect, and then on purpose accusing us of all sorts of rudeness.

I expect to reach Fayetteville by Saturday, and I will determine as quick as possible what is next for you, but I don't see as you can do better than hold on that flank. There is a body of infantry and cavalry left down in the pocket about Florence that might be caught, but it won't pay to chase them. Horse flesh is too precious. Keep your horses in the best order for the day when we must have a big fight; not, however, on this turn.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General KILPATRICK,  
*Commanding Cavalry, Rockingham.*

[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Laurel Hill, N. C., Wednesday, March 8, 1865.*COMMANDING OFFICER, *Wilmington, N. C.:*

We are marching on Fayetteville; will be there Saturday, Sunday, and Monday, and then will march for Goldsboro'.

If possible, send a boat up Cape Fear river, and have word conveyed to General Schofield that I expect to meet him about Goldsboro'. We are all well and have done finely. The rain makes our roads difficult and may delay me about Fayetteville, in which case I would like to have some bread, sugar, and coffee; we have abundance of all else. I expect to reach Goldsboro' by the 20th instant.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Bethel Church, 26 miles from Fayetteville, N. C.,**March 10, 1865—2 p. m.*

GENERAL: Yours of 11.20 is just received. The heavy rain last night caught Hazen's train in a swamp, and he has had to corduroy five miles, and his train is not up yet. General Corse is behind him, just on this side of Lumber river. I will come on in the morning as fast as possible, but you may go on, ready to support General Slocum, who reports, that he will be ready to enter Fayetteville to-morrow. I have no doubt Johnston will try and get some troops to oppose, and it is well for us to anticipate his preparations, and therefore you may push so as to threaten the town on the southwest. Let General Blair take from the plank road to the river the two divisions of the 15th corps on the direct road communicating with Williams on the left, but let Slocum break into town.

I will send a staff officer to him at daylight with orders to shove right in and push for the bridge.

I think if the enemy fights us with a bridge to his rear, he commits a mistake, of which we must take immediate advantage.

If any cause delay me have preparations made at once to cross over to the east bank of Cape Fear, below the town, but we will pause thereabouts until we can get some real news from Wilmington. You may send any number of messengers to convey the intelligence that we are hereabouts, all well, and bound for Goldsboro', unless necessity force us toward Wilmington.

I regret that this column has lost this day, but it seems inevitable.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HOWARD,

*Commanding Right Wing.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Raft Swamp, N. C., March 10, 1865.*

GENERAL: The heavy rain of last night caught the column with which I am in the swamp, which is bottomless, and has to be cleared and corduroyed for miles to let the trains and artillery pass.

The 17th corps is now at Rockfish creek, and will have time to repair the bridges and push into Fayetteville to-morrow, Saturday. I want you to go in first; this you can do in your own way, but General Howard will have the 17th corps and two divisions of the 15th corps near enough to support. Do all that is possible to secure the bridge across Cape Fear; but if, as I suppose will be the case, the enemy burn it, effect a lodgement at once across, and make a pontoon bridge with a brigade across intrenched. We will wait there some days. Destroy nothing until I meet you unless there be special reason that you know I will approve. I will try and be near you at sunset.

Should it be that Johnston has resolved to defend Fayetteville with a large force, it is to our interest, and you can engage his attention on the north and northwest, while General Howard closes in to the southwest. Avoid intrenchments, but make haste to prevent the making of them.

I send you this message, which may seem superfluous, but I am with troops delayed by the swamp, and cannot afford to leave anything to chance. I have sent messengers and orders to Wilmington.

I set much store on a lodgement east of Cape Fear river, and would advise your having the pontoons convenient.

The weather is now clearing away, and will give us, I hope, some days of sunshine. Our roads here are swampy in the extreme, but yours, I hope, have proven better.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SLOCUM,  
*Commanding Left Wing.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Fayetteville, N. C., March 11, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have just received your report, and read it with great satisfaction. I feared it was more, as the enemy claims from two to four hundred prisoners, which were conducted through Fayetteville. You may rest a couple of days, and then be ready to cross the river. I think there are some of the enemy that failed to escape across the bridge. You might send a strong foraging party up to the Little river bridge, and burn the railroad bridge. The enemy have sent a good deal of ordnance up towards the coal mines on the railroad. I would like to have it and the cars and the locomotives destroyed, but can hardly spare time. We will lay the pontoons to-morrow and cross on Monday. I am at the arsenal. I did not get a despatch from you at Solemn Grove.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General KILPATRICK,  
*Commanding Cavalry.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Fayetteville, N. C., March 11, 1865.*

Major General TERRY, *Wilmington:*

I have just received your despatch of the 7th. We entered Fayetteville to-day, Hardee retreating eastward with twenty thousand men, and burning the bridge across Cape Fear river. We will cross the river to-morrow and start for 'Goldsboro' on Tuesday. You can calculate the time of my arrival by the

weather. I will strike the Wilmington railroad about Faison's. We are all well, and have destroyed a vast amount of stores, and done the enemy irreparable damage. I will destroy the arsenal utterly. I want everything concentrated at or as near Goldsboro' as possible, with the railroad finished as near as possible.

We have a large number of negroes and refugees that I may send to Wilmington.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[By scout.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Fayetteville, N. C., March 11, 1865.*

General TERRY, *Wilmington, N. C.:*

I may send a train of wagons down the road along Cape Fear river to convey refugees and negroes that have followed my army from South Carolina.

Please ask Admiral Porter to have some gunboats feel up Cape Fear river as high as Elizabeth City, or at all events as high up as the wreck of the Chieamauga, at Indian Wells. The rebels burned their steamboats here.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Fayetteville, N. C., March 12, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have just received your message by the tug which left Wilmington at 2 p. m. yesterday, and arrived here without trouble. The scout who brought me your cipher message started back last night with my answers, which are superseded by the fact of your opening the river.

General Howard just reports that he has secured one of the enemy's steamboats below the city, and General Slocum will try to secure two known to be above, and we will load them with refugees, white and black, which have clung to our skirts, impeded our movements, and consumed our food.

We have swept the country well from Savannah here, and my men and animals are in fine condition. Had it not been for the foul weather, I would have caught Hardee at Cheraw, or here; but at Columbia, Cheraw, and here, we got immense stores, and have destroyed machinery, guns, ammunition, and property, of inestimable value to our enemy. At all points he has fled from us, "standing not on the order of his going."

The people of South Carolina, instead of feeding Lee's army, will now call on Lee to feed them.

I want you to send me all the shoes, stockings, drawers, sugar, coffee, and flour, you can spare; finish the loads with oats or corn. Have the boats escorted and let them run at night at any risk. We must not lose time for Joe Johnston to concentrate at Goldsboro'. We cannot prevent his concentrating at Raleigh, but he shall have no rest. I want General Schofield to go on with his railroad from Newbern as far as he can, and you do the same from Wilmington. If we can get the roads to, and secure Goldsboro' by April 10, it will be soon enough, but every day now is worth a million of dollars. I can whip Joe Johnston provided he don't catch one of my corps in flank, and I will see that my army marches hence to Goldsboro' in compact form.

I must rid my army of from twenty to thirty thousand useless mouths; as many to go down Cape Fear as possible, and balance to go in the vehicles and on captured horses *via* Clinton to Wilmington.

I thank you for the energetic action that has marked your course, and shall be most happy to meet you.

I am truly your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Major General TERRY,  
*Commanding U. S. Forces, Wilmington, N. C.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Fayetteville, N. C., March 12, 1865.*

DEAR GENERAL: We reached this place yesterday at noon—Hardee, as usual, retreating across the Cape Fear, burning his bridge but our pontoons will be up to-day, and with as little delay as possible I will be after him towards Goldsboro'.

A tug has just come up from Wilmington, and before I get off from here I hope to get up from Wilmington some shoes and stockings, sugar, coffee, and flour. We are abundantly supplied in all else, having in a measure lived off the country.

The army is in splendid health, condition, and spirit, though we have had foul weather and roads that would have stopped travel to almost any other body of men I ever heard of.

Our march was substantially what I designed—straight on Columbia, feigning on Branchville and Augusta. We destroyed, in passing, the railroad from the Edisto nearly up to Aiken; again from Orangeburg to the Congaree; again from Columbia down to Kingsville and the Wateree, and up towards Charlotte as far as the Chester line; thence I turned east on Cheraw, and thence to Fayetteville. At Columbia we destroyed immense arsenals and railroad establishments, among which were forty-three cannon. At Cheraw we found also machinery and material of war from Charleston, among which twenty-five guns and three thousand six hundred barrels of powder, and here we find about twenty guns and a magnificent United States arsenal.

We cannot afford to leave detachments, and I shall, therefore, destroy this valuable arsenal, for the enemy shall not have its use; and the United States should never again confide such valuable property to a people who have betrayed a trust.

I could leave here to-morrow, but want to clean my columns of the vast crowd of refugees and negroes that encumber me; some I will send down the river in boats, and the balance I will send to Wilmington by land under small escort as soon as we are across Cape Fear river.

I hope you have not been uneasy about us, and that the fruits of this march will be appreciated. It had to be made not only to secure the valuable depots by the way, but its incidents, in the necessary fall of Charleston, Georgetown, and Wilmington. If I can now add Goldsboro' without too much cost, I will be in position to aid you materially in the spring campaign.

Joe Johnston may try to interpose between me here and Schofield about Newbern; but I think he will not try that, but concentrate his scattered armies at Raleigh, and I will go straight at him as soon as I get my men re clothed and our wagons reloaded.

Keep everybody busy and let Stoneman push towards Greensboro' or Charlotte from Knoxville; even a feint in that quarter will be most important.

The railroad from Charlotte to Danville is all that is left the enemy, and it won't do for me to go there on account of the red clay hills, that are impassable to wheels in wet weather.

I expect to make a junction with General Schofield in ten days.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT,

*Commanding United States Army, City Point.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Fayetteville, N. C., March 12, 1865.*

GENERAL: We reached this place yesterday without opposition. Our march was exactly as I expected, and its fruits all I could have asked for. We have destroyed vast magazines at Columbia, Cheraw, and here, and have destroyed effectually the railroad system of South Carolina.

From Cheraw I sent a small cavalry force to Florence, but it found a force of infantry and cavalry more than it could match, and had to return, breaking only the railroad trestles down as far as Darlington. The enemy still has much railroad stock and munitions on the track about Sumterville and Florence, and if you can make up a force of two thousand five hundred men out of your Charleston and Savannah garrisons, I want you to reach that road and destroy everything possible, and exhaust the country of supplies. The best points of departure are Georgetown and the Santee bridge. I think Admiral Dahlgren could send some light gunboats up the Santee, but don't know enough about the bar. The distance from Georgetown does not exceed sixty miles, and we look on sixty miles as a pleasant excursion. As soon as you accomplish this, reduce your garrisons at Savannah and Charleston to the minimum, and re-enforce the movement on Goldsboro', which is the real objective now. I expect to be there in ten days.

My army is in splendid health and condition, and we have had no battle involving more than a single brigade or division at a time. Our foragers have had plenty of fighting on a limited scale, and have gathered more bacon, chickens, turkeys, and corn-meal than I believed were in the country. We are now only short of bread, sugar, and coffee, and our men have been so much in the mud and water that shoes and stockings are scarce. Send to Goldsboro', *via* Newbern, all the clothing you can spare.

I am truly your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General FOSTER,

*Commanding Department of the South, Charleston, S. C.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Fayetteville, N. C., Sunday, March 12, 1865.*

GENTLEMEN: We need, very much, shoes, stockings, drawers, and pants; also flour, bread, sugar, and coffee; all else we have in abundance. I cannot afford to stay here longer than Wednesday. The river is now high, and if you, or either of you, are in Wilmington, send from there what you can of such articles as I have mentioned, to the capacity of the boats you have at disposal. Do not draw from Newbern, but collect there the great depot, especially, of forage and clothing. My command will need an entire equipment of clothing. We have been in water half the time since leaving Savannah, and consequently the clothing is worn out. We have not lost a wagon, and our animals are in

good condition; but I take it for granted we shall find little or no forage about Goldsboro'.

The moment you hear I am approaching Goldsboro' forward to meet me with clothing and bread, sugar and coffee, and empty wagons will meet them.

We have made a hard and extraordinary march, and achieved all I could expect. We are in good health and fighting condition.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Generals EASTON and BECKWITH, or either,  
*at Wilmington, North Carolina.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Fayetteville, N. C., Sunday, March 12, 1865.*

GENERAL: We reached here yesterday, and will be delayed until Tuesday or Wednesday putting down pontoons. I will destroy utterly the arsenal and other public property, and I hope to get up some shoes and small stores from Wilmington before we leave. I will then march in compact order straight for the bridge across Neuse river, south of Goldsboro'. I expect to make junction with you thereabouts. If I don't find you there I will feel towards Kinston and Newbern. I will need clothing and provisions. We have gathered plenty of cattle and bacon, and a good deal of cornmeal and molasses. We have also found plenty of corn and fodder, and my animals are all in good order. I will have trains enough for you. I have plenty wagons and mules for one hundred thousand men, so you need not bring any from the north.

On making junction with you, I want you to make your command twenty-five thousand, and will call it the centre, thus restoring our old Atlanta organization. Go on repairing the railroad towards Goldsboro', and let Terry repair the Wilmington road northward as far as he can—if possible, to the Neuse. I will get the navy to patrol Cape Fear river, so as to make the Wilmington and Goldsboro' road safe. You must judge as to the mode and manner of covering the railroad from Goldsboro' to Newbern.

I have ordered General Foster to diminish his garrison of Savannah, Charleston, and Wilmington to the minimum, and re-enforce the movement from Newbern on Goldsboro'. I really do not know if any change has been made in the command on the seaboard; but whether you or Foster command, I want the foregoing policy to be adopted. If I find that holding Savannah, Charleston, and Wilmington cost us too many men, I would not hesitate to destroy them, and use the garrisons in the field. It will be time enough to build up the country when war is over.

Keep your command well concentrated, on the defensive, advancing as fast as the road is built; but reach Goldsboro', if possible, and fortify.

Hardee crossed here with a force represented at twenty thousand, but I don't see the signs of that many; he has six batteries of four guns each. I suppose Johnston may have up about Greensboro', now moving to Raleigh, ten thousand, and I estimate Hokes's command at eight thousand. All told, he may concentrate at Raleigh forty to forty-five thousand men. I can whip that number with my present force, and with yours and Terry's added we can go wherever we can live. We can live where the people do, and if anybody has to suffer let them suffer.

Collect all the forage you can at Newbern; also provisions and clothing. We will need an immense supply of clothing, for we have been working from knee to waist deep in water for four hundred miles, and our men will need reclothing throughout.



Organize your command into divisions of about five thousand men each, but don't embrace any men rightfully belonging to the organizations now with me, but order them at once to join their proper brigades and divisions on our arrival at your neighborhood.

We have had so much bad weather in February and March that I hope we may now count on a change for the better.

Hoping to meet you in person in ten days, I am your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

Major General SCHOFIELD,  
Commanding at Newbern, North Carolina.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Fayetteville, N. C., Sunday, March 12, 1865.*

DEAR SIR: I know you will be pleased to hear that my army has reached this point and have opened communication with Wilmington. A tug-boat came up this morning and will start back at 6 p. m.

I have written a letter to General Grant, the substance of which he will doubtless communicate, and it must suffice for me to tell you what I know will give you pleasure; that I have done all I proposed, and the fruits seem to me ample for the time employed. Charleston, Georgetown, and Wilmington are incidents, while the utter demolition of the railroad system of South Carolina, and the utter destruction of the enemy's arsenals of Columbia, Cheraw, and Fayetteville, are the principals of the movement. These points were regarded as inaccessible to us, and now no place in the confederacy is safe against the army of the west. Let Lee hold on to Richmond, and we will destroy his country; and then of what use is Richmond? He must come out and fight us on open ground, and for that we must ever be ready. Let him stick behind his parapets and he will perish.

I remember well what you asked me, and think I am on the right road, though a long one. My army is as united and cheerful as ever, and as full of confidence in themselves and their leaders as ever. It is utterly impossible for me to enumerate what we have done, but enclose a slip just handed me, which is but partial.\* At Columbia and Cheraw we destroyed nearly all the gunpowder and cartridges the confederacy had in this part of the country.

This arsenal is in fine order and much enlarged. I cannot leave a detachment to hold it, and therefore shall burn it; blow it up with gunpowder, and then with rams knock down its walls. I take it for granted the United States will never again trust Carolina with an arsenal to appropriate at her pleasure.

Hoping that good fortune may still attend my army, I remain your servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Fayetteville, N. C., Sunday, March 12, 1865.*

SIR: My army is here, the enemy having fled eastward across the river, burning his bridge, but I will have pontoons down to-day. I will be here probably till Wednesday, and would like some of your boats to come up for effect,

\*43 guns at Columbia; 25 guns at Cheraw; 17 guns at Fayetteville; total 85, of which four-fifths are field guns, and all are serviceable. 50 field and siege gun carriages, 30 caissons, 5 battery wagons, 5 travelling forges.—(Memorandum of General Barry, chief of artillery.)

and, if agreeable, can give you a load of refugees or cotton, at pleasure. I would like to produce the effect of a design to establish a base, which, of course, I do not propose to do. Water will continue high some time.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General*

The COMMANDING OFFICER GUNBOAT FLEET,  
*Cape Fear River.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Fayetteville, N. C., Sunday, March 12, 1865—5 p. m.*

GENERAL: I have this moment received, at the hands of the two officers of the navy who came from Wilmington by canoes and land, your cipher despatch of March 4. I am marching for Goldsboro', and will start Wednesday. I wrote you fully to-day, and send by this same opportunity, viz: the tug-boat Davidson that came from Wilmington last night.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SCHOFIELD,  
*Newbern, N. C.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Fayetteville, N. C., Monday, March 13, 1865.*

GENERAL: Colonel Kerwin reports from Elizabeth, where he has halted his regiment, having despatched two officers and fifty men through with your cipher despatch, which is now being unravelled. I wish you would send a boat up to Elizabeth with forage and rations for Colonel Kerwin's command, and order him to ferry his command across, and to push to the railroad, and up it until he encounters me about Faison's. Your own command should also move at once up towards Goldsboro', leaving the railroad construction party to follow, as the whole country south of Goldsboro', between the Cape Fear river and the sea, will be covered by our armies. You may be short of wagons. If you can manage to reach me I can supply you with, say, two hundred (200.) I will have enough wagons for General Schofield also. I want to concentrate all my available force about Goldsboro' as soon as possible. The single road from Newbern to Goldsboro' may not have a capacity sufficient for mine, and yours, and General Schofield's armies, and I wish you to advise General Schofield that I expect him to get boats, as quick as possible, that will enable us to use the Neuse river as auxilliary, as high up as possible, when our wagons can haul forage and stores.

I have with me, say, three thousand (3,000) wagons and near forty thousand (40,000) animals, about sixty-five thousand (65,000) fighting men.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General TERRY, *Commanding, Wilmington.*

P. S.—If General Schofield wants you at Newbern, I do not object to your re-enforcing him, but I want all the troops not absolutely necessary for garrisons to be at or near Goldsboro' in seven (7) days, viz: by Monday or Tuesday of next week.

SHERMAN, M. G.

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, opposite Fayetteville, Tuesday, March 14, 1865.*

DEAR GENERAL: I am now across Cape Fear river with nearly all my army save a division, with orders to cross at daylight to-morrow. I shall then draw out ten miles and begin my manœuvres for the possession of Goldsboro', which is all-important for our future purposes.

I was in hopes that I could get some shoes and stockings at Wilmington, but the tug Davidson has returned with Brigadier General Dodge, chief quartermaster, with word that there is no clothing there, but he brings us some forage, sugar, and coffee. I can get along for ten days, having forced the army to collect plenty of beef, and a good deal of corn-meal.

I shall to-night move my cavalry (5,000) straight towards Raleigh, and follow it with four divisions infantry, without trains, and keep the trains off toward the right rear. I will hold another four divisions in close support, and move toward Smithfield, or to strike the railroad half-way between Goldsboro' and Raleigh; then, when my trains are well across towards the Neuse, will move rapidly to Bentonville, and afterwards, at leisure, move opposite Goldsboro', and open direct communication with General Schofield, who is ordered to push against Kinston and Goldsboro'. I may cross Neuse about Cox's bridge, and move into Goldsboro', but will not attempt it till within close communication with General Schofield. I have sent full orders to Schofield. It will not do to build any determinate plan from there until I am in full possession of Goldsboro'. I have ordered Generals Schofield and Terry to push towards Goldsboro' as hard as possible from the east as I advance from the southwest. The enemy is superior to me in cavalry, but I can beat his infantry, man for man, and I don't think he can bring forty thousand (40,000) men for battle. I will force him to guard Raleigh until I have interposed between it and Goldsboro'.

Weather is now good, but threatens rain. We are all well; keep all parts busy, and I will give the enemy no rest.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT,  
*City Point.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, opposite Fayetteville, Tuesday, March 14, 1865.*

GENERAL: Quartermaster General Dodge is now with me, and I have explained many things to him. I want your nine thousand (9,000) infantry up at Goldsboro' as soon as possible. I begin my movement to-morrow, and if the weather is at all favorable will be opposite Goldsboro' in five days. I think your best plan is to move up as light as possible by the best road. When you effect a junction I can supply you two hundred (200) wagons. Until we get Goldsboro' reduced to possession, and its railroads down, we will not have much marching. General Schofield should push his railroad from Newbern, and your branch should be kept moving as fast as possible. Colonel Wright has but a limited force, but I will write to General Schofield to send some of Colonel Wright's foremen, and also one or two regiments of negro troops, as laborers. As I approach the road the enemy will doubtless remove as much of the iron as he can.

I have asked Captain Young, of the navy, to keep up an active movement

along Cape Fear river, to make Joe Johnston believe I have re-supplied my wagons, and can stand a thirty days' campaign.

I shall feign strong on Raleigh, but actually approach Goldsboro', and will not attempt Goldsboro' until I have Kinston and the railroad bridge across the Neuse, so that I can draw supplies from Newbern, on the north bank of the Neuse; that once done, I think I can get Goldsboro' quick. I may do so, however, at once, according to appearances as I approach the place.

I am much obliged for the supplies, but would suggest that you estimate to keep on hand always a million of rations, independent of your own wants. I feel confident that Generals Easton and Beckwith have full supplies for me about Newbern.

I am truly yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General TERRY,  
*Commanding, &c., Wilmington.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, opposite Fayetteville, Tuesday, March 14, 1865.*

GENERAL: I am now across Cape Fear river, and to-morrow shall draw out ten miles, and next day, if weather is favorable, will begin to manoeuvre on Goldsboro'. I shall feign strong on Raleigh by approaching, and it may be striking the railroad half way between Goldsboro' and Raleigh; then, as soon as the wagons are well towards Faison's, will swing rapidly in front of Goldsboro', but will not cross the Neuse till I hear from you. You must push vigorously towards Kinston and Goldsboro', with the absolute certainty that I will engage the attention of Joe Johnston's army to the west and southwest of Goldsboro'. Let the railroad construction party push their work at least as far Kinston. I want you to draw up Terry's force also, either by water or by a land march; the latter will be best. On making a junction I can spare Terry two hundred, and you three hundred wagons. I think we have transportation enough for a hundred thousand men. Be sure to accumulate food for my army, and especially clothing. Tell General Easton we will need at least one hundred thousand (100,000) suits of clothing. Our animals are in good condition, and have been accustomed to a full ration of fodder. They will wail piteously if put on a mere grain ration. If not delayed much at Goldsboro' we can soon gain a good fodder country.

You must now push as boldly as possible straight on Goldsboro', and I will do the same. Joe Johnston may try to interpose, in which case we must strike him as near at the same time as possible. If he crosses the Neuse to the south you must do the same, but I think he will await me at Goldsboro' and Raleigh, and I hope at both. Consolidate your command at once into an army, the centre of this. General Howard has the right wing, General Slocum the left. You can have Terry's troops, but I want the detachments that belong to this army to join their respective brigades as quick as possible. I understand that Meagher's division is composed wholly of detachments that belong to the corps now with me, viz: 15th, 17th, 14th, and 20th. I will want to give Kilpatrick as much cavalry as possible, as he has a heavy load to carry. He has to look out for Hampton, Wheeler, and Butler, all accounted as first-class men.

I take it for granted Joe Johnston now has S. D. Lee's corps, four thousand, (4,000;) Cheatham's, five thousand, (5,000;) Hoke's, eight thousand, (8,000;) Hardee's, ten thousand, (10,000;) and detachments, about ten thousand, (10,000;) making thirty-seven thousand (37,000,) with near eight thousand (8,000) cavalry.

Our duty is to effect a junction south of the Neuse; but if you can get Kinston whilst Joe Johnston is engaged with me, do so, and push on towards Goldsboro'. I will attack the Raleigh road.

Get your supplies as far forward as possible, that I may quickly replenish.

I am yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SCHOFIELD,  
*Commanding at Newbern.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, opposite Fayetteville, March 14, 1865—7 p. m.*

GENERAL: I think I have studied the problem of the next move, and will give you in confidence its analysis.

We must make a strong feint on Raleigh, and strike with cavalry, if possible, the railroad near Smithfield. I take it for granted the bridge will be too strongly guarded for General Kilpatrick to surprise, and therefore I will leave him to disable that road, of course only partially, between the Neuse and Eureka. To this end the cavalry will move to-night across the bridge, beginning at 3 a. m., and will push to-morrow up the plank road to about Averysboro'; General Slocum following up with four disencumbered divisions to near the forks of the road, moving his trains by a cross-road towards Bentonville. The next move will be the cavalry to "Elevation," and General Slocum will cross Black river. The next move will bring General Slocum to Bentonville, and Kilpatrick, supported by a division of infantry, will make a dash for the railroad. This is as far as I will now determine.

I want you to be as near in support as possible. I do think it is Johnston's only chance to meet this army before an easy junction can be effected with General Schofield.

I would like you to have four (4) divisions free to move rapidly to the sound of battle in the direction of Mingo creek and Elevation, and at any event to make a junction by head of column with General Slocum at Bentonville. The weather looks bad, and I fear we may have swamps about South river. I think it would be well for you to have four divisions to get ahead of General Slocum's trains on the direct road from Fayetteville to Bentonville, and keeping ahead of him about five or six miles, so as, in case of action, to come up on his "right." I will keep near General Slocum, and wish you to keep me thoroughly advised of the position of your troops and trains, and, instead of aiming towards Faison's, rather look towards Dead Field and Everetttsville.

I think Colonel Garber can give you another boat, in which case you had better send down another load of prisoners of war. Do not fail to clear your columns of the dead-weights, by sending them, *via* Clinton, to Wilmington.

I do not expect your heads of columns to be more than ten miles distant from Fayetteville to-morrow night, but it would be well for a brigade to secure the bridge across South river if not already done.

Generals Schofield and Terry are now fully advised of our whereabouts, and have my orders. Their movements will directly co-operate with ours, and I propose to make an actual junction before crossing the Neuse, unless events and weather favor a different course.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General O. O. HOWARD,  
*Commanding Right Wing.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, opposite Fayetteville, N. C., March 14, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have notified General Howard that to-morrow night your head of column would be near the crossroads, above Kyle's landing; the next day across Black river, near Mingo; and third day near Bentonville, and have instructed him to have four (4) divisions in easy support, and a little in advance of you, say, five or six miles, so that on receiving orders or hearing battle he may come promptly up on your right.

I think Colonel Garber can promise you another boat, in which case it would be well to send to Wilmington your prisoners of war. You might leave them to-morrow where the gunboat lies, two (2) miles below General Howard's bridge, and the guard, if unable to overtake you the day after to-morrow, could follow direct to Bentonville. I want the three first marches to be made with prudence and deliberation. I am willing to accept battle with Johnston's concentrated force, but would not attack him in position until I make junction with General Schofield.

I am truly yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SLOCUM,  
*Commanding Left Wing.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, 12 miles from Fayetteville, N. C.,  
on Raleigh road, March 15, 1865.*

GENERAL: I got a file of northern papers yesterday from Wilmington, in which I observe you are in command of the Department of the South. I have had no official communication from the War Department or General Grant since my departure from Savannah, and am compelled to pick up information the best way I can. I wrote to General Foster from Fayetteville, supposing him to be in command of the department, and hope you got the letter, and it is a fear its contents may not reach you promptly which induces me to write this.

When at Columbia I had the railroad broken down to Kingsville and the Wateree bridge; subsequently from Cheraw I aimed to strike Florence, but sent too weak a party, but the enemy himself has destroyed the Pedee bridge, and has on the railroad at Sumterville and between it and Florence a vast amount of rolling stock, the destruction of which is all important, and it should be done before any repairs can be made whereby they can be removed. I want it done at once, and leave you to devise the way. I think twenty-five hundred (2,500) men lightly equipped, with pack mules only, could reach the road either from Georgetown or the Santee bridge. I think also that you can easily make up that force from Charleston and Savannah. As to the garrisons of those places I don't feel disposed to be over-generous, and should not hesitate to burn Savannah, Charleston and Wilmington, or either of them, if the garrisons were needed. Savannah and Wilmington are the only really useful ports, because of their inland rivers. Still, I suppose you can always get garrisons of sick, disabled, or indifferent troops. All real good soldiers must now be marching. Do not let your command rest on its oars, but keep them going all the time, even if for no other purpose than to exhaust the enemy's country or compel him to defend it. The simple fact that a man's home has been visited by an enemy makes a soldier in Lee's and Johnston's army very anxious to get home to look after his family and property. But the expedition I have indicated to Sumterville and Florence has even higher aims. Those cars and locomotives should be destroyed, if to do it cost you five hundred (500) men. I know you can get there

all the bacon, beef, meat, &c., your command may want, and a good deal of corn-meal. The men could march without knapsacks, with a single blanket, and carry eight (8) days' provisions, which, with what is in the country, will feed your command two weeks. Let it be done at once, and select your own point of departure. After destroying those cars and engines, (not merely damaging them, but an absolute destruction of boilers, steam chambers, connecting rods, flanges, &c., &c., powder can be used to good advantage in blowing up boilers and engines, but we use cold-chisels and crowbars,) you may reduce your garrisons to the minimum and send every man to Newbern and Goldsboro'. I want to collect an army that can whip Lee in open fight if he lets go Richmond, which I think he will soon be forced to do.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General Q. A. GILLMORE,  
*Commanding Department of the South, Charleston, S. C.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Kyle's Landing, N. C., March 16, 1865—2 a. m.*

GENERAL: Yours is just received; your orders are all right. I fear the present rain will make the roads utterly impracticable. Hardee's whole force is in our front, near the forks of the road, and I have ordered General Slocum to go at him in the morning in good shape, but vigorously, and push him beyond Averysboro'. General Kilpatrick is ahead, across the branch marked Taylor's Hole creek, about two miles this side the forks.

Your courier brings me good news from Generals Schofield and Terry. General Schofield reports he whipped Bragg handsomely at Kinston, and undertakes to have supplies for us there, and probably further along. General Terry says he can reach Faison's with his 9,000 men by Sunday or Monday, and that the rest of General Schofield's troops that had left Wilmington had made junction with General Schofield at Kinston. Also that General Sheridan is coming to us by land with 8,000 cavalry. So all is working well around us, and we must not scatter, but aim to converge about Bentonville, and afterwards Goldsboro'. The rain is as bad for our opponents as for us, and I doubt if they have as good supplies or transportation as we.

General Terry has sent up 3,900 pairs of shoes, and 2,400 pairs of pants. Divide them with General Slocum.

We took Colonel Alfred Rhett, of Fort Sumter, prisoner yesterday. He was commanding a brigade in Hardee's troops ahead, and from drop expressions I think Hardee will try and fight us at the crossroads.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HOWARD,  
*Commanding Right Wing.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, 13 miles on the Raleigh Road, out of Fayetteville, March 16, 1865—2 a. m.*

GENERAL: Thank you kindly for the shoes and pants, and still more for the certain knowledge that General Schofield is in possession of Kinston. That

is of great importance; for thence to Goldsboro' there are no bridges. I will, in consequence, move straight on Goldsboro'.

It is now raining hard, and the bottom has fallen out, and we will have to corduroy every foot of the way. Hardee is ahead of me and shows fight. I will go at him in the morning with four divisions, and push him as far as Averysboro' before turning towards Bentonville and Cox's bridge. My extreme right will aim for Everettsville and Faison's. I am delighted that General Sheridan is slashing away with his column of cavalry. He will be a disturbing element in the grand and beautiful game of war, and if he reaches me I'll make all North Carolina howl. I will make him a deed of gift of every horse in the State, to be settled for at the day of judgment. I cannot, of course, reach General Sheridan with any suggestions, but he should march for Danville, Greensboro' and Raleigh, or rather near those points, making some detours to mislead.

Tell General Dodge to keep boats running up Cape Fear, until he knows I am at my new base. This rain, so damaging to my land transportation, is a good thing for the river, which had fallen very much. He can use the rebel captured boats, which if lost are of no account. Each of these boats should be supplied a good barge, that can hold all the crew, in case the boat is caught by a fall in the river. Captain Young agreed to keep his gunboats running busy, and as high up as possible. I want to keep up the impression that I am using the Cape Fear river for supplies, for our foolish northern journals have published the fact that I am aiming for Newbern, a fact that I had concealed from everybody not necessarily in my confidence. These fellows discovered it by the course taken by the supply boats from Port Royal.

Hoping to meet you soon, I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General TERRY, *Wilmington, N. C.*

P. S.—We took some prisoners to-day, among them Colonel Alfred Rhett, of Fort Sumter, who commands a brigade in Hardee's army.

SHERMAN.

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, 18 miles N. E. Fayetteville, March 17, 1865—7 a. m.*

GENERAL: General Slocum found the enemy covering the narrow neck from Taylor's Hole creek up to the Goldsboro' road. He drove them from two successive positions, taking three guns, some prisoners, wounded, but losing himself pretty severely—I think as many as 300 in all; but the enemy lost heavily also, from appearances. At night the enemy still held the forks, but it is just reported that he is gone—I suppose up to Averysboro', where the Raleigh and Smithfield roads fork. Your scout Duncan is just in, having escaped from McLaw's guard, he thinks about twelve miles out on the Smithfield road. So Hardee is retreating on Smithfield.

General Slocum will feel out towards Averysboro', but move his column on the Goldsboro' road, which is that which crosses Black and Mingo creeks, just ahead of where we are. Our true tactics would be to push all our columns to Smithfield, but I will only follow Hardee far enough to give him impulse, when we must resume our course.

I want you to-day to get to where the Goldsboro' road crosses Mingo, and have that bridge well repaired. You need not come on to General Slocum, unless you hear him engaged. We might cut his column at Elevation, but it will be time enough to think of that to-night.

General Blair is getting too far off; better draw him and all your trains towards Troublefield's store.



Weather having cleared off, we may count on better roads.

Have a road for your column reconnoitred from Mingo bridge to that point north of Troublefield's where three roads meet.

I expect to be to-night somewhere between the Black river and Mingo bridge.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General O. O. HOWARD,  
*Commanding Right Wing.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, March 17, 1865.*

GENERAL: The enemy is gone from our front, and I take it he is up at the forks of the Raleigh and Smithfield roads—Averysboro'.

General Slocum will feel up that road, but be prepared to use the Goldsboro' road which crosses Black and Mingo. I have ordered General Howard to be at Mingo to-night, but I want your cavalry on the road which leads from Black river bridge towards Elevation. Captain Duncan, of General Howard's scouts, is here, having escaped. He reports Hardee and Wheeler ahead of us, on the Smithfield road. Wade Hampton and Butler are off in front of General Howard.

You can forage from the Goldsboro' road northward, between Black and Mingo.

Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General KILPATRICK,  
*Black River Mill.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Camp between N. river and Mingo creek, March 17, 1865.*

GENERAL: North river had to be bridged and has delayed us to-day. General Davis is on the Mingo, and Williams on North river. General Kilpatrick is up the road in the direction of Elevation. We still threaten Smithfield, but to-morrow will move rapidly towards Cox's bridge and Goldsboro'. If the enemy fail to fight for Goldsboro', of course we go right in—General Slocum by Cox's bridge, and you by the south, as General Schofield comes from the east, (Kinston.) But if the enemy oppose, I propose to throw our empty wagons down to Kinston for forage and supplies, whilst we proceed to reduce Goldsboro'. To this end General Slocum will break the railroad west of Cox's bridge, and you will cross the Neuse in front, as General Schofield comes from the east, and swings against the railroad north of the town. I doubt if there be any fortifications at Goldsboro' capable of holding anything more than a railroad guard.

I have examined your order and it will do, only get on a right-hand road as soon as possible, that you may not delay General Slocum's troops, who will necessarily all be forced on the one road. Try and keep around the head of Falling Water creek, viz., to the south. I will push General Slocum to-morrow and next day, and think by day after to-morrow we will be in position, viz., you directly in front of Goldsboro', and General Slocum at Cox's bridge.

At the time I sent Colonel Ewing to you yesterday, the enemy had brought General Slocum up all standing, and it was on the theory that he would hold

General Slocum there that I wanted you at Mingo bridge. But the enemy retreated in the night on Smithfield, and we are again on the march, feigning to the left, but moving trains and troops as rapidly as the roads admit on Goldsboro'. You may do the same.

The enemy yesterday had a strong intrenched line in front of the cross-roads, and had posted the Charleston brigade about  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile in front, also intrenched. The 20th corps struck the first line, turned it handsomely, and used the Charleston brigade up completely, killing about 40, and gathering about 35 wounded and a hundred well prisoners, capturing three (3) guns, but on advancing further encountered the larger line, which they did not carry, but it was abandoned at night.

This morning a division of Williams's followed as far as Averysboro', whilst the rest turned to the right, as I have heretofore stated. General Slocum lost in killed and wounded about 300. He is somewhat heavily burdened by his wounded, which must be hauled. We left the confederate wounded in a house by the road-side.

The route of retreat of the enemy shows signs of considerable panic, and I have no doubt he got decidedly the worst of it.

Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General HOWARD,

*Commanding Right Wing.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, 27 miles from Goldsboro', N. C., March 18, 1865.*

GENERAL: The 14th corps is here, but the 20th is well back. It started from Averysboro' and North river, with General Kilpatrick to the north of the road. We heard some musketry and artillery in that direction, but Colonel Poe left Mingo creek, which he bridged, at 11 a. m., at which time the 20th corps was a half a mile behind.

We cannot get any further to-day. General Davis may go a couple of miles further to the forks of the road. I think this road, the Averysboro' and Goldsboro' road, will lead to Cox's bridge, though it is represented as passing three (3) miles south of Bentonville.

Get on to the right-hand road, so that General Geary and his trains may take that to Goldsboro', *via* Cox's bridge.

I think the enemy is concentrated about Smithfield, and I cannot make out whether Goldsboro' is held in force or not. I think it probable that Joe Johnston will try to prevent our getting Goldsboro'.

We find a good deal of forage to-day, but the roads still cut deep. I hope the sun will dry them up good.

Our map is evidently faulty. Can't you send me to-night a sketch of the country towards Dead Fields, Everettsville, and Faison's? I fear General Slocum will be jammed with all his trains in a narrow space, but at the same time I don't want to push you too far till this flank is better covered by the Neuse. General Slocum is back with the 20th corps, and as soon as I hear from him I will send over to you.

General Morgan's division found a couple of Hampton's regiments here, but they cleared out towards the north as soon as he deployed skirmishers.

I am, general, very respectfully, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General O. O. HOWARD,

*Commanding Right Wing.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, March 18, 1865.*

GENERAL: General Slocum is up. The firing you heard was General Kilpatrick, who found parties picketing the roads to the north. He reports Hardee retreating on Smithfield and Joe Johnston collecting his old Georgia army this side of Raleigh. I know that he will call in all minor posts, which embraces Goldsboro'. You may, therefore, move straight for Goldsboro', leaving General Slocum the river road, and, if possible, the one from Lee's store toward Falling Waters. Make a break into Goldsboro' from the south, and let your scouts strike out for General Schofield, at Kinston, though I hope to meet him at Goldsboro'.

Our roads are very bad, but I think the 14th corps will be at Cox's bridge to-morrow night, and will aim to strike the railroad to the northwest of Goldsboro'. If any change occurs I will notify you to-night.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General.*Major General HOWARD, *Present.*

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[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, 10 miles southwest of Goldsboro',**Sunday, March 19, 1865—2 p. m.*Major General SCHOFIELD, *Kinston:*

To-night my left wing will be at Cox's bridge, and my right wing within 10, miles of Goldsboro'. To-morrow we will cross the Neuse river at Cox's bridge and be near Goldsboro', to prevent the enemy reoccupying Goldsboro' in force.

The scout Pike has arrived with your despatch of the 17th. Continue to extend the road as fast as possible, and I expect you to move towards Goldsboro', even if it be unnecessary, as I don't want to lose men in a direct attack, when it can be avoided.

Don't depend altogether on your depot, but collect forage and provisions of the people. Tell Generals Easton and Beckwith to estimate for one hundred thousand men. I must give my men and animals some rest.

We whipped Hardee easily about Averysboro'. All retreated on Smithfield and Raleigh.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General.*

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[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, March 19, 1865—5 p. m.*

General SCHOFIELD:

Since making my despatch to-day, General Slocum reports the enemy in force between him and Cox's bridge; thinks it is the main army of the enemy. I can hardly suppose the enemy will attempt to fight us this side the Neuse, but will direct all my columns on Cox's bridge to-morrow. You must secure Goldsboro' and fortify.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Falling Creek Church, March 19, 1865—2 p. m.*

GENERAL: General Howard, with one division, is now at this point, which is just three miles south of Cox's bridge and ten from Goldsboro'. A scout is just in from General Schofield, who writes that he will leave Kinston for Goldsboro' to-day or to-morrow. I have sent him a courier with orders to march straight for Goldsboro'. General Howard's four (4) divisions are strung out, but he will push them through to-night. We occupy a position dangerous to the enemy, if he thinks he is in front of the whole army. You may strengthen your position, but feel the enemy all night. If he is there at daylight, we will move straight for Cox's bridge, and then turn towards you. I think you will find him gone in the morning. General Howard has sent a regiment to Cox's bridge. It has not reported yet. He has the bridge across Falling creek, two miles east of this, towards Goldsboro', and has also some mounted men opposite Goldsboro', where they find a tête de pont occupied by the enemy. General Blair is about five miles south of this with the trains.

I will order General Kilpatrick to remain with you. Get up your trains between Lee's store and your camp, and keep the enemy busy until we can get up the 4th division of the 15th corps.

If you hear firing to your front, not explained by your own acts, you must assault or turn the enemy, for it will not do to let him fight us separately.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General.*

Major General SLOCUM,

*Commanding Left Wing.*

P. S.—Your note of 2 p. m. is just received. General Howard's regiment drove the picket from the crossroads, one mile this side of Cox's bridge; that will disturb the force to your front. General Howard can better help you from this quarter than by returning by Lee's store.

SHERMAN.

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Falling Creek Church, March 19, 1865—5 p. m.*

GENERAL: Your report of to-day is received. General Slocum thinks the whole rebel army is to his front. I cannot think Johnston would fight us with the Neuse to his rear. You may remain with General Slocum until further orders, or until the two wings come together.

If that force remain in General Slocum's front to-morrow, I will move straight on its rear.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

General KILPATRICK,

*Commanding Cavalry.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, March 20, 1865—2 a. m.*

GENERAL: Yours of 8 p. m., 19th, is just received, and I acknowledge receipt by direction of the general-in-chief, who instructed me also to say that the whole army is moving to your assistance as rapidly as possible. Upon its

approach he wishes you to be prepared to assume the offensive against the enemy.

Colonel Asmussen has directions for you. All ambulances will be given you that can.

I am, with respect,

L. M. DAYTON, A. A. G.

Major General SLOCUM,  
*Commanding Left Wing.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Falling Creek Church, March 20, 1865—4 a. m.*

GENERAL: I got a despatch from General Schofield yesterday, saying he would start from Kinston for Goldsboro' yesterday or to-day.

I have just received information that General Terry camped his troops five (5) miles south of Faison's yesterday, and that he, in person, reached Faison's on a train last night.

I have ordered him to feel into Goldsboro' for General Schofield, and up to Cox's bridge for me.

We all move at five (5) a. m. toward you; hold fast to your position, which I take for granted is now well fortified, but be ready to attack the enemy the moment you see signs of let go; follow him as far as Mill creek, and take position covering the movement of your trains on the direct Goldsboro' road.

If it be true that General Terry has reached Faison's on a train, we will be able to send your wounded down to Wilmington from Neuse river bridge. You shall have the use of every ambulance in the army not absolutely needed in the other corps and divisions.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General SLOCUM,  
*Commanding Left Wing.*

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[Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Falling Creek Church, March 20, 1865—4 a. m.*

GENERAL: I have just learned through your cavalry of your arrival at Faison's.

Johnston, with his concentrated force, made an unsuccessful attack on my left wing yesterday, near Bentonville. I am just starting with my right wing to attack him.

Feel into Goldsboro' for General Schofield, and up the Falling creek and Cox's bridge, for me. We have cavalry pickets south of Goldsboro'. The Neuse bridges are burned.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General A. H. TERRY, *Commanding, &c.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Falling Creek Church, March 20, 1865—6 a. m.*

GENERAL: I have this moment received your despatch of yesterday. I had just sent off a cipher despatch to you, but as yours is plain, I infer you have no cipher clerk.

Yesterday Johnston, with his force concentrated, struck my left wing near Bentonville, and they had a severe battle, lasting until night. General Slocum beat them off, but was uneasy. I am now turning the right wing on Bentonville.

I want you to move to Mount Olive station and communicate with General Schofield, who ought to be at Goldsboro' to-night, and then feel up for me on the south of the Neuse towards Bentonville.

Get the railroad from Northeast branch to the Neuse in running order to the capacity of the captured stock.

The railroad and road bridges near Goldsboro' were burned yesterday, on being threatened by some of our cavalry parties. If General Schofield gets to Goldsboro', the road bridges should be rebuilt at once. If you need pontoons, I can send you some of canvas.

Half our trains are with General Slocum, near Bentonville, and the other half about eight miles south of this, on the road from Cox's bridge to Wilmington.

By to-night I will know if Joe Johnston intends to fight me in force, when I will communicate further. Until you know the result, you and General Schofield should work up to my support south of the Neuse.

Send that cavalry regiment through to me *via* the Bentonville road. We hold the bridge over Falling creek.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Major General TERRY,  
*Faison's Depot.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, near Bentonville, March 20, 1865—2 p. m.*

GENERAL SCHOFIELD: Your despatch of yesterday is received. You can march into Goldsboro' without opposition. General Terry is at Faison's, and I have ordered him to Cox's bridge till the present action is over. I am now within two miles of Slocum, but Johnston is between us. We are now skirmishing.

After occupying Goldsboro', if you hear nothing to the contrary, join a part of your force with General Terry's, and come to me, wherever I may be.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, March 20, 1865—8 p. m.*

GENERAL: I find the topography of the country different from what I expected. The road from Falling creek church will be very bad in wet weather as far as Cox's bridge; thence for eight miles very good, with sandy ground and open fields hence about ten miles from Cox's bridge. We are on flat pine land, such as makes bad roads in wet weather.

We struck the enemy on his left rear about noon, and have pressed him very hard, and have dislodged him from all his barricades, except the line constructed as against you, which may be double, or enclosed; for our men find parapets from the road well down to Mill creek. Johnston hoped to overcome your wing before I could come to your relief; having failed in that, I cannot see why he remains, and still think he will avail himself of night to get back to Smithfield. I would rather avoid a general battle, if possible; but if he insists on it, we must accommodate him. In that event, if he be in position to-morrow, I

want you to make a good road around his flank into this, and to-morrow night pass your trains and dispose your troops, so that we have our back towards Faison's and Goldsboro'. General Schofield was to leave Kinston for Goldsboro' to-day, and General Terry has arrived with 9,000 infantry at Faison's, and I have ordered him to Cox's bridge, to be drawn up here if we need him. I can also draw on General Schofield, in a few days, for 10,000 men; but I think we have enough.

First, in case of being forced to fight the enemy here, we must send our trains to Kinston for supplies, and therefore get a road at once around the flank of the enemy; the rest is in our possession—retain ordnance, and all wagons with food; all else should go down.

Make no orders as yet, till to-morrow reveals the purpose of our enemy; but think the problem over.

Post General Hazen to your right, so as to join his own corps—the 15th. Keep General Kilpatrick on your left rear; feel the enemy at several points to-night, and if he retreats, try and get some prisoners. Make me a report of to-day's operations with you, and describe more fully the topography.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General SLOCUM,  
*Commanding Left Wing.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Bentonville, N. C., March 20, 1865—9 p. m.*

GENERAL: We struck Johnston on his left rear to-day, and have been skirmishing pretty hard all day. We have opened communication with General Slocum, who had a hard fight yesterday. We are now ready for battle, if Johnston desires it, to-morrow; but as he has failed to overcome one wing, he will hardly invite battle with both. I don't want to fight now, or here, and therefore won't object to his drawing off to-night towards Smithfield, as he should. General Schofield moves to-day from Kinston for Goldsboro', and I wish you to go to Cox's, to which point I will send a pontoon train, if I conclude to lay a bridge there. The north side of the Neuse will afford us good foraging ground, and will be a direct threat to Smithfield, and the rear of Johnston's army, now to my front. I may have to send all my empty wagons to Kinston for clothing and supplies, but you would do well to have the railroad from Wilmington repaired up to the Neuse, and you can draw supplies up that road.

If Johnston insists on fighting us here, I may call you up; but if he goes I will drop down to Goldsboro', put you about Faison's or Mount Olive, and General Schofield at Kinston, until we are re-supplied and equipped for the next campaign. This will take us a couple of weeks.

I suppose you will be put to your wits to feed your men until the roads are equipped, but it is wonderful how necessity develops the searching qualities of soldiers. My men seem to keep fat and healthy on parched corn and bacon.

Have both bridges over Falling Water put in good order, and tell General Schofield to repair at once the road bridge across the Neuse at Goldsboro'. The railroad bridge will be built by Colonel Wright, with his railroad gang.

I do hope we shall have some fine weather, as rain makes these roads terrible.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Major General TERRY, *Mount Olive.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

*In the field, near Bentonville, N. C., March 21, 1865.*

GENERAL: Captain Twining is here, and I send by him an order that, you will perceive, looks to staying here some days.

I thought Johnston, having failed as he attempted to crush one of my wings, finding he had not succeeded, but that I was present with my whole force, would withdraw, but he has not, and I must fight him here. He is twenty (20) miles from Smithfield, with a bad road to his rear, but his position is in the swamps, difficult of approach, and I don't like to assail his parapets, which are of the old kind.

As soon as you get Goldsboro' leave a small garrison; break the bridge across Little river, above the railroad, but use the one near its mouth, at old Waynesboro', and advance to Millard, where you can effect a junction with Terry. He need leave a very small picket at Cox's bridge. Make up a force of about 25,000 men, leaving at Goldsboro' Carter's division, if, as I understand, it is composed of troops properly belonging to this army. Let me know the moment these combinations are made, when we can act.

I would like to have your pontoon bridge across Neuse, about Jericho, so that our trains to and from Kinston can use it. General Howard will bridge at or near Goldsboro', and General Slocum at Cox's. The roads are now comparatively good, and I want to make the most of the good weather, but the moment Johnston gives ground I propose to fall back on Goldsboro', and await the completion of our railroad and the re-equipment of my army. I will probably post you at Kinston, General Terry about Faison's, and this army at Goldsboro'.

You will probably find plenty of corn, bacon, and corn-meal in the country, from Waynesboro' to Millard. The road near the Neuse is also better than the one back, as it is better drained. All the heads of creeks in this region are swampy, and level pine lands that afford bad roads.

I expect you surely at Goldsboro' to-day, and that you have at once secured the bridge across Little river. I don't think you will find anything over there but cavalry. Hoke is to our front; we took prisoners from his command yesterday.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General SCHOFIELD,

*Commanding Army of the Ohio.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Bentonville, N. C., March 21, 1865—6 p. m.*

GENERAL: It is manifest that we are not to be favored with weather. After raining six weeks, it has, apparently, set in for another six weeks. I wish, while waiting for the pontoon train, you would keep strong details corduroying the roads at the low places, especially in the bottoms of Falling creek, at both bridges, or at the bridges on both roads, viz: the one from Cox's to Goldsboro', and the one from Falling Creek School House to Goldsboro'. Better keep a thousand men on detail for such work. We will corduroy back towards you and you towards Goldsboro'. Rails are pretty good, but pine saplings, ten inches through, the cut split in two, the flat side laid down, make a better road.

We have had some pretty hard skirmishing all round the line, but nothing material either way. If I could get the railroad done to Goldsboro' I would be better off than Johnston, as he has the same weather, and, I think, a worse road to his base at Smithfield, both distances twenty miles.



I am very anxious to hear of General Schofield, at Goldsboro', and especially that the railroad is done to that point. It should have been completed before I got here.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

Major General TERRY, *Commanding Bridge.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Bentonville, N. C., March 22, 1865—6½ a. m.*

GENERAL: I am directed by the general-in-chief to write you.

The effect of the operations of our skirmishers yesterday and last night has been that the enemy has left his position and retreated towards or beyond Mill creek. The general desires you to use all possible expedition in effecting a crossing at Cox's bridge, over the Neuse, getting the bridge down at the earliest practicable moment. If the bridge-train has not reached you, he wishes that you send couriers to it to hurry up.

Communicate these facts to Major General Schofield, and that General Sherman expects him to occupy Goldsboro' at once. Johnston may attempt sending a force there from Smithfield, and therefore it is important for General Schofield to occupy Goldsboro'.

Let your despatch bearer go at a gallop.

I am, with respect, &c.,

L. M. DAYTON,  
Assistant Adjutant General.

Major General A. H. TERRY, *Commanding, &c.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Bentonville, N. C., March 22, 1865.*

I have just been at the front. Johnston retreated last night on Smithfield in some confusion, leaving dead and wounded. We have pursued two miles beyond Mill creek, but are not in a condition as to our supplies to follow up our advantage, which amounts to a substantial victory, and accordingly I have ordered the army to move towards Goldsboro'. I can't imagine why I don't hear from General Schofield. Until I know he has Goldsboro', I must direct my attention on that point.

I commend highly your promptness in securing the crossing at Cox's. If you observe any of the enemy's force on the north side, move across a whole division and intrench it, so as to command all the outlet roads, and so that if I choose I can cross General Slocum's wing there, and move out against the railroad between Goldsboro' and Smithfield.

I will probably come down to-day and stay with you.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

Major General TERRY,  
*Commanding at Cox's Bridge.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Bentonville, N. C., March 22, 1865—10 a. m.*

GENERAL: The enemy having retreated precipitately and in disorder from our front, and we not being in a condition as to supplies to follow up, will move

on Goldsboro', from which place I have nothing definite. General Terry reports that he has crossed the Neuse to the north bank, where he has a brigade intrenched. From that position I can take Goldsboro' without delay or trouble. I shall go there to-night. General Slocum's wing will also be at or near Cox's, but General Howard will remain till morning. To-morrow morning, unless nothing happens in the interval, move your cavalry slowly and in order by a circuit to the south, to Mount Olive Station, on the Wilmington and Goldsboro' road, and report to me from there by letter. General Terry, on his way up, secured two locomotives and a few old cars, and found the road in good order from Northeast Branch, near Wilmington, to Mount Olive, so that I hope to be able to supply you food and forage from that quarter, which will relieve the Newbern road, which, for some reason, was more damaged by the enemy.

Nevertheless, continue, as heretofore, to gather all the food and forage of the country you can. I claim, of course, the absolute right to all property lying south of our route of march, and care not how close you pinch the inhabitants, if it be done without pillage of the mere household goods and apparel of women.

General Schofield reports this morning from Goldsboro'. So our campaign is an *eminent success*.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General KILPATRICK,  
*Commanding Cavalry Forces.*

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#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Bentonville, N. C., March 22, 1865—10 a. m.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of yesterday is just received. We whipped all of Joe Johnston's army yesterday, and he retreated in disorder in the night. We are in possession of the field, and our skirmishers are after his rear guard, two miles north of Mill creek. We are not in a condition as to supplies to follow up, but will gradually draw back to Goldsboro' and refit.

Push the repairs of the railroad back to Newbern. You need not advance to Millard, but secure all the bridges across Little river, and lay your pontoons across Neuse near the main road south, unless in the mean time you have used it on Little river.

We have many prisoners, and I think we can get along till our wagons get back from Kinston. General Slocum will move to-day to Cox's bridge, but General Howard will remain till morning and follow us to Goldsboro'. I will go to Cox's to-day, and if you have gone to Millard's, will communicate with you. If this finds you at Millard's, draw back to the Little river, on the Goldsboro' side.

I will not move against Raleigh till we are resupplied.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SCHOFIELD, *Goldsboro'.*

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#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Bentonville, N. C., March 22, 1865.*

GENERAL: General Schofield reports from Goldsboro', which he occupied with little opposition, so that our campaign is an *eminent success*. Let General Slocum have the roads to-day, and to-morrow move at your leisure to your new position on the right of Goldsboro', facing north, first south of the Neuse and

next north. I will promise that no pains or efforts on my part shall be spared to supply your command in the most thorough manner before calling on them for new efforts.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General HOWARD,

*Commanding Right Wing.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Cox's Bridge, Neuse River, N. C., March 22, 1865.*

GENERAL: I wrote you from Fayetteville, North Carolina, on Tuesday, the 14th instant, that I was all ready to start for Goldsboro', to which point I had also ordered General Schofield from Newbern and General Terry from Wilmington. I knew that General Joe Johnston was supreme in command against me, and that he would have time to concentrate a respectable army to oppose the last stage of this march. Accordingly General Slocum was ordered to send his main supply train, under escort of two divisions, straight for Bentonville, while he, with his other four divisions, disencumbered of all unnecessary wagons, should march towards Raleigh, by way of threat, as far as Averysboro'. General Howard, in like manner, sent his trains with the 17th corps well to the right, and with the four divisions of the 15th corps took roads which would enable him to come promptly to the exposed left flank. We started on the 15th; but again the rains set in, and the roads, already bad enough, became horrible.

On Tuesday, the 15th, General Slocum found Hardee's army from Charleston, which had retreated before us from Cheraw, in position across the narrow swampy neck between Cape Fear and South river, where the road branches off to Goldsboro'. There a pretty severe fight occurred, in which General Slocum's troops carried handsomely the advanced line held by a South Carolina brigade, commanded by a Colonel Butler. Its commander, Colonel Rhett, of Fort Sumter notoriety, with one of his staff, had the night before been captured by Kilpatrick's scouts, from his very skirmish line. The next morning Hardee was found gone, and was pursued through and beyond Averysboro'. General Slocum buried one hundred and eight dead rebels, and captured and destroyed three guns. Some eighty wounded rebels were left in our hands, and, after dressing their wounds, we left them in a house attended by a confederate officer and four privates, detailed out of our prisoners and paroled for the purpose.

We resumed the march towards Goldsboro'. I was with the left wing until I supposed all danger was passed; but when General Slocum's head of column was within four miles of Bentonville, after skirmishing as usual with cavalry, he became aware that there was infantry at his front. He deployed a couple of brigades, which, on advancing, sustained a partial repulse, but soon rallied; and he formed a line of the two leading divisions, Morgan's and Carlin's, of Jeff. C. Davis's corps. The enemy attacked these with violence, but was repulsed. This was in the forenoon of Sunday, the 19th. General Slocum brought forward the two divisions of the 20th corps, and hastily disposed of them for defence, and General Kilpatrick massed his cavalry on the left.

General Joe Johnston had the night before marched his whole army, Bragg, Cheatham, S. D. Lee, Hardee, and all the troops he had drawn from every quarter, determined, as he told his men, to crush one of our corps, and then defeat us in detail. He attacked General Slocum in position from 3 p. m. on the 19th till dark, but was everywhere repulsed and lost fearfully. At the time, I was with the 15th corps, marching on a road more to the right, but on hearing of General Slocum's danger directed that corps towards Cox's bridge, and that night brought Blair's corps over and on the 20th marched rapidly on Johns-

top's flank and rear. We struck him about noon, and forced him to assume the defensive and to fortify. Yesterday we pushed him hard, and came very near crushing him. The right division of the 17th corps, Mower's, having broken in to within a hundred yards of where Johnston himself was, at the bridge across Mill creek, last night he retreated, leaving us in possession of the field, dead, and wounded. We have over two thousand (2,000) prisoners from this affair and the one at Aveyrsboro', and I am satisfied that Johnston's army was so roughly handled yesterday that we could march right on to Raleigh; but we have now been out six weeks, living precariously upon the collections of our foragers, our men "dirty, ragged, and saucy," and we must rest and fix up a little. Our entire losses thus far, killed, wounded, and prisoners, will be covered by two thousand five hundred (2,500,) a great part of which are, as usual, slight wounds. The enemy has lost more than double as many, and we have in prisoners alone full two thousand (2,000.)

I limited the pursuit this morning to Mill creek, and will forthwith march the army to Goldsboro' to rest, re-clothe, and get some rations.

Our combinations were such that General Schofield entered Goldsboro' from Newbern; General Terry got Cox's bridge, with pontoons laid, and a brigade across intrenched; and we whipped Joe Johnston—all on the same day.

After riding over the field of battle to-day, near Bentonville, and making the necessary orders, I have ridden down to this place, Cox's bridge, to see General Terry, and to-morrow shall ride into Goldsboro'.

I propose to collect there my army proper; shall put General Terry about Faison's depot, and General Schofield about Kinston, partly to protect the road, but more to collect such food and forage as the country affords until the railroads are repaired leading into Goldsboro'.

I fear these have not been pushed with the vigor I expected, but I will soon have them both going. I shall proceed at once to organize three armies of twenty-five thousand (25,000) men each, and will try and be all ready to march to Raleigh or Weldon, as we may determine, by or before April 10.

I enclose you a copy of my orders of to-day. I would like to be more specific, but have not the data. We have lost no general officers or no organization. General Slocum took three guns at Averysboro', and lost three at the first dash on him at Bentonville. We have all our wagons and trains in good order.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT,

*Commander-in-Chief, City Point, Va.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Cox's Bridge, N. C., March 22, 1865.*

GENERAL: We whipped Johnston yesterday at Bentonville. The army will march for Goldsboro'. Be prepared to feed this army, sixty-thousand (60,000,) at Goldsboro'; General Schofield's, twenty thousand (20,000,) at Kinston; General Terry's, ten thousand (10,000,) at Faison's depot; and General Kilpatrick's, five thousand (5,000), at Mount Olive station. The two former will draw up by the Newbern road; the two latter by the Wilmington road. Show this to General Easton. I will be at Goldsboro' to-morrow, and will advise you more fully.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General.*

Brevet Brig. General BECKWITH, *Newbern.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Goldsboro', N. C., March 23, 1865.*

GENERAL: On reaching Goldsboro' this morning, I found Lieutenant Dunn awaiting me with your letter of March 16 and despatch of 17th. I wrote you fully from Bentonville yesterday, and since reaching Goldsboro' have learned that my letter was sent punctually down to Newbern, where it will be despatched to you.

I am very glad to hear that General Sheridan did such good service between Richmond and Lynchburg, and hope he will keep the ball moving. I know these raids and dashes disconcert our enemy and discourage him.

General Slocum's two corps, 14th and 20th, are now coming in, and I will dispose of them north of Goldsboro', between the Weldon road and Little river. General Howard to-day is marching south of the Neuse, and to-morrow will come in and occupy ground north of Goldsboro', and extending from the Weldon railroad to that leading to Kinston.

I have ordered all the provisional divisions, made up of troops belonging to other corps, to be broken up, and the men to join their proper regiments and organizations; and have ordered General Schofield to guard the railroad back to Newbern and Wilmington, and to make up a movable column equal to twenty-five thousand (25,000) men, with which to take the field. He will be my centre, as on the Atlanta campaign. I don't think I want any more troops, other than absentees and recruits to fill up the present regiments; but that I can make up an army of eighty thousand (80,000) men by April 10. I will put General Kilpatrick out at Mount Olive station on the Wilmington road, and then allow the army some rest.

We have sent all our empty wagons under escort, with the proper staff officers, to bring up from Kingston clothing and provisions. As long as we move we can gather food and forage; but the moment we stop, trouble begins.

I feel sadly disappointed that our railroads are not done. I don't like to say there has been any neglect until I make inquiries; but it does seem to me the repairs should have been made and the road properly stocked. I can only hear of one locomotive, beside the four old ones, on the Newbern road, and two damaged locomotives found by Terry on the Wilmington road. I left Generals Easton and Beckwith purposely to make arrangements in anticipation of my arrival, and I have heard from neither, though I suppose them both to be at Morehead City.

At all events, we have now made a junction of all the armies, and if we can maintain them, will, in a short time, be in position to march against Raleigh, or Gaston, or Weldon, or even Richmond, as you may determine.

If I get the troops all well placed, and the supplies working well, I might run up to see you for a day or two before diving again into the bowels of the country.

I will make in a very short time accurate reports of our operations for the past two months.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT,

*Commanding the Armies of the United States, City Point, Va.*

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[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Goldsboro', March 23, 1865.*

Colonel WRIGHT, *Morehead City:*

Report to me the condition of the railroad. Employ at any cost laborers to put both the Wilmington and Newbern branches in order. Hire three gangs

at each point to work each eight hours, calling it a day, so that you may do three days' work in twenty-four hours. My army is now coming in, and all will be here to-day and to-morrow. I was much disappointed that this was not already done. Cars must carry into Kinston at once supplies. I will put an engineer regiment at once to work from this end. You can have as many details as you want. Expedition is the thing.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Goldsboro', N. C., March 24, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have kept Lieutenant Dunn over to-day that I might report further. All the army is now in save the cavalry, which I have posted at Mount Olive Station, south of the Neuse, and General Terry's command, which to-morrow will move from Cox's ferry to Faison's depot, also on the Wilmington road. I send you a copy of my orders of this morning, the operations of which will, I think, soon complete our roads. The telegraph is now done to Morehead City, and by it I learn that stores have been sent to Kinston in boats, and our wagons are there loading with rations and clothing. By using the Neuse as high up as Kinston, and hauling from there twenty-six (26) miles, and by equipping the two roads to Morehead City and Wilmington, I feel certain I can not only feed and equip the army, but in a short time fill our wagons for another start. I feel certain, from the character of the fighting, that we have got Johnston's army afraid of us. He himself acts with timidity and caution. His cavalry alone manifests spirit, but limits its operations to our stragglers and foraging parties. My marching columns of infantry don't pay the cavalry any attention, but walk right through it.

I think I see pretty clearly how, in one more move, we can checkmate Lee, forcing him to unite Johnston with him in the defence of Richmond or abandon the cause. I feel certain if he leaves Richmond, Virginia leaves the confederacy. I will study my maps a little more before giving my clear views. I want all possible information of the Roanoke as to navigability, how far up, and with what draught.

We find the country here sandy, dry, and with good roads, and more corn and forage than I expected. The families remain, but I will gradually push them all out to Raleigh or Wilmington. We will need every house in the town. Lieutenant Dunn can tell you of many things of which I need not write.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT, *City Point, Va.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Goldsboro', N. C., March 24, 1865.*

GENERAL: Yours of this date to the general-in-chief is received, and he is much gratified that your command is in such good condition as to forage; secure all you can.

General Terry's command will be posted at Faison's, and must have the use of the railroad to supply it. All arrangements possible are being made to the end that all troops shall be well supplied. I enclose an order of this date which will give you a complete understanding of the matter.

At present there is a good supply of subsistence, clothing, &c., at Kinston,

and if you will send your spare wagons there with the proper staff officers, Colonel Garber, acting chief quartermaster, will give you loads and all supplies that can be furnished.

There is also a quantity of mail for the army there.

I am, with respect, &c.,

L. M. DAYTON,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

General KILPATRICK,  
*Commanding Cavalry.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, March 24, 1865.*

GENERAL: A despatch from Colonel Garber states that the trains of the 15th and 17th corps sent to Kinston are returning loaded with subsistence and some clothing, &c. He says if trains are kept moving with regularity from the command to that point he can keep the army supplied from the stores that are arriving there by water. The general-in-chief suggests that you keep your spare wagons moving accordingly. Colonel Garber will need some four hundred contrabands for loading trains and unloading vessels, and with the next train you send down you should send some to him.

Respectfully, &c.,

L. M. DAYTON,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Major General HOWARD,  
*Commanding Right Wing.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Goldsboro', N. C., March 24, 1865.*

General EASTON, *Chief Quartermaster, Morehead City:*

Our field transportation is in excellent condition, and if you can place, by water, fifteen hundred tons of freight per week at Kinston, independent of the railroad, it can be brought from there by the wagons when the roads are good. The teams will be the better for being out of camp. The general suggests that you aim to accomplish this. It is desirable to relieve the railroad as much as possible.

L. M. DAYTON,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, March 24, 1865.*

General DODGE, *Quartermaster, Morehead City:*

Your despatch received. Tell General Easton to unload and despatch vessels north as fast as possible, and you proceed with all speed to General Grant, and he will order the cars and locomotives we want from Norfolk and elsewhere. Lieutenant Dunn will be down to-night, before daylight, with despatches for General Grant. Wait and take him along with you. Remember how valuable time is. We can bring up daily supplies enough, but to move, I must have enough ahead to fill my wagons.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Goldsboro', March 25, 1865.*

General EASTON, *Morehead City*:

I will come down with Colonel Wright. Have a steamer to take me to City Point; only four in the party. If the navy has a good gunboat doing nothing I would ask for it. I want to see General Grant and return at once; to be absent not to exceed five days.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, March 25, 1865.*

Colonel GARBER, *Kinston*:

I think 2,000 tons a week should come by water to Kinston, and then be hauled in wagons to our camps. This will help the railroad till we get it stocked, and our mules can make one round trip a week and thrive; so keep that line moving while Colonel Wright pushes his railroad from Morehead City and Wilmington. We are doing finely now.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Newbern, N. C., March 30, 1865.*

General SCHOFIELD, *Goldsboro'*:

Have just arrived from City Point—all well. Have completed arrangements for twenty-five additional barges and five tugs. General McCallum, of railroad department, is with me; we will be up to-night. Telegraph me any news, if there be any. General Grant with his whole army marched out of their lines towards Dinwiddie Court House, and Lee must attack him or the force left intrenched at City Point. General Sheridan is on General Grant's left. I saw him and the President, and have a full understanding. Everything seems most favorable. I want to be all ready by April 10. Please send this message to Generals Slocum and Howard. Tell General Slocum the orders were made he asked for; also, your two corps and commanders are as requested. We must hold on to Kinston till the last moment, and then throw everything round by water to Halifax, Winton, and Norfolk.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Newbern, N. C., March 30, 1865.*

General EASTON, *Chief Quartermaster, Goldsboro'*:

General McCallum is with me, and will be here in an hour. We came from City Point in the naval steamer Bat, through Hatteras inlet, but she broke down ten miles below, and I came up in a small row-boat, and have sent a tug



down for the rest. I got at Norfolk twenty-five barges of 150 tons, and five (5) tugs. The best we can do will be to bring up to Kinston in barges three thousand (3,000) tons of supplies and load up our supply trains there, about the 6th of April. In the mean time the railroad can supply clothing, and immediate wants. Make your calculations to have all our men provided and equipped ready to start for our next objective by or before April 10. General Grant's army is in motion; it started yesterday, and I don't see how Lee can refuse to accept battle at once. We must be ready as soon as possible. Take a minute account of transportation, so as to divide it out according to effective strength. When we start I want you and General Beckwith to move by water to another point on the coast which I will designate.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Goldsboro', N. C., March 31, 1865.*

GENERAL: I reached Goldsboro' last night, and find all things working well. The enemy has manifested no activity hereabouts, and has only some cavalry, seemingly, moving across our front from west to east. The railroad to the seacoast at Morehead City is working well, and is doing good work, but the Wilmington branch is not yet done. I have concluded arrangements for the barges to be loaded and brought to Kinston, where our wagons will meet them; afterwards, they can be reloaded and moved up to the Chowan to await our arrival north of the Roanoke.

I shall keep things moving, and be all ready by the date fixed, April 10. In the mean time I expect to hear the result of your moving by the left flank. I will keep you daily advised of our progress.

I must now set to work to make a report of our march from Savannah to Goldsboro' before it fades from memory, or gets lost in the rush of events. John Sherman came with me here, and will return with this to Old Point. I think Lee will unite his and Johnston's army. I cannot think he will coop himself in Richmond. If he do, he is not the general he is reputed to be; but we must go straight for him and fight him in open ground, or coop him up, when starvation will tame him.

If General Sheridan swings off and is likely to come down toward me, get me word that I may meet him. I doubt if he can cross the Roanoke for a month yet, unless he has pontoons with him; but he cannot be better employed than in raiding the road about Burkesville.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT, *City Point.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Goldsboro', N. C., March 31, 1865.*

DEAR SIR: I had the honor and satisfaction to receive your letter and telegram of welcome when at City Point and Old Point Comfort.

I am back again at my post, possessed of the wishes and plans of the general-in-chief, and think in due time I can play my part in the coming campaign. All things are working well, and I have troops enough to accomplish the part assigned me, and only await the loading our wagons, patching up and mending made necessary by the wear and tear of the past winter.

Feeling as I do the responsibilities that rest on me, I shall spare no labor of body or mind to deserve the success and consequent blessings that you so heartily call down on me. Others must tell you of the continued harmony and confidence that pervade this army, to which qualities the country owes more than to any mere ability that I possess.

Your son is now here, and will return to Washington with John Sherman.

With great respect,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

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[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Goldsboro', N. C., March 31, 1865.*

General TERRY, *Commanding at Faison's Station :*

Send orders to the depot commissary of subsistence at Wilmington to send forward coffee, sugar, and hard bread with all possible despatch. Let them come up the river to the bridge, and thence by rail to this place. We greatly need these stores. Two additional locomotives and about twenty cars are now at Wilmington, ready for your branch of the road, as soon as the bridge is done. Answer.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Goldsboro', N. C., April 5, 1865.*

General HAWLEY, *Wilmington :*

We will be all ready here on the 10th. The Newbern road has worked admirably, and brought us full supplies already. Your road can be used for sending up the troops destined for this army. See that General Dodge understands this, and uses the road up to Monday next to bring up men, as also such forage and stores as are still needed by Generals Terry and Schofield.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Headquarters incumbrances can remain ; forward only good men for battle.

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Goldsboro', N. C., April 5, 1865.*

DEAR GENERAL: I can hardly help smiling when I contemplate my command. It is decidedly mixed. I believe, but am not certain, that you are in my jurisdiction, but I certainly cannot help you in the way of orders or men, nor do I think you need either. General Cruft has just arrived with his provisional division, which will at once be broken up and the men sent to their proper regiments, as that of Meagher was on my arrival. You may have some feeling about my asking that General Slocum should have command of the two corps that properly belonged to you, viz: 14th and 20th ; but you can recall that he was but a corps commander, and could not legally make orders of discharge, transfer, &c., which was imperatively necessary. I therefore asked that General Slocum be assigned to command "an army in the field," called the "Army of Georgia," composed of the 14th corps and 20th. The order is not yet made

by the President, though I have recognized it, because both General Grant and the President sanctioned it, and promised to have the order made.

My army is now here, pretty well clad and provided; divided into three parts of two corps each—much as our old Atlanta army. I expect to move on in a few days, and propose, if Lee remains in Richmond, to pass the Roanoke and open communication with the Chowan and Norfolk. This will bring me in direct communication with General Grant.

This is an admirable point—country open, and the two railroads in good order back to Wilmington and Beaufort. We have already brought up enough to fill our wagons, and only await some few articles and the arrival of some men marching up from the coast, to be off.

General Grant explained to me his orders to you, which, of course, are all right. You can make reports direct to Washington or to General Grant, but keep me advised occasionally of the general state of affairs, that I may know what is transpiring. I must give my undivided attention to matters here. You will hear from a thousand sources pretty fair accounts of our next march.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Commanding Department of Cumberland.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Goldsboro', N. C., April 5, 1865.*

GENERAL: I now enclose you a copy of my orders prescribing the movement hence for a position on the Roanoke. The movement begins on the 10th, as I promised, and by the 12th we will be fairly under way. Our railroads have worked double what I calculated, because the track is so level that a locomotive can haul twenty-five cars instead of ten or twelve, as in upper Georgia. We now have enough of bread and small stores for our wagons, and I am hurrying up Cruft's provisional division from Tennessee; also the men who belong to this army, who had been sent to Savannah and Charleston. We can use the railroad to bring up the last; the others are marching.

I get nothing from you—nothing since I left you, and am, of course, impatient to know what Lee proposes to do. I hear nothing satisfactory from Johnston. We find Wade Hampton's cavalry on the roads to Weldon and Raleigh, but evidently only watching us. They have made no efforts to strike our railroads anywhere.

I shall expect to hear the effect of your move on Dinwiddie before I get off, but shall not wait.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT, *City Point.*

#### HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Goldsboro', N. C., April 6, 1865.*

GENERAL: I wrote you very fully from Fayetteville, since which time I have joined my own immediate army with those of Terry and Schofield, and now have at this point a splendid base, with roads finished back to Newbern and Wilmington. I have also been up to see General Grant, and am ready to march again.

It is all important that the work I did in South Carolina be kept unrepaired, and more especially that the locomotives and cars penned up about Sumterville and Florence be either destroyed or brought in. I believe that Johnston has brought up to Raleigh every man that can be brought out of South Carolina and Georgia. Therefore, now is your time to do the work. The enemy should not in any event be allowed to repair the roads about Columbia, but railroads are of less importance than locomotives and cars. It is not sufficient to burn cars. The driving wheels and trucks should *all* be broken, and axles bent, boilers punctured, cylinder heads broken and cast into deep water, and connecting rods bent and hid away. I don't know what force you have left, but I judge 2,500 men, lightly equipped, can reach Sumterville and Florence from Georgetown or the Santee bridge.

We have this minute received news that our troops are in possession of Richmond and Petersburg, with twenty-five thousand prisoners, five hundred guns, General A. P. Hill killed, Lee in full retreat on Danville, with Generals Grant and Sheridan in full pursuit. Joe Johnston is between me and Raleigh, and I will be after him as soon as I get my wagons loaded. Time is now the thing. Don't exaggerate the difficulty, but go right at it and the difficulties will disappear.

Truly, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General Q. A. GILLMORE,  
*Commanding Department of the South, Charleston.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Goldsboro', April 7, 1865.*

GENERAL: The success of our armies about Richmond changes the whole plan of our campaign. We have now to watch the enemy, who is adroit, and may turn up suddenly at unexpected points. Therefore don't commit yourself to any system other than to perfect the details of our present base of supplies—Goldsboro', with its two railroads. The army is so much interested in mails and small parcels that we will need such a line as, connected with others already established, will connect our army with the mail and express system of the United States. Please send a quartermaster's inspector through to Old Point by Newbern, Roanoke island, the canal, Norfolk, &c., and on his return let him make or suggest any improvements that will increase the certainty and regularity of such a line. At present some confusion may exist, caused by the change in the lines of departments, but I think this army, which includes the department of North Carolina, has so much more interest in the line than the few about Norfolk, that you could establish a new connexion from the channel straight for Old Point. Coming this way, preference should be given to mails, couriers, and general officers travelling on duty; afterwards it could carry such quartermaster or ordnance stores as might be ordered. But in no event do I want a line of government vessels to be usurped or monopolized by a set of peddlers and traders.

The bulk of supplies should come, of course, as heretofore, by sea to Morehead City, and by schooners and light draught vessels to Newbern and Wilmington.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

General EASTON,  
*Chief Quartermaster—Present.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Goldsboro', N. C., April 7, 1865.*

GENERAL: The capture of Richmond, and the retreat of Lee's army to the west, (Danville and Lynchburg,) necessitates a change in our plans. We will hold fast to Goldsboro' and its lines, and move rapidly on Raleigh. I want you to be all ready to move early on Monday straight on Smithfield and Raleigh by the most direct road. General Schofield will support you with the 23d corps, following you, and the 10th and cavalry will move from Mount Olive and Faison's by Bentonville and Turner's bridge; the right wing by Pikesville and Whiteley's mill, with a division around by Nahunta and Folk's bridge. If the enemy declines to fight this side of the Neuse, I will, of course, throw the right wing up to Hinton's bridge.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SLOCUM,  
*Commanding Army of Georgia.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Goldsboro', April 6, 1865.*

I have reports from Newbern, brought by General Carl Schurz, that General Grant took Petersburg last Monday; that General Weitzel then took Richmond, with 500 guns and 25,000 prisoners; that Generals Grant and Sheridan are pursuing Lee towards Danville. This will alter our plans. We must move on Raleigh. Be all ready. I think Johnston is still near Smithfield. We must hit him hard.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

General KILPATRICK, *Mount Olive.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Goldsboro', N. C., April 7, 1865.*

GENERAL: The capture of Richmond makes a change in our plans necessary. We will move early on Monday rapidly on Raleigh, holding on to the roads from Goldsboro' back and repairing forward to Raleigh.

General Slocum will move straight on Smithfield and Raleigh; General Schofield in support, with the 10th corps and cavalry, keeping south and west of the Neuse, by Bentonville and Turner's bridge.

I want you to start early by Pikesville, Whiteley's, and Pine level, prepared to join to General Schofield's right in case the enemy fights about Smithfield; otherwise to swing up along the Neuse, to cross over at some point, to be determined, it may be, as high up as Hinton's bridge. Send one division light, with all the mounted men you can spare, up as high as Nahunta station, thence to join your wing *via* Folk's bridge.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HOWARD,  
*Commanding Right Wing.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Goldsboro', N. C., April 7, 1865.*

GENERAL: The capture of Richmond makes unnecessary our move against the Roanoke. We will move, and that with rapidity, on Raleigh, repairing and holding the railroad to that point.

General Slocum will move Monday at daybreak straight for Smithfield and Raleigh; the right wing by Pikesville and Whiteley's mill, with a division swinging round by Nahunta and Beulah.

I want you to support General Slocum with the 23d corps, keeping a pontoon bridge here at Goldsboro' and laying another at Cox's, and let the 10th corps move straight from Faison's to Bentonville and Turner's bridge. The cavalry will also be on that flank, and will strike the enemy in flank, and break the railroad *partially* about Gully's, provided the enemy awaits our attack this side of the Neuse. You may depend on General Slocum's bridges for the 23d corps to cross the Neuse about Smithfield. Dispose your troops detailed for the railroad guards to cover the roads from Goldsboro' back, giving most care to that from Goldsboro' to Morehead city. Winton and Murfreesboro' are now no longer needed, and you can recall any force sent there.

I am yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SCHOFIELD,  
*Commanding Centre.*

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## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Goldsboro', N. C., April 7, 1865.*

GENERAL: We will move straight on Raleigh on Monday next. General Terry's infantry will move from Faison's to Bentonville and Turner's bridge. I want you to move on his left front, and if possible reach the railroad between Smithfield and Raleigh, disable it slightly, enough to prevent its use for a day or so, and then act against the flanks of the enemy, should he retreat to Raleigh. I think the bulk of the enemy's cavalry is between us and Weldon. As soon as you cut the railroad you should keep up a communication with Terry's left, but you may act boldly and even rashly now, for this is the time to strike quick and strong. We must get possession of Raleigh before Lee and Johnston have time to confer and make new combinations, forced on them by the loss of their capital, and the defeat of their principal army about Petersburg. You can send your wagons to the nearest infantry column. I think you had better move by Troublefield's, Lees, and Elevation, crossing Middle creek as high up as the Gully Station road.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

Major General KILPATRICK,  
*Commanding Cavalry, Mt. Olive.*

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## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Goldsboro', N. C., April 7, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have the honor herewith to send you the report of Major General Kilpatrick and of Lieutenant Colonel T. G. Baylor, chief of ordnance, which I wish you to file with my report of the recent campaign. Events progress so rapidly that we have scarce time to report them fully, but I will endeavor to

get in the full reports of my army commanders before we start for Raleigh. I have not yet received General Grant's orders consequent on the capture of Richmond, and defeat of Lee's army before Petersburg, but I am so confident that I know his wishes, that my orders are all out for my entire army to move at daylight on Monday next, the 10th, for Raleigh. Before the capture of Richmond, of which I only heard yesterday, I was preparing to feign on Raleigh, and move across the Roanoake above Gaston, but now I shall move straight on Raleigh, repairing the railroad to that place. From Raleigh I can reach the Danville and Charlotte road, about Greensboro', but I expect definite orders before getting off. I want my mails to come to Old Point, Dismal Swamp Canal, Newbern, Goldsboro', &c., and have ordered General Easton to complete arrangements to that end.

It is now important that I should have more rapid communication with headquarters than heretofore.

General Meigs is now here and will start for Washington to-night.

I am, with respect, yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
*Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*Wilson's Station, April 5, 1865.*

Major General SHERMAN :

All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach Danville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with him last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot and dragoons, at twenty thousand (20,000,) much demoralized. We hope to reduce this number one-half. I shall push on to Burkesville, and if a stand is made at Danville, will in a very few days go there. If you can possibly do so, push on from where you are and let us see if we cannot finish the job with Lee's and Johnston's armies. Whether it will be better for you to strike for Greensboro' or nearer to Danville, you will be better able to judge when you receive this. Rebel armies now are the only strategic points to strike at.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

Official :

T. S. BOWERS,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Goldsboro', N. C., April 8, 1865.*

GENERAL : I have just received your letter of the 5th from Wilson's station, and although I have written you several letters lately, will repeat.

On Monday at daylight all my army will move straight on Joe Johnston, supposed to be between me and Raleigh, and I will follow him wherever he may go. If he retreats on Danville to make junction with Lee, I will do the same, though I may take a course round him, bending towards Greensboro', for the purpose of turning him North. I will bear in mind your plain and unmistakable point that "the rebel armies are now the strategic points to strike at." I will follow Johnston, presuming that you are after Lee, or all that you have left of him, and if they come together, we will also. I think I will be at Raleigh

on Thursday, the 13th, and shall pursue Johnston towards Greensboro', unless it be manifest that Lee has gone towards Danville. I shall encourage him to come to bay or to move towards Danville, as I don't want to race all the way back through South Carolina and Georgia. It is to our interest to let Lee and Johnston come together, just as a billiard-player would nurse the balls when he has them in a nice place. I am delighted and amazed at the result of your move to the south of Petersburg, and Lee has lost in one day the reputation of three years, and you have established a reputation for perseverance and pluck that would make Wellington jump out of his coffin. I wish you could have waited a few days, or that I could have been here a week sooner, but it is not too late yet, and you may rely, with absolute certainty, that I will be after Johnston with about 80,000 men, provided for twenty full days, which will last me forty, and I will leave a small force here at Goldsboro' and repair the railroad up to Raleigh. If you have a spare division you might send it to General Schofield to help him hold this line of railroad out from Morehead City to Goldsboro', but I will not hesitate to let go railroad and everything, if I can get at Joe Johnston in an open field. If General Sheridan don't run his horses off their legs, and you can spare him for a week or so, let him feel down for me, and I think he can make a big haul of horses. Tell him I make him a free gift of all the blooded stock of North Carolina, including Wade Hampton's, whose pedigree and stud are of high repute.

Don't fail to have Stoneman break through the mountains of west North Carolina. He will find plenty of Union men who will aid him to reach either your army or mine, and Canby should, if he takes Mobile, get up the Alabama river about Selma, from which place he can catch all fragments passing towards Texas. I have an idea that he can get up the Alabama river even if he do not take Mobile. I have a report from General Wilson, who will, I think, break up all railroad lines in Alabama.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT,  
*City Point, Va.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Goldsboro', April 8, 1865—12 m.*

General KILPATRICK, *Mt. Olive :*

I now have official intelligence from General Grant of the defeat of Lee's army, and occupation of Petersburg and Richmond. He is pursuing the fragments, represented at 20,000, towards Danville. We move on Monday rapidly on Johnston towards Raleigh. I sent you orders last night, and now repeat the substance. Move early on Monday by Troublefield's store, Lee's and Elevation, to strike the railroad between Smithfield and Raleigh. General Terry will move *via* Bentonville and Turner's bridge. The main army takes the main road, crossing the Neuse at Smithfield. Now is the time for your cavalry to work on the flanks and rear of Johnston. I think Wheeler is between this and Weldon. I think Butler's division has been sent back to South Carolina; I hear of them between Wilmington and Florence. Wade Hampton is about Smithfield, where I also suppose Johnston to be, though he may have moved back towards Raleigh. Answer.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*



## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, April 7, 1865.*

General KILPATRICK :

Spencer can have his leave. You can communicate with me here till Monday. I will then keep with General Slocum's left corps near Cox's bridge, and be near Smithfield Tuesday. Afterwards, on the main road to Raleigh, not far from the head of column. General Sheridan has done great service against the retreating infantry, cutting off and capturing whole brigades of infantry, artillery and wagon trains. Of course I would like you to have new saddles, but time won't wait. I will have the telegraph and railroad keep up with me, and shall habitually camp near the wires to communicate back. We will keep a bridge here and at Cox's. Terry's command will be your support, until we are all across the Neuse at Smithfield, when General Slocum will be the left, General Schofield with General Terry the centre, and General Howard the right. I intend to push to Greensboro' as fast as I can do so, consistent with ordinary prudence.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General Commanding.

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## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Goldsboro', N. C., April 8, 1865.*

Dear MACOMB : You have of course heard of the defeat by General Grant of Lee's army at Petersburg, and consequent occupation of Richmond and Petersburg. I have letters from General Grant of the 5th from Wilson's station, on the road towards Burkesville, stating that he is pushing the pursuit after the retreating army. This changes our whole plans, and I will move straight for Raleigh instead of marching for the Roanoke. We will not, in consequence, have any use for Winton or Murfreesboro', and if General Schofield has sent any troops up to Winton, he will recall them, and use them to cover our railroads. I expect to march on Monday, 10th, on Raleigh and maybe Greensboro', and I give you this notice that you may not be disappointed in the recall of troops from the Chowan. So far as my operations are concerned for the next month, all I ask is that the sounds and channels leading up to Newbern and Kinston be patrolled by the gunboats. Hoping to meet you again soon,

I am, with respect, yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General.

Captain W. N. MACOMB, U. S. N.,  
Commanding Squadron, Albemarle Sound.

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## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Goldsboro', April 8, 1865—7 p. m.*

General MEIGS, Morehead City :

Am just in receipt of a cipher despatch from General Grant, at Burkesville, of 6th. He is pressing Lee hard, and expects to scatter his whole army. Davis and cabinet are at Danville. Tell Major Leet, who comes down to-day, to get to Old Point as quick as possible, and get a message to General Grant, at any cost, that I will push Joe Johnston to the death.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
Major General.

[Cipher telegram.]

BURKESVILLE, Va., April 6, 1865.

Major General W. T. SHERMAN :

We have Lee's army pressed hard ; his men scattering and going to their homes by the thousand.

He is endeavoring to reach Danville, where Jeff. Davis and his cabinet have gone. I shall press the pursuit to the end. Push Johnston at the same time, and let us finish up this job at once.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Smithfield, N. C., April 11, 1865.*

GENERAL : Your note is received. You need not have the Lowell factory destroyed. I will wait our reception at Raleigh to shape our general policy. You may instruct General Logan to exact bonds that the factory shall not be used for the confederacy. Of course, the bond is not worth a cent ; but if the factory owners do not abide by the conditions, they cannot expect any mercy the next time.

Until we get to Raleigh I propose to keep up connexion back with Goldsboro'. I shall await your coming to-morrow morning. I send you a Raleigh paper of the 10th.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General O. O. HOWARD,  
*Commanding Right Wing.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Smithfield, N. C., April 11, 1865.—10.30.*

GENERAL : General Slocum has two bridges done, and will cross early and go to the point on the railroad, twelve miles out, known as Stalling's, (Gulley's on our map.) We have questioned the doctors and preachers, who all agree that our map is substantially correct, and that there is but one road between Swift creek and the Neuse, until abreast of Gulley's.

General Kilpatrick reported from Moore's house, on Middle creek, (not on our map,) which must be up near Leachburg ; he reports bridges burned. If in your progress you judge Johnston to be beyond Raleigh and no fight, you can go as far to the westward as you please, aiming towards Chapel Hill and Hillsboro'. You are safe in leaving your wagons under small escort to follow until we are sure of Raleigh.

General Howard's two corps are at Pine Level and Lowell factory, and will keep well up on this side the Neuse, unless wanted.

I would give you the middle or direct road, but judge time important, to save fortifying by the enemy, but will give you *the centre* as soon as you get Cox and Terry together. In reporting your position use names on my map, though incorrect.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Gen. SCHOFIELD, *near Fennon's bridge.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Smithfield, N. C., April 11, 1865—10.30 p. m.*

GENERAL: Please hereafter, in reporting your position, to use names on our map. "Moore's," on Middle creek, is not down. I suppose you to be about the mill without name. You may count on my being near Gulley's store to-morrow night, and you may go as near Raleigh as you can. I have Raleigh papers of the 10th; Stoneman is raiding *strong* near Greensboro', and Wheeler is after him. A portion of Wade Hampton's cavalry is cut off over towards Weldon (Nahunta swamp.) I don't think Hampton has 2,000 cavalry with him, and this is your chance. I will push all the columns straight on Raleigh. I don't care about Raleigh now, but want to defeat and destroy the confederate army. Therefore you may run any risk. Of course don't break the railroad, except to the rear (west) of Johnston, as we want the railroad up to Raleigh.

General Wilson has taken Selma, and is threatening Montgomery. He had whipped Red Jackson, 27 miles from Selma, and at Selma knocked Forrest all to pieces. Rebel papers report Forrest wounded in three places. Abe Buford to defend Montgomery with citizens. Dick Taylor ran westward from Selma. Maury cooped up in Mobile. General Grant is between Johnston and Lee. They cannot communicate. Davis is at Danville.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*Gen. KILPATRICK, *Commanding Cavalry.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Smithfield, N. C., April 12, 1865—5 a. m.*

GENERAL: I have this moment received your telegram announcing the surrender of Lee's army. I hardly know how to express my feelings, but you can imagine them. The terms you have given Lee are magnanimous and liberal. Should Johnston follow Lee's example, I shall, of course, grant the same. He is retreating before me on Raleigh, and I shall be there to-morrow. Roads are heavy, but under the inspiration of the news from you, we can march twenty-five miles a day. I am twenty-seven miles from Raleigh, but some of my army is eight miles behind. If Johnston retreat south, I will follow him to insure the scattering his force, and capture of the locomotives and cars at Charlotte. But I take it, he will surrender at Raleigh. General Kilpatrick's cavalry is ten miles to the south and west of me, viz: on Middle creek, and I have sent Major Audenreid with orders for him to make for the south and west of Raleigh by five different roads. The railroad is being repaired from Goldsboro' to Raleigh, but I will not aim to carry it further. I shall expect to hear of General Sheridan, in case Johnston does not surrender at Raleigh; with a little more cavalry, I would be sure to capture the whole army.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Lieut. Gen. U. S. GRANT,

*Commanding Armies of the United States, Virginia.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, near Gulley's, 12, 1865—7 p. m.*

General KILPATRICK:

Your note is received. Certainly you may go into Raleigh to-night and press Johnston's rear. I want him to go towards Greensboro', and I will cut across

to Charlotte via Ashboro'. Cut across the rear of his column, right and left. I will come to Raleigh early. Keep me advised of the direction of Johnston's retreat as often as possible.

Yours, in haste,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Raleigh, N. C., April 13, 1865.*

Lieut. Gen. U. S. GRANT,

*City Point, Virginia:*

We entered Raleigh this morning. Johnston has retreated westward. I shall move to Ashville and Salisbury or Charlotte. I hope General Sheridan is coming this way with his cavalry. If I can bring Johnston to a stand, I shall soon fix him. The people here have not heard of the surrender of Lee and hardly credit it. All well.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Raleigh, April 13, 1865.*

GENERAL: Yours of 11.50 a. m. is received and quite satisfactory, and the general wishes you to keep pushing the enemy. To-night the general will inform you of the coming move. The columns are closing up here now. Have you captured any railroad stock? No further news.

I am, &c.,

L. M. DAYTON,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

General KILPATRICK, *Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Raleigh, N. C., April 13, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have been out and am just back, and hasten to answer yours of to-day. I have two locomotives here, and will send one up the road to bring back the cars you have captured. Please have pickets along the road so as to advise the conductor where to stop.

It will take all day to-morrow to close up our trains and to draw out on the new lines of operations, of which I will fully advise you to-morrow. Rest your animals to-morrow, or confine your operations to mere feints, and be ready for work the next day. I think we may expect General Sheridan down soon. I think I can force Johnston to disperse his army or accept battle in a few days, and will proceed as fast as I can get troops into position. We will hold Raleigh, and repair roads and telegraph back to Goldsboro',

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

General KILPATRICK,  
*Commanding Cavalry.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Raleigh, N. C., April 14, 1865.*

General EASTON, *Newbern* :

I want the road repaired up to Raleigh and put in order, but no stores sent up till you hear we need them. I suppose Johnston to be about Greensboro' and Salisbury, and I must go there, and will endeavor to capture his army and materials. Of course he cannot fight me now, and all I fear he may scatter his men and escape. We will take vast amounts of railroad stock and other property, because it cannot escape us, but it will take time to run it down to the seacoast. Governor Vance sought an interview with me, but before I got his messenger back our cavalry approached Raleigh, and he went off for fear of arrest. I have sent out for him to come and see me, with a promise of safety. Keep General Grant advised of my whereabouts, by all chances. The troops are now moving, but I will not go till to-morrow. I will garrison Goldsboro' and Raleigh. Send me any news that may reach you. Trains all up and in good condition. I think I will find forage enough, but, in any event, the grass and wheat fields begin to give us pasturage.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Raleigh, N. C., April 14, 1865.*

GENERAL: I sent you orders to-day, but now enclose you a copy. You see I am to put my army where, if Johnston tries to pass out by Charlotte, I can strike him in flank, but if he remains at Greensboro' I shall capture the whole. All I expect of you is to keep up a delusion, viz: that we are following him *via* the University and Hillsboro', until I get my infantry heads of column across the Haw river, when I want you to cross also, and feel out towards Greensboro', till I get to Ashboro', when, if he remains at Greensboro', I can approach him from the south and force him to battle, to surrender, or disperse. You will perceive that we save a couple of days by cutting across the bend in the direction of Salisbury. I am very anxious to prevent his escape towards Georgia. If he does go to Georgia we can capture all the rolling stock and vast amounts of property on the road from Salisbury back to Greensboro'. The governor asks me to suspend hostilities and to confer with him. I am willing to confer with him, but not to suspend hostilities. I will not suspend hostilities till Johnston's army is captured or scattered.

General Howard to-morrow will have one corps at Jones's station, and one at Morrison's station. Next day all move by separate roads for Ashboro'. My army is very large, and cannot move as fast as Johnston, who has the assistance of the railroads. I am in hopes that General Sheridan will come down, when he, with the aid of your cavalry, can get ahead of him, and hold him until we get up, when we can make short work of him.

The people here manifest more signs of subjugation than I have yet seen, but Jeff. Davis has more lives than a cat, and we must not trust him. If you reach the University do not disturb its libraries, buildings, or specific property.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding*

General KILPATRICK, *Commanding Cavalry.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Raleigh, N. C., April 14, 1865.*

GENERAL: The letter by flag of truce is from General Johnston, which is the beginning of the end. Send my answer at once, and to-morrow do not advance your cavalry beyond the University, or to a point abreast of it on the railroad. I will be up to Morrisville to-morrow to receive the answer, and it may be to confer with General Johnston. The infantry will come to Morrisville.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

General KILPATRICK,  
*Commanding Cavalry.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Raleigh, N. C., April 14, 1865—12 m.*

GENERAL: The general-in-chief is just in receipt of a communication from General Johnston, C. S. A., which is the forerunner to events that may obviate our contemplated long march. You will, therefore, by his direction, to-morrow (15th) place one corps of your command at Holly Springs, and the other just outside of Raleigh, in the direction of the proposed march, and there await further directions from him.

I have the honor to be, general, yours, &c.,

L. M. DAYTON,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Major General J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
*Commanding Army of Ohio.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Raleigh, N. C., April 14, 1865—12 m. d.*

GENERAL: The general-in-chief is just in receipt of despatches from General Johnston, C. S. A., which are tending to the end of making unnecessary our contemplated long march. You will, therefore, by his direction, to-morrow place one corps of your command at Morrisville, and the other at Jones's station, and there await further directions from him before continuing the march. The general will go to Morrisville for further communication.

I have the honor to be, with respect, yours, &c.,

L. M. DAYTON,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Major General O. O. HOWARD,  
*Commanding Army of the Tennessee.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Raleigh, N. C., April 14, 1865.*

General EASTON, *Newbern:*

The capture of Selma is also announced in rebel papers. I expect every hour an answer from General Johnston, but shall start to-morrow towards Ashboro', unless he makes clear and satisfactory terms. You had better hold yourself prepared to give us forage here when the railroad is done, as we have enough provision on hand; but send nothing this side of Goldsboro' until ordered by myself or some army commander.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Raleigh, April 14, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have faith in General Johnston's personal sincerity, and do not believe he would use a subterfuge to cover his movements. He could not stop the movement of his troops till he got my letter, which I hear was delayed all day yesterday by your adjutant's not sending it forward. If he gains on us by the time lost, we will make it up at the expense of North Carolina. Major McCoy will be with you, and will receive Johnston's letter, and I will instruct him to open it and send me contents. My orders are for all to be ready to move. Yesterday the roads were impassable to trains, but if the weather be favorable they will be good to-morrow.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

General KILPATRICK, *Durham's.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Raleigh, April 14, 1865.*

GENERAL: The general-in-chief has arranged for a meeting with General J. E. Johnston, near Durham's station, North Carolina railroad, at 12 m., April 17, and to accomplish it will leave here at 8 a. m. to-morrow, by railroad. Until further orders he directs that all troops will remain as they are at this time. The movements as directed in Special Field Orders No. 55 being for the time suspended.

I am, general, with respect,

L. M. DAYTON,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

General H. W. SLOCUM,  
*Commanding Army of Georgia.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, April 18, 1865—9.30 p. m.*

General EASTON, *Morehead:*

Major Hitchcock leaves here in an hour for Washington with despatches of great importance. Have the most fleet steamer you can obtain ready on his arrival to take him direct to Washington, and return subject to his orders. He will telegraph you from Goldsboro' and Newbern, and you can calculate the time you will have, but he must not be delayed a minute.

By order of Major General W. T. Sherman.

L. M. DAYTON,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

[By telegraph to Morehead City, steamer to Old Point, and telegraph to Lieutenant General Grant, Washington.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Raleigh, N. C., April 22, 1865.*

General Wilson held Macon on the 20th, with Howell Cobb, G. W. Smith, and others as prisoners; but they claim the benefit of my armistice, and he has telegraphed to me, through the rebel lines, for orders. I have answered him that he may draw out of Macon, and hold his command for further orders, unless he has reason to believe that rebels are changing the status to our prejudice.

A brigade of rebels offered to surrender to me yesterday, but I prefer to make one grand *finale*, which I believe to be perfectly practicable. There will be no trouble in adjusting matters in North Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama, and I think South Carolina ought to be satisfied with Charleston and 'Columbia in ruins. All we await is an answer from you and the President. Weather fine and roads good. Troops ready for fight or home.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, April 24, 1865.*

General KILPATRICK :

Send the enclosed notice to General Johnston immediately by an officer, who will obtain a receipt for it, and send the same to me. It is a notice that the truce will end forty-eight hours after the notice reaches the rebel lines.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Raleigh, N. C., April 24, 1865—6 a. m.*

General JOHNSTON, *Commanding Confederate Army, Greensboro' :*

You will take notice that the truce or suspension of hostilities agreed to between us will cease in forty-eight hours after this is received at your lines, under first of the articles of our agreement.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Raleigh, April 24, 1865.*

General JOHNSTON, *Commanding Confederate Armies :*

I have replies from Washington to my communications of April 18. I am instructed to limit my operations to your immediate command, and not to attempt civil negotiations. I therefore demand the surrender of your army on the same terms as were given General Lee, at Appomattox, of April 9th, instant, purely and simply.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Raleigh, N. C., April 24, 1865.*

General GILLMORE, *Hilton Head, S. C. :*

Send several couriers by different routes by land from Savannah to General Wilson, at Macon, that the truce is at an end and hostilities are resumed, and that he will go on and act according to original orders. You will also do the same.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, N. C., April 25, 1865.*

GENERAL: You may make your orders to start to-morrow towards the enemy wherever we may find him, and instead of following the route prescribed in Special Field Orders No. 55, you may cover the railroad and cover it substantially in the direction of Greensboro' and Salisbury. Colonel Wright will be ordered to repair it behind us as far as the company's shops in Alamance county.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SCHOFIELD,  
*Commanding Department of North Carolina.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Raleigh, April 26, 1865.*

General KILPATRICK, *Durham's:*

No orders further than to hold your command well in hand, ready to move on notice; but no movements will be made until after the interview between Generals Johnston and Sherman has terminated. Please have about 20 horses ready, as Generals Howard, Schofield, and probably Blair, will go up with the general.

The dismounted men will go up with your train in the morning, as the locomotives cannot haul sufficient number of cars to accommodate them.

L. M. DAYTON,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Raleigh, April 26, 1865.*

GENERAL: The general-in-chief will again meet General J. E. Johnston, C. S. A., on same conditions of armistice as on the 18th instant. He directs that you hold your command at rest, but well in hand, ready for further move on notice from him.

I am, general, with respect,

L. M. DAYTON,  
*Major and Assistant Adjutant General.*

Major General H. W. SLOCUM,  
*Commanding Army of Georgia.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, Fort Monroe, May 8, 1865.*

General SCHOFIELD, *Raleigh:*

Have arrived at Fortress Monroe, and will go to City Point to-morrow. Telegraph to General Wilson to act in all matters according to his own good sense, and in a day or so I will hear from General Grant, whether I am to command my own subordinates or not. Generals Howard and Slocum have reached Petersburg.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Fortress Monroe, May 8, 1865—12 p. m.*General GRANT, *Washington* :

I have full despatches from General Wilson of the 6th. One boat has arrived at Augusta all right. He is after Davis, who cannot escape, save in disguise ; but he is reported in Georgia, escorted by about 70 officers, as a special body-guard, and about 3,000 cavalry.

Does Mr. Stanton's newspaper order take General Wilson from my command, or shall I continue to order him ? If I have proven incompetent to manage my own command, let me know it.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Manchester, Va., May 9, 1865.*General SCHOFIELD, *Raleigh* :

Your despatch is received. Notify General Wilson that he must get forage in Georgia for the present. I will notify General Grant of his wants, by telegraph, and await his instructions.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Manchester, Va., May 9, 1865.*

GENERAL : I have joined my army at Manchester, opposite Richmond, and await your orders. General Wilson telegraphs through General Schofield for hay and forage for 20,000 animals, to be sent up the Savannah river to Augusta. Under Secretary Stanton's newspaper orders, taking Wilson substantially from my command, I wish you would give the orders necessary for the case.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT,  
*Commander-in-Chief.*

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[Cipher.]

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, City Point, Va., May 9, 1865.*

GENERAL : I have the honor to report my arrival at City Point, pursuant to your orders, and my army is reported by General Easton, quartermaster, to be at Manchester, opposite Richmond. I have, as yet, seen no orders for me to come to Alexandria, although that was contemplated by you at Raleigh. Will you please telegraph me orders at Manchester, where I will forthwith join the army. I have nothing from you since you left Raleigh.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT,  
*Washington, D. C.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Manchester, Va., May 10, 1865.*Lieut. General GRANT, *Washington, D. C.:*

Your despatch, directing me to march my command to Alexandria, just received. I have ordered the army of Georgia to move to-morrow, and the army of the Tennessee to follow next day.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*On the road, Concord Church, 25 miles from**Richmond, Va., May 12, 1865—4 p. m.*Lieutenant General GRANT, *Washington:*

The following despatch from General Wilson is just received and sent for your information.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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[By telegraph from Macon Ga., May 10, 1865—3 p. m.]

Major General SHERMAN, *through General Schofield:*

Captain Abraham, of General Upton's division, yesterday received surrender of two brigades rebel cavalry, two thousand strong, at Washington, Georgia, including Generals Vaughn, Dibrell, Elzey, Williams, Loomis, Gilmer, and Lawton. General Croxton is now engaged in paroling Ferguson's brigade at Forsyth. Balance of the rebel cavalry, which started as Jeff. Davis's escort, has either been surrendered or gone home. General Vaughn told General Upton that he had received positive orders to escort Davis to Mississippi river, but on his arrival at Washington determined to go no further. The money Davis had with him (doubtless over-estimated) has been paid his troops, and scattered through the country around Washington. Lieutenant Youman, a very energetic and capable officer, reports Davis on night of the 7th tried to cross Chattahoochee at Warsaw, but lost his trail. Youman himself crossed Chattahoochee at Vining's late same night. Since then he has not been heard from. General Winslow seems to think his report probable, though he favors now the idea that he may have turned south. Alexander's brigade is in the neighborhood of Marietta. Will strike trail if there is one. My troops are all over North Georgia, at Warrenton, Athens, Madison, Warsaw, Lawrenceville, and other places, with scouts on every road. The country southward, eastward, and west is also thoroughly patrolled.

J. H. WILSON,  
*Brevet Major General.*

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## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Fredericksburg, Va., May 15, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have to report my arrival here. I left General Slocum at noon at Chancellorsville, and he will cross the 14th at Raccoon ford, and 20th at U. S. Ford to-morrow. General Logan is not yet in, and I suspect he has found his roads badly cut up by the troops that preceded him.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

General U. S. GRANT,  
*Washington, D. C.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, Alexandria, Va., May 19, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to report my arrival at camp near the Washington road, three miles north of Alexandria. All my army should be in camp near by to-day.

The 15th corps, the last to leave Richmond, camped last night at the Occoquan.

I have seen the orders for the review in the papers, but Colonel Sawyer says it is not herein official form. I am old-fashioned, and prefer to see orders through some other channels, but if that be the new fashion, so be it. I will be all ready by Wednesday, though in the rough. Troops have not been paid for eight or ten months, and clothing may be bad, but a better set of legs and arms cannot be displayed on this continent.

Send me all orders and letters you may have for me, and let some one newspaper know that the vandal Sherman is encamped near the canal bridge, halfway between the Long bridge and Alexandria, to the west of the road, where his friends, if any, can find him.

As ever, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

General RAWLINS,  
*Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.*

## HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the field, camp near Washington, May 28, 1865.*

GENERAL: I see no public business that calls for my further stay at Washington. I have made my full testimony before the "Committee on the Conduct of the War," as ordered; and the four corps, under my command here, are in good camps, and the company and field officers are busy upon the muster-rolls and papers needed for the payment of the troops, and for disbanding of such as are entitled to discharge under existing orders. You remember that the commanders of military divisions have nothing to do with such matters, so that my longer presence is unnecessary. I will therefore ask for an order, or for instructions to return to the west—say Louisville, Kentucky, or wherever the general thinks I should take post. If the territory north of the Ohio river is to be included in the military division of the Mississippi, I would prefer, for the sake of economy, to reside in Cincinnati. I would like to take New York and Chicago in my route west, to keep appointments made by my family before my arrival here. I will be ready to leave Washington on Wednesday.

I am, with great respect,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Colonel T. S. BOWERS,  
*Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters Armies United States.*

LANCASTER, OHIO, *June 30, 1865.*

General E. D. TOWNSEND,  
*Assistant Adjutant General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:*

Despatcher received. Assignment to St. Louis perfectly satisfactory.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

LANCASTER, OHIO, *June 30, 1865.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT,  
*Washington, D. C.:*

My assignment to St. Louis is perfectly satisfactory. I go to Cincinnati to-day, and will go to Louisville, and it may be to St. Louis, before I come back.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

All of which is respectfully submitted, by your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General United States Army.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*St. Louis, Missouri, November 21, 1865.*



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REPORT

OF

MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS, U. S. A.,

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

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REPORT  
OF  
MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS  
TO THE  
HON. COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

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PART I.

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COMMANDING DETACHMENT SECOND UNITED STATES CAVALRY; FIRST BRIGADE DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA; FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO; RIGHT WING OF ARMY BEFORE CORINTH; "SECOND IN COMMAND" ARMY OF THE OHIO; "CENTRE" ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND; FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND; FROM NOVEMBER 1, 1860, TO OCTOBER 19, 1863.

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NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, *March* 9, 1866.

SIR: In compliance with your communication of May 22, 1865, I have the honor to submit the following as a record of the campaigns in which I have been engaged since the beginning of the rebellion, together with copies of my reports, and those of my principal subordinates, as far as available:

*November* 1, 1860.—I left Camp Cooper, Texas, on leave of absence for twelve months, but the rebellion of the southern States having broken out, and the second cavalry, (of which I was junior major,) by an agreement between General Twiggs and the authorities of the State of Texas, having been disarmed and ordered out of the State, I received orders at New York city, April 10, 1861, to take charge of the regiment on its arrival in New York, conduct it to Carlisle barracks, Pennsylvania, and take prompt measures to refit it for active service.

*April* 14 to *May* 27, 1861.—I remained at Carlisle barracks, reorganizing and equipping the second United States cavalry.

*April* 25, 1861.—Was promoted lieutenant colonel second United States cavalry, *vice* R. E. Lee, resigned.

*May* 3, 1861.—Was promoted colonel second United States cavalry, *vice* A. S. Johnson, resigned.

*June* 1, 1861.—Reported for duty, at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, to Major General Patterson, United States volunteers, in accordance with Special Order No. —, headquarters of the army, May 27, 1861, with four companies of the second cavalry and the Philadelphia City Troops.

*June* 3, 1861.—Assigned to command of the first brigade of the army of Pennsylvania, per Special Order No. —, headquarters department of Pennsylvania.

*July* 2, 1861.—Commanded the brigade in the affair of Hoge's run, in Patterson's advance on Martinsburg, Virginia.

*July* 3, 1861.—Entered Martinsburg with my brigade in advance of the army. Commanded the advance guard in the march towards Winchester, Virginia, and drove in the enemy's outpost at Bunker Hill, July 15, 1861.

*August* 17, 1861.—I was appointed brigadier general of volunteers; was relieved from duty with the army of the Shenandoah August 26, and ordered to

report to Brigadier General Robert Anderson, United States army, commanding department of the Cumberland.\*

*September 6, 1861.*—Reported for duty at Louisville, Kentucky.

*September 12, 1861.*—Was assigned to the command of Camp Dick Robinson, Kentucky, and assumed command September 15, relieving Lieutenant William Nelson, United States navy, who formerly commanded the camp, and was organizing Kentucky and Tennessee troops.

*September 15 to October 14, 1861.*—Remained at Camp Dick Robinson. Completed the organization of and mustered into service the first Kentucky cavalry, first Kentucky battery, the third, fourth, and sixth Kentucky infantry, and the first and second Tennessee infantry. The fourteenth, seventeenth, thirty-first, thirty-eighth regiments of Ohio infantry, thirty-third Indiana infantry, and batteries B and C first Ohio light artillery, having arrived and reported for duty, were, with the Kentucky and Tennessee troops above mentioned, organized into a brigade, and designated the first brigade army of the Cumberland.†

*October 14, 1861.*—The enemy, under Zollicoffer, having been reported on the march to invade Kentucky, through Cumberland Gap, the fourteenth and seventeenth Ohio, the thirty-third Indiana, and battery B first Ohio artillery, were ordered, under Brigadier General A. Schoepf, United States volunteers, to re-enforce the third Kentucky infantry on outpost duty in Rock Castle Hills.

*October 21.*—The position was attacked by Zollicoffer, who was beaten back with considerable loss.‡

\* Major General Patterson having been relieved from duty and mustered out of service, the designation of his army was changed from the army of Pennsylvania to that of the Shenandoah, and Major General N. P. Banks assigned to the command of the same, August, 1861.

† Brigadier General Robert Anderson, United States army, was relieved, at his own request, in command of the army of the Cumberland, by Brigadier General W. T. Sherman, United States volunteers, October, 1861.

‡ Affair of Rock Castle Hills, or Wild Cat, October 21 and 22, 1861.—(See the following reports of the same:)

HEADQUARTERS CAMP DICK ROBINSON,

*October 22, 1861—4 a. m.*

GENERAL: I have just received a despatch from General Schoepf, at Rock Castle Hills. He writes that the enemy attacked the camp with six thousand infantry and one thousand five hundred cavalry, and were repulsed and driven back, as he says, behind their intrenchments. He reports four of our men killed and twenty wounded; among the latter was Captain Heruser, 33d Indiana, who rejoined his command after the amputation of his finger. General Schoepf regards the position as secure. I am sending forward provisions and ammunition, in addition to the supply taken by the troops. I thought it more advisable, in the present confused state of the quartermaster's department here, to remain at this post myself, sending forward Generals Schoepf and Carter, who are on the ground with 5,000 men. As soon as I can arrange matters I will go forward myself.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Brigadier General U. S. V., Com'g.*

Brigadier General W. T. SHERMAN,

*Commanding Department of Cumberland, Louisville, Ky.*

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and A. E. C.*

HEADQUARTERS CAMP DICK ROBINSON,

*October 23, 1861.*

GENERAL: I wrote you on the 22d, giving the substance of General Schoepf's report of the events of the 21st at Rock Castle Hills. I have just received another despatch from him, in which he reports that his scouts had just returned and report the enemy have fully retreated in the direction of Loudon. Our loss is ascertained to be four killed and eighteen wounded. On examination of the battle-ground, I set the enemy's loss down at thirty killed and a large wounded list—the latter taken by them off the field, (as I learn from an influential citizen in the vicinity,) except three, who were brought into our camp and properly cared for; one since died. Our wounded are doing well. The three prisoners, all examined by me separately, gave the same statement relative to the strength of the enemy, viz: 7,000.

*October 28.*—Headquarters and balance of brigade advanced to Crab Orchard.\*

*November 17.*—Ordered to move brigade to Lebanon, Kentucky, detaching the two Tennessee regiments and the third Kentucky to Loudon, Kentucky, to observe the road through Cumberland Gap.

*November 30.*—Assigned to command first division army of the Ohio, Special Order No. 16, headquarters department of the Ohio, and ordered to concentrate the command at Lebanon, Kentucky.†

*December 31.*—Per instructions from department headquarters, I marched with part of two brigades of the division to unite with the brigade stationed at Somerset, Kentucky, and attack the enemy in his intrenched camp at Mill Springs. Learning of my approach, the enemy, under Major General George Crittenden, moved out of his intrenchments, and attacked my advance at Logan's Crossroads at 6 a. m., January 19, 1862. By 10 a. m. he was completely routed, with one general officer (Zollicoffer) killed, and fled in disorder to his intrenched camp, closely pursued by my command. By 5 p. m. the camp was closely invested, and during the night the troops were disposed for an assault of the works at daylight on the 20th. But with the aid of a steamer and several flatboats, protected from the fire of our artillery by the high hills on the bank of the river, the enemy succeeded in making good his escape before morning, abandoning all his artillery, ammunition, quartermaster and commissary supplies, and the personal baggage of the officers, and crossing the Cumberland river with his disorganized forces.

Annexed please find my report of the battle of Mill Springs, dated January 31, 1862. The reports of my sub-commanders are not to be found among the records of the department of the Ohio.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Somerset, Ky., January 31, 1862.*

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that, in carrying out the instructions of the general commanding the department, contained in his communication of the 29th December, I reached Logan's cross-roads, about ten miles north of the intrenched camp of the enemy on the Cumberland river, on the 17th instant, with a portion of the second and third brigades, Kenney's battery of artillery, and a battalion of Woolford's cavalry. The fourth and tenth Kentucky,

The enemy fought well, approaching to within fifty yards of our muskets with shouts and cheers, which were promptly responded to by our men under the immediate command of Colonels Coburn and Woolford.

In the pocket of one of the wounded prisoners was found a letter to the commander of a (secession) Tennessee regiment, urging him to send forward his regiment to the relief of General Zollicoffer. I have just learned from a citizen on the route of the retreating enemy that they acknowledge a loss of 100 killed.

I find a rumor in the papers that General Lee will supersede Zollicoffer. If he does, I would wish to be prepared for him fully.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier General U. S. V.*

Brigadier General W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Commanding Department of Cumberland.*

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and A. D. C.*

\* Brigadier General W. T. Sherman was relieved at his own request in command of the army of the Cumberland, when the designation of that army was changed to that of the department and army of the Ohio, and Brigadier General D. C. Buell, United States volunteers, assigned to the command, November, 1861.

† Zollicoffer, being defeated at Rock Castle Hills, fell back into Tennessee, through Cumberland Gap. Reorganized his forces and attempted a second advance into Kentucky, by way of Monticello and Somerset, succeeding in effecting a crossing of the Cumberland river at Mill Spring on December, 1861, and immediately intrenched himself at Beech Grove, on the north bank of the river, between Fishing and Oak creeks.

fourteenth Ohio, and eighteenth United States infantry being still in rear, detained by the almost impassable condition of the roads, I determined to halt at this point, await their arrival, and to communicate with General Schoepf.

The tenth Indiana, Woolford's cavalry, and Kenney's battery, took position on the main road leading to the enemy's camp. The ninth Ohio and tenth Minnesota (part of Colonel McCook's brigade) encamped three-fourths of a mile to the right of the Robertsport road. Strong pickets were thrown out in the direction of the enemy beyond where the Somerset and Mill Springs road comes into the main road from my camp to Mill Springs, and a picket of cavalry some distance in advance of the infantry. General Schoepf visited me on the day of my arrival, and after consultation I directed him to send to my camp Standart's battery, the twelfth Kentucky, and the first and second Tennessee regiments, to remain until the arrival of the regiments in the rear.

Having received information on the evening of the 17th that a large train of wagons with its escort were encamped on the Robertsport and Danville road, about six miles from Colonel Steedman's camp, I sent an order to him to send his wagons forward under a strong guard, and to march with his regiment (the fourteenth Ohio) and the tenth Kentucky, Colonel Harlan, with one day's rations in their haversacks, to the point where the enemy were said to be encamped and either capture or disperse them.

Nothing of importance occurred from the time of our arrival until the morning of the 19th, except a picket skirmish on the night of the 17th. The fourth Kentucky, the battalion Michigan engineers, and Wetmore's battery joined on the 18th. About half-past 6 o'clock on the morning of the 19th the pickets from Woolford's cavalry encountered the enemy advancing on our camp, retired slowly, and reported their advance to Colonel M. D. Hanson, commanding the second brigade. He immediately formed his regiment (the tenth Indiana) and took a position on the road to await the attack, ordering the fourth Kentucky, Colonel S. S. Fry, to support him, and then informed me in person that the enemy were advancing in force, and what disposition he had made to resist them. I directed him to join his brigade immediately, and hold the enemy in check until I could order up the other troops, which were ordered to form immediately, and were marching to the field in ten minutes afterwards. The battalion of Michigan engineers, and company A, thirty-eighth Ohio, were ordered to remain as guard to the camp. Upon my arrival on the field soon afterwards, I found the tenth Indiana formed in front of their encampment, apparently awaiting orders, and ordered them forward to the support of the fourth Kentucky, which was the only entire regiment then engaged. I then rode forward myself to see the enemy's position, so that I could determine what disposition to make of my troops as they arrived. On reaching the position held by the fourth Kentucky, tenth Indiana, and Woolford's cavalry, at a point where the roads fork to go to Somerset, I found the enemy advancing through a cornfield, and evidently endeavoring to gain the left of the fourth Kentucky regiment, which was maintaining its position in a most determined manner. I directed one of my aids to ride back and order up a section of artillery, and the Tennessee brigade to advance on the enemy's right, and sent orders for Colonel McCook to advance with his two regiments (the ninth Ohio and second Minnesota) to the support of the fourth Kentucky and eighteenth Indiana.

A section of Captain Kenney's battery took a position on the edge of the field, to the left of the fourth Kentucky, and opened an effective fire on a regiment of Alabamians which were advancing on the fourth Kentucky. Soon afterwards the second Minnesota, Colonel H. P. Van Cleve, arrived, reporting to me for instructions. I directed him to take the position of the fourth Kentucky and tenth Indiana, which regiments were nearly out of ammunition. The ninth Ohio, under the immediate command of Major Kaimmerling, came into position on the right of the road at the same time. Immediately after these regiments had gained their positions the enemy opened a most determined and galling fire, which was returned by our troops in the same spirit, and for nearly half an hour the contest was maintained on both sides in the most obstinate manner.

At this time the twelfth Kentucky, Colonel W. A. Haskins, and the Tennessee brigade reached the field on the left of the Minnesota regiment, and opened fire on the right flank of the enemy, who then began to fall back.

The second Minnesota kept up a most galling fire in front, and the 9th Ohio charged the enemy on the left with bayonets fixed, turned their flank, and drove them from the field, the whole line giving way and retreating in the utmost disorder and confusion.

As soon as the regiments could be formed and refill their cartridge-boxes, I ordered the whole force to advance. A few miles in rear of the battle-field a small force of cavalry was drawn up near the road, but a few shots from our artillery—a section of Standart's battery—dispersed them, and none of the enemy were seen again until we arrived in front of their intrenchments.

As we approached their intrenchments the division was deployed in line of battle, and steadily advanced along the summit of the hill at Moulden's. From this point I directed their intrenchments to be cannonaded, which was done until dark, by Standart and Wetmore's batteries. Kenney's battery was placed in position on the extreme left of Russell's house, from which point he was directed to fire on their ferry to deter them from attempting to cross.

On the following morning Captain Wetmore's battery was ordered to Russell's house, and

assisted with his Parrott guns in firing upon the ferry. Colonel Manson's brigade took position on the left, near Kenney's battery, and every preparation was made to assault their intrenchments on the following morning. The fourteenth Ohio, Colonel Steedman, and the tenth Kentucky, Colonel Harlan, having joined from detached service soon after the repulse of the enemy, continued with their brigade in pursuit, although they could not get up in time to join in the fight. These two regiments were placed in front, in my advance on the intrenchments the next morning, and entered first; General Schoepf having also joined me the evening of the nineteenth, with the seventeenth, thirty-first, and thirty-eighth Ohio, his entire brigade, and entered with the other troops. On reaching the intrenchments, we found that the enemy had abandoned everything, and retired during the night. Twelve pieces of artillery, with their caissons packed with ammunition, one battery wagon, and two forges, a large amount of small-arms, mostly the old flint-lock muskets, and ammunition for the same, one hundred and fifty or sixty wagons, and upwards of one thousand of horses and mules, a large amount of commissary stores, intrenching tools, and camp and garrison equipage, fell into our hands. A correct list of all the captured property will be forwarded as soon as it can be made up, and the property secured.

The steam and ferry boats having been burned by the enemy, on their retreat, it was found impossible to cross the river and pursue them; besides, their command was completely demoralized, and retreated with great haste and in all directions, making their capture in any numbers quite doubtful, if pursued. There is no doubt but what the moral effect produced by their complete dispersion will have a more decided effect in re-establishing Union sentiments than though they had been captured.

It affords me much pleasure to be able to testify to the uniform steadiness and good conduct of both officers and men during the battle, and I respectfully refer to the accompanying reports of the different commanders for the names of those officers and men whose good conduct was particularly noticed by them.

I regret to have to report that Colonel R. L. McCook, commanding the third brigade, and his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant A. S. Burt, eighteenth United States infantry, were both severely wounded in the first advance of the ninth Ohio regiment, but continued on duty until the return of the brigade to camp, at Logan's cross-roads. Colonel S. S. Fry, fourth Kentucky, was slightly wounded while his regiment was gallantly resisting the advance of the enemy, during which time Zollicoffer fell from a shot from his pistol, which, no doubt, contributed materially to the discomfiture of the enemy.

Captain George E. Hunt, assistant adjutant general, Captain Abram C. Gillem, division quartermaster, Lieutenant J. C. Breckenridge, aide-de-camp, Lieutenant S. B. Jones, acting assistant quartermaster, Mr. J. W. Scully, quartermaster's clerk, Privates Samuel Letcher, twenty-first regiment Kentucky volunteers, ———— Stitch, fourth regiment Kentucky volunteers, rendered me valuable assistance in carrying orders and conducting the troops to their different positions.

Captain G. S. Roper, commissary of subsistence, deserves great credit for his perseverance and energy in forwarding commissary stores for the command as far as the hill where our forces bivouac.

In addition to the duties of guarding the camp, Lieutenant Colonel A. K. Hunton, commanding the Michigan engineers, and Captain Greenwood, company A, thirty-eighth regiment Ohio volunteers, with their commands, performed very efficient service in collecting and burying the dead on both sides, and removing the wounded to the hospitals near the field of battle.

A number of flags were taken on the field of battle and in the intrenchments. They will be forwarded to department headquarters as soon as collected together.

The loss of the enemy is as follows: Brigadier General F. K. Zollicoffer, Lieutenant Bailey Peyton, and one hundred and twenty officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates killed and buried; Lieutenant Colonel M. B. Carter, twentieth Tennessee, Lieutenant J. W. Allen, fifteenth Mississippi, Lieutenant Allen Morse, sixteenth Alabama, and five officers of the medical staff, and eighty-one non-commissioned officers and privates taken prisoners.

Lieutenant J. E. Patterson, twentieth Tennessee, A. J. Knapp, fifteenth Mississippi, and sixty-six non-commissioned officers and privates wounded, making one hundred and twenty-two killed, eighty-nine prisoners, not wounded and wounded; a total of killed and wounded and prisoners of three hundred and forty-nine.

Our loss was as follows:

	KILLED.	
	Com'd officers.	Non-com'd officers and privates.
Ninth Ohio.....		6
Second Minnesota.....		12
Fourth Kentucky.....		8
Tenth Indiana.....		10
First Kentucky cavalry.....	1	2
	—	—
	1	38
	==	==

## WOUNDED.

Ninth Ohio.....	4	24
Second Minnesota.....	2	31
Fourth Kentucky.....	4	48
Tenth Indiana.....	3	72
First Kentucky cavalry.....		19
	<hr/> 13	<hr/> 194
	<hr/>	<hr/>

One commissioned officer and thirty-eight men were killed, and fourteen officers, including Lieutenant Burt, eighteenth United States infantry, aide-de-camp, and one hundred and ninety-four non-commissioned officers and privates, wounded.

A complete list of the names of our killed and wounded and of the prisoners is herewith attached.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Brigadier General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.*

Captain JAMES B. FRY,

*A. A. G., Chief of Staff, Headquarters Dept of the Ohio,  
Louisville, Kentucky.*

Circular showing the force which marched out of the intrenchments of the enemy on the night of the 18th January, 1862:

## CIRCULAR.

HEADQUARTERS BEECH GROVE, KY.,  
*January 18, 1862.*

The following will be the order of march:

General Zollicoffer: fifteenth Mississippi, in advance, Colonel Walthall; battery of 4 guns, Captain Rutledge; nineteenth Tennessee, Colonel Cummings; twentieth Tennessee, Colonel Battles; twenty-fifth Tennessee, Colonel Stanton.

General Carroll: seventeenth Tennessee, Colonel Newman; twenty-eighth Tennessee, Colonel Murray; twenty-ninth Tennessee, Colonel Powell; two guns, in rear of infantry, Captain McClung.

Sixteenth Alabama, Colonel Wood, in reserve.

Cary battalions in rear.

Colonel Brauner on the right.

Colonel McClellan on the left.

Independent companies in front of the advance regiment.

Ambulances and ammunition.

Wagons in rear of the whole, and in the order of their regiments.

By order of General Crittenden:

A. L. CUNNINGHAM,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

*January 23, 1862.*—Moved the command to Somerset, to complete preparations for marching into Tennessee.

*February 15.*—Ordered from department headquarters to move command to Lebanon, preparatory to advancing on Bowling Green. Whilst en route was ordered to march to Louisville and embark for the Cumberland river, the enemy having retreated from Bowling Green. Embarked at Louisville, February 26, with ten (10) days' supplies, preparatory to operations against Nashville, if necessary.

*March 4.*—Reached Nashville.

*March 19.*—Marched from Nashville to Savannah, Tennessee, my division being detailed as the reserve of the army of the Ohio.

*April 7.*—Reached Savannah at midnight, and Pittsburg landing on the morning of the 9th, having been detained at Savannah for want of transportation. Went into camp on left of the army.

*April 25.*—Appointed major general of volunteers.

*April 30.*—Per Special Field Order No. 35, headquarters department of the Mississippi, transferred with my command to army of the Tennessee, and assigned

to the command of the "right wing of the army before Corinth," Mississippi, (consisting of my division, commanded by Brigadier General T. W. Sherman, the divisions of Brigadier Generals W. T. Sherman, S. H. Hurlburt, J. A. Davies, and T. J. McKean.)

*May 30.*—At 6 a. m. entered Corinth with two divisions of my command, Major General W. T. Sherman pursuing and driving the enemy's rear guard across Hatcher's creek, a few miles south of Corinth. The stream being impassable on account of the swampy banks, and the enemy having destroyed the bridge and causeway, he pursued no further by that route. The divisions of Brigadier Generals T. W. Sherman and Davies were temporarily detached, and assigned to General Buell's command, to pursue by the river road.

The following is the report made by me of the operations of my command about Corinth; the reports of my division commanders are, doubtless, filed among the records of the department of the Tennessee, and are consequently not available to forward herewith :

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING ARMY OF TENNESSEE,  
*Camp near Corinth, Mississippi, June 3, 1862.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the right wing army of the Tennessee before Corinth.

On the 4th instant the right wing commenced its move upon Corinth, Major General W. T. Sherman's division taking up a position to the right of Monterey, towards the Purdy and Corinth road, supported by Brigadier General Hurlburt's division on his left, Brigadier General T. W. Sherman's division taking position on the main road from Monterey to Corinth, with Davies's and McKean's divisions in reserve. Major General Sherman's right flank, being much exposed, was intrenched immediately. On the 7th instant the right wing again moved forward, occupying the ground from the Monterey and Corinth to the Purdy and Farmington roads, and extending from the Monterey and Corinth to the Purdy and Corinth roads. This advance was made in the face of a strong resistance from the enemy, who was in force in front of each of the wings of my command. The ground taken up was strongly intrenched the same day by all the troops. From this time until our next advance there was considerable skirmishing between our pickets and those of the enemy. Our pickets cautiously but steadily advanced from day to day, and always holding the ground they had gained. On the 17th instant Major General Sherman, with a regiment and a section of artillery from his division, drove in the enemy's pickets at the crossing of Bridge creek and occupied their position. The same day Brigadier General T. W. Sherman drove a force of the enemy in his front across Bridge creek, on the Monterey and Corinth roads, and occupied with his pickets, supported by a strong reserve, all the ground in his front as far as the creek.

On the 21st instant Major General Sherman's division, supported by Brigadier General Hurlburt, advanced to Russell's House, on the Gravel Hill road, to the main road from Purdy to Corinth, refusing his right flank, General Hurlburt connecting with Sherman's left, extending along the same ridge to the position held by General McArthur's brigade of McKean's division, the latter connecting with Brigadier General Schoepf's brigade, which had moved forward from its last position, and striking across Bridge creek nearly east, connected with the centre of Brigadier General Sherman's division which had advanced but little.

The enemy made no serious opposition to this move, except in front of Brigadier General Davies, who, in advancing his pickets before taking his position, encountered one brigade of the enemy posted on the Corinth side of Phillip's creek. A few rounds from one of his field-batteries dispersed them, and the different divisions intrenched their position without further molestation.

About 10 o'clock a. m. that day our pickets reported that there appeared to be great commotion in Corinth, and there was every indication that the enemy would attack the right wing in force; I accordingly made all the preparation necessary to receive them, but continued the work on the intrenchments until they were completed.

Two days afterwards we were informed by deserters that Bragg and Van Dorn were to have attacked us that morning, but found on sending their scouts forward that we already held the position they intended to have taken up, consequently they withdrew.

On the 28th instant Major General Sherman, with his division, supported by General Hurlburt and a part of General Davies's division on the left, and General Logan, of Judah's division, on his right, advanced along the main Corinth road and took up a position within a few hundred yards of the enemy's outer intrenchments; this advance was met with more determined opposition on the part of the enemy than any he had previously made; every inch of the ground was obstinately contested until we had gained our position, and soon afterwards a strong effort was made by the enemy to drive us from it, which was met by our men

with so much coolness and determination that it terminated in a complete withdrawal of the enemy from our immediate front.

On the 29th there was comparative quiet all along the front of the right wing. Brigadier General Sherman moved two of the brigades of his division across Bridge creek, to fill up the gap between the left of General McKean's division and the right of General Buell's army corps, which had been advanced the day before. About 5 o'clock a. m., on the 30th instant, several explosions being heard in the direction of Corinth, General Halleck telegraphed directly to Major General Sherman to move forward his division cautiously, feel the enemy, and ascertain what they were doing, and sent me an order to support General Sherman's advance with as many troops as would be necessary. I immediately ordered one brigade from General Hurlburt's division to the support of Major General Sherman, and directed Generals Davies and McKean to hold their divisions in readiness to move at a moment's notice. Major General Sherman, anticipating General Halleck's order, was ready to move when the order was received, and moved forward his division in three columns, pressing the enemy so closely that they had barely time to cross the Tuscumbia creek and destroy the bridge before the advance of General Sherman was upon their rear guard.

The cheerfulness with which labor in the trenches was performed by the officers and men, and their steady, energetic, and soldierly bearing on this advance, evinces a state of discipline highly commendable, to which I take great pleasure in calling the attention of the general commanding the department.

There were no casualties in the right wing on the 30th; those occurring previously have been mentioned in the reports of the division commanders. Quite a number of prisoners were taken by Major General Sherman's division during the pursuit on the 30th. Their number and rank will be furnished the provost marshal by him.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Major General Commanding Right Wing Army of Tennessee.*

Brigadier General G. W. CULLEM,

*Headquarters Department of the Mississippi.*

*June 5, 1862.*—I was placed in temporary command of Corinth and vicinity by Special Field Order No. —, headquarters department of the Mississippi.

*June 10.*—I was relieved from the command of the right wing of the army before Corinth, and assigned (with my division as the garrison) to the command of that place by Special Field Order No. 99, headquarters department of the Mississippi.

*June 11.*—The divisions of Brigadier Generals Davies and Todd were assigned to the garrison per Special Field Order No. 100, headquarters department of the Mississippi.

*June 22.*—I was relieved in command of the town of Corinth by Major General E. O. C. Ord, commanding second division army of the Tennessee, and was retransferred with my divisions to the army of the Ohio per Special Field Order No. 119, headquarters department of the Mississippi.

*June 26.*—Left Corinth and posted the troops of the division along the Memphis and Charleston railroad, making my headquarters at Tusculumbia, Alabama, in obedience to Special Orders No. 85, headquarters army of the Ohio.

*June 24.*—Relieving Wood's division, army of the Ohio, which was ordered forward.

*July 15.*—Received orders by letter to prepare to join Buell's main army as soon as relieved from charge of the railroad.

*July 25.*—Having been relieved by Morgan's division, army of the Mississippi, I marched in obedience to the above-mentioned orders; reached Huntsville, Alabama, with the division and reported to headquarters August 1. Ordered to take post at Deckerd, Tennessee, and push forward one brigade to Pelham on outpost duty.

*August 5.*—Reached Deckerd. Was temporarily relieved from the command of the division and ordered to proceed to McMinnville and assume command of the forces at that place, per official letter dated headquarters department of the Ohio, Huntsville, August 15, 1862.

*August 19.*—Arrived at McMinnville and assumed command.



The following correspondence fully illustrates the state of affairs about this period:

HUNTSVILLE, *August 19, 1862.*

General THOMAS, *McMinnville:*

The enemy crossed three hundred cavalry and three thousand infantry at Chattanooga yesterday. This may be for the purpose of foraging in Sequatchie valley, but we must be prepared for more than that. Hold your command in readiness to march at the shortest notice. You will probably march on the Truman road or the Dunlap road, but you should be provided with capable and reliable guides in all directions. General Schoepf's scouts also report the enemy in the mountains twenty-one miles beyond him in quite a large force; that is not very definite in any respect. You should by means of spies and scouts keep yourself thoroughly informed of what is going on between you and Chattanooga. There is a road leading along the mountains from Spencer to Pikeville and other points by which an enemy could penetrate; you should also look well in the direction of Sparta and Smithville, both for the purpose of detecting any advance upon you and any attempt to pass you towards Nashville. Collect, in a day or two, all the forage, flour, and beef you can, and then send your supply trains to Murfreesboro' to be fed until required. The McMinnville railroad will be open Thursday, and at any rate you should not keep on hand more supplies than you can carry away in your baggage wagons and haversacks. The great problem with us is supplies, and that we must solve by management and starving if necessary. It will be quite as difficult for the enemy. I shall concentrate your division and McCook's at Tracy City, or near there, and send Crittenden up the Sequatchie valley to about the Anderson road. We must be prepared either to fight in detachments or concentrate rapidly, according to circumstances. I have prepared a code of signals by which to control our movements and communicate information; study it carefully. Call Wood's division up to you, or at least have him within a few hours march, which, for the sake of supplies, will be better, as well as to give some protection to the road.

A true copy:

D. C. BUELL, *Commanding.*

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and A. D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
*McMinnville, Tenn., August 22, 1862.*

Major General BUELL, *Deckerd:*

I have believed for a day or two that the demonstration in this direction is intended to cover the advance of the enemy toward Kentucky. Forrest and Scott are said to be near Crossville. I have been reliably informed that forage is being collected there in large quantities. My scouts report no force of the enemy on Cumberland mountains this side of Sequatchie. Morgan day before yesterday was at Hartsville. Johnson is this side of the Cumberland, near Carthage. The troops I sent to his assistance are now at Smithville. Colonel Grose reports that Morgan is trying to get east, probably to join Forrest, but to do so he will have to march by Johnson or Grose. We have captured two or three small droves of cattle going east. Two men came in yesterday from near Crossville who report that the enemy's cavalry and some infantry, probably the advance guard, are at Jamestown, Fentress county. The citizens here think that they will advance into Kentucky.

G. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General U. S. V.*

A true copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and A. D. C.*

*General Buell to General Thomas.*

DECKERD, *August 22, 1862.*

General THOMAS, *McMinnville:*

From General McCook's information this morning it seems almost certain that Bragg is marching on McMinnville; his advance was at the top of Waldron's ridge last night. McGowan is said to be crossing at Kingston, and Withers at Harrison. Of course they will expect to unite. What sort of ground can we take by concentrating at McMinnville? How would it do to fight at Altamont? Is the ground such as to give us the advantage of our artillery? How many days' rations have you? Are you provided with ammunition? Be ready to march immediately.

BUELL, *Commanding.*

A true copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

*General Thomas to General Buell.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF OHIO,  
McMinnville, August 22, 1862.

Major General BUELL, *Deckerd* :

By all means concentrate here. The enemy cannot reach Nashville by any other route across the mountains unless by Sparta. At Altamont, I am positively informed that the enemy would have an equal advantage with ourselves. Here we will have a most decided advantage, and by being here, should he march by Sparta, we can meet him either there or at Allen's ford, across the Caney Fork. He is obliged to pass this place or Sparta, to reach Nashville. I have six days' rations and plenty of ammunition. Did you get my despatch of to-day? I cannot think that Bragg is coming here, either by the Hill or Thurman road. My reconnoitring party went into Dunlap yesterday.

G. H. THOMAS,  
Major General U. S. Volunteers.

S. C. KELLOGG,  
Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.

A true copy :

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*General Buell to General Thomas.*

DECKERD, August 22, 1862.

General THOMAS, *McMinnville* :

Of course you will instantly recall your absent troops. I will probably bring second Kentucky by rail, to march from here—that is, on the supposition that we will advance to attack in Sequatchie valley. I can hardly think the enemy will attempt the march across to McMinnville—at least not immediately. It appears to me that he will rather endeavor to get into north Alabama, and perhaps strike across to Deckerd. If we advance to Altamont we may thwart him in both and preserve our communication with Deckerd and Nashville. If we concentrate at McMinnville we lose north Alabama and Deckerd. What think you? The great difficulty is in moving in the mountains with our trains. Of course we must cut loose from everything but our ammunition train and subsistence for six days, most of it in haversacks.

D. C. BUELL.

A true copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,  
Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.

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*General Thomas to General Buell.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF OHIO,  
McMinnville, Tennessee, August 22, 1862.

Major General BUELL, *Deckerd* :

We can get neither forage nor water at Altamont. It will be as difficult for us to march across the mountains to Sequatchie valley, as for the enemy to come either to Altamont or this place. I would not advise concentrating here except for battle, or for an advance into East Tennessee. I think our connexion with Nashville will be better preserved by holding Deckerd, with a division to enable us to concentrate either there, if threatened, or at this place. I have also learned that Tupelo, Mississippi, has been abandoned, and most of the enemy at that place have been sent to Chattanooga. I therefore do not apprehend any attempt to seize north Alabama.

G. H. THOMAS,  
Major General U. S. Volunteers.

S. C. KELLOGG,  
Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.

A true copy :

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*General Buell to General Thomas.*

DECKERD, August 23, 1862.

General THOMAS, *McMinnville* :

There is no possibility of our concentrating at McMinnville. We must concentrate in advance and assume the offensive, or fall back at least to Murfreesboro'. I deem the former the surest, and we will act accordingly. I wish you, therefore, to move by a forced march to Altamont, there to form a junction with McCook, and Crittenden, and Schoepf. McCook

and Crittenden started for Tracy City yesterday, from Jasper. I presume they are now at Tracy City, though possibly not. Schoepf will march at once. The junction must be formed to-morrow, and any division meeting the head of the enemy's column first must at least hold it in check until a larger force arrives. One battery to a division would, I think, be ample in the mountains. McCook and Crittenden have with them six batteries; leave all of yours, therefore—at least don't take more than one. It will be necessary to leave some force with them, at least two regiments, and they should be put in a strong position and covered by breastworks to-night, without fail. I shall order Schoepf's batteries here, to be similarly disposed of. There must be no delay or failure. The enemy's advance was at the top of Waldron's ridge, ten miles from Chattanooga, night before last, and talked of being at McMinnville to-morrow; that is hardly possible, but they must be met at the earliest possible moment. Communicate with McCook to-night, by a trusty scout—the distance is thirty-two miles; he may possibly not be at Tracy City; if not, look for him on the road to Battle creek. If you think best you may send your artillery to this place, which will relieve the force that would be required to protect them there; though if they will be safe, there is some advantage in having a force at McMinnville. Take no wagons except what will be necessary to carry rations and cooking utensils. I shall probably leave here with Sil's brigade to-morrow, for Tracy City. Communicate always in cipher, by telegraph, to this place, and by courier through Tracy City. Schoepf sends a report that Hardee is advancing on the Dunlap road. Answer, that I may know exactly what you do. Your staff officer makes mistakes in the use of the cipher.

D. C. BUELL.

A true copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

General THOMAS, *McMinnville :*DECKERD, *August 24, 1862.*

In advancing to Altamont, take the Hickory Creek road, instead of the Thurman road. That will put you on a shorter line of retreat on Murfreesboro', by the way of Manchester, and brings us nearer together. Start your trains for Murfreesboro' at once, with the least escort that will possibly suffice, say one regiment and a battery, and let it go through in thirty-six hours. In the event of any reverse which makes it necessary for the whole force to fall back, do so by Manchester and Beach grove, making a stand to check the enemy whenever it can be done with advantage. Keep your telegraph open until the last minute, and after that communicate frequently by couriers. It is very desirable that we should reach the enemy at the same time if possible. McCook can, I think, get there by twelve o'clock day after to-morrow.

D. C. BUELL.

A true copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF OHIO,  
*McMinnville, Tennessee, August 24, 1862.*

Major General BUELL, *Deckerd :*

A reconnoitring party, under Major Loughlin, First Ohio cavalry, sent by me towards Pikeville, day before yesterday, has just returned. Major Loughlin reports that he reconnoitred (?) the enemy's advance scouts at Spencer, and gained reliable intelligence from one or two citizens that a force of two or three thousand infantry and some artillery was then at Pikeville, and that the enemy intended advancing on this place by two or three routes. A party sent out last night on the Chattanooga road reports the enemy's pickets at Beersheba, and a force behind in Sequatchee valley. I have been delayed until this time, waiting for the return of these parties. Will move this afternoon, on the Hickory Creek road, in compliance with your last orders. General Wood's division will be at the foot of the mountains, if not the pass, to-night.

G. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General U. S. Volunteers.*

A true copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
*Altamont, Tennessee, August 25—5 p. m.*

Major General BUELL, *Deckerd :*

The enemy no nearer than Dunlap. It is reported there is one brigade there, and one at Pikeville. This I learn here, and which confirms the report of Major Loughlin, First Ohio cavalry.

Water scarce; only one spring here, and not forage enough in the neighborhood to last for one day. The road up the mountain is almost impassable; General Wood has been from six o'clock till now and has not succeeded in getting his artillery up the road. I deem it next to impossible to march a large army across the mountains by Altamont, on account of scarcity of water and forage, and the extreme difficulty of passing over the road. I will therefore return to McMinnville and await further orders. As I mentioned in one of my despatches, I regard McMinnville as the most important point for occupation of any. The occupation of McMinnville, Sparta, and Murfreesboro' will, in my opinion, secure the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad. I have sent out Smith to put in operation a system of couriers by which I believe we can get reliable information.

Very respectfully,

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major General U. S. Volunteers.*

A true copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

DECKERD, August 26. 1862.

General THOMAS, *McMinnville*:

Keep your position at McMinnville, but make nothing like a permanent establishment. Be always ready to move at a moment's notice. That Bragg is this side of the river with a large force is beyond all question. It is hardly probable that it is merely for the purpose of demonstration, and we must be prepared to concentrate promptly. Of course the passage of so large a force across the mountains is difficult, but not as much so as you would suppose, from the road you took. The Thurman road is very good, and the mountain quite easy of ascent. The descent on this side is easy enough by four roads, all diverging from Altamont; the first going by Beersheba to McMinnville, the second by Hickory creek to McMinnville or towards Manchester, the third also to Manchester and to Deckerd by Pelham, and the fourth by Cowan. The Beersheba road is excellent, for a mountain road. The question is, how to meet an advance which may take either of these routes through Altamont. The best position we could take would be McMinnville, Altamont, and on the Thurman road, just this side of Sequatchie valley. We should not only be able to concentrate against an advance on that road, or the Sparta road, but also threaten his flank if he should attempt to go into north Alabama by Battle creek—a not improbable thing on many accounts. The difficulty of supplying ourselves on the mountains is, I think, the only objection to the disposition I mention. Did you leave any force at Altamont? McCook, Crittenden, and Schoepf are at Pelham. I have ordered the railroad and telegraph re-established immediately. Be sure to be informed the moment the enemy enters Sequatchie valley and which direction he takes. Forrest and Morgan are reported at Lebanon to attack Murfreesboro' or Nashville. Give all the information you can obtain. \* \* \* \* \* Davis's division crossed at Eastport four day ago, and Payne is across—crossing at Lamb's ferry and Hood's.

Do you know a colonel fit to command a light brigade of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, to operate against Forrest? McCook, Crittenden, and Schoepf are at Pelham.

D. C. BUELL.

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
*McMinnville, August 28, 1862.*

Major General BUELL, *Deckerd*:

Saturday three regiments of cavalry were at Pikeville, but fell back to Robinson cross-roads, hearing that I was advancing on that road. About one regiment was reported to be at Dunlap, but since learned from a brother of Smith that there were no troops there; he went to Dunlap on Saturday. It was reported to him that Bragg was at the foot of Waldron's ridge, in the valley of the Tennessee, with forty thousand men, awaiting rain to cross the mountain. Smith will send or bring me information by to-morrow of the truth of Bragg's position. He then proposes to go towards Pikeville and endeavor to establish an express line to convey information. I have sent a brigade of infantry on the Murfreesboro' road after Forrest, who is at Woodbury with something over one thousand men. I have also directed the commanding officer to escort a train of provisions through to this place from Murfreesboro'. Our provisions will be out in three days, and none to be had in this region. Will you order supplies here immediately by the cars? We can get fodder here, but no corn. Troops at this place can watch the direct Chattanooga road, the Dunlap, and the Harrison and Pikeville roads, and by the system of expresses to be established by Smith I think I can give you

intelligence of the enemy before he can cross Sequatchie valley. Would not Colonel Harker be a good light brigade commander? I was favorably impressed with him. Please send the First Ohio cavalry here. It is very much needed. \* \* \* \*

G. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General United States Volunteers.*

True copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

ALTAMONT, August 29, 1862.

General THOMAS :

I am here and cannot subsist. Will send my train down the Hickory Creek trace to-morrow. Have you had any orders to supply me? I captured three of Bragg's body-guard this morning. They say they were out reconnoitring with an engineer officer. They say Bragg has a large force, but not yet in the Sequatchie valley. Have you any news? My cavalry think they have a division in the Sequatchie.

McCOOK.

A true copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
*McMinnville, August 30, 1862.*

General McCook, *Altamont :*

Your note was received last night at 11 o'clock. I have no orders to supply you with rations, and I have barely enough for three days. Send to Deckerd. If you remain at Altamont I will make arrangements to supply you. Crittenden is to be at Hillsboro' to-day, and I have orders to be ready to move at any moment and keep no supplies on hand. The enemy's cavalry attacked a stockade on this railroad yesterday, got whipped, losing fifteen killed and seven wounded. Wood went out yesterday with one of his brigades towards Dunlap, captured a rebel officer, a negro, and a hotel-keeper, and late Chattanooga papers. Bragg is not in the Sequatchie valley yet. Forrest is said to be in Hubbard's cove. Will get after him to-night. Look out; he will probably try to escape by Altamont.

G. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General United States Volunteers.*

True copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
*McMinnville, August 30, 1862.*

Major General BUELL, *Decherd :*

A citizen of Livingston came in this morning. He reports that he saw a large force of cavalry coming from Knoxville, six miles the other side of Sparta. They told him they were on their way to Dickson springs, near Hartsville, on the road from that place to Smithville. A citizen of Sparta told him that provisions were being hauled from Sparta and neighborhood to Marmaduke's brigade in the mountains southwest of Spencer. He also saw six or eight pieces of cannon with the cavalry. They told him they were going to Smithville to get on my flank and rear, ready to attack me from that direction as soon as Bragg and Marmaduke attacked me in front. He saw them on last Thursday. He was a Mexican war pensioner before this rebellion broke out; belonged to James Thomas's regiment of Tennessee cavalry. His name is J. W. Hall. His story seems truthful. Will send despatch again to-day.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General U. S. Volunteers.*

A true copy.

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

SHORT MOUNTAIN CROSS ROADS, TENNESSEE,  
*August 30, 1862.*

COLONEL: On Friday, August 29, instant, the troops under my command, numbering one hundred effective men of company A, eighteenth Ohio volunteers, company I, eighteenth Ohio volunteers, Captain Charles C. Ross, and company D, ninth Michigan volunteers, Lieutenant Wallace, had just completed the enclosure of a stockade at this place thirty

by forty feet square, of round timbers twelve feet high. The men were eating dinner at about one o'clock p. m. in a grove distant from the stockade about one hundred yards, and in which also we had the ammunition belonging to the command, excepting such as was in boxes, when the enemy, fifteen hundred strong, made his appearance, formed in line of battle along the skirt of woods extending from the railroad along the south side of the stockade at the distance of about two hundred yards, and rapidly extended his lines on the east and west sides. My men ran rapidly to the stockade, and at the same time the enemy, with a terrific yell, fired a volley and rushed to cut us off from the stockade. The attacking force consisted of nine hundred dismounted cavalry, commanded by General Forrest and led to the charge by him. My men kept up a sharp running fire on the way to the stockade, checking the impetuosity of the enemy, and but some ten of company I and the men on picket got inside the fort before the enemy. The men cut off kept up a constant fire from the railroad and woods during the engagement and got in in safety. The race to the stockade was a desperate one. On getting within the stockade I at once sent three parties of six men each, one from each company, to bring in the ammunition. These squads were commanded by Sergeant McLaren, company A; Sergeant Williams, company I, and I regret that I do not know who from the ninth Michigan company. They ran to the thicket under a terrible fire from the enemy's skirmishers and succeeded in bringing in the ammunition.

The enemy now made an attack from three directions with great desperation, approaching within fifty feet of the stockade. I kept up a constant and well directed fire upon him for ten minutes, when, finding it impossible to dislodge us or seriously injure our men, and his own falling rapidly around, he made a rapid retreat to the woods in great confusion. His men ran in every direction before our fire, throwing down their arms, and immediately fell back out of range. Soon after, an attempt was made to destroy the railroad above us. I went out with a party and drove them away.

I at once sent messengers to Manchester and McMinnville, on foot, through the enemy's lines, with information. To do this dangerous duty I called for volunteers, and from those offering to go I sent Clinton S. See, private, company A, to McMinnville, and Henry F. Thayer, private, company D, ninth Michigan, to Manchester. They both got safely through and gave information of our situation.

The enemy's force consisted of Colonel Wharton's Texas rangers; one battalion Alabama cavalry, Captain Bucoats; one battalion Tennessee cavalry, Major Smith, and one battalion Kentucky cavalry, numbering, as I learn from Dr. Houston, surgeon Texas cavalry, fifteen hundred strong. I have also the same information from Lieutenant Butler and other prisoners. We buried twelve of the enemy left dead and dying on the field, and have forty-one of his wounded in our hands and scattered among the houses of citizens in the vicinity. Among the dead are Captain W. Y. Houston and Lieutenant Butler, Texas rangers. Our loss is nine wounded, to wit: seven of company I, eighteenth Ohio volunteers; one of company A, eighteenth Ohio volunteers, and one of company D, ninth Michigan volunteers. Two are wounded dangerously and the others slightly. I send list of wounded.

Drs. Johnson and Mills, surgeons eighteenth Ohio volunteers, arrived at midnight, and at once proceeded to give all possible attention to the wounded. At daylight Drs. Stemmel and Sabin, twenty-sixth Ohio volunteers, arrived from McMinnville and assisted in attentions to the wounded and suffering. To all the gentlemen my thanks are due for their promptness, industry, and skill in administering to the wounded.

We captured eight horses, three saddles, and thirty guns. The conduct of all the officers and men of the command was such as to compel my admiration. They fought from the first with great coolness, bravery, and determination. The enemy outnumbered us as nine to one.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

Captain H. R. MILLER,  
18th Ohio Volunteers, Commanding.

Col. T. R. STANLEY,  
Commanding 18th Ohio Volunteers.

MANCHESTER, September 1, 1862.

Respectfully forwarded.

Colonel T. R. STANLEY, Com'dg Post.  
H. C. JONES, Adjutant.

A true copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
McMinnville, August 30, 1862.

Major General BUELL, *Deckerd*:

Sent report of citizen from Livingston at 12 m. to-day. Received despatch from Captain Miller about 11 o'clock last night from the railroad bridge, eight miles from McMinnville. He was attacked by Forrest's cavalry, one thousand five hundred strong, men dismounted.

They were handsomely repulsed, and fled, leaving fifteen dead on the ground. Sent General Wood, with a brigade and some cavalry, on the Chattanooga road. He sent cavalry, under Major Foster, to within five miles of Dunlap. Reports that he encountered the enemy's pickets eight miles this side of Dunlap, which he drove in for three miles, coming in succession upon different outposts. Learned that General Bragg was there with three brigades, encamped up and down the Sequatchie. There is also another force some seven miles higher up the valley. People with whom Major Foster conversed thought the enemy was marching up the valley. These reports of citizens not known are good for nought. Major Foster also reports no water from the foot of the mountain this side, to the foot on the other side, a distance of fifteen miles. A small party was sent to Beersheba Springs. Were told by citizens that a rebel force, fifteen hundred strong, (cavalry,) were encamped yesterday on Big creek, six or seven miles from Altamont, towards Dunlap. Heard from General McCook at Altamont last night; has captured two of Bragg's body-guard, who report that he has a large force, but not yet in the Sequatchie valley. His cavalry think he has a division there. News from all sources seems to confirm the report of the citizen from Livingston, Tennessee, that the enemy will move his main force by Sparta. If he is moving on Murfreesboro', by Sparta, I think the sooner we concentrate to meet him, and drive him back, the better; and Murfreesboro' seems to be the point from which we should operate. It would be very advantageous if one brigade was stationed at Smithville to watch any movement of the enemy on our left flank, as there seems to be some probability of a movement on my left and rear, if the enemy can assemble force enough for that purpose.

G. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General United States Volunteers.*

A true copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

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HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*Near McMinnville, Tennessee, August 31, 1862.*

SIR : In pursuance to orders from Brigadier General Wood to cut off General Forrest and his command, who was passing to the westward, and within two miles of this camp, making his way northward, and upon five minutes' notice, after procuring a guide, I marched in a circuitous route through the woods to the Murfreesboro' and McMinnville road, a distance of six miles from camp. I pushed forward in the direction of Murfreesboro' in "quick time" until I came to an open country, where, at some distance across the fields, I discovered the column of General Forrest, consisting entirely of cavalry. The enemy having become aware of my presence at this time, then commenced an exciting race between his command of cavalry and my column of infantry for the intersection of the two roads. I ordered my command forward at a "double-quick," which they obeyed cheerfully, although they had marched several miles at "quick time" without water. I discovered, when about four or five hundred yards distant from the junction of the roads, that General Forrest had formed his command in line of battle to receive my attack. I immediately ordered Lieutenant Estep, commanding eighth Indiana battery, to take up a position on an elevated piece of ground in the field to the left of the road, with instructions to commence firing; and the advance guard, (companies A and F, Captains James and Peatman, of the twenty-sixth Ohio,) under Major Dagenfeldt, to deploy in front of the artillery, on the low ground, advance and commence firing. In the mean time Lieutenant Colonel Young, commanding the twenty-sixth Ohio regiment, agreeably to instructions, formed his regiment in rear of the advance guard, and followed it closely in line of battle. After firing a few rounds the enemy's line gave way in the centre. His right wing (the Texas rangers and some Alabama troops) was forced to take the back track to our left, while General Forrest, with his left wing, scampered off in the direction of Murfreesboro'. I ordered Lieutenant Jarvis forward on the main road, with one section of artillery, to fire on General Forrest's detachment, and gave instructions to Lieutenant Colonel Gorman, commanding seventeenth Indiana, to support him with his regiment. I then ordered Lieutenant Voris, with the other section, supported by the fifty-eighth Indiana, Colonel Buell commanding, to follow up and to fire on the Texas rangers, leaving the twenty-sixth Ohio to occupy the centre.

In a very short time the enemy were entirely dispersed in every direction—so much so that it was with great difficulty I could determine on which road it would be most profitable to pursue him. I immediately concluded to follow him on the Murfreesboro' road; but it had grown so dark that I was enabled to pursue him but about two miles, when I was forced to abandon the chase in consequence of the men and animals suffering for water. I returned to camp the same night, arriving about 11 o'clock.

The ground over which we fought presented every indication of the utmost confusion and consternation on the part of the enemy, the woods and roads being strewn with arms, wearing apparel, &c., &c. Accompanying this I have the honor to present a list of the property that fell into our hands.

The actual loss of the enemy I had no means of ascertaining; but, from the statements of

citizens subsequently received, and from his own admissions, his loss must have been from eighteen to twenty in killed and wounded.

It is with pleasure that I inform you that these fine regiments of your division never came into line in better order at their battalion drills than they did upon this occasion.

The artillery commanded by Lieutenant Estep was well handled, quickly got into position, fired rapidly, and with precision.

The command of that portion of the brigade that accompanied the expedition devolved upon me in consequence of the severe illness of Brigadier General Hascall who was at the time confined to his room. It is proper to state that the 3d Kentucky regiment did not participate in consequence of just having returned from a severe march of two days' duration, thus entirely incapacitating them for further immediate service.

I cannot speak too highly in praise of the members of the general staff; Captain Ed. R. Kerstetter, assistant adjutant general, and Lieutenants James R. Hame, Jules J. Montagnier, and Charles H. Bruce, aides-de-camp, were active in conveying my commands to every part of the field. I would respectfully commend them to your favorable notice.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. P. FYFFE,

*Col. 26th Ohio Volunteers, Commanding.*

Captain WILLIAM H. SCHLATER,  
*Ass't Adj't Gen'l, 6th Division, Army of the Ohio.*

A true copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
*McMinnville, Tennessee, August 31, 1862.*

GENERAL BUELL, *Deckerd*:

Thursday Forrest was whipped by Colonel Gross, near Woodbury. Friday he attacked the stockade on the McMinnville railroad, eight miles from here, and was whipped again, and returned up Hickory creek; started yesterday for Bragg's camp, by Altamont; was met by McCook's advance, and again whipped. He then returned toward Woodbury, but was pursued by one of Wood's regiments, overtaken and attacked at the crossing of the road from Manchester to Smithville, and the road from here to Murfreesboro', and again badly whipped and dispersed.

G. H. THOMAS,

*Major General United States Volunteers.*

A true copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

DECKERD, *August 30, 1862.*

Major General THOMAS, *McMinnville*:

*General orders.*—The following movements of troops are ordered, viz.:

First. The wagon trains and artillery under escort of the 1st brigade, Colonel Walker, commanding, to move as follows, to wit: To Tullahoma on the 31st instant; to Keat's on the 1st, and thence to within five miles of Nashville on the 2d; on the 3d, on the Nashville pike, thence to halt and encamp. The commanding officer will report to General Rousseau in person in Nashville for further orders.

Second. The fifth division (Crittenden's) will march to Manchester, and there draw eighteen thousand rations on the 31st; to Hoover's Gap on the 1st of September; to a point within five miles of Murfreesboro' on the 2d; to Murfreesboro' on the 3d; a brigade will be pushed forward by forced marches to-night, so as to reach Hoover's Gap early to-morrow. It must be held until occupied in succession by brigades of the rear divisions, each of which will push forward a brigade for that purpose on arriving at Manchester.

Third. The first division (Schoepf's) to march to Hillsboro' on the 31st, to within eight miles of Beech Grove; on the 1st, drawing fifteen thousand rations in passing Manchester, to a point within fourteen miles of Murfreesboro' on the 2d; to Murfreesboro' on the 3d. This division (first) will draw fifteen thousand rations at Manchester in passing.

Fourth. The second division (McCook's) to march from its present position to Pelham on the 1st, unless he has marched to Hickory creek, in which case he will continue on that road to Manchester on the 2d, whither he goes by Pelham or Hickory creek to Hoover's Gap on the 3d, and to a point within ten miles of Murfreesboro' on the 4th, and to Murfreesboro' on the 5th. This division to take up what rations remained at Manchester, about twenty-seven thousand rations.

Fifth. The fourth and sixth division under General Thomas, to march his divisions to Claremont on the 3d, and Readyville on the 4th, and to Murfreesboro' on the 5th.

Sixth. The thirteenth Michigan, Simon's battery, and three companies of engineers and mechanics at Stevenson, to march to Fautallon on the 31st; to Elk river on the 1st; to Duck



river on the 2d ; to War Trace on the 3d ; to Christiana on the 4th ; to Murfreesboro' on the 5th. The thirty-seventh Indiana, now on the line between Stevenson and Deckerd, and that part of the twenty-fourth Illinois and ninth Michigan, on the line between Deckerd and Murfreesboro', will be relieved by Brigadier General Smith, who is assigned to the command of the troops named in this paragraph and to the duty of relieving all the bridge guards on the arrival of the troops at Deckerd, and march the whole command as above directed, reaching Murfreesboro' on the 5th. A train of fifty wagons will accompany this command to convey the sick.

Seventh. The eighteenth Ohio and other troops between Manchester and McMinnville will be concentrated at Manchester on the 1st by Colonel Stanley, and will march from that point with the second division, (McCook's.)

These orders must be strictly and rigidly complied with, and the marches made in good order, and without straggling or confusion. Commanders will be held responsible for this. In case, however, the enemy should not press upon Altamont and McMinnville, the troops at that point will delay as long as they can do so and still have a day's march between the enemy's advanced guards, if indeed the enemy should follow at all. The different columns on the same route will communicate with each other daily, and report if any movements of the enemy or other controlling obstacles should unavoidably interpose with the order of marching. But it is expected that everything that energy and fortitude can accomplish will be done to overcome and accomplish such difficulties; strong pioneer parties will be sent with the advance guard and invariably clear the road of obstacles, and they will be thrown forward as far as the cavalry advance as safety will permit, to prevent the road from being obstructed by the enemy.

D. C. BUELL.

A true copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS, August 31, 1862.

General THOMAS:

The general purpose of my order is to concentrate at Murfreesboro'. The rearmost detachments cannot get up in these until the 5th instant. Your movements should be to Clamont on the 3d, and to Readyville on the 4th, and to Murfreesboro' on the 5th, and it is of course highly important that you should conform to the movements of other columns; but it is also important that you should not risk a battle. You should, if possible, keep a day's march between you and the enemy. It will not answer to trust detachments. All must be left to your judgment.

BUELL.

A true copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

DECKERD, August 31, 1862.

General NELSON:

General Van's scouts have just reached here, and report the enemy crossing the mountains on the Thurman and Tracy Hill road, and that their destination, from what they said, was Nashville. They seem to be in two columns, and are said to be thirty or forty thousand strong. Fifteen hundred infantry had crossed the mountains on yesterday at 2 o'clock. He says he conversed with a captain who gave him this information. One regiment of cavalry was without rations entirely, and all men very scarce of provisions and scattered through the country two miles in every direction getting food as best they could. Their motto—Nashville or hell.

A true copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp*

HUBBARD'S COVE, August 31, 1862.

General THOMAS:

I was compelled to fall back from Altamont on account of scarcity of water and forage. I will camp to-day as near the junction of the Hubbard's cross-roads and the McMinnville road as possible. I made a reconnoissance this morning about four miles south of Altamont, and found the enemy's cavalry about two hundred strong; no infantry or artillery in sight; do not believe they are in force on the Thurman road. Forrest's cavalry met my advance to-day, fled before them, and has passed up McMinnville road towards Beersheba, on Collier river. I sent a despatch to you yesterday by a negro; did you get it?

McCOOK.

A true copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

General THOMAS:

TULLAHOMA, August 31, 1862.

I do not know what to make of information we get in regard to the strength and movements of the enemy. Have you arrived at any conclusion about it? Answer at once. I once thought our information tolerably definite as to his force, but he seems to have vanished. I hear of nothing now but small cavalry guards.

A true copy:

D. C. BUELL.

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

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HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
McMinnville, Tenn., August 31, 1862.

Major General BUELL, *Tullahoma*:

Despatch received. All that I know of the enemy's forces number about five hundred on the Chattanooga road, about the same number near Sparta, a small force near Pikesville, and Forrest's cavalry, said to number about fifteen hundred strong. The general impression is that the enemy is advancing, but I have yet to see the person who has seen any of the Chattanooga forces proper.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major General U. S. Volunteers.*

A true copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

General THOMAS:

TULLAHOMA, September 1, 1862.

Do any circumstances present themselves which would make a change in our movements advisable? Answer quickly; I will be here a few minutes.

D. C. BUELL.

A true copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

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HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
McMinnville, September 1, 1862.

General BUELL, *Tullahoma*:

My last despatch last night gives all the information I can obtain. I think as the movement has commenced, that it had better be executed.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major General U. S. Volunteers.*

A true copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

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HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
McMinnville, September 1, 1862.

General BUELL *Murfreesboro'*:

Smith has returned from Dunlap. He saw four regiments of infantry and four pieces of artillery, 12-pounders, march up the Sequatchie valley towards Pikesville Saturday afternoon, three regiments of cavalry and two small pieces of artillery having previously marched for Pikesville. He was told that this was the advance of a force of forty-five thousand which was to march on this place by the Dunlap and Thurman roads; also by Spencer and Sparta. He was also told that they were on their way to Kentucky. From what he could see these troops were not well provided with provisions. Their arms seemed to be good, but many had shot guns. They appeared to be in low spirits. Cheatam was in command. Hardee was there; his troops were expected the next day. Smith heard drums beating below Dunlap Sunday morning before he left home, but did not see any troops. He met the same cavalry force on the mountain which has so often been reported to you. He was informed that Bragg had two steamers and one horse-boat at Chattanooga constantly engaged in crossing troops, and that they would bring with them fifty pieces of artillery.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major General U. S. Volunteers.*

A true copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

## HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO.

*McMinnville, Tenn., September 2, 1862.*General BUELL, *Murfreesboro'* :

I will start to-morrow. I have heard again that the enemy intends advancing on this place by the Thurman, Dunlap, and Sparta roads. By concentrating at Murfreesboro' we shall be within striking distance of this place. By convenient roads our main force can be thrown upon the enemy between this and Deckerd or Hillsboro', overcome him and drive him towards Sparta, his longest line of retreat. A larger force of cavalry and light infantry can be pushed across the mountain to Dunlap, by the Dunlap and Thurman road, attack him in rear and completely route his whole force. I have studied the roads, and am now convinced that this is our best plan of attack.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Major General U. S. Volunteers.*

A true copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

## HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO,

*Camp Reederville, September 4, 1862.*Colonel FRY, *Chief of Staff, Nashville* :

General Buell's order of this date, to march direct to Nashville, has been received, and will be complied with as soon as possible.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Major General U. S. Volunteers.*

A true copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

*September 3.*—Evacuated McMinnville in obedience to department orders of September 1, bringing away all government property, and reached Murfreesboro' September 5 with the troops, then proceeded in person to Nashville by rail the same day in obedience to orders, relinquishing command of the troops which formed the garrison of McMinnville and resuming command of the first division.

*September 7.*—Assigned to command of Nashville by Special Orders No. 154, headquarters department of the Ohio. Garrison composed of my own, Negley's, and Palmer's divisions, and a large number of convalescents.

NOTE.—The enemy's main army had effected a crossing of the Cumberland river at Carthage and above, and was invading Kentucky by way of Scottsboro' and Glasgow, striking for Louisville. Breckinridge, with a large force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, was left behind to attract the attention of the garrison of Nashville and to invest the place.

SEPTEMBER 11, 1862—11 p. m.

General THOMAS, *Nashville* :

Orders have been sent to Mitchell to-night to march to-morrow to Tyree springs, and to Mitchellville next day, and thence to Bowling Green, unless otherwise ordered. Send him at once an order to this effect, to provide against the accident of my note not reaching him. If he should not be required he will be sent back with a train of supplies. You will understand from the movements of the enemy that a battle is possible near Mitchellville, or Franklin, or in the vicinity of Bowling Green, and you must be in readiness and act according to circumstances.

FRY.

A true copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*MITCHELLVILLE, *September 12, 1862—8 p. m.*Major General THOMAS, *Nashville* :

Mitchell's division is ordered to return and report to you, and to get within five miles of Nashville to-morrow. The railroad was torn up to-day between Franklin and Bowling Green, and it is not possible to send a wagon train to you without bringing Mitchell up to

escort it, and that might endanger him. So you must depend upon yourself for the supplies for the present. Forrest with his cavalry is near here, moving to the north. All well here.

FRY.

A true copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

SEPTEMBER 13, 1862.

Major General THOMAS, *Nashville :*

General Mitchell is ordered to proceed on to Bowling Green, and will not return to you. The indications are too strong that the enemy will move the greater part of his force into Kentucky to try and save the troops he now has there ; that this order is deemed best.

FRY.

A true copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

SEPTEMBER 13, 1862—8 p. m.

Major General THOMAS :

March with your own and Payne's division for Bowling Green on receipt of this order. You must reach Bowling Green in three days and a half at most, and will march directly on from there. You must march by 3 o'clock on the morning of the 15th, day after to-morrow, and earlier if possible. Leave the siege artillery and most of the cavalry with Negley. It seems quite certain that the whole of Bragg's army is in or marching to Kentucky, and that it will be concentrated at Glasgow to-morrow if not sooner. If, however, you have positive information that as much as two divisions of Bragg's army are near Nashville, or not marching to cross the Cumberland, you may, if you deem it advisable, leave Payne's division and bring only your own. Post Negley at the defensible works and position, and at the capitol, and at the bridge, and direct him to leave twenty days' rations at each point for its garrison. He must defend his position to the last extremity. Bring only wagons enough to carry your ammunition and four days' full rations, and the cooking utensils, not exceeding five loaded wagons to each regiment, exclusive of ammunition. You may, however, act at your own discretion, and unknown to the troops bring fifty wagons to each division to carry men who give out on the march. You must, however, start with none but able-bodied men. You will find the best watering places at Tyree springs, and at a creek five miles north of Mitchellville, and at Cave Creek springs, three miles south of Bowling Green, and it is expected you will be able to make these marches. Explain the urgency of this matter to Governor Johnson. If Bragg's army is defeated Nashville is safe ; if not it is lost. At any rate, bring forage for your command on the march for three days.

FRY.

A true copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

Payne's division (commanded by Palmer) was left with Negley, and I marched with my own division only, at 3 a. m. on the 15th, reaching Bowling Green at 12 m. on the 18th.

HEADQUARTERS, DRIPPING SPRINGS,  
*September 18, 1862.*

General Thomas :

Push your division forward at the earliest possible hour. I shall expect you at Green river by day after to-morrow morning ; bring the reserved artillery ammunition with you ; put your train across the river to-night if possible, and guard it well on the march. Forrest is said to be about Brownsville with a large cavalry force. The garrison of Munfordsville surrendered yesterday morning, and I learn that Bragg, hearing that I was close upon him, immediately threw his whole force across the river. I expect to be there early to-morrow ; bring no train, except enough to carry reserve ammunition, provisions, and cooking utensils, and leave that, excepting ammunition, at whatever point on the road you may find the other trains picketed. Tell Colonel Bruce to be industrious in collecting supplies ; to keep himself and me fully informed of the movements of any enemy about him ; protect the supplies and defend his post to the last extremity.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Major General Commanding.*

A true copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
September 14, 1862—7 a. m.

General BUELL:

Received your order of Tuesday, 8 o'clock p. m. It is certain a large force of the enemy is near Nashville, awaiting an opportunity to attack it; I shall, therefore, leave Payne's division here. Will march with my division at the time ordered, and reach Bowling Green as soon as possible.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
Major General U. S. Volunteers.

A rue copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.

September 20.—Joined the main army at Prewitt's Knob and found the enemy immediately in our front, skirmishing with Crittenden's pickets.

September 21.—In compliance with orders, was engaged in disposing Crittenden's and Wood's divisions in order of battle, when the pickets reported the enemy retiring. Information was immediately sent to headquarters, and the army, with the exception of my division, put in motion in pursuit. I was ordered to remain one day to give protection to the convalescents and public stores, until they could be sent back to Bowling Green. Having seen all the sick and the surplus stores safely to the rear, I marched on the morning of September 24, and reached Louisville with the division at 2 p. m. on the 27th of September.

September 29.—Received orders at the hands of Colonel McKibben, aide-de-camp staff of Major General Halleck, commanding United States army, assigning me to the command of the army of the Ohio; but declining, the order was countermanded.

September 30.—Was announced as second in command of the army of the Ohio, per Special Order No. 159, headquarters army of the Ohio. Continued in this position throughout the campaign in Kentucky; commanded the right wing of the army during the battle of Perryville, October 8, 1862, and in the pursuit of the enemy from Perryville to Barboursville.

OCTOBER 7—7 p. m.

GENERAL: The 3d corps, Gilbert's, is within three and a half miles of Perryville, the cavalry being nearer—perhaps two and a half miles. From all the information received to-day it is thought the enemy will resist our advance into Perryville. They are said to have a strong force in and around the place. We expect to attack and carry the place to-morrow. March at three o'clock precisely to-morrow morning without fail, and if possible get all the canteens filled, and have the men cautioned to use water in the most sparing manner. Every officer must caution his men on this point. Send back every team and animal that is not absolutely necessary with the troops, as they will suffer for water. All the wagons that can must move in rear of your troops.

The right of Gilbert's corps rests opposite to Gordon's place, which is on the Lebanon pike, and from "Gordon's" to Gilbert's right is about two or two and a quarter miles. When the two corps get up to that vicinity—that is to say, three or three and a half miles from town—let the front be halted and put in order of battle, and the whole column closed up, and the men allowed to rest in position, and made as comfortable as possible, but not allowed to scatter. The commander of the corps must then immediately have the front reconnoitred, and gain all the information he can of the position of the enemy, and his strength, and also of the nature of the country in his front. This must be done by inquiry of the inhabitants, and personal examination of officers and by the reconnoissance.

When the column has got into position you will please report in person at these headquarters with all the information you may have been able to obtain, and instructions for further movements will be given. Send orderlies back with bearer to learn where our headquarters are. All the usual precautions must be taken and preparations made for action. There is no water near us, and we can expect but little if any until we get it at Perryville. Nothing has been heard of you since we parted this morning.

Respectfully, &c.,

JAMES B. FRY,  
Colonel and Chief of Staff.

General THOMAS, *Second in Command.*

A true copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.

At daylight on the morning of the 8th of October the cavalry, under the command of Colonel Ed. McCook, in advance of the right wing, had reached the point indicated in the foregoing communication—on the Lebanon and Perryville road. Upon his arrival, Colonel McCook sent me a message that he had encountered the enemy's pickets and had driven them a mile beyond in the direction of Perryville. I immediately rode to the front and gave directions for the formation of Crittenden's corps, sending my aid, Captain O. A. Mack, fourth United States artillery, to General Buell, reporting my position and requesting him to send orders by Captain Mack, the enemy being reported immediately in my front, for which reason I did not like to leave my troops. About 4 p. m. Captain Mack returned with verbal orders from General Buell to hold one division in readiness to re-enforce the centre if necessary, and also to reconnoitre my front to see if the enemy had re-enforced his left or was withdrawing, which information was to be reported to him immediately. Notwithstanding my reconnaissance developed the enemy still in my front, I had no orders to advance. After sundown I received the following communication:

OCTOBER 8—6.30 p. m.

GENERAL: The 1st corps, McCook's, on our left, has been very heavily engaged. The left and centre of this corps gained ground, but the right yielded a little. Press your lines forward as far as possible to-night and get in position to make a vigorous attack in the morning at daylight. If you have got your troops into a position which you deem advantageous it will not be advisable to make a change for the purpose of complying with the general's instructions for you, sent by Captain Mack. It may be as well to have the division ordered to the centre and let it wait where it is for further orders. The general desires to see you in person as soon to-night as your duties will permit you to come over.

Respectfully, &c.,

J. B. FRY,  
Colonel and Chief of Staff.

General THOMAS, *Second in command.*

A true copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.

Having made my dispositions of the troops, I immediately started for General Buell's headquarters, on the Springfield and Perryville road, reaching there about 8.30 p. m. Soon afterwards General McCook and Gilbert arrived and reported the result of their day's operations, when I received instructions from General Buell to return to my command and make preparations to advance on Perryville at daylight on the 9th, keeping up connexion with the centre as I advanced. The town was found evacuated, and the enemy was pursued through Harrodsburg, Danville, Stanford, Crab Orchard, and Mount Vernon, to Rock Castle river, at which point further pursuit by the main body was abandoned. One division (Smith's) from Crittenden's corps was pushed forward to Wild Cat, Pittman's Crossroads, and London, and then returned to Columbia, *via* Somerset. The main army was put in motion for Nashville, *via* Lebanon, Campbellsville, Greensburg, Glasgow, and Bowling Green. General Buell then left the direction of the army to me, and went to Louisville, from where he issued the following order, viz:

[By telegraph from Louisville, October 26.]

To General THOMAS:

Crittenden's corps will proceed to Glasgow as fast as it reaches Columbia. If its baggage should not have arrived it will follow. It must be at Glasgow entire by the 31st.

Put McCook's division in motion by the way of Somerville, Horse-well, and Bowling Green. It must reach Bowling Green by the 31st. Rations will meet it at Bell's.

Crittenden's division will draw rations from Cave City or Mumfordsville.

Direct the 1st and 3d divisions, Schoepf's and Rousseau's, to march for Bowling Green, by Campbellsville, Greensburg, and Glasgow; they must reach Bowling Green by the 1st proximo, and Glasgow by the 29th; rations for them will be at Cave City.

J. B. FRY,  
Colonel and Chief of Staff.

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.

Whilst the above movements were being carried into execution the cavalry was left at Lebanon, by direction of General Buell, to refit and prepare to resume active operations against the enemy at as early a day as practicable after the concentration of the main army at Bowling Green and Glasgow should have been effected.

*October 30, 1862.*—General Buell was relieved in command of the army of the Ohio by Major General W. S. Rosecrans, and the designation of that army changed to that of the Cumberland, and known as the 14th army corps, per General Orders No. —, War Department, October 24, 1862.

*November 7, 1862.*—General Orders No. 8, headquarters 14th army corps, department of the Cumberland, reads as follows :

I. Major General George H. Thomas is assigned to the command of the centre of this army, consisting of the divisions of Rousseau, Negley, Dumont, Fry, and Palmer. The divisions of Generals Negley and Palmer will be for the present regarded as temporarily detached.

II. Major General McCook will command the right wing. Major General Crittenden the left. Their commands will be designated.

By command of Major General Rosecrans :

ARTHUR C. DUCAT,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

True copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

The same day I received the following instructions from General Rosecrans, viz :

HEADQUARTERS 14TH ARMY CORPS, DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Bowling Green, Kentucky, November 7, 1862.*

GENERAL: You have this day been assigned to the command of the centre of the 14th army corps, comprising the divisions of Dumont, Fry, and the two divisions at Nashville. These latter will remain there for the present. Relieve Smith's division of the right wing at Glasgow and Scottsville. With your other two divisions occupy Gallatin and cover the railroad. By all means push forward by every means in your power the completion of the railroad and the forwarding of supplies. The prompt occupation of these points and of Tyree springs is highly desirable. General Granger will for the present occupy Bowling Green with his brigade.

Giebert is moving to occupy Jamestown with a brigade. Colonel Bruce will be sent to clear out southwest Kentucky. You will establish your headquarters at any point you may think best on the telegraphic communication, which open through as fast as possible.

W. S. ROSECRANS,  
*Major General United States Volunteers.*

Major General GEORGE H. THOMAS.

I moved my headquarters to Gallatin, where I remained until December 22, when I went to Nashville to concentrate my command for an advance on the enemy's position at Murfreesboro'.

*December 26, 1862.*—The whole army advanced from Nashville, my command taking position between Brentwood and Nolansville.

For a full account of the part taken by my command in the movement against the enemy at Murfreesboro' and the five days' battle at Stone river, which resulted therefrom, I respectfully refer to a report of the same made by me January 15, 1863, of which the following is a copy, and also to copies of the reports of Major Generals Rousseau and Negley and of Colonel M. B. Walker, commanding first brigade, Fry's division.

HEADQUARTERS CENTRE 14TH ARMY CORPS,  
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Murfreesboro', January 15, 1863.*

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit to the major general commanding the department of the Cumberland the following report of the operations of that part of my command which was engaged in the battle of Stone river, in front of Murfreesboro'. It is proper to state here that two brigades of Fry's division and Reynolds's entire division were detained near

Gallatin and along the Louisville and Nashville railroad to watch the movements of the rebel leader Morgan, who had been for a long time on the watch for an opportunity to destroy the railroad.

Rousseau's, Negley's, and Mitchell's divisions and Walker's brigade of Fry's division were concentrated at Nashville, but Mitchell's division being required to garrison Nashville, my only available force was Rousseau's and Negley's divisions and Walker's brigade of Fry's division, about thirteen thousand three hundred and ninety-five (13,395) effective men.

*December 26.*—Negley's division, followed by Rousseau's division and Walker's brigade, marched by the Franklin pike to Brentwood, at that point taking the Wilson pike. Negley and Rousseau were to have encamped for the night at Owens's store. On reaching the latter place, Negley hearing heavy firing in the direction of Nolansville, left his train with a guard to follow, and pushed forward with his troops to the support of Brigadier General J. C. Davis's command, the advance division of McCook's corps, Davis having become hotly engaged with the enemy posted in Nolansville and in the pass through the hills south of that village. Rousseau encamped with his division at Owens's store, Walker with brigade at Brentwood. During the night a very heavy rain fell, making the cross-roads almost impassable, and it was not until the night of the 27th that Rousseau reached Nolansville with his troops and train. Negley remained at Nolansville until 10 a. m. on the 27th, when, having brought his train across from Wilson pike, he moved to the east over an exceedingly rough by-road to the right of Crittenden, at Stewartsboro', on the Murfreesboro' pike. Walker, by my orders, retraced his steps from Brentwood, and crossed over to the Nolansville pike.

*December 28.*—Negley remained in camp at Stewartsboro', bringing his train from the rear. Rousseau reached Stewartsboro' on the night of the 28th; his train arrived early next day.

*December 29.*—Negley's division crossed Stewart's creek two miles southwest, and above the turnpike bridge, and marched in support of the head and right flank of Crittenden's corps, which moved by the Murfreesboro' pike to a point within two miles of Murfreesboro'. The enemy fell back before our advance, contesting the ground obstinately with their cavalry rear guard. Rousseau remained in camp at Stewartsboro', detaching Starkweather's brigade with a section of artillery to the Jefferson pike, crossing Stone river, to observe the movements of the enemy in that direction. Walker reached Stewartsboro' from the Nolansville pike about dark.

*December 30.*—A cavalry force of the enemy, something over four hundred strong, with two pieces of artillery, attacked Starkweather about 9 a. m., but were soon driven off. The enemy opened a brisk fire on Crittenden's advance, doing but little execution, however. About 7 a. m. during the morning Negley's division was obliqued to the right, and took up a position on the right of Palmer's division of Crittenden's corps, and was then advanced through a dense cedar thicket, several hundred yards in width, to the Wilkinson cross-road, driving the enemy's skirmishers steadily and with considerable loss—our loss comparatively small. About noon Sheridan's division of McCook's corps approached by the Wilkin's cross-road, joined Negley's right, McCook's two other divisions coming up on Sheridan's right, thus forming a continuous line—the left resting on Stone river, the right stretching in a westerly direction, and resting on high wooded ground a short distance to the south of the Wilkinson cross-roads, and, as has since been ascertained, nearly parallel with the enemy's intrenchments, thrown up on the sloping land bordering the northwest bank of Stone river. Rousseau's division, with the exception of Starkweather's brigade, being ordered up from Stewartsboro', reached the position occupied by the army about 4 p. m., and bivouacked on the Murfreesboro' pike in rear of the centre. During the night of the 30th I sent orders to Walker to take up a strong position near the turnpike bridge over Stewart's creek, and defend the position against any attempts of the enemy's cavalry to destroy it. Rousseau was ordered to move by 6 a. m. on the 31st to position in rear of Negley. This position placed his division with its left on the Murfreesboro' pike, and its right extending into the cedar thicket through which Negley had marched on the 30th. In front of Negley's position, bordering a large open field reaching to the Murfreesboro' pike, a heavy growth of timber extended in a southerly direction towards the river. Across the field, running in an easterly direction, the enemy had thrown up rifle-pits at intervals from the timber to the river bank, to the east side of the turnpike. Along this line of intrenchments, on an eminence about eight hundred yards from Negley's position, and nearly in front of his left, some cannon had been placed, affording the enemy great advantage in covering an attack on our centre. However, Palmer, Negley, and Sheridan held the position their troops had so manfully won the morning of the 30th against every attempt to drive them back, and remained in line of battle during the night.

*December 31.*—Between 6 and 7 a. m. the enemy, having massed a heavy force on McCook's right during the night of the 30th, attacked and drove it back, pushing his division in pursuit in echelon and supporting distance until he had gained sufficient ground to our rear to wheel his masses to the right and throw them upon the right flank of the centre, at the same moment attacking Negley and Palmer in front with a greatly superior force. To counteract this movement I had ordered Rousseau to place two brigades with a battery to the right and rear of Sheridan's division, facing towards the west, so as to support Sheridan should he be able to hold his ground, or to cover him should he be compelled to fall back. About 11



o'clock General Sheridan reported to me that his ammunition was entirely out, and he would be compelled to fall back to get more. As it became necessary for General Sheridan to fall back, the enemy pressed on still further to our rear, and soon took up a position which gave them a concentrated cross-fire of musketry and cannon on Negley's and Rousseau's troops at short range. This compelled me to fall back out of the cedar woods, and take up a line along a depression in the open ground within good musket range of the edge of the woods, whilst the artillery was retired to the high ground to the right of the turnpike. From this last position we were enabled to drive back the enemy, cover the formation of our troops, and secure the centre on the high ground. In the execution of this last movement the regular brigade, under Lieutenant Colonel Shepherd, eighteenth United States infantry, came under a most murderous fire, losing twenty-two officers and five hundred and eight men in killed and wounded, but with the co-operation of Scribner's and Beatty's brigades, and Guenther's and Loomis's batteries, gallantly held its ground against overwhelming odds. The centre having succeeded in driving back the enemy from its front, and our artillery concentrating its fire on the cedar thicket on our right, drove him back far under cover, from which, though attempting it, he could not make any advance.

*January 1, 1863.*—Repeated attempts were made by the enemy to advance on my position during the morning, but they were driven back before emerging from the woods. Colonel Starkweather's brigade of Rousseau's division, and Walker's brigade of Fry's division, having re-enforced us during the night, took post on the right of Rousseau and left of Sheridan, and bore their share in repelling the attempts of the enemy on the morning of the 1st instant. For the details of the most valuable service rendered by these two brigades on the 30th and 31st December, 1862, and the 1st, 2d, and 3d January, 1863, I refer you to their reports. In this connexion I also refer you to the report of Lieutenant Colonel Parkhurst, commanding ninth Michigan infantry, (on provost duty at my headquarters,) for the details of most valuable service rendered by his command on the 31st of December and 1st and 2d of January. Negley's division was ordered early in the day to the support of McCook's right, and in which position it remained during the night.

*January 2.*—About 7 a. m. the enemy opened a direct and cross-fire from his batteries in our front, and from our position on the east bank of Stone river to our left and front, at the same time making a strong demonstration with infantry, resulting, however, in no serious attack. Our artillery—Loomis's, Guenther's, Stokes's, and another battery—the commander's name I cannot now recall—soon drove back their infantry. Negley was withdrawn from the extreme right, and placed in reserve behind Crittenden's right. About 4 p. m. a division of Crittenden's corps, which had crossed Stone river to reconnoitre, was attacked by an overwhelming force of the enemy, and after a gallant resistance compelled to fall back. The movements of the enemy having been observed, and reported by some of my troops in the centre, I sent orders to Negley to advance to the support of Crittenden's troops should they want help. This order was obeyed in most gallant style, and resulted in the complete annihilation of the twenty-sixth Tennessee rebel regiment, and the capture of their flags; also in the capture of a battery, which the enemy had been forced to abandon at the point of the bayonet. (See Negley's report.)

*January 3.*—Soon after daylight the forty-second Indiana, on picket in a clump of woods about eight hundred yards in front of our lines, was attacked by a brigade of the enemy, evidently by superior numbers, and driven in with considerable loss. Lieutenant Colonel Shanklin, commanding regiment, was surrounded and taken prisoner whilst gallantly endeavoring to draw off his men from under the fire of such superior numbers. From this woods the enemy's sharpshooters continued to fire occasionally during the day on our pickets. About 6 p. m. two regiments from Colonel John Beatty's brigade of Rousseau's division, co-operating with two regiments of Spear's brigade of Negley's division, covered by the skillful and well-directed fire of Guenther's fifth United States artillery and Loomis's first Michigan batteries, advanced on the woods, and drove the enemy not only from its cover, but from their intrenchments a short distance beyond. For the details of this gallant night attack I refer you to the reports of Brigadier General Spear, commanding third brigade of Negley's division, and Colonel John Beatty, commanding second brigade of Rousseau's division.

The enemy having retreated during the night of the 3d, our troops were occupied during the morning of the 4th in burying the dead left on the field. In the afternoon one brigade of Negley's division was advanced to the crossing of Stone river with a brigade of Rousseau's division in supporting distance in reserve.

*January 5.*—My entire command, preceded by Stanley's cavalry, marched into Murfreesboro' and took up the position we now hold. The enemy's rear guard of cavalry was overtaken on the Shelbyville and Manchester roads, about five miles from Murfreesboro', and after sharp skirmishing for two or three hours was driven from our immediate front. The conduct of my command from the time the army left Nashville to its entry into Murfreesboro' is deserving of the highest praise, both for their patient endurance of the fatigues and discomforts of a five days' battle, and for the manly spirit exhibited by them in the various phases in this memorable contest. I refer you to the detailed reports of the division and brigade commanders, forwarded herewith, for special mention of those officers and men of their commands whose conduct they thought worthy of particular notice.

All the members of my staff, Major G. E. Flynt, acting adjutant general; Lieutenant Col-

onel A. Van Shraeder, seventy-fourth Ohio, acting inspector general; Captain O. A. Mack, thirteenth United States infantry, acting chief of commissary, and Captain A. J. Mackay, chief quartermaster, were actively employed in carrying my orders to various parts of my command and in the execution of the appropriate duties of their offices. Captain O. A. Mack was dangerously wounded in the right hip and abdomen, while carrying orders from me to Major General Rosecrans. The officers of the signal corps, attached to my headquarters, did excellent service in their appropriate sphere, when possible, and as aides-de-camp carrying orders. My escort, composed of a select detail from the first Ohio cavalry, commanded by First Lieutenant J. D. Barker, of the same regiment, have been on duty with me for nearly a year, and deserve commendation for the faithful performance of their appropriate duties. Private Guiteau was killed by a cannon shot on the morning of January 2.

Surgeon G. D. Beebe, medical director, deserves special mention for his efficient arrangements for moving the wounded from the field, and giving them immediate attention.

Annexed hereto is a consolidated return of the casualties of my command. The details will be seen in the accompanying reports of division and brigade commanders.

*Consolidated report of casualties of the centre, 14th army corps, in the five days' battle before Murfreesboro', commencing December 31, 1862, and ending January 4, 1863.*

Commands.	In action.				Lost in action.									
	Commissioned.	Enlisted men.	Horses.	Guns, artillery.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Horses.		Guns.	
					Commis'd.	Enlisted.	Commis'd.	Enlisted.	Commis'd.	Enlisted.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Lost.
1st division, Maj. Gen. Rousseau...	303	5,483	....	18	8	171	43	903	3	324	8	5	....	....
2d division, Brig. Gen. Negley...	237	4,632	257	13	11	167	47	704	1	308	62	24	9	6
1st brigade, 3d division, Colonel M. B. Walker.....	97	2,243	....	6	....	....	4	19	....	1	....	....	....	....
Total.....	637	12,358	257	37	19	338	94	1,626	4	633	70	29	9	1

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
Major General U. S. Vols., Commanding.

Major O. GODDARD,  
Assistant Adjutant General and Chief of Staff.

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.

NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, January 11, 1863.

SIR: I have the honor to report the part taken by my command, the third division of the army, in the battle of Murfreesboro', began on the 31st ultimo and ended on the 3d instant. Early on the morning of the 30th ultimo, in obedience to the order of General Thomas, my division moved forward toward Murfreesboro' from Stewartsboro', on the Nashville and Murfreesboro' pike, about nine miles from the latter place. On the march forward several despatches from General Rosecrans reached me, asking exactly where my command was and the hour and minute in the day.

In consequence we moved rapidly forward, halting but once, and that for only five minutes. About 10½ o'clock a. m. we reached a point three miles from Murfreesboro', where Generals Rosecrans and Thomas were, on the Nashville and Murfreesboro' turnpike, and remained during the day and bivouacked at night.

At about 9 o'clock a. m., on the 31st, the report of artillery and heavy firing of small-arms on our right announced that the battle had begun by an attack on the right wing, commanded by Major General McCook. It was not long before the direction from which the firing came indicated that General McCook's command had given way and was yielding ground to the enemy. His forces seemed to swing around toward our right and rear.

At this time General Thomas ordered me to advance my division quickly to the front to the assistance of General McCook. On reaching the right of General Negley's line of battle, General Thomas there directed me to let my left rest on his right and to deploy my division off toward the right as far as I could, so as to resist the pressure on General McCook. They consulted and agreed as to where the line should be formed. This was in a dense cedar brake through which my troops marched in double-quick time to get into position before the enemy reached us. He was then but a few hundred yards to the front, sweeping up

in immense numbers, driving everything before him. This ground was new and unknown to us all; the woods were almost impassable to infantry, and artillery was perfectly useless, but the line was promptly formed. The seventeenth brigade, Colonel John Beatty commanding, on the left; the brigade of regulars, Lieutenant Colonel O. L. Shepherd commanding, on the right; the ninth brigade, Colonel B. F. Scribner commanding, was placed, perhaps, a hundred yards in rear and opposite the centre of the front line so as to support either or both of the brigades in front, as occasion might require. My recollection is that perhaps the second Ohio and thirty-third Ohio regiments filled a gap between General Negley's right and the seventeenth brigade, occasioned by the effort to extend our lines far enough to the right to afford the desired aid to General McCook.

The twenty-eighth brigade, Colonel John C. Starkweather commanding, and Stone's battery of first Kentucky artillery, were at Jefferson Crossing on Stone river, about eight miles below.

Our lines were hardly formed before a dropping fire from the enemy announced his approach. General McCook's troops, in a good deal of confusion, retired through our lines and around our right under a most terrific fire. The enemy in pursuit furiously assailed our front and greatly outflanking us, passed around to our right and rear. By General Thomas's direction, I had already ordered the artillery, Loomis and Guenther's batteries to the open field in the rear. Seeing that my command was outflanked on the right, I sent orders to the brigade commanders to retire at once also to this field, and riding back myself I posted the batteries on a ridge in the open ground parallel with our line of battle, and as my men emerged from the woods they were ordered to take position on the right and left and in support of these batteries, which was promptly done. They had perhaps four or five hundred yards of open ground in our front; while the batteries were unlimbering, seeing General Van Cleve close by, I rode up and asked him if he would move his command to the right and aid in checking up the enemy by forming on my right, and thus giving us a more extended line in that direction in the new position taken. In the promptest manner possible his command was put in motion, and in double-quick time reached the desired point in good season. As the enemy emerged from the woods in great force, shouting and cheering, the batteries of Guenther and Loomis, double-shotted with canister, opened upon them; they moved straight ahead for a while, but were finally driven back with immense loss. In a little while they rallied again and, as it seemed, with fresh troops, again assailed our position, and were again, after a fierce struggle, driven back. Four deliberate and fiercely sustained assaults were made upon our position and repulsed. During the last assault I was informed that our troops were advancing on the right, and saw troops, not of my division, led by General Rosecrans, moving in that direction. I informed General Thomas of the fact and asked leave to advance my lines; he directed me to do so. We made a charge upon the enemy and drove him into the woods, my staff and orderlies capturing some seventeen prisoners, including a captain and lieutenant, who were within a hundred and thirty yards of the batteries. This ended the fighting of that day, the enemy in immense force hovering in the woods during the night, whilst we slept upon our arms on the field of battle. They occupied this position during the three following days and nights of the fight. Under General Thomas's direction I had it intrenched by rifle pits, and believe the enemy could not have taken it at all.

During the day the twenty-eighth brigade, Colonel Starkweather, was attacked by General Wheeler's cavalry in force, and some of the wagons of his train were burned before they reached him, having started that morning from Stewartsboro' to join him. The enemy were finally repulsed and driven off with loss. Starkweather's loss was small, as will be seen by his report of the action. In this affair the whole brigade behaved handsomely. The burden of the fight fell upon the twenty-first Wisconsin, Lieutenant Colonel Hobart commanding. This regiment, led by its efficient commander, behaved like veterans.

From the evening of the 31st until the ensuing Saturday night no general battle occurred in front of my division, though firing of artillery and small-arms was kept up during the day, and much of the time small-arms during the night. The rain on the night of the 31st, which continued at intervals until the Saturday night following, rendered the ground occupied by my command exceedingly sloppy and muddy; and during much of the time my men had neither shelter, food, nor fire. I procured corn, which they parched and ate, and some of them ate horse-steaks, cut and broiled, from horses upon the battle-field. Day and night, in the cold, wet, and mud, my men suffered severely, but during the whole time I did not hear one single man murmur at the hardships, but all were cheerful and ever ready to stand by their arms and fight. Such endurance I never saw before. In this severe trial of their patience and their strength they were much encouraged by the constant presence and solicitous anxiety of General Thomas for their welfare.

On the evening of Saturday, 3d instant, I asked permission of General Thomas to drive the enemy from a wood on our left front, to which he gave his consent. Just before dark I directed the batteries of Guenther and Loomis to shell the woods with six rounds per gun, fired as rapidly as possible. This was very handsomely done, and ended just at dark, when the third Ohio regiment, Lieutenant Colonel O. H. Lawson, and the eighty-eighth Indiana, Colonel George, Humphreys, both under command of the brigade commander, Colonel John Beatty, moved promptly up to the woods. When near the woods they received a heavy fire

from the enemy, but returned it vigorously and gallantly, and pressed forward. On reaching the woods a fresh body of the enemy, attracted by the fire, moved upon their left to support them. On that body of the enemy Loomis's battery opened with shell. The fusillade was very rapid and continued for perhaps three-quarters of an hour, when Beatty's command drove the enemy at the point of the bayonet and held the woods. It turned out that the enemy was posted behind a stone breastwork in the woods, and when ousted, about thirty men were taken prisoners behind the woods. This ended the battle of Murfreesboro'.

On the morning of the 31st six companies of the second Kentucky cavalry, Major Thomas P. Nicholas commanding, were ordered down to watch and defend the fords on Stone river to our left and rear. The cavalry of the enemy several times, in force, attempted to cross these fords, but Nicholas very gallantly repulsed them with loss, and they did not cross the river. I should have mentioned that on Friday evening, late, I was directed by General Thomas to place a regiment in the woods on our left front, as an outpost, and with the river to hold these woods, as they were near our lines, and the enemy could greatly annoy us if allowed to hold them. Our skirmishers were then just leaving the woods. I ordered the forty-second Indiana, Lieutenant Colonel Shanklin commanding, to take that position, which he did. But early the next morning the enemy in large force attacked Colonel Shanklin, first furiously shelling the woods, and drove the regiment back to our lines, taking Shanklin prisoner. It was this wood that was retaken on Saturday night, as before described.

The troops of my division behaved admirably. I could not wish them to behave more gallantly. The ninth and seventeenth brigades, under the lead of their gallant commanders, Scribner and Beatty, were, as well as the twenty-eighth brigade, Colonel Starkweather, veterans. They were with me at Chaplin Hills, and could not act badly. The twenty-eighth brigade held a position in our front after the first day's fighting, and did it bravely, doing all that was required of them, like true soldiers. The brigade of United States infantry, Lieutenant Colonel O. L. Shepherd commanding, was on the extreme right. On that body of brave men the shock of battle fell heaviest, and its loss was most severe. Over one-third of the command fell killed and wounded. But it stood up to the work and bravely breasted the storm, and though Major King, commanding the fifteenth, and Major Slemmer ("Old Pickens") the sixteenth, fell severely wounded, and Major Carpenter, commanding the nineteenth, fell dead in the last charge, together with many brave officers and men, the brigade did not falter for a moment. These three battalions were a part of my old fourth brigade at the battle of Shiloh. The eighteenth infantry, Majors Townsend and Caldwell commanding, were new troops to me, but I am proud now to say we know each other. If I could, I would promote every officer and several non-commissioned officers and privates of this brigade of regulars, for gallantry and good service in this terrific battle.

I make no distinction between these troops and my brave volunteer regiments, for, in my judgment, there never were better troops than those regiments in the world. But the troops of the line are soldiers by profession, and with a view to the future I feel it my duty to say what I have of them. The brigade was admirably and gallantly handled by Lieutenant Colonel Shepherd. I lost some of the best and bravest officers I had. Lieutenant Colonel Kell, commanding second Ohio, was killed. After he fell his regiment was efficiently handled by Major Anson McCook, who ought to be made colonel of that regiment for gallantry on the field. Colonel Foranan, my brave *boy*, colonel of the fifteenth Kentucky, also fell. Major Carpenter, of the nineteenth infantry, fell in the last charge; his loss is irreparable. Many other gallant officers were lost whose names will appear in the list of casualties.

Of the batteries of Guenther and Loomis I cannot say too much. Loomis was chief of artillery for the third division, and I am much indebted to him; his battery was commanded by Lieutenant Van Pelt. Guenther is much a Lieutenant. Both of these men ought to be promoted, and deserve to be *at once*; without them we could not have held our position in the centre.

I fell in with many gallant regiments and officers on the field not of my command. I wish I could name all of them here. Whilst falling back to the line in the open field, I saw Colonel Charles Anderson gallantly and coolly rallying his men. Colonel Grider, of Kentucky, and his regiment efficiently aided in repulsing the enemy. The eighteenth Ohio, I think it was, though I do not know any of its officers, faced about and charged the enemy in my presence, and I went along with it. The eleventh Michigan and its gallant little colonel (I do not know his name, but believe it is Staddart) behaved well, and the sixth Ohio infantry, Colonel Nick Anderson, joined my command on the right of the regular brigade, and stood manfully up to the work.

I fell in with the Louisville legion in retreat, Lieutenant Colonel Berry commanding. This regiment, though retreating before an overwhelming force, was dragging by hand a section of artillery which it had been ordered to support. A part of General McCook's wing of the army, it had fallen back with the rest, but through the woods and fields, with great difficulty, bravely brought off the cannon it could no longer defend on the field. When I met it, it faced about and formed line of battle with cheers and shouts.

To Lieutenant McDowell, my assistant adjutant general, Lieutenant Armstrong, second Kentucky cavalry, Lieutenant Millard, nineteenth United States infantry, inspector general, Captain Taylor, fifteenth Kentucky infantry, and Lieutenant Alf Pirtle, ordnance officer, my regular aids, and to Captain John D. Wickliff and Lieutenant W. G. Jenkins, both of the second Kentucky

cavalry, aids for that battle, I am much indebted for services on the field. The wounded were kindly and tenderly cared for by the third division medical director, Surgeon Muscroft, and the other surgeons of the command. Captain Paul, my division commissary, rendered valuable services during the whole time of the battle. The musicians of the divisions carried the wounded from the field faithfully and fearlessly. Lieutenant McDowell was wounded. My orderlies, Damas, Emery, and the rest, went through the whole fight, behaving well. Emery was wounded. Lieutenant Carpenter, of the first Ohio infantry, one of my aids, was so badly injured by the fall of his horse that I would not permit him to go on the field. Lieutenant Hartman, of the seventy-ninth Pennsylvania infantry, a member of my staff, was ill with fever, and unable to leave his bed. It should be mentioned that the eighty-eighth Indiana, Colonel Humphreys commanding, being placed at one of the fords on Stone river where our forces were temporarily driven back, very opportunely rallied the stragglers and promptly crossed the river and drove the enemy back. In this he was aided by the stragglers, who rallied and fought well. The colonel was wounded by a bayonet thrust in the hand in the attack of Saturday night on the enemy in the woods in our front. I enclose herewith the report of brigade commanders, which will show the list of casualties.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

LOVELL H. ROUSSEAU, *Major General.*

Major GEORGE E. FLYNT,

*Chief of Staff, "Centre," 14th Army Corps, Department of the Cumberland.*

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH DIVISION,  
*Camp near Murfreesboro', January 8, 1863.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the troops of my command in the engagement with the enemy on Stone river.

On Tuesday morning, 30th December, 1862, the eighth division, composed of the seventh and twenty-ninth brigades, Schultz's, Marshall's, and Wells's batteries, was posted on a rolling slope of the west bank of Stone river, in advance, but joining the extreme right of General Crittenden's line and the left of General McCook's. In the rear and on the right was a dense cedar woods, with a broken, rocky surface. From our position several roads were cut through the woods in our rear, by which to bring up the artillery and ammunition trains. In front a heavy growth of oak timber extended towards the river, which was about a mile distant. A narrow thicket crossed our left diagonally and skirted the base of a cultivated slope, which expanded to the width of a mile as it approached the Nashville pike. This slope afforded the enemy his most commanding position (in the centre,) on the crest of which his rifle-pits extended (with intervals) from the oak timber immediately in my front to the Nashville pike, with a battery of four Napoleon and two iron guns, placed in position near the woods and about 800 yards from my position.

Behind this timber, on the river bank, the enemy massed his columns for the next day. Their skirmishers were driven from our immediate front after a sharp contest, in which the nineteenth Illinois and seventy-eighth Pennsylvania volunteers displayed admirable efficiency. The position of my command was held under a heavy fire until darkness terminated the skirmishing in our front, by which time we had inflicted considerable loss upon the enemy. In the mean time General Sheridan's division came up and formed "line of battle," his left resting on my right, and began to advance, driving the enemy until he had passed the centre of my right brigade. While General Sheridan was in this position I changed my front slightly, bearing it more to the left to avoid masking a portion of Sheridan's command. The troops remained in this position and in "order of battle" all night, cheerfully enduring the rain and cold, awaiting the morrow's sun to renew the contest. Early the next morning, and before the heavy fog had drifted away from our front, the enemy in strong force attacked and surprised General McCook's right, commencing a general action, which increased in intensity towards his left. Sheridan's division stood its ground manfully, supported by the eighth division, repulsing and driving the enemy at every advance. The enemy still gained ground of General McCook's right and succeeded in placing several batteries in position, which covered my right from these and the battery on my left, which now opened; the troops were exposed to a converging fire which was most destructive. Haughtling's, Schultz's, Marshall's, Burt's, and Nell's batteries were all ordered into action in my front, pouring destructive volleys of grape and shells into the advancing columns of the enemy, mowing him down like swaths of grain. For four hours the eighth division, with a portion of Sheridan's and Palmer's divisions, maintained their position amid a murderous storm of lead and iron, strewing the ground with their heroic dead. The enemy, maddened to desperation by the determined resistance, still pressed forward fresh troops, concentrating and forming them in a concentric line on either flank. By 11 o'clock Sheridan's men, with their ammunition exhausted, were falling back; General Rousseau's reserve and General Palmer's division had retired in rear of the cedar to form a new line. The artillery ammunition was exhausted; that of the infantry reduced to a few rounds. The artillery horses were nearly all killed or wounded. My ammunition train had been sent back to avoid capture. A heavy column of the enemy was marching directly to our rear through the cedars. Com-

munication with Generals Rosecrans or Thomas was entirely cut off, and it was manifestly impossible for my command to hold the position without evidently making a hopeless, fruitless sacrifice of the whole division. To retire was but to cut our way through the ranks of the enemy. The order was given and manfully executed; driving back the enemy in front and checking his approaching columns in our rear. All the regiments in my command distinguished themselves for their coolness and daring, frequently halting and charging the enemy under a withering fire of musketry.

On approaching General Rousseau's line the battalion of regulars under command of Major King, at my request, gallantly charged forward to our assistance, sustaining a severe loss in officers and men in the effort. Colonels Stanley and Miller now promptly reformed their brigades with the remaining portions of the batteries and took position on the new line, as designated by Major General Thomas.

Shortly afterwards the twenty-ninth brigade was ordered to the left to repulse an attack from the enemy's cavalry on the trains. The troops remained in line all night and the next day in "order of battle" until noon, when the division was ordered to the right of General McCook's line, in expectation of an attack upon his front.

The next day, (January 2,) at 1 o'clock p. m., my command was ordered to the support of General Crittenden on the left, and took position in the rear of the batteries on the west bank of Stone river. About 3 p. m. a strong force of the enemy with artillery advanced rapidly upon General Van Cleve's division, which, after sustaining a severe fire for twenty or thirty minutes, fell back in considerable disorder, the enemy pressing vigorously forward to the river bank. At this important moment the eighth division was ordered to advance, which it did promptly, the men crossing the river and charging up the steep bank with unflinching bravery; the twenty-first, eighteenth, sixty-ninth, and seventy-fourth Ohio, nineteenth Illinois, eleventh Michigan, thirty-seventh Indiana, and seventy-eighth Pennsylvania volunteers displaying their usual promptness and gallantry. Four pieces of artillery and a stand of colors belonging to the twenty-sixth (rebel) Tennessee were captured at the point of the bayonet, and a large number of prisoners, the enemy retreating in disorder. It is proper to mention here that the artillery practice of Schultz's, Mendenhall's, Standart's, Nell's, Marshall's, and Stokes's batteries, which were acting temporarily under my orders in this engagement, was highly satisfactory, giving the enemy great tribulation. The promptness displayed by Captain Stokes in bringing his battery into action by my orders, and the efficient manner with which it was served, affords additional evidence of his marked ability and bravery as an officer and patriot. In the same connexion I feel permitted to speak in complimentary terms of the gallant Morton and his pioneer brigade, which marched forward under a scathing fire to the support of my division. The enemy having fallen back to their intrenchments, my division recrossed the river and resumed its former position.

On the evening of the 4th the twenty-ninth brigade was moved forward to the north bank of Stone river, near the railroad, as an advanced force. On the same day General Spear's first Tennessee brigade was assigned to the eighth division. This brigade distinguished itself on the evening of the 3d in a desperate charge on the enemy, a report of which is included in General Spear's report annexed.

On the morning of the 5th I was ordered to take command of the advance and pursue the enemy toward Murfreesboro'. By 9 a. m. the eighth division, Colonel Walker's brigade, pioneer brigade, and General Stanley's cavalry force had crossed the river and taken possession of Murfreesboro' without having met any resistance, the rear guard of the enemy retreating on the Manchester and Shelbyville roads, our cavalry pursuing, supported by the twenty-ninth brigade on the Shelbyville pike, and by Colonel Byrd's first East Tennessee regiment on the Manchester pike. The rear guard of the enemy (three regiments of cavalry and one battery) was overtaken on the Manchester pike, five miles from Murfreesboro'. Colonel Byrd fearlessly charged this unequal force of the enemy, driving him from his position with the loss of four killed and twelve wounded. Enemy's loss not ascertained.

Our army marched quietly into Murfreesboro', the chosen position of the enemy, which he was forced to abandon after a series of desperate engagements. The joyful hopes of traitors have been crushed, treason receiving another fatal blow.

My command enthusiastically join me in expressions of admiration of the official conduct of Generals Rosecrans and Thomas. During the most eventful periods of the engagements their presence was at the point of danger, aiding with their counsels and animating the troops by their personal bravery and cool determination.

I refer to my command with feelings of national pride for the living, and personal sorrow for the dead. Without murmur they made forced marches over almost impassable roads, through drenching winter rains, without a change of clothing or blankets; deprived of sleep or repose; constantly on duty for eleven days; living three days on a pint of flour and parched corn: ever vigilant; always ready; sacrificing their lives with a contempt of peril, displaying the coolness, determination, and high discipline of veterans. They are entitled to our country's gratitude. Pennsylvania, Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Tennessee may proudly inscribe upon their scrolls of fame the names of the seventy-eighth Pennsylvania volunteers, eighteenth, twenty-first, sixty-ninth, and seventy-fourth Ohio, Schultz's and Marshall's batteries, (Ohio,) the eleventh Michigan, nineteenth Illinois, thirty-seventh Indiana, Nell's section Kentucky battery, and Spears's Tennessee brigade.

I respectfully refer to the records of General Spears, Colonels Miller and Stanley, which I approve and append hereto, for a detailed account of the part taken by each portion of the command, and for special reference to the meritorious conduct of individuals in their respective commands. In addition to which, I make honorable mention of the bravery and efficient services rendered by the following named officers and men, for whom I earnestly request promotion: Brigadier General Spears, commanding East Tennessee brigade; Colonel I. R. Stanley, eighteenth Ohio infantry, commanding twenty-ninth brigade; Colonel John I. Miller, twenty-ninth Indiana, commanding seventh brigade; Captain James St. C. Morton, commanding pioneer brigade; Captain James H. Stokes, Chicago battery; Major John A. King, fifteenth United States infantry; Captain Bush, fourth Indiana battery; Captain W. E. Standart, Ohio battery; Captain James A. Lowrie, assistant adjutant general; Lieutenant Fred. K. Kennedy, aide-de-camp; Captain Charles T. Wing, assistant quartermaster; Major F. H. Gross, medical director; Captain James R. Hayden, ordnance officer; Lieutenant W. W. Barker, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant Robert H. Cochrane, provost marshal; Lieutenant Francis Riddle, acting assistant commissary of subsistence; Lieutenant Charles C. Cooke, assistant aide-de-camp; Lieutenant N. D. Ingraham, topographical engineer; Captain Frederick Shultz, battery M, first Ohio artillery; Lieutenant Joseph Him, battery M, first Ohio artillery; Lieutenants A. Marshall, J. Crable, and R. D. Whittelsey, battery G, first Ohio artillery; Lieutenants A. A. Ellsworth and W. H. Spense, of Nell's section Kentucky artillery; Lieutenant H. Terry, third Ohio cavalry; Sergeant H. B. Fletcher, company K, nineteenth Illinois volunteers; Corporal R. G. Rice, company K, first Wisconsin volunteers; Private J. A. Sangeton, company C, seventy-ninth Pennsylvania; Sergeant Charles Ram-bour, company K, seventy-fourth Ohio; Private William Longwell, orderly, seventh Pennsylvania cavalry; Sergeant George C. Lee, Corporal E. H. Dougherty, and Privates Henry Zimmerman, Henry Schwenk, J. M. Higgins, Leon Starr, Daniel Walker, John D. McCorkle, Abraham Kepperly, George Gillen, and John Cunningham, of escort.

*Casualties.*—The following is an approximate report of the casualties of my command during the battles before Murfreesboro', Tennessee, December 30 and 31, 1862, and January 2 and 3, 1863.

Command.—Second division, centre, 14th army corps.	Went into action.				Lost in action.									
	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Horses.	Guns, artillery.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Horses.		Guns.	
					Commis'd.	Enlisted.	Commis'd.	Enlisted.	Commis'd.	Enlisted.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Lost.
1st E. Tennessee brigade..	66	734	8	....	3	1	22	....	....	....	1	....	....	....
29th brigade .....	93	1,719	37	....	8	78	25	259	....	94	5	3	5	....
7th brigade .....	71	1,948	....	....	3	79	20	415	1	193	....	....	....	....
Infantry .....	230	4,401	45	....	11	160	46	696	1	237	5	4	5	....
Schult's battery .....	2	75	56	4	....	1	1	....	....	1	5	4	....	1
Marshall's battery .....	3	110	116	6	....	5	....	5	....	14	34	12	....	4
Nell's battery .....	2	47	40	3	....	1	....	3	....	6	18	4	4	1
Artillery .....	7	232	212	13	....	7	1	8	....	21	57	20	4	6
Total .....	237	4,633	257	13	11	167	47	704	1	308	62	24	9	6

REMARKS.—My command captured from the enemy upwards of 400 prisoners, four brass pieces of field artillery, and one stand of regimental colors.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
JAMES S. NEGLEY, *Brigadier General.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, THIRD DIVISION,  
14TH ARMY CORPS, DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Camp before Murfreesboro', Tennessee, January 11, 1863.*

MAJOR: On the night of the 30th ultimo the first brigade made a night march from Nolansville to Stewartsboro'. The road was very heavy, rough, and intricate, and most of the night was occupied in the march. The fourth Michigan battery, belonging to the brigade, got through without accident, but in a manner unknown to the "oldest inhabitants."

On the 31st the brigade was ordered to join the forces near Murfreesboro'. This order would have been promptly obeyed, but at the moment it was received a messenger came into

camp with the news that a body of rebel cavalry, numbering from one to two thousand men, had attacked and were burning the supply train belonging to General McCook's corps at Lavergne.

I immediately ordered the seventeenth, thirty-first, and thirty-eighth Ohio Regiments, and one section of the fourth Michigan battery to move with all possible haste to the relief of the train. Lest an attack might be made upon our camp in the absence of the troops, I left the eighty-second Indiana volunteers drawn up in line of battle, with four pieces of the fourth Michigan battery for its defence. The distance from my camp to Lavergne was a little more than two and a half miles; and though the infantry moved with great rapidity, we were unable to reach Lavergne before nearly all the wagons and their contents had been destroyed. By pushing forward the artillery with all haste, I was able to get the two guns which I had taken into position on the hill, about one-third of a mile on this side of the town, before the rebels had succeeded in paroling near all the men connected with the train. Many of the rebel cavalry were engaged in trying to drive away the mules belonging to the train, but the timely administration of shells by Lieutenant Wheat put an effective stop to driving away the mules, but drove the rebels pell-mell into the woods on the right and left of the road. Captain Patton, of the first Ohio cavalry, who had joined me on the march, with twenty of his men, supported as well as could be done by the thirty-first Ohio volunteers, now made pursuit, and succeeded in capturing five prisoners. The other two regiments having come up, a sufficient detail was made, under the direction of Major Ward and Captain Stincham, to secure all the mules and harness, with two wagons, which were not burnt, and a considerable amount of camp and garrison equipage, all of which was for the time being secured, and has since been sent back to Nashville. The rebels had broken and rifled the trunks and valises of the officers, taking everything in the way of clothing and other property of value from them. Having done the best that I could under the circumstances, in the way of saving property, and, as I have since learned, having killed several and wounded others, I marched my command back to camp, on reaching which I immediately ordered Colonel Hunter, of the eighty-second Indiana volunteers, to move with his regiment on the road leading to Nashville, to collect together and bring forward all the trains which he might meet coming this way. This was accordingly done, the regiment making a forced march to Nashville the same night, and returning the next day to join the brigade at this place at about eight o'clock at night. This regiment rendered important service, checking and forcing back fugitives.

About 11 o'clock p. m. of the 30th I was ordered to move forward as soon as relieved by General Stanley. At half past seven a. m. of the 31st General Stanley relieved me, and again ordered me to move to the front. Whilst on the march, and near the crossing of Stewart's creek, I received an order from Major General Rosecrans to take up a strong position and defend the trains at the creek. I hastened forward, and at the creek was met by a large number of fugitives flying to the rear, and spreading most exaggerated reports of disaster to the right wing of our army.

I immediately brought the fourth Michigan battery into position on the high hill east of the road, and formed my infantry in line of battle to support it. The tenth Ohio volunteers, commanded by Colonel Burke, was drawn up in line of battle on the west side of the road. Our position was such as to completely command the road, as well as a wide area stretching off to the front. I here stopped the first stampede, compelling men who had thrown away their guns to take them up again and return to the field. They had remained here but a few moments until I received an order from Major General Thomas again directing me to move to the front and join my brigade to General Rousseau's division. I was also, at this point, notified by General Stanley that he would move forward on my right flank with a force of cavalry.

It was about 9 o'clock a. m. when I again moved forward, throwing a line of skirmishers to the front, for the two-fold purpose of driving back fugitives and giving me timely warning if an enemy should approach. About 10 o'clock a. m. I reached the headquarters of Major General Thomas, and here learning from you that but a short time previous a large body of rebel cavalry had menaced that part of the field, I again took up a position in the cornfield fronting the headquarters, throwing my battalions into squares, and masking a section of guns in the centre of each square. I remained in this position but a few moments until another stampede of mules, negroes, fugitives, and cowards of every grade were seen swarming to the rear. At this moment Captain McKay, of Major General Thomas's staff, rode up and requested me, if possible, to check the stampede. I at once reduced my squares, forming a line of battle with my right resting upon the road. The appearance of this force appeared to reassure and give confidence to the runaways. Men and mules all stopped.

Again receiving your instructions to move to the front, I advanced on this side of the creek, but was here again met by an order directing me to watch my right flank with great vigilance, as the rebel cavalry were again in strong force menacing that part of the field. I again formed a line of battle, taking advantage of a piece of woodland lying to the right of the road—from a piece of high land, immediately in front of which I had a good view of the field to our right. I remained here a short time, and no enemy approaching, I moved forward to the front. At 1 o'clock reached the point on the turnpike in front of General Rosecrans's headquarters on the field. Here, in accordance with your instructions, I reported to General McCook, who ordered me to take up a position on his left, which I did, and remained here



comparatively inactive until about sundown, when I was ordered by General Johnson to move to the front, which I did, forming a double line of battle, and throwing out a strong body of skirmishers. We remained in this position all night without fires. My skirmishers were busy all night, almost constantly exchanging shots with those of the enemy.

At 3 o'clock a. m., January 1, I was sent for to report at General Thomas's headquarters in person, which I did, and was there instructed to watch my front with great vigilance, and keep a strong body of skirmishers in advance to prevent any surprise. This I did; and daylight had no sooner broken upon us than I saw the wisdom of the warning that I had received, as the enemy showed himself in strong force upon the margin of the woodland immediately in my front. General Johnson had, in the mean time, ordered me to move to the left about the distance of a brigade front formed in two lines.

The ground I then occupied was covered with a somewhat dense cedar forest. I directed my men to throw up a breastwork upon our front, which they very soon did, constructing it of loose rocks and logs gathered together for that purpose. So well was this work constructed, and with such rapidity, that by ten o'clock we had a strong line of defences, which were continued by other troops on our right, who evinced equal energy, skill, and industry.

The fourth Michigan battery, under command of Captain Church, assisted by Lieutenants Wheat, Corbin, and Sawyer, acted an important part in this morning's operations. Twice during the early hours of the morning the enemy showed himself upon our front. Captain Church had placed his guns in the most commanding position, and whenever the opportunity offered the most destructive fire I ever witnessed from artillery was poured upon the rebel masses as they thickened upon the margin of the opposite woods. Other batteries, however, to our right and left opened their fire with perhaps equal effect. It is not my business to speak of what they did, further than to admit the noble part they took in the work. I watched the progress and observed the effect of my own shot, and saw the rebel masses torn down and scattered before it like leaves before a storm. One rebel battery on our extreme right and one or two guns in front of our centre replied with shell and round shot, many of which struck in the timber and fell crashing and bursting in dangerous proximity, but not a man of the brigade was injured by them. The day was spent in skirmishing upon the front and in these artillery duels, in one of which a rebel gun on our right front was dismounted in a very handsome manner by a shot from Lieutenant Wheat's section of the fourth Michigan battery, which was sent with the accuracy of a rifle ball.

About 8 o'clock of the night of the 1st I was ordered by General Sheridan to send a strong reconnoitring party to the front, which I did. The enemy were found in force but a short distance in front of our line, and apparently engaged in the same business. In this reconnoissance I had three men from the seventeenth Ohio volunteers wounded—J. Zigler, company A; Corporal E. Lacy and William R. Sain, company B; the first two were severely, the third but slightly wounded.

On the morning of the 2d the enemy could again be seen threatening our front, but so vigorous and well directed was the fire from Church's battery and others upon the right and left of our position that no body of soldiers could have attacked our front successfully, covered as it was by the batteries. Heavy skirmishing continued upon our front all through the fore part of the day, until the action on our left appeared to command silence upon every other part of the field, there being no firing upon our front. I reported in person to Major General Thomas that the enemy appeared to have withdrawn; upon which he ordered me to advance to the front with my brigade and test the fact; I immediately obeyed his order. My men leaped over their breastworks, formed their lines, and moved to the front with a veteran steadiness and determination. The enemy had again showed himself upon our front, and that at closer proximity than at any time during this or the preceding day. Stone's battery had opened fire upon such a line as to compel me to move my left directly under it, and finding that the elevation of his guns was not such as to enable me to do so in safety, I sent an officer to him with the request that he would change the direction of his pieces. The officer in command of the battery seems not to have understood my message, and for a few moments the fire from this battery threatened to do us greater injury than anything coming from the front, knocking the branches of trees to pieces, and scattering them around us. Several shells from this battery also burst in our very midst, but fortunately did us no injury. We had not advanced more than three hundred yards beyond our breastworks when the rebel infantry opened a rapid fire on our right from the cornfield adjacent, and from the pickets in front of our centre. My lines advanced under this fire with the utmost steadiness and good order a distance of seventy-five or eighty yards before a shot was returned. I then gave the order to commence firing. The front line, composed of the seventeenth and thirty-first regiments, delivered a steady and well-directed fire, then, as previously instructed, falling upon the ground to load; the thirty-eighth Ohio and eighty-second Indiana immediately advanced and delivered their fire, lying down to load. I then gave the order to fix bayonets, intending to finish the job with that weapon.

The enemy, however, had fled precipitately before our volleys behind their breastworks in the woods. There being no corresponding movement on our right, and the battery on our left keeping up a most pertinacious fire, which put my lines in great peril should I advance, I withdrew the brigade again behind the breastworks.

In this advance upon the enemy I had one man severely wounded from the seventeenth Ohio

volunteers, Thomas Outcalt, private company K; four men from the eighty-second Indiana volunteers—E. K. Rigg, private company C, shot in the hip, badly hurt; H. C. McCoy, private company C, dangerously wounded in the abdomen; William Manott, private company F, badly wounded in the thigh; J. A. Many, company F, wounded in the hand; and six men from the thirty-first Ohio volunteers—John Kisic, John Sheldon, company G; M. P. Murray, Corporal David Kiser, and John Shae, company K, and David Condon, company A.

About half-past seven in the evening, I was again ordered by General Sheridan to make a reconnoissance in front. For this purpose I detailed two companies from each of the Ohio regiments under my command, and placed them under command of Lieutenant Colonel Choate, or the thirty-eighth Ohio regiment, assisted by Lieutenant Colonel Davis, of the eighty-second Indiana, and Captain Stincham, of the seventeenth Ohio volunteers. This force had not advanced above a quarter of a mile to the front before they were fired on by the enemy. A brisk skirmish ensued, which was kept up for about half an hour. In this affair I had six men wounded, five from the thirty-eighth Ohio—Lieutenant Hanna, slightly; Sergeant J. J. Wilsey, severely; Privates L. Lovejoy, severely; Jno. Simmons, severely, and James Rogers, severely, all of company A; Sergeant B. H. Jay, company K, severely, and Captain Stincham, seventeenth Ohio volunteers.

On the morning of the 2d, being ordered to maintain great vigilance in watching the movements of the enemy to our front, I placed the brigade under arms, advancing my rear line and massing it upon the front, under the breastworks. Here we remained pretty much all day, exposed to the inclemency of the weather, and suffering a good deal, but without complaint.

The officers and men uniformly behaved well while under my command, and I find no lack of zeal, patience, or courage.

With the night of the 3d closed the active struggles of this great conflict. The first brigade has sustained few casualties, compared with others. We have tried to perform our duty; we have done the work assigned us in the best manner we knew how. We are in good condition to perform any service which may be required of us, and will do it cheerfully, whatever it may be, as we have ever heretofore done.

Respectfully submitted:

M. B. WALKER,  
*Colonel Commanding First Brigade.*

Major GEORGE E. FLYNT.

*January 5, 1863.* Marched into Murfreesboro', and placed my troops in position on the Woodbury, Bradyville, Manchester, and Shelbyville pikes—General McCook's command stretching from my right on the Shelbyville pike across the Salem pike to Stone river, his right resting on the river; General Crittenden, on my left, covering Liberty and Lebanon pikes, his left resting on Stone river.

During the month of January, Steedman's (formerly Fry's) division was moved to the front from Gallatin and took post at Triune and Lavergne. Reynolds's division moved from Gallatin to Murfreesboro'.

By virtue of General Order No. 9, War Department, dated January 9, 1863, the army of the Cumberland was divided into three army corps, the 14th, 20th, and 21st, and I was assigned to command the 14th. It consisted of Rousseau's, Negley's, Steedman's, Mitchell's, and Reynolds's divisions.

The army remained at Murfreesboro' until the 24th of June, occupied in reorganizing and equipping for the summer campaign. During that time a great many expeditions were sent out against the enemy, to harass him as much as possible, and, particularly, to keep him on the south side of Duck river. Of these expeditions, the following is a report of one of the most important sent out from my command:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION 14TH ARMY CORPS,  
*Murfreesboro', April 30, 1863.*

COLONEL: The troops employed in the recent expedition to McMinnville, &c., returned to-day, and a report will be most readily comprehended by reference to the operations of each day.

The expedition consisted of the following force:

Colonel Wilder's brigade, (three regiments mounted infantry,) about.....	1,100
Colonel Hall's brigade.....	1,400
Brigadier General Wagner's brigade.....	1,300
Colonel Starkweather's brigade.....	1,300
Cavalry under Colonel Minty.....	1,500

In all, 'about..... 6,600

*April 20.*—The whole command made Readyville. At dark a mounted scout was sent to Woodbury, which returned before midnight. The scout was reported at McMinnville, and deceived the enemy as to the movement of the next day.

*April 21st.*—The advance, a cavalry force of about three hundred and fifty, under Colonel Eli Long, fourth Ohio cavalry, destined to strike the railroad from Manchester to McMinnville, took the road at 2 o'clock a. m., and turning to the southeast just after leaving Woodbury, directed their march upon Morrison, under the guidance of Captain Fleming, late of Stokes's Tennessee cavalry.

The remainder of the mounted force, cavalry under Colonel Minty, and mounted infantry, the whole under Colonel Wilder, promptly followed, and beyond Woodbury took the old McMinnville road, which passed between Jacksboro' and the McMinnville pike.

The advance of his force captured a portion of a picket belonging to a regiment of the enemy stationed on the pike; those that escaped reported that the main mounted column was a flanking party. The force that moved for the railroad under Colonel Long appears not to have been discovered at all until they were near the road, and in a condition to accomplish their work beyond doubt.

The supporting infantry force closely followed the mounted column, and, after the mounted force left the direct pike to McMinnville, the infantry support was apparently the only force moving towards that place. Soon after leaving Woodbury we discovered the mounted regiment of the enemy which was known to be on the road, and which gradually retired before us, evidently not aware of the fact that our mounted column had passed them, and was nearing McMinnville.

We abstained from firing on this regiment, and moved cautiously but firmly upon it until we reached Glascock's, nine miles from McMinnville, the point at which we were to await advices from Wilder. This point was made by 12½ o'clock, having marched nineteen miles.

About 4 p. m., received a communication from Wilder, who had taken possession of McMinnville at 1½ o'clock p. m., with his advance of seventh Pennsylvania cavalry and mounted infantry scouts, at a charge, supported by the fourth regiment cavalry. The surprise was complete. Among the prisoners captured here was the notorious Dick McCann, who subsequently made his escape from a guard of the fourth regiment cavalry, which occurrence will be investigated and reported upon at an early day.

General John H. Morgan came very near being captured, but escaped by having a fresh fleet horse, and being personally unknown to the men of our advance.

The infantry force moved northward, and encamped on a branch of Charley's creek, about three miles from the pike.

The force at McMinnville passed the night of the 21st at and near the town, and that under Colonel Long about six miles out.

*22d.*—Mounted force moved to Beckwith's, *via* Smithville; bivouacked near the former place.

The infantry moved to within five miles of Beckwith's, and encamped at Pine flats, on a branch of Clear Fork. The entire country passed over this day, by both commands, is barren and unproductive; the animals were very scantily supplied with forage, and the provisions for the mounted men (which had been left with the infantry support at Readyville) were pushed on during the night of the 22d to Beckwith's, escorted by a portion of Hall's brigade.

*23d.*—The remainder of Hall's brigade, starting at 2 o'clock a. m., joined the mounted force at Beckwith's by dawn of day, and, with his brigade as a support, Wilder pushed right on towards Liberty, closely followed by the brigades of Wagner and Starkweather.

On reaching Snow Hill, about 10 a. m., where the rebels had been reported in large force, we found the position abandoned, and learned that the enemy had retreated *via* Alexandria, and Lancaster.

Men and animals were much jaded and a vigorous pursuit was simply impossible.

The force from Carthage that we hoped would co-operate with us by taking position at or near the vicinity of Alexandria, to prevent this very retreat of the enemy, had not arrived. Two regiments from Carthage arrived at Alexandria about midnight, 23d, and reported to me on the 24th; they were too late by thirty-six hours to co-operate with us, and the force sent was less than half that necessary to any effective co-operation.

The mounted force was distributed from fork of road, two and a half miles from Liberty, to a point three miles beyond Alexandria, towards Lebanon, with instructions to forage and rest. Wagner's brigade was placed at Liberty; Hall's and Starkweather's at fork of road, communicated with provision train near Auburn.

*24th.*—Spent the day in foraging and picking up straggling rebels. Provisions escorted by General R. S. Granger's brigade arrived and were distributed at night. Sent reconnaissance of fourth regiment cavalry, under Captain McIntyre; went as far as Smithville and found no enemy.

*25th.*—Headquarters and Hall's brigade moved to Cherry Valley; Wilder's mounted infantry to Shop springs; Wagner's brigade to Alexandria; Starkweather's brigade remained at forks of roads.

Cavalry (except Ray's, about 350) started for Murfreesboro', a portion with Granger's brigade, *via* Auburn, and the main body *via* Cherry Valley, Camsville, and Milton.

26th.—Wilder's mounted infantry, Hall's brigade, and headquarters made Lebanon, Tennessee.

27th.—Mounted infantry scouring country in direction of Rome, Gallatin, and Silver spring, expecting to be absent two days; discovered two boats in creek near Rome. At 5 p. m. received information from Colonel Starkweather, through General Wagner, that the enemy was certainly advancing in force towards Liberty with the intention of attacking Starkweather at the forks of the road. Ordered Hall's brigade on the road at once, and sent messengers to order the mounted regiments to follow as early as possible next morning, (28th.)

Hall and headquarters reached Alexandria at 10½ a. m., 28th, and communicated with Wagner and Starkweather, (the former had moved near the forks.)

28th.—Train of fifty-three empty wagons reached Starkweather's camp, under escort of ninth Michigan, Colonel Parkhurst. This train was loaded with bacon and forage, a portion belonging to refugees, the remainder captured from prominent rebels, and turned over to the proper staff officers at corps headquarters, on the arrival of the train at Murfreesboro', on the 30th.

29th.—Headquarters and Hall's brigade moved from Alexandria to Stone river, *via* Slatesville and Camsville. Wagner and Starkweather encamped near Milton. Wilder, with two regiments of mounted infantry, moved through Lebanon to Beard's mill; one regiment coming through to Murfreesboro' with headquarters.

#### DESTROYED OR DISABLED.

The railroad leading from McMinnville to Manchester may be said to be destroyed. All the bridges of any note, as well as trestle-work, are burnt. Also, one locomotive and train of three cars, and various other detached cars at stations.

Depot buildings at McMinnville; 600 blankets; 2 hogsheads sugar; 3 hogsheads rice; 200 bales cotton; 8 barrels of whiskey; 30,000 bacon; 1 cotton factory, (large;) 2 mills; 1 camp, tents, &c., on Charley's creek; 1 camp at Liberty; 1 mill at Liberty.

One hundred and eighty prisoners captured at various places from Morrison to Stone river, including five commanding officers. One who represents himself as a major, on the staff of General J. C. Breckinridge, was captured on the 29th, by Wilder's scouts, near the Glades. Lieutenant Colonel Martin was mortally wounded by a sabre in the hands of a member of the seventh Pennsylvania cavalry. Six hundred and thirteen animals were captured and seventy-six abandoned. Large quantities of forage and wheat were discovered.

The only casualties to our force were one man, seventeenth Indiana, badly and treacherously wounded—he got into camp; one man, one hundred and twenty-third Illinois, died of disease.

The district bounded south by the road from McMinnville to Smithville, and west and north by a line drawn from Readyville, *via* Auburn, Liberty, Alexandria, and New Middleton, to Caney Fork, is sterile and unproductive, excepting a small area about New Middleton; the same remark will apply to the district between Woodbury and the railroad connecting McMinnville with Manchester.

There is no forage and but little subsistence of any kind in the country named above. An army cannot subsist in it, and hence the rebels have been driven to occupy the country to the west of Alexandria and lying between the Cumberland and Stone rivers.

The last-named district is with occasional exceptions very productive, well watered, and under a high state of cultivation. The rebels have drawn immense quantities of supplies from this portion of country. A force at Alexandria or Liberty would command this whole district.

The inhabitants may be divided into three classes: first, the wealthy; second, those of medium means, or well to do; third, the poor.

The first class are, with a few exceptions, decided rebels; their farms have furnished rebel supplies, and their houses have been made stopping places for rebel commanders, conscript agents, spies, &c. Without the aid furnished by these men the raids upon the railroad from Murfreesboro' to Nashville, and from Nashville to Gallatin, and even beyond, could not be made.

With the supplies furnished by these "quiet citizens" the rebels are enabled to move almost without transportation or provisions, knowing just where forage and subsistence await them.

The tone of this class in February, when we made our first expedition into that part of the country, was quite defiant; they were determined to persevere in their rebellion until they secured their "rights." They have since that time lost no little property in forage and animals, to supply both armies, and in addition their negro men have run away; and the wagons that were driven the first of February, by soldiers detailed for that purpose, were about the last of April just as well driven by the negroes that formerly lived in that section of the country; and the strength of the companies was increased by the same number of able-bodied soldiers. The tone of this class is now changed; they have discovered their mistake, they had been misled, they have formed their regrets, and they are anxious to take the non-combatant oath, give bonds, and stay at home. (?) The question arises here, Shall they be allowed to do so? At the risk of being officious, I respectfully answer no! If the leading men

of the neighborhoods are allowed to remain, although they may give bonds, when the rebels run into their neighborhoods they will be forced to aid them. If they are sent away their influence is gone. A few of this class returned with us, a step preliminary, I trust, to a longer journey. The second class have generally been well meaning citizens, but without much influence politically; they have become from wavering men to loyal citizens, are desirous of taking the oaths, and pursuing their ordinary avocations. Many of them have sons conscripted into the rebel service, who would desert that service and return home, if their fathers were placed in a better position politically, and their oppressors sent away, so that there would be no one to return them to a service which they detest. This class is deserving of the fostering care of the government.

The third class are all loyal; they have no weight in the community, possess but little property; they have in fact been "subjugated" all their lives.

By encouragement they must improve; they have suffered greatly from the rebel conscription. The *absence* of the first class is a thing greatly desired by them, but they speak it only in whispers.

They have at least one thing in their favor—their devotion to the flag of their country is unwavering in both men and women.

There was one idea that evidently occupied the minds of all classes. We were everywhere met with the questions, Will the federal army remain in Middle Tennessee? Will it go forward and leave us, or will it go back and leave us? There is a feeling of insecurity which can be eradicated only by adopting such measures as will convince the loyal people that this country is to be possessed only by loyal men, and that when our lines are advanced, they are advanced *forever*; that no retrograde step will be taken, and that whatever may be necessary to *loyalize* a district of country will be done before the army leaves it.

J. J. REYNOLDS,

*Major General, Commanding Expedition.*

Lieutenant Colon

*Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Army Corps.*

A true copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

The apparent inactivity of the army of the Cumberland during its stay at Murfreesboro', was due really to the severity of the winter, which rendered it almost impossible to move large bodies of men on the ordinary roads of the country, and to the difficulty of procuring animals to refit the transportation and equip the cavalry and artillery. The country having become practicable, and General Rosecrans having partially equipped his trains and cavalry, he commenced the campaign of the summer of 1863 on the 24th of June, of which the following is the report of the part taken by my command:

#### REPORT OF MIDDLE TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN, JUNE 24 TO JULY 4, 1863.

HEADQUARTERS 14TH ARMY CORPS, DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*Camp Winfred, Tennessee, July 8, 1863.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to transmit the following report of the operations of the 14th army corps from the 24th ultimo to the present time.

The third division, Brigadier General Brannan commanding, having, in accordance with orders previously given, reached Salem from Triune on the 23d, received orders to march with McCook's corps in the direction of Fosterville on the 24th, and on the 25th to join the other divisions of the 14th army corps on the Manchester pike. The first division, (Rousseau's,) second division, (Negley's,) and the fourth division, (Reynolds's,) marched from Murfreesboro' June 24, on the Manchester pike. Reynolds's division in advance, starting at 4 a. m. with orders, if possible, to seize and hold Hoover's Gap; Rousseau's division marching at 7 a. m., to move to the support of Reynolds, in case he called upon him for assistance. Negley's division marched at 10 a. m., in reserve. A few miles from our picket station, Wilder's brigade, mounted infantry, Reynolds's division, encountered the enemy's mounted videttes, which he drove upon their reserve third confederate cavalry, and drove the whole through Hoover's Gap and beyond McBride's creek. Colonel Wilder then observing that the enemy were in force in the direction of Fairfield, and preparing to attack him, took up a strong position on the hills at the southern terminus of Hoover's Gap. The other two brigades of Reynolds moved into and occupied the gap in rear of Wilder's force, and prepared for an attack from the front, having marched seventeen miles.

While the division was taking its position, the first brigade was attacked by a superior force. The attack was promptly accepted by Wilder's brigade, supported by the second and third brigades, which were immediately ordered to the front and posted on the ridge of woods on the extreme right, to prevent the enemy turning our right flank which was being heavily

engaged by a superior force. As these re-enforcements arrived the enemy was forced to fall back from the woods, and the right made secure by posting three regiments of Cook's brigade in the woods from which the enemy had first been so gallantly driven by the seventeenth and seventy-second Indiana volunteers and ninety-third Illinois volunteers, and the position maintained. General Rousseau was ordered to send forward one brigade to re-enforce Reynolds, which was done. Major Coolidge, commanding brigade of regulars, reporting soon after dark, and every preparation made for an attack on the following morning. The first and second brigades of Rousseau's division encamped in supporting distance, near the widow Hoover's house, and Negley's division at Big spring, in rear of Rousseau's division. The disposition of General Reynolds's division remained unchanged on the morning of the 25th, with slight skirmishing with the enemy in front. Colonel Scribner's brigade, second division, having been ordered to the front in the early part of the day, was posted in position to support the batteries in front and to form picket line on the extreme left.

General Brannan's division arriving from Salem was ordered to go into camp near Rousseau, at Hoover's mill. Orders having been previously given from department headquarters, General Rousseau's division was moved immediately in rear of General Reynolds's division on the night of the 25th, preparatory to an attack on the enemy's position at Beech Grove. General Brannan's division moved up at 4 a. m. to take part in the attack. General Negley's division moved up at 8 a. m. to support the attack of the other divisions. After carrying the position of Beech Grove, Rousseau's (1st) and Brannan's (3d) divisions were ordered to push on to Manchester that night, if possible. During the night of the 25th instant it rained so continuously that it became almost impossible for troops to move, but with extraordinary exertions the divisions were placed in their respective positions by half past 10 a. m. Immediately after the advance was ordered, when the enemy were driven steadily and rapidly towards Fairfield, Rousseau and Brannan operating on his left flank from the hills on the north of the Fairfield road, while Reynolds advanced against his front and right. The enemy had evidently prepared for an obstinate resistance and attempted to enfilade my troops from the high ground on our right, but were effectually prevented by a gallant charge of the first brigade third division, Colonel Walker, and the fourth (regular) brigade first division, Major Coolidge commanding. The steady and rapid advance of my troops forced the enemy to retire in the direction of Fairfield, very rapidly, covering his retreat with two batteries of artillery and occupying positions behind strong bodies of skirmishers, flanked by a heavy cavalry force. The behavior of our troops was admirable—everything that could be desired.

On the morning of the 27th, at 8 a. m., Reynolds's advance brigade, Wilder's mounted infantry, took possession of Manchester, capturing a guard at the railroad depot and taking the town completely by surprise; Negley's division marching in support of Rousseau's and Brannan's towards Fairfield road by way of Noale's Fork, and reached Manchester at 8 p. m. Rousseau and Brannan pursued the enemy as far as Fairfield, ascertaining at that place, from what they considered reliable sources, that the enemy had retreated entirely; these two divisions, in compliance with orders, turned into the Fairfield and Manchester road—Brannan's division reaching Manchester at 10 p. m., and Rousseau's division at 12 midnight. In compliance with department orders, Colonel Wilder, with his mounted brigade, started at reveille on the morning of the 28th, by way of Hillsboro', to break the Chattanooga railroad at some point below Deckard. The first and third divisions started at an early hour, supported by a brigade from General Sheridan's division on the right and two regiments of Reynolds's division on the left, and pushed forward during the evening to within one and a half or two miles of Tullahoma with comparative ease, General Steedman reporting that he was opposed by two regiments of cavalry and one section of artillery, at the same time reporting a loss of fifteen men in his command, also killing and wounding many of the enemy, but could not report the number, as they were carried from the field by the enemy. The two regiments of Reynolds's division also reached a point about two miles from Tullahoma, where they came upon a regiment of the enemy's cavalry, which retired after feeble resistance. The officer believing it was intended to lead him into an ambushade, did not pursue further. Two regiments from Negley's division moved out on the Hillsboro' road four or five miles without encountering or seeing the enemy. Colonel Wilder with his brigade returned to-day, having succeeded in striking the railroad and doing considerable damage near Deckard. Early on the morning of July 1st, having heard from a citizen that the enemy were evacuating Tullahoma, Steedman's brigade, third division, supported by two regiments of Reynolds's division on his left, were ordered to advance cautiously and ascertain if the report was true. Meeting with no opposition he entered Tullahoma at 12 m., capturing a few prisoners; General Brannan, commanding third division, reporting that the last of the rebel infantry retired during the night, and their cavalry commenced evacuating at daylight. General Reynolds was accordingly ordered to Tullahoma with his division, and the two divisions (Brannan's and Reynolds's) ordered to rejoin the corps at Hefner's mill on the following morning. General Negley was directed to march to Hefner's mill and take post there for the night, General Rousseau to support him. In executing this order, Negley came upon the enemy about four miles from Boobas cross-roads, and drove them steadily until they retired just at night-fall beyond Hefner's mill. He then went into camp for the night, throwing out strong pickets to the right and front. General Rousseau was instructed, after forming his camp, to throw pickets to the rear and left. The enemy made a stubborn resistance through the pass of

Spring creek, wounding a good many of our men, but were steadily driven back until darkness prevented further pursuit through the thick underbrush bordering the hill-sides of the pass.

On the 2d, the third and fourth divisions joined on Spring creek, and the enemy were followed to the Winchester road crossing of Elk river. The bridge having been burned by the rebels and the river not fordable, the first, third, and fourth divisions were moved up the river to Jones's ford, and one brigade of Rousseau's division thrown across the stream, the remainder of the command camping on the north side. The ford being very deep, it was with difficulty that the brigade effected a passage, damaging much of their ammunition by the water getting into their cartridge boxes. Colonel Hambright, commanding this brigade, reported that the enemy had left the vicinity of the ford, and was informed by rebel prisoners that their retreat was by way of Pelham and Cowan and across the mountains.

On the morning of the 3d, Rousseau's and Brannan's troops crossed the river at Jones's ford and took up a position on the Winchester and Hillsboro' road, crossing their artillery and trains of both divisions. Negley's division and entire train crossed the ford on the Winchester and Manchester pike. The troops of Reynolds's division crossed at the same place, leaving his ordnance train on the north side of the river to be crossed in the morning.

On the 4th, Rousseau's division marched to the Deckard and Pelham road, and took up a position at Brakefield Point. Reynolds's division encamped at Pennington's, and Brannan's division at Taite's; the two latter positions on the Deckard, Winchester, and McMinnville road. The order to halt was received at 2 p. m. this day, and the details directed to be made for the repairs of roads were ordered. Location of corps headquarters on the Winchester and McMinnville road, half way between Taite's and Pennington's.

The positions of divisions of my corps are substantially the same to this date.

Without particularly referring to individual merit in any one division of my command, I can render willing testimony to the manly endurance and soldierly conduct of both officers and men composing my corps, marching day and night, through a most relentless rain, and over almost impassable roads, bivouacking by the road-side, ever ready and willing to "fall in" and pursue the enemy whenever ordered, with a cheerfulness and determination truly admirable, and no less commendable when confronting the enemy; their columns never wavered, giving the highest proof of their veteran qualities and showing what dependence can be placed upon them in time of peril.

For particulars, incidents, and the part taken by the different divisions, brigades, and regiments of my corps, in the engagements mentioned in my report, I respectfully refer you to the accompanying reports of division commanders.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
Major General U. S. V., Commanding.

S. C. KELLOGG,  
Brevet Major and A. D. C.

True copy:

Brigadier General J. A. GARFIELD,  
Chief of Staff, Department of the Cumberland.

### Casualties.

Commands.	COMMISSIONED.			ENLISTED.			Aggregate.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	
First division.....	.....	3	.....	4	39	.....	46
Second division.....	1	.....	.....	1	5	2	9
Third division.....	.....	1	.....	4	59	1	65
Fourth division.....	.....	.....	.....	15	47	.....	62
Total.....	1	4	.....	24	150	3	182

After the evacuation of Tullahoma and the retreat of the enemy across the Tennessee river, the army of the Cumberland was concentrated about Winchester, Dechard, and Manchester, preparatory to continuing the campaign as soon as the railroad could be completed as far as Bridgeport.

August 16, 1863.—The whole command was ordered to move forward to the

Tennessee river, and was concentrated (*i. e.* 14th army corps) in the vicinity of Stevenson, Alabama, and opposite shell-mound. Preparations were then made to cross to the south side of the Tennessee river, the enemy under Bragg being at Chattanooga.

On the night of the 30th of August, Mr. Wm. Crutchfield, a Union man, residing at Chattanooga, having been forced by the rebels to leave his home, swam the Tennessee river and sought refuge within our lines, bringing the information that it was reported in Chattanooga that General Burnside had possession of Knoxville, Buckner having fallen back to Loudon, and Bragg had sent part of Hill's corps to Kingston to support Forrest. Wheeler was said to be at Rome and Gadson, Alabama, watching for a move on our right. Johnson was to re-enforce Bragg with 15,000 men, two trains of whom came in on the 29th.

The following are copies of the reports of the operations of the troops under my command during the month of September, 1863, including the battle of Chickamauga, September 19th and 20th, when, besides the four divisions composing the 14th army corps, I had the divisions of Generals Wood, Palmer, Steedman and Johnson under my immediate direction.

## CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN.

### HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

*Chattanooga, Tennessee, September 30, 1863.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the operations of my corps from the 1st September up to date, as follows, viz:

General Brannan's division crossed the Tennessee river at Battle creek; General Baird ordered to cross his first division at Bridgeport, and to move to Taylor's store; General Negley's second division to cross the river at Caperton's ferry, and to report at Taylor's store also.

*September 2.*—General Baird's division moved to Widow's creek. General Negley reports having arrived at Moore's spring, one and a quarter mile from Taylor's store, and two miles from Bridgeport; he was ordered to cross the mountain at that point, it being the most direct route to Trenton, in the vicinity of which place the corps was ordered to concentrate.

*September 3.*—Headquarters 14th army corps moved from Bolivar springs at 6 a. m. *via* Caperton's ferry to Moore's spring, on the road from Bridgeport to Trenton. Baird's division reached Bridgeport, but could not cross in consequence of damage to the bridge; Negley's division marched to Warren's mills, on the top of Sand mountain, on the road to Trenton; Brannan's division reached Graham's store, on the road from Shell mound to Trenton; Reynold's division marched six miles on the Trenton road from Shell mound.

*September 4.*—Negley's division camped at Brown's spring, at foot of Sand mountain, in Lookout valley; Brannan's division at Gordan's mill, on Sand mountain; Reynold's division at foot of Sand mountain, two miles from Trenton; Baird's division crossed the river at Bridgeport, and camped at that point; corps headquarters at Moore's spring.

*September 5.*—Baird's division arrived at Moore's spring; Negley's division still in camp at Brown's spring. He reports having sent forward a reconnoissance of two regiments of infantry and a section of artillery to scour the country towards Chattanooga, and secure some captured stores near Macon iron-works. They captured some confederate army supplies. No report from Brannan's division; Reynolds's division in camp at Trenton; Brannan somewhere in neighborhood; corps headquarters at Warren's mill.



*September 6.*—Baird's division encamped at Warren's mill; Negley's division reached Johnson's crook; Beatty's brigade was sent up the road to seize Stevens's Gap; met the enemy's pickets, and it being dark, did not proceed further. The eighteenth Ohio, of Negley's division, went to the top of Lookout mountain, beyond Payne's mills; met the enemy's pickets and dispersed them. The head of Brannan's column reached Lookout valley, two (2) miles below Trenton; Reynolds's division in camp at Trenton; rumors of the enemy's design to evacuate Chattanooga; corps headquarters at Brown's spring.

*September 7.*—Baird's division closed up with Negley's in the mouth of Johnson's crook. Negley's gained possession of the top of the mountain, and secured the forks of the road. Brannan's division reached Trenton; Reynolds remained in camp at that place; corps headquarters still at Brown's spring.

*September 8.*—Baird's division remained in its camp of yesterday, at the junction of Hurricane and Lookout creeks; Negley's division moved up to the top of Lookout mountain, at the head of Johnson's crook, one brigade occupying the pass; another brigade was sent forward and seized Cooper's Gap, sending one regiment to the foot of the gap to occupy and hold it; one regiment was also sent forward to seize Stevens's Gap, which was heavily obstructed with fallen trees; Brannan's division occupied the same position as last night; Reynolds's division, headquarters at Trenton, with one brigade at Payne's mills, three miles south of Trenton. Headquarters of the corps still at Brown's spring.

*September 9.*—Baird's division moved across Lookout mountain to the support of Negley. Negley's division moved across the mountain and took up a position in McLamore's cove, near Rogers's farm, throwing out his skirmishers as far as Bailey's cross-roads. Saw the enemy's cavalry in front, drawn up in line; citizens reported a heavy force concentrated in his front at Dug Gap, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery; Brannan's division in same camp as yesterday; Reynolds's division also. The ninety-second Illinois (mounted infantry) sent on a reconnoissance towards Chattanooga, along the ridge of Lookout mountain. Colonel Atkins, commanding ninety-second Illinois, reports September 9, 11 a. m., entered Chattanooga as the rear of the enemy's column was evacuating the place; corps headquarters moved from Brown's spring to Easley's farm, on Trenton and Lebanon road.

*September 10.*—General Negley's in front of or one mile west of Dug Gap, which has been heavily obstructed by the enemy, and occupied by a strong picket line. General Baird ordered to move up to-night to Negley's support. General Reynolds to move at daylight to support Baird's left, and General Brannan to move at 8 a. m. to-morrow morning to support Reynolds; headquarters and General Reynolds's division camped for the night at foot of the mountain; Brannan's division at Easley's.

*September 11.*—Baird's division closed up on Negley's at widow Davis's house about 8 a. m. Soon afterwards, Negley being satisfied, from his own observations, and from the reports of officers sent out to reconnoitre, and also from loyal citizens, that the enemy was advancing on him in very superior force, and that this train was in imminent danger of being cut off, if we accepted battle at Davis's Cross-roads, determined to fall back to a strong position in front of Stevens's Gap. His movement he immediately proceeded to put into execution, and by his untiring energy and skill, and with the prompt co-operation of Baird, succeeded in gaining possession of the hills in front of Stevens's Gap, and securing his trains, without losing a single wagon. For a detailed account of this movement, see reports of Generals Negley and Baird, annexed, marked A and B. General Turchin, commanding third brigade Reynolds's division, was pushed forward, by way of Cooper's Gap, to Negley's support, on the left, reaching his position about 10 o'clock a. m. Orders were sent to General Brannan to close up as rapidly as possible. Corps headquarters at top of Cooper's Gap.

*September 12.*—Brannan's division reached Negley's position by 8 a. m., and

took post next on the left of Baird. Reynolds's division was posted on the left of Brannan, one brigade covering Cooper's Gap. Reports from citizens go to confirm the impression that a large force of the enemy is concentrated at Lafayette. A report from General McCook confirms that fact. A later despatch from the same source says it is reported that Bragg's whole army, with Johnston's, is at Lafayette. Generals Brannan and Baird, with part of their commands, went out on a reconnoissance towards Dug Gap at 1 o'clock p. m. to-day. General Brannan reports they advanced two miles beyond Davis's cross-roads without finding any enemy with the exception of a few mounted men; corps headquarters encamped at top of Stevens's Gap.

*September 13.*—Negley's, Baird's, and Brannan's divisions remained in their camps of yesterday waiting the arrival of McCook's corps, which had been ordered to close to the left. Reynolds concentrated his division on the road from Cooper's Gap to Catlett's Gap. Two deserters from eighteenth Tennessee state that they belong to Buckner's corps. Buckner's corps consists of eight brigades, and two batteries, six guns each; were in the fight with Negley. Saw a brigade of Forrest's cavalry, commanded by Forrest himself, pass towards the fight on the eleventh. Hill's and Buckner's corps were both engaged. Bragg's army is concentrated at Lafayette; headquarters moved by way of Cooper's Gap to the foot of the mountain.

*September 14.*—General Reynolds took up a position at Pond spring with his two infantry brigades, and was joined by Wilder at that place. Turchin's brigade, of Reynolds's division, made a reconnoissance to the mouth of Catlett's Gap with the ninety-second Illinois, (mounted infantry.) Was opposed by the rebels' mounted pickets from Chickamauga creek to mouth of Catlett's Gap, at which place he found their reserve drawn up, also a strong line of skirmishers to the right of the road; but having received instructions to avoid bringing on an engagement, he returned to camp with the brigade, leaving two regiments on Chatanooga valley road, strongly posted on outposts. General Brannan advanced one brigade of his division to Chickamauga creek, east of Lee's mills, one mile to the right and south of Reynolds's position, at Pond spring. A mounted reconnoissance was also pushed forward to within a mile of Bluebird Gap without encountering any of the enemy. A negro who had been taken before General Buckner yesterday, and released again, reports that Buckner and his corps are in Catlett's Gap preparing to defend that place. A negro woman, lately from the neighborhood of Dug Gap, reports a large force of rebels between Dug Gap and Lafayette.

*September 16.*—Corps headquarters and first and second divisions remained camped as last reported, at foot of Stevens's gap. Turchin's brigade, of Reynolds's division, made a reconnoissance towards Catlett's Gap. The enemy fell back as he advanced, until he came upon a force strongly posted, with two pieces of artillery, in the road. He made a second reconnoissance at 2 p. m. that day, with but little further result, as he could advance but a short distance further, the enemy being in force in his front.

*September 17.*—First, second, and third divisions changed their positions from their camps of yesterday: Baird's (first) division, with its right resting at Gower's ford, and extending along Chickamauga creek to Bird's mill; Negley's (second) division, with its right at Bird's mill, and its left connecting with Van Cleve's division, at Owen's ford; Brannan's (third) division on the right of the first, covering four fords between Gower's ford and Pond spring. One brigade of the fourth division (Reynolds's) thrown out in front of Pond spring, on the Catlett's Gap road, covering the pass through the mountains. Wilder's brigade detached and ordered to report to department headquarters. The left of McCook's corps closed in, connecting with our right near Pond spring.

*September 18.*—At 4 p. m. the whole corps moved to the left along Chickamauga creek to Crawfish springs. On arriving at that place received orders to move on

the cross-road leading by widow Glenn's house to the Chattanooga and Lafayette road, and take up a position near Kelley's farm, on the Lafayette road, connecting with Crittenden on my right at Gordon's mill. The head of the column reached Kelley's farm about daylight on the 19th, Baird's division in front, and took up a position at the forks of the road, facing towards Reid's and Alexander's bridges over the Chickamauga. Colonel Wilder, commanding the mounted brigade of Reynolds's division, informed me that the enemy had crossed the Chickamauga in force at those two bridges the evening before, and driven his brigade across the State road, or Chattanooga and Lafayette road, to the heights east of the widow Glenn's house. Kelley's house is situated in an opening about three-fourths of a mile long and one-fourth of a mile wide, on the east side of the State road, and stretches along that road in a northerly direction, with a small field of, perhaps, twenty acres on west side of the road, directly opposite to the house. From thence to the Chickamauga the surface of the country is undulating and covered with original forest timber, interspersed with undergrowth, in many places so dense that it is difficult to see fifty paces ahead. There is a cleared field near Jay's mill, and cleared land in the vicinity of Reid's and Alexander's bridges. A narrow field commences at a point about a fourth of a mile south of Kelley's house, on the east side of the State road, and extends, perhaps, for half a mile along the road towards Gordon's mills. Between the State road and the foot of Missionary ridge there is a skirt of timber stretching from the vicinity of widow Glenn's house, south of the forks of the road to McDaniel's house, three-fourths of a mile north of Kelley's. The eastern slope of the Missionary ridge, between Glenn's and McDaniel's, is cleared and mostly under cultivation. This position of Baird's threw my right in close proximity to Wilder's brigade; the interval I intended to fill up with the two remaining brigades of Reynolds's division on their arrival. General Brannan, closely following Baird's division, was placed in position on his left, on the two roads leading from the State road to Reid's and Alexander's bridges. Colonel Dan. McCook, commanding a brigade of the reserve corps, met me at General Baird's headquarters, and reported to me that he had been stationed the previous night on the road leading to Reid's bridge, and that he could discover no force of the enemy except one brigade, which had crossed to the west side of Chickamauga at Reid's bridge the day before; and he believed it could be cut off, because, after it had crossed, he had destroyed the bridge, the enemy having retired towards Alexander's bridge. Upon this information I directed General Brannan to post a brigade, within supporting distance of Baird, on the road to Alexander's bridge, and with his other two brigades to reconnoitre the road leading to Reid's bridge to see if he could locate the brigade reported by Colonel McCook, and, if a favorable opportunity occurred, to capture it. His dispositions were made according to instructions by 9 a. m. General Baird was directed to throw forward his right wing, so as to get more nearly in line with Brannan, but to watch well on his right flank. Soon after this disposition of these two divisions, a portion of Palmer's division, of Crittenden's corps, took position to the right of General Baird's division. About 10 o'clock, Croxton's brigade, of Brannan's division, posted on the road leading to Alexander's bridge, became engaged with the enemy, and I rode forward to his position to ascertain the character of the attack. Colonel Croxton reported to me that he had driven the enemy nearly half a mile, but that he was then meeting with obstinate resistance. I then rode back to Baird's position, and directed him to advance to Croxton's support, which he did with his whole division, Starkweather's brigade in reserve, and drove the enemy steadily before him for some distance, taking many prisoners. Croxton's brigade, which had been heavily engaged for over an hour with greatly superior numbers of the enemy, and being nearly exhausted of ammunition, was then moved to the rear to enable the men to fill up their boxes; and Baird and Brannan, having united their forces, drove the enemy from their

immediate front. General Baird then halted for the purpose of readjusting his line; and learning from prisoners that the enemy were in heavy force on his immediate right, he threw back his right wing in order to be ready for an attack from that quarter. Before his dispositions could be completed, the enemy, in overwhelming numbers, furiously assaulted Scribner's and King's brigades, and drove them in disorder. Fortunately, at this time, Johnson's division, of McCook's corps, and Reynolds's division, of my corps, arrived, and were immediately placed in position. Johnson preceding Reynolds, his left connecting with Baird's right, and Palmer being immediately on Johnson's right, Reynolds was placed on the right of Palmer, with one brigade of his division in reserve. As soon as formed they advanced upon the enemy, attacking him in flank and driving him in great confusion for a mile and a half, while Brannan's troops met them in front as they were pursuing Baird's retiring brigades, driving the head of his column back and retaking the artillery which had been temporarily lost by Baird's brigades; the ninth Ohio recovering battery H, fifth United States artillery, at the point of the bayonet. The enemy at this time being hardly pressed by Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds, in flank, fell back in confusion upon his reserves, posted in a strong position on the west side of Chickamauga creek between Reid's and Alexander's bridges. Brannan and Baird were then ordered to reorganize their commands and take position on commanding ground on the road from McDaniel's to Reid's bridge, and hold it to the last extremity, as I expected the next effort of the enemy would be to gain that road and our rear. This was about 2 p. m. After a lull of about one hour, a furious attack was made upon Reynolds's right, and he having called upon me for re-enforcements, I directed Brannan's division to move to his support, leaving King's brigade, of Baird's division, to hold the position at which Baird and Brannan had been posted, the balance of Baird's division closing up to the right of Johnson's division. It will be seen, by General Reynolds's report, Croxton's brigade, of Brannan's division, reached his right just in time to defeat the enemy's efforts to turn Reynolds's right and rear. About 5 p. m., my lines being at that time very much extended in pursuing the enemy, I determined to concentrate them on more commanding ground, as I felt confident that we should have a renewal of the battle the next morning. I rode forward to General Johnson's position and designated to him where to place his division; also to General Baird, who was present with Johnson. I then rode back to the cross-roads to locate Palmer and Reynolds on Johnson's right, and on the crest of the ridge about five hundred yards east of the State road. Soon after Palmer and Reynolds got their positions; and while Brannan was getting his on the ridge to the west of the State road, near Dyer's house, to the rear and right of Reynolds, where I had ordered him as a reserve, the enemy assaulted first Johnson and then Baird in a most furious manner, producing some confusion, but order was soon restored, and the enemy repulsed in fine style; after which these two divisions took up the positions assigned to them for the night. Before adjusting the line satisfactorily, I received an order to report to department headquarters immediately, and was absent from my command until near midnight. After my return from department headquarters, and about 2 a. m. on the 20th, I received a report from General Baird that the left of his division did not rest on the Reid's Bridge road as I had intended, and that he could not reach it without weakening his line too much. I immediately addressed a note to the general commanding requesting that General Negley be sent me to take position on General Baird's left and rear, and thus secure our left from assault. During the night the troops threw up temporary breastworks of logs, and prepared for the encounter which all anticipated would come off the next day. Although informed by note, from General Rosecrans's headquarters, that Negley's division would be sent immediately to take post on my left, it had not arrived at 7 a. m. on the 20th, and I sent Captain Willard, of my staff, to General Negley to

urge him forward as rapidly as possible, and to point out his position to him. General Negley, in his official report, mentions that he received this order through Captain Willard at 8 a. m. on the 20th, and that he immediately commenced withdrawing his division for that purpose, when the enemy was reported to be massing a heavy force in his front, sharply engaging his skirmishers, and that he was directed by General Rosecrans to hold his position until relieved by some other command. General Beatty's brigade, however, was sent under guidance of Captain Willard, who took it to its position, and it went into action immediately. The enemy at that time commenced a furious assault on Baird's left, and partially succeeded in gaining his rear. Beatty, meeting with superior numbers, was compelled to fall back until relieved by the fire of several regiments of Palmer's reserve, which I had ordered to the support of the left, being placed in position by General Baird, and which regiments, with the co-operation of Van Deever's brigade of Brannan's division, and a portion of Stanley's brigade of Negley's division, drove the enemy entirely from Baird's left and rear. General Baird being still hardly pressed in front, I ordered General Wood, who had just reported to me in person, to send one of the brigades of his division to General Baird. He replied that his division had been ordered by General Rosecrans to support Reynolds's right, but that if I would take the responsibility of changing his orders, he would cheerfully obey them, and sent Barnes's brigades, the head of which had just reached my position. General Wood then left me to rejoin the remainder of his division, which was still coming up. To prevent a repetition of this attack on the part of the enemy, I directed Captain Gaw, chief topographical officer on my staff, to go to the commanding officer of the troops on the left and rear of Baird's and direct him to mass as much artillery on the slopes of Missionary ridge, west of the State road, as he could conveniently spare from his lines, supported strongly by infantry, so as to sweep the ground to the left and rear of Baird's position. This order General Negley, in his official report, mentions having received through Captain Gaw, but from his description of the position he assumed, he must have misunderstood my order, and instead of massing the artillery near Baird's left, it was posted on the right of Brannan's division, nearly in rear of Reynolds's right. At the time the assault just described was made on Baird, the enemy attacked Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds, with equal fierceness, which was continued at least two hours, making assault after assault with fresh troops, which were met by our troops with a most determined coolness and deliberation. The enemy having exhausted his utmost energies to dislodge us, he apparently fell back entirely from our front, and we were not disturbed again until near night, after the withdrawal of the troops to Rodsville had commenced. Just before the repulse of the enemy on our left, General Beatty came to me for fresh troops, in person, stating that most of those I had sent to him had gone back to the rear and right, and he was anxious to get at least another brigade before they attacked him again. I immediately sent Captain Kellogg to hurry up General Sheridan, whose division I had been informed would be sent to me. About 2 p. m., hearing heavy firing to my right and rear through the woods, very soon after Captain Kellogg left me, I turned in that direction and was riding to the slope of the hill in my rear to ascertain the cause. Just as I passed out of the woods, bordering the State road, I met Captain Kellogg returning, who reported to me that in attempting to reach General Sheridan he had met a large force in an open cornfield to the rear of Reynolds's position, advancing cautiously, with a strong line of skirmishers thrown out to their front, and that they had fired on him and forced him to return. He had reported this to Colonel Harker, commanding a brigade of Wood's division, posted on a ridge a short distance to the rear of Reynolds's position, who also saw this force advancing, but, with Captain Kellogg, was of the opinion that they might be Sheridan's troops coming to our assistance. I rode forward to Colonel Harker's position, and told him that, although I was expecting Sheridan from that direction, if these troops

fired on him, seeing his flag, he must return their fire, and resist their further advance. He immediately ordered his skirmishers to commence firing, and took up a position with his brigade on the crest of a hill, a short distance to his right and rear, placing his right in connexion with Brannan's division, and portions of Beatty's and Stanley's brigades of Negley's division, which had been retired to that point, from the left, as circumstantially narrated in the report of General John Beatty and Colonel Stanley; I then rode to the east of the hill referred to above. On my way I met General Wood, who confirmed me in the opinion that the troops advancing upon us were the enemy, although we were not then aware of the disaster to the right and centre of our army. I then directed him to place his division on the prolongation of Brannan's, who, I had ascertained from Hood, was on the top of the hill above referred to, and to resist the further advance of the enemy as long as possible. I sent my aid, Captain Kellogg, to notify General Reynolds that our right had been turned, and that the enemy was in his rear, and in force. General Wood barely had time to dispose his troops on the left of Brannan before another of those fierce assaults, similar to those made in the morning on my lines, was made on him and Brannan combined, and kept up by the enemy, throwing in fresh troops as fast as those in their front were driven back, until near nightfall. About the time that Wood took up his position, General Gordon Granger appeared on my left flank at the head of Steedman's division of his corps. I immediately despatched a staff officer, Captain Johnson, second Indiana cavalry, of Negley's division, to him with orders to push forward and take position on Brannan's right, which order was complied with, with the greatest promptness and alacrity, Steedman moving his division into position with almost as much precision as if on drill, and fighting his way to the crest of the hill on Brannan's right, moved forward his artillery and drove the enemy down the southern slope, inflicting on him a most terrible loss in killed and wounded. This opportune arrival of fresh troops revived the flagging spirits of our men on the right, and inspired them with new ardor for the contest. Every assault of the enemy from that time until nightfall was repulsed in the most gallant style by the whole line. By this time the ammunition in the boxes of the men was reduced, on an average, to two or three rounds per man, and my ammunition trains having been unfortunately ordered to the rear by some unauthorized person, we should have been entirely without ammunition in a very short time had not a small supply come up with General Steedman's command. This being distributed among the troops, gave them about ten rounds per man. General Garfield, chief of staff of General Rosecrans, reached this position about 4 p. m., in company with Lieutenant Colonel Thruston, of McCook's staff, and Captains Gaw and Barker, of my staff, who had been sent to the rear to bring back the ammunition, if possible. General Garfield gave me the first reliable information that the right and centre of our own army had been driven, and of its condition at that time. I soon after received a despatch from General Rosecrans, directing me to assume command of all the forces, and with Crittenden and McCook take a strong position and assume a threatening attitude at Rossville, sending the unorganized forces to Chattanooga for reorganization, stating that he would examine the ground at Chattanooga, and then join me; also, that he had sent out rations and ammunition to meet me at Rossville. I determined to hold the position until nightfall, if possible, in the mean time sending Captains Barker and Kellogg to distribute the ammunition—Major Lawrence, my chief of artillery, having been previously sent to notify the different commanders that ammunition would be supplied them shortly. As soon as they reported the distribution of the ammunition, I directed Captain Willard to inform the division commanders to prepare to withdraw their commands as soon as they received orders. At 5.30 p. m. Captain Barker, commanding my escort, was sent to notify General Reynolds to commence the movement, and I left the position behind General Wood's command to meet Reynolds and point out to him the position where I wished him to form line to

cover the retirement of the other troops on the left. In passing through an open woods bordering on the State road, and between my last and Reynolds's position, I was cautioned by a couple of soldiers, who had been to hunt water, that there was a large rebel force in these woods, drawn up in line and advancing towards me. Just at this time I saw the head of Reynolds's column approaching, and calling to the general himself, directed him to form line perpendicular to the State road, changing the head of his column to the left, with his right resting on that road, and to charge the enemy, who were then in his immediate front. This movement was made with the utmost promptitude, and facing to the right whilst on the march. Turchin threw his brigade upon the rebel force, routing them, and driving them in utter confusion entirely beyond Baird's left. In this splendid advance more than 200 prisoners were captured and sent to the rear. Colonel Robinson, commanding the twentieth brigade Reynolds's division, followed closely upon Turchin, and I posted him on the road leading through the ridge to hold the ground whilst the troops on our right and left passed by. In a few moments General Willich, commanding a brigade of Johnson's division, reported to me that his brigade was in position on a commanding piece of ground to the right of the ridge road. I directed him to report to General Reynolds, and assist in covering the retirement of the troops. Turchin's brigade, after driving the enemy a mile and a half, was reassembled, and took its position on the ridge road, with Robinson and Willich. These dispositions being made, I sent orders to Generals Wood, Brannan, and Granger to withdraw from their positions. Johnson's and Baird's divisions were attacked at the moment of retiring, but by being prepared, retired without confusion, or any serious losses. General Palmer was also attacked whilst retiring. Gross's brigade was thrown into some confusion, but Creft's brigade came off in good style, both, however, with little loss. I then proceeded to Rossville, accompanied by Generals Garfield and Gordon Granger, and immediately prepared to place the troops in position at that point. One brigade of Negley's division was posted in the gap, on the Ringold road, and two brigades on the top of the ridge to the right of the road, adjoining the brigade in the road; Reynolds's division on the right of Negley's and reaching to the Dry Valley road; Brannan's division in the rear of Reynolds's right, as a reserve; McCook's corps on the right of the Dry Valley road, and stretching towards the west, his right reaching nearly to Chattanooga creek; Crittenden's entire corps was posted on the heights to the left of the Ringold road, with Steedman's division of Granger's corps in reserve behind his left; Baird's division in reserve, and in supporting distance of the brigade in the gap; McCook's brigade of Granger's corps was also posted as a reserve to the brigade of Negley's on the top of the ridge, to the right of the road; Minty's brigade of cavalry was on the Ringold road, about one mile and a half in advance of the gap. About 10 a. m. on the 21st, received a message from Minty that the enemy were advancing on him with a strong force of cavalry and infantry. I directed him to retire through the gap, and post his command on our left flank, and throw out strong reconnoitring parties across the ridge to observe and report any movements of the enemy on our left front. From information received from citizens, I was convinced that the position was untenable in the face of the odds we had opposed to us, as the enemy could easily concentrate upon our right flank, which, if driven, would expose our centre and left to be cut entirely off from our communications. I therefore advised the commanding general to concentrate the troops at Chattanooga. About the time I made the suggestion to withdraw, the enemy made a demonstration in the direct road, but were soon repulsed. In anticipation of this order to concentrate at Chattanooga, I sent for the corps commanders, and gave such general instructions as would enable them to prepare their commands for making the movement without confusion. All wagons, ambulances, and surplus artillery carriages were sent to the rear before night. The order for the with-

drawal being received about 6 p. m., the movement commenced at 9 p. m., in the following order: strong skirmish lines, under the direction of judicious officers, were thrown out to the front of each division to cover this movement, with directions to retire at daylight, deployed and in supporting distance, the whole to be supported by the first division 14th army corps, under the superintendence of Major General Rousseau, assisted by Muelly's brigade of cavalry, which was to follow after the skirmishers. Crittenden's corps was to move from the mills to the left of the road at 9 p. m., followed by Steedman's division. Next Negley's division was to withdraw at 10 p. m.; then Reynolds, McCook's corps, by divisions, from left to right, moving within supporting distance one after the other; Brannan's was posted at 6 p. m., on the road about half-way between Rossville and Chattanooga to cover the movement. The troops were withdrawn in a quiet, orderly manner, without the loss of a single man, and by 7 a. m., on the 22d, were in their positions in front of Chattanooga, which had been assigned to them previous to their arrival, and which they now occupy, covered by strong intrenchments thrown up on the day of our arrival; and strengthened, from day to day, until they were considered sufficiently strong for all defensive purposes. I respectfully refer you to the reports of division, brigade, and regimental commanders for the names of those of their respective commands who distinguished themselves. Among them I am much gratified to find the names of Colonel F. Van Derveer, thirty-fifth Ohio, commanding third brigade, and Colonel John T. Croxton, fourth Kentucky, commanding second brigade, Brannan's division, both of whom I saw on Saturday, and can confirm the reports given of them by their division commander. Colonel B. F. Scribner, thirty-eighth Indiana, commanding first brigade, Baird's division, was on the right of that division on Saturday morning, when it was attacked in flank by an overwhelming force of the enemy and driven back; yet Colonel Scribner was enabled to rally and reorganize it without the least difficulty, as soon as supported by Johnson's division. All the troops under my immediate command fought most gallantly on battle days, and were ably handled by their respective commanders, viz., Major Generals Palmer and Reynolds, and Brigadier Generals Brannan, Johnson, and Baird, on Saturday, and on Sunday, in the afternoon, in addition to the above, Major General Gordon Granger, commanding reserve corps, and Brigadier General Wood, commanding first division 21st army corps, who, with two brigades of his division, under their brave commanders, Colonels Harker and Buell, most nobly sustained Brannan's left, while Brigadier General Steedman, commanding a division of the reserve corps, as valiantly maintained his right. Colonel Dan McCook, commanding a brigade of the reserve corps, and left by General Granger, near McDaniel's house, in a commanding position, kept a large force of the enemy's cavalry at bay while hovering on Baird's left, and with his battery materially aided Turchin's handsome charge on the enemy, who had closed in on our left. Brigadier General Willich, commanding a brigade of Johnson's division on Saturday, in the attack, and especially on Sunday, nobly sustained his reputation as a soldier. Brigadier General Jno. Beatty and Colonel F. R. Stanley, commanding brigades of Negley's division, bravely supported Baird's left in the morning of Sunday. Colonel Stanley being struck by the fragments of a shell and disabled in the afternoon, the brigade fought with Brannan's division, under the command of Colonel W. L. Stoughton, eleventh Michigan. Colonel J. G. Parkhurst, commanding ninth Michigan volunteers, and provost marshal 14th army corps, at the head of his regiment, did most valuable service on the 20th, in arresting stragglers and reorganizing the troops which had been driven from the field. His report is herewith enclosed, and special reference made thereto for particulars.

I also tender my thanks to the members of my staff for the services they rendered me. To Lieutenant Colonel G. E. Flynt, my assistant adjutant general; Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Mackey, chief quartermaster; Lieutenant Colonel J.



R. Paul, chief commissary of subsistence, who, although not present on the field of battle, were discharging their duties in their respective departments entirely to my satisfaction; Lieutenant Colonel A. Von Schrader, seventy-fourth Ohio, assistant inspector general, who rendered most efficient service as aide-de-camp during the first day's fight, and who was taken prisoner on the afternoon of the 19th while in discharge of his duty; Major W. E. Lawrence, first Ohio artillery, my chief of artillery, Captains J. P. Willard and S. C. Kellogg, aides-de-camp; Captain J. D. Barker, first Ohio cavalry, commanding my escort; Captain W. B. Gaw, chief topographical officer 14th army corps, as also the signal officers of the corps, who did duty on the field as aids, were of great assistance in conducting the operations of my command. Surgeons F. H. Grass, medical director, and H. C. Barrell, medical purveyor, were untiring in their efforts to relieve the wants of the wounded; Dr. Grass was wounded early in the engagement, Sunday, but continued in the discharge of his duties; Captain G. C. Moody, nineteenth United States infantry, commanding musters, also rendered efficient service as aide-de-camp; Captain Johnson, second Indiana cavalry, of General Negley's staff, and Captain T. C. Williams, nineteenth United States infantry, of General Baird's staff, having been cut off from their respective commanders, reported to me for duty, and were of great assistance as aids.

I submit herewith annexed a consolidated report of the casualties of the 14th army corps.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General U. S. Vols., Commanding.*

Brigadier General J. A. GARFIELD,

*Chief of Staff, Department of Cumberland.*

*Summary of killed, wounded, and missing in the 14th army corps, during the battles of the 19th and 20th September, 1863.*

STAFF OF 14TH ARMY CORPS.

Name.	Rank.	Regiment.	Remarks.
A. Von Sewrader.....	Lieut. colonel.....	74th Ohio.....	Acting inspector general missing.
G. W. Landrum.....	1st lieutenant.....	2d Ohio.....	Signal officer missing.

FIRST DIVISION.

Command.	Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.			Aggregate.		
	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Total.	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Total.	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Total.	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Total.
<i>1st brigade.</i>												
38th Indiana vols.....		10	10		48	48		51	51		109	109
94th Ohio vols.....		2	2	1	20	21	1	22	23	2	44	46
2d Ohio vols.....		8	8	1	43	44	9	118	127	10	169	179
10th Wisconsin vols.....	1	9	10		38	38	14	131	145	15	178	193
33d Ohio vols.....	2	11	13	3	48	51	5	88	93	10	147	157
1st Michigan battery.....	1	5	6		6	6		13	13	1	24	25
Total.....	4	45	49	5	203	208	29	423	452	38	671	709

*Summary of killed, wounded, and missing, &c.—Continued.*

## FIRST DIVISION—CONTINUED.

Command.	Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.			Aggregate.		
	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Total.	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Total.	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Total.	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Total.
<i>2d brigade.</i>												
79th Pennsylvania vols.....	1	15	16	5	62	67	1	41	42	7	118	125
21st Wisconsin vols.....		2	2	4	32	36	8	67	75	12	101	113
24th Illinois vols.....	1	18	19	9	67	76	3	53	56	13	138	151
1st Wisconsin vols.....	4	23	27	5	75	80	4	77	81	13	175	188
4th Indiana battery.....		1	1		14	14	1	4	5	1	19	20
Total.....	6	59	65	23	250	273	17	242	259	46	551	597
<i>3d brigade.</i>												
18th U. S. infantry.....	1	32	33	6	145	151	5	113	118	12	290	302
19th U. S. infantry.....	2	2	4	2	12	14	7	111	118	11	125	136
15th U. S. infantry.....		9	9	2	30	32	6	113	119	8	152	160
16th U. S. infantry.....		2	2	3	16	19	11	164	175	14	182	196
5th artillery.....	1	12	13	2	16	18		13	13	3	41	44
Total.....	4	57	61	15	219	234	29	514	543	48	790	838

## SECOND DIVISION.

<i>1st brigade.</i>												
15th Kentucky vols.....		5	5		42	42	1	14	15	1	61	62
42d Indiana vols.....		1	1	3	49	52	3	50	53	6	100	106
88th Indiana vols.....	1	2	3	3	29	32	2	15	17	6	46	52
104th Illinois vols.....		2	2	5	40	45		16	16	5	58	63
Bridge's battery.....	1	5	6		16	16		4	4	1	25	26
Total.....	2	15	17	11	176	187	6	99	105	19	290	309
<i>2d brigade.</i>												
18th Ohio vols.....		5	5	6	49	55		14	14	6	68	74
19th Illinois vols.....		10	10	4	41	48	1	15	16	5	66	71
11th Michigan vols.....	1	4	5	4	38	42		19	19	5	61	66
69th Ohio vols.....												
Battery M, 1st Ohio vols.....					4	4					4	4
Total.....	1	19	20	14	132	146	1	48	49	16	199	215
<i>3d brigade.</i>												
21st Ohio vols.....		28	28	3	65	68	12	135	147	15	228	243
78th Pennsylvania vols.....		2	2		4	4		3	3		9	9
74th Ohio vols.....		2	2		4	4		6	6		12	12
37th Indiana vols.....					7	7		2	2		9	9
Battery G, 1st Penn. vols.....												
Total.....		32	32	3	80	83	12	146	158	15	258	273

## THIRD DIVISION.

<i>1st brigade.</i>												
17th Ohio vols.....	1	15	16	9	103	112	3	18	21	13	136	149
31st Ohio vols.....		13	13	6	126	132		22	22	6	161	167
82d Indiana vols.....	1	19	20	1	66	67	2	21	23	4	106	110
4th Michigan battery.....				1	6	7		4	4	1	10	11
Total.....	2	47	49	17	301	318	5	65	70	24	413	437

*Summary of killed, wounded, and missing, &c.—Continued.*

## THIRD DIVISION—CONTINUED.

Command.	Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.			Aggregate.		
	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Total.	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Total.	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Total.	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Total.
<i>2d brigade.</i>												
14th Ohio vols. ....		35	35	8	158	166		43	43	8	236	244
74th Indiana vols. ....	2	20	22	12	113	125		10	10	14	143	157
10th Indiana vols. ....	2	22	24	8	127	135		5	5	10	154	164
40th Kentucky vols. ....	1	20	21	6	128	134		10	10	7	158	165
4th Kentucky vols. ....		25	25	12	141	153		12	12	12	178	190
Company C, 1st Ohio vols. ....		4	4		9	9					13	13
Total.....	5	126	131	46	676	722		80	80	51	882	933
<i>3d brigade.</i>												
35th Ohio vols. ....	2	19	21	7	132	139	1	26	27	10	177	187
2d Minnesota vols. ....		35	35	6	107	113				6	142	148
91st Ohio vols. ....	3	45	48	7	176	183	1	15	16	11	236	247
87th Indiana vols. ....	3	37	40	7	130	137		8	8	10	175	185
Comp'y I, 4th U. S. artillery		1	1	1	20	21				1	21	22
Total.....	8	137	145	28	565	593	2	49	51	38	751	789

## FOURTH DIVISION.

<i>1st brigade.</i>												
17th Indiana vols. ....		4	4		9	9		3	3		16	16
72d Indiana vols. ....	1	9	10		23	23		2	2	1	34	35
52d Illinois vols. ....		2	2	2	24	26		2	2	2	28	30
98th Illinois vols. ....		2	2	2	29	31		2	2	2	33	35
123d Illinois vols. ....		1	1	2	11	13	1	9	10	3	21	24
18th Indiana battery ....		1	1	2	2	4				2	3	5
Total.....	1	19	20	8	98	106	1	18	19	10	135	145
<i>2d brigade.</i>												
105th Ohio vols. ....		3	3	4	31	35	2	30	32	6	64	70
75th Indiana vols. ....		17	17	3	96	99	2	19	21	5	132	137
101st Indiana vols. ....		11	11	4	83	87		17	17	4	111	115
6th Indiana vols. ....				5	103	108		11	11	5	114	119
19th Indiana battery ....		2	2	1	15	16		2	2	1	19	20
Total.....		33	33	17	328	345	4	79	83	21	440	461
<i>3d brigade.</i>												
89th Ohio vols. ....	2	17	19	1	61	62	13	158	171	16	236	252
36th Ohio vols. ....	1	11	12	3	62	65		13	13	4	86	90
11th Ohio vols. ....		5	5	1	35	36	2	20	22	3	60	63
92d Ohio vols. ....		6	6	6	62	68		17	17	6	85	91
18th Kentucky vols. ....		7	7	8	37	45	4	29	33	12	73	85
31st Indiana battery ....					12	12					12	12
Total.....	3	46	49	19	269	288	19	237	256	41	552	593

*Summary of killed, wounded, and missing, &c.—Continued.*

## RECAPITULATION.

	Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.			Aggregate.		
	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Total.	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Total.	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Total.	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Total.
Headquarters.....	14	161	175	43	672	715	2	1,179	1,254	2	2,012	2,144
1st division.....	3	66	69	28	388	416	19	293	312	50	747	797
2d division.....	15	310	325	91	1,542	1,633	7	194	201	113	2,046	2,159
3d division.....	4	98	102	44	695	739	24	334	358	72	1,127	1,199
4th division.....												
Total.....	36	635	671	206	3,297	3,503	127	2,000	2,127	369	5,932	6,301

Respectfully submitted :

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
Major General U. S. V., Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,  
Chattanooga, Tenn., October 11, 1863.

True copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,  
Brevet Major and A. D. C.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION 14TH ARMY CORPS,  
Chattanooga, Tenn., September, 1863.

COLONEL : I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this division, from the 2d of September, when we moved from our camp on Crow creek to cross the Tennessee river, to the 22d, when we reached this place.

The reports of the battles are made separate, and in detail.

I marched from the point above mentioned on the 2d instant, and concentrated my force near Bridgeport, but was unable, from the great accumulation of materials, troops, and trains, as well as the frequent breaking of the bridge, to pass the river until the 4th. I then crossed without an accident or moment of delay, occupying the day in so doing, and encamped at night near the south end of the bridge. Upon the 5th I moved to Morse's spring, at the foot of Sand mountain, but was delayed there until night by trains of other divisions in advance of me. On the 6th, after a day of hard labor, I got my troops, artillery, and wagons, upon the mountains, and late at night went into camp at Warren's mill, four miles from the summit. On the 7th I moved on, descended the mountain again, detained by troops and trains in our front, and leaving the seventy-ninth Pennsylvania volunteers to work the road down the mountain, encamped at a late hour of the night in Lookout valley at the junction of Lookout and Hurricane creeks. On the 8th and 9th I remained in camp waiting for General Negley, in front, to get over Lookout mountain. On the 10th, in obedience to orders to unite with General Negley in McLamoore's cave, I labored hard during the whole day, and at 10 o'clock at night had only got my troops, artillery, and a portion of my train to the foot of the mountain in Stevens's Gap, and was compelled to leave the rest of the train on the summit, with a regiment to guard it. On the 11th I moved forward with the portion of my force present, and joined General Negley near the entrance to Dug Gap, in Pigeon mountain. We here had an encounter with the enemy, which forms the subject of a separate report, hereto attached, and at night fell back to Stevens's Gap. During the 12th my men, having been under arms all night, and having

no sleep for two nights, were still kept in position, awaiting an attack from the enemy. General Braunan came up during the day, and taking Colonel Scribner's brigade, I united with him in a reconnoissance to Dug Gap, and returned at night. During the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th we remained in camp at Stevens's Gap awaiting the arrival of Major General McCook, the first of whose division arrived on the 16th. On the 17th we marched to Bird's mills, on Chickamauga creek, and encamped between there and Owen's ford. On the 18th received orders in the afternoon to march to the left by way of Crawfish springs, which place we reached about midnight, and there received orders for our disposition next day. On the 19th and 20th were engaged with the enemy, the events being reported separately in the reports herewith annexed. On the 21st, after collecting our force at Rossville, we fell back to this place, bringing in the pickets and covering the retreat. We reached here on Monday, the 22d instant.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. BAIRD,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

Lieutenant Colonel GEO. E. FLYNT,

*Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters 14th Army Corps.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION 14TH ARMY CORPS,  
*Stevens's Gap, Ga., September 11, 1863.*

COLONEL: In obedience to orders from the major general commanding, I moved on the 10th instant, with the first and second brigades of my division, from Johnson's creek, Lookout valley, to cross Lookout mountain, and unite with Major General Negley's command, then at or slightly in advance of this place. With much difficulty and great labor I succeeded, by nine o'clock p. m., in getting to the foot of the mountain with three regiments of General Starkweather's brigade, the first and twenty-first Wisconsin, and twenty-fourth Illinois, and his battery; also a portion of my transportation train and four regiments of Colonel Scribner's brigade, the thirty-third and ninety-fourth Ohio, the thirty-eighth Indiana and tenth Wisconsin, together with the first Michigan battery. The remainder of the division was in rear, employed either in guarding trains or depots, or other important duty, so that I had with me about 2,800 men. On my arrival here I received intelligence from General Negley, who had moved forward in the morning, to the effect that he had driven the enemy before him during the day and had got up quite close to Dug Gap, on the road to Lafayette; that he here met with a strong resistance, perhaps too great for his force to overcome, and at the same time that he had learned of a large rebel force with 12 pieces of artillery on his left flank, lower down the valley. The communication expressed anxiety for the safety of his own party, and a wish that I should move forward as rapidly as possible. The fact of a rebel force, both of artillery and infantry, being near us down the valley, was likewise reported to me by citizens of credibility. In the condition in which I was, with a portion of my train at the foot and the rest on the mountain, requiring a guard to protect it from approach by way of Cooper's Gap, I felt somewhat embarrassed. I sent word, however, to General Negley, suggesting that if he believed in the reports regarding the forces opposed to us, that it might be better for him to fall back upon me at this place, where we could defend ourselves and trains until other forces could arrive; nevertheless, that if he thought otherwise I would march at 3 o'clock in the morning with the force at hand and join him. This he replied would be satisfactory. As soon as possible after 3 o'clock a. m. on the 11th instant I moved forward, taking everything with me, as I was not able to leave a guard

for it here. At about 8 o'clock I reached General Negley's headquarters, at the widow Davis's house. All then appeared to be quiet, and I soon after started with him to ride around his lines, so as to acquire some knowledge of the country. General Negley upon this ride explained to me that his left flank and rear were in danger, and that he intended drawing back some portion of his force from the front beyond the creek to prolong our line to the left and rear, and that he wished me to occupy with my troops the position from which he would withdraw his. Returning from this ride we were informed that firing had commenced in the front, and we at once rode to the spot. About half a mile beyond (eastward) the widow Davis's house, beyond the woods, and with open fields in front, our line of infantry and artillery was formed; the right resting upon the Dug Gap road, supported by skirmishers in a wood upon the other side of the road, extending one-fourth of a mile further, as far as Shaw's house; our main line curved over the ridge to the Chattanooga road, and thence fell back to the left and rear, being for the greater part of its extent in the woods; in front of our right our line of skirmishers occupied some woods beyond the open ground about 800 yards from our line of battle. Just as we arrived upon the ground our skirmishers were driven back some 200 yards from the woods and took shelter behind a fence. The enemy then had the advantage, and his fire was quite sharp, but indicated nothing serious. Attracted by the appearance of mounted officers in the line, many shots were directed towards them with much accuracy, notwithstanding the distance, and one passing quite near, inflicted a serious if not fatal wound upon my orderly, just in rear. We then returned to General Negley's headquarters, and I to get my men under arms and to remove my wagons, which I found to be too much exposed, to a more secure locality. I was about the same time told by General Negley that a large force was coming towards us from Blue Bird Gap, and his informant said within three-quarters of a mile; also that the enemy was working around our left, and that he must make his new dispositions at once. I threw, as speedily as possible, my seven regiments on the line extending from the Dug Gap road to the Chattanooga road, relieving those of General Negley. The line was so extended that it left me nothing with which to guard or support my right flank had it been heavily attacked. This was the portion of our line then immediately under the fire of the enemy's skirmishers, and the replacement of General Negley's men by my own, and throwing out a new line of skirmishers, was an operation of some delicacy; but, thanks to the skill of my commanders, and the good instructions of the men, was performed without a mishap. Hardly had I got my men in position, when General Negley informed me that if his information became more threatening he should fall back and take up a new position on the Missionary ridge. He asked what I thought of it, and I replied that I concurred with him, and mentioned my suggestion of the night before, that he should fall back to me at Stevens's Gap. The plan he adopted was to form a second line with a portion of his troops, on the first rise west of the creek, and to pass his trains to the rear to be followed by mine. Then I was to withdraw and form again a third line upon Missionary ridge. It was immediately put in operation and rapidly executed. The enemy saw, without doubt, the movement of our trains to the rear, and hastened the collection of troops in the woods to assail both of my flanks. The sequel showed that it was their intention to throw a strong force upon widow Davis's house, where it would have been one-half mile in rear of my right flank. I was not aware of this at the time, but had made preparations to draw troops from the other flank to me in such a contingency. The trains having all passed, I prepared to bring back my troops, the line first, and then the skirmishers, each 500 yards at a time, pivoting on my left, already on the Chattanooga road, and swinging around to reform our line at the cross-roads. To do this successfully required a complete understanding between the commanders, and as my regiments were all in a dense

wood where one could not see the length of a regiment, it required a little time to put it in operation. I had barely commenced, when General Negley sent word that I could not get my men over the creek too soon, and I hastened accordingly. Our line was formed with regularity, by columns of battalions, and I then sent all my artillery to the rear, afterward the remaining troops of General Negley, and then directed Colonel Scribner to retire by regiments from his left. They then passed through a wood by which the movement was concealed. This completed, General Starkweather was left at the cross-roads with three regiments, and at the same time the plans of the enemy developed themselves, but a little too late to do us much damage. A battery, planted on our left, out of sight on the prolongation of the Chattanooga road, attempted to shell these regiments, but not seeing them the shells passed over. Simultaneously a heavy line of skirmishers pushed out into the field on right of Dug Gap road, and beyond Bird Gap road, under cover of which a double line of battle was formed and advanced. Our men fell back, covered by the skirmishers, to the creek, and there a brief but sharp contest took place. The enemy pressed on vigorously, but being repulsed by the fire of our men, many of whom had taken position behind a stone fence, we had time to retire behind the second line. In passing Colonel Scribner, I had been ordered by General Negley to move on with train to Bailey's cross roads, and there take position, while General Starkweather was to be posted in line of the road, upon Missionary ridge. A brigade of General Negley's men was upon the north, thus forming the third and last line we established. The only portion of my command in the second line was the fourth Indiana battery, which was supported by regiments from General Negley's division, and contributed in no small degree to the repulse of the enemy, who, supported by a heavy fire from his batteries, charged boldly upon the second line. The third line having been established, the second retired behind it, and was no longer molested. The third fell back gradually, and night coming on I drew the regiment of Colonel Mihalotz (24th Illinois) into the road and remained with it in rear until we reached this place. General Negley, in advance, had selected a position for the troops, anticipating a renewal of the attack in the morning, and thus closed the events of the day. These operations, while of too unimportant a character to be dignified by the name of a battle, and really not sufficient to test the mettle of my troops, who would have been glad to have pushed further still, presented occasions of a severe trial to the parties involved, as a general engagement. I claim for my command the credit of having handsomely performed the difficult military operation of retiring, step by step, in good order, while constantly engaged with the enemy. It is an evidence of what may be expected from these men in the future. They have my highest commendation, and I trust their conduct will meet with the approval of the major general commanding. It would be wrong for me to name those whose good conduct attracted my attention, lest I might do injustice to others whom I did not see. I leave this to eth brigade commanders, more constantly upon the spot, and their reports I enclose herewith. Not an instance of bad conduct has been brought to my notice. The brigade commanders themselves, Brigadier General Starkweather and Colonel Scribner, I desire to name to the general for their coolness and bravery, as well as the skill and good judgment with which they managed their commands. The officers of my staff I must likewise mention for their zeal, energy, and efficiency with which they discharged their duty. It is the best method I have of thanking these officers.

My losses, considering the amount of powder expended by the enemy and the circumstances in which we were placed, are remarkably small. We fired but little, yet I am satisfied inflicted far greater loss upon him.

My list of casualties is as follows :

Private Benjamin W. Singer, company E second Kentucky cavalry, orderly at these headquarters, severely wounded.

#### FIRST BRIGADE.

*Killed.*—Corporal Daniel Pope, company B, thirty-eighth Indiana volunteers.

*Wounded.*—Private F. M. Kelley, company B, thirty-eighth Indiana volunteers; Private W. Nofrey, company C, thirty-eighth Indiana volunteers.

*Prisoners.*—Sergeant W. H. Heutsler, company E, thirty-eighth Indiana volunteers; Private Isaiah Carter, company E, thirty-eighth Indiana volunteers.

#### SECOND BRIGADE.

*Killed.*—First Lieutenant Robert I. Nickols, first Wisconsin volunteers, aide-de-camp; Private F. I. Stearns, fourth Indiana battery.

*Wounded.*—Sergeant H. A. Young, fourth Indiana battery.

#### RECAPITULATION.

Killed, 3; wounded, 4; prisoners, 2; total, 9.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. BAIRD,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

Lieut. Colonel GEO. E. FLYNT,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

*Report of the operations of the first division, 14th army corps, in the battle of Chickamauga creek, September 19, 20, and 21, 1863.*

Being encamped upon Chickamauga Creek between Bird's mill and Owen's ford, with the division of General Brannan on my right and General Negley on my left, I received orders on the 18th instant from the major general commanding to move immediately to the left, lower down the creek, for the support of General Crittenden's corps, as the enemy appeared to be gathering in that direction.

The road being encumbered by troops in advance, I did not reach Crawfish springs, the headquarters of the army, until near midnight, where we halted a short time until the way was clear, and then I received my final orders from the general commanding. Under the direction of a guide I was to take a road which, leaving the Chattanooga road near the widow Glen's, came into the State road from Chattanooga to Lafayette at Kelley's, about three miles north of Lee's mills. I could thus pass around the rear of General Crittenden's corps, located about that mill, and come into position on his left. I was to post one brigade on the west of the State road facing towards the south, and my other two brigades on the east of it. General Brannan following me, was to post his division on the prolongation of my left. I reached the point indicated about daybreak, and posted General Starkweather on my right, Colonel Scribner's in the centre, the right of his brigade upon the road, and the regular brigades, General King, upon the left. General Thomas arrived upon the ground almost immediately after these dispositions were made, and General Brannan soon followed. While the latter was getting into position Colonel McCook, who commanded a brigade of the reserve corps, came in and reported a brigade of the enemy not far distant upon our left, which he had been skirmishing; he was then formed facing to the eastward, and I was directed to change my front to the left, conforming my line to his, and at the same time to watch well upon my right flank against an approach from that direction. We were then in a thick woods interspersed with thickets and openings, which extended, I believe, as far as the Chickamauga in front. I formed General King's brigade upon the ——— with orders to dress and close up on General Brannan's, and a portion of Colonel Scribner's force upon



the same line, to be guarded by King's right, and the rest of his force I had sent to the rear, so as to march by flank in rear of his right and be ready to front in that direction or towards the south should it be required. To General Starkweather I gave orders to move in column in rear, holding his brigade as a reserve; I had particularly in view the support of our right flank. The artillery could not advance in line with the infantry, nor, indeed, could it have been used except at rare intervals. It could not at the same time be left behind, for want of protection, and it was directed to follow closely the brigade, making its way through the trees. I had scarcely got my line formed when General Brannan's men, a little in advance, begun to skirmish hotly; my men were soon after engaged. We drove the enemy before us, and covered the ground quite thickly with his dead and wounded, besides sending two hundred prisoners to the rear, some just from the army of Virginia. During this movement forward, I received orders from the general commanding to push rapidly towards the left to support Colonel Croxton's brigade, of Brannan's division, then hard pressed by the enemy and almost out of ammunition. About the same time General Starkweather as will be seen by his report, received an order to a similar effect, and at once acted upon it. I was not until subsequently aware of this, and thus lost my knowledge of his position. Before I had closed up with General Brannan's left, word was brought me that General Palmer had arrived upon my right, and that his skirmishers were then passing across my front. I sent a caution in consequence to my men not to fire into them. The evidence seems clear that men of our forces were in position indicated, but to whom they could have belonged, or how they came there, I cannot now conjecture. I arrived close up to General Brannan, and the enemy having disappeared from our front, I halted to readjust my line. We had now advanced about three-fourths of a mile from where we first became engaged, and the troops had behaved admirably. While arranging my line I learned from prisoners that there had been but one division in our front, while the main body of the rebel force, which they exaggerated at 90,000, had crossed the river at Alexander's bridge above us, and was then upon our right flank. I immediately ordered General King to change his front, so as to face the south, his left being supported by General Brannan's troops, in order to face the new danger. I also despatched staff officers to General Starkweather to bring him to the same point, but having moved towards the left, as before stated, they failed for some time to find him. I went myself towards Colonel Scribner's to see his command properly posted, but before I could reach him the attack had been made in such force that he was unable to withstand it, and I met his men coming back in disorder, driven by the enemy across the rear of what had been our previous position. For the particulars of this attack, and the manner in which it was met, I refer to the lucid report of Colonel Scribner. Our troops behaved with gallantry and yielded only to overwhelming force. Assisted by my staff officers, Major Fitch, Captain Cary, and Captain Williams, I strove to restore confidence to these men and induce them to make another stand, but it was only after they had passed far in the rear that I could do so. Complete destruction seemed inevitable. Four pieces of Colonel Scribner's battery were captured after firing 64 rounds, and the enemy, sweeping like a torrent, fell upon the regular brigade before it had got into position, took its battery, and after a struggle in which whole battalions were wiped out of existence, drove it back upon the line of General Brannan's division. We are indebted to the 9th Ohio regiment, of General Brannan's division, for recapturing this battery. In this onslaught of the enemy General Starkweather was brought into line a little after Scribner, and moved to his rear and right. His brigade suffered severely, and his battery was almost entirely disabled by the loss of horses and men; the guns, however, were saved. The appearance of other forces upon the left of the enemy caused further pressure upon us to cease, and probably saved us from destruction.

Having collected my forces, they were united to those of General Brannan in a strong position on the road leading from McDaniel's house to Reed's bridge, and this post we were ordered by General Thomas to hold to the last extremity. A period of quiet to us then ensued, during which a fierce conflict was going on upon the ground we had fought over in the morning, and, as we learned later, with the division of General Johnson. I would here testify to the high qualities for a commander exhibited by General Brannan, for the moment, a trying one, the commander of our united divisions. Towards evening I received orders to support General Johnson while General Brannan was withdrawn for the assistance of General Reynolds to the right of the cross-road near Kelley's, leaving the small brigade of King to hold the road where we were. I moved with those of General Starkweather and Colonel Scribner to the right, and caused them to be posted under the direction of a staff officer of General Johnson's, nearly in prolongation of his left. We were then upon the very ground from which we had driven the enemy in the morning, and from which we had subsequently to fall back. We found a number of our dead there stretched upon the ground. With the exception of an occasional shot from rebel sharpshooters, entire quiet prevailed along the line, and I remained with General Johnson until towards dark, when the major general commanding arrived and directed us to retire some half-mile to a better position for the night. Orders were given accordingly to have the troops withdrawn after nightfall, and General Johnson and myself rode back with the general to ascertain the position we would occupy. I was returning when, just as the light of day began to disappear, I heard sounds of fierce battle in front; the enemy attacked with both artillery and infantry in apparently large force, and with greater determination than previously, shelling at the same time the entire woods which we occupied, as far back even as the road, where my ammunition was parked. This attack came first on General Johnson's division, and then extended on to the left on to mine. It was quite dark before it was repulsed, when we remained in possession of the ground. Quiet being again restored, we fell back as had been designed. Thus ended the first day.

At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 20th I put my men in position to meet the enemy. We were posted upon a wooded ridge, running parallel to the State road and about a quarter of a mile to the east of it. An open field extended along the east side of the road from near a quarter of a mile south of McDaniel's to a point beyond Kelley's line, a short distance in our rear. The rest of the country, as far back as the Chickamauga, in all directions was thickly wooded. My division was posted around the northeast corner of the field, but about 150 yards in advance of it in the wood. General Johnson's division was on my right, and beyond him, I think, General Palmer's. My second brigade, Brigadier General Starkweather, was placed next to Johnson's, facing to the east, with four guns in position so as to enfilade our front, beside having a direct fire; the first brigade, Colonel Scribner, was upon the turn, a portion of his force facing in the same direction as Starkweather's, and the rest sloping to the rear so as to face partially to the north. The third brigade, Brigadier General King, was upon the left of Scribner when the line was established; there was no force whatever upon King's left and no natural obstructions, and I then was compelled to refuse or to echelon that flank in order to cover it. I formed my men generally in two lines, King's brigade was even more concentrated, and I used only the four (4) pieces of artillery of General Starkweather; the rest, much disabled, indeed, was held in reserve in the rear. About 7 o'clock General Beatty's brigade, four regiments of Negley's division, came up and formed line on the north side of the field, and then passed into the woods, when I had his right joined on to King's left, and subsequent orders caused him to move further to the left, and, as he informs me, he posted one of his regiments on the west of the State road, looking towards McDaniel's, and

the other three on the east in line with it, and all looking towards the north. This arrangement gave General Beatty a long thin line, easily brushed away, and at the same time left an important gap between mine and King's. To fill this gap I had no troops, but finally I induced a regiment, perhaps the seventy-ninth Indiana, coming to this quarter with only general instructions, to move into it. I am sorry to have lost the name of the colonel of this regiment.

During the interval between daylight and the first attack our men worked vigorously, and covered themselves with a hastily constructed breastwork of logs and rails, which proved of vast service to them during the day. I believe that the battle began upon my front at about half past 8 o'clock a. m.; previous to this there had been some sharp skirmishing along the front, and our skirmishers were, at times, compelled to fall back, but as often returned to their original position, and continued throughout the day to re-form the first line whenever the assaults of the enemy were repulsed. It was also reported to me that distinct words of command were heard by our advanced pickets as in the formation of bodies of rebel troops, both upon our front and flank, and we awaited this attack, quietly working upon our defences. At about 9 o'clock the enemy, in force, advanced upon us through the woods and attempted, by throwing strong bodies of troops upon King and Scribner, on the left, while they likewise assailed Starkweather furiously in front, to crush that portion of our line. I judge the general direction of all the attacks made upon us to have been from the northeast. This attack continued about one hour, during which repeated efforts were made to dislodge us from our position, but in vain. The battle flags of the rebel general borne with the line of troops approached quite close to our position, but each time these lines exposed themselves they were broken and driven back; when they withdrew, our skirmishers were thrown to the front and took many prisoners, by whom we were informed that it was the division of Breckinridge which we had been fighting, together with troops from Virginia.

An interval of about one hour now elapsed, during which there was but little fighting upon our position of the line. Warned, however, by the previous attack of the vulnerability of my left, I strove to obtain forces to secure it. There were regiments lying in reserve in rear of Johnson's division, I know not what, which I thought might be of more service on the left. I went to their commander and explaining to them the danger from that quarter, and that it might certainly be looked for, I asked them to keep a lookout in that direction, and should the regiments on the left seem to waver to rush to their assistance. As all had different orders I received no satisfactory reply. I then went to General Johnson and got him to visit the left, with me, of his own line, where I pointed out the condition of things and asked him to take his left regiment of the second line and place it in column in rear so as to be ready to move to whatever point should require it the most. While speaking of this matter the attack came as I anticipated, and was made with large force and great impetuosity. General Beatty's line was cut in two in the middle, two regiments being driven beyond the road to the west, the other two were driven back into the open field towards my rear. My own left was forced back and our line seemed ready to crumble away on this flank. The rebels were already in the fields behind us, and the column which had forced Beatty's centre was pushing down the road towards Kelley's house. I immediately caused the second line to rise and face about, and then to wheel forward towards the right so as to support our men and meet the advancing enemy. This line was composed of regiments from various brigades, a part only of my own. The unexpected direction of the attack, the facing to the rear, and the crowd of our retiring troops caused some disorder, but riding to the front with a cheer two regiments took it up, formed a good line and advanced gallantly; the rest followed and the rebels were driven back into the woods. The column upon the road was at the same time driven

back by troops, I believe, of General Brannan's division, and at this juncture Colonel Barne's, commanding a brigade of General Wood's division came up, and pushed his brigade in line into the woods on the north side of the field. I saw at once that this attack was at an end, and requested Colonel Barne's to withdraw two of his regiments, to be held in reserve in the northeast corner of the field near my own position, to be used upon the next point assailed. He complied, and brought the two regiments commanded by Colonel Swain, which remained near me until the close of the fight. My line was re-established as it had been in the morning, and was not for some four hours attacked in force. Immediately after this assault upon my left ceased, the sound of a tremendous conflict reached us from the southwest beyond Kelley's house. I could not tell how it was progressing, but knowing it must be a desperate struggle, I sent word to General Thomas that I held the two regiments under Colonel Swaine in reserve, and that if he required them more than we did they were disposable. The fighting in the direction I have named was continued throughout the afternoon with only intervals when it was partially suspended. During this period re-enforcements seemed to arrive from the direction of Chattanooga, and about 4 o'clock the firing seemed more vigorous than before; at five o'clock it had almost ceased, but I was still ignorant of the course of events upon the right and had no idea that any portion of the troops had given way. An officer then arrived with orders for myself and General Johnson to withdraw our troops and fall back in the direction of the hills and of Rossville. Just as this order reached me the heavy firing on the right ceased, and it seemed to be the signal for another attack, the most violent of all, upon my portion of the line. This time the enemy used artillery, and concentrated the fire of three batteries upon us, while his infantry pressed on with the utmost vigor. Still we held our position, yielding not an inch, and I am confident could have continued to do so. To fall back was more difficult than to remain, and I should have taken the responsibility of holding on for a short time had I not seen the troops on my right, first those of General Palmer, then those of General Johnson, passing off to the rear. I saw then that no time was to be lost, and transmitted the order to my brigade commanders. I am indebted to Captain Forsythe, of General King's staff, for assisting Captain Cary, of my own staff, in bearing this order. The remainder of my staff officers I had sent away on other missions. As my men fell back the enemy pressed after them, and in crossing the open field very many were struck down. They reached the woods west of the road in as good order as could be expected, but then, uncertain which direction to take, and having no landmark to guide them, many became separated from their regiments, and in groups joined other commands, with which they fell back to Rossville, where all were united during the night. A number, doubtless, became confused at this time and marched into the lines of the rebels. We had during the day been fired into from every point of the compass, and when we fell back, no other portions of our troops being in sight, it was impossible to tell where they could be found or where we would encounter the enemy. My loss, up to the time of falling back, was small compared with the punishment inflicted on the rebels. In retiring it was great; a list of those lost is appended. Brave men, their names will live the pride of their children and a monument of glory for their country. On the 21st, at Rossville, my division was again put upon duty to defend one of the main approaches to that position, and I believe it was the only one attacked. The gorge which we occupied was shelled during the afternoon, and I lost five men in killed and wounded from the brigade of regulars. During the same afternoon Major General Rosseau arrived and resumed command of this his old division, inspiring it with new life after the arduous duties it had performed; by his courtesy I have since remained with it, co-operating with him. On the night of the 21st our army was withdrawn from Rossville to this place, and the first division was

selected to bring up the rear. Under its protection the pickets of all commands were withdrawn and marched here, Colonel Scribner's brigade the last, arriving about sunrise. The campaign thus terminated, although brilliant, has been one of unusual hardship upon the soldier. The labor in marching and transporting our trains over the mountain ridges has been enormous, and from Saturday morning until late Sunday night, throughout two days of battle, my horses and most of the men were without water. The first division, thus sorely tried, has not murmured, but with its thinned ranks stand proudly ready to meet any foe. Its record is as bright as any, and all may be proud to have belonged to it. Its losses are heavy, but they occurred in gallant resistance to overwhelming forces. We reported 1,034 in killed and wounded, and 1,319 missing; many of the latter we know were left dead and wounded upon the field, and in exchange for our prisoners lost we have captured and brought back over 400 of the enemy. Some of our artillery was lost, but it has all been recovered; a part, it is true, temporarily disabled. In the battery of Starkweather's brigade one limber box was blown up and two axles broken by the recoil of the guns during the fight of Sunday. And I must here thank the officers in command, Lieutenant Willets, for the service it rendered. To my brigade commanders, Brigadier General John H. King, Brigadier General Starkweather, and Colonel Scribner, the country owes a debt of gratitude for the courage with which they maintained the fight, and the good judgment with which their troops were handled. The performance of General King's command upon Saturday morning was particularly brilliant. In the fight on Sunday, General Starkweather, holding the key-points to one of our positions, rendered distinguished service by his own coolness, inspiring his men with confidence. He received a slight wound in the leg, but I am happy to say not such as to make him quit the field. Colonel Scribner, who has long commanded one of the best brigades in the army, and has been recommended for promotion after previous battles, has again distinguished himself. Three missiles from the enemy passed through his clothes, one inflicting a slight wound in the face, and another a slight bruise of the shoulder. I renew the recommendation for his promotion as a reward for the good conduct of his brigade. I would be glad to name to the general commanding the officers in command of troops belonging to other divisions who were brought into action in the neighborhood of my own, but I do not know them all. Colonel Barnes, who commands a brigade of General Wood's division, and Colonel Swaine, who reported to me with two regiments of the same brigade, were among the number. To the officers of my staff I tender my thanks for the efficient service they rendered, and commend them to the notice of the general commanding for their gallant bearing on the field. A tabular statement of the killed, wounded, and missing is annexed, and the reports of the brigade commanders are likewise enclosed.

Respectfully submitted:

A. BAIRD,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

*Report of casualties of the first division 14th army corps, commanded by Brigadier General A. Baird, in the battle of Chickamauga Creek, of two days' duration, September 19 and 20, 1863.*

Command.	Commanders.	Commanding officers.					Enlisted men.				
		Killed.	Wounded.	Wounded and missing.	Missing, condition unknown.	Total.	Killed.	Wounded.	Wounded and missing.	Missing, condition unknown.	Total.
<i>First division 1st brigade.</i>											
Headquarters 1st division . . .	Brig. General Baird . . .		1			1					
Headquarters 1st brigade . . .	Colonel Scribner . . .		3								
35th Indiana volunteers . . .	Lieut. Colonel Griffin . . .		3	1		4	9	42	13	42	106
33d Ohio volunteers . . .	Colonel Moore . . .	2	3	1	4	10	10	29	32	92	163
2d Ohio volunteers . . .	Colonel Warnock . . .		1	2	5	8	8	35	12	162	217
94th Ohio volunteers . . .	Major Hutchins . . .		1		1	2	2	20	1	21	44
10th Wisconsin volunteers . . .	Captain Roby . . .	1	2		18	21	9	42		169	220
1st Michigan battery . . .	Lieutenant Wilber . . .	1				1	5	7		12	24
Total . . .		4	11	4	28	47	43	175	58	498	774
<i>First division 2d brigade.</i>											
Headquarters 2d brigade . . .	Brig. General Starkweather . . .	1				1					
79th Pennsylvania volunteers . . .	Colonel Hambright . . .	1	4		1	6	14	63		54	131
24th Illinois volunteers . . .	Captain A. Mauff . . .	1	9		3	13	18	17		53	138
1st Wisconsin volunteers . . .	Lieut. Colonel Bingham . . .	4	3		4	11	22	88		80	190
21st Wisconsin volunteers . . .	Captain C. H. Walker . . .		4		9	13	2	32		67	101
4th Indiana battery . . .	Lieutenant H. J. Willets . . .				1	1	1	17		5	23
Total . . .		7	20		18	45	51	267		259	583
<i>First division 3d brigade.</i>											
Headquarters 3d brigade . . .	Brig. General King . . .										
1st bat. 15th U. S. infantry . . .	Captain Dodd . . .		2		6	8	9	31	16	88	144
1st light bat. 16th U. S. inf . . .	Captain Crofton . . .		3	10	1	14	10	13		204	227
1st light bat. 18th U. S. inf . . .	Captain G. W. Smith . . .	1	3		2	6	29	73		39	141
2d light bat. 18th U. S. inf . . .	Captain Henry Hammer . . .		1	3	2	6	15	79		48	142
1st light bat. 19th U. S. inf . . .	Captain Crofton . . .	1	2	2	6	11	5	56		120	161
Battery, 45th U. S. artillery . . .	Second Lieut. Fessenden . . .	1	1	1		3	12	15	14		41
Total . . .		3	12	16	17	48	80	247	30	499	856
Aggregate . . .		14	43	20	63	140	180	689	88	1,256	2,213

## RECAPITULATION.

Class.	Commanding officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
Killed .....	14	180	194
Wounded .....	63	777	840
Missing .....	63	1,256	1,319

Station: CHATTANOOGA, TENN.

Dated: September 25, 1865.

True copy:

A. BAIRD, *Brig. Gen. Commanding.*

S. C. KELLOGG, *Bat. Major and A. D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,  
Owen's Ford, Georgia, September 17, 1865.

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command since leaving Cave springs, near Stevenson, Alabama. In compliance with verbal instructions received from the major general commanding the department, I marched my command on the 1st instant across the Ten-

nessee river at Carpenter's ferry, starting from Cave springs at 6.30 p. m. After crossing the river my command proceeded up the east bank to Norwood's, where I arrived at 10 p. m. and bivouacked for the night.

*September 2*—8 a. m.—Marched in the direction of Taylor's store, where I was ordered to halt my command for further instructions. Arriving at Moore's spring, two miles south of Taylor's store, I learned that there was an insufficiency of water at that point for my command I therefore halted my command and bivouacked in the vicinity of the spring.

*September 3*—8 a. m.—Marched in the direction of Trenton; found the mountain road very rough, rocky, and steep. I at once discovered that it would be impossible to cross my transportation in safety until the roads could be repaired. I therefore set the entire division at work repairing the road and assisting the trains over; at dark all my regimental trains, together with ambulances and ammunition trains, had reached the summit without the loss of a wheel. Camped one mile from Warren's mills; sent Lirwell's brigade forward to repair crossing at mill. By 11.30 p. m. a bridge 121 feet long and 20 feet high had been constructed.

*September 4*—7.30 a. m.—Marched the command forward; three brigades crossed the bridge at 7 a. m.; trains commenced crossing at 8 o'clock. Deeming the bridge unsafe for the crossing of entire train, I halted it and commenced repairs, which delayed us until 12 m., when the passage of transportation was resumed, 3 p. m.; arrived at Brown's spring, foot of mountain; found a small spring at this point, which, after being excavated and dammed up, afforded sufficient water for my command. By 8 p. m. my entire train was placed at foot of mountain except eight wagons of supplies, which were left at Moore's spring.

*September 5*.—Sent a party of two regiments of infantry and one section of artillery, under command of Colonel Lirwell, commanding third brigade, to reconnoitre towards Johnson's creek, and gain an accurate description of the road and country in that direction. Colonel Lirwell discovered a large amount of property at the works of the Empire State Iron and Coal Mining Company, consisting of machinery, tools, stationery, &c., which were brought into camp by Captain Wing, assistant quartermaster, and placed to proper use. At Pain's mills a quantity of wheat (some bushels) was found, which the seventy-eighth Pennsylvania volunteers, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Blakley, was directed to convert into flour for the use of the command.

*September 6*—10 a. m.—Marched forward on right hand, and leading from Brown spring to Johnson's creek and Stevens's Gap. 3½ p. m.—Arrived at Junction, Hurricane, and Lookout creeks, where I parked my trains and established headquarters for the night. General Beatty arrived at McKaig's (foot of mountain) at 5 p. m., and sent one regiment (forty-second Indiana) half-way up the mountain, where the enemy's pickets were met; about a half-dozen shots were exchanged, and one man severely wounded in the leg. The object of the expedition being fully accomplished, the regiment returned at dark to the foot of the mountain.

*September 7*—7 a. m.—Leaving all trains in the rear, except ambulances and hospital wagons, with one regiment as guard, moved forward with Lirwell's and Stanley's brigades, arriving at McKaig's, foot of mountain, at 10 a. m. 12 a. m.—Arrived at top of mountain, which had been gained by General Beatty at 11 a. m. without any resistance from the enemy. 4 p. m.—First and second brigades were on top of mountain; trains ascending slowly; road very rough and dangerous to transportation.

*September 8*—4 a. m.—Sent General Beatty with two regiments to seize and hold Cooper's Gap. 8 a. m.—Sent Colonel Stoughton with the eleventh Michigan infantry to take possession of and clear Stevens's Gap, which was heavily blockaded with fallen trees. 11.30 a. m.—Arrived at junction of State road and Cooper's Gap road, where the troops were ordered to bivouac for the night.

*September 9*—8 a. m.—Marched the second and third brigades forward *via* Stevens's Gap; first brigade moving through Cooper's Gap. 4 p. m.—Arrived at foot of the mountain (Stevens's) 5 p. m.; moved Stanley's brigade to the foot; on a reconnoissance drove the rebel cavalry three and a half miles. My escort, under the command of Lieutenant Cooke, made a gallant charge upon a superior force of the enemy, capturing two.

*September 10*—8 a. m.—Pursuant to orders, marched my command from Stevens's in the direction of Lafayette. After passing Bailey's cross-roads my skirmishers were more or less engaged until we arrived at the gorge leading to Dug Gap, where I halted the command for the purpose of ascertaining the position of the enemy in the gap. 1.30 p. m.—I learned from a Union citizen that a large force of the enemy, (Buckner's corps,) with cavalry and artillery, (then only three miles distant,) was approaching towards my left from the direction of Catlett's Gap. I immediately sent one regiment in the direction of this force for the double purpose of a reconnoissance and to compel the enemy to halt under the impression that I would attack him. At sundown I made a strong demonstration in the direction of Dug Gap, driving the enemy's skirmishers back to his main force, and holding the position until I could establish my picket lines unobserved before dark. The strongest positions of defence the locality afforded were selected with the intention of bivouacking the troops for the night, with my trains packed close to my rear. From the movements of the enemy, and from information gained from scouts, I felt confident the enemy proposed to attack me in the morning with a superior force. I also learned from a prisoner, and from Union civilians, that I was confronted by Hill's corps of three divisions, (twelve brigades;) that Buckner's corps of two divisions, (eight brigades,) also first division of cavalry, were three miles to my left, and that Polk's and Breckinridge's commands were in supporting distance. From the concurrence of testimony on this point there seemed no doubt of the fact. I therefore adopted immediate measures to guard against surprise. At 9 o'clock, on the evening of the 10th, Colonels Stanley and Lirwell were ordered to withdraw quietly, at 3 the next morning, their entire line of pickets to the west side of the road running along the foot of the ridge occupied by the enemy, and to remain under arms until morning. It was subsequently learned that the enemy intended to surprise my picket line at daylight if their position had not been changed.

*September 11*—8.30 a. m.—Brigadier General Baird, with two brigades of his division, (Starkweather's and Scribner's,) arrived, and General Baird courteously reported to me, as his senior, for instructions. His troops were placed in position at once near widow Davis's cross-roads and held in reserve. I now learned positively that the enemy had removed the obstructions from Dug and Bluebird Gaps, and was moving a heavy force through each of them; also, that Buckner's corps was moving forward rapidly on the Chattanooga road, and that his advance was only two miles distant. A careful examination of the ground we occupied, which was a long, low ridge covered with a heavy growth of young timber, descending abruptly on the north end to the Chickamauga, while the east, south, and west sides were skirted by cornfields and commanded by higher ridges, demonstrated the fact that it would be impossible to hold this or any other position south of Bailey's cross-roads and fight a battle without involving the certain destruction of the trains, which, from the contour of these ridges and uneven nature of the ground, we would be obliged to park in close proximity to our position; the preservation of the trains, perhaps the safety of the entire command, demanded that I should retire to Bailey's cross-roads, two miles northwest of our position, where we could get the trains under cover and fight the enemy to a better advantage. I therefore directed that the trains should commence moving back slowly and in good order, and that General Baird should hold widow Davis's cross-roads until I could withdraw a portion of the second division and take position on the north side of Chickamauga creek, to cover the withdrawal



of his brigades and prevent the enemy from flanking us on the left. 1 p. m.—A heavy column of cavalry was seen moving steadily on our left with the evident intention of gaining my rear. I immediately had four pieces of artillery placed in position on the ridge at John Davis's house, which commanded the valley on my left; also sent General Beatty with one regiment and a section of artillery to seize and guard Bailey's cross-roads, which was reported to be in possession of the enemy's cavalry. At 2 p. m. the trains were all in motion, falling back to Bailey's cross-roads. General Beatty and Colonel Scribner, of General Baird's division, were directed to proceed to that point without delay and protect the trains from attack of a large force of cavalry approaching with that view. 3 p. m.—The skirmishers of General Baird's division were directed to fall back across the creek, where they were placed in position to hold the enemy in check until I could get my artillery in position on the ridge this side. Two companies of the nineteenth Illinois infantry, concealed behind a stone fence, poured into the enemy's ranks a destructive volley, killing, as I have since learned, thirty on the spot. This partially checked the enemy, who was advancing in three heavy lines. Meantime I had ten pieces of artillery planted on the ridge to the rear of John Davis's house, which commanded that position, until another new line could be formed on the ridge to the rear. The enemy now occupied the south side of the creek with a heavy force. He opened two batteries of artillery upon us at a distance of four hundred yards; two of his brigades were parallel to our position on the right. Buckner's corps was deployed, and moving up steadily on our left within short range. Colonel Stanley's and a portion of General Starkweather's brigades sustained here a well-directed and terrific fire, which our troops returned with spirit and marked effect. The firing increased and indicated an immediate general engagement along our entire front, and would have terminated in an assault from the enemy in a few moments, which would, unquestionably, have been disastrous to us, considering the overwhelming force of the enemy and our very unfavorable position. By direction, General Baird deployed General Starkweather's brigade to the right, which checked the enemy's advance in that direction and enabled Colonel Stanley to withdraw his brigade, which being done we retired slowly and in good order to Bailey's cross-roads, where a strong position of defence was assumed and the troops bivouacked for the night. During the night the enemy withdrew his force to Dug Gap.

*September 13.*—As strong positions of defence were selected as the locality afforded, where the troops were posted and remained until this morning.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES S. NEGLEY,

*Major General.*

Lieutenant Colonel GEO. E. FLYNT,

*Chief of Staff 14th Army Corps.*

#### HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, 14TH ARMY CORPS.

*Chattanooga, Tenn., September 26, 1863.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command since September 17, 1863.

*September 17, 1863*—8 a. m.—Marched to Owens's ford, encamping there for the night.

*September 18*—3½ p. m.—Received orders to march to the left and relieve General Palmer's division; reached his first brigade (General Hazen's) at 5 p. m. General Hazen informed me and General Beatty that he had no orders to move from his position. I reported in person to General Rosecrans for instructions; was directed by him, through Colonel Ducat, to send one brigade to

Crawfish spring; was afterwards ordered by General Thomas, through Captain Williard, to move up and encamp my division *en masse*.

Subsequently this order was changed directing me to relieve General Palmer, which attenuated my command from Crawfish spring along the Chickamauga a distance of three and one-half miles. My troops did not get in position until near daylight; they were greatly exhausted by fatigue and want of sleep.

*September 19.*—At daylight I sent all my transportation, except ammunition and ambulance trains, to Chattanooga for safety. Very early in the morning the enemy advanced a heavy line of skirmishers upon Beatty's front, which was a very exposed position, and engaged his pickets sharply for some hours. 11.30.—Enemy appeared in force flanking two batteries within 400 yards of Beatty's position, which was followed by a fierce cannonading, during which Bridge's battery, of Beatty's brigade, sustained a loss in men and horses. A part of Beatty's line being gradually driven back, (but soon re-established,) I sent one regiment (eighteenth Ohio volunteer infantry, and a section of Schultz's battery, of Stanley's brigade, to his support. 12.30 p. m.—Beatty repulsed the enemy. 2.30.—General McCook's corps had passed to the left of my position, leaving me on the extreme right; General McCook assuming command. Shortly afterwards I received written orders to report to General McCook. 3.30. p. m.—Received orders from Generals McCook and Rosecrans, who directed me to take position and support General Thomas. Moved to the left of his (General Rosecrans's) headquarters, at the farmhouse, one-half mile, when I discovered a gap in our line through which the enemy was moving upon the right flank and rear of General Thomas's line. Stanley's brigade was immediately dispatched to meet and check the advance of the enemy, Lirwell supporting him on his right. After a brisk skirmish the enemy was driven back into the woods. 6 p. m.—Stanley and Lirwell were ordered to push the enemy back vigorously, so as to connect our line with the troops on the left. A sharp engagement with the enemy immediately followed, lasting until 7.30 p. m., during which time our line was pushed forward from one-half to three-quarters of a mile, but I was unable to connect with any of our forces on my right or left. Held this position during the night.

*September 20.*—Military operations were suspended until 8 o'clock a. m. in consequence of a dense fog. 8 a. m.—Received a pressing order from General Thomas, through Captain Williard, to move at once to his support. I immediately commenced withdrawing my division for that purpose, when the enemy was reported to be massing a heavy force in my front, sharply engaging my line of skirmishers. I was directed by Major General Rosecrans to hold my position until relieved by some other command. General Beatty, however, with his brigade, was sent, at 8 a. m., under guidance of Captain Williard, to report to General Thomas, going into action immediately. Although the most strenuous efforts were made to hurry into position the troops that were to relieve me, the remaining two brigades of my command were not relieved until 9.30, when one brigade was sent from General Wood's division for that purpose. In withdrawing these two brigades the enemy availed himself of the change, and pressed so hard upon the relieving force that I was compelled to halt, and send one of the brigades back to assist in re-establishing my former line, also to protect my ammunition train, which was passing at the time. Those serious detentions had the effect of separating my division, and destroying the unity of action in my command, which I was unable to restore during the day.

I deeply regret the circumstances which rendered this subdivision necessary, actually placing two of my brigades entirely beyond my personal supervision. Although I am satisfied that the causes which interfered with the unity and concerted movements of my command are properly appreciated by my corps and department commanders, and will not be allowed to detract from the credit due the division, yet I feel that it would have been more advantageous and satisfactory had it been otherwise. 10 a. m.—On being informed that General Thomas's

left was being turned I left Lirwell's brigade to follow with the artillery, and pushed Stanley's brigade forward under a heavy fire to the left of General Thomas's line, where Stanley met the enemy in heavy force. Here I received orders through Captain Gaw to take charge of and mass all the artillery at hand on a high ridge facing the south. I now learned with surprise that Lirwell's brigade was not yet relieved, and that Captain Johnson, of my staff, was compelled to withdraw his brigade, leaving only a weak line of skirmishers. I immediately took charge of all batteries at this point, and massing them on the ridge, placed them in position, supported by Lirwell's brigade when it arrived. 1 p. m.—A heavy force of the enemy was discovered to be moving to our left and rear, also that Beatty's brigade was being overwhelmed. Lirwell's brigade was at once sent forward to check his advance, while Bridge's battery, of Beatty's brigade, and Smith's fourth regular battery were placed in position, and immediately opened a very destructive fire upon him from the ridge facing eastward, causing him to fall back, thus temporarily relieving the left wing.

The character of the ground prevented the effective use of all the batteries; they were placed on a ridge to the rear, and the seventy-eighth Pennsylvania volunteers sent to protect them; the remainder of Lirwell's brigade was deployed at the most exposed points. 2 p. m.—Finding that our right wing and centre had given way before the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, and being hard pressed on my front and right, I sent Lieutenant Moody, of my staff, to General Rosecrans for a brigade. Upon being applied to General Rosecrans replied that it was too late; that he could give me no help. At this juncture General Brannan applied to me for support, and I ordered the twenty-first Ohio volunteers, of Lirwell's brigade, to his assistance. I then rode forward to the crest of the ridge, over which the right wing and centre was retiring, to get a position for artillery, when I was met by a strong column of the enemy, who pressed forward rapidly between me and the troops on my left, leaving me but one whole regiment, the seventy-eighth Pennsylvania volunteers, and a part of another, organized; with the artillery in my charge, with its ammunition nearly exhausted at the same time, my ammunition train had been driven off the field. At this moment reliable information reached me that a force of the enemy's cavalry was moving from our right to our rear, and a column of infantry on our front and left. Finding it impossible to organize any of the passing troops, and unable to communicate with General Thomas, and being informed by a staff officer that Generals Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden had left the field, I deemed it vitally important to secure the safety of the artillery, which appeared to be threatened with immediate capture by a large force of the enemy who was pressing forward on my front and right. I immediately took the seventy-eighth Pennsylvania volunteers, and marched to the mouth of the gap, two miles from Rossville, the first open ground where the troops could be collected and reorganized.

I found Colonel Parkhurst here with the ninth Michigan volunteers energetically checking the struggle. He informed me that General Crittenden had passed some hours before, and had ordered him with all the troops to fall back to Chattanooga. This I stated to him was inexpedient; that the troops must be immediately reorganized, and prepare to march to the front. In this purpose I was ably assisted by Colonel Ducat, Colonel McKibben, and Captain Joe Hill, of General Rosecrans's staff, Colonel Parkhurst, of General Thomas's staff, Lieutenant Elkin and Lieutenant Morris, of General Baird's staff, and Lieutenant Wilson, of General Sheridan's staff, members of my own staff, with other officers whose names I cannot now recall. As soon as I had cleared the gap of the artillery and transportation, which extended back some distance, and in great confusion, and formed the scattered troops into battalions, I learned that General Sheridan was close at hand with some 1,500 men. I rode forward, and respectfully suggested to General Sheridan to move to the support of General Thomas,

stating that I would join him with all the troops I had collected. He stated his object was to march to Rossville. I then rode forward to communicate with General Thomas; found the enemy's cavalry in possession of the road between us, preventing my further passage. I then returned, and held a consultation with Generals Davis and Sheridan and Colonel Ducat.

It was determined as advisable to proceed to Rossville, to prevent the enemy from obtaining possession of the cross-roads, and from there General Sheridan would move to the support of General Thomas *via* Lafayette road. The column reached Rossville at dark, and the scattered troops were organized as rapidly as possible. Provisions and ammunition, of which the troops were destitute, were telegraphed for and received from Chattanooga. At this moment I learned that General Granger had gone to the assistance of General Thomas, that he was safe, and that the troops were retiring to Rossville; also that General Sheridan had halted three miles from Rossville. I therefore continued the organization and preparation of the troops, to hold our position against a force of the enemy who were reported to be advancing from the direction of Ringold. Before the disposition of the force was completed, General Thomas with a portion of his command arrived.

*September 21.*—Early in the morning my division was disposed so as to hold the gap and mountain crest east of Rossville. 2 p. m.—The enemy advanced a heavy force, with artillery on the Lafayette road, and on the crest of the mountain. After a brisk engagement, with artillery and musketry, he was checked in the gap by Stanley's brigade and driven from the mountain crest by a gallant charge of the fifteenth Kentucky, General Beatty's brigade. 5 p. m.—The enemy was seen moving in heavy columns to our right and massing a considerable force on our front. He was able to shell our position, which was greatly exposed to his artillery, and which would become immediately untenable should he plant artillery on the crest of the mountain beyond our line; at the same time communication with Chattanooga could be easily cut off. The troops were without supplies, and the animals had had no food for twenty-four hours. The troops were accordingly ordered to fall back to Chattanooga. 6 p. m.—The sixty-ninth Ohio volunteers, of Stanley's brigade, which had been left at Cowan, arrived and took position in the gap. My division was directed to quietly withdraw to Chattanooga at midnight, leaving three regiments to hold the picket line until daylight. This important duty was intrusted to Colonel Stoughton, eleventh Michigan volunteers, who performed it in a most judicious manner. My command reached Chattanooga at 2.30 a. m., and took the position designated by Major Bond, of General Rosecrans's staff. At daylight we occupied the unfinished rebel fort, on the west side of Chattanooga and Lafayette road, and immediately commenced its completion for defence. I beg leave to refer to the reports of General Beatty and Colonel Stanley for the details of the brilliant operations of their brigades while temporarily separated by order and the tide of battle on Sunday. The conduct of these two officers was highly creditable, and that of their troops brave and efficient. General Beatty gallantly remained upon the field of battle, in command of scattered troops, after most of his brigade had been driven from it and separated from by the charge of the enemy upon the left. Colonel Stanley continued to command his brigade when he received a severe contusion from a fragment of a shell, when Colonel Stoughton, eleventh Michigan volunteers, assumed command and ably handled the brigade.

In Lirwell's brigade, the twenty-first Ohio volunteers, which assisted General Brannan, suffered severely, holding their position at the base of the ridge until they had exhausted nearly all their ammunition, and were compelled to supply themselves from their dead comrades.

When General Brannan, with his division, the remaining portion of the twenty-first Ohio volunteers, was left to hold their position, during which they lost heavily, the balance of Colonel Lirwell's brigade, although deployed at several

points and compelled to change position frequently during the day, rendered valuable services, not only in battle, but with the assistance of the ninth Michigan volunteers in rallying and organizing a number of the scattered troops and in saving the artillery and transportation which occupied the road and choked up the gap, endangering the immediate capture of the whole by the enemy.

The highest compliment I am able to bestow upon both officers and men of the entire division is to simply refer to their endurance, fortitude, cheerful obedience, and heroic conduct during the entire campaign and battle.

I respectfully direct attention to the reports of brigade and regimental commanders for the lists of those desiring honorable mention, which I cordially approve. All members of my staff performed their duties with coolness and ability and entirely satisfactory. Captain Johnson, division inspector; Captain Hough, (nineteenth United States infantry,) A. C. M.; Lieutenant Moody, aide-de-camp, rendered important services. Their gallantry and efficiency is worthy of special mention.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAS. S. NEGLEY,  
*Major General.*

Lieutenant Colonel GEO. E. FLYNT,  
*Chief of Staff 14th Army Corps.*

True copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and A. D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, 14TH ARMY CORPS,  
*Near Chattanooga, Tenn., September 29, 1863.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to forward, for the information of the major general commanding, the following report of the part taken by my division, third, 14th army corps, during the engagement of the 19th and 20th September, 1863, on Chickamauga creek.

In accordance with orders I struck the camp of my division at Gowan's ford, Chickamauga creek, at about 5 p. m., on the 18th instant, and advanced by the Chattanooga road to the junction of the Lafayette road, about three (3) miles above Crawfish spring, whence, taking the latter road, I arrived by daylight at a point about two and one-half ( $2\frac{1}{2}$ ) miles distant from its junction with the Chattanooga road. I was much retarded in this march, which continued during the entire night, by the delay of the 21st corps in getting into position, having frequently to halt for a considerable time to enable portions of that command to come up from the rear of my column. On arriving at a point on the Lafayette road, known as Kelley's house, I received orders from Major General Thomas to capture, if possible, a rebel force, represented by Colonel Daniel McCook to be a brigade cut off on the west side of the Chickamauga creek; failing in this, to drive it across the creek. In obedience to these instructions, I advanced the second brigade of my division, Colonel John F. Croxton, fourth regiment Kentucky volunteer infantry commanding, by the Reid's Bridge road, towards the rebel left, while the remaining brigades of my command advanced by the Daffren's Ford road, to strike the supposed right of the enemy's position.

Shortly after 7 a. m., on the 19th instant, the second brigade having advanced about three-quarters of a mile towards the Chickamauga, came upon a strong force of the enemy, consisting of two (2) divisions instead of the supposed brigade, who made a furious attack, repulsing General Croxton's first advance. The rebels following this up with a much superior force, a desperate conflict ensued, Colonel Croxton maintaining his ground with great determination, and though suffer-

ing considerable loss, refusing to yield his position to the most furious efforts of the rebels. At this point Colonel Carroll, tenth regiment Indiana volunteer infantry, fell mortally wounded, while gallantly leading his regiment, and Lieutenant Colonel P. B. Hunt, commanding fourth Kentucky volunteer infantry, was carried from the field in a scarcely less precarious condition. On Colonel Hunt being wounded, I sent Major R. M. Keely, division inspector, at his own request, to command the fourth Kentucky, which he did that day and the following in the most gallant manner.

I here therefore re-enforced Colonel Croxton with the thirty-first Ohio volunteer infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Lister commanding, from the left, being the only force available. In the mean time the third brigade, Colonel F. Van Derveer, thirty-fifth Ohio volunteer infantry, commanding, supported the first brigade, with two (2) regiments, (Colonel J. M. Connell, seventeenth Ohio volunteer infantry, commanding,) having advanced about one and a half mile on the Daffren's Ford road, came into collision with the rebels, strongly posted, who opened with a tremendous fire of musketry and cannon at short range. This, however, could not deter the third brigade, which bore down upon the rebels with irresistible determination, driving them back to within a quarter of a mile of the creek, when the rebels, making a feint on the left, rapidly threw a heavy force upon my right, and succeeded in partially piercing the centre, where the communication with the extreme right was unavoidably weak and disconnected. About this period, at my repeated and earnest request for re-enforcements, General Thomas sent the first division to my support, and the greater portion of that command advanced to my centre to arrest the movement of the enemy. In this, however, the first division failed, the troops retiring with some precipitance, leaving the battery of the regular brigade in the hands of the enemy, and communication entirely cut off between my extreme flanks. I, however, succeeded in preventing the rebels from following up their advantage at this point by a charge of portions of the first and third brigades, during which the battery of the regular brigade was retaken at the point of the bayonet by the ninth Ohio infantry, (Colonel Gustavus Cammerling commanding.) The enemy, however, continued to press heavily on the centre, and finding it impossible to re-establish and hold communication between my flanks, I withdrew to a ridge about half a mile from the Lafayette road, removing my dead and wounded, and formed line there, without molestation, at about 2 p. m. About 3 p. m., by direction of Major General Thomas, I moved the first and third brigades to the right, in rear of the second brigade, and subsequently, in accordance with orders to that effect, withdrew my entire division to the right on the Lafayette road, resigning my first position to Baird's, Palmer's, and Johnson's divisions.

During this day the 2d brigade maintained a severe conflict without intermission for a period of six hours, repulsing with great slaughter the repeated attacks of a superior force, and capturing five guns, which they brought off the field. The other brigades of the division cannot have had less severe work, owing to the number of points from which they were at different times attacked, and the vastly superior force of the enemy immediately opposed to them. It was only by the most unflinching courage and determination that these points could be held before the overwhelming masses of troops hurled against them by the rebels where every effort appeared to be directed towards breaking this line and securing the line of communication in its rear.

I bivouacked on the night of the 19th on a line perpendicular to the Lafayette road, my left brigade nearly joining it at Dyer's house, and my two right brigades thrown back at right angles on the heights of Missionary ridge. During the night I was ordered to put two brigades into line, connecting Reynolds's and Negley's divisions, which I accordingly did, completing the movement before daylight. On the 20th I moved the third brigade of my division shortly after daylight of the 20th as support, in rear of first and second brigades. I had now

two brigades in line with one in support, Negley being on my right and Reynolds on my left. After a continuous flank movement of some duration by the entire line to the left, the engagement about 9 a. m. by a furious attack on Baird's division, which, proving of a determined nature, my supporting brigade was ordered to support that division. Negley having previously removed to the extreme left of the corps, and Vancleve, who had replaced him, having shortly afterwards been ordered in the same direction, Wood was now on my immediate right; Wood being almost immediately afterwards ordered to the left, moved out of the line, while Davis took ground to his left to fill the vacancy caused by Wood. In this movement a slight interval occurred in the line, which the rebels took advantage of with great rapidity, intercepting and breaking the line of battle of the army at this point. Wood being taken while marching by the flank, broke and fled in confusion, and my line actually attacked from the rear, was obliged to swing back on the right, which it accomplished with wonderful regularity under such circumstances, (with, however, the exception of a portion of the first brigade, which, being much exposed, broke with considerable disorder.) The line being now broken, and severely pressed at this point, and great confusion prevailing in the support, composed of Wood's and Vancleve's divisions, I formed the remnant of my command, and such stragglers from other commands as I could rally and bring into position, in line to resist, if possible, the pressure of the now advancing rebels. In this manner I succeeded in holding the enemy in check for a considerable time, until finding that the rebels were moving on my right to gain command of the valley, by which the right (McCook) was retreating. I swung back my right flank, and moving about half a mile to the rear, took up a good position on a commanding ridge. General Negley (who had a portion of his command intact) having pledged himself to hold my right and rear. Finding that this latter point was the key to the position so desired by the enemy, I made every preparation to defend it to the last, my command being somewhat increased by the arrival of portions of Palmer's and Negley's divisions, and most opportunely re-enforced by Colonel Van Duer's brigade, (third,) which having successfully, though with great loss, held its precarious position to the general line until all in its vicinity had retreated, retired in good order, actually cutting its way through the rebels to rejoin my division. This gallant brigade was one of the few who maintained their organization perfect through the hard-fought passes of that portion of the field. Nothing can exceed the desperate determination with which the rebels endeavored to gain possession of this point, hurling entire divisions on my small force, in their fierce eagerness to gain a position which would undoubtedly have given them the grand advantage of the day. My troops maintained their ground with obstinacy, evincing great gallantry and devotion, in the most trying circumstances, until re-enforced about 3.30 p. m. by a portion of General Granger's reserve corps, who took up the position that should have been occupied during the day by Negley's division.

General Negley, so far from holding my right as he had promised, retired with extraordinary deliberation to Rossville at an early period of the day, taking with him a portion of my division, (as will be seen by the report of Colonel Connell, commanding first brigade,) and leaving me open to attack from the right as well as from the left and front, (from which points the rebels attacked me simultaneously on several occasions,) and my rear so far exposed that my staff officers sent back for ammunition were successfully cut off, and the ammunition, of such vital importance at that time, prevented from reaching me, thus necessitating the use of the bayonet as my only means of defence. I remained in this position heavily engaged until sunset, re-enforced at intervals by the ninth regiment Indiana volunteers, sent me at my request by General Hazen, and the sixty-eighth and one hundred and first regiments Indiana volunteers sent by order of General Thomas, also the twenty-first Ohio volunteer infantry, all of whom re-

mained in position and behaved with steadiness while their ammunition lasted. Colonel Stoughton with a portion of a brigade also rallied at this point and did good service. Finding my ammunition almost entirely exhausted, some of the troops having none at all and the remainder but one or two rounds, I ordered it to be reserved until the last and final efforts, and resort to the bayonet as a means of defence.

Several charges were made by the entire command during the last attack of the enemy, by which they were gallantly driven from the ridge where they had obtained a momentary lodgement. My entire force during the day and afternoon on this ridge could not have been over 2,500 men, including the stragglers of various regiments and divisions, beside my own immediate command. Shortly after sunset I withdrew without molestation to Rossville, where I bivouacked for the night, my retreat being covered by the sixty-eighth and one hundred and first Indiana volunteer infantry, (the only troops who had a supply of ammunition.) This duty was satisfactorily performed by these regiments, under the direction of Captain C. A. Cilley, of Colonel Van Duer's staff. I cannot speak too highly of the gallant conduct of my command during these engagements. The accompanying report of killed and wounded is a sad but glorious report of the stern devotion with which the officers and men of the third division maintained their stand in the desperate position assigned them during the battle of the 19th and 20th. To the commanding officers of brigades, regiments, and batteries the highest praise is due for the able and fearless manner in which they managed their commands, in circumstances of more than ordinary trial. I herewith forward their several reports, to which I respectfully refer you for an account of the individual action of the different portions of my division, and I cheerfully indorse such special mention as is made of deserving members of the command. Where the conduct of all is so commendable, it is hardly possible for me to select any for particular mention, yet I cannot conclude this report without bringing to the special notice of the commanding general the gallant and meritorious conduct of Colonel F. Van Duer, thirty-fifth regiment Ohio volunteer infantry, commanding third brigade, whose fearlessness and calm judgment in the most trying situations added materially to the efficiency of his command, which he handled both days in the most skilful manner, punishing the enemy severely. As also the gallant and dashing Croxton, (fourth Kentucky infantry, commanding second brigade,) who, though severely and painfully wounded early the second day, remained on the field rallying and encouraging his men until utterly exhausted. Colonel Connel, seventeenth Ohio infantry, commanding first brigade, acted with coolness and judgment, and with his brigade rendered efficient service, fighting most gallantly.

Captain Church, commanding fourth Michigan battery, First Lieutenant F. G. Smith, commanding, and First Lieutenant Rodney, battery I, fourth United States artillery, as also First Lieutenant Gary, commanding company C, first Ohio volunteer artillery, are worthy of mention for their gallantry and the skill and judgment with which they worked their guns. The opportune arrival of Major General Granger's command I consider saved the army from total route, being left to my own resources by General Negley, who I supposed to be on my right. I could not have held my position against another attack had not General Granger's troops got into position to prevent my being flanked on the right. I am indebted to General Steedman for a small supply of ammunition, when I was depending solely upon the bayonet for repulsing the next assault. The staff of my division, Captain Louis I. Lambert, assistant adjutant general; Captain George S. Roper, commissary of subsistence; Captain Lewis Johnson, tenth Indiana volunteers, provost marshal; Lieutenant Ira V. Germani, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant F. V. Webb, aide-de-camp, and Lieutenant Dame, tenth Kentucky infantry, topographical engineer, missing—performed their duties with fearlessness and great gallantry, carrying my orders under the severest fire, and



using every effort to rally and encourage the troops to return to their flag, when a panic had evidently seized many, particularly of other divisions.

The medical director, Surgeon Tollman, second Minnesota volunteer infantry, made successfully all the arrangements for the care of the wounded that could be expected, considering their great numbers. First Lieutenant J. W. White, ordnance officer, did his duty well, supplying the ammunition promptly under heavy fire, until his communication with the line was cut off. Brigadier General John Beatty joined me on the hill where our last stand was made, and gave great assistance in rallying the troops and keeping them in position. Colonel M. B. Walker, thirty-first Ohio volunteer infantry, joined me shortly after we fell back to the ridge, and offered his services to me, as, being in arrest, he had no command. Being short of staff officers, I accepted Colonel Walker's services, and well he served me and his country, rallying and collecting the men and encouraging them to stand, by his energy and personal courage. I am much indebted to him. The thirty-eighth Ohio volunteer infantry, Colonel Phelps commanding, of the first brigade, was detailed on the 18th as guard to the supply and general train of the division, and being subsequently ordered across the river by General Rosecrans, was unable to participate in the engagement of either day. The unavoidable absence of this regiment is much to be regretted.

Total number engaged, 5,998. Total loss during the 19th and 20th.—Killed, 325; wounded, 1,639; missing, 210. Total, 2,174.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. M. BRANNAN,

*Brigadier General, Commanding Division.*

GEO. E. FLYNT,

*Lieut. Col., A. A. G. and Chief of Staff, 14th Army Corps.*

#### HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION 14TH ARMY CORPS,

DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*Chattanooga, September 26, 1863.*

GENERAL: Immediately after taking the battery of your brigade the ninth Ohio volunteers were ordered to their brigade, which the rebels had attacked in considerable force, leaving the battery in charge of the seventeenth Ohio volunteers. This regiment remained in charge of the battery until it was known you had sent a regiment to relieve it, when, there being no rebels in the vicinity, the seventeenth Ohio volunteer infantry hurried to the left, where their services were much needed.

Very respectfully,

J. M. BRANNAN,

*Brigadier General, Commanding Division.*

General KING, *First Division.*

#### HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION,

FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

*Chattanooga, September 26, 1863.*

I certify that the above is a true copy.

JAS. W. FORSYTHE,

*Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

## HEADQUARTERS FOURTH DIVISION 14TH ARMY CORPS,

*Chattanooga, Tenn., September 23, 1863.*

COLONEL: I herewith submit a report of the operations of the fourth division, 14th army corps, in the battle of Chickamauga creek, Georgia, September 19 and 20, 1863.

The division moved from Pond spring about 4 p. m. on the 18th, and having marched all night, halted one hour for breakfast near Osborn's, and thence proceeded, by order of General Thomas, commanding 14th corps, to take position in line of battle northeast of Glann's house; while taking this position the division was ordered to advance immediately towards McDaniel's and enter in the action then progressing on our left. I at once reported in person to the corps commander, and, in accordance with his instructions, directed the third brigade (Turchin's) to take position southeast of Kelley's cross-roads. The second brigade (King's) was about leaving the main road to take place on the right of the third, when I met General Palmer in the road, who represented that his command had gained upon the enemy, but was nearly out of ammunition and in great need of assistance to enable him to hold what he had gained, at least until they could replenish ammunition. This, although not the precise position indicated to me for the second brigade, was very close to it, and appeared to be a place that it was essential to fill at once, and no other troops were in sight to take the position. Three regiments, under Colonel E. A. King, were therefore ordered in at this point, leaving in my hands one regiment, seventy-fifth Indiana, and Harris's battery. I had just arrived on the field and, found my division would occupy about the centre of our line. No reserve force being anywhere apparent, I determined to form one of Harris's battery and the seventy-fifth Indiana, to which was shortly added Swallow's battery, (which I found on the road unem-ployed,) and the ninety-second Illinois, (temporarily dismounted.) In a short time the sixth Ohio came from the front and took position near Harris's battery to re-supply ammunition. General Palmer soon called also for the seventy-fifth Indiana temporarily; it was ordered to go, the sixth Ohio serving in the interim as support to the guns. The sixth having been re-supplied with ammunition, was subsequently ordered away, leaving the ninety-second Illinois the only support for the batteries. The seventy-fifth Indiana returned late in the day and in some disorder, having relieved an entire brigade and done efficient service. Calls for support had been made from the right, to which it was impossible for me to respond. General J. C. Davis arrived and inquired where troops were needed. I gave him the substance of my information, and he led his division in on our right. Finally a call came direct from Colonel E. A. King, who had drifted further to the right, that he was hard pressed, and wanted his own regiment, the seventy-fifth Indiana. This regiment had gone, but I ordered to him the ninety-second Illinois, trusting to regiments returning to the road to re-supply ammunition for support to the batteries, or that in case the force in front were driven back, of which I felt there was danger, I might rally them around the batteries and re-establish the line. The two howitzers of the ninety-second Illinois were now added to the two batteries, and the ninety-second started to King's support. Scarcely had it cleared the front of the guns when this regiment was struck in flank by our own forces retiring, followed closely by the enemy. I met our retiring regiments in person, pointed them to fourteen guns in position as evidence that the enemy must be thrown back, and by great exertion succeeded in reforming several regiments in rear of the batteries.

Battery H, fourth regiment artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Russell, at this time came to our position, and was ordered into action on Harris's left. These batteries fired with terrible effect upon the enemy, his progress was checked, and our line for a time prevented from yielding any further. The enemy now shifted further to the right, where there was evidently an opening in our lines,

and coming in on their right flank, our regiments again became disheartened and began to retire. The batteries following the regiments changed front and fired to the right, and the line was reformed along a fence nearly perpendicular to its former position, with the batteries in the edge of the woods, the enemy pushing still further to the right and rear. I rallied and formed into double line some ten or twelve other returning regiments, which came in from the left centre, and placing the front line under the immediate command of Colonel Croxton, tenth Kentucky, ordered them to swing around on the left flank as a pivot; this order was well executed by both lines in our rear, thus entirely cleared of the enemy. It was now nearly sundown, and operations on this part of the field ceased for the day.

On the 20th my division was posted at Kelley's cross-roads in echelon, the third brigade (Turchin's) in front, and immediately on General Palmer's right; the second brigade (King's) slightly retired to secure good ground, and facing the main Rossville and Layfayette road. Two brigades of the third division, 14th army corps, (Brannan's,) were on my right; my division was formed in two lines, nearly one-half of the infantry being in reserve. During the early morning of the 20th temporary breastworks were erected of such material as could be found at hand, and were of great benefit. The attack of the enemy in our position commenced about 10 o'clock, and was very heavy; he was successfully repulsed at all points in front of our position without calling upon the second line of infantry. About 11 o'clock the two brigades of the third division being heavily pressed in front and right flank, which had been left uncovered, began to yield. Colonel Croxton reported this to me, and personal inspection verified the report. The one hundred and fifth Ohio, Major Perkins commanding, and until this time lying in reserve, was ordered to face the enemy, and go at them with the bayonet; the order was gallantly executed; the enemy was thrown back, and the yielding regiments partially rallied, but the enemy returning with increased force, and turning their right, these regiments were borne back, the one hundred and fifth Ohio with them.

The latter regiment carried off the field the rebel General Adams, wounded, who had been previously captured by Captain Guthrie's company, of the nineteenth Illinois. After all the troops had left the right of my division, and the enemy was silenced in front, a column of the enemy appeared in the main road, in the prolongation of the line of battle of the second brigade; at this same time a rebel battery was firing into the rear of this brigade. The position of the second brigade was therefore changed so as to throw its left nearer the right of the third brigade, and to face the enemy, who had taken position on our right and rear. At this time the division was out of ammunition, except such as was gathered from the boxes of the dead, and the enemy was between us and our ammunition train; but for this circumstance we could have maintained our position indefinitely. The ammunition train, by another route, got safely to Chattanooga. We remained in this position for some time, when orders were received from the corps commander to prepare to change our position, and the division in a short time received an order to initiate a movement towards Rossville. This was done with the brigade still formed in two lines, and moving by flank in parallel columns, thus ready at a moment's notice to face in double line in either of the directions in which firing had lately been heard. Arriving at the Rossville road, the command was met by the corps commander in person, and I was directed to form line perpendicular to the Rossville road. This done, General Thomas pointed in the direction of Rossville and said, "There they are, clear them out." The division was faced about, and a charge ordered and executed in two lines, at double quick through the rebel lines, dispersing them and capturing more than two hundred prisoners, under a fire of infantry in front and artillery in flank. I understand that this movement was intended to open the way to Rossville for the army, and did not then know of any other road to that point. I therefore pressed right on

in the charge, expecting the whole division to do the same, until the rebel lines and batteries were cleared and the road opened, and found myself with only about one hundred and fifty of the third brigade, under Colonel, Lane eleventh Ohio, near the field hospital of the 14th corps. The remainder of the division proceeded to the high grounds on the left, by order of General Thomas; the third brigade was re-formed by Brigadier General Turchin, who had his horse shot under him in the charge; the second brigade was re-formed by Colonel M. S. Robinson, who succeeded to the command of that brigade after the death of Colonel E. A. King; the advance party re-formed the division on the ridge to the west of the road, and the whole division marched to Rossville by the valley road. The first brigade (Wilder's mounted infantry) was detached from the division by order of the department commander, except the ninety-second Illinois, which was with the division on the 19th. The operations of this brigade will be reported separately.

The brigade commanders, Brigadier General J. B. Turchin and Colonel E. A. King, handled their brigades with skill and judgment, and no instance of confusion or disorder occurred to the batteries; Harris's nineteenth Indiana and Andrews's twenty-first Indiana were skilfully and bravely managed and did fine execution; the nineteenth battery on both days, and the twenty-first battery more especially on the 20th. Captain Harris was wounded on the 19th. His battery was ably commanded on the 20th by Lieutenant Lackey. This battery lost two guns, one left on the field, the horses killed; the other disabled by the enemy's fire. Andrews's battery lost one gun, left from the breaking of the harness. The untimely fall of Colonel King renders it impracticable to obtain a connected report of the operations of the second brigade; the regiments were ably commanded, as follows: one hundred and first Indiana, Lieutenant Colonel Doan; seventy-fifth Indiana, Colonel Robinson; sixty-eighth Indiana, Captain Espy, wounded; one hundred and fifth Ohio, Major Perkins, wounded. The division staff were at their posts and discharged their duties promptly and faithfully. Major John Levering, assistant adjutant general, sick in ambulance; Major O. O. Herrick, medical director, in the hands of the enemy; Captain F. F. Starkweather, assistant quartermaster; Captain J. C. Leech, commissary of subsistence; Captain C. O. Howard, mustering officer, aide-de-camp, wounded in the hand; Captain J. F. Floyd, one hundred and first Ohio, aide-de-camp; Captain P. B. Hanna, seventy-second Indiana, provost marshal, (wounded;) First Lieutenant J. W. Armstrong, seventeenth Indiana, ordnance officer; Second Lieutenant W. P. Bainbridge, one hundred and first Indiana, aide-de-camp, wounded in the arm; Sergeant Daniel Bush, company D, one hundred and first Indiana, orderly at headquarters, was badly wounded and has since died. Among the deaths the country has to deplore the loss of Colonel E. A. King, commanding second brigade, and Colonel W. G. Jones, commanding thirty-sixth Ohio, both superior officers. Herewith are submitted lists of casualties, from which it appears that the total loss of the division in killed and wounded and missing is (963) nine hundred and sixty-three.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. J. REYNOLDS,

*Major General Commanding Division.*

Lieutenant Colonel FLYNT,

*Assistant Adjutant General and Chief of Staff.*

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, 20TH ARMY CORPS,  
*Chattanooga, September 28, 1863.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division in the battles of the 19th and 20th instant.

Early in the morning of the 19th, while in camp near Catlett's Gap, a passage through Pigeon mountain, I received an order to move forward on the Chattanooga road to the support of the left. On my arrival at Crawfish spring, I received an order from the major general commanding the corps to move forward and report to Major General Thomas, from whom I would receive orders. I at once sent Captain E. T. Wells, of my staff, to report to General Thomas, and to receive from him such orders as he might have for me. The instructions I received were to move in the direction of the cannonading. Arriving near the battle-field, I met Major General Thomas, who ordered me to form line of battle and move forward and attack. My division was formed with Willich's brigade on the right, and Baldwin's on the left, with Dodge's in reserve. In this order the command moved forward, though oblique to the general line. Soon the skirmishers became engaged and the enemy forced back. General Hazen's brigade, at this time on my right, was reported heavily pressed, and I ordered Dodge's brigade to his relief. The brigade moved forward at double-quick and soon engaged the enemy. The contest was severe, but soon the enemy was forced from my entire front, but unfortunately the troops on my right and left did not move forward. After driving the enemy for at least a mile, Willich sent me word that there was no support on his right. I ordered him not to move forward, but to hold his ground. Everything remained quiet on my front until about 5 p. m., when my entire line was attacked by an overwhelming force in front, flank, and rear. Here the assault was terrific; the darkness soon prevented us from recognizing friend from foe, and in hand-to-hand contest the enemy was repulsed, and the second division remained master of the field.

A short time before dark I received an order from Major General Thomas to fall back at dark, and encamp in a position which he designated. This order was sent to brigade commanders. My staff officer delivered this order to Colonel Baldwin, soon after which he fell, and Colonel Berry, his successor, was not made aware of the movement until he saw it being executed by the troops on his right. By this movement many of our wounded fell into the hands of the rebels. I established my line at the point designated by General Thomas by placing Berry's brigade on the right, and Dodge's on the left, with Willich posted in strong position as a reserve. In this position my right rested against Palmer and my left on Baird.

Early in the morning of the 20th, breastworks were hurriedly thrown up, behind which my men were well sheltered. At 10 o'clock a. m. the enemy advanced in force, attacking my entire front. I have not heard heavier musketry during the war than we had for one hour, when the enemy was handsomely repulsed, in great confusion, leaving the ground literally covered with their dead and dying. Before the repulse I ordered Willich in with his brigade to resist to the last extremity. After the repulse he withdrew a part of his brigade to his former position to support his battery in reserve. There was comparative quiet on my front, with occasional shots only, until about 4 p. m., when we were again vigorously attacked. General Baird appealed to me in person to send him re-enforcements or to make a demonstration in his behalf. The ninth, fifteenth, and forty-ninth Ohio, fifth Kentucky, and thirty-second Indiana were sent, under Willich. Soon after, the troops on my left gave way, and the troops above mentioned charged, driving the enemy back with terrible slaughter. After this movement Willich assembled his regiments in their former positions.

While the attack in my immediate front was progressing well, I received an order from Major General Thomas for the withdrawal of the entire army—Rey-

nolds first, then Palmer—and I was to follow the latter. I at once sent a staff officer to General Thomas to say to him that I supposed his order was given, based upon the belief that all was quiet in my front, whereas I was fearfully attacked, though I felt confident of being able to hold my position; yet a retreat at that time might be disastrous. Before the return of the staff officer, Reynolds's and Palmer's commenced the movement, followed by a heavy force of the enemy, thus exposing my right. I barely had time to send word to my command to save them from complete destruction. They, however, withdrew in good order. By having Willich in reserve he was enabled to engage the enemy in four different directions, and by his prompt movement he saved the troops from annihilation and capture.

At the time the order was received to withdraw he was engaged with the enemy immediately in my rear. I did not send him the order to withdraw, believing that he was then engaged with General Granger; he withdrew, however, in fine style, and with his brigade covered the retreat of the army.

To each of my brigade commanders I am under many obligations for their good and gallant conduct, and their valuable suggestions. Brigadier General Wellich, commanding first brigade, was always in the right place, and by his individual daring rendered the country great service. This gallant old veteran deserves promotion, and I hope he may receive it.

Colonel J. B. Dodge, commanding second brigade, handled his brigade well, and is worthy and deserving of promotion. He is a brave and gallant soldier.

Colonel W. W. Barry, who took command of the third brigade, behaved with so much coolness, and displayed so much skill and ability in the management of his brigade after the fall of the lamented Baldwin, that I hope he may be promoted at once. Colonel Barry first joined the troops under Rousseau, at the first breaking out of the rebellion, and has participated in all the battles and skirmishes of his regiment (fifth Kentucky infantry) with distinguished gallantry.

Colonel P. P. Baldwin, than whom a more gallant or accomplished officer is not in the service, fell in the night attack on the 19th. His loss will be seriously felt to his regiment and the service. At one time, before his fall, one of his regiments became somewhat disorganized, owing to the fall of its colonel. Baldwin seized the colors, and calling out, "Rally round the flag, boys," the effect was electric; the men rallied, and his gallant regiments moved magnificently forward.

My thanks are due for coolness and distinguished gallantry to Lieutenant Colonel Langdon and Major Stafford, first Ohio; Major Gray and Captain Strong, forty-ninth Ohio; Lieutenant Colonel Askin and Major M. Clenahan, fifteenth Ohio; Lieutenant Colonel Hall and Major Williams, eighty-ninth Illinois; Colonel Buckner, Lieutenant Colonel Reeve, Major Van Deven, and Major Fitzsimmons, thirtieth Indiana; Colonel Rose, Lieutenant Colonel Pyfer, and Major Phillips, seventy-seventh Pennsylvania; Colonel Strong, Lieutenant Colonel Martin, and Major Bach, ninety-third Ohio; Major Thomasson, and Captain Huston, fifth Kentucky; Lieutenant Colonel Tripp, and Major Campbell, sixth Indiana.

For individual mention of subaltern officers reference is respectfully made to regimental and brigade reports, but I take this occasion to thank every officer and soldier in the division for their good conduct; no troops ever behaved better. I wish it were possible to mention each member of the division by name in this report.

To my staff, Captains Bartlett, Wells, Matzner, Laft, Lieutenant A. J. Smith, J. I. Kessler, Edward Davis, I owe my thanks for their efficiency and gallantry on the battle-field. Captains Bartlett and Wells were with me all the time, and were frequently sent to points of danger. Their duties were faithfully and fearlessly performed.

Lieutenant F. N. Streets, of my staff, was killed; he was a brave and gallant

young man, and died as heroes wish to die. My thanks are due to Captain Simonson, my chief of artillery, and all the artillery officers, for good and gallant service.

My thanks are due to my medical director, Surgeon Charles Schessler, and the other medical officers of the division; they were untiring in their exertions to alleviate the pain of the suffering.

My escort and orderlies performed their duties well; among them I mention Sergeant Miles, third Kentucky cavalry, and private Robert Hays, thirtieth Indiana.

The country must mourn the loss of gallant spirits who offered their lives upon the altar. For a list, reference is made to sub-report. The first brigade captured five pieces of artillery, and the third brigade two pieces; about six hundred prisoners were captured by the division and sent to the rear.

It is a source of great pleasure to me to know that the second division did not yield an inch; that it defeated every force whether attacked or attacking. The list of casualties shows that it did have fighting.

Respectfully submitted:

R. W. JOHNSON,

*Brigadier General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding Division.*

G. P. THRUSTON,

*Lieutenant Colonel, Chief of Staff 20th Army Corps.*

### *Casualties.*

Commands.	COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.				ENLISTED MEN.				Aggregate.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	
Division staff .....	1	-----	-----	1	-----	-----	2	2	3
First brigade .....	7	15	3	25	47	340	110	497	522
Second brigade .....	3	17	28	48	23	184	283	490	538
Third brigade .....	4	24	-----	28	50	421	67	538	566
Total .....	15	56	31	102	120	945	462	1,527	1,629

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and A. D. C.*

### HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION 21ST ARMY CORPS,

*Chattanooga, Tenn., September 29, 1863.*

SIR: At early dawn of the morning of Sunday, the 16th of August, I received an order to move with my division from Hillsboro', in Middle Tennessee, by the most practicable and expeditious route across the Cumberland mountains, to Thurman, in the Sequatchie valley. Wednesday evening, the 19th, was the time fixed for the division to arrive at the destination assigned to it. The second brigade, Wagner's, had for a month previously occupied Pelham, near the foot of the mountains, and General Wagner had been ordered to repair the road up the mountains, known as the Park road.

As the order of movement left to my discretion the route by which my division should cross the mountains, I determined to make the ascent by the Park

road, thence to Tracy city, thence by Johnson's to Purden's, whence I would fall into the road leading from McMinnville, by Altamont, to Thurman.

Immediately on receiving the order I despatched instructions to General Wagner to commence the ascent of the mountains; and to insure his being out of the way of the other two brigades, I directed he should continue the work of getting up his train. During the night of the 16th this was done, and early in the morning of the 17th, the road being free, the first and third brigades, with their baggage trains and ammunition and supply trains of the division, began to ascend the mountains; the work was continued uninterruptedly through the day and entire night of the 17th, and by 10 o'clock of the 18th the whole was up; Wagner's brigade had advanced to Tracy city. Monday morning, the 17th instant, orders to move forward as far as the Thurman and Anderson road. On Thursday, the 18th, I allowed the first and third brigades, Buell's and Harker's, to rest till 10 o'clock p. m. on the 18th, and then move to Tracy city. Wagner was ordered to advance on the Thurman road to Thurman Wednesday morning, select a good encampment, and await my arrival with the other two brigades and heavy trains. The distance from Tracy city to Thurman is twenty-eight miles, which had to be accomplished in one day, with the first and third brigades, their batteries and the trains to be at the rendezvous assigned me at the designated time. At 4 o'clock a. m. on the 19th the march was commenced, and a little after nightfall the brigades encamped at Thurman. The order for the general movements directed me to take with me ten days' subsistence for the men and ten days' grain for the animals. I descended into the Sequatchie valley with twenty-five days' subsistence for the men and sixteen days' grain for the animals. I do not mention this in a spirit of egotism, but simply to show what can be accomplished by intelligence and good judgment, energy, and a willingness to make some sacrifice of personal comfort by commanders. Every educated and experienced soldier knows that one of the greatest drawbacks in the mobility and activity, and consequently in the offensive power of an army, is to be found in the immense baggage and supply trains which usually accompany its movements; hence, whatever lessens the number of vehicles required for the transportation of baggage and supplies, by so much increases the efficiency of the army. I transported all the supplies took into the Sequatchie valley in the wagons originally assigned to my division for the transportation of regimental and staff baggage. I was then prepared with my division for a campaign of twenty-five days in full rations, or fifty days on half rations. The additional forage required beyond what I brought with me could have been found in the country, in conformity with the order for the general movements. I despatched Wagner's brigade early Thursday morning, the 20th, to the eastern slope of Waldren's ridge, to make something of a show of force, and at the same time closely observe and, if opportunities permitted, to threaten the enemy. With the other two brigades, first and third, I remained encamped at Thurman's till the early morning of the 1st of September. I then moved, in conformity to orders, to Jasper, lower down in the valley. Later in the afternoon of the 2d I received an order to send one of my brigades to Shellmound, to cross the Tennessee river. The first brigade was immediately put in motion under this order, and under the skilful management of Colonel Buell was thrown across the river rapidly and without accident during the night. Early in the morning of the 3d I moved with the third brigade and the ammunition and ambulance trains to the crossing, and with the energetic and judicious assistance of Colonel Harker had everything passed rapidly across without accident. I remained encamped at Shellmound till Saturday afternoon, the 5th, awaiting orders, the delay being occasioned by the necessity of waiting for the arrival of the supply train, which had been sent to cross the river at Bridgeport. During the afternoon of the 5th I received an order to move, with the two brigades of my division with me, *via* Whiteside and the



river road, to the junction of the Nashville and Chattanooga railway with the Trenton and Chattanooga railroad, for the purpose of observing and threatening the enemy posted on the spur of Lookout mountain. I advanced as far as Whiteside Saturday afternoon and evening. Early Sunday morning I continued to advance, Harker's brigade leading. Soon very light parties of the enemy were encountered, but they rapidly fell back before my sturdy onward movements through the country which my line of march led me, most favorable to a prolonged and obstinate resistance by a small force. Crossing Raccoon mountain, I descended into Lookout mountain valley, and then followed down the valley northward to the junction of the two railways. As I moved down the valley the enemy's signal stations on the crest of Lookout mountain were in full and perfect view, evidently watching my advance, and actively communicating the result of their observations to the rear.

At the junction of the railways my command was about two to two and a half miles from the enemy's advance works, but the outposts and pickets were much nearer to each other—in fact, in hearing distance. As I was well aware that the enemy had been able to learn from his signal stations with very close approximate correctness the strength of my command, and hence would, most probably, be disposed to take advantage of my inferiority of force to attempt to crush me by a sudden blow. I immediately made the best possible disposition to foil such an effort. In making these dispositions I soon became convinced of the utter untenableness of the position at the junction of the railways for an inferior force to receive an attack from a superior one. The position is entirely open, capable of being assailed simultaneously in front, on both flanks, and in rear. I was well satisfied that I was in the immediate proximity of a very large force of the enemy, (which could be still further swelled in a very short time.) This information I had gained satisfactorily during my advance, and it was strengthened and corroborated during the afternoon and early evening of the 6th. At 2 o'clock p. m. I communicated to the corps commander my position, seven miles from Chattanooga, (being at the junction of the railways,) informed him of my immediate proximity to the enemy, and attempted to describe briefly the obstacles which barred my further progress to Chattanooga. At 4 p. m. I communicated to him the result of further observations, and some facts omitted in my note of 2 p. m. In my note of 2 p. m. I suggested that he should move part of the force immediately with him to cover my rear from a reverse attack. This he declined to do on the ground of a want of authority, and indicated that, in case I should be attacked by a superior force, I would have to fall back on him; also indicating that if I should have to retreat, I had better do so by the Trenton road. I had already opened communication with him by that road. Not understanding to retreat, except as a matter of the last and dire extremity, and as the evidences continued to thicken and multiply during the evening that I would be attacked in heavy force next morning, I determined to shift my command a mile and a half to the rear, to a very strong, high, and defensible position, in which I was satisfied I could maintain myself from against almost any odds for a long time, and, if finally overpowered, could draw off my command to the rear. From this position I could maintain my communication by the Trenton road with the force immediately with the corps commander. The movement was commenced at 10 p. m., the 6th, and made with perfect success, though my pickets were at the time in hearing of the enemy's pickets. My command was thus safely extricated from immediate imminent danger. I learned satisfactorily during the afternoon of the 6th that the spur of Lookout mountain was held by Cheatham's division, supported immediately in rear by Hindman's (late Withers's) division, being the whole of Lieutenant General Polk's corps.

My two small brigades confronted this force. About 8 a. m. in the morning of the 7th I received a copy of a communication, addressed by the commanding general to the corps commander, saying that he thought it would be safe (judg-

ing from some indications he had obtained of the movements of the enemy) to threaten the enemy on the spur of Lookout mountain with a part of my force. This communication the corps commander appears to have interpreted into an order to make a reconnoissance in force, and accordingly ordered that I should make such a reconnoissance without loss of time. I accordingly commenced at once to make my preparation to make the reconnoissance, and actually made it at the earliest possible moment compatible with the safety of my command and the assurance of the success of the reconnoissance itself. As the results of the reconnoissance have hitherto been reported, I will not recapitulate them. After taking the necessary precautions to increase the safety, as far as possible, of the command to be engaged in the reconnoissance, and the assurance of the success of the reconnoissance, I committed the conduct of it to that gallant and accomplished officer, Colonel Harker, commanding third brigade of my division. I instructed him to proceed with the utmost circumspection, but to force his command as near to the enemy's position as he might deem prudent. This point I was, of course, compelled to submit to his judgment.

It affords me the greatest satisfaction to record, in a permanent, official manner, that Colonel Harker conducted the reconnoissance in exact conformity to wishes and instructions, securing well his flank and rear from being assailed without timely notice. He drove his solid line within some thousand yards of the enemy's batteries, (and his line of skirmishers to within some six hundred yards,) whence twelve guns opened on him, and then drew off his command with the loss of but one man. I knew no parallel in military history to this reconnoissance. My command being much faded and worn by the labors of the several preceding days, I allowed it to rest during the 8th, but I was on the alert to gain information of the movements and designs of the enemy. Near nightfall I obtained some information which led me to suspect the enemy was evacuating Chattanooga, but the indications were by no means positive. With a view to verifying this information, I addressed a note to the corps commander informing him that I had observed some mysterious indications on the part of the enemy, of which I proposed to compel a development by a reconnoissance in force early next morning. During the night I received a reply to my note saying the corps commander could not approve the making the reconnoissance on account of some indications of a general movement of the army, but that he would refer the note to the commanding general, confidently believing the commanding general would approve my proposition to make the reconnoissance. I held my command in readiness for the movement. In the mean time General Wagner, having with him the third brigade of my division, had received information on the north side of the river that the enemy was evacuating Chattanooga. The information having been communicated to the commanding general of the army, an order was despatched to me to move my command to Chattanooga prepared for a vigorous pursuit of the enemy. This agreeable order was joyfully obeyed, and in a very few minutes my command was in rapid motion. Between my late camp in Lookout Mountain valley and the spur of the mountain my command was overtaken by the ninety-second Illinois mounted infantry, commanded by Colonel Adkins, who informed me he had been ordered to press forward to Chattanooga with all haste to secure any property the enemy might have left behind, and to discover something of his lines of retreat. I allowed his regiment to pass my command, but on the spur of the mountain I overtook the regiment halted, where the colonel informed me that the enemy's skirmishers outflanked his, and his further progress was delayed.

I immediately threw forward the twenty-sixth Ohio, Lieutenant Colonel Young commanding, to the right, and higher up the mountain-side than the skirmishers of Colonel Adkins extended, and rapidly drove the enemy's skirmishers from the mountain side. No further opposition was encountered in occupying Chattanooga, and the ninety-second Illinois pushed rapidly into the

town, followed by my first and third brigades. The second brigade crossed from the north side of the river during the afternoon and evening of the 9th. The colors of the ninety-seventh Ohio, of the second brigade of my division, were the first planted on the works of Chattanooga, having been brought across the river by a few men in a small boat early in the morning.

Thus was this great strategic position, the long-sought goal, gained to us and occupied by our troops. Placing myself as soon as possible after the occupation in communication with the most intelligent and reliable citizens, I learned that a portion of the enemy's troops had retreated by the Cove road, and that the remainder with the baggage and materials of war had retreated by the Rossville and Lafayette road. I was informed, further, that Buckner's command, which had been posted at Tyner's station on the railway, had retreated by Johnson towards Ringold, but I subsequently learned he did not go so far eastward as Ringold, but passed through Graysville and thence to Lafayette. The bulk of these facts I reported to the commander of the corps immediately on his arrival, and by him I am informed they were communicated to the commanding general. My division remained in Chattanooga till the morning of the 10th; I then received an order to detail one brigade to occupy the town, and move with the other two in pursuit of the enemy by the Rossville and Ringold road. The second brigade was detailed to remain in Chattanooga. At 10 a. m. of the 10th I led the first and third brigades out of Chattanooga to commence the pursuit of the enemy. At 2 p. m. of that day I advised the corps commander of the reported presence of a considerable force on my right flank, and at 7 p. m. I furthermore advised him that I had taken a contraband during the afternoon who reported the bulk of the rebel army, with General Bragg in person, at Gordon's mill, on the Chickamauga, where it is crossed by the Rossville and Lafayette road. I was incredulous of the story, and so expressed myself; but if true, it was so important it should be known that I deemed it my duty to report his narration. It is due to the humble person who furnished me this invaluable information to record, that subsequent development proved his report to be singularly accurate and correct. Based on my note of 7.30 p. m. of the 10th, a communication was sent me by the commanding general to send a brigade by the way of Rossville to make a reconnoissance in the direction of Gordon's mill, with a view of verifying the truth of the contraband's report. The order was received at early daylight of the morning of the 11th. Colonel Harker's brigade was immediately sent to execute this service. About the time Harker's brigade was moving the corps commander arrived at my camp. I was directed by him to move forward with my remaining brigade two miles on the Ringold road and there to await further orders. The order was obeyed at 3.30 p. m.

While awaiting further instructions, I received an order from the general commanding to move across the country by the shortest and most expeditious route to the Lafayette and Rossville road to support Colonel Harker. Near the same hour I received a note from Colonel Harker informing me that he had been driving the enemy all day, and had arrived within three miles of Gordon's mill. I immediately sent him an order to press forward to the mill, informing him that I would make a junction with him during the evening. The junction was made, and fortunately for Harker, who had been driving his little brigade all day against a vastly superior force, the rear guard of the enemy's great army. A full report of this brilliant and dangerous reconnoissance has been already made, and it is not now necessary that I should say more than that it was superbly made. When I arrived at Gordon's mill, at 8.30 p. m. of the 11th, the enemy's camp fires could be distinctly seen on the other side of the creek. Their light reflected over a wide section of the horizon, and, extending upwards in the heavens, told that the foe was present in considerable force. It was my intention to continue the pursuit early next morning, the 12th; but till 8 o'clock

a. m. the atmosphere was so loaded with haze, fog, and smoke that it was difficult to see a hundred yards in advance. While I was waiting for the atmosphere to become sufficiently clear to continue the pursuit, I received an order to remain at Gordon's mill till the corps commander arrived there with the other two divisions of the corps. This was done during the afternoon of the 12th. My two brigades remained quiet during the 13th, enjoying much-needed rest. During the evening of the 13th, a copy of a letter of instructions from the general commanding to the corps commanders was furnished me by the latter, in which he was directed to leave my command at Gordon's mill, and proceed with the other two divisions to a position on Missionary ridge, with a view to facilitating the concentration with the other corps of the army. My orders directed me to try strictly to maintain the position at Gordon's mill, but if attacked by a superior force, to fall back slowly, resisting stoutly, to Rossville, where it was supposed I would be supported by Major General Granger's force. In case of extremity, and in case also I should not be supported by General Granger at Rossville, I was directed to select a position guarding the roads leading to Chattanooga and around the point of Lookout mountain, and hold them at all hazards. Resolved to make the most stubborn resistance at Gordon's mill, I took advantage of the creek, a very strong defensible position, and barricaded my entire front and flanks strongly. So strengthened, I could have successfully resisted a front attack of a vastly superior force. With the exception of an occasional firing on my pickets, the enemy left me undisturbed at Gordon's mill till between 11 a. m. and 12 m. of Friday, the 18th instant. A rapid advance of his light troops, supported by troops in a solid line, on my right front, drove in my pickets as far as the creek, but no effort was made to pass the stream; such an attempt would have been foiled, and cost the enemy dearly. At about 10 o'clock p. m., a force, apparently about a brigade of four regiments, emerged from the wood on the southern side of the creek, nearly opposite the centre of my position, apparently with the intention of forcing a passage at the ford near the mill. A few well-directed shots from Bradley's battery soon forced him to relinquish his design and seek the shelter of the woods. The enemy continued to hover in my front during the whole afternoon, making, however, no serious attempts, and accordingly I became reasonably satisfied that his demonstrations were only a mask to his real design, that of passing a heavy force across the creek lower down with a view to turning our left and cutting off our communication with Chattanooga. I communicated my opinion on this point to the commanding general at his headquarters during the evening of the 18th. It was verified by the opening of a terrific engagement on our left as early as 8.30 a. m. on the 19th. Troops had been moved to our left during the night of the 18th to meet the emergency. The battle continued throughout the forenoon and in the afternoon, but my command was left at Gordon's mill till 3 o'clock p. m. At this hour I received a verbal order from the corps commander, through one of his staff, to move with my command and take position, as well as I now remember, on the right of some part of General Van Cleve's division. Throughout the entire preceding part of the day I had distinctly observed a considerable force of the enemy in front of my position at Gordon's mill, and just before I received the order to move into action a contraband came into my lines, from whom I learned that this force was the division of General Bushrod Johnson. Knowing it would pass the creek immediately I vacated my position, if it should not be occupied by some other troops, I despatched one of my aides-de-camp to the commanding general to inform him of the presence of this force in my front, and to suggest that at least a brigade should be sent to occupy the position as soon as I should vacate it. On his way to the headquarters of the general commanding, my aide-de-camp encountered Major General McCook, to whom he communicated the object of his mission to headquarters. General McCook immediately ordered a brigade from his corps to move into position at Gordon's mill. My

aide-de-camp rode to headquarters and reported what had been done to the commanding general, who approved the dispositions. No delay, however, had occurred on this account in the movement of my command from Gordon's mill. Immediately on the receipt of this order, my command was put in rapid motion for the scene of the great conflict. As already remarked, the order directed me to take position on the right of General Van Cleve's division; but as I was totally ignorant of his position in the battle and met no one on my arrival on the field to enlighten me, I found myself much embarrassed for the want of information where I could bring my command judiciously and effectively into action. It should be borne in mind that many of the troops were engaged in the woods, and that it was next to impossible to gain information by sight of the arrangement of the troops already engaged. This information could only be given by general and staff officers, posted in advance, to aid in bringing the troops arriving freshly on the ground into action properly. Fortunately, shortly after my arrival on the field, I met General Davis, from whom I received some useful information in regard to the status of the conflict. From him I learned that his left brigade, Hayne's, was sorely pressed and needed assistance. While I was in conference with him, a staff officer informed him that Colonel Hayne reported that he could not maintain his position, and at the same instant I saw a stream of fugitives pouring out of the woods, across the Rossville and Lafayette road, and over the field to the west of it. These, I learned, belonged to Hayne's brigade of Davis's division. It was evident a crisis was at hand. The advance of the enemy, before which these men were retiring, must be checked at once, or the army would be cut in twain. Directing Major Mendenhall, of the corps commander's staff, who chanced to be near me at the moment, to go and rally the fugitives rushing across the field on the west of the road, I at once commenced my disposition to check the advancing foe. When I first met General Davis on the field, I inquired of him where the fight was; he pointed into the woods whence the roar and rattle of very sharp musketry fire resounded, and told me that Hayne's brigade was heavily engaged in there. I immediately directed Colonel Harker to form his brigade in battle array, nearly parallel with the Rossville and Lafayette road, advance into the woods and engage the enemy. But the evidence immediately brought to my notice that Hayne's brigade was retiring made a change in this disposition necessary. I consequently directed Colonel Harker to throw forward his right, holding his left as a pivot on the road, thus giving his line an oblique direction to the road, and then advance his whole line. By this disposition I hoped to be able to take the enemy's advancing force in flank. These dispositions, though most expeditiously made, were scarcely completed when a staff officer rode up and reported that the enemy had gained the road and was advancing up it, *i. e.*, in the direction of Gordon's mill. This information rendered necessary a further change in the arrangement of Harker's brigade. I ordered him to refuse his left, which brought the left half of his line at right angles with the road, and gave to his whole front the form of a broken line with apex towards the enemy. In this shape he advanced rapidly, engaged the enemy, and drove him between a half and three-fourths of a mile. I followed his advance nearly half a mile, and found he was doing well. Having perfect confidence in his ability to handle his brigade, I remarked to him that I would leave him and go to look after my other brigade, Colonel Buell commanding, which had followed Harker's to the field of battle. For the details of the severe conflict through which Harker's brigade passed in this stage of the battle, for an account of the valuable services it rendered in checking the force which threatened to cut the right of the army from the left, for a report of the heavy loss of gallant officers and men which occurred here, and for a description of the skilful manner in which the brigade was extricated from the perils by which it became environed from encountering in its advance a vastly superior force, I must refer to the more detailed report of the brigade

commander. The list of casualties attests the severity of the fighting. The gallant commander himself had two horses shot under him. Bradley's battery, attached to Harker's brigade, owing to the density of the woods into which the brigade advanced, did not accompany it. The signal service which this battery rendered at a little later period of the action will be chronicled at the proper time.

Leaving Harker's brigade, I returned to where I had ordered Colonel Buell to halt and form his brigade. When I first met General Davis on the field of battle I was informed by him that Carlin's brigade of his division was hotly engaged in the woods in advance or eastward of the cornfield in which our meeting occurred. The sharp and quick rattle of musketry fully assured the correctness of the statement. Seeing no other reserves at hand, and assured that both Harker and Carlin were severely engaged, I determined to hold Buell's brigade on hand to meet emergencies. And it was fortunate I did so, for ere long Carlin's brigade was swept back out of the woods, across the cornfield, and into the woods beyond the field on the western side of the road, carrying everything away with it. When I observed the rush across the cornfield I was near the one hundredth Illinois. With a view to checking our exultant enemy, I ordered Colonel Bartleson, commanding the one hundredth Illinois, to fix bayonets and charge the foe. The bayonets were promptly fixed, and the regiment had commenced to advance, when it was struck by a crowd of fugitives and swept away in the general melange. The whole of Buell's brigade was thus carried off its feet. It was necessary for it to fall back across the narrow field on the western side of the road to the edge of the woods, under whose cover it rallied. As soon as possible, it was formed along the fence separating the field from the woods, and with the aid of a part of Carlin's brigade and a regiment of Wilder's brigade, dismounted there, repulsed the enemy. This result was greatly contributed to by the heavy and most effective fire at short range of Bradley's and Estep's batteries. At this critical moment these two batteries were most splendidly served. The narrow field separating the woods on the left from the Rossville and Lafayette road is scarcely two hundred paces wide. Buell's brigade was formed just east of the road, where it was struck by Carlin's brigade. It hence had to retire the distance of less than two hundred yards to get to shelter of the woods for reforming, but in crossing this narrow space it suffered terribly. The killed and wounded were thickly strewn on the ground. Captain George, fifteenth Indiana infantry, of my staff, was struck by a ball and knocked from his horse by my side. So soon as the enemy were repulsed, I addressed myself to reforming Buell's brigade for the purpose of advancing it to recover the lost ground. Order being restored, and a sufficiently solid formation acquired to warrant an advance, I led the brigade back in person and reoccupied the ground from which it had been forced—the site on which it had been originally formed. In this advance my horse was twice shot, the second one proving fatal. I dismounted one of my orderlies near me and took his horse. In this advance a portion of Carlin's brigade participated, led by General Carlin. Estep's battery, attached to Buell's brigade, accompanied the advance. Scarcely had this lost ground been repossessed when the enemy emerged from the woods on the eastern side of the cornfield and commenced to cross it. He was formed in two lines, and advanced firing. The appearance of his force was large. Fortunately, re-enforcements were at hand. A compact brigade of Sheridan's division not hitherto engaged was at the moment crossing the field in rear of the position then occupied by Buell's brigade and the portion of Carlin's. This fresh brigade advanced handsomely into action, and, joining its fire to that of the other troops, most materially aided in repelling a most dangerous attack, but this was not done until considerable loss had been inflicted on us. The enemy advanced near enough to cut down so many horses in Estep's battery that he could not bring off his guns, but as our infantry held

its ground, they did not fall into the hands of the enemy. After the attack had been repelled, some of the men of the brigade of Sheridan's division kindly drew the pieces to the ravine or, rather, dip in the ground in rear of the ridge on which the battery was posted where Captain Estep retook possession of them. For this act of soldierly fraternity and kindness I desire publicly and officially to return my thanks and those of my division to the troops who rendered it; and I regret that I do not know the number of the brigade and the name of its commander, that I might more distinctly signalize them in my report. The day was now far spent; in truth it was near sunset. No further serious demonstrations were made by the enemy on our immediate front.

The troops were posted in a strong position to resist a night attack; the brigade of Sheridan's division and Buell's brigade being in juxtaposition, the former on the right and the latter on the left. Harker's brigade was held as a reserve in the edge of the woods on the western side of the road, and Bradley's battery was posted near to it, covering the troops in the front lines. Just after nightfall a sharp fire ran along the line, caused by some movement of the enemy, which at first was taken for an advance, but in the end proved to be nothing more than a picket demonstration. Jaded, worn, and thirsty, the men laid down on their arms to pass a cheerless and comfortless night on the battlefield.

It affords me much pleasure to record here a Samaritan deed rendered to my division during the night by Colonel Harrison, of the thirty-ninth Indiana, and a part of his mounted regiment. The men were very thirsty, but the distance to water was so great that but few could hope to get permission to go for it. During the night Colonel Harrison brought to us some five hundred canteens of good water. They were distributed among my men as equitably as possible, and proved the cooling drop to the thirsty soldiers.

Estep's battery was refitted during the night, and was ready for service the next morning.

Between midnight and daylight of the morning of the 20th I received an order to move my command to a position on the slope of Missionary ridge, to be held there as part of the reserve of the army in the coming conflict of the morning. The movement was quietly and successfully made. In the early morning I was directed to move my division eastward from the slope of Missionary ridge and take the position hitherto occupied by Negley's division, keeping my left in constant communication with General Brannan's right. Colonel Barnes's brigade, of Van Cleve's division, was ordered to report to me for service during the day. Placing his brigade on the left, Harker's in the centre, and Buell's on the right, (the whole formed in two lines, the front one deployed, the second in double column closed in mass, with their batteries following and supporting,) I advanced my command and occupied the position assigned. In doing so I met no opposition from the enemy. I was instructed not to invite an attack, but to be prepared to repel any effort of the enemy. In throwing out skirmishers to cover my front I aroused the enemy, and had quite a sharp affair with him. By a very imprudent advance of his regiment, done without an order, Colonel Bartleson (moving himself in advance of his troops) was shot from his horse and either killed or very severely wounded, it was impossible to decide which, on account of the proximity of the place where he fell to the enemy's lines. He was an accomplished and gallant officer, and a hightoned, pure-minded gentleman. His loss is a serious disadvantage to his regiment and to the service. The position my command then occupied closed the gap in our lines between Sheridan's left and Brannan's right. Although I had not been seriously engaged at any time during the morning, I was well satisfied the enemy was in considerable force in my immediate front, consequently I was extremely vigilant.

Such was the state of the battle in my immediate vicinity when I received the following order:

“HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

“September 20—10.45 a. m.

“Brigadier General Wood, *Commanding Division*:

“The general commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as fast as possible and support him.

“Respectfully, &c.,

“FRANK S. BOND,

“*Major and Aide-de-Camp.*”

I received the order about 11 o'clock. At the moment of its receipt I was a short distance in the rear of the centre of my command. General McCook was with me when I received it. I informed him that I would immediately carry it into execution, and suggested that he should close up his command rapidly on my right to prevent the occurrence of a gap in my lines. He said he would do so, and immediately rode away. I immediately despatched my staff officer to the brigade commander with the necessary orders, and the movement was at once begun. Reynolds's division was posted on the left of Brannan's division, which in turn was on the left of the position I was just quitting. I had, consequently, to pass my command in the rear of Brannan's division to close up on and go into the support of Reynolds. So soon as I had got the command, and learned where and how it was designed to bring my command into action, (I did not know General Reynolds's position,) I rode forward to find General Reynolds, but in my search for him, I met Major General Thomas, to whom I communicated the order I had received from the commanding general, and desired to know where I should move my command to support General Reynolds.

General Thomas replied that General Reynolds did not need support, but that I had better move to the support of General Baird, posted on our extreme left, and who needed assistance. I exhibited my order to him, and asked him whether he would take the responsibility of changing it. He replied he would, and I then informed him I would move my command to the support of General Baird.

I requested General Thomas to furnish me a staff officer who could conduct me to General Baird, which he did.

Taking this staff officer with me, I rode at once to Barnes's brigade, and directed the staff officer to conduct it to and report it to General Baird. I then rode to the other two brigades for the purpose of following with them in the rear of Barnes's brigade, to the assistance of General Baird. When I re-formed them, I found the valley south of them swarming with the enemy. It appeared that when I moved my command to go to the support of General Reynolds that the gap thus made in our lines was not closed by the troops on my right, and that the enemy poured through it very soon in great force. The head of his column struck the right of Buell's brigade, and cutting off a portion of it, forced it over the adjacent ridge, whence it retired, as I have subsequently learned, with the vast mass of fugitives from the troops on our extreme right, towards Rossville. In moving to the support of General Reynolds, naturally following the shortest route, I moved through the woods. My two batteries, Estep's and Bradley's, could not follow their brigade through the woods, and consequently were compelled to make a short detour to the left to get into the open fields on the slope of the ridge, intending to move thence parallel to their brigade. But they were caught in this movement by the rapidly advancing columns of the enemy. Estep's guns were captured, (in the neighborhood, as I understand, of infantry of the right, which might have supported him if it had



stood,) while Bradley's battery, more fortunate, succeeded in getting over the ridge, and drew off towards Rossville with the tide of fugitives setting strongly in that direction.

For further details in regard to the movements of these batteries, at this stage of the action, I must refer to the reports of Captains Bradley and Estep.

I will only remark that their movements did not occur under my immediate observation, but took place beyond the reach of my infantry support. I am fully satisfied, from all I have learned, that neither Captain Bradley nor Estep can be censured for what occurred.

When I discovered the enemy in force in the valley south of my command, I at once divined his intentions and appreciated the terrible hazard to our army and the necessity for prompt action. His object was clear; having turned our right and separated a portion of our force from the main body, he was seeking the rear of our solid lines of battle, to attack it in reverse, hoping thus to cut our communication with Chattanooga, and capture and destroy the bulk of our army. I had with me at this time but one brigade, Harker's, and a portion of Buell's. I immediately formed a line across the valley, facing southward, determined, if possible, to check the advance of the enemy. He was in full and plain view in the open fields, and it was evident his force far outnumbered mine, but I felt that this was no time for comparing numbers; the enemy at all hazards must be checked. I was without the support of artillery, and knew I had to depend alone on the musket. I formed my line in a skirt of woods reaching across the valley. In front of me was the open fields, across which the enemy was advancing. It was a matter of great importance to get possession of the fence which bounded the field on the northern side. My line was some one hundred and fifty or two hundred yards from the fence on the north of it, while the enemy's line was perhaps as much as three hundred and fifty yards south of it. In person I ordered the 125th Ohio, Colonel Opdyke, commanding, to advance and seize the fence; there was a momentary hesitation in the regiment to go forward. Its gallant colonel immediately rode in front of the centre of his regiment, and taking off his hat called on his men to advance. His regiment gallantly responded by a prompt advance, as men ever will under the inspiration of such leadership. The regiment quickly lined the fence, whence a sharp fire was opened on the enemy. Soon the 64th Ohio, Colonel McIlvain commanding, followed and formed along the fence on the left of the 125th Ohio. This bold and rapid offensive movement seemed to take the enemy by surprise, and disconcerted his movements, for his hitherto advancing lines halted. The other regiments, 65th Ohio and 3d Kentucky, Major Brown commanding the former, and Colonel Dunlap the latter, of Harker's brigade, with the 58th Indiana, of Colonel Buell's brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Ombree commanding, was formed on the right of the 125th Ohio, higher up the fence, and on a hill dominating the field in which the enemy had halted. The 125th Ohio and 64th Ohio again advanced, and took position behind a copse of woods, near the centre of the field, the now debatable ground of the contending bodies. The movements of the enemy at this moment were so singular, and his blurred and greasy and dusty uniform so resembled our own when travel-stained, coupled with the fact that it was expected a part of McCook's command would come from that direction, (the terrible disaster to his force on the right not being then known to us,) that for a few minutes the impression prevailed and the cry ran along the line that the troops in front of us were our own. I ordered the firing to cease, the thought of firing on our own comrades in arms being too terrible to contemplate. In a few minutes, however, the delusion was dispelled, the enemy commencing to advance again in a way that left no doubt of his identity, for he advanced firing on us. I do not mention this singular mistake on account of its possessing any particular importance *per se*, but rather to record it as an instance of the strange delusions that sometimes

occur on the battle-field without any sufficient cause, and without the possibility of a reasonable explanation. This mistake was the more remarkable, as the enemy was probably not more than three hundred, certainly not over three hundred and fifty yards distant, and was halted in a broad open field. But for this mistake we could have punished him most severely at the time he was halted. The sun was now about high noon, possibly it may have been as late as 12.30 p. m., when the 125th Ohio and 64th Ohio advanced to the copse in the open field. I ordered Colonel Opdyke to line the southern side of the copse with skirmishers, with a view to annoying and delaying the progress of the enemy. As he advanced he inclined to his left, evidently with the intention of outflanking my line, and turning my right. This movement of the enemy made it necessary that I should gain a position in which I could form a shorter and more compact line, in which my right would be more protected by natural obstacles. I accordingly retired my command to a narrow and short ridge, which shoots out nearly at right angles as a spur from the general ridge, which is parallel to the Rossville and Lafayette road. The short and narrow ridge extends athwart the valley in a nearly east and west course. The abruptness of the declivity on either side of it almost gives to this ridge the quality of a natural parapet. Troops holding it could load and fire behind it out of reach of the enemy's fire and then advance to the crest of it to deliver a plunging fire on the advancing foe. In addition, there was a moral effect in its command over the ground south of it, which inspired the courage of the troops holding it. Here I determined to make an obstinate and stubborn stand. When General Brannan's right was turned, (by the opening of the gap in our lines by the movement of my division to support General Reynolds,) he had been compelled to fall back to the general ridge enclosing on the west the valley in which the great battle was fought, which ridge, as already remarked, runs nearly parallel to the Rossville and Lafayette road. When I took position with Harker's brigade on the narrow ridge extending partially across the valley, General Brannan formed his command on my right and higher up on the main ridge, thus giving to our united lines something of the shape of an irregular crescent, with the concavity towards the enemy. This disposition gave us a covering fire on the attacking columns. Colonel Buell formed his command with General Brannan's.

When my arrangements in this position were concluded, it was probably one o'clock p. m., or a little after. The enemy did not leave us long in the quiet possession of our new position. Soon a most obstinate and determined attack was made, which was handsomely repulsed. Similar attacks were continued during the whole afternoon. To describe each one in detail would be unnecessary and only add useless prolixity to my report. But I deem it proper to signalize one of these attacks especially. It occurred about four o'clock, and lasted about thirty minutes. It was most unquestionably the most terrific musketry duel I have ever witnessed. Harker's brigade was formed in two lines; the regiments were advanced to the crest of the ridge alternately, and delivered their fire by volley at the commands, retiring a few paces behind it after firing to reload. The continued roar of the very fiercest musketry fire inspired a sentiment of grandeur in which the awful and sublime were intermingled. But the enemy was repulsed in this fierce attack, and the crest of the ridge was still in our possession. Finally the evening shades descended and spread the drapery of moonlight over the hardly contested field. The battle ceased and my command still held the position it had taken about one o'clock, maintaining with glorious courage a most unequalled contest in point of numbers, but our inferiority of strength did not appal the men; their courage and steadfast resolution rose with the occasion. I do not believe that history affords an instance of a more splendid resistance than that made by Harker's brigade and a portion of Buell's brigade from 1 p. m. on the 20th to nightfall. A part of the contest was witnessed by that able and distinguished commander, Major General Thomas. I

think it must have been near to two o'clock when he came to where my command was so hotly engaged. His presence was most welcome. The men saw him, felt they were battling under the eye of a great chieftain, and their courage and resolution received fresh inspiration from the consciousness. At a most opportune time in the afternoon, probably between 2 and 3 o'clock, Major General Granger arrived on the field with two brigades of fresh troops of the division of General Steedman. They were brought into action on the right of General Brannan (who was on my right) and rapidly drove the enemy before them; this movement very considerably relieved the pressure in my front. The gallant bearing of General Granger during the whole of this most critical part of the contest was a strong re-enforcement. It affords me much pleasure to signalize the presence with my command for a length of time during the afternoon (present during the period of the hottest fighting) of another distinguished officer, Brigadier General Garfield, chief of staff. After the disastrous event of the right, General Garfield made his way back to the battle-field, showing thereby that the road was open to all who might choose it, to follow it where duty called, and came to where my command was engaged. The brigade which made so determined a resistance on the crest of the narrow ridge during all that long September afternoon had been commanded by General Garfield when he belonged to my division. The men remarked his presence with much satisfaction, and were delighted that he was a witness of the splendid fighting they were doing. Early in the afternoon my command was joined by portions of two regiments belonging to Van Cleve's division, the seventeenth Kentucky, Colonel Stout commanding, and the forty-fourth Indiana, Lieutenant Colonel Aldrich commanding. The fact that these parts of regiments in preserving the form of a regimental organization did not leave the field after the disaster on the right, where so many other troops fled from the contest, is certainly most creditable to them. The fact also affords very just ground for the inference that if a more determined effort had been made by the officers, many other regiments that left the field might have been kept in it. The remains of the two regiments most nobly and gallantly aided my command in repulsing the repeated attacks of the enemy. The forty-fourth Indiana bore itself with special gallantry. I should do injustice to my feelings were I to omit to record my testimony to the splendid resistance made on my right by General Brannan and his command. It was the *ne plus ultra* of defensive fighting. About 7 o'clock p. m. I received an order from General Thomas to withdraw my command from the field and retire to Rossville. The order was executed without noise, without confusion, and without disaster. My command left the field not because it was beaten, but in obedience to an order. With a fresh supply of ammunition it could have renewed the contest next morning, and here I can appropriately return my thanks to Major General Granger for a timely supply of ammunition given me during the afternoon, when that in the cartridge-boxes and men's pockets was reduced to two or three rounds per man, and when the prospect of being reduced to the bayonet alone as a means of defence seemed inevitable. My own ammunition train had been carried off by the route from the right. My command reached Rossville about 10 p. m., where it bivouacked for the night. Early next morning, the 21st, in obedience to orders, I took a strong position on Missionary ridge. Strong barricades against an infantry assault were at once made. During the day there was some light firing on my picket front, but nothing serious. The enemy was, however, evidently in considerable force in my front. At 10 p. m. of the 21st my command, in obedience to orders, left its position on Missionary ridge and withdrew to this place. Early Tuesday morning, the 22d, it occupied its present position in the line of defences, and has since been most constantly and actively engaged in strengthening them. To the officers and men of my command I return my thanks for their gallant bearing, soldierly conduct and steadfast courage, exhibited both in the contest of Saturday, the 19th, and

Sunday, the 20th. Their conduct on both days deserves all praise, and I commend it to the consideration of the commanding general. There were undoubtedly instances of individual misconduct which deserve reprehension, but as a whole the behavior of the command was most satisfactory. Of the numerous killed and wounded I would gladly speak by name, but the list is too numerous. To do so would extend my report beyond all reasonable compass. I can only here express my serious condolence with the relatives and friends of the gallant dead and wounded. The regiments and batteries in my command represented the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Kentucky. The citizens of these great and loyal States have much cause to be proud of their representatives in the late great conflict. They may safely trust their honor and the public weal to such representatives. For the special commendation by name of the more subordinate officers and men who distinguished themselves I must refer the commanding general to the reports of my brigade commanders, Colonels Harker and Buell, and their accompanying documents, the sub-reports of regimental commanders. Where so great a portion of my command behaved well, it is difficult to distinguish officers by name, and perhaps may be regarded as making an invidious distinction. Nevertheless I consider it my duty, on account of their distinguished services, to commend to the notice of the commanding general Colonel Dunlap, commanding third Kentucky; Colonel McIlvain, commanding sixty-fourth Ohio; Colonel Opdyke, commanding one hundred and twenty-fifth Ohio, and Captain Bradley, commanding sixth Ohio battery. I desire to commend Colonel Opdyke especially to the favorable consideration of the commanding general; the record of his regiment (a comparatively new one and never before in a general engagement) in the late battle will, I am sure, compare most favorably with that of the most veteran regiments engaged. The credit is mainly due to the colonel commanding. His untiring zeal and devoted attention to his regiment has brought forth fruits worthy his efforts. I commend him to the commanding general as an officer capable and worthy of commanding a brigade. Colonel Buell, commanding the first brigade of my division, has exercised this command about three months. He bore himself with great gallantry on the field, both on Saturday, 19th, and Sunday, the 20th; with a little more experience he would make an excellent brigadier general, and should receive the promotion. In my report of the battle of Stone river I especially signalized the services of Colonel Harker, commanding the third brigade of my division, and earnestly recommended him for promotion, both as a reward for his merits and as an act of simple justice. In the late campaigns he has peculiarly distinguished himself; he made two of the most daring and brilliant reconnaissances during the campaign—reconnaissances almost without a parallel in the annals of warfare, and his personal gallantry on the battle-field, the skilful manner in which he handled his brigade, leading it together so well when so many other troops broke, and his general good conduct, are beyond all praise. To speak of his services in what I conceive to be just encomium might be considered fulsome praise. I earnestly recommend him for immediate promotion to the rank of brigadier general. Returns herewith submitted show that I went into action on Saturday with an effective force of men and officers of twenty-nine hundred and sixty-five (2,965.) The return of casualties shows that my command lost in killed and wounded, absolutely known to be such, eight hundred and forty-four (844,) and in killed, wounded, and missing one thousand and thirty-five (1,035.) Taking the number of killed and wounded actually known, it will be found to be twenty-eight and eighty one-hundredths (28.80) per cent. of the effective force with which I went into action. But it is fair to presume, as we retired from the field Sunday evening, that many of the one hundred and ninety-one reported missing were either killed or wounded, and that their bodies fell into the hands of the enemy. Taking the number of the killed, wounded and missing, it will be found to be

thirty-four and ninety one-hundredths (34.90) per cent. of my whole command. These figures show an almost unparalleled loss; they attest the severity of the conflicts through which my command passed on the 19th and 20th. The record of its participation in the great battle of the Chickamauga is written in blood. Before closing my report, I deem it my duty to bring to the notice of the commanding general certain facts which fell under my observation during the progress of the conflict. On the 20th, as I was moving along the valley with my command to the support of General Reynolds, in conformity with the order of the commanding general, I observed on my left (to the west of me) a force posted high up on the ridge. I inquired what force it was, and was informed it was a part (a brigade perhaps) of General Negley's division. I was informed that General Negley was with this force in person. I remember distinctly seeing a battery on the hill-side with the troops; at the time it was certainly out of the reach of any fire from the enemy. This was between 11 and 12 o'clock in the day, a little later in the day, perhaps half or three-fourths of an hour, when I became severely engaged, as already described, with a large hostile force that had pierced our line and turned Brannan's right, compelling him to fall back. I looked for the force I had seen posted on the ridge, and which, as already remarked, I had been informed was a part of General Negley's division, hoping if I became severely pressed it might re-enforce me, for I was resolved to check the enemy if possible, but it had entirely disappeared; whither it had gone I did not then know, but was informed later in the day it had retired towards Rossville, and this information, I believe, was correct. By whose order this force retired from the battle-field I do not know; but of one fact I am perfectly convinced, that there was no necessity for its retiring. It is impossible it could have been at all seriously pressed by the enemy at the time—in fact, I think it extremely doubtful whether it was engaged at all. Near sundown of the 20th I met General John Beatty not far from where I had fought the enemy all the afternoon. He was entirely alone when I met him, and did not seem to have any special command. I at once came to the conclusion that he had not retired from the battle-field when the bulk of the division he is attached to did. At the moment I met him I was engaged halting some troops that were crossing the valley north and west of my position, and who appeared to have straggled away from the front, on which General Thomas's command had fought all day. General Beatty desired to know where I wished these troops re-formed. I pointed out a position to him, and desired him to re-form them, which he said he would do. I then rode back to my command. It is proper that I should remark that I did not see the corps commander from about 9½ o'clock a. m. of Sunday, the 20th, to some time after sunrise of the 21st, when I met him at Rossville. The officers of my staff performed their duties well in the late arduous campaign, as well in the march and in camp as on the battle-field. I deem it due to them to record their names in my official report, and to thank them individually for their valuable assistance and co-operation: Captain H. P. Briston, assistant adjutant general; Lieutenant I. L. Yaryan, fifty-eighth Indiana, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant George Schefer, ninety-third Ohio, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant Colonel I. R. Palmer, thirteenth Michigan, inspector general; Surgeon W. W. Blair, medical director; Captain S. B. Meyers, assistant quartermaster; Captain James McDonald, commissary of subsistence; Captain William McLaughlin, thirteenth Michigan, topographical engineers; Captain J. E. George, fifteenth Indiana, assistant commissary of musters; Lieutenant P. Haldiman, third Kentucky, ordnance officer; Captain M. Keiser, sixty-fourth Ohio, provost marshal.

Up to the occupation of Chattanooga, when his leg was accidentally broken, since which time his duties have been well performed by Lieutenant Ehlers, of the same regiment, Captain Cullen Bradley, sixth Ohio battery, in addition to commanding his own battery, ably performed the duties of chief of artill

lery. It affords me much pleasure to mention in my official report the true courage and faithful devotion exhibited throughout the entire conflict of my personal escort. Early in the conflict of Sunday my color-bearer was wounded; the colors were then taken by Sergeant Samuel Goodrich, company A, one hundredth Illinois, who bore aloft my standard through the remainder of the day, remaining with me all the time. Private Robert Leman, company I, fifty-eighth Indiana, a member of my escort, rode immediately in rear of me through the whole conflict of Sunday, the 20th; whenever I called, this brave and devoted boy, a youth not more than sixteen or seventeen years of age, responded. I have the honor to forward herewith, as accompaniment to my report, first, official report of Colonel Harker, commanding third brigade, (with sub-reports of regimental commanders,) marked A; second, official report of Colonel Buell, commanding first brigade, with sub-reports of regimental commanders, marked B; third, return of effective force taken into action on the 19th September, 1863, marked C; fourth, return of casualties in the battle of the 19th and 20th, marked D; fifth, map showing the various positions of command in the battle of the 19th and 20th, marked E.

I cannot conclude my report of the participation of my command in the great battle of the Chickamauga—a battle in which the fate of the proud army of the Cumberland hung trembling in the balance—in truth, a battle in whose results the great nation's life seemed involved, without returning thanks to Almighty Providence for His merciful deliverance vouchsafed to us from the hosts of our enemies. For His protection of myself through all the dangers of the bloody conflict I am humbly thankful.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS J. WOOD,

*Brigadier General Volunteers, Commanding.*

Captain J. P. OLDERSHAW,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

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#### HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION 21ST ARMY CORPS,

*Chattanooga, Tenn., September 30, 1863.*

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that on the first day of September the brigades of Cruft and Grose, with Standardt's, Russell's, and Cushing's batteries, marched from Dunlap down the Sequatchie valley, towards the Tennessee river. Hazen's brigade, with Cocknell's battery, were at the time at Poe's tavern, in the Tennessee valley, and not then subject to my orders. On the 3d of September Grose's brigade reached the mouth of Battle creek, and the following night and next day crossed the river on rafts. Cruft was sent, by order of the general commanding, by way of Shellmound, found good boats and crossed without difficulty during the afternoon of the 11th of September; both brigades were brought together at Shellmound.

On the 5th of September I received orders to march to Whiteside's Station, on the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, following Wood's division to that point, and then to move up the valley of Running Water creek. In the afternoon of that day I followed Wood closely, and reached "Cole's Academy, in Lookout valley," near Wood. My command remained at "Cole's Academy" until four o'clock in the morning of the 8th of September, and then moved down the Trenton and Chattanooga railroad to Hawkins's Station, one and a half mile, to the rear of Wood. As Hawkins information was received from General

Wood that the enemy occupied Lookout mountain in strong force, I at once sent two regiments to reconnoitre the face of the mountain to ascertain if it could be ascended, and found a gap accessible to infantry and cavalry, and applied to the general commanding the corps for his approval of an expedition to the top of the mountain to learn what the enemy was doing. I received his approval, and ordered General Grose, with three regiments, to attempt the ascent at three o'clock next morning. About eight o'clock in the morning Brigadier General Wood called at my quarters and told me that he received information that on the night before the enemy had relieved his infantry pickets along our front with cavalry, and proposed to make a reconnoissance towards Chattanooga with his own division early next morning, to be supported by me. I had already, with the approval of the general commanding the corps, ordered Colonel Grose to the top of the mountain, and was not able to meet General Wood's wishes. At three o'clock on the morning of the 9th Colonel Grose marched in execution of his order, and ascended the mountain with but little difficulty; and four o'clock Captain Cooke, of the staff of the general commanding, reached my quarters, and gave me information of the evacuation of Chattanooga.

Under orders from the general commanding the corps, at eight o'clock on the 9th instant, with Cruft's brigade, two regiments of Colonel Grose, and the artillery and baggage of both brigades, I moved towards Chattanooga, following Wood's division and all his transportation. The road around the spur of the mountain was rough and blocked by the wagons of the first division, in consequence the march was slow and fatiguing. Upon reaching the eastern base of the mountain I directed my march to Rossville, without passing through Chattanooga, and when near there drove a small cavalry force before me, and halted at Rossville for the night. At five o'clock on the morning of the 10th I received orders from the general commanding the corps, directing me to take one hundred rounds of ammunition for men and five days' rations, and march on the Dalton road, by the way of Ringold, in pursuit of the enemy. I was ordered not to wait for my train, but leave that under a sufficient escort to follow me. I was thus separated from my supplies, and had with me but one day's rations. I determined, therefore, to make a short march on that day, with the hope that the supply train would reach me during the night. Accordingly I marched to Pea Vine creek, within five miles of Ringold, and halted. Upon reaching this point, a small mounted force of the enemy was seen in front, and Captain Norton, an officer of great firmness and experience, was sent forward with my personal escort and a small detachment of cavalry, (fourth Michigan,) to drive them off. This small party attacked with great spirit and drove the enemy a mile, and as it was quite obvious that the parties of the enemy near were numerous and comparatively strong, it rejoined the column. A few moments after the return of our cavalry, a force of the enemy under cover of a cloud of dust charged the advance guard, (four companies first Kentucky,) at full speed, threw it into confusion, and captured two officers and fifty-six enlisted men. The pressure of other duties has prevented a full investigation of this unfortunate affair; none of the excuses yet tendered to me are satisfactory. I will for that reason, as soon as time will allow, bring the officers responsible to trial for what seems to me gross negligence in the performance of their important duties. It is due to the regiment and all its officers that I should say, that on all subsequent occasions during the late operations all behaved most creditably. The five day's rations required by the order of the 10th reached me during the night, and at six o'clock next morning resumed the march by the way of Graysville in charge of the baggage of my own and Van Cleve's division, he having taking the most direct route to Ringold over the hills. At Graysville Hazen's brigade united with the division, and the whole moved to Ringold and bivouacked that night. It was apparent on the 10th instant that the enemy

were numerous on our front and right, but were rapidly drifting south. On the 11th Colonel Wilder, supported by Van Cleve, pushed a large cavalry force through Ringold in the direction of Dalton. Reports from a hundred sources, citizens, deserters, &c., all pointed to Rome, Georgia, as the point fixed for the concentration of the whole rebel army.

At six o'clock in the morning of the 12th of September, in pursuance of orders received during the previous night, I marched in the direction of Gordon's mill, by the way of Gilbert's, on Pea Vine creek. Upon reaching the road at Pea Vine, citizens gave the information that a heavy cavalry force of the rebels had passed down towards Lafayette in the course of the night. The bridge was cut down and the ford blocked, and signs of the recent passage of retreating troops abundant.

In accordance with the order of the general commanding the corps before referred to, my command was halted at the junction of the Gordon's Mill road and the Lafayette road for several hours to cover the march of Van Cleve's division, which had crossed the Pea Vine valley lower down, in charge of the transportation.

A few troops of the enemy were seen watching our movements. About ten o'clock it was reported to me that firing was heard towards Gordon's mill. I pushed Hazen forward to learn the cause, and effect a junction with our forces at the mill. This he did with but little trouble. About two o'clock I sent a portion of Cruft's brigade up the valley toward Pea Vine church, to clear that flank of the enemy, and learn the cause of firing in that direction. This was handsomely done by Colonel Sedgwick and Colonel Rippey, with their respective regiments, and a section of Standart's battery. About dark the whole division bivouacked at Gordon's mill.

*September 13.*—Early in the morning, Grose's pickets were fired upon by the enemy. After a noisy skirmish the enemy fell back. Grose remained in position during the day, watching a reconnoissance made by Van Cleve to the front, and Cruft marched back to Pea Vine valley to support a reconnoissance by Colonel Welder.

*September 14.*—Marched at six o'clock across Missionary ridge to Harrison's, in Chattanooga valley; pushed one brigade two miles up the valley to Mitchell's.

*September 15.*—Started at daylight for the Chickamauga valley; marched by way of Crawfish springs, and then up the valley to Gowen's, two brigades occupying the crossing at Gowen's, and one was posted at Mathew's, near Owen's ford.

*September 16.*—Grose with two regiments and one section of artillery crossed the creek and drove a party of the enemy over the hills.

*September 17.*—Early in the morning, the enemy's cavalry attacked our pickets at Gowen's. After a short skirmish, were repulsed with some loss in wounded and one prisoner. In the afternoon, marched down the creek towards Crawfish springs, giving way to the 14th army corps.

*September 18.*—Orders were received in the afternoon to relieve Colonel Barnes, of Von Cleve's division, at the ford near Glenn's, with one of my brigades. After putting Grose in position there, I reported at department headquarters, and received orders to march to Gordon's mills as soon as relieved by General Negley. While receiving these orders, I was called upon by a staff officer of General Negley for information as to the position of the brigade on the creek, to be relieved, and sent with him a staff officer (Lieutenant Scarritt) to guide him. I then, by written order, directed Colonel Grose as soon as relieved to march toward Crawfish springs and await orders. Brigadier General Hazen was ordered to follow Grose, and Cruft to move in the rear. These orders were promptly issued and delivered, placing the movements under the direction of General Cruft. I started soon after to Gordon's mill to select a position for



my command, but Grose was not in fact relieved before midnight. Hazen and Cruft were justified by my orders in awaiting his movement, and I have no doubt if Grose had been relieved by seven o'clock, as I had every reason to believe would have been done, my whole command would have been in position at Gordon's mill by ten o'clock at latest. These delays, however, made it nearly daylight before my command was in position on the left of Van Cleve's division, and about one mile north of Gordon's mill. At daylight the cavalry of Minty's brigade passed from the front to the left, giving me the information that the road along the creek to my right front was occupied by the enemy. At about nine o'clock, by the orders of the general commanding the corps, Colonel Grose was ordered with his brigade to reconnoitre the Rossville road, as far as McDonald's cross-roads, ascertain if the road was clear, and communicate with General Thomas. Soon after this brigade had marched, firing was heard in the direction of Rossville, which excited some apprehension for its safety, and about half past ten o'clock a messenger came in from Colonel Grose, in charge of one of General Bragg's orderlies taken prisoner. From this prisoner, who was sent forward to headquarters, enough was learned to satisfy us that the enemy was near in force. In answer to Colonel Grose's inquiry as to whether he should engage the cavalry reported near him, without information of the plans of the general commanding beyond the contents of my orders, and under the belief that the defence of the position of Gordon's mill was of vital importance, I ordered him not to engage unless there was a very clear prospect of doing good, but to return. About noon, I received orders to move up my whole division to the assistance of our troops then engaged. I moved at once, and met Grose's brigade returning. After marching quickly for perhaps a mile and a half, guided by the sounds of the firing, and forming lines to the right of the road, I ordered Hazen, who was on the left, to march in the direction of the firing, Cruft to keep well close up to him on his right, and Grose in reserve, re-enforcing the right, and engage as soon as possible. At this moment I received a note from the general commanding the army, which led to a slight, but turned out to be a most advantageous, change of formation. He suggested an advance in échelon by brigades, refusing the right, keeping well closed on Thomas. This suggestion was adopted; the brigades, at about one hundred paces intervals, pushed forward and engaged the enemy almost simultaneously. At once the fight became fierce and obstinate. From the character of the ground, but few positions could be found for the effective use of the artillery. My batteries were used as well as was possible, but the work was confined mainly to the musket. Our men stood up squarely without faltering, and after a struggle of perhaps an hour, the enemy were driven from the ground and pursued for a considerable distance. The firing along the line ceased, and skirmishers were thrown forward, as the ammunition of the sixth and twenty-fourth Ohio volunteers was completely exhausted, and all efforts to get a supply to them had so far failed that they were ordered back to the open ground in the rear, with the hope that they would meet the ammunition which was known to be on the way, and be ready to assist in the checking of the enemy's force, (which was obstinately driving some troops, of what command I am unable to say;) and passing the right, giving orders to close up the lines, I rode back to the open ground from which my command had marched upon the enemy. I had hardly reached the road when some troops driven out of the woods crossed the road and were pursued to the edge of the road by the enemy. At that moment one brigade of General Reynolds passed, going to the right, but as they seemed likely to go too far, I requested Colonel Robinson, of seventy-fifth Indiana volunteers, to meet the advancing enemy. He did so in fine style, and drove him back for a considerable distance. The officers and men of that regiment deserve great credit for their gallantry in this affair. After Robinson's regiment had moved off under my orders, General Reynolds suggested his withdrawal had left his

battery without support. I then ordered Colonel Anderson, with the sixth Ohio volunteers, to fill his boxes and remain there until relieved, and returned to my own lines. Upon reaching them I found my men resting, and every means was being used to fill the cartridge-boxes. Hazen had been relieved by General Turchin, who had formed on Cruft's left, and he (Hazen) had retired to fill his boxes, and protect some artillery which was threatened from the rear. I then committed the error of directing Grose to move to the right, to engage in a severe fight going on in that direction. I only for the moment saw that our troops were hard pressed, and that mine were idle, but did not observe that one brigade was not enough to relieve them. While riding towards Cruft's brigade to order him to move to the right to support Grose, a heavy force came down upon him and Turchin. For ten minutes or more our men stood up under this fire, and then the enemy charged them and bore them back. Cruft, Turchin, and all their officers exerted themselves with distinguished courage, to arrest the retreat, and I gave them what assistance I could. It seemed as if nothing would prevent a rout; but, as if by magic, the line straightened up, the men turning upon their pursuers with bayonet, and as quickly as they turned and fled, were in turn pursued. Many prisoners were brought to me at this point by soldiers for orders. I told them to break their muskets and let them go, and then go back to their places in the ranks. By this time the enemy had passed to their rear, and I felt much apprehension for Hazen. I rode in the direction of heavy firing, near the Rossville road, and found him with a part of his own brigade and a large conscription of stragglers and several pieces of artillery, resisting an attempt of the enemy to cross an open field in his front. His fire was too hot, and they abandoned the attempt. Very soon other troops of Reynolds's division came up. Grose collected his troops, which were somewhat scattered. Cruft was ordered to fall back to this point, our lines were re-formed, and the battle seemed over.

Major General Thomas, who had been upon the ground all day, gave orders for the disposition of my command for the night, and the men, suffering from cold, built fires. About dark the enemy made a furious attack upon General Johnson's command, which I then learned was upon my left. I at once ordered Cruft and Hazen to proceed rapidly to his support. They moved off with great alacrity, but did not reach the scene in time to participate in the affair.

About eight o'clock I visited departments and corps headquarters, and learned that, from the difficulties of changing the position of troops, it was expected in the anticipated battle of the next day my command would be subject to the immediate orders of Major General Thomas, and this information was reiterated in orders received on the morning of the 20th from the headquarters of the corps.

Early on the 20th I was directed by Major General Thomas to form along a ridge running from northeast to southwest, and terminating near the Rossville road, closing on the left on Johnson's division. Intending to avoid what seemed to me the common error of the day before, (too extended line,) Hazen and Cruft were put in position in two lines, and Grose in double column in reserve. The men hastily constructed barricades of logs, rails, and other materials, and awaited the attack. The engagement commenced by a furious assault upon the position of Baird on the extreme left, and soon extended along the whole front. This was repulsed with great slaughter. Then a new persistent attack was made, the chief weight of which fell upon the extreme left. Some troops posted there fell back. By direction of General Thomas my reserve brigade made that direction and took part in the obstinate contest there. The enemy was repulsed, but Grose suffered very severely. I respectfully refer to his report in reference to the share his brigade took in that bloody affair. The position held by the divisions of Reynolds, Johnson, Baird, and my own, were

frequently assailed during the day, but were maintained firmly by the willing men behind the barricades. A glance at the field along the front proved what these efforts were costing the enemy. At two o'clock unusually heavy firing was heard on the right of our position, which seemed like a determined effort on the part of the enemy to force the centre of our line. Hazen was ordered by me in that direction. He moved off rapidly in obedience to the order. I heard his volley when he went in, and saw him no more that day; that his command did its duty I have no doubt; I refer to his report for the details.

The remains of Grose's brigade had by this time returned, and now took Hazen's position in the line, but no formidable attempt was made upon us afterwards.

The enemy's sharpshooters were busy, and killed and wounded several officers, and some of our adventurous men tumbled some of them from the trees upon which they were perched.

At about five o'clock I received an order from Major General Thomas, by a staff officer, to retire. Under the impression that it was intended that I should, after retiring towards the rear of the centre, halt and be prepared to resist the attacks which were coming on both flanks, I sent my orders to my brigade commanders and rode to the Rossville road to await the head of column. I reached the road and looked back across the field, some four hundred yards; my men were half way across. The enemy had already discovered the movement and were crossing the barricades and firing. Batteries opened on us from the left and right, sweeping the road and field from opposite directions. It seemed impossible to bring men across the field in anything like good order. Grose was thrown into confusion, but Cruft came off in good style, and both with little loss. Cruft's brigade was retired slowly after leaving the field, frequently halting to serve as a nucleus for the re-formation of our scattered troops.

The brigades were conducted to the top of the ridge, formed, and held until large crowds of stragglers passed; and as I received no orders from any quarter at late dark, I gave order to the brigades to descend into the valley, throw out strong guards in the rear and front, to resist any possible attack, and march to Rossville. The head of the column reached there at 8 p. m.

On the 21st instant my command was placed in position on the ridge, to the left of Ringold road, near Rossville. Barricades were constructed, and the position occupied until nine o'clock p. m., when, under orders, it was abandoned, and the troops retired to their present position.

I can only say, in conclusion, that I am satisfied with the conduct of Brigadier Generals Cruft and Hazen and Colonel William Grose, commanding brigades. They have earned a real title to my respect and confidence; while subordinates of all grades maintained the character for hardy courage and endurance which had been won by good service upon many fields.

The artillery, under the general control of Captain Standart, chief of artillery, was used skilfully, and under all circumstances effectively. Standart had two and Cushing one gun disabled and abandoned. Captain Standart and Lieutenants Russell, Cushing, Cockenell and Baldwin, skilful, gallant men, deserve well of the country. Lieutenant Colonel Martin, aide-de-camp, and Major Muleman, assistant adjutant general, are missing, probably wounded, and in the hands of the enemy. Captain Bartlett, of seventh Illinois cavalry, commanding my escort, and Lieutenant Shaw, of the same company, exhibited commendable courage. Captain D. W. Norton was wounded; Lieutenants Scarritt and Thomas, aides, behaved with great gallantry. Captain Steele, forty-first Ohio, topographical engineer, rendered most important service on the whole march from Dunlap to the battle-field, and on both days of the battle was on all occasions where duty called, exhibiting the highest courage and the most ready intelligence. My thanks are due to Captain Howland, assistant quartermaster of the division; Lieutenant Chilton, commissary; the indefatigable Lieutenant Peck, who had charge

of transportation; and that model ordnance officer, Lieutenant Croxton, for the faithful manner in which they discharged their duties. Dr. Menzies, medical director, aided by Dr. Sherman, and all the medical officers of the division, did all that was possible by skill, animated by humanity and sense of duty, for the relief of the wounded. Private Ebey, seventh Illinois cavalry, remained with me all day as orderly, but at the close of the battle on Sunday was wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy.

I forward herewith the reports of four brigades and regiments, and cordially approve the special mentions contained in them; many of the instances of gallantry and good conduct alluded to in these occurred under my personal observation. I add, Colonel Sedgwick, second Kentucky regiment, remained with his regiment during both days' battles, kept it in good order under the heaviest fire, and brought it off the field ready to turn upon the enemy effectively at any point or moment. I recommend his promotion. Colonel Rippey, ninetyeth Ohio volunteers, remained with his regiment during both days' battles; kept in good order, exhibiting great gallantry in resisting a charge of superior numbers on the 19th instant. Colonel Smith, thirty-first Indiana volunteers, behaved with great courage and coolness. Lieutenant Colonel Heff, of the same regiment, received a painful wound in the arm on the 19th, but refused to quit his post; he fought through both days and accompanied his regiment on its retreat. Colonel Wiley, forty-first Ohio volunteers, for courage and coolness on the 19th and 20th; he kept the fire of his regiment under his control, firing by order, and by volley. Colonel Sumner, ninth Indiana volunteers, for dauntless, steady courage. Colonel Waters, eighty-fourth Illinois volunteers, for courage and steady composure in battle and vigilance in camp. Lieutenant Colonel Larey, thirty-sixth Indiana volunteers, was wounded on Saturday, remained with his command during the day, behaved with great courage. Colonel Anderson, sixth Ohio volunteers, received a painful wound on Saturday, remained until night; his courage and prudence deserve high praise. Major Erwin, sixth Ohio volunteers, assumed command after Colonel Anderson was disabled, and acquitted himself well. Lieutenant Colonel Foy, twenty-third Kentucky volunteers, exhibited great courage and devotion to duty.

These special references to officers are based upon my own observations of their conduct, and are not to be understood to reflect upon others who did not act under my eye.

I am, very respectfully, &c.,

JOHN M. PALMER,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Captain P. P. OLDERSHAW,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

*Casualties of the second division twenty-first army corps, in the battle of the 19th and 20th September, 1863.*

Commands.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate.		Horses killed.
	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	
Headquarters second division.....	---	1	2	---	2	1	4	2	---
Headquarters first brigade.....	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Thirty-first Indiana volunteers, infantry.....	1	4	2	59	---	17	3	80	---
First Kentucky volunteers, infantry.....	---	2	1	25	---	3	1	30	---
Second Kentucky volunteers, infantry.....	1	9	5	59	---	18	6	86	---
Ninetieth Ohio volunteers, infantry.....	2	5	2	60	1	14	5	79	---
Total first brigade.....	4	20	10	203	1	52	15	275	---
Headquarters second brigade.....	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
One hundred and twenty-seventh Ohio volunteers, infantry.....	---	15	4	88	---	34	4	137	---
Forty-first Ohio volunteers, infantry.....	---	6	5	95	---	9	5	110	---
Ninth Indiana volunteers, infantry.....	3	22	6	59	---	18	9	99	---
Sixth Kentucky volunteers, infantry.....	5	9	5	88	---	11	10	108	---
Total second brigade.....	8	52	20	330	---	72	28	454	---
Headquarters third brigade.....	1	---	---	3	---	---	1	3	---
Thirty-sixth Indiana volunteers, infantry.....	1	13	8	89	---	17	9	119	---
Twenty-fourth Ohio volunteers, infantry.....	---	3	3	57	---	16	3	76	---
Sixth Ohio volunteers, infantry.....	1	13	7	94	1	16	9	123	---
Eighty-fourth Illinois volunteers, infantry.....	1	12	2	81	---	9	3	102	---
Twenty-third Kentucky volunteers, infantry.....	1	10	3	49	---	6	4	65	---
Total third brigade.....	5	51	23	373	1	64	29	488	---
<i>Artillery.</i>	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Battery F, first Ohio artillery.....	1	1	---	8	---	2	1	11	12
Battery B, first Ohio artillery.....	---	1	---	8	---	4	---	13	13
Battery H, first Ohio artillery.....	---	4	1	16	---	---	1	20	23
Battery M, fourth United States artillery.....	---	2	---	6	---	---	---	8	14
Total artillery.....	1	8	1	38	---	6	2	52	62
Grand total second division.....	18	132	56	944	4	195	78	1,271	62

JOHN M. PALMER,  
Major General Commanding.

D. W. HORTON, Captain and A. A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION RESERVE CORPS,  
ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
Chattanooga, September 26, 1863.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report the part taken by my command in the late battle of Chickamauga Hills.

In obedience to the order of the major general commanding the corps, my command, consisting of the first and second brigades of the first division of the

reserve corps, the twenty-second regiment Michigan volunteers, and the eighty-ninth regiment Ohio volunteers, serving temporarily under my command, and the eighteenth Ohio battery, and company M, Illinois artillery, marched from Bridgeport, Tennessee, at seven o'clock a. m. on the 13th, and reached Rossville, Georgia, a distance of nearly forty miles, at eleven o'clock a. m. on the 14th.

At three o'clock a. m. on the 17th I moved, under the orders of the major general commanding the corps, with six regiments and a battery, to reconnoitre the road in the direction of Ringold. I moved without opposition until within two miles of Ringold, when we encountered and drove in the enemy's pickets, crossing the east Chickamauga within three-fourths of a mile of Ringold. I placed a section of artillery on the crest of the ridge commanding the town, and drove the enemy out of it. Discovering from the heavy clouds of dust rising from the roads leading to Tunnell Hill and Lafayette that large bodies of troops were moving, I deemed it prudent to return with my command as speedily as I could without indicating to the enemy an intention to retire hastily, and re-crossing the Chickamauga returned six miles towards Rossville, bivouacking for the night at Battle springs. At eleven p. m. the enemy, having followed us, threw six shells into my camp, and then under the cover of darkness speedily retired. At eight o'clock a. m. on the 18th, discovering no signs of an enemy, my command moved and reached Rossville at one o'clock p. m. At four o'clock p. m. on the 18th, in obedience to the order of Major General Granger, I sent Colonel McCook's brigade (it being temporarily under my command) to Reed's bridge, and General Whittaker's brigade to Red House bridge. At five o'clock Colonel Mitchell's brigade was sent to re-enforce Colonel McCook's, who had reached Reed's bridge without opposition, when Colonel Mitchell's brigade joined him. General Whittaker met resistance, and lost sixty men killed and wounded in a severe skirmish with the enemy's cavalry. On the morning of the 19th, (having received orders from Major General Granger to do so,) I withdrew Colonel McCook's and Colonel Mitchell's brigades from Reed's bridge, which had been burned by my order, before the troops were withdrawn. I moved with Colonel Mitchell's brigade to the support of General Whittaker and posted Colonel McCook's brigade at the junction of the Cleavland and Ringold roads. On the morning of the 20th, McCook's brigade was ordered on to the road leading from the Ringold road to Dyer's mill. At half past eleven o'clock, General Granger becoming satisfied, from the heavy and receding sounds of artillery, that the enemy was pressing the left of our line severely, ordered me to move to the battle-field as rapidly as possible with two brigades of my command, General Whittaker's and Colonel Mitchell's. I moved at once, and after marching five miles with the enemy's cavalry on my left flank, and shell-ing my troops for two miles of the distance, reached Major General Thomas and reported to him at half past one o'clock, p. m. Immediately after reaching General Thomas I received orders to move on the enemy on the left of General Wood's division. After getting into position to execute this order, Major General Granger ordered me to move to the right of General Brannan's division, which order was promptly executed, and the moment my troops were in position they moved on the enemy, and after a severe fight of about twenty-five minutes the enemy was driven from his position and my troops occupied the ridge from which they had forced the enemy. Slight skirmishing was kept up for about three quarters of an hour, when the enemy attacked us furiously, and after severe fighting for about half an hour we repulsed him. In a few moments he renewed the attack with increased force, and was again repulsed. Determined to get possession of the ridge, he immediately attacked us again, and for about an hour fought desperately, my troops maintaining their position against superior numbers until six o'clock, when, having expended our ammunition, the extra ammunition which I had with my command, 95,000 rounds, having been taken to supply General Brannan's troops, who were out, my troops fell back under orders, slowly

and in good order, after retiring to the second ridge in rear of the one on which they had fought, and resting half an hour. Finding the enemy did not attempt pursuit, all firing having ceased on both sides, they retired under orders to Ross-ville and occupied their former camp. The officers and men of my command behaved well, fought bravely, and I am proud to say did all that could have been expected of them to insure the success of our arms, to win and hold the bloody ground on which they fought. I beg leave to reassure the major general commanding the corps of my confidence in the willingness and ability of the division to meet his highest expectations. Under other circumstances it might be proper for me to make a more elaborate and detailed report of the part taken by my command in the terrible conflict of Sunday, but as my troops fought under the eye of the major general commanding the corps, I have deemed it proper to just briefly state in general terms the prominent features of the engagement. I respectfully submit herewith a tabular statement of the killed, wounded and missing in my command, together with statements of the losses in the quartermaster's and ordnance departments.

With esteem, respectfully submitted :

JAMES B. STEEDMAN,

*Brigadier General Commanding First Division Reserve Corps.*

Major J. S. FULLERTON,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

True copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

#### WHEELER'S RAID INTO TENNESSEE.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Chattanooga, Tenn., November 24, 1863.*

GENERAL: Enclosed herewith I have the honor to transmit the reports of Brigadier General Robert B. Mitchell, late chief of cavalry of this department, Brigadier General George Crook, Colonel E. M. McCook, and their subordinates, in their chase of the rebel General Joseph Wheeler during his raid into Middle Tennessee, and upon our communications early in October last.

General Crook had been stationed at Washington, Tennessee, with a force of 2,000 effective men, with which to guard the river for a distance of fifty miles up and down from near that place. On the 30th of September he reported by courier to Major General Rosecrans that the enemy was trying to cross at Cottonport ferry, and the next day from Smith's cross-roads, that he had crossed a force subsequently ascertained to number from 5,000 to 6,000 men. He was ordered by General Rosecrans to gather together all the cavalry and mounted infantry that he could and start in pursuit. The pursuit was pushed most vigorously, and the rear guard of the enemy overtaken about two miles from McMinnville, and here, as at every other point when overtaken, they were charged with the sabre, before which they could not stand. At Farmington our forces under General Crook had a severe engagement with the enemy, capturing four guns and compelling him to retreat, although his numbers far exceeded ours. The pursuit was kept up with vigor until he finally crossed the Tennessee river, leaving his rear guard and two more pieces of artillery in General Crook's hands. For the particulars of the operations of his command I refer you to his report.

The route taken by Wheeler in this raid was from Cottonport, across Waldron's ridge and the Cumberland mountains, to McMinnville; thence, by way of Murfreesboro', Shelbyville, Farmington, and Pulaski, to a ford of the Tennessee,

about three miles above the mouth of Elk river, which he crossed on the 9th of October.

Brigadier General Mitchell joined in the pursuit on the 4th of October, moving from Anderson's Gap on that day with the first division of cavalry up the Sequatchie valley, through Dunlap, and continued on, after leaving McMinnville, until he overtook Brigadier General Crook at Murfreesboro', where he assumed command, the whole force being concentrated seven miles from Shelbyville.

Colonel E. McCook started in pursuit on the 1st of October from Bridgeport, and proceeded as far as he was ordered, namely: to Anderson's cross-roads, where he had an engagement with the enemy which reflects great credit upon himself and his men.

I refer you to the reports of the last-named officers for particulars.

Colonel A. O. Miller, seventy-second regiment Indiana volunteers, commanding the mounted infantry, also started in pursuit, September 30, from Blythe's ferry, and joined General Mitchell in time to assist him in driving the rebel Roddy, with his command, out of North Alabama.

This pursuit is unsurpassed for its energy and the bravery and endurance of the officers and men engaged in it, and prevented the execution of an extensive plan of destruction to our communications, and plunder, rapine, and murder throughout Middle Tennessee and Northern Alabama, in which Roddy and Lee were to co-operate with Wheeler. It cost the enemy six pieces of artillery and about 2,000 men, including the killed, captured, and deserted.

Enclosed I also send some papers captured from the rebels near Trenton by a scouting party from General Hooker's command, among which is an official report of his raid by the rebel Wheeler himself, in which he forgets to mention the loss of four of his guns at Farmington. His report is probably equally truthful in other respects.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General U. S. V. Commanding.*

Brigadier General L. THOMAS,

*Adjutant General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS CHIEF OF CAVALRY,

DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*Deckerd, Tenn., October 20, 1863.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to forward, for your information, a report of cavalry operations which came under my notice and direction in the pursuit of Wheeler and Roddy in their raids upon our rear.

From the time I left Anderson's Gap, which was on the 4th day of October, the first division of cavalry acted directly under my command. General Crook having moved directly from Smith's cross-roads towards McMinnville with the second division of cavalry and Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry, I moved on the morning of October 4, up Sequatchie valley, through Dunlap, and up the mountains towards McMinnville, and after a toilsome march up and over the mountain, bivouacked at nine o'clock for three hours, and again commenced my march towards McMinnville. Arrived at McMinnville at eight o'clock on the morning of the 5th, and after stopping long enough for the horses to be fed and the men to make a cup of coffee, continued the march on the Murfreesboro' road, the enemy and General Crook's command having both preceded me in that direction. I continued the march till midnight; and hearing from General Crook that he had arrived in Murfreesboro', and that the enemy had passed the place without attacking it, I encamped at midnight on Cripple creek, eight miles from Mur.



freeshoro', on the Woodbury pike, having made in the twenty-four hours preceding a march of fifty-two miles with the whole division.

*October 6.*—I marched at daylight into Murfreesboro', where I halted the command to draw rations. General Crook moved on in pursuit at 9 a. m., his command having commenced drawing rations the evening previous; and as soon as the first division had drawn rations I followed with it, all moving on the Shelbyville pike. On the road out I met parties of bridge guards whom Wheeler had captured on his route, but had not time or means to take along, as his movements were very precipitate. The whole command was brought together seven miles from Shelbyville, and bivouacked for the night, and scouts sent out to find the direction the enemy had gone; returned without gaining any definite information.

*October 7.*—I moved forward to Shelbyville with Crook's command, leaving the first division in camp until the direction and movements of the enemy were more fully ascertained. I found, before reaching Shelbyville, that the enemy had divided into three columns—one moving to the left to attack Wartrace, another moving on the direct road into Shelbyville, and the third turning to the right and going towards Unionville. I also learned that the party that went towards Wartrace had returned during the night and joined the main command. I immediately sent Colonel McCook,\*commanding the first division of cavalry, orders to strike off to the right, direct for Unionville, by the nearest practicable route, and started General Crook with his division and the mounted infantry on the Farmington road, that being the one the enemy had taken after sacking Shelbyville, the main body taking the Unionville road. As soon as his command had moved out I returned *via* the Shelbyville pike, and joined McCook's division near Unionville. I had ordered McCook to keep down the north side of Duck river, which he did, having, however, turned to the left after reaching Unionville, and after following the route the right-hand column of the enemy had taken, again turning to the right and moving directly down the river, thereby forcing one division of the enemy (which had, I think, originally intended to go to Columbia,) back to the south side of the river. At dark I crossed the division to the south side of the river, for the purpose of procuring forage for the command, and bivouacked six miles from Farmington, and communicated with Crook's at Farmington. He had, during the day, been severely engaged with the enemy at Farmington, and with marked success; for the details of which I refer you to his report.

I neglected to mention that in the morning, while returning from Shelbyville to join the first division, I found Colonel Minty's brigade still in camp, he claiming that he had had no orders to move out. I immediately ordered him to move at once and join his command, knowing that General Crook had intended, and supposed he had marched, and that he was in his place with his command.

*October 8.*—I recrossed Duck river at daylight, and moved down the north bank again to Caney springs, where I turned to the left and took the Lewisburg road, crossing on my route again to the south side of the river. Arrived at Lewisburg, I found the enemy had all united, and were retreating on the road towards Connerville and Pulaski, and that General Crook was following them with his command as fast as possible. I marched till 9 p. m., and bivouacked ten miles from Pulaski, on the plantations of Messrs. Laird and Wood.

*October 9.*—Moved again at daylight, and passed on through Pulaski, learning here that the enemy had taken the Lamb's Ferry road, and were marching night and day to get across the Tennessee river. I followed on till noon, and then throwing out all weak and lame horses, I moved the column rapidly forward, hoping to overtake the enemy ere they crossed the river; but, on arriving at Rodgersville, eight miles from the river, I found General Crook just returning from the river, and learned from him that the enemy had succeeded in getting across the river, not, however, without, during the day, losing a rear

guard of about 70 men, which General Crook had captured from them. I then bivouacked, and the next morning (October 10) took a regiment, and, accompanied by General Crook, visited the ford where they had crossed, which I learned from citizens to be a good one, and one at which they could cross at moving even ten and twelve men abreast. I found in Rodgersville about \$52,000 worth of cotton, owned by the confederate government, which I directed General Crook to destroy. I moved during the afternoon out six miles on the Huntsville road, having concluded to return with the command towards Stevenson *via* Huntsville.

*October 11.*—Marched on through Athens, making an easy march, and encamped at night on Limestone creek; General Crook's command encamping three miles from Athens, on Beaverdam creek.

*October 12.*—Resumed march at daylight, and arrived at Huntsville about 10 a. m., where I gained information that the rebel General Roddy had crossed the river at Guntersville, and had the evening previous passed through Marysville, in the direction of Winchester and Deckerd. I immediately changed the direction of my column, and moved out on the New Market road, intending to march all night and overtake him before he struck the railroad. It began to rain just before dark, and about dark my advance met an enemy, much to my surprise. I ordered them to move steadily and cautiously forward, and shortly a brisk skirmish ensued, some of the time the contending parties being so close they could distinctly see each other's faces by the flash of their guns. The rain coming down in torrents, and total darkness surrounding us, I was compelled reluctantly to halt and bivouack.

*October 13.*—I moved the command forward at daylight, and found the enemy had, during the night, retreated. On reaching New Market, I learned that the force I had met was Roddy's cavalry, and it had, after meeting my troops the previous evening, suddenly countermarched to New Market, and taken the road to Sulphur springs and Athens. It seems, from all the information I could gather, that Roddy had crossed the Tennessee at Guntersville with his command, and was moving to strike our communications in the vicinity of Deckerd and Cowan, probably intending to co-operate with General Wheeler in his movements. The defeat and precipitate retreat of Wheeler across the Tennessee probably materially interfered with his arrangements, for on arriving at Branchville, three miles from Salem, he suddenly countermarched his column and started back for the river. At New Market I threw out all my unserviceable horses, and with the remainder of the division started on in pursuit, having previously sent an order to General Crook, who was moving up from Huntsville, on the Maysville road, to strike for Athens by the nearest possible route, hoping thereby to reach there ahead of Roddy, or at least to strike him in the flank. I followed with all possible speed, but the heavy rains and muddy roads rendered it impossible to make very great speed, and at 3 o'clock p. m. I discontinued the pursuit, not having been able up to that time to overtake their rear guard, and feeling satisfied that before I could overtake them it would be dark, and under cover of the night they would be able to cross the river. I also sent orders to General Crook to discontinue his pursuit and move toward Deckerd. At night I encamped at Kelley's mill, on Bean fork of Flint river.

*October 14.*—Marched with the first division to Branchville, and bivouacked. It rained all day in torrents, and the roads had been previously rendered almost impassable for the artillery, saying nothing of the labor the horses had in getting over the muddy roads. The men were completely drenched, and I think it was altogether one of the most disagreeable days I ever moved a column. Colonel Long, with his brigade, arrived about dark from Fayetteville, where he had been ordered by General Crook, when leaving Rodgersville, and encamped on Bean creek, near Salem.

*October 15.*—I moved on towards Deckerd this morning, hoping to find

rations for my command, but soon after passing Salem I received a communication from Colonel Hoblitzell, whom I had despatched from New Market for them, informing me that there was not a ration to be had. I at the same time received a communication from General Rosecrans, directing me to leave one-half of my command on Flint river, and the remainder station at Winchester. I accordingly directed General Crook, who had just come up with his command, to countermarch and take post at or near Flint river, and put the first division into camp about four miles from Winchester. I came immediately to Deckerd, and finding there was little probability of obtaining rations for my command, I went at once to Stevenson and attended personally to their being provided, and succeeded that night at midnight in starting to the first division three days' rations. The morning of the 16th I had a train also started for General Crook's command on Flint river, but it was obliged to return on account of bridges having been destroyed on the Memphis and Charleston railroad.

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I think the record of the cavalry service during the entire war cannot show a more severe campaign than the one my command has just closed. There was scarcely an hour during the whole pursuit that the horses were unsaddled; for days and nights together the men were in the saddle, almost constantly on the march, and some days making as high as fifty-three and fifty-seven miles.

Take again into consideration the fact that a greater part of the time the troops were out of rations, and our hasty movements giving them little or no time to forage on the country; that the nights were very cold, and the men without overcoats, and I think the campaign challenges comparison with any service performed during the war. Yet, with all the severe duty and hardships necessarily devolving upon the men, they made not a murmur; but, on the contrary, seemed only anxious to do everything in their power to accomplish the object for which we had started, namely, to overtake and, if possible, destroy the enemy's cavalry; and whenever we did succeed in reaching them they proved that they were ready and competent to do this. I only regret that the precipitancy of their movements after the engagement at Farmington prevented us from again overtaking their main body, though on the last day of their flight General Crook captured their rear guard.

For further details concerning our movements, I must refer you to the reports of the division commanders and their subordinates. Your particular attention is called to the brilliant affair at Anderson's cross-roads, on the day the trains of General Thomas's corps were burned, in which the first Wisconsin and second Indiana cavalry were engaged. Although the troops of Colonel McCook's division did not arrive in time to save the trains, the action of these two regimental commanders, when they did arrive, (Colonel La Grange, first Wisconsin, and Major Presdie, second Indiana,) is no less commendable. The gallantry and daring of Colonel La Grange were very conspicuous, and he handled his regiment with great skill. I consider him one of the most promising young officers in the cavalry command. The damage done the cavalry from the time of their crossing the Tennessee river cannot be definitely stated. We pursued them so closely and vigorously that they had but little time to destroy our communications, and the results of their raid, I think, may be summed up so that when General Wheeler strikes his balance sheet, the debts and credits will be on the wrong sides of the sheet to give him a very large net profit. We captured six pieces of artillery, and, including killed, wounded, prisoners, and deserters, I think they recrossed the Tennessee river with between two and three thousand fewer men than they started out with.

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My thanks are due to the division and brigade commanders for the untiring energy and zeal they evinced during the entire pursuit. The troops of their commands did all it is possible for troops to do to second the endeavors of their

commanders, and when I thank them, as I do, for the fatigues and gallant fighting which they did, I do it in all earnestness and sincerity, realizing and appreciating their labors and sufferings. A simple mention of their marches, of the fighting at Anderson's cross-roads, at McMinnville, and at Farmington, is as proud a record as any body of troops need crave.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBERT B. MITCHELL,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

Major General REYNOLDS, *Chief of Staff.*

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HEADQUARTERS SECOND CAVALRY DIVISION,

*Maysville, Alabama, November 5, 1863.*

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that on the 23d of September I was ordered by the commanding general of the department to proceed to Washington, Tennessee, with my command, numbering about two thousand (2,000) effective men, for the purpose of guarding the fords along the Tennessee river for a distance of some fifty (50) miles. The roads leading to the different fords and ferries were, in many cases, five miles apart. Between these points there were practicable fords almost every half mile. It was impossible to patrol along the bank of the river between these roads, and to go from one to the other required us, in many instances, to make a detour of ten and even fifteen miles. It was at one of these intermediate points that the enemy, dismounting his men, crossed and established himself on the north bank of the river with a force far superior to mine, commanded by Major General Wheeler. I immediately informed General Rosecrans of the fact, who ordered me to gather all the cavalry and mounted infantry and pursue the enemy, who had crossed the river for the purpose of making a raid in the rear of our lines. Learning the enemy was crossing Waldron's ridge, opposite Smith's cross-roads, I collected together the first and second brigades of my division, commanded respectively by Colonels Minty and Long, and Captain Stoke's Board of Trade battery, and ascended the mountain some five miles south of Smith's cross-roads, directing Colonel Miller, commanding brigade of mounted infantry, to join me on top of the mountain that night; but he did not join me until next morning, when I resumed the march, entering the Sequatchie valley at Pitt's cross-roads, learning here that the enemy had divided his forces, one portion under General Wharton ascending the Cumberland mountains at Pikeville, while the remainder under General Wheeler had passed down the valley and would ascend the mountain at Dunlap's, concentrating at some point beyond the Cumberland mountain, and then move on McMinnville; I also found here that the enemy had some fourteen hours the start of me. I took the intermediate road, Robison's trace, and, although the mountain was very bad to ascend at this place, I succeeded in getting up my entire command that night. Next morning, after marching some ten miles, I struck Wharton's trail where he came into the Robison trace. I did not meet any of his force, except some stragglers, until I arrived at the descent of the mountain, where he had left some sharpshooters to oppose my advance. I dismounted part of the fourth Michigan, it being in the advance, and drove them before me, they leaving five of their dead and one wounded on the field. After descending the mountain, I found the country rocky and brushy—no place for cavalry to operate. As soon as I could get my infantry down the mountain I dismounted them, sending them so as to completely surround their force, holding my cavalry as a support. In this way I had Colonel Crew's Texas brigade completely surrounded in a space not over ten acres, my men under cover and his exposed. My men poured several vol-

leys into them, but by this time it had become so dark that we could not tell friend from foe. Under cover of darkness they broke through my lines, my men not firing for fear of shooting each other.

The fight lasted for a couple of hours after night, the remainder of Wharton's division coming to Crew's support. My loss was forty-six killed and wounded. The enemy's loss is not definitely known. We found some ten of their dead close by the road, and a good many of their wounded scattered along the road in houses. I pushed on after them early next morning, and could not ascertain their loss. I left instructions with the citizens to collect them, and give them all proper attention. I saw nothing of the enemy until within a couple of miles of McMinnville, where some of his scouts fired into us. On arriving at McMinnville, I found the garrison had surrendered without making any resistance. The enemy sacked the place, destroying a great deal of public and private property, and left in the direction of Murfreesboro'. I was also informed by an intelligent Union man that he counted four thousand (4,000) of the enemy, and saw enough more that he was unable to count to make up fully six thousand (6,000.) After leaving McMinnville, I became satisfied, from the time occupied by his force in passing a given point, he had between five thousand and six thousand (5,000 and 6,000) men—my own force at this time numbering about three thousand five hundred (3,500.) I had not marched more than two miles on the Murfreesboro' road before I came upon his rear guard, posted in the edge of a woods, who commenced skirmishing with my advance. Being satisfied that the guard intended to detain us so that the main body could march unmolested, I ordered Colonel Long to send a regiment ahead to make a sabre charge. The second Kentucky, Colonel Nicholas commanding, with Colonel Long at their head, made a most gallant charge of some five miles, breaking through his lines, killing and wounding several of his men, capturing eleven prisoners, and driving the remainder into the main column, compelling him to turn round and give me fight. When I arrived with the main column, I found the enemy drawn up in line of battle in the edge of a woods, a large field between us, with high fences intervening. I dismounted my infantry, and with my artillery drove them out of the woods, he forming in another thick jungle a short distance in the rear. The fight lasted for two hours, until after dark, when I camped in the field. Here again I was unable to ascertain the number of his killed and wounded, but left instructions for the citizens to collect them. I learned that it was the intention of the enemy to take Murfreesboro', and then go to Laverne, destroying the railroad between these two points, and that he had sent squads of men who were familiar with the country to destroy telegraphic communication between Murfreesboro' and Nashville, which they succeeded in doing. I tried to get a despatch through to the commanding officer at Murfreesboro' to hold out until I could get there, but the courier could not get through. At Readyville I crossed over on to the Liberty pike, so as to get between them and Laverne, and also to prevent them from ambushing me on the road. By this move I drove them off in the direction of Shelbyville. I found every person at Murfreesboro' in great consternation, and overjoyed to see us. They were momentarily expecting an attack from the enemy, and felt that their force was too weak to repel him.

I found here an officer of the engineer department, who was very kind and energetic, giving me all the assistance in his power. Through the want of proper attention to duty on the part of the assistant quartermaster and commissary of subsistence, I was unable to procure anything for my men and horses until nearly morning, (although I had marched forty-one miles that day, and my men had had no rations for five days,) greatly retarding my march. The next night I camped two miles beyond Guy's Gap. From this point I sent my scouts in different directions, who brought prisoners from the enemy's camp. General Mitchell, with the first cavalry division, came up with us here. Next

morning I was ordered by him to march on the road to Farmington, south of Duck river. About three miles from Shelbyville I found Davidson's division encamped on Duck river, some two miles north of the road. The brigade of mounted infantry being in the advance, and seeing the enemy's ranks in confusion, I ordered them to charge on horseback. They drove the enemy a short distance into a cedar thicket, and then dismounted them. At the same time ordered Colonel Long's brigade to the front, and, headed by Colonel Long, made a most gallant sabre charge, driving the enemy thirteen miles, killing and capturing a great many rebels. The enemy made another stand in a cedar thicket, where it was impossible for the cavalry to operate. I sent the mounted infantry to the front as soon as possible, where they soon dislodged the enemy, who made again a stand on the main road, and were driven from this point, falling back towards Farmington, skirmishing as they retreated. About three-fourths of a mile from Farmington I found him posted in force in a dense cedar thicket. I at once dismounted my infantry, and deployed them on each side of the road. When I attacked Davidson's division in the morning, breaking through it, part of his column went to the right. Fearing that it would turn my flank, I sent back instructions to Colonel Minty, whose position was in the rear of the column, to move to the right and anticipate them. I supposed that Colonel Minty had carried out my instructions, but when I arrived at Farmington I learned from one of my staff officers, much to my chagrin and surprise, that Colonel Minty was not with me. The absence of Colonel Minty and some five hundred (500) men left at Murfreesboro', having been dismounted during the march, left me about one thousand five hundred (1,500) effective men. Finding the enemy vastly superior to me, I left one regiment of cavalry to protect my rear, holding the other two regiments as a support to the infantry, the country being impracticable for the cavalry to operate in. The enemy's battery was posted in the cedar thicket, some four hundred yards distant from me, pouring into me a heavy fire of grape, canister, and shell, and made one or two charges on my men, at the same time attempting to turn both of my flanks. At this critical moment I ordered Captain Stokes forward with his battery to operate upon the enemy. He could only find position for one piece, which was in full view of the battery, and not over three hundred and fifty yards distant. They turned their fire from the infantry on to Captain Stokes's battery, mowing down his horses and men. The captain sighted his own piece, and in three shots he disabled one of their pieces, blowing up a caisson, and throwing their ranks into confusion. At this moment my infantry, making a charge, broke through the enemy's line, scattering them to the right and left, capturing four guns, some wagons, and several prisoners. The enemy then being in an open country, I ordered Colonel Long to the front to make a sabre charge, but they had the roads barricaded so as to render it impossible. It was now getting dark. I went into camp near Farmington.

Had Colonel Minty, with his brigade, been there at the time the enemy broke, I should have thrown him on the left flank, and, as things turned out since, I would have captured a large portion of his command, together with all of his artillery and transportation. I learned here that I fought General Wheeler with his entire command. That night, after the fighting had ceased, Colonel Minty with his brigade joined me, stating that he had no orders to march with me. From this, together with a disposition manifest during the whole expedition to frustrate my designs in a covert manner, I deprived him of his command and sent him to the rear. I sent my scouts out in different directions that night, and learned that a large portion of the enemy had gone towards Pulaski. Being satisfied that they were making for the Tennessee river, and that the portion cut off would join them by other roads, I the next morning pursued them on the Pulaski road, reaching that point that night. I found to-day that their retreat, instead of a march, was a rout. Their rear guard left Pulaski as I came

in sight of the town. On this day's march I found that the night before a portion of their cut-off came into the road ahead of us at Lewisburg. On the march, the next day, another portion came into the road six miles south of Pulaski.

I found that their men were deserting and scattering over the country, and learned of a great many wounded being left along the road and through the country. The enemy left some two or three regiments at Sugar creek, a strong position, to oppose my advance; but instead of fighting them at long range, as they expected, I ordered a sabre charge. The fifth Iowa, Lieutenant Colonel Patrick commanding, being in advance, made a most gallant charge, breaking through their lines, killing ten, wounding nine, capturing some seventy prisoners, and scattering the remainder to the mountains. From this on I met with only a few stragglers on the road. When within eight miles of the river, although my horses were very tired, I galloped most of the way to the river, and there found that the enemy had crossed at a ford but little known of and just above Elk river, where twelve could cross abreast. I went into camp at Rodgerville, General Mitchell with the first division coming up that night, and from that point I was ordered with the remainder of the cavalry to Stevenson *via* Huntsville. On arriving at Huntsville, General Mitchell learning that the rebel General Roddy was passing in the direction of Winchester, went in pursuit of him, but he escaped toward Athens. I was then ordered to Winchester, and thence to this place. I have since learned that General Lee, with five thousand (5,000) men, reached Courtland the same day that Wheeler crossed the river.

Roddy, with about one thousand eight hundred (1,800) men, had crossed to the north bank of the river at Guntersville, both he and Lee being ordered to join Wheeler; but the latter was driven out of the State and across the river before a junction could be effected.

I have since learned that at Farmington the enemy left on the field eighty-six of their dead and one hundred and thirty-seven wounded, while many of their wounded were taken up by citizens through the country, of which I have no account. The loss of the enemy, from the time he crossed the river near Washington until he re-crossed near Elk river, judging from the difference in the length of his column in coming in and going out and other satisfactory evidence, I am fully satisfied is not less than two thousand (2,000) men. One entire regiment, the fourth Alabama, deserted and scattered through the mountains. My loss during the entire trip was fourteen killed and ninety-seven wounded. I regret to report the death of the gallant Colonel Monroe, of the one hundred and twenty-third Illinois, who fell while bravely leading on his regiment at the battle of Farmington.

It is hard to distinguish individual cases of bravery and gallantry when all, both officers and men, have done so nobly. Notwithstanding the fatigue and severe hardships under which the men suffered, having but three days' rations in twenty days, many of them nearly naked, and several times exposed to a cold drenching rain, yet they never complained, but were always cheerful and ever ready to perform all duties required of them.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

GEORGE CROOK,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION,  
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Winchester, Tenn., October 23, 1863.*

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that, at 11 a. m. of the 1st instant, I received a despatch (a copy of which is herewith enclosed) from department head-

quarters, informing me that the enemy had crossed the Tennessee river in heavy force at or near Washington with designs upon our trains and communications, and ordering me to move to Anderson's cross roads.

I was at that time, with three (3) regiments—first Wisconsin, second and fourth Indiana, and one (1) section of a battery, Lieutenant Newell commanding, of the second brigade—at Bridgeport, Alabama, forty-five (45) miles from that point. The other regiment of that brigade (second East Tennessee) was guarding fords and ferries in the vicinity of Jasper.

The first brigade, with the exception of the second Michigan, which was at Eyler's and Rankin's ferries, was at Caperton's ferry, where they had been placed, pursuant to orders, to observe the movements of the enemy and prevent his crossing in that vicinity. The third brigade was at Bellefonte, except the fifth Kentucky, which was at Kelly's ferry. I immediately moved, with the three regiments and section of artillery of the second brigade above named, in the direction of Anderson's cross-roads, at the same time despatching orders to Colonel Campbell to move his command with all possible haste and join me at Jasper, giving directions to Colonel Watkins, commanding third brigade, to move up to Caperton's. I moved at 10 o'clock p. m., expecting to reach Anderson's by daylight, but owing to a heavy and incessant fall of rain, which continued during the whole day and night, the roads became so slippery and full of water that I did not reach Jasper sooner than 8½ p. m. Expecting to be joined by the first brigade, I halted and bivouacked for the night.

On the morning of the 2d marched at daylight, and at 8 a. m. I despatched Colonel Campbell again to make all possible speed in overtaking me. At 1 p. m. a heavy column of smoke was observed in the direction of Anderson's cross-roads, and a short time after citizens brought the intelligence that the train had been attacked by a large cavalry force and was then burning. I moved the command forward at a trot to a point four miles from the cross-roads, where I took a by-road across the country, leaving the fourth Indiana on the main Jasper and Dunlap road to observe any movements that might be made from the direction of Dunlap, and moved on rapidly with the first Wisconsin, second Indiana, and section of Newell's battery, in the direction of the enemy. The first Wisconsin encountered a portion of the enemy's force two miles south of the cross-roads, and immediately charged, capturing a number of prisoners and driving them past the burning train upon their main force, which was one mile north of the cross-roads, in line of battle. I ordered the second Indiana to take position with their right resting upon the base of the mountain, forming one battalion front, with the other two supporting a short distance in the rear, and formed the first Wisconsin on their left in a similar manner. A simultaneous charge was ordered with both regiments, and executed with such vigor that the enemy were dislodged from their position and driven two miles across a small creek, where they secured a strong position and erected barricades of rails. The first Wisconsin were then moved off to the left so as to enfilade the enemy's line; the second Indiana at the same time were dismounted, and charged upon the right at double-quick. This movement was entirely successful, and the enemy were driven back with considerable loss. The first Wisconsin being mounted, charged upon their left, driving them in confusion, taking forty or fifty prisoners, besides killing and wounding a number with the sabre. The second Indiana having remounted, both regiments were now sent in pursuit. Several positions taken by the enemy were wrested from them by sabre charges until they were driven across the Sequatchie, when, it having become quite dark, and the men and horses being exhausted from marching since daylight, and five hours of constant and determined fighting, in which the enemy were driven a distance of eight miles, the command was bivouacked for the night.

At 2 a. m. of the 3d the fourth Indiana was sent to reconnoitre the front. They crossed the Sequatchie and proceeded to the top of the mountain four



miles beyond Dunlap, attacking the enemy's rear, capturing six prisoners and recapturing 200 mules. The result of the whole engagement was the capture of 12 commissioned officers, among whom were Major Duff Green Reed, assistant adjutant general on General Wheeler's staff; Major Morgan, inspector, of Martin's staff, and Captain May, commanding his escort, and 93 enlisted men, comprising men and officers of twelve different regiments. The enemy lost 7 commissioned officers killed, among them Major ———, Captain Jones, Lieutenant May, and Captain Smith, besides a number of enlisted men, whose bodies I ordered the citizens to bury. One of their officers, captured four days afterwards, acknowledged a loss of 250 killed and wounded. We also recaptured a number of prisoners that the enemy had taken, and about 800 mules, besides rescuing a part of the train that had not yet been burned. The enemy shot 200 or 300 mules upon finding they could not escape with them.

I cannot speak too highly of the conduct and gallantry of Colonel O. H. Lagrange, first Wisconsin. To his intrepidity in leading and skill in manoeuvring his regiment is attributable, in a large degree, the successful repulse of the enemy. Major Presdee, commanding second Indiana cavalry, is also entitled to great credit for the brilliant manner in which he led his regiment during the entire engagement.

To the officers and men of these regiments I tender my thanks for their gallant and soldierly bearing. The fourth Indiana, and Lieutenant Newell, commanding battery, though not actively engaged during the day, executed their orders with precision and to my entire satisfaction.

Having no orders to proceed further than Anderson's cross-roads, and having at my immediate command only three regiments, I determined to await orders from the general commanding, lest further movement on my part might cause disarrangement in his plans.

Colonel Campbell, with the first brigade, did not overtake me until the afternoon of the third, twenty-four hours later than he was expected to arrive. The delay was unfortunate, and a matter of extreme regret to me; as had the additional force of his command been at my disposal when I encountered the enemy, results of much more importance and benefit might have been secured.

For a recital of the ability, energy, and valor displayed by the various members of my staff, I would refer you to any of the usual reports made by military commanders of engagements in which their commands have taken a part.

I am, respectfully, yours,

E. M. MCCOOK,  
*Colonel Commanding Division.*

Major W. H. SINCLAIR,  
*A. A. G., Cavalry Corps, Deckerd, Tennessee.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
October 1, 1864—2.15 a. m.

Colonel McCook, *Commanding Division of Cavalry:*

The enemy's cavalry have crossed the river in heavy force a short distance below Washington, and design making a raid upon our communications.

The general commanding directs that you leave one or two small regiments that are down the river to watch the crossings, and move with all despatch with the balance of your force to Anderson's cross-roads, in the Sequatchie valley, to protect our wagon trains there. Three (3) regiments of infantry and a section of artillery have been ordered there to support you. More forces will be sent if necessary.

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Brigadier General, Chief of Staff.*

## CAPTURED DESPATCH OF THE REBEL WHEELER.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS,

*Near Courtland, Ala., October 12, 1863.*

GENERAL: I wrote you yesterday, stating that General Lee had arrived at Florence with twenty-five hundred (2,500) men, with instructions to cross the Tennessee river and attack General Rosecrans's line of communications. He deemed it too hazardous to attempt the movement with the force at his disposal, and decided to wait until you could be heard from. General Roddy, I was informed, would cross the river on the night of the 27th ultimo, and would meet me at Jasper. When my command was within ten miles of that place I learned that he had not crossed the Tennessee river. I afterwards learned that he was moving from Bellfonte towards Murfreesboro', but on moving in that direction I finally found he was not in Middle Tennessee. On crossing at this place I learned that General Roddy had just crossed the river near Bellfonte. I immediately sent couriers to him, placing him on his guard, and informing him of my position.

The enemy which followed us to this point consisted of two divisions of cavalry and a large force of mounted infantry, including Wilder's brigade. A considerable force of foot infantry followed us to Farmington. On account of a mistake of General Davidson's, I was obliged, when near Farmington, to make a fight with this large force of infantry and mounted troops, in order to save General Wharton's command and the wagons and caissons. The troops engaged were a part of General Martin's and one regiment of General Wharton's. The fight was most severe, the lines being engaged at a distance of about thirty yards. We charged and repulsed them at first, but finally I found they were preparing an overwhelming force to attack, and, having attained the main object for which we fought, I ordered General Martin to withdraw. Most of the troops fought most nobly; others acted shamefully. Our loss was confined to the killed and wounded. I cannot learn, at this time, that we lost any prisoners, except the wounded and some men who remained to take care of the wounded. While crossing the mountains, our artillery carriages became much shattered, and finally two of them broke down. We repaired them several times, but finally the harness became broken, and, finding it impossible to drag them on, these two pieces were abandoned. One was an old iron gun which has been condemned as useless at every inspection during the last year; the other was a brass howitzer. On the evening of the 7th, while travelling slowly over a good road, one of the limbers of General Wharton's blew up, tearing up everything in the vicinity. This piece was also left. If the enemy found these pieces, they will probably claim to have captured them, which claim will be false. I think my entire loss on the trip in killed will not exceed sixty, (60,) my wounded will not exceed 200, and prisoners will not exceed 200. This will include more than half of the wounded. But very few prisoners were taken in action. Those taken were mostly stragglers and scouts. They, of course, took nearly all our wounded, as they were necessarily left at houses on the road. Many men were allowed by their officers to throw away their arms to enable them to bring out private plunder.

What we want is officers, and Colonel John T. Morgan and Major W. Y. C. Humes will make good officers. I would like, also, Colonel Grigsby, for Kentucky troops. If we can have one good brigadier general for every five or six regiments, who will obey orders, and make his officers and men do so also, we can then get along. Such men as General Anderson, General Walthall, or General Manigault, are what the cavalry needs, and Colonel Morgan and Major Humes are the nearest to that stamp that we now have. Colonel Russel is also a man of the right stamp, and the service would be benefited by his promotion.

I would respectfully suggest that any of these officers would answer: Colonel John T. Morgan, Major W. Y. C. Humes, Colonel A. A. Russel, Colonel Warren Grigsby, and Colonel C. C. Crews.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOS. WHEELER,  
*Major General.*

Colonel GEO. WM. BRENT, *A. A. G.*

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## PART II.

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### COMMANDING ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND—OPERATIONS AROUND CHATTANOOGA FROM OCTOBER 19, 1863, TO MAY 1, 1864.

*October 19, 1863.*—I relieved General Rosecrans in command of the department of the Cumberland, per General Orders No. 337, War Department. The same order assigned Major General U. S. Grant to the command of the military division of the Mississippi, embracing the departments and armies of the Tennessee, the Cumberland, and the Ohio. The department and army of the Cumberland at that time comprised the following commands: the 4th and 14th army corps, at Chattanooga, three divisions of cavalry, the local garrisons of Middle Tennessee, and the 11th and 12th army corps, under Major General Joseph Hooker, just arrived from the east, from whence they had been despatched to re-enforce the army at Chattanooga, and who were, at the time of my assuming command, guarding the railroad from Bridgeport to Nashville. The forces at Chattanooga were in a very precarious condition from the difficulty of obtaining supplies, the only means of procuring which was by wagons and over sixty miles of almost impassable mountain roads, the enemy holding the river and the railroad between Chattanooga and Bridgeport; and his cavalry had destroyed one large train laden with supplies, numbering over three hundred (300) wagons, on its way from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. The question of holding Chattanooga was then simply that of supplies. The animals were perishing by hundreds daily, and the men were suffering from the scantiness of their food, but they bore up cheerfully under their difficulties, appreciating the impossibility of giving up Chattanooga, and inspired their officers with renewed confidence in their self-sacrificing devotion.

General Grant telegraphed me from Louisville on the 19th as follows:

“Major General THOMAS:

“Hold Chattanooga at all hazards. I will be there as soon as possible. Please inform me how long your present supplies will last and the prospect for keeping them up.

“U. S. GRANT, *Major General.*”

I replied by telegraph:

“CHATTANOOGA, *October 19.*

“Major General GRANT, *Louisville, Kentucky:*

“Two hundred and four thousand four hundred and sixty-two rations in store-houses. Ninety thousand to arrive to-morrow, and all the trains were loaded which had arrived at Bridgeport up to the sixteenth—probably three hundred wagons. We will hold the town till we starve.

“G. H. THOMAS, *Major General.*”

The following was sent the same night to General Hooker :

“HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT CUMBERLAND,

“October 19, 1863—11 p. m.

“Major General HOOKER, *Stevenson* :

“Major General G. H. Thomas directs me to state that, in obedience to the orders of the President of the United States, he has assumed command of the department of the Cumberland. He desires that you will use all possible despatch in concentrating your command and preparing to move in accordance with the instructions of General Rosecrans, leaving proper railroad guards.

“J. J. REYNOLDS,

“Major General and Chief of Staff.”

The instructions referred to in the above were to concentrate as much of his command at Bridgeport as he could safely spare from guarding the railroad between that point and Nashville, and to hold himself in readiness to move at any moment toward Chattanooga for the purpose of opening communication with that place by river and by rail. Before he was relieved in command of the department of the Cumberland, General Rosecrans and his chief engineer, Brigadier General W. F. Smith, had consulted together as to means of relieving the army at Chattanooga from the perilous condition it was in, owing to the great difficulty of obtaining supplies, and had partially planned the movement which was left to me to be completed when I assumed command, namely, to open a short route of supplies from Bridgeport.

On the 24th of October I sent the following instructions to General Hooker, by telegraph, viz :

“HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF CUMBERLAND,

“Chattanooga, October 24, 1863—2.30 p. m.

“Major General HOOKER, *Stevenson* :

“You will leave General Slocum with one division of the 12th corps to guard the railroad from Murfreesboro’ to Bridgeport. The 11th corps and one division of the 12th will be concentrated at or in the vicinity of Bridgeport, preparatory to crossing the Tennessee river and moving up the south side to take possession of Rankin’s ferry, between Shellmound and Running Water creek. Look well to your right flank, which may be approached *via* Island creek, the Moore road, McDaniels Gap road, and the Nickajack road.

Two brigades under General Palmer leave here this p. m. for Rankin’s ferry, which point they will probably reach on Monday evening. It is reported that the steamboat at Bridgeport will be completed by Monday evening. The railroad may also be available. If you can do so it is better not to move wagons to the south side of the river at present. You will, however, exercise your judgment on this point. Report by telegraph when you are ready. We will co-operate at Brown’s ferry as well as Rankin’s ferry. Inform yourself with regard to the roads from Rankin’s ferry, *via* Whiteside’s, to Brown’s ferry. The object of the movement is to hold the road and gain possession of the river as far as Brown’s ferry.

“By command of Major General Thomas.

“J. J. REYNOLDS,

“Major General and Chief of Staff.”

True copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,

Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.

General Hooker reported his command in readiness to move, and that he would start at daylight on the 27th.

During the time the preparations for this movement were being made General

Grant reached Chattanooga. On the night of the 26th of October the co-operating movement, resulting in the seizure of Brown's ferry, was made. I made the following preliminary report of it that evening to the General-in-Chief at Washington, by telegraph :

"CHATTANOOGA, *October 27*—11.30 p. m.

"Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.* :

"General W. F. Smith, commanding Hazen's brigade of Sheridan's division, 4th corps, and Turchin's brigade of Baird's division, 14th corps, floated boats of pontoon bridge down the river from Chattanooga to Brown's ferry, six miles below, landed, surprised and drove off the enemy's pickets and reserve, took possession of hills commanding debouche of ferry on southwest side, laid bridge and intrenched the command strongly enough to hold bridge securely. By the judicious precautions taken by General Smith before starting and the intelligent co-operation of Generals Turchin and Hazen, commanding brigades, and of Colonel Stanley, eighteenth Ohio, commanding boat party, this was a complete success and reflected great credit on all concerned. Our loss, four killed and fifteen wounded; enemy's, eight killed, six prisoners, and several wounded. Major General Hooker, commanding troops composing 11th corps and part of 12th, marched from Bridgeport at daylight to-day to open road from Bridgeport to Chattanooga and take some position protecting river. Two brigades of Palmer's division, 4th corps, should have reached Rankin's ferry to-day to co-operate with General Hooker. The sixteenth Illinois reached Kelley's ferry to co-operate with General Hooker. If General Hooker is as successful as General Smith has been, we shall in a few days have open communication with Bridgeport by water, as well as by a practicable road running near the river on the northern bank.

"GEO. H. THOMAS,

"*Major General, United States Volunteers.*"

General Hooker reached a point in Lookout valley about two (2) miles from Brown's ferry at 3 p. m. on the 28th. In that position he was attacked about midnight by a large force of the enemy, who had descended Lookout mountain to dislodge General Hooker's forces and regain possession of the valley. Severe fighting continued for nearly two hours, when the enemy withdrew, having been repulsed at every point assailed by him. As soon as the noise of the conflict reached me at Chattanooga I gave directions for the brigades of General Whitaker and of Colonel Mitchell to be held in readiness to move to the support of General Hooker, and notified him to that effect, directing him to send a messenger to Brown's ferry, where staff officers from those commands would be found. For further particulars of this night engagement I refer you to General Hooker's report of the same, forwarded herewith.

The seizure of Brown's ferry and the splendid defence of Lookout valley by General Hooker's command decided the question of our ability to hold Chattanooga, for steamers began immediately to carry rations from Bridgeport to Kelley's ferry, leaving but about eight miles of wagon transportation from that point to Chattanooga, and repairs were commenced on the railroad south of the Tennessee river. The enemy made no further attempt to regain Lookout valley after it had slipped from his grasp, and confined himself to an occasional cannon shot from the top of Lookout as he watched our trains undisturbedly moving from Kelley's ferry across the valley, bearing rations to a grateful army.

To Brigadier General W. F. Smith, chief engineer, should be accorded great praise for the ingenuity which conceived and the ability which executed the movement at Brown's ferry. The preparations were all made in secrecy, as was also the boat expedition which passed under the overhanging cliffs of Lookout, so much so that when the bridge was thrown at Brown's ferry on the

morning of the 27th the surprise was as great to the army within Chattanooga as it was to the army besieging it from without.

Herewith I forward copies of the reports of Major General Hooker and of Brigadier W. F. Smith:

#### REPORT OF BROWN'S FERRY AFFAIR.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*Chattanooga, Tenn., November 7, 1863.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to forward herewith the official reports of Major General Hooker, commanding the 11th and 12th corps, and of Brigadier General W. F. Smith, chief engineer department of the Cumberland, and commanding the expedition composed of Turchin's brigade, Baird's division, 14th army corps, and Hazen's brigade, Wood's division, 4th corps, and detachments of the eighteenth Ohio infantry, under command of Colonel T. R. Stanley, and of the twenty-second Michigan engineers, under command of Captain Fox, of the operations of their respective commands between the 26th and 28th ultimo to gain possession of the south bank of the Tennessee river, and to open the roads for a depot of supplies at Bridgeport. Preliminary steps had already been taken to execute this vitally important movement before the command of the department devolved upon me. The bridge which it was necessary to throw across the river at Brown's ferry to gain possession of the northern end of Lookout valley and open communication with Bridgeport by road and river was nearly completed.

On the 23d, orders were sent General Hooker to concentrate the 11th corps and one division of the 12th at Bridgeport, informing him at the same time what his force was expected to accomplish, and that a force from this place would co-operate with him, by establishing a bridge across the river at Brown's ferry and seize the heights on the south of Lookout valley. The force to throw the bridge was organized by Saturday, the 24th ultimo, and the boats and bridge completed, giving General Smith two days to examine the ground with the two brigade commanders, and to give all the necessary detailed instructions to insure success.

General Hooker reported on the 26th that he would be ready to move on the 27th at daylight. He was instructed to move at the appointed time, with full instructions how to provide for the defence of his flank, and to cover the approaches to the road in the direction of Trenton. The bridge was successfully thrown across the river on the night of the 26th, and General Hooker reached Lookout valley and communicated with this place on the 28th. The enemy attempted to surprise him the night after reaching his position in Lookout valley, and, after an obstinate contest of two hours' duration, was completely repulsed, with a loss of upwards of 1,500 killed and wounded, one hundred prisoners, and several hundred stand of arms.

I refer you to the reports of Generals Hooker and Smith for the details of the operations of their commands, commending to favorable consideration the names of those officers specially mentioned for gallant and meritorious conduct. The skilful execution by General Smith of the work assigned him, and the promptness with which General Hooker with his troops met and repulsed the enemy on the night of the 28th, reflect the greatest credit on both of these officers and their entire commands.

I herewith enclose consolidated returns of casualties.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. H. T.

*Major General U. S. V., Commanding.*

Brigadier General L. THOMAS,

*Adjutant General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*

*Consolidated return of casualties.*

Commands.	KILLED.			WOUNDED.			MISSING.			Total.
	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	
Major General Hooker's command—										
Eleventh corps .....	5	33	38	13	135	148	....	14	14	200
Second division, twelfth corps.....	4	30	34	15	159	174	....	8	8	216
Brigadier General Smith's command.....	....	4	4	2	15	17	....	....	....	21
Total.....	9	67	76	30	309	339	....	22	22	437

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and A. D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS 11TH AND 12TH CORPS, ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 6, 1863.*

COLONEL: I desire to submit the following report of the battle of Wauhatchie, and the operations of my command preliminary to that engagement. In conformity with orders from the headquarters of the department, I crossed the Tennessee by the pontoon bridge at Bridgeport the morning of the 26th of October with the greater portion of the 11th corps, under Major General Howard, a part of the second division of the 12th corps, under Brigadier General Geary, one company of the fifth Tennessee cavalry, and a part of a company of the first Alabama cavalry, and at once took up my line of march along the line of railroad, to open and secure it in the direction of Brown's ferry; a regiment was left to defend the bridge head when the column was crossed the river, and to take possession of and hold the passes leading to it through Raccoon mountain. Our route lay along the base of this mountain until we reached Running Waters, when we followed the direction of that stream, and in the morning descended through the gorge into Lookout valley. No event attended our first day's march deserving mention, unless it be that the enemy's pickets fell back as we advanced, and the leaving of two more of my regiments, one at Shellmound, with instructions to occupy a pass near Gordon's mines, and another at Whiteside's, to protect the route over the mountain through which we had passed. After entering Lookout valley our general course lay along a creek of that name until within a mile or more of its mouth, where the Brown's ferry road leaves it to the left. This valley is perhaps two miles in width, and completely overlooked by the lofty crests of Lookout and Raccoon mountains. All the movements and dispositions of troops are easily descried from the heights of either, while the valley itself affords abundant opportunity for concealment from the observation of those within. Another prominent feature in Lookout valley requires mention to give a clear perception of its topography and a correct understanding of our operations. This is a succession of hills, two or three hundred feet high, with precipitous timbered slopes and narrow crests, which penetrate three miles up the valley, and divide it, as far as they go, nearly in its centre. There are five or six of them in number, almost isolated, though in a direct line on the left bank of Lookout creek, with the railroad passing between the two summits at the entrance of the range, and still lower down the valley the road bears off to

Chattanooga, about two miles distant, through these hills, while the road to Brown's ferry continues along the west base to the Tennessee river. The enemy held possession of these hills, as, indeed, of all the country through which we had passed after crossing at Bridgeport; they had also batteries planted on Lookout mountain overlooking them.

On the opposite side of the valley is Raccoon range, and about three miles up is the gorge through it, which leads to what is called Kelley's ferry, three miles distant. As it was proposed to make this our new line of communication with Chattanooga, my instructions required me, if practicable, to gain possession of and to hold it. As the gorge debouches into Lookout valley the road forks—one leading to Wauhatchie and up the valley, the other to Chattanooga and down the valley. It was known that a portion of Longstreet's command were in the valley, it is presumed in part for convenience in supplying themselves with rations and forage, but mainly for his sharpshooters to annoy our communication on the north side of the Tennessee, and compel our trains to make long detours, over execrable roads, in their transit from Chattanooga to our depot at Stevenson. From its proximity to the enemy's lines of investment around Chattanooga, and his facilities for detaching heavily from his masses, it was apprehended that the enemy would make unusual efforts to prevent the transfer of its possession, as a failure on our part to establish new communications involved a fact of no less magnitude than the necessity for the early evacuation of Chattanooga, with the abandonment of much of our artillery and trains.

To return to the column. It pushed on down the valley until arrested by an irregular fire of musketry proceeding from the hill next the railroad, as it passes through the central ridge before described. As it was densely covered with forest we had no means of ascertaining the number of the enemy except by feeling. General Howard's corps being in the advance, he was directed to throw a brigade to the right, to turn the position, and a regiment, supported by the balance of another brigade, to the left, for the same purpose. No sooner had the brigade on the right deployed than the enemy took to his legs and fled across the creek, burning the railroad bridge in his flight. We lost a few men here as well as from the shelling we received from the batteries of Lookout mountain whenever our column was exposed to them. The central ridge of hills afforded partial cover from these batteries. These, however, caused no serious interruption in the movement of the column, which, about five o'clock p. m., halted for the night and went into camp about a mile or more up the valley from Brown's ferry. Here we learned that a pontoon bridge had been thrown across the river and that General Hazen's brigade held the heights on the south side of it.

Geary's division being in the rear, and being anxious to hold both roads leading to Kelley's ferry, he was directed to encamp near Wauhatchie, three miles from the position held by Howard's corps. Pickets were thrown out from both camps on all of the approaches, though no attempt was made to establish and preserve a communication between them. The commands were too small to keep up a substantial communication that distance, and I deemed it more prudent to hold the men well in hand than to have a feeble one. In my judgment it was essential to retain possession of both approaches to Kelley's ferry, if practicable, as it would cause us inconvenience to dispossess the enemy if he established himself on either. Before night Howard threw out three companies in the direction of Kelley's ferry to intercept and capture, if possible, the enemy's sharpshooters who had been engaged in firing across the river into our trains, and had, in fact, compelled them to avoid that line entirely. A regiment was also sent towards that point where the Chattanooga road crosses Lookout creek, and about 12 o'clock had a little skirmishing with the enemy. An hour after the mutterings of a heavy musketry fell upon our ears from the direction of Geary. He was fiercely attacked; first his pickets, and soon after



his main force; but not before he was in line of battle to receive it. Howard was directed to double-quick his nearest division (Schurz's) to his relief, and before proceeding far a sheet of musketry was thrown upon him from the central hills, but at long range, and inflicting no great injury. This was the first intimation that the enemy was there at all.

Directions were immediately given for one of the brigades en route to Geary (Tyndale's) to be detached, and assault the enemy in the hills on the left, and for the other brigade to push on as ordered. Meanwhile, Howard's first division, under Steinwher, came up, when it was discovered that the hill to the rear of Schurz's division was also occupied by the enemy in force, and Smith's brigade of this division was ordered to carry it with the bayonet. This skeleton but brave brigade charged up the mountain, almost inaccessible by daylight, under a heavy fire, without returning it, and drove three times their number from behind hastily thrown up intrenchments, capturing prisoners and scattering the enemy in all directions. No troops ever rendered more brilliant service. The name of their valiant commander is Colonel Orland Smith, of the seventy-third Ohio volunteers. Tyndale, encountering less resistance, had also made himself master of the enemy's position in his front.

During these operations a heavy musketry fire, with occasional discharges of artillery, continued to reach us from Geary. It was evident that a formidable adversary had gathered around him and that he was battling him with all his might. For almost three hours, without assistance, he repelled the repeated attacks of vastly superior numbers, and in the end drove them ingloriously from the field. At one time they had enveloped him on three sides under circumstances that would have dismayed any officer except one endowed with an iron will and the most exalted courage. Such is the character of General Geary.

With this ended the fight. We had repelled every attack, carried every point assaulted, thrown the enemy headlong over the river, and, more than all, secured our new communications for the time being beyond peradventure. These several conflicts were attended with unusual interest and satisfaction from the violence of the attack, the great alacrity displayed by the officers and men in springing to their arms on the first indications of the presence of the enemy, and the glorious manner in which they closed in on him for the struggle.

I regret that my duty constrains me to except any portion of my command in my commendations of their courage and valor. The brigade despatched to the relief of Geary, by orders delivered in person to its division commander, never reached him until long after the fight had ended. It is alleged that it lost its way, when it had a terrific infantry fire to guide them all the way, and also that they became involved in a swamp, when there was no swamp or other obstacle between them and Geary which should have delayed them a moment in marching to the relief of their imperilled companions.

For the instances of conspicuous individual daring and conduct, also of regiments and batteries the most distinguished for brilliant services on this field, the attention of the commanding general is respectfully called to the reports of corps and division commanders, herewith transmitted. I must confine myself to an expression of my appreciation of the zealous and devoted services of Major General Howard, not only on the battle-field but everywhere and at all times. Of General Geary I need say no more. To both of these officers I am profoundly grateful for the able assistance they have always given me.

Our loss is four hundred and sixteen, among them some of the bravest officers and men of my command. General Green was severely wounded while in the heroic performance of his duty. Colonel Underwood, of the thirty-third Massachusetts volunteers, was also desperately wounded, and for his recovery I am deeply concerned. If only in recognition of his services on this field, his

many martial virtues and great personal worth, it would be a great satisfaction to me to have this officer advanced to the grade of brigadier general. For the many whose deaths the country will deplore I must refer you to the reports of subordinate commanders.

Of the loss of the enemy, it cannot fall short of fifteen hundred. Geary buried one hundred and fifty-three rebel carcasses on his front alone. We took upwards of one hundred prisoners and several hundred stand of small-arms. Could we have had daylight to follow up our success, we have reason to believe our trophies would have been much more abundant.

The force opposed to us consisted of two of Longstreet's divisions, and corresponded in number to our corps. From the prisoners we learn that they had watched the column as it descended the valley, and confidently counted on its annihilation.

To conclude, I must express my grateful acknowledgments to Major General Butterfield, chief of staff, for the valuable assistance rendered me on the field; also, to Major Lawrence, Captain Hall, Lieutenants Perkins and Oliver, aides-de-camp, for the faithful, intelligent, and devoted performance of all the duties assigned them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER,

*Major General Commanding.*

Lieut. Col. C. GODDARD,

*Ass't Adj't Gen'l Army of Cumberland.*

True copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

OFFICE OF CHIEF ENGINEER,

*Chattanooga, Tenn., November 4, 1863.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations for making a lodgement on the south side of the river at Brown's ferry. On the 19th of October I was instructed by General Rosecrans to reconnoitre the river in the vicinity of Williams's island, with a view to making the island a cover for a steamboat landing and storehouses, and began the examination near the lower end of the island. Following the river up, I found on the opposite bank, above the head of the island, a sharp range of hills whose base was washed by the river. This range extended up the river nearly to Lookout creek, and was broken at Brown's ferry by a narrow gorge, through which ran the road to the old ferry, and also flowed a small creek. The valley between this ridge of hills and Raccoon mountains was narrow, and a lodgement effected there would give us the command of the Kelley's ferry road, and seriously interrupt the communications of the enemy up Lookout valley and down to the river on Raccoon mountains. The ridge seemed thinly picketed, and the evidences were against the occupation of that part of the valley by a large force of the enemy, and it seemed quite possible to take by surprise what could not have been carried by assault if heavily occupied by an opposing force.

The major general commanding the geographical division and the major general commanding the department visited with me the ferry a few days after this reconnoissance, and were agreed as to the importance of the position by itself, and especially in connexion with the movements to be made from Bridgeport to open the river; and I was directed to make the necessary arrangements for the expedition to effect the lodgements. To do this fifty pontoons, with oars, to carry a crew, and twenty-five armed men, were prepared, and also two flatboats carrying forty, and seventy-five men. The force detailed for the expedition

consisted of the brigades of Brigadier General Turchin and Brigadier General Hazen, with three batteries, to be posted under the direction of Major Mendenhall, assistant to General Brannan, chief of artillery.

Sunday, the 25th of October, I was assigned to the command of the expedition, and the troops were distributed as follows: Fifteen hundred men, under Brigadier General Hazen, were to embark in the boats and pass down the river a distance of about nine miles, seven of which would be under the fire of the pickets of the enemy. It was deemed better to take this risk than to attempt to launch the boats near the ferry, because they would move more rapidly than intelligence could be taken by infantry pickets, and, in addition, though the enemy might be alarmed, he would not know where the landing was to be attempted, and therefore could not concentrate with certainty against us. The boats were called off in sections, and the points at which each section was to land were carefully selected and pointed out to the officers in command, and range fires kept burning, lest in the night the upper points should be mistaken. The remainder of General Turchin's brigade and General Hazen's brigade were marched across and encamped in the woods out of sight, near the ferry, ready to move down and cover the landing of the boats, and also ready to embark as soon as the boats had landed the river force and crossed to the north side. The artillery was also halted in the woods during the night, and was to move down and go into position as soon as the boats had begun to land, to cover the retirement of our troops in case of disaster. The equipage for the pontoon bridge was also ready to be moved down to the river as soon as the troops were across; axes were issued to the troops, to be used in cutting abatis for defence so soon as the ridge was gained. General Hazen was to take the gorge and the hills to the left, while General Turchin was to extend from the gorge down the river. The boats moved from Chattanooga at 3 a. m. on the 27th, and, thanks to a slight fog and the silence observed, they were not discovered until about 5 a. m., when the first section had landed at the upper point and the second section had arrived abreast of the pickets stationed at the gorge. Here a portion of the second section of the flotilla failed to land at the proper place, and, alarming the pickets, received a volley; some time was lost in effecting a landing below the gorge, and the troops had hardly carried it before the enemy began the attack. The boats by this time had recrossed the river, and Lieutenant Colonel Langdon, first Ohio volunteers, in command of the remnant of the brigade of General Hazen, was rapidly ferried across, and forming his men, quickly pushed forward to the assistance of the troops under Lieutenant Colonel Fry, twenty-third Kentucky volunteers, already hard pressed. The skirmish was soon over, and General Turchin, who followed Lieutenant Colonel Langdon, quietly took possession of the hills assigned to him.

So soon as the skirmishers were thrown out from each command, the axes were set at work felling an abatis, and in two hours the command was sufficiently protected to withstand any attack which was likely to be made. So soon as the last of the troops were across, the bridge was commenced and continued under some shelling for an hour or so, and was completed at 4½ p. m., under the vigorous and skilful superintendence of Captain P. V. Fox, first Michigan engineers, and Captain George W. Dresser, fourth artillery. Six prisoners were taken, and six rebels buried by our command, and several wounded, reported by citizens; among the wounded, the colonel of the fifteenth Alabama. Twenty beaves, six pontoons, a barge, and about 2,000 bushels of corn fell into our possession. Our loss was six killed, twenty-three wounded, and nine missing. The artillery placed in position was not used, but credit is due Major Mendenhall for his promptitude in placing his guns. To Brigadier General Turchin, Brigadier General Hazen, and Colonel Stanley, eighteenth Ohio volunteers, who had the superintendence of the boats and was zealous in his duty, and to Captain Fox, first Michigan engineers, all credit is due for their zeal,

coolness, and intelligence. Captain Dresser, fourth artillery, and Captain P. C. F. West, United States Coast Survey, rendered every service on my staff. Lieutenants Klokke, Fuller, Hopkins, and Brent, of the signal corps, were zealous in the discharge of their duties, and soon succeeded in establishing a line of communications from the south side of the river. I enclose the reports of the various commanders.

Respectfully submitted.

WM. F. SMITH,  
*Brigadier General, Commanding Expedition.*

*List of casualties that occurred during the action at Brown's ferry October 27, 1863.*

FORTY-FIRST OHIO VOLUNTEERS.

Name.	Co.	Rank.	Remarks.
Thomas Ladler.....	A	Private.....	Killed.
C. W. Hills.....	A	Second lieutenant.	Wounded.
C. H. Bennett.....	A	Sergeant.....	Do.

ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOURTH OHIO VOLUNTEERS.

A. S. Galbraith.....	I	First lieutenant...	Wounded.
L. Gagus.....	I	Sergeant.....	Do.
Jas. Simms.....	K	Private.....	Do.
Wm. Clark.....	K	do.....	Do.

TWENTY-THIRD KENTUCKY VOLUNTEERS.

Thos. M. Parrish.....	D	Sergeant.....	Wounded.
Frank Miller.....	E	do.....	Do.
W. H. Johnson.....	H	do.....	Do.
H. Tucker.....	D	Corporal.....	Do.
Julius Taylor.....	D	do.....	Do.
R. D. Buffington.....	B	Private.....	Do.
Chas. M. Faque.....	C	do.....	Killed.
Chas. Pines.....	D	do.....	Wounded.
W. H. H. Taylor.....	E	do.....	Do.
.....	H	do.....	Do.

THIRTY-THIRD OHIO VOLUNTEERS.

Jno. G. Gillilain.....	I	Corporal.....	Killed.
Henry Pierce.....	B	Private.....	Wounded.
Elijah Ponklin.....	C	do.....	Do.
Melvin F. Howard.....	B	Fifth Ky. vols.....	Killed.

Killed, 4.

Wounded, 17.

Missing, —.

True copy :

WM. F. SMITH, *Brigadier General.*

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and A. D. C.*

Soon after the first of November rumors reached us at Chattanooga that the enemy had withdrawn a considerable force from our front, and had sent them to operate against Knoxville. These rumors were afterwards confirmed through the reports brought in by spies and deserters, and it was finally ascertained

that Longstreet's corps had been detached from Bragg's army. In the mean time Major General Sherman, with the army of the Tennessee, was closing up on to the right of the army of the Cumberland, moving along the north bank of the Tennessee river from Eastport, Mississippi, where he had crossed, part of his command reaching Pulaski on the 7th of November. Soon afterwards General Sherman arrived in person at Chattanooga, when, after consulting with General Grant and making a thorough examination of the ground, preparations were made to attack the enemy in front. For that purpose General Sherman was directed by General Grant to move the 15th army corps from Stevenson and Bridgeport to a point on the Tennessee river north of Chattanooga, where it was to effect a crossing and advance against the enemy on my left. I was to send one division from my command to support the crossing of General Sherman's troops, and with the remainder of my force attack the enemy directly in front, where his forces remained unchanged on Mission ridge and on Lookout mountain.

The following instructions were received from General Grant, viz:

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*Chattanooga, Tenn., November 18, 1863.*

"GENERAL: All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on Missionary ridge by Saturday morning at daylight. Not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountain, and other places, such definite instructions cannot be given as might be desirable. However, the general plan, you understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him, strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the Tennessee river just below the mouth of Chickamauga, his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river, (to be located by your chief of artillery,) and to carry the heights from the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can concentrate a force against him. You will co-operate with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on your right and centre, and a movable column of one division in readiness to move wherever ordered. This division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. Your effort then will be to form a junction with Sherman, making your advance well towards the north end of Missionary Ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. The junction once formed and the ridge carried, communication will be at once established between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy.

"Lookout valley, I think, will be easily held by Geary's division and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old army of the Cumberland. Howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at Chattanooga or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday night to a position on the north side of the river not lower down than the first pontoon bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary.

\* \* \* \* \*

"I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"U. S. GRANT,

*"Major General Commanding."*

"Major General GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*"Commanding Department and Army of the Cumberland."*

Copy of a copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

Howard's corps was moved from Lookout valley in accordance with the above, being relieved in its position by two brigades of the first division 4th army corps, moved up from Bridgeport for the purpose.

The second brigade of the second cavalry division, Colonel Eli Long, fourth United States cavalry, commanding, was directed by me to follow up the left flank of General Sherman's command, and, if not required by General Sherman, to cross Chickamauga creek and make a raid upon the enemy's communications, and do as much damage as possible.

The division sent to support General Sherman's movement was the second division 14th army corps, Brigadier General J. C. Davis commanding, which was in position by the morning of November 21, at the point where the crossing of the 15th army corps was to take place, General Davis reporting everything quiet and his troops concealed from the enemy's view.

Owing to a heavy rain-storm which came up on the 20th and continued throughout the 21st, General Sherman's troops could not get into position until the 22d, and even then his rear division (Osterhaus's) was cut off in Lookout valley, by the bridge at Brown's ferry being broken away. Howard's corps, (the 11th,) which had been between the two bridges since the 20th, was moved into Chattanooga on the 22d, in full view of the enemy, and posted in the interval between Wood's and Sheridan's divisions of the 4th corps, the movement being made partly to draw off the enemy's attention from General Sherman's design, making it appear that the troops he (General Sherman) was marching up the valley were re-enforcing the town.

By the breaking of the bridge at Brown's ferry, General Hooker was left in Lookout valley with Geary's division of the 12th corps, Osterhaus's division of the 15th corps, and two brigades of the first division 4th army corps.

By reference to the following communications received and sent, the operations of my command around Chattanooga will be fully explained:

"HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION 4TH ARMY CORPS,

*"Chattanooga, November 22, 1863.*

"COLONEL: David Gardner, first lieutenant company B, thirty-seventh Tennessee infantry, Tyler's brigade, Bates's division, Breckinridge's corps, who resides near Knoxville, Tennessee, came in last night making the following statement: 'Buckner's and Anderson's divisions moved day before yesterday to McLemore's and Pigeon coves. Indications are that a general move is to be made. Baggage is being reduced and hard bread is being issued. Most of the army is massed between Bragg's headquarters and Lookout mountain; but few troops on the right of Bragg's headquarters. Reported yesterday that Longstreet occupied Knoxville. Bragg's army now here is composed of four corps, two divisions in each corps, four brigades in each division. The corps are commanded by Hardee, Breckinridge, Walker, and Buckner. Total strength about 60,000.'

"I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"P. H. SHERIDAN,

*"Major General Commanding.*

"Lieutenant Colonel J. S. FULLERTON,

*"A. A. G. and Chief of Staff, 4th Army Corps.*

"The movement to McLemore's cove was made to meet Sherman, who was expected to attack Stevens's Gap.

"P. H. S."

True copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

"HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION 4TH ARMY CORPS,

"*Chattanooga, November 23, 1863—3½ a. m.*

"MAJOR: I have the honor to forward you the following information obtained from two deserters who came inside the lines of this division after twelve o'clock this a. m.

"These men state the rebel army is retreating. Say the troops which passed over the ridge yesterday were going to Chickamauga station. They say the rumor in camps was yesterday that by this evening there would be nothing but their pickets left. Say their wagon trains had been ordered in, (they had been kept to the rear for foraging purposes.) They fully corroborate the statement of prisoners received yesterday morning as to their artillery having all left. I send the prisoners to corps provost marshal herewith.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"T. J. WOOD,

"*Brigadier General U. S. V. Commanding  
and General Officer of the day.*

"Major FULLERTON, *Assistant Adjutant General.*"

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

Both of the foregoing were sent to Major General Grant for his information, and in reply the following was received:

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

"*Chattanooga, November 23, 1863.*

"GENERAL: The truth or falsity of the deserters who came in last night stating that Bragg had fallen back should be ascertained at once. If he is really falling back, Sherman can commence at once laying his pontoon trains, and we can save a day.

"Very respectfully,

"U. S. GRANT, *Major General.*

"Major General G. H. THOMAS,

"*Commanding Army of the Cumberland.*"

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide de-Camp.*

I directed a reconnoissance to be made from my front, as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF CUMBERLAND,

"*Chattanooga, November 23, 1863.*

"Major General GRANGER,

"*Commanding 4th Corps:*

"The general commanding department directs that you throw one division of the 4th corps forward in the direction of Orchard Knob, and hold a second division in supporting distance, to discover the position of the enemy if he still remains in the vicinity of his old camps. Howard's and Baird's commands will be ready to co-operate if needed.

"Respectfully,

"J. J. REYNOLDS,

"*Major General and Chief of Staff.*"

True copy:

S. C. KELKOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

The above resulted in our occupying the enemy's first line of works after some resistance on his part. (See report of the same, page 133.)

During the night the enemy on Lookout mountain was busy signalling to the main force on Mission ridge; some of his messages were deciphered by our signal officers, of which I give one of the most important, as follows :

"11 p. m.—HARDEE: I observed from the point the movements of the enemy until dark. The object seemed to be to attract our attention. The troops in sight were formed from centre to left. Those on the right moved to centre. The troops from Raccoon were in line in full sight. If they intend to attack, my opinion is it will be upon our left. Both of their bridges are gone.

"General STEVENSON."

The bridges being gone, I gave the following directions to general Hooker :

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF CUMBERLAND,

"Chattanooga, November 23—10 p. m.

"Major General HOOKER, *Lookout Valley*.\*

"If Wood's division does not get across the river by daybreak he is ordered to report to you, and in that event the general commanding department directs that you endeavor to take the point of Lookout mountains.

"J. J. REYNOLDS,

"*Major General and Chief of Staff*."

Later, another despatch was sent to General Hooker to the same effect, as follows :

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF CUMBERLAND,

"Chattanooga, November 24—12.30 a. m.

"Major General HOOKER, *Lookout Valley* :

"Intercepted rebel despatches are to the effect that rebels expect us to attack them on their left in the morning. General commanding desires that you make demonstration early as possible after daybreak on point of Lookout mountain. General Grant still hopes Wood's division will get across to join Sherman, in which case your demonstration will aid Sherman's crossing. If Wood can't cross, you can take the point of Lookout if your demonstration develops its practicability.

"J. J. REYNOLDS,

"*Major General and Chief of Staff*."

General Hooker answered :

"HOOKER'S HEADQUARTERS,

"November 24—2 a. m.

"Major General REYNOLDS, *Chief of Staff* :

"I am just informed that Wood's division will not be able to cross the river for twelve (12) hours, and in consequence have given directions for it to take position for an advance on Lookout Nose, to be there at sunrise. That there may be no mistake as to the crossing, I will send a staff officer to ascertain positively.

"Major General HOOKER."

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\* See explanatory note, page 133.



The above-mentioned movement was successfully carried out; (see my report of the same and that of General Hooker.) Simultaneously General Sherman succeeded in laying a pontoon bridge at the mouth of North Chickamauga creek, and then secured a lodgement on the northern extremity of Mission ridge.

My instructions for the operations of the 25th were as follows :

“HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

“*Chattanooga, Tenn., November 24, 1864.*

“GENERAL: General Sherman carried Missionary ridge as far as the tunnel with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the hill; his left at Chickamauga creek. I have instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in co-operation. Your command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker's present position on the mountain can be maintained with a small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable road.

“Very respectfully,

“U. S. GRANT,

“*Major General Commanding.*”

“Major General GEORGE H. THOMAS,

“*Commanding Army of the Cumberland.*”

True copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

I directed General Hooker to make the following movement on the 25th :

“HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

“*Chattanooga, November 24, 1863—9.30 p. m.*

“Major General HOOKER, *Lookout Valley* :

“The general commanding department congratulates you most heartily upon your glorious success to-day, and desires that you convey his warmest thanks to the troops under your command for their valorous conduct. General Grant has just directed that General Sherman move along Mission ridge to-morrow with his force, whilst our force advances to the front, co-operating with Sherman, and compelling the enemy to show whether he occupies his rifle-pits in our front. Be in readiness to advance as early as possible in the morning into Chattanooga valley, and seize and hold the Summertown road, and co-operate with the 14th corps by supporting its right. Map sent by courier at eight o'clock this evening.

“J. J. REYNOLDS,

“*Major General and Chief of Staff.*”

True copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

At daylight on the 25th the enemy was found to have withdrawn completely from Lookout mountain, and our flag was planted on the heights, where it could plainly be seen waving in the pure morning air by the troops in the valley below.

My orders of the evening before were then repeated to General Hooker by signal and by an aide-de-camp, and were as follows :

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF CUMBNRLAND,

"November 25, 1863—8 a. m.

"Major General HOOKER :

"Leave Carlin's brigade at Summertown road to rejoin General Palmer. Move with the remainder of your force, except two regiments to hold Lookout, on the Rossville road towards Mission ridge, looking well to your right flank.

"By command of General Thomas.

"J. J. REYNOLDS,

"Major General and Chief of Staff."

True copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,

Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.

Later I sent the following, (signal:)

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

" Orchard Knob, November 25, 1863.

"Major General HOOKER :

"I wish you and General Palmer to move forward firmly and steadily upon the enemy's works in front, using General Sheridan as a pivot.

"GEO. H. THOMAS,

"Major General."

(Passed through Mission signal station at 10 a. m.)

The result is shown in my official report dated December 1, 1863.

#### EXPLANATORY NOTE REGARDING THE CAPTURE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN.

When it became evident, by the breaking of the Brown's Ferry bridge, that Wood's division (General Osterhaus, its commander, being absent,) could not cross to join General Sherman, I received the following communication from General Grant :

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

"Chattanooga, November 22, 1863.

"GENERAL : The bridge at Brown's ferry being down to-day, and the excessively bad roads since the last rain, will render it impossible for Sherman to get up either of his two remaining divisions in time for the attack to-morrow morning. With one of them up, and which would have been there now but for the accident to the bridge, I would still make the attack in the morning, regarding a day gained as of superior advantage to a single division of troops. You can make your arrangements for this delay.

"Very respectfully,

"U. S. GRANT, Major General.

"Major General GEO. H. THOMAS,

"Commanding Army of the Cumberland."

True copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,

Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.

Feeling as I did the necessity of avoiding delay for fear the enemy should become advised of our plans, immediately upon the receipt of the above letter I went to General Grant and advised against any further postponement of our movement, and suggested that, if needed, the 11th corps, then between the two bridges, could be sent to General Sherman to take the place of the troops that could not join him, whilst these last, together with the troops already in Lookout valley, would form a column to attack the enemy on Lookout mountain, or at least divert his attention from Sherman's crossing above. This met the approbation of the commanding general, and on it was based my order of the 23d to General Hooker to demonstrate on Lookout, and, if practicable, to carry the position.

## OPERATIONS AROUND CHATTANOOGA.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF CUMBERLAND,  
*Chattanooga, Tennessee, December 7, 1863.*

GENERAL: The following operations of the army of the Cumberland since the 31st October are respectfully submitted to the major general commanding.

As soon as communication with Bridgeport had been made secure and the question of supplying the army at this point rendered certain, preparations were at once commenced for driving the enemy from his position in our immediate front on Lookout mountain and Missionary ridge, and, if possible, to send a force to the relief of Knoxville. To enable me to dislodge the enemy from the threatening position he had assumed in our front, guns of a heavier calibre than those with the army were needed; also additional means for crossing the Tennessee river. Brigadier General Brannan, chief of artillery, was directed to send for the necessary number of guns and ammunition, and after consulting with Brigadier General W. F. Smith, chief engineer, to prepare the batteries for the guns on their arrival. Whilst awaiting the arrival of the guns and ammunition, work was prosecuted on the fortifications around the town. In addition to his duties of superintending the work on the fortifications, General Smith pushed vigorously the construction of two pontoon bridges to be used in the execution of the movements which were determined upon as necessary to a successful dislodgement of the enemy.

Guerillas having become somewhat troublesome to the northeast of McMinnville, and east of the Caney fork of the Cumberland, Brigadier General Elliott, chief of cavalry, was ordered, November 14, to establish his headquarters with the first division of cavalry at or near Alexandria, and employ the division in hunting up and exterminating these marauders. General Elliott reached Alexandria on the 18th. On the 27th he reports that his scouts met those of Burnside on Flint ridge, east of Sparta, and that Lieutenant Colonel Brownlow, with detachments from the first East Tennessee and ninth Pennsylvania cavalry, attacked the rebel Colonel Murry on the 21st, at Sparta, killing one, wounding two, and capturing ten (10) of the enemy, including a lieutenant of Champ Ferguson's. He also captured a few horses, some ammunition, and destroyed extensive salt-works used by the rebels.

A company of scouts, under Captain Brixie, also encountered a party of guerillas near Beersheba springs, capturing fifteen or twenty and dispersing the rest.

Brigadier General R. S. Granger reports from Nashville, November 2, that a mixed command, under Lieutenant Colonel Sculley, first Middle Tennessee infantry, sent out from Nashville, attacked Hawkins and other guerilla chiefs, routed and pursued them to Centreville, where Hawkins made another stand, attacking our forces while crossing the river. Hawkins was again routed and pursued until his forces dispersed. Rebel loss from fifteen to twenty killed and sixty-six prisoners. Our loss, one severely and several slightly wounded. Again, on November 4, that Major Fitzgibbon, fourteenth Michigan infantry, came upon the combined forces of Cooper, Kirk, Williams and Scott, (guerillas,) at Lawrenceburg, thirty-five miles from Columbia, that morning, and after a severe hand-to-hand fight defeated them, killing eight, wounding seven, and capturing twenty-four (24) prisoners, among the latter one captain and two lieutenants. Major Fitzgibbon's loss was three men slightly wounded and eight horses killed. He reports the enemy 400 strong, and his force 120.

November 13.—Captain Cutler, with one company of mounted infantry and a portion of Whitmore's battery, mounted infantry, belonging to the garrison of Clarksville, had a fight, near Palmyra, with Captain Grey's company of

guerillas, killing two, wounding five, and taking one prisoner. Cutler's loss was one lieutenant, and one man wounded.

*November 16.*—A scout was organized by Brigadier General Payne, and sent out from Gallatin and Laverne. They report having killed five and captured twenty-six guerillas, with horses, sheep, cattle and hogs in their possession, collected for the use of the rebel army.

*November 17.*—Brigadier General Crook was ordered to concentrate his division (second cavalry division) at or near Huntsville, Alabama, to patrol the north side of the Tennessee river from Decatur to Bridgeport, and to hunt up bands of guerillas reported to be roaming about in that region, arresting and robbing Union citizens.

General Crook reports, on the 21st, that an expedition sent down the Tennessee had destroyed nine (9) boats between Whitesburg and Decatur, some of them sixty feet long.

The expedition crossed the river and drove off the rebels, taking their boats. From the best information to be obtained, there were two small regiments of cavalry and one battery on the other side doing picket duty. Lee and Roddy reported as having gone to Mississippi.

Major General Sherman, commanding army of the Tennessee, having been ordered with the 15th corps to this point, to participate in the operations against the enemy, reached Bridgeport with two divisions on the 16th November. He came to the front himself, and having examined the ground, expressed himself confident of his ability to execute his share of the work. The plan of operations was then written out substantially as follows: Sherman with the 15th corps, strengthened with one division from my command, was to effect a crossing of the Tennessee river, just below the mouth of the south Chickamauga, on Saturday, November 21, at daylight, his crossing to be protected by artillery planted on the heights on the north bank of the river. After crossing his force he was to carry the heights of Missionary ridge from their northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy could concentrate a force against him. I was to co-operate with Sherman by concentrating my troops in Chattanooga valley on my left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend the fortifications on the right and centre, with a movable column of one division in readiness to move wherever ordered. This division was to show itself as threateningly as possible on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. I was then to effect a junction with Sherman, making my advance from the left, well towards the north end of Missionary ridge, and moving as nearly simultaneously with Sherman as possible. The junction once formed and the ridge carried, communication would be at once established between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river. Further movements to depend on those of the enemy. Lookout valley was to be held by Geary's division and the two brigades of the 4th corps ordered to co-operate with him; the whole under command of General Hooker. Howard's corps was to be held in readiness to act either with my troops at Chattanooga or with General Sherman's, and was ordered to take up a position on Friday night on the north side of the Tennessee, near the first pontoon bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as might become necessary. General Smith commenced at once to collect his pontoons and material for bridges in the north Chickamauga creek, preparatory to the crossing of Sherman's troops, proper precautions being taken that the enemy should not discover the movement.

General Sherman then returned to Bridgeport to direct the movements of his troops.

On the 16th, Colonel Long, commanding second brigade second division cavalry command, was ordered to report at Chattanooga on Saturday the 21st at noon, the intention being for him to follow up the left flank of Sherman's troops, and if not

required by General Sherman he was to cross the Chickamauga, make a raid upon the enemy's communications and do as much damage as possible. Owing to a heavy rain-storm commencing on Friday, 20th instant, and lasting all the 21st, General Sherman was not able to get his troops in position in time to commence operations on Saturday morning as he expected. Learning that the enemy had discovered Sherman's movements across Lookout valley, it was thought best that General Howard should cross over into Chattanooga, thus attracting the attention of the enemy, with the intention of leading him to suppose that the troops he had observed moving were re-enforcing Chattanooga, and thereby concealing the real movements of Sherman. Accordingly, Howard's corps was crossed into Chattanooga on Sunday and took up a position in full view of the enemy. In consequence of the bad condition of the roads, General Sherman's troops were occupied all of Sunday in getting into position. In the mean time the river having risen, both pontoon bridges were broken by rafts sent down the river by the enemy, cutting off Osterhaus's division from the balance of Sherman's troops. It was thought that this would delay us another day, but during the night of the 22d two deserters reported Bragg had fallen back, and that there was only a strong picket line in our front. Early on the morning of the 23d I received a note from the major general commanding, directing me to ascertain by a demonstration the truth or falsity of this report. Orders were accordingly given to General Granger, commanding the 4th corps, to form his troops and to advance directly in front of Fort Wood, and thus develop the strength of the enemy. General Palmer, commanding 14th corps, was directed to support General Granger's right, with Baird's division refused in echelon. Johnson's division to be held in readiness, under arms, in the intrenchments, to re-enforce at any point. Howard's corps was formed en mass behind the centre of Granger's corps. The two divisions of Granger's corps, Sheridan's and Wood's, were formed in front of Fort Wood, Sheridan on the right, Wood on the left, and his left extending nearly to Citico creek. The formation being completed, about two p. m. the troops were advanced steadily and with rapidity directly to the front, driving before them first the rebel pickets, then their reserves, and falling upon their grand guards stationed in their first line of rifle-pits, capturing something over two hundred men, and secured themselves in their new position before the enemy had sufficiently recovered from his surprise to attempt to send re-enforcements from his main camp. Orders were then given to General Granger to make his position secure by constructing temporary breastworks and throwing out strong pickets to his front.

Howard's corps was moved up on his left flank with the same instructions, and Bridge's Illinois battery was placed in position on Orchard Knob; the troops remained in that position for the night. The Tennessee river having risen considerably from the effect of the previous heavy rain-storm, it was found difficult to rebuild the pontoon bridge at Brown's ferry. Therefore it was determined that General Hooker should take Osterhaus's division, which was still in Lookout valley, Geary's division 12th corps, and Whittaker's and Grose's brigades, of the first division 4th corps, under Brigadier General Cruft, and make a strong demonstration on the northern slope of Lookout mountain, for the purpose of attracting the enemy's attention in that direction, and thus withdrawing him from Sherman whilst crossing the Tennessee at the mouth of the south Chickamauga. General Hooker was instructed that in making this demonstration, if he discovered the position and strength of the enemy would justify him in attempting to carry the point of the mountain, to do so.

By four p. m., on the evening of the 24th, General Hooker reported his troops in position and ready to advance. Finding Lookout creek so much swollen as to be impassable, he sent Geary's division 4th corps to cross the creek at Wauhatchie and work down on the right bank, whilst he employed the remainder of

his force in constructing temporary bridges across the creek on the main road. The enemy being attracted by the force on the road, did not observe the movements of Geary until his column was directly on his left and threatened his rear. Hooker's movements were facilitated by the heavy mist which overhung the mountain, enabling Geary to get into position without attracting attention. Finding himself vigorously pursued by a strong column on his left and rear, the enemy began to fall back with rapidity, but his resistance was obstinate and the entire point of the mountain was not gained until about two p. m., when General Hooker reported by signal and telegraph that he had carried the mountain as far as the road from Chattanooga valley to the White House. Soon after his main column coming up, his line was extended to the foot of the mountain near the mouth of Chattanooga creek. His right being still strongly resisted by the enemy, was re-enforced by Carlin's brigade, first division 14th corps, which arrived at the White House about five p. m., in time to take part in the contest still going on at that point. Continuous and heavy skirmishing was kept up in Hooker's front until ten at night, when there was an unusual quietness along our whole front.

With the aid of the steamer Dunbar, which had been put in condition and sent up the river at daylight of the 24th, General Sherman by eleven a. m. had crossed three divisions of the 15th corps and was ready to advance as soon as Davis's division 14th corps commenced crossing. Colonel Long, commanding second brigade, second division cavalry, was then directed to move up at once, follow Sherman's advance closely and proceed to carry out his instructions of the day before, if not required by General Sherman to support his left flank. Howard's corps moved to the left about nine a. m., and communicated with Sherman's troops about noon. Instructions were sent to General Hooker to be ready to advance on the morning of the 25th from his position on the point of Lookout mountain, to the Summertown road, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat, if he had not already withdrawn, which he was to ascertain by pushing a reconnoissance to the top of the mountain.

The reconnoissance was made as directed, and having discovered that the enemy had evacuated during the night, General Hooker was then directed to move on the Rossville road with the troops under his command against Rossville, carry that pass and operate upon the left and rear of the enemy's position on Mission ridge. Palmer's and Granger's troops were held in readiness to advance directly on the rifle pits in their front as soon as Hooker could get into position at Rossville. In retiring on the night of the 24th, the enemy had destroyed the bridges over Chattanooga creek, on the road leading from Lookout mountain to Rossville, and, in consequence, General Hooker was delayed until after two o'clock p. m. in effecting the crossing of Chattanooga creek. About noon General Sherman becoming heavily engaged with the enemy, they having massed a strong force in his front, orders were given for General Baird to march his division within supporting distance of General Sherman; moving his command promptly in the direction indicated, he was placed in position to the left of Wood's division of Granger's corps. Owing to the difficulties of the ground, his troops did not get in line with Granger's until about half past two p. m.; orders were then given him to move forward on Granger's left, and within supporting distance, against the enemy's rifle pits on the slope and at the foot of Missionary ridge. The whole line then advanced against the breastworks and soon became warmly engaged with the enemy's skirmishers. These giving way retired upon their reserves, posted within their works, our troops advancing steadily in a continuous line. The enemy, seized with panic, abandoned the works at the foot of the hill and retreated precipitately to the crest, where they were closely followed by our troops, who, apparently inspired by the impulse of victory, carried the hill simultaneously at six different points, and so closely upon the heels of the enemy that many of them were taken prisoners in the trenches.

We captured all their cannon and ammunition before they could be removed or destroyed. After halting for a few moments to reorganize the troops, who had become somewhat scattered in the assault of the hill, General Sheridan pushed forward in pursuit, and drove those in his front who escaped capture across Chickamauga creek. Generals Wood and Baird being obstinately resisted by reinforcements from the enemy's extreme right, continued fighting until darkness set in, slowly but steadily driving the enemy before them.

In moving upon Rossville, General Hooker encountered Stuart's division and other troops. Finding his left flank threatened, Stuart attempted to escape, by retreating towards Graysville, but some of his forces, finding their retreat from that quarter threatened, retired in disorder towards their right along the crest of the ridge, where they were met by another portion of General Hooker's command, and were driven by these troops in the face of Johnson's division of Palmer's corps, by whom they were nearly all made prisoners.

On the 26th the enemy were pursued by Hooker and Johnson's divisions of Palmer's corps, surprising a portion of their rear guard near Graysville after nightfall, capturing three (3) pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners. General Granger's command returned to Chattanooga with instructions to prepare and hold themselves in readiness for orders to re-enforce General Burnside at Knoxville.

The pursuit was continued on the 27th, capturing an additional piece of artillery at Graysville. Hooker's advance encountered the enemy posted in the pass through Taylor's ridge at Ringold, who, after obstinate resistance of an hour, were driven from the pass, with considerable loss in killed, wounded and prisoners. Our loss was also heavy. A large quantity of forage and some additional caissons and ammunition were captured at Ringold.

Colonel Long returned to Chattanooga from his expedition and reported verbally that on the 24th he reached Tyner's station, destroying the enemy's forage and rations at that place; also some cars, doing considerable injury to the railroad. He then proceeded to Ootowah, where he captured and destroyed some wagons loaded with forage; from thence he proceeded to Cleveland, remaining there one day, destroyed their copper-rolling mill and a large depot of commissary and ordnance stores. Being informed that a train of the enemy's wagons was near Charleston on the Hiawassee, and was probably unable to cross the river on account of the break in their pontoon bridge, after a few hours' rest, he pushed forward with a hope of being able to destroy them, but found on reaching Charleston that the enemy had repaired their bridge and had crossed their train safely, and were prepared to defend the crossing with one or two pieces of artillery, supported by an infantry force, on the northern bank. He then returned to Cleveland and damaged the railroad for five or six miles in the direction of Dalton, and then returned to Chattanooga.

On the 28th General Hooker was ordered by General Grant to remain at Ringold until the 30th, and so employ his troops as to cover the movements of General Sherman, who had received orders to march his force to the relief of Burnside, by way of Cleveland and Loudon. Palmer's corps was detached from the force under General Hooker and returned to Chattanooga.

It will be perceived from the foregoing report that the original plan of operations was somewhat modified, to meet and take the best advantage of emergencies, which necessitated material modifications of that plan. It is believed, however, that the original plan, had it been carried out, could not possibly have led to more successful results. The alacrity and intelligence displayed by officers in executing their orders, the enthusiasm and spirit displayed by the men who did the work, cannot be too highly appreciated by the nation, for the defence of which they have on so many other memorable occasions nobly and patriotically exposed their lives in battle.

Howard's (11th) corps having joined Sherman on the 24th, his operations from that date will be included in Sherman's report. Also those of Brigadier General J. C. Davis, second division 14th corps, who reported to Sherman for duty on the 21st.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General U. S. V. Commanding.*

Brigadier General L. THOMAS,

*Adjutant General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*

True copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

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HEADQUARTERS CHIEF OF ARTILLERY, D. C.,

*Chattanooga, Tenn., December 5, 1863.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit, for the information of the major general commanding the department, the following report of the operations of the artillery in my charge during the recent battle of Chattanooga, November 23, 24, and 25 :

With considerable difficulty, owing to the deficiency in transportation, I succeeded in getting sixteen (16) pieces of heavy ordnance into position on the line of works, in addition to the two (2) 30-pounder Parrotts already in Fort Wood, by the 22d November—four (4) 4½-inch Rodman guns, with the two (2) 30-pounder Parrotts, being in Fort Wood on the extreme left; four (4) 20-pounder Parrotts in Fort Cheatham, and four (4) 4½-inch Rodman guns in Battery Rousseau, on the centre, and four (4) 20-pounder Parrotts in Fort Sheridan, on the right.

These forts occupied prominent positions on the line, the guns commanding the rebel intrenchments at the foot of Missionary ridge and Lookout mountain, and sweeping the level ground in their front. In addition to the heavy guns on the line of intrenchments, by the night of the 23d I had two (2) 20-pounder Parrotts on Moccasin Point, a point on the north side of the river, commanding the approach to Lookout mountain on its most northern extremity; three (3) guns, with the tenth Indiana battery and the eighteenth Ohio battery, under Captain W. A. Naylor, (tenth Indiana battery,) subsequently did good service during Hooker's assault on Lookout mountain, rendering it impracticable for the rebels to concentrate on the north side of the mountain to resist his attack.

The tenth Indiana and eighteenth Ohio batteries had previously been stationed on this point for some weeks, and had succeeded in cutting off, in a great measure, the enemy's communication with Lookout mountain by the northern route. I had also seven (7) field batteries on the line, viz: C and M, first regiment Illinois volunteer artillery; M, first regiment Missouri artillery; F and G, first Ohio volunteer artillery; sixth Ohio and seventh Indiana batteries, so arranged at the defensible points as to insure a safe retreat should the attacking line be repulsed.

On the night of the 23d I had the following batteries placed in position on the north side of the river at four (4) several points, to cover the crossing of General Sherman's command and prevent a force moving to oppose him until he had taken up position and established connexions with our left, viz: Company C, first regiment Ohio volunteer artillery, Captain Gary; company B, first regiment Ohio volunteer artillery, Lieutenant Baldwin; company B, first regiment Illinois volunteer artillery, Captain Rumsey; company F, first regiment Illinois volunteer artillery, Captain Cheeney; company H, first regiment Illi-



nois volunteer artillery, Lieutenant De Grass; company I, first regiment Illinois volunteer artillery, Lieutenant Burton; twenty-sixth Pennsylvania battery, Lieutenant McDowell; thirteenth New Lock battery, Captain Wheeler; twelfth Wisconsin battery, Captain Zackerick; Casswell's Illinois battery, Captain Casswell. These batteries were under the directions of Colonel James Barnett, first regiment Ohio volunteer artillery, commanding first division artillery reserve, and Colonel Taylor, chief of artillery of General Sherman's command, and from their commanding positions were well calculated to effect the purpose for which they were intended.

Everything could have been in position by the morning of the 20th, but the contemplated attack having been postponed, it was unnecessary to make a final disposition of the guns until the night of the 22d.

At about 12 m. on the 23d instant I opened with the heavy guns from all points of the line on the rebel positions at the foot of Missionary ridge and the east side of Lookout mountain with some effect, in many instances driving the enemy from their camps and line of works. At 3 p. m. on the following day I ordered a section of 10-pounder Parrotts to be placed at the "Tannery," commanding the valley road and Chattanooga creek, where it subsequently did good service.

About 1 p. m. on the 23d the infantry advanced under cover of the guns and carried the rebel rifle-pits situated about one and a half mile to our front. Such batteries as could be mounted were immediately thrown out on "Orchard Knoll," "Brush Knob," and such other elevations as the country afforded.

With the assistance of General Sherman, who furnished me with horses for three (3) batteries, (the battery horses of the D. C. having either died or become so emaciated from starvation as to render but few of them fit for service,) I had succeeded in mounting seven (7) batteries; four, (4,) however, were only brought into action. These did excellent service during the attack of the 25th instant, as, being in easy range of the rebel intrenchments, they did considerable execution, and aided materially in forcing the enemy to abandon those works.

On the 24th Sherman crossed the river and formed a junction with Howard near Citico creek, the batteries on the north side of the river effectually preventing any masses of troops intercepting them. It was, however, found too hazardous to endeavor to enfilade the rebel line from these batteries, as was at first purposed, our troops being in such close proximity.

During the 24th and the morning of the 25th the guns of Forts Wood and Cheatham opened on all bodies of troops observed to be concentrating or moving on Missionary ridge, distance  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles, sometimes with good effect. At about 2.30 p. m., on the 25th instant, the line made the advance that ultimately resulted in carrying the enemy's position; the guns from the intrenchments continued to play on the rebel lines at the foot of the ridge until the proximity of our troops rendered such fire dangerous, when they turned their attention to the crest of Missionary ridge, and made some excellent practice on the rebel troops moving on that position.

This engagement has proved beyond doubt the utter worthlessness of the projectile known as the Rodman projectile, furnished the  $4\frac{1}{2}$ -inch Rodman guns, and unless other and better projectiles be obtained I consider that these guns will be little better than useless.

There is a radical defect in the fuze of the shells furnished this department, which I believe to originate in the irregularity of their composition, rendering the explosion of the shell at the calculated time very uncertain. I have also remarked that the partitions in the fuzes are very thin, and liable to burst, then causing the explosion of the shell in a shorter period than the time for which the fuze was cut.

In fact, the entire practice with shell was very unsatisfactory, the shells either exploding too soon or not at all.

The following guns, carriages, caissons, limbers, and ammunition were captured from the rebels during the engagement of the 24th and 25th, and subsequent pursuit of the enemy :

By General Davis's division at Chickamauga station.....	2	24-pr. guns
By General Geary's division on Lookout mountain.....	2	field pieces
By General Osterhau's division on Missionary ridge.....	1	" "
By General Wood's division on Missionary ridge.....	12	" "
By General Sheridan's division on Missionary ridge.....	6	" "
By General Johnson's division at Graysville.....	4	" "
By General Baird's division on Missionary ridge.....	1	" "
Claimed by Generals Baird and Wood.....	6	" "
Claimed by Generals Wood and Sheridan.....	6	" "

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Total, (2 heavy guns, and 38 field pieces)..... 40

- 19 carriages for light 12-pounder guns.
- 4 carriages for 10-pounder Parrotts.
- 8 carriages for 6-pounder guns.
- 1 carriage for 3-inch gun.
- 3 carriages for 6-pounder James's 3-80 bore.
- 3 carriages for 12-pounder howitzers.

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38 carriages.

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- 17 caissons for light 12-pounder guns.
- 3 caissons for 10-pounder Parrott's.
- 3 caissons for 12-pounder howitzers.
- 3 caissons for 6-pounder guns.
- 1 caisson for 3-inch gun.
- 2 caissons for 3-80 James's rifle.

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29 caissons.

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- 13 limbers for light 12-pounder guns.
- 4 limbers for 10-pounder Parrotts.
- 7 limbers for 6-pounder guns.
- 1 limber for 3-inch gun.

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25 limbers.

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A good many parts of harness were also ca

- 805 rounds ammunition for 12-pounder g
- 283 rounds ammunition for 12-pounder howitzers.
- 332 rounds ammunition for 6-pounder gun.
- 216 rounds ammunition for 10-pounder Parrott.
- 57 rounds ammunition for 3-inch gun.
- 151 rounds ammunition for 3-80 James's rifle.

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1,844 rounds.

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This is all that has come in up to the present time.

I am indebted to Major J. Mendenhall, assistant chief of artillery, for valuable assistance previous to and during the three days' battle.

Captain Stokes, Chicago Board of Trade battery, acting as additional aide-de-

camp, had charge of the batteries on the right of the line of intrenchments, which were served under his directions with skill and effect. Captain L. J. Lambert, assistant adjutant general, and Lieutenant T. V. Webb, aide-de-camp, of my staff, performed their duties with promptitude and to my satisfaction.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. M. BRANNAN,

*Maj. Gen. and Chief of Art'y, D. C.*

Brigadier General WM. D. WHIPPLE,

*Ass't Adj't General, Department of the Cumberland.,*

True copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

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HEADQUARTERS 4TH ARMY CORPS,

*Loudon, East Tenn., February 11, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to forward to the major general commanding the department of the Cumberland the following report of the operations of the 4th army corps in the recent battles of Chattanooga. For particular and detailed accounts of the facts mentioned therein I refer to the official reports of division, brigade, and regimental commanders, herewith forwarded.

On the 18th day of November last I received instructions from Major General Thomas directing me to hold the two divisions of my command, then at Chattanooga, in readiness to join in an attack about to be made upon the enemy in our front. In this attack I was to co-operate directly with Major General Sherman after he had crossed his command from the north bank of the Tennessee river, immediately below the mouth of Chickamauga creek, and had reached the north end of Mission ridge. This attack was ordered to be made at daylight on the morning of November 21. I was, therefore, directed to bridge Citico creek, a deep, narrow stream that would separate my command from the position that was to be occupied by Major General Sherman, working under cover of darkness on the night of the 20th, and to cross it with my two divisions before daylight the next morning, moving toward the north end of Mission ridge, and marching so as to arrive at that point simultaneously with Major General Sherman.

It was designed that after having effected a juncture with these troops I should change the direction of my column, and move along the northwestern side and base of Mission ridge, taking the enemy in front and flank.

This contemplated attack, however, was not made on the morning of the 21st, the orders having been countermanded on the 20th, when it was found that Major General Sherman's column; which had been much delayed on the march from Bridgeport, Alabama, by the heavy rains and the bad roads, could not get up in time for it.

On the night of November 22, acting under orders similar to those above mentioned, I bridged Citico creek and placed my command in readiness to cross it, but did nothing further, as I received a note, after dark, from department headquarters informing me that as an accident had happened to the bridge at Brown's ferry, Major General Sherman would be there detained, and that consequently immediate action was to be suspended. The disposition of the troops of this corps on the morning of November 23 was as follows: The second division, under command of Major General Sheridan, and the third division, under Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood, were camped within our advanced line of rifle-pits in front of Chattanooga. The right of Major General Sheridan's division resting on the Rossville road, and the left joining General Wood's right, while the left of General Wood's division rested on the right bank of the Ten-

nessee river, northeast of the town. The first brigade of the first division was at Bridgeport, Alabama, and the second and third brigades of the same division, the second commanded by Brigadier General Whitaker, and the third commanded by Colonel Grose, and both under the temporary command of Brigadier General Cruft, were marching from Shellmound and Whiteside en route to join Major General Hooker's command, on the south side of the Tennessee river, near Brown's ferry.

On the night of November 22 there were movements in the enemy's camp indicating that he was advised of our intentions, which, by reason of delays and accidents, had become somewhat apparent, and that he was either withdrawing or concentrating his forces. His front, however, remained unchanged. At eleven o'clock on the morning of the next day, November 23, I received a despatch, of which the following is a copy :

“HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*“Chattanooga, Tenn., November 23, 1863.*

“The general commanding department directs that you throw one division of the 4th corps forward in the direction of Orchard Knob (and hold a second division in supporting distance) to discover the position of the enemy, if he still remain in the vicinity of his old camp. Howard's and Baird's commands will be ready to co-operate if needed.

“J. J. REYNOLDS,

*“Major General and Chief of Staff.*

“Major General GRANGER,

*“Commanding 4th Army Corps.”*

Orchard Knob is a rugged hill, rising one hundred feet above the Chattanooga valley, lying between Fort Wood, a work on our exterior line of defence, northeast of Chattanooga and Mission ridge, being distant from the former point one mile and a quarter, and about one mile from the ridge. The ascent of the knob is very steep, save on the side to the right looking south, where the ground gradually sloping from the summit makes a dip or gorge, and rises on the other side to nearly the same height as the knob. From this point running off in a southwestern direction for over one-half of a mile, turning to the right, is a rough rocky ridge, which is covered with a sparse growth of timber.

Along the crest of this ridge the enemy had made breastworks of logs and stone and a line of rifle-pits. Along the base of Orchard Knob, on the side towards Chattanooga, was another line of rifle-pits which extended beyond the knob, on our left, for more than a mile, following the curvature of Citico creek ; and yet, to the left of its termination, and on the other side of the creek, ran two additional and parallel lines. A heavy belt of timber, ranging from one-quarter to three-quarters of a mile in width, lay between our lines and Orchard Knob, covering the front of the knob and the line of the ridge, and serving the enemy as a mask for his position and movements. Between this timber and Chattanooga were open fields, some of which, being low and swampy, were difficult to cross with troops. Through them runs the Atlantic and Western railroad, which, as it approaches the river, bends towards the north end of Mission ridge, where it passes through the tunnel.

The foregoing is a brief sketch of the ground and points over which and in the direction of which I was ordered to make a reconnoissance. It would be necessary to give a more complete description of such, to fully explain the movements of my troops that were made in obedience to this order. As such cannot be given in this brief report, I will forward a map of the topography of the country, to be attached hereto, and for reference, as soon as it can be procured.

In order to carry out the instructions of Major General Thomas, I directed Brigadier General Wood, commanding the third division, to prepare for an ad-

vance by forming his troops in the open field at the base of the slope of Fort Wood, and without the lines of our rifle-pits; and at the same time I directed Major General Sheridan, commanding the second division, to hold his troops within supporting distance on the right of General Wood, posting them along the line of the Atlantic and Western railroad, with his right resting opposite Lunette Palmer. The positions indicated were promptly taken by these two divisions at noonday, with no attempts at concealment or surprise, and in plain view of the enemy, who watched them from Mission ridge and Orchard Knob. The troops moved into line and position with such regularity and precision as to present the appearance of a formation for review or parade, and the enemy's pickets, but a few hundred feet off, were apparently awaiting a display or military pageant when our skirmish line advanced and opened fire.

At half past one o'clock p. m. I directed General Wood to advance. In a few moments his troops having passed through the open fields engaged the enemy in the woods, and drove them back to their rifle-pits. The resistance here met with, especially in front of Hazen's brigade, where we sustained the heaviest loss, was very stubborn, and the enemy was only driven back when his works were cleared by the bayonet. In this dash, which was quick and gallant, we lost one hundred and twenty-five officers and men, killed and wounded, and by it we gained Orchard Knob and the ridge to its right, at the same time capturing many prisoners. The twenty-third Alabama infantry, almost entire, with the regimental colors, was captured.

As soon as General Wood had occupied the knob and ridge, I directed Major General Sheridan to advance his division, and it was placed in position in echelon on the right of General Wood, the two divisions forming a continuous line of battle resting on the rising ground lying almost parallel with Mission ridge, and sweeping on the extreme right around towards our chain of defensive works at Chattanooga. The reconnoissance was a complete success. In making it we had not only obtained the desired information, but had also successfully attacked the enemy and had driven him from a strong and important position.

Orchard Knob and the ridge to its right looked into the long line of rifle-pits at the base of Mission ridge, which were held by the enemy in force, and they also afforded points of observation upon movements that the enemy might make through the valley towards the scene of Major General Sherman's operations. My command now remained in position awaiting further orders. I reported our success and the position and condition of the enemy in our front to Major General Thomas, commanding the department of the Cumberland, and at 4 o'clock p. m. I received a despatch from him instructing me to hold and strengthen my position, and stating that Major General Howard's command was taking position on my left. In accordance with these instructions, a rude line of breastworks was thrown up along my front during the evening, and an epaulement for a six-gun battery was constructed on the knob, in which Bridges's battery of four three-inch Rodman guns and two Napoleons was placed before morning.

Immediately after receiving the above instructions I observed from Orchard Knob Major General Howard was meeting with such resistance from the enemy in the double line of rifle-pits to the left of our position, and on the opposite side of Citico creek, as to prevent him from making any further advance, or from gaining possession of them. I therefore ordered Brigadier General Beatty, commanding third brigade third division, to send two regiments through the woods as quietly as possible to surprise the party of the enemy and to attack them in flank. The regiments sent by him for this purpose, the nineteenth Ohio, commanded by Colonel Manderson, and the ninth Kentucky infantry, commanded by Colonel Cram, came upon the enemy suddenly, attacked them in flank and drove them back toward Mission ridge. The rifle-pits, however, not having been taken possession of by the troops in their front, were occupied by the enemy during the night, but they were again cleared in a similar

manner by the same two regiments after daylight the next morning, and for some reason unknown to me were not even then occupied by the troops of the 11th corps. On the 24th day of November the two brigades of the first division of this corps, under command of Brigadier General Cruft, were, with Major General Hooker, engaged in his splendid assault upon Lookout mountain. Copies of the official reports of Brigadier General Cruft and of his brigade and regimental commanders have been forwarded to me. The original reports have been forwarded to Major General Hooker. To these and to the report of Major General Hooker I refer for a full statement of the conduct of my troops on Lookout mountain. It may be allowed me, however, as their commanding officer, to thank them for their conspicuous gallantry; for the important service they rendered, and for the hearty support which they gave to Major General Hooker on that memorable day.

During the night of November 23 Major General Sheridan's and Brigadier General Wood's commands were engaged in strengthening their positions. All of the next day they remained in line watching the enemy in front and awaiting orders. No movement was made by them during the day, and the quiet of this part of our lines was only broken by an occasional exchange of shots between Bridge's battery on the knob and the enemy's batteries on Mission ridge. At 6 o'clock p. m. I received a despatch, of which the following is a copy:

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND.

"General GRANGER:

"The general commanding the department directs that you have everything ready for an offensive movement early to-morrow morning.

"J. J. REYNOLDS,

*"Chief of Staff."*

One mile in front of our position and almost parallel with it was Mission ridge, a line or "back-bone" of rugged hills running from a point about four miles northeast of Chattanooga, where it juts towards the Tennessee river in a southwesterly direction until it dips into the valley at Rossville, four miles south of Chattanooga. It is of almost a uniform height along the part mentioned, rising about five hundred feet above the valley that lies at its base. On the side looking toward Chattanooga it presents a bare, rough, and broken surface, marked by gullies and ravines. This mountain barrier, even as nature planted it, was a most formidable fortress. The commander who held it might be warranted in the conclusion that troops could not storm it. But strengthened as it was by the enemy, with a line of heavy breastworks running along its base, with two additional lines of rifle-pits, one partly girdling it midway up, and the other fringing its crest, and with empanelments on the summit for fifty guns, it could well be deemed impregnable. Lying between Mission ridge and Orchard Knob to the right is a broad, wooded valley extending on the right to the southwestern end of the ridge, while to the left it extends beyond Orchard Knob, stretching towards the river and Chattanooga. From the end of the ridge last mentioned this valley sweeps around into the Chattanooga plain; that part of it, though, is almost altogether cleared of timber, leaving open ground for the most part between Mission ridge and the position held by Major General Sheridan's division. In front of Mission ridge the enemy had cleared away the timber for a distance of from three to five hundred yards, so as to leave no obstructions to a direct and enfilading fire from them.

During the night of November 24 the enemy withdrew from Lookout mountain and from Chattanooga valley, and commenced to mass his whole force upon Mission ridge. At daylight the next morning, November 25, Major General Sherman, having crossed the Tennessee river at the designated point, gained possession of the northern end of the ridge near the railroad tunnel. Long

columns of the enemy could be seen before sunrise moving towards that point, and it was not late in the day before their guns, with those of General Sherman briskly replying, were heard opening the battle. For hours my command, from behind their breastworks, anxiously and impatiently watched this struggle of their brothers-in-arms away off to their left on the northern end of the ridge. They saw these veterans from Vicksburg coming to their relief and engaging the same enemy who had beleaguered them for nine long weeks, holding them in their defensive works by strong lines of circumvallation that rested upon Look-out mountain and Mission ridge and in the Chattanooga valley, and that stretched like an iron crescent from the river on their right to the river on their left. As the day wore on, their impatience of restraint gathered force, and their desire to advance became almost uncontrollable. At last came the orders to move.

General Sherman was unable to make any progress in moving along the ridge during the day, as the enemy had massed in his front; therefore, in order to relieve him I was ordered to make a demonstration upon the works of the enemy directly in my front, at the base of Mission ridge. I accordingly directed Major General Sheridan and Brigadier General Wood to advance their divisions at a given signal, moving directly forward simultaneously and briskly to attack the enemy, and, driving him from his rifle-pits, to take possession of them. At twenty minutes before 4 o'clock p. m. six guns, the signal agreed upon, were fired in rapid succession, and before the smoke had cleared away these two divisions, Sheridan on the right and Wood on the left, had cleared the breastworks that had sheltered them for two days, and were moving forward. They were formed in the following order: first, a double line of skirmishers that covered the troops behind; then the line of battle by brigades, commencing on the extreme right with Colonel Sherman's brigade, then Colonel Harker's, then Brigadier General Wagner's, then Brigadier General Hazen's, then Brigadier General Willick's, and next, on the extreme left, Brigadier General Beatty's. Following this line were the reserves in mass.

It pleases me to report that scarcely a straggler could be seen as this magnificent line, stretching one mile from end to end, swept through the valley up to the assault. At the moment of the advance of these troops Mission ridge blazed with the fire from the batteries which lined its summit. Not less than fifty guns opened at once, throwing a terrible shower of shot and shell. The enemy now taking the alarm, commenced to move troops from both extremities of the ridge for the purpose of filling up the ranks below and around these batteries. In the mean time, the troops holding the woods were driven back to the works at the base of the ridge, their pursuers rapidly following. Here they halted and made a stout resistance, but our troops, by an impetuous assault, broke this line in several places; then, scaling the breastworks at these points, opened a flank and reserve fire upon them, which, throwing them into confusion, caused their precipitate flight. Many prisoners were left in our hands, and we captured a large number of small-arms.

My orders had now been fully and successfully carried out, but not enough had been done to satisfy the brave troops who had accomplished so much. Although the batteries on the ridge, at short range, by direct and enfilading fire, were still pouring down upon them a shower of iron, and the musketry from the hillsides were thinning their ranks, they dashed over the breastworks, through the rifle-pits, and started up the ridge. They started without orders. Along the whole line of both divisions, from right to left and from left to right, simultaneously and with one accord, animated with one spirit, and with heroic courage, eagerly they rushed forward to a danger before which the bravest, marching under orders, might tremble. Officers caught the enthusiasm of the men, and the men in turn were cheered by the officers. Each regiment tried to surpass the other in fighting its way up a hill that would try those of stout

limb and strong lungs to climb, and each tried first to plant its flag on the summit. Above these men were an additional line of rifle-pits filled with troops. What was on the summit of the ridge they knew not, and did not stop to inquire. The enemy was before them; to know that was to know sufficient. At several points along the line my troops were ascending the hill and gaining positions less exposed to the enemy's artillery fire, though more exposed to the fire of the musketry. Seeing this, I sent my assistant adjutant general to inquire, first of General Wood and then of General Sheridan, whether the troops had been ordered up the ridge by them, and to instruct them to take the ridge if possible. In reply to this, General Wood told him that the men had started without orders, and that he could take it if he could be supported. In the mean time an aide-de-camp from General Sheridan had reported to me that the general wished to know whether the orders that had been given to take the rifle-pits "meant those at the base of the ridge or those on top." My reply was that the order had been to take those at the base. Conceiving this to be an order to fall back to those rifle-pits, and on his way to General Sheridan, so reporting it to General Wagner, commanding second brigade of Sheridan's division, this brigade was withdrawn from a position which it had gained on the side of the ridge to the rifle-pits which were being raked by the enemy's artillery, and from this point, starting again under a terrible fire, made the ascent of the ridge. My assistant adjutant general, on his way to General Sheridan, reported to me General Wood's reply, but, by my instructions, went no further with the message which I had given him, as I had already sent Captain Avery, my aide-de-camp, directly to Major General Sheridan, instructing him to go ahead and take the ridge if he could. I had also, in the mean time, sent all the rest of my staff officers, some of them to deliver similar messages to Major General Sheridan and Brigadier General Wood, fearing the first message might not get through, and others to order up the reserves and every man that remained behind to the support of the troops starting up the ridge. Brigadier General Johnson's division of the 14th army corps was now ordered up to the support of Major General Sheridan, while Brigadier General Baird's division of the same corps was pushed up to the support of Brigadier General Wood on the left. Through the shower of musket shot that came from above, climbing up the ridge over rocks and felled timber, my command marched upward. In just one hour from the time of leaving Orchard Knob it was driving the enemy from his last line of breastworks and rifle-pits, and capturing his batteries. As soon as the enemy had been driven from the summit of the ridge in front of Major General Sheridan, he fled down its southern slope, retreating towards Chickamauga creek. General Sheridan promptly followed them, moving with two brigades of his division (Brigadier General Wagner's and Colonel Harker's) down the road leading to Chickamauga station. He had pursued but one mile when, as night was approaching, he came up with a large body of troops posted, with eight pieces of artillery, in a strong position on a high ridge. Our men, elated with their success thus far, stopped not at this obstacle, but boldly pushing up to the enemy's line, opened a vigorous fire of musketry and then made a gallant assault, which caused him to fly. Two guns and part of the enemy's wagon train were here captured.

It was now night, and as the troops were almost exhausted by the fatigues of the day, they were halted on this ridge for the purpose of taking a short rest before continuing the pursuit.

Brigadier General Wood had just driven the enemy from his front, on the summit of the ridge, when I observed a large force of the enemy coming from that part of the hill occupied by Major General Sherman, and moving in the direction of our left flank. Before General Wood could get his troops in shape to meet them, Brigadier General Baird opportunely arrived with his division and went into position on our left. When the enemy came up a sharp contest here commenced, which afterwards lasted until dark. After the 17th Kentucky infantry had wheeled to the left and fired a few volleys into the enemy's



flank, thereby immediately relieving Baird's right, I directed General Wood to form his division on the ground it then occupied for the purpose of resting his men and getting them also ready for the anticipated pursuit of the enemy.

Two miles and a half straight forward from the ridge held by General Wagner and Colonel Harker at dark is Chickamauga creek. From this point it runs towards the north end of Mission ridge, which was held by Major General Sherman, then, sweeping around the same, it flows in a northwestern direction for a short distance, and empties into the Tennessee river. Taking the north end of Mission ridge as the apex, and then Ridge and Chickamauga creeks as sides, we have an acute triangle. It was my design, as soon as the troops were sufficiently rested, to move, and, as soon as I could procure guides, to push Sheridan's division, supported by Wood's, down Moore's road, and, if possible, get possession of the crossing of Chickamauga creek, then, swinging my column, to move towards the north end of Mission ridge. By this movement I expected to capture many prisoners, together with wagon trains and artillery that could not get over the creek in time to be saved by the enemy. The night was favorable for this movement, as the moon shone clear and bright.

At 7 $\frac{1}{4}$  p. m. I sent a despatch to Major General Thomas, informing him that I thought we could cut off a large number of the enemy by making a bold dash upon the Chickamauga, moving down the roads that led from our front, and that I was in readiness for any disposition that he might be pleased to make.

Being, to my great disappointment, unable to procure guides acquainted with the country between the ridge and the creek, I was not able to commence the movement until midnight, so that by the time General Sheridan reached the creek the rear guard of the enemy was just crossing. The enemy was so closely pursued, however, that he was obliged to burn his pontoon bridge before all of his forces could cross the creek, leaving several hundred of them to fall into our hands as prisoners. We also captured a large number of wagons loaded with quartermasters' supplies, together with caissons, limbers, small-arms, artillery, ammunition, &c.

In accordance with orders received from Major General Thomas, I withdrew the troops from this pursuit before daylight to make preparations to start on forced marches for the relief of Major General Burnside, at Knoxville.

The bold and successful attempt to storm Mission ridge, the result that followed, the short time consumed in beating back the enemy, and the fruits of the victory, were such as to render this one of the most remarkable battles of the age.

The ridge was taken after a hard struggle, and those who looked on from below were unable to tell which division or what regiment first reached its summit, for along my whole line many regiments appeared to dash over the breast-works on the crest at the same moment.

Although it took but one hour to gain the Ridge, my command lost 20.21 per cent. of the force engaged in killed and wounded. For particulars of the casualties I refer to the tabular statement of the same, herewith filed.

We captured thirty-one pieces of artillery and three thousand eight hundred and twelve prisoners. General Sheridan reports 1,762 prisoners taken by his division, for whom he obtained receipts, and General Wood reports 2,050 taken by his division, for over one thousand of whom he also obtained receipts. I do not hesitate to state that the enemy in his flight lost over five thousand stand of small-arms. In many places the ground was covered with them; we passed by without gathering them up, as we were pursuing and fighting the enemy until after dark, and as my command was recalled during the night for the purpose of marching to Knoxville.

For an account of the captures made by the two brigades of my 1st division

on Lookout mountain, and for a statement of their losses, I refer to the official reports of Brigadier General Cruft, forwarded to Major General Hooker.

Were I to name all who in this most gallant feat of arms won credit, I must needs call the roster and rolls of my command; sufficient be it then in this place that I refer for the names of officers and men worthy of special mention to the reports of their immediate commanders.

To Major General Philip H. Sheridan, conspicuous for his conduct and gallantry on every battle-field where he has been engaged, and not less so upon this one, to Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood, the tried and trusty soldier, who here added a new glory to his enviable record, to Brigadier Generals Willich and Hazen and Wagner, and Samuel Beatty, and to Colonels Harker and Sherman, commanding brigades, whose names will be heard wherever is told the story of the marching and fighting of this army, to the regimental and company officers, and to the private soldiers in the ranks, not merely my own acknowledgments, but those of the whole country are due.

To all of the members of my staff for rendering me important service in carrying despatches and orders over the hottest part of the field during the battle, and for promptly and efficiently performing all other duties required of them, I offer my sincere thanks.

G. GRANGER,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Brigadier General W. D. WHIPPLE,  
*Chief of Staff, D. C.*

#### BATTLE OF MISSION RIDGE.

*Statement of killed, wounded, and missing in the second division, 4th army corps, commanded by Major General P. H. Sheridan; and in the third division, 4th army corps, commanded by Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood.*

Command.	Commander.	Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		Aggregate.
		Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Total.	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Total.	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Total.	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	
1st brig., 2d division..	Colonel Sherman...	6	26	32	27	239	266	.....	.....	.....	32	266	298
2d brig., 2d division..	Brig. Gen. Wagner..	2	70	72	50	586	636	.....	2	2	52	658	710
3d brig., 2d division..	Colonel Harker....	4	23	27	34	235	269	.....	.....	.....	38	258	296
Total 2d division...	.....	12	119	131	111	1,060	1,171	.....	2	2	123	1,181	1,304
1st brig., 3d division..	Brig. Gen. Willich..	7	46	53	17	267	284	.....	.....	.....	24	313	337
2d brig., 3d division..	Brig. Gen. Hazen...	7	86	93	30	399	429	.....	.....	.....	37	485	522
3d brig., 3d division..	Brig. Gen. Beatty..	2	12	14	12	148	160	.....	.....	.....	14	160	174
Total 3d division...	.....	16	144	160	59	814	873	.....	.....	.....	75	958	1,033
Total 2d & 3d divisions.....	.....	28	263	291	170	1,874	2,044	.....	2	2	198	2,139	2,337

Respectfully submitted,

G. GRANGER, *Major Gen., Commanding 4th Army Corps.*

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG, *Brevet Major and A. D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS 11TH CORPS,  
*Lookout Valley, Tenn., December 18, 1863.*

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report upon the operations of this corps during the battle of Chattanooga and during the march that followed until its return to camp.

In accordance with instructions received through your headquarters, the infantry, with three batteries, left this point at 1 p. m., November 22d ultimo.

The remaining two batteries (Waderich's battery, I, first New York, and Heckman's, K, first Ohio,) were left behind and established under General Hooker's directions. They participated to some extent in the glorious work of getting possession of Lookout mountain.

My original instructions contemplated placing the 11th corps in reserve on the peninsula between the bridges of Brown's ferry and Chattanooga, in order to act with General Thomas, at Chattanooga, or with General Sherman, as the exigencies of the battle should determine. Subsequent instructions from your headquarters, dated November 22, directed me to cross the pontoon bridge at Brown's ferry at 2 p. m. of that day, and move thence to Chattanooga direct.

This change, as I understand, was based on the report of the chief engineer of the department that it was practicable to re-enforce Sherman along the south bank of the Tennessee without trusting to the treacherous pontoons.

The north bank of the river as high and intermediate between the Chattanooga bridge and the point three (3) miles above, selected for Sherman's crossing, is a prominent knoll in the river bank, which overlooks the broad interval on the other shore, spread out between the heights of Chattanooga and Mission ridge.

The ridge springs from the interval land between the Chickamauga and the Tennessee, and stretches off for miles in a southwesterly direction, leaving the Chickamauga on the left. I sent a battery (Wheeler's, thirteenth New York) to the knoll described. He commanded all the low ground as far as his guns could reach, and in conjunction with Fort Wood, situated on the south bank and near to Chattanooga, prevented any large force from occupying such points as might separate Sherman from the main body. My remaining force, about six thousand strong, moved over the bridge into Chattanooga, and took post to the right of Fort Wood. The rebel signal officer's report from Lookout, read by one of our officers, was that a large force, apparently a corps, had passed into Chattanooga. This, taken in connexion with the fact that General Sherman's troops had been and were still passing along Lookout valley, now in plain view and now hidden by hills, makes it probable that Bragg took my force for a part of Sherman's, and therefore was in doubt as to the principal point of attack, if, indeed, he believed yet that any attack at all was intended.

Bad roads, and perhaps other unforeseen hinderances, delayed the march of the troops that were to operate on our left, so that Sunday night, November 22, the general movement intended for the morrow was postponed. I received this order direct from General Thomas and also through your headquarters. My command remained during the night as posted.

Monday, November 23, deserters reported that the enemy intended to retreat, and some deserted camps visible from Fort Wood gave rise to the rumor that the retreat had begun. During the morning a reconnoissance was ordered, General Granger's corps being selected to make the movement and mine held in readiness for support.

At 1 p. m. General Granger deployed to the east and south of Fort Wood, facing toward Mission ridge. The enemy on the ridge and on the few high intermediate points were gazing on the magnificent display, and apparently without thinking that so fine a parade without any attempt at concealment was a demonstration against them. As soon as formed, the lines moved briskly forward, driving in the enemy's outposts and taking Orchard Knob, a small hill, little more than half-way to the ridge and one mile south from the Tennessee. The enemy had here a small epaulement for two guns and rifle pits. During this operation I had, by General Thomas's direction, sent a battery (company A, fourth regulars) to the next height, (Brush Hill,) southeast of Fort Wood, nearly opposite the centre of Granger's line. Afterwards, during the battle, the battery was moved forward to Sheridan's front line, on Granger's right, having

been replaced by Dilger's, company I, first Ohio. Lieutenant Mickle, commanding the regular battery, was highly complimented for good firing. General Grant determined to hold Orchard Knob. A creek, the Citico, having two small branches, bends around in the low ground, its general direction northwest, and flows into the Tennessee half a mile north of Fort Wood. The western branch passes near Orchard Knob. I was directed to move up to this creek, covering the approaches to Granger's left. The land near the creek was for the most part covered with woods. Major General Schurz, with his division of infantry, was ordered to take the right of this line, and General Steinwehr, with his division, the left. The two divisions were deployed with great promptitude. The skirmishers were more or less engaged as they advanced along the entire line, and quite briskly in Steinwehr's division. The latter had (mainly in the thirty-third New Jersey, here for the first time engaged, and with credit) three killed and about twenty wounded. General Schurz's, one killed and twelve wounded. The enemy was forced back beyond the creek, and the line occupied as directed. This ended the engagement of the first day of the battle. The troops threw up slight breastworks during the night and next morning. From the map it will be noticed that the Atlanta railroad, passing south of Fort Wood, runs northeast, nearly parallel with the river. The East Tennessee railroad, passing north of Fort Wood, crosses the other before entering the tunnel through Mission ridge. My line cut both of these woods, and its left rested just across the Citico, on the river. At 9 a. m. of the 24th, General Steinwehr, by my direction, moved the seventy-third Ohio regiment across the Citico, near its mouth, which, deploying nearly at right angles to the general line, handsomely cleared our immediate front as far as the East Tennessee railroad. As there was difficulty in recrossing the creek, the regiment was halted in this position and served as a cover to a movement that shortly took place.

General Sherman had now effected a crossing of the Tennessee just below the mouth of South Chickamauga. I was directed to open communication with him by a brigade. General Steinwehr detailed Colonel Buschbeck's, which I accompanied in person, with a small escort of cavalry. Some skirmishing occurred on our right, and thinking we might meet resistance from that quarter, Krizanowski's brigade of General Schurz's division was brought forward as a support. Very little opposition being made, the junction with Sherman was effected just as he was placing the last boat of the bridge. Already two of his divisions had been thrown over in boats and had covered their bridge by a line of breastworks. From this place to the north end of Mission ridge the distance is a mile and a half, the ground mostly low and undulating. The general pointed out the hill he should first attempt to secure. He requested me to allow Colonel Buschbeck's brigade to remain and skirmish on his right, while he advanced toward the ridge. The brigade was ordered to remain; I then returned to my corps by the route we had come. Believing Colonel Krizanowski could take care of his brigade, situated as he was under the cover of Wheeler's guns from the opposite shore, I concluded to leave him on the northeast side of the Citico to keep open the communication along the river with Buschbeck's brigade. During this march and while returning heavy cannonading was heard in the direction of Lookout mountain, and at 5.20 p. m. we were cheered with the news that General Hooker had carried the heights and secured the eastern slope of the mountain. Dilger's Ohio battery had been sent to the Chattanooga creek, and fired effectively, preventing a movement of the enemy between Hooker and Palmer, and covering the building of a pontoon bridge across the creek.

Early in the morning of the 25th I issued an order to my divisions, in accordance with General Thomas's instructions, to conform to the movements of General Sherman as he moved forward along the ridge. I was to advance and complete my connexion with him. In order to effect this, after hearing that he

had reached the tunnel of the East Tennessee railroad, I directed General Steinwehr to push forward his left till it rested on this railroad, which he accomplished with very little opposition. During the whole morning, from daylight, the enemy were seen marching along the crest of Mission ridge toward General Steinwehr's position.

At 9.45 a. m. an order was received by me to march towards General Sherman, looking out well for my right flank. An aide from General Grant urged me to hasten, as General Sherman needed re-enforcements.

At 10.45 a. m. my head of column arrived at the pontoon bridge, where I halted and massed my troops, starting to report in person to General Sherman. He sent me the order through Lieutenant Colonel Meysenburg, of my staff, and afterwards repeated it to me, to take post on his left, closing a space that had just been left vacant by troops that had been pushed further to the right in support of the main attack along the ridge.

The corps was placed as directed, its left resting on Chickamauga creek, near Boyce's station, and its front well covered by a good line of skirmishers. The right rested high up the ridge on a work constructed and occupied by a part of General Blair's corps. Here again my troops covered themselves with breast-works. The report that General Sherman had reached the tunnel was premature. Instead of finding a continued ridge of land, as one would suppose looking from Chattanooga, that portion of Mission ridge north of the East Tennessee railroad is broken into transverse ridges with deep ravines between them.

The enemy's troops had possession of the first ridge or hill north of the Tennessee on my arrival, and a fierce contest was going on between them and the attacking party for its possession.

Colonel Buschbeck's brigade, or rather a part of it, as General Steinwehr had detained two of his regiments with him, was bearing a part in this action. Having been assigned to General Ewing, this brigade went into action with that of Colonel Loomis of Ewing's division. The conduct of the twenty-seventh Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant Colonel McAloon, was most highly complimented.

The main attack was along the crest of the ridge, and Colonel Loomis was trying to support it by a movement from the front. McAloon actually led his regiment up that steep acclivity, five or six hundred feet high, under a terrific fire of grape and musketry, and staid there until he was mortally wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Taft behaved with equal intrepidity with the seventy-third Pennsylvania, until he was killed. His troops drove the enemy from some buildings and held them. Subsequently, after his death, some of his company commanders culpably allowed themselves and many of their men to be taken by the enemy. It is alleged, in excuse for them, they had exhausted their ammunition; that Colonel Loomis left their flank exposed and their position was turned. General Sherman did not succeed in dislodging the enemy, but these vigorous assaults served to accumulate against us a heavy force and thus weakened other portions of the enemy's line.

It is due to the true-hearted men who nobly sacrificed their lives at this point, or who are now suffering from painful wounds, that their names and their regiments should not be overlooked. They contributed all they could to the grand result. News arrived in the evening that General Thomas had carried Mission ridge by direct assault, that General Hooker had moved to Rossville and got upon the enemy's left flank, and that the enemy was in full retreat.

The enemy left our front during the night. The battle of Chattanooga was over and it was a success. The news spread like wild-fire and the Chickamauga hills echoed with our soldiers' victorious cheers. By direction of General Sherman, about 5 a. m. of the 26th, the corps crossed the Chickamauga near its mouth by a pontoon bridge already there and proceeded towards Chickamauga station, ascending the creek. At 7 a. m. we overtook Davis's division that

crossed in the night; the fog was so dense that you could not discern a horse at a hundred yards.

General Davis reported to me on my arrival as the senior officer. I desired him to keep the lead and make his own dispositions. We pushed forward carefully till the fog cleared away, being delayed somewhat by reports that the enemy was moving in force towards our left. We reached Chickamauga station at 12 m., Davis's advance skirmishing with the enemy. Two siege guns, about a thousand bushels of corn, ten pontoons, and considerable flour were captured here, large quantities of flour and corn were burning when we arrived. General Sherman joined us at this point, and the pursuit was continued. Just before dark Davis's advance came upon the enemy's rear guard, posted in the further edge of a small opening in a forest, some three miles this side of Greysville. Two brigades were deployed and soon succeeded in dislodging and driving this force. In the mean time I had brought up my command and posted Steinwehr's division on Davis's right, and massed Schurz's division in reserve. We encamped at this point.

November 27, march resumed at 6 a. m. At Greysville I met Generals Palmer and Sherman, and learned that General Hooker's column was already on the way to Ringgold. I was directed to move on the north side of the Chickamauga, and, if possible, reach the railroad between Dalton and Cleveland. I found that the best practicable route on that side of the creek led through Parker's gap, so that I marched thither. After passing the gap, I detached two brigades, one from General Steinwehr, or rather from Colonel Buschbeck's, (General Steinwehr, owing to sickness, having left us at Greysville,) and another (Hecker's) from General Schurz. These brigades and a section of Dilger's battery, under command of Colonel Orland Smith, marched on to the railroad. My aide-de-camp, Major C. W. Howard, with a squad of cavalry, accompanied the expedition. The remainder of Schurz's division (Tyndale's and Krizanowski's brigades) were moved forward two miles, the better to support Colonel Smith, if required. Colonel Smith's orders were to proceed to Red Clay, destroy as much as we could of the railroad, and, if possible, return the same night. This work was done, and well done. A rebel officer, having despatches from Kelley's cavalry division at Cleveland to Bragg, and a few other prisoners were captured. Some three miles of railroad track were torn up, the sleepers burnt, and the rails bent by the fire. Three cars and the depot building were destroyed. The brigades then returned to Parker's gap, reporting to their commands between 12 and 1 at night. They had made a continuous march of twenty-seven (27) miles, besides this extra work at the railroad. This operation prevented for the present the possibility of Longstreet joining Bragg by railroad, and it equally prevented the passage of any re-enforcements from Bragg to Longstreet.

The pursuit of the enemy had now ended. We had in possession about 100 prisoners gathered on the march. The next morning the order was issued that the corps should rest one day, and afterwards return to Chattanooga. That afternoon General Sherman made known to me that General Grant had instructed him to move to the Hiawassee, to operate against Longstreet. He wanted his entire column, and issued orders to me accordingly, designating the route I should take. The rest of the day and night was therefore spent in preparation.

Wagons belonging to the different brigades were on the road, many of them stuck in the mud, all the way from Parker's gap to the mouth of the Chickamauga. As the command was short of rations, the wagons had to be brought up before the next morning. By extraordinary exertions this was done, and three days' rations distributed.

One battery and all of the wagons, except the ammunition, were sent back to Chattanooga. November 29 the corps marched from Parker's gap to Cleveland, twenty miles. A company of sixty (60) rebel cavalry, in Cleveland and

its immediate vicinity, escaped towards Dalton as we approached. The rebel provost marshal, Captain Henly, was captured.

November 30, the corps marched to Charleston on the Hiawassee. On learning of our approach a company of rebel cavalry, about three (300) hundred infantry, and several wagons, left towards Athens. We found the pontoon bridge broken, swung around, and many of the boats stove, and others rapidly floating down stream, the railroad bridge partially destroyed, the stringers having been sawed off and two of the trestles thrown down. A detachment of rebels on the opposite bank were trying to destroy three cars loaded with stores, whereupon Wheeler, with a section of his battery, opened fire upon them and drove them off. From these cars we subsequently obtained some two days' rations of flour and seven or eight days' of salt and a quantity of spikes, which came in play in repairing the bridge. Several boats were rescued by Colonel Orland Smith, by which he crossed a regiment immediately. During the rest of the day and the following night the railroad bridge was repaired, planked over, and rendered passable for artillery and wagons.

December 1, the crossing commenced at 5 a. m. We arrived at Athens by 4 p. m., and encamped about two miles beyond; march for the day fourteen (14) miles. Here we heard the report that Longstreet had attacked Burnside, at Knoxville, and had been repulsed on Sunday, November 29.

December 2, the corps leaves camp at 5½ a. m. for Philadelphia and Loudon. About three (3) miles this side of Sweetwater, the advance came upon a detachment of the enemy's cavalry. As soon as the infantry skirmishers approached within musket range, the cavalry would leave. We kept them in sight till we arrived at Sweetwater, at which place we were directed by Major General Sherman to make a halt in order to allow Colonel Long, with his cavalry, to pass us. This small brigade of cavalry was instructed to move forward and make a dash into Loudon, with a view to save the enemy's pontoon bridge and stores at that point. I was directed to follow Colonel Long and give him support, in case he needed it. We marched to within about three miles of Loudon, having made that day twenty-three (23) miles, when it became dark. The roads were too bad and the command too weary to proceed further that night. A section of Wheeler's battery was sent forward to Colonel Long, at his request.

December 3, we break camp at 4 a. m., and march for Loudon; Colonel Long's cavalry was about two miles from town. His advance picket not nearer than one mile. On the approach the evening before, the enemy had opened upon him with artillery, so that he deemed it prudent not to make the dash.

On entering the town we found that the rebel General Vaughn's command, consisting of a small brigade of infantry, artillery, and a detachment of cavalry, had evacuated, having destroyed from sixty to seventy-five cars, containing supplies of commissary stores, clothing, and ammunition, three locomotives, and partly their pontoon bridge. The railroad bridge at Loudon, previously burnt, had not been rebuilt. The stone piers were standing. The main channel of the Tennessee, in between the Loudon shore and the first pier, we found completely filled with the rubbish of locomotives, cars, and their contents, which had been set on fire before being run into the river. Notwithstanding this wholesale destruction of property, there were distributed among the inhabitants and stored in warehouses a sufficient quantity of rebel provisions to feed my command for three days, after leaving sufficient for the rebel wounded, captured in hospital at Loudon, about seventy-five in number. These were a part of Longstreet's wounded from his unsuccessful assault at Knoxville on the Sunday previous.

There were two redoubts upon the heights, on the west side of Loudon, one of which was located upon a position of natural strength, and made to face southward; the other was nearer the river, and facing towards it. One of my batteries was located in the latter, and on the appearance of some squads of rebel

cavalry upon the opposite bank opened fire. Considerable artillery firing was allowed, in accordance with instructions, in the hope that the guns might be heard by General Burnside, at Knoxville, and he thus be made aware of the approach of re-enforcements. Off against the redoubts the river makes a sudden bend forming a peninsula. The road leading to the rebel pontoon bridge passed across this peninsula, making the bridge about three-quarters of a mile from town by land, and six by water.

One incident occurred at Loudon which made a strong impression upon my mind. Along the entire route, from Parker's gap to Loudon, we were cheered by the most lively demonstrations of loyalty on the part of the inhabitants. Therefore we never lacked for information as to roads, bridges, fords, location of the enemy, &c. But here a man, who had been a major in the rebel service and resigned, came to me, and, without laying any claim to loyalty, stated that he had drifted with the current, but since our recent victory was satisfied that Tennessee would resume her place in the Union. He gave me information so accurate that I was able to sketch the works at Knoxville, and the enemy's position. He also gave me the enemy's strength, with the names of the officers commanding at different points, all of which proved to be substantially correct.

The next day Colonel Hecker, commanding third brigade third division, sent a regiment across the Tennessee, which skirmished with the enemy's cavalry, and took possession of four rifled guns which General Vaughn had been compelled to abandon. They also captured a rebel flag.

I must not omit to mention about thirty rebel wagons that the enemy has partially destroyed by cutting the spokes of the wheels. In anticipation of crossing the Little Tennessee, at Davis's ford, I set a detachment to work to repair these wagons sufficiently to enable their transportation to the ford, six miles, and to construct from them a bridge suitable for infantry. I found that there were not enough wagons to stretch across the river, a distance of upwards of seven hundred and fifty (750) feet, and therefore made movable trestles to complete the bridge. It had been hitherto understood that my command was to march to Morgantown to cross a bridge in the process of construction by General Blair, my corps to cross in rear of General Blair. Finding that this would not only occasion a loss of time, but greatly increase the distance to be marched by my command, I obtained permission from General Sherman to make the bridge, as indicated, at Davis's ford. The captured wagons were loaded with plank from the depot, and by 6 p. m. the bridge was commenced. Colonel Boughton, with his regiment, one hundred and forty-third New York volunteers, cheerfully undertook the work. Other plank were procured from neighboring barns, the loyal people not only cheerfully consenting, but lending a helping hand in the work.

While at Loudon we heard of a raid in our rear upon Charleston by rebel cavalry. Nothing reliable from Burnside yet. My corps marched at 10 p. m., and reached Davis's ford in time to begin the crossing at daylight. The bridge thrown obliquely across, more than 1,000 feet long, was completed in season, two-thirds or more made of wagons, with connecting planks, the remainder of light trestle-work. The horses, artillery, and wagons, crossed simultaneously by this ford. While at Loudon an order was received from General Sherman announcing that his army would be commanded as follows: The right wing, General F. Blair; centre, Major General Gordon Granger; left wing by myself; and that the different commanders would act independently, and on the offensive, marching to the support of each other at the sound of the guns. My corps reached Louisville, Tennessee, by dark, having made above twenty (20) miles.

At United we learned that a courier, passing that morning with despatches from General Burnside, had said that Longstreet was beginning his retreat. This was the first positive information of the fact received by me.

At Louisville I saw a boy just from Knoxville, who said Longstreet was in



full retreat. This boy, son of a loyal citizen, had carried through to General Burnside despatches, which his father, then with Colonel Bird at Kingston, had succeeded, with the help of a sister, in forwarding from the latter place. The sister travelled some eighteen miles, through a country occupied by the enemy, and crossed the Tennessee in the night. We learned that Longstreet's retreat commenced the day before, and that there had been some rebel cavalry hovering about Louisville until the day of our arrival.

My command was allowed to rest the following day. Sunday, December 6, in person, I visited Knoxville, where I met Major General Sherman, and received instructions to commence the return march on the morrow. It was decided that General Granger's corps should remain as re-enforcement to General Burnside, in accordance with first plan, an order of Major General Grant, which had designated General Granger's command to move to the relief of Knoxville. Besides, the fact that my corps was to a large extent without tents, one or two brigades without blankets, and nearly all either suffering from bad shoes, or entirely destitute of shoes, having turned directly from the pursuit of Bragg, without going back for anything. These considerations made it advisable that we return as soon as possible to our camps, now that the pressing necessity was over. On the march back the commissaries generally preceded the corps, and, seizing the mills, notified the inhabitants to bring in wheat and corn, which they purchased and ground in readiness for distribution on the arrival of their respective brigades. The mills were kept running night and day. The salt captured at Charleston on the way up lasted till our return to the same place. By means of this we were able to make use of the cattle and sheep of the country, which were sufficient for our purpose. The region of our march also abounded in sorghum, or home-made molasses, which was purchased in quantity, and issued to the troops. This was found a suitable substitute for sugar. For coffee, wheat in the grain was issued. No complaint of want of food came to my ears.

The loyal inhabitants were no less demonstrative on our return than on our march up. One lamentable fact came under my observation, the habit of depredation upon the property of citizens pervading among certain portions of our army, too little checked by officers. Instances of great outrage came to my knowledge, and of suffering on account of such misconduct of the troops, even among people of undoubted loyalty. While called upon through necessity to impress supplies, I ordered proper receipts in all cases to be given, and restrained theft by the severest punishment. We returned by comparatively easy marches, recrossing the bridge of wagons at Davis's ford.

At Athens a halt was made by direction of General Sherman, except that one brigade (Colonel Hecker's) was sent forward to Charleston to the bridge and held it. The cavalry guard, on hearing of the approach of the enemy, abandoned the Charleston bridge and fled. It was, however, only partially destroyed by the enemy, so that Colonel Hecker repaired it again in a couple of days.

General Sherman had located Davis's division abreast of Hecker, further up the river, at Columbus, thus threatening to move down the old federal road past Bragg's right, while the rest of his force was in the vicinity of Tellico plains, for the purpose of supporting Colonel Long's cavalry, which had gone in pursuit of one of Longstreet's trains through Murphy, North Carolina.

Supplies were expected by the river to Cottonport, and I was directed to impress wagons and have the stores brought to Athens, with a view to a concentration at that point. But, by a mistake, no supplies were landed there.

As soon as Colonel Long returned, the march was continued to Chattanooga. At Cleveland my troops were cheered by the arrival of a day's ration of hard bread and coffee, which I had arranged to have meet me at that place. My corps, followed by Davis's division, passed through McDaniel's gap. The road was execrable, a third of the men without proper clothing, and many barefooted, and now a heavy rain added to the discomforts and difficulties of the march.

Yet our devoted soldiers toiled on without complaint. We arrived at our old camp in Lookout valley, December 17th. The corps had endured the extreme fatigue of a three days' battle, engaged in the pursuit of the enemy for two days, affectively destroyed the railroad communication between Longstreet and Bragg, and then turned northward and made a march of a hundred and twenty miles to the relief of Burnside, and then immediately returned to its old camp; and when we consider that this was accomplished under such unfavorable circumstances as wretched roads, no transportation, few blankets and tents, with rivers to cross without bridge trains, and supplies to be collected from the country, why may we not speak of our soldiers with pride as equal to any in the world? I wish to commend my division and brigade commanders for the energy and constancy they manifested during this campaign. More than I can express is due to the untiring efforts of the different members of my staff; Lieutenant Colonel Asmussen, assistant inspector general, evinced his usual activity and ability. Lieutenant Colonel Meysenburg, assistant adjutant general, Major O. H. Howard, aide-de-camp, Captain Simson, aide-de-camp, and Captain Pearson, (seventeenth infantry,) C. of M., were, as heretofore, fearless in action and ever ready on the march to do everything required of them without flagging. Major Hoffman, of my engineers, gave me great assistance; the medical director, Surgeon D. G. Brinton, United States volunteers, aided by Surgeon Robert Hubbard, medical inspector, and Captain Rowe, chief of ambulances, relieved me from all care regarding the sick; Captain Schofield, assistant provost marshal, and Lieutenants Gilbreth, Palmer, and Wickham, deserve mention for their cheerfulness and alacrity in duty by day and night. My chief of scouts and road engineers, E. H. Kirlin, rendered valuable assistance; Lieutenant Colonel Long, seventy-third Ohio, in the different towns through which we passed, acting as provost marshal, was untiring in his exertions to preserve order.

Herewith you will find a nominal list of killed and wounded in this corps at the battle of Chattanooga, and map of the position.

Respectfully,

O. O. HOWARD,  
*Major General.*

Captain H. W. PERKINS,  
*A. A. Gen. 11th and 12th corps.*

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide de-Camp.*

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HEADQUARTERS 14TH ARMY CORPS,  
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Chattanooga, December, 1863.*

SIR: I have the honor to forward for the information of the general commanding the department, the reports of Brigadier General Johnson and Brigadier General A. Baird, commanding divisions, of the part borne by the commands during the late operations near Chattanooga, together with the reports of their brigade and regimental commanders respectively.

It will be seen that the report of the operations of each division is complete of itself, and as their movements were entirely disconnected with each other, no attempt has been made to blend them. They are respectfully referred to for all details and particulars.

The pleasing duty devolves upon me in forwarding these papers, which ends my connexion with the army, to express my high satisfaction with the conduct of the officers and men of these divisions; Brigadier Generals Johnson and

Baird were prompt, able, and true. They discharged all their duties like earnest patriots and good soldiers, nor were their subordinates less entitled to praise.

All the members of my personal staff deserve and have my thanks for their good conduct.

Appended hereto will be found a consolidated statement, trophies and prisoners captured, as well as the casualties of the command.

Respectfully,

JOHN M. PALMER,  
*Major General.*

Brig. General W. D. WHIPPLE,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

*Killed and wounded in the first division 14th army corps.*

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
First brigade.....	25	134	159
Second brigade.....	21	124	145
Grand total .....	46	258	304

CAPTURES.

Three Napoleon guns, with horses and harness complete; two caissons, with horses and harness complete; one Napoleon gun; one thousand one hundred and sixty-five (1,165) prisoners of all grades, from lieutenant colonel down to privates; five stands of colors, with a great number of small arms.

*Killed, wounded, and missing in third division 14th army corps.*

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
First brigade .....	57	222	4	283
Second brigade .....	22	139	2	163
Third brigade.....	18	100	1	119
Grand total.....	97	461	7	565

CAPTURES.

One regimental and one battle flag, and ten pieces of artillery; about two hundred (200) small-arms in good condition.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, 14TH ARMY CORPS,  
*Chattanooga, Tenn., November 30, 1863.*

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of my division from November 23d up to this date:

November 23.—I was directed by the major general commanding the corps to place my first and third brigades, (the second being on picket,) within the rifle pits in front of my encampment where the troops remained during the night.

*November 24.*—General Baird's division of the 14th army corps was sent to the front, and the forts and intrenchments in front of his encampment were held by my division. The command under General Hooker attacked the enemy on Lookout mountain, and late in the evening I was ordered to send General Carlin's brigade over Chattanooga creek to report to General Hooker. The creek being much swollen by recent rains, and the banks very abrupt, it was impossible to ford it or to throw over a temporary bridge. Meeting with Colonel Stanley, eighteenth Ohio volunteers, he kindly consented to bring down a ferry-boat, which was used. Pending the arrival of the ferry-boat, the corps commander directed Major Mendenhall to bring down to the bank of the creek some artillery. One section of the eighth Wisconsin battery, and one section of the seventh Indiana battery, were posted in position, and did fine execution against the masses of the enemy hurled against General Hooker's left, and prevented reinforcements being sent against our forces on the mountain.

General Carlin, although necessarily delayed a short time, formed a junction with General Hooker on the rough irregular slope of the mountain in time to assist in repelling, in a gallant style, a heavy assault upon our lines.

*November 25.*—General Carlin's brigade recrossed Chattanooga creek and rejoined my command, while the forces on Lookout mountain passed down the eastern slope and over the valley to the foot of Missionary ridge. In the afternoon I was instructed to draw in my second brigade from picket, and hold it in readiness to move against the enemy; my third brigade, (General Starkweather,) was ordered to hold the forts and intrenchments in and around Chattanooga. Later in the day I was ordered to form my command in two lines, resting my left against the right of General Sheridan's division, and to conform to his movements. Up to this time, owing to the sickness of General King, whose absence I regretted very much, my second brigade had been commanded by the accomplished soldier, Colonel M. F. Moore, of sixty-ninth regiment Ohio volunteer infantry; Colonel Stoughton, of the eleventh Michigan volunteers, arrived, and by virtue of seniority, took command of the brigade.

My division was formed, General Carlin on the right, and Colonel Stoughton on the left, connecting with General Sheridan and facing Missionary ridge, a heavy line of skirmishers was thrown out, and all the arrangements made for aiding the movement on the left. The enemy was posted in a strong position in front, overlapping and extending away off to the right as far as the eye could reach, while in our front and to our right and left batteries were posted so as to have a cross-fire. About 3.45 o'clock p. m., the advance was sounded on my left, which was promptly conformed to by my command, and it moved forward steadily across the valley and towards the base of Missionary ridge. My skirmishers soon became engaged with the enemy, who were sheltered by their rifle pits; but, without faltering, and under a galling fire of musketry and artillery, they moved forward, driving the enemy from his first line of intrenchments. Notwithstanding the steepness of the mountain, the division moved steadily forward, driving the rebels from their works, and soon the summit of the mountain was reached, and the colors planted upon the enemy's boasted stronghold; a loud and prolonged cheer announced that a great victory had been gained. The summit was reached a little before sundown, the lines reformed, pickets thrown out, and arrangements made for encamping for the night. Orders were received to replenish our ammunition, (up to one hundred rounds,) and to issue four days' rations preparatory to following up the retreating foe.

*November 26.*—The first and second brigades, the second in advance, moved out on the road leading south of east, accompanied by the commander of the corps. After a march of seven miles the head of the column arrived at the west Chickamauga creek; here the bridge had been destroyed and the creek could not be forded. The horses were made to swim over while a temporary bridge was constructed, over which the men passed. After moving one and a half miles

the column reached Pea Vine creek, and here again it was necessary to construct a temporary bridge for our men. At this point the road forked, the right hand leading directly to Ringgold; the left leading to Graysville. General Carlin lead off on the latter road.

Before advancing, far the noise of men and wagons rendered it certain that a column of the enemy was retreating by the Lafayette road. General Carlin was directed to form into line of battle, and Colonel Stoughton's brigade was, by direction of the corps commander, directed to advance on the Ringgold and to its crossing with the Lafayette road, and to attack the enemy vigorously. This movement was made in gallant style, and about 9 o'clock p. m. a volley was fired into Stewart's rebel division, the men of which scattered in all directions, throwing away their arms, abandoning their colors, and leaving in our possession three Napoleon guns, two caissons, with horses, harness, &c., and quite a number of prisoners. The command then resumed the march on Graysville, General Carlin leading with his brigade. The head of the column reached the village about 11 o'clock p. m., driving out of it, in great confusion, a number of the enemy, supposed to be a brigade. In this place General Carlin captured a number of prisoners and one cannon.

*November 27.*—At early dawn I was ordered to proceed to Ringgold by one road, while the major general commanding the corps, with General Baird's division, marched by another route. This movement threw me in rear of General Hooker's forces.

When General Hooker's advance reached Ringgold it met with a spirited resistance. I directed General Carlin to form his brigade on the left of General Hooker and to advance and attack. This was done in fine style, and soon his skirmishers opened upon those of the enemy, the latter falling back to the summit of White Oak ridge.

Before advancing far General Hooker directed me to halt and await further orders. My command had hardly halted before the enemy withdrew from my front, and attacked the troops on my right, by which they were repulsed and driven from the field. My command remained in Ringgold until the morning of the 29th November, when it was ordered to return to this place.

The battles referred to in this report were fought on open ground, and every commander in the army could see the conduct of nearly all the troops engaged. To say my division done well would hardly convey an idea of the noble daring of its officers and men. The army of the Cumberland has nobly sustained its gallant reputation, and it is but just to accord to the heroes of Vicksburg and the Potomac an equal share in the honor and glory won by our united efforts. I cannot close this report without acknowledging the valuable services of my brigade commanders.

Brigadier General W. P. Carlin, commanding the first brigade, ably assisted by Colonel B. F. Scribner, thirty-eighth regiment Indiana volunteer infantry, exhibited the same cool courage and daring which characterized his conduct at Perryville, Stone river, and Chickamauga. I thank him for his valuable advice and services, and congratulate him on his achievements. Colonel W. L. Stoughton, eleventh Michigan volunteers, commanding second brigade; Colonel M. F. Moore, sixty-ninth Ohio volunteers, commanding left wing, and Major J. R. Edie, fifteenth infantry, United States army, commanding right wing, were very efficient in the discharge of their duties. Great praise is due to them. A small battalion of the fifteenth United States infantry, never under fire before, acted like veterans. The fifteenth Kentucky volunteers, on post duty, were not engaged. Its Colonel, Marion C. Taylor, joined me and acted as a staff officer. I am greatly indebted to him for his valuable assistance; he was at all times ready and willing to carry orders to any part of the field. He is a brave and gallant officer, worthy of promotion. Major Fitch, Captain Wagner, Lieutenants Morris, Lowe, Kessler, and Smith, and Surgeon Miller of my staff, were

prompt and efficient. Their gallantry was conspicuous on all occasions calling it forth.

The hope for glory and distinction will account for the gallantry of officers, but how can we thank too much the private soldiers, who face death without hope of future reward. Every officer and soldier did his duty, and I regret not being able to submit the name of every man in the division in this report, in order that others may honor those to whom honor is justly due.

#### LOSS.

First brigade, 25 killed; 134 wounded. Second brigade, 21 killed; 124 wounded. Total killed, 46. Total wounded, 258. Total killed and wounded, 304.

#### CAPTURES.

Three Napoleon guns, with horses and harness complete; two caissons, with horses and harness complete; one Napoleon gun; 1,165 prisoners of all grades, from lieutenant colonel down to private; two stands of colors, with a great number of small arms.

Accompanying this report is the report of Brigadier General Carlin with sub-reports.

The reports of the second brigade will be forwarded when received.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. W. JOHNSON,

*Brigadier General United States Volunteers.*

Captain B. H. POLK,

*Assistant Adjutant General 14th Army Corps.*

True copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

#### HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, 14TH ARMY CORPS,

*Chattanooga, Tenn., December 9, 1863.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this division in the recent operations of our forces in this vicinity.

On the 23d of November I received orders to move north my division from its camp, within the line of works surrounding this place, and to display my force in position near Rossville road, immediately in front of the rebel intrenchments, strongly threatening attack, but to avoid becoming seriously engaged.

During the afternoon of the day, (Monday,) this order was carried into execution, and after driving back the pickets of the enemy, my lines were formed between the Rossville and Moore's roads, under the guns of our own works. My position was quite nearly in front of the enemy's centre, and on the right of the troops composing our own centre. The object of the demonstration I understood to be to aid in the execution of other movements on the extreme flanks.

We bivouacked in our position on Monday night, and continued to maintain it during Tuesday and Thursday night. On that day, while General Hooker on our right assaulted Lookout mountain, gaining such a foothold upon it as to lead to its evacuation during the night, and while General Sherman on our left established himself upon the north end of Missionary ridge, we remained comparatively inactive, only skirmishing slightly with the rebel pickets, and using our artillery upon such points as seemed to promise the most for the object in view.

On the morning of Wednesday, the 25th, it was found that the enemy was no longer in heavy force upon our right, about Chattanooga creek, and I sent out parties to feel in that direction, so as to ascertain to what extent he had withdrawn.

While engaged in this way orders were brought me directly from department headquarters, directing me to pass with my division to the extreme left to the assistance of General Sherman, then hotly engaged in the vicinity of Tunnel hill. The road I was required to take led along the river, and it was several miles to the point when I struck the rear of General Sherman's command. I had barely reached this point with the head of my column when a messenger reached me with orders to return towards the centre, and to form my division on the left of the troops occupying that position. I would thus prolong the line formed by General Granger's corps towards the left, and partly fill up the long interval between him and General Sherman. It was then about noon, and owing to the difficult character of the ground, intersected by streams, marshes, and thickets, it was some time before I could reach the spot, and get the division into position. When established, my right joined the left of General S. Beatty's brigade of Wood's division, at a point not far from the north of Orchard Knob, my left extending well off towards the tunnel. My brigades were posted in their order from right to left, General Turchin on the right, Colonel Van Derveer in the centre, and Colonel Phelps on the left, and the division was in two lines, the first deployed with a heavy skirmish line in front and on the left, which was otherwise uncovered. The interval between my left and General Sherman was, perhaps, two miles in extent; communication being open between us by passing around to the rear, but on the direct line lay the rebel masses which were opposing him.

I had just completed the establishment of my line, and was upon the left of it, when a staff officer from Major General Thomas brought me verbal orders to move forward to the edge of the open ground which bordered the foot of Mission ridge, within striking distance of the rebel rifle-pits at its base, so as to be ready at a signal, which would be the firing of six guns from Orchard Knob, to dash forward and take those pits. He added this was intended preparatory to a general assault on the mountain; that it was doubtless designed by the major general commanding that I should take part in this movement, so that I would be following his wishes were I to push on to the summit. I gave the necessary orders to the third brigade, and passing on to the right was in the act of communicating them to Colonel Van Derveer, of the second, when firing from Orchard Knob began. Many more than six shots were fired, and it was impossible to determine whether it was the signal fixed or not; nevertheless, I hastened to the first brigade, when I found the troops of General Wood's division already in motion, going forward. I at once directed General Turchin to push to the front, and without halting to take the rifle-pits; then, conforming his movements to those of the troops on his right, to endeavor to gain the summit of the mountain along with them. I then passed back towards the left to see how things were progressing there, and found the first line of both the second and third brigades in possession of the rifle-pits, from which the enemy had been handsomely dislodged, the second line lying down some short distance in the rear. The rebel troops which had occupied the works were in retreat up the mountain, while numerous batteries, both in our front and far to our right and left, opened upon us a heavy cross-fire from the crest. For a time this cannonade was indeed severe; the atmosphere seemed filled with messengers of death, and shells bounded in every direction. It was continued until the guns were captured, but, owing no doubt to the great depression under which they were fired, our loss was far less than might have been expected. Looking towards the right I saw that General Turchin had passed the line of rifle-pits, and was well upon his way to the top of the ridge. Two of his flags, surrounded by a troop of the bravest spirits, had passed the rest and remained for some time perched upon the side of the mountain quite near its top. I saw, however, that the troops on the right had halted near the rifle-pits, contrary to my understanding when I

gave him my instructions, and that he was unsupported. I was in the act of starting forward my other two brigades for this purpose, when I received orders not to permit my men to go further, and not to permit them to become engaged. I was at this much perplexed as to how I should best withdraw General Turchin. It was only, however, momentary, as another order came in less than three minutes for the whole line to charge to the top. This order having been communicated, all of both lines leaped forward with a shout and rushed up the mountain side. The ridge, more or less steep and difficult throughout, was particularly so in my front, but those striking the more accessible points, and the strongest men, and the bravest men, soon passed to the front. Regimental organizations became somewhat deranged, and presented rather the appearance of groups gathered around the colors, which they pushed onward and upward through the storm of bullets.

I cannot too strongly commend to the major general commanding the heroic gallantry of the officers and men of the division in the charge, which has few parallels in my readings of wars. To say less than this would be unjust to those brave men, to say more might seem out of place, since it occurred under the eye of the general himself. I rode up myself to the interval between the first and second brigades, and for a time portions of the line were concealed from my view, but I have taken great pains to collect evidence of what transpired, and it is herewith transmitted.

The march of General Turchin's brigade was directed upon a prominent knob, on which there were several pieces of artillery, and a small house, used afterwards as a hospital. It may be recognized readily by the marks. This I believe to be the first point carried by my command. It is difficult to determine questions of slight precedence in point of time, in a rivalry of this nature, and when all act nobly, they are unimportant. The second brigade, in line going from troops toward the right, perhaps that of General Willich, may possibly have reached its point of aim a little before mine reached theirs, and soon after opened communication with us. The intermediate brigades came up a little later. I mention the first knob taken by General Turchin's command particularly, as marking the extreme point towards the right carried by this division. It was strongly defended by the enemy, who was driven from it by the eleventh, thirty-first, and thirty-sixth Ohio regiments, and three guns captured. From this point to the left, every foot that was gained was due to the stubborn fighting of the men of this division, who drove the enemy steadily before them, and whatever captures were here made are the proper trophies of their valor. Colonel Van Derveer's brigade reached the crest a little to the left of the knob taken by General Turchin, and Colonel Phelps's brigade, a little further yet in that direction.

The works of the enemy along the crest of the ridge consisted of a slight breastwork of logs and stones, capable, however, of strong defence. During the night much of it was transferred to the opposite side of the ridge to be used to our advantage. As our men reached the summit they were all turned to the left, the direction of the enemy's resistance, and pressed forward after him. In this movement, from the point where my right gained the top of the extreme left, ten or twelve pieces of artillery were captured. My men found them in the possession of the enemy, some with strong infantry supports. They drove him from them and passed over them in the pursuit. One of their batteries was recaptured by a rally of the enemy, but again taken by us. The credit of capturing seven of these guns is claimed by the first brigade, and the second to have taken five. It is not impossible that two are the same in the claim of each of the parties for the men got much mingled together at the end of the assault, yet they may be distinct; certain it is that the men of this division took ten guns out of the hands of the enemy, and that they never returned to him.

A map attached to the brigade report of General Turchin shows minutely the position of most of the batteries captured by us, and I invite attention to it.



As we gained ground towards the left, we approached closely the large bodies of troops collected by the rebel commander to resist or crush General Sherman; and as the attacks of the latter had been repulsed or were suspended about the time that we commenced our assault, these men were at liberty to be used against us. The time which it took for us to mount the hill was enough for them to recover from their first surprise, and before we had gone far a strong force was found ready to confront us. Each knoll was more strongly defended than the previous one. The gallant Colonel Phelps, commanding the third brigade, was shot dead soon after reaching the crest, in forming and directing his men, and the great number of the dead, both of our men and of the enemy, left upon the ground, attest the severity of the struggle. At length, after having driven the enemy to a knoll where he had the cover and support of the huts of one of his camps, and could be reached by us only over a long, narrow neck of ground, we found further progress at the time, impossible, and darkness put an end to the conflict. During the night the enemy abandoned his position and retired. While thus engaged upon the extreme left, the guns which we had captured and which we had left in the position where we had found them, were carried off to the rear, and we have since been unable to identify them individually so as to claim them. I learn that all the guns turned over to the chief of artillery have been claimed by those presenting them as their capture, leaving none for this division.

I regret, for the sake of the brave men who so fearlessly risked their lives in taking them, that this is so; but I felt at the time that we had a higher duty to perform, as long as there was an enemy to be encountered, than that of stopping to secure trophies for exhibition after the battle. Indeed, I was not quite sure that without strenuous exertions we would be able to retain what we had already gained. In considering the evidence of these captures, which I submit in behalf of my command, I trust that the general commanding will remember that the guns of the enemy being widely scattered along the ridge, very few in one spot, a brigade or division, to have captured an unusual number, must not only have taken possession of the works in our front, but must have passed widely to the right and left along the crest, before the arrival of other troops. The prisoners whom we have captured, most of them, like the guns, were sent to the rear to be taken care of by others less occupied. Out of more than three hundred (300) taken we have receipts for less than two hundred, (200.) Along with this report will be forwarded one regimental color and one battle flag, the former captured by the thirty-first Ohio, and the latter by the eleventh Ohio regiment, of Turchin's brigade. The division also took about two hundred (200) stand of small-arms in good condition, and several caissons or limbers.

On Thursday morning, in obedience to orders, I made a reconnoissance with the first brigade, as far as the Chickamauga, in our front, without coming up with the rear of the enemy, and in the afternoon marched in the direction of Ringgold.

On Friday morning I reached that place, and joined the other divisions of the corps. We remained at Ringgold without performing any unusual service until Sunday, when we returned to this place.

In the battle of the 25th, in addition to the brave and gallant commander of the first brigade, Colonel E. H. Phelps, whose loss to the country, to his family, and to ourselves, (his friends,) we much deplore, we have likewise to mourn the loss of many others of our best and bravest officers and men. A list giving the names of the killed, wounded, and missing is appended. Of the living, both officers and enlisted men, who have signally distinguished themselves, mention will be found in the sub-reports, upon which my own is based. To present here a consolidated list of them would not add to their renown, and to mention some might be unjust to those overlooked. I trust, however, that some means may be devised for rewarding their distinguished services. A medal or badge of honor for some, and the promotion they so richly deserve for others, might be awarded.

To my brigade commanders, Brigadier General Turchin, of the first, and Colonel Van Derveer, of the second brigades, I invite your attention. To their skill, bravery, and high soldierly qualifications, we are greatly indebted for the result we were enabled to accomplish. I hope that their services will be rewarded. After the death of Colonel Phelps, the command of the third brigade devolved upon Colonel Hays, tenth Kentucky infantry, by whom the duty was handsomely performed.

To my staff officers, who were with me, Captain McClurg, acting assistant adjutant general; Major Connelly, inspector general; Captain Swallow, chief of artillery; Captain Johnson, provost marshal; Lieutenant White, ordnance officer; Lieutenant Dick, mustering officer; and to my medical director, Surgeon Bogue. I am highly indebted, both for services in the field and for the efficient aid which they rendered me.

Respectfully submitted:

A. BAIRD,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,

*Headquarters 14th Army Corps.*

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

*Recapitulation.*

Command.	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL.		Aggregate.
	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	Commissioned.	Enlisted.	
First brigade third division.....	6	51	11	211	.....	4	17	266	28
Second brigade third division.....	2	20	13	126	.....	2	15	148	16
Third brigade third division.....	2	16	3	97	.....	1	5	114	12
Third division 14th army corps.....	10	87	27	434	.....	7	37	528	56

*Effective force engaged.*

Command.	Commiss'ned officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
First brigade.....	.....	.....	.....
Second brigade.....	102	1,577	1,679
Third brigade.....	.....	.....	.....

HEADQUARTERS 11TH AND 12TH CORPS,

*Lookout Valley, Tenn., February 4, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my command in the operations of the army, which resulted in driving the rebel forces from all of their positions in the vicinity of Chattanooga, and of its participation immediately afterwards in the pursuit of them. In order that this may be distinctly understood, that the troops concerned be known and receive the honor due them, it is necessary to premise by stating that the attack was ordered to be made on the enemy's extreme right at daylight on the 21st of November.

and that preparatory orders were sent through me on the 18th for the 11th corps to cross on the north bank of the Tennessee river on the 20th. At this time the 11th and a part of the 12th corps were encamped in Lookout valley, opposite to the left of the enemy's line. In consequence of the non-arrival of the force mainly relied on to lead off at the attack, it was postponed to the following morning and again until the 24th, for the same reason. Meanwhile, orders were received for the 11th corps to go to Chattanooga, where it reported on the 22d. This divided my command, and as the orders contemplated no advance from Lookout valley, application was made to the major general commanding the department for authority to accompany the 11th corps, assigning as a reason that it was my duty to join that part of my command going into battle. This was granted, and, preparatory to leaving, invitation was sent for the senior officer in my absence, Brigadier General Geary, to examine with me the enemy's positions and defences, and to be informed at what points I desired to have his troops held to enable me to make use of the telegraph in communicating with him advisedly, during the progress of the fight, should a favorable opportunity present itself for him to advance.

On the 23d, the commander of the department requested me to remain in Lookout valley, and to make a demonstration as early as possible the following morning on the point of Lookout mountain; my command to consist of the parts of the two divisions. Later in the day (the 23d) a copy of a telegram was received from the major general commanding the division of the Mississippi, to the effect that in the event the pontoon bridge at Brown's ferry could not be repaired in season to cross Osterhaus's division of the fifteenth corps by 8 o'clock a. m. on the 24th, it would report to me; and soon after another telegram, from the headquarters of the department, instructed me in this case to take the point of Lookout mountain, if my demonstration should develop its practicability. At 1 o'clock a. m. word was received that the bridge could not be put in serviceable condition for twelve hours, and, to remove all doubt on the subject, a staff officer was despatched to ascertain. At 3.15 a. m., on the 24th, the report was confirmed.

As now composed, my command consisted of Osterhaus's division, 15th corps; Cruft's division of the 4th; Geary's of the 12th; excepting from the last two named divisions such regiments as were required to protect our communications with Bridgeport and Kelley's ferry; battery K of the first Ohio, and battery L of the first New York, of the 11th corps; (the two having horses but for one;) a part of the second Kentucky cavalry, and company K of the fifteenth Illinois cavalry, making an aggregate force of nine thousand six hundred and eighty-one, (9,681.) We were all strangers, no one division having seen either of the others. Geary's division, supported by Whittaker's brigade, of Cruft's division, was ordered to proceed up the valley, cross the creek near Wauhatchie, and march down, sweeping every rebel from it; the other brigade, of the 4th corps, to advance, seize the bridge just below the railroad, and repair it. Osterhaus's division to march up from Brown's ferry, under cover of the hills, to the place of crossing; also to furnish supports for the batteries. The Ohio battery to take a position on Bald hill, and the New York battery on the hill directly in rear. The second Kentucky cavalry was despatched to observe the movements of the enemy in the direction of Trenton, and the Illinois company to perform orderly and escort duty. This disposition of the forces to be made as soon after daylight as practicable. At this time the enemy's pickets formed a continuous line along the right bank of Lookout creek, with the reserves in the valley, while his main force was encamped in a hollow, half way up the slope of the mountain. The summit itself was held by three brigades of Stevenson's division, and were comparatively safe, as the only means of access from the west, for a distance of twenty miles up the valley, was by two or three trails, admitting of the passage of but one man at a time, and even those held at the top by

rebel pickets. For this reason no direct attempt was made for the dislodgment of this force.

On the Chattanooga side, which is less precipitous, a road of easy grade has been made, communicating with the summit by zigzagging diagonally up the side of the mountain; and it was believed that before our troops should gain possession of this, the enemy on the top would evacuate his position, or, in the event he did not, would be cut off from his main body, to rejoin which would involve a march of twenty or thirty miles. Viewed from whatever point, Lookout mountain, with its high palisaded crest and its steep, rugged, rocky, and deeply furrowed slopes, presented an imposing barrier to our advance. And when to these were added almost interminable well planned, well constructed defences, held by Americans, the assault became an enterprise worthy the ambition and renown of the troops to whom it was intrusted.

On the northern slope, midway between the summit and the Tennessee-river, a plateau or belt of arable land encircles the crest, where a continuous line of earthworks had been thrown up, together with redoubts, redans, and pits lower down the slope to repel an assault from the direction of the river, while on each flank were rifle-pits, epaulements for batteries, walls of stones, and abatis to resist attacks from either the Chattanooga or Lookout valley themselves. Geary commenced his movement as instructed, crossed the creek at 8 o'clock, captured the entire picket of forty-two men posted to defend it, marched directly up the mountain until the right rested on the palisades, and headed down the valley. At the same time Gross's brigade advanced resolutely, with brisk skirmishing drove the enemy from the bridge, and at once proceeded to put it in repair. The firing at this point alarmed the rebels, and immediately their columns were seen filing down the mountain from their camps, moving into their rifle-pits and breastworks, while numbers established themselves behind the embankment of the railroad, which enabled them, without exposure, to sweep with a fire of musketry the field over which our troops would be compelled to march, for a distance of three or four hundred yards.

These dispositions were distinctly visible, and as facilities for avoiding them were close at hand, Osterhaus was directed to send a brigade, under cover of the hills and trees, about eight hundred yards higher up the creek, and prepare a crossing at that point. This was Brigadier General Wood's brigade.

Soon after, Cruft was ordered to leave a sufficient force at the bridge to engage the attention of the enemy, and for the balance of Gross's brigade to follow Wood's. Meanwhile, a section of howitzers was planted to enfilade the positions the enemy had taken, and Osterhaus had established a section of 20-pounder Parrotts to enfilade the route by which the enemy had left his camp. The battery on Bald hill enfiladed the railroad and highway leading to Chattanooga and all the batteries and sections of batteries had a direct or enfilading fire within easy range on all the positions taken by the rebels; besides, the 20-pounder Parrotts could be used with good effect on the rebel camp on the side of the mountain. With this disposition of the artillery it was believed that we would be able to prevent the enemy from despatching relief to oppose Geary, and also keep him from running away. At 11 o'clock Wood had completed his bridge. Geary's line appeared close by, his skirmishers smartly engaged. All the guns opened, Wood and Gross sprang across the river, joined Geary's left, and moved down the valley. A few of the enemy escaped from the artillery fire, and those that did ran upon our infantry and were captured. The balance of the rebel forces were killed or taken prisoners, many of them remaining in the bottom of their pits for safety until forced out by our men. Meanwhile, the troops on the mountain rushed on in their advance, the right passing directly under the muzzles of the enemy's guns on the summit, climbing over ledges and boulders, up hill and down, furiously driving the enemy from his camp, and from position after position, until 12 o'clock, when Geary's advance heroically rounded the

peak of the mountain. Not knowing to what extent the enemy might be re-enforced, and fearing, from the rough character of the field of operations, that our lines might be disordered, directions had been given for the troops to halt on reaching this high ground; but fired with success, a flying, panic-stricken enemy before them, they pressed eagerly forward; Cobham's brigade on the right, occupying the high ground between the enemy's line of defence on the plateau and the palisades, incessantly plying them with fire from above and behind, while Ireland's brigade was vigorously rolling them on the flank, both closely supported by the brigades of Whittaker and Creighton. Our success was uninterrupted and irresistible.

Before losing the advantages the ground presented us, the enemy had been re-enforced. Meantime, after having secured the prisoners, two of Osterhaus's regiments had been sent forward on the Chattanooga road, and the balance of his and Cruft's divisions had joined Geary. All the rebel efforts to resist us only resulted in rendering our success more complete and triumphant. After two or three short but sharp conflicts the plateau was cleared, the enemy with his re-enforcements driven from the walls and pits around Craven's house, the last point at which he could make a stand in force, and, all broken and dismayed, were hurled over the rocks and precipices into the valley.

It was now near 2 o'clock, when our operations were arrested by the darkness. The clouds which had hovered over and enveloped the summit of the mountain during the morning, and to some extent favored our movements, gradually settled into the valley, and completely veiled it from our view. Indeed, from the moment we had rounded the peak of the mountain, it was only from the roar of battle and occasional glimpses they could catch of our lines and standards that our comrades from whom we were separated knew of the strife or its progress; and when from these evidences our true condition was revealed to them, their painful anxiety yielded to transports of joy, which only soldiers can feel at the earliest moment of dawning victory.

Deeming a descent into the valley imprudent without more accurate information of its topography, and also of the position and strength of the enemy, our line was established on the east side of the mountain, the right resting on the palisades and the left near the mouth of Chattanooga creek, and this was strengthened by all the means at hand until 4 o'clock, when the commander of the department was informed that our position was impregnable.

During all of these operations the batteries on Moccasin point, under Captain Naylor, had been busily at work from the north bank of the Tennessee river, and had contributed as much to our assistance as the irregularities of the ground and the state of the atmosphere would admit of. From our position we cannonaded the enemy's line of defence stretching across Chattanooga valley by an enfilading fire, and also by a direct fire many of his camps, some of which were in our immediate vicinity. Also direct communication had been opened with Chattanooga, and at a quarter past five o'clock Brigadier General Carlin, 14th corps, reported to me with his brigade, and was assigned to duty on the right of the line to relieve Geary's command, almost exhausted with the fatigue and excitement incident to their unparalleled march.

To prevent artillery being brought forward the enemy had undermined the road and covered it with felled timber. This was repaired and placed in serviceable condition before morning. During the day, and until after midnight, an irregular fire was kept up along our line, and had the appearance of an effort to break it. This was on the right, and was at once vigorously and handsomely repelled. In this Carlin's brigade rendered excellent service. His report is herewith forwarded.

Before daylight, anticipating the withdrawal of the rebel force from the summit of the mountain, parties from several regiments were despatched to scale it; but to the eighth Kentucky must forever belong the proud distinction of having

been foremost to reach the crest, and at sunrise to display our honored emblem from the towering peak of Lookout, amid the wild and prolonged cheers of the stalwart men whose dauntless valor and resolution had raised it almost to the skies.

During the night the enemy had quietly abandoned the mountain, leaving behind twenty thousand rations, the camp and garrison equipage of three brigades, and other material. An impenetrable mist still covered the face of the valley. Prisoners reported that the enemy had abandoned it, but deemed it imprudent to descend; a reconnoissance was ordered, and soon after 9 o'clock report came in that the rebels had left, but that their pickets still held the right bank of Chattanooga creek in the direction of Rossville. Soon after the fog had vanished, and nothing was to be seen in the valley but the deserted and burning camp of the enemy.

Among the fruits of the preceding operations may be enumerated the concentration of the army, the abandonment of defences upwards of eight miles in extent, the recovery of all the advantages in position the enemy had gained from our army on the bloody field of Chickamauga, giving to us the undisputed navigation of the river and the control of the railroad, the capture of between two and three thousand prisoners, five stands of colors, two pieces of artillery, and upwards of five thousand muskets.

Of the troops opposed to us were four brigades, all of Walker's division, of Hardee's corps, a portion of Stewart's division, of Breckinridge's corps; and on the top of the mountain Carlin's brigade was directed to await orders on the Summertown road, and at 10 o'clock my column, Osterhaus leading, (being nearest the road,) marched for Rossville.

On arriving at Chattanooga creek it was discovered that the enemy had destroyed the bridge, and in consequence our pursuit was delayed nearly three hours. As soon as the stringers were laid Osterhaus managed to throw over the twenty-seventh Missouri regiment, and soon after all of his infantry. The former deployed, pushed forward as skirmishers to the gorge in Missionary ridge, and drew a fire of the artillery and infantry holding it, and also discovered that the enemy was attempting to cover a train of wagons loading with stores at the Rossville house.

As the position was one presenting many advantages for defence, the skirmishers were directed to keep the enemy engaged in front while Wood's brigade was taking the ridge on the right, and four regiments of Williamson's on the left. Two other regiments of this brigade were posted on the road leading to Chattanooga to prevent surprise. In executing these duties the troops were necessarily exposed to the enemy's artillery; but as soon as it was discovered that his flanks were being turned, and his retreat threatened, he hastily evacuated the gap, leaving behind large quantities of artillery and small-arm ammunition, wagons, ambulances, and a house full of commissary stores. Pursuit was made as far as consistent with my instructions to clear Missionary ridge; meanwhile the bridge had been completed and all the troops over or crossing. Osterhaus received instructions to move with his division parallel with the ridge on the east, Cruft on the ridge, and Geary in the valley to the west of it, within easy supporting distance. The batteries accompanied Geary, as it was not known that roads could be found for them with the other divisions without delaying the movements of the column.

General Cruft, with his staff, preceded his column in ascending the ridge to supervise the formation of his lines, and was at once met by a line of the enemy's skirmishers advancing. The ninth and thirty-sixth Indiana regiments sprang forward, ran into line under their fire, and instantly charged and drove back these audacious rebels, while the residue of the column formed their lines, Gross's brigade, with fifty-first Ohio and thirty-fifth Indiana, of Whittaker's, in advance, the balance of the latter closely supporting the front line. It was, however, soon

found that the ridge on top was too narrow to admit of this formation, and the division was thrown into four lines. By this time the divisions of Geary and Osterhaus were abreast of it, and all advanced at a charging pace. The enemy had selected for his advanced line of defence the breastworks thrown up by our army on its return from Chickamauga, but such was the impetuosity of our advance that his front line was routed before an opportunity was afforded him to prepare for a determined resistance. Many of the fugitives, to escape, ran down the east slope to the line of Osterhaus, a few to the west, and were picked up by Geary. The bulk of them, however, sought refuge behind the second line, and they in their turn were soon routed, and the fight became almost a running one. Whenever the accidents of the ground enabled the rebels to make an advantageous stand, Geary and Osterhaus, always in the right place, would pour a withering fire into their flanks, and again the race was renewed. This continued until near sunset, when those of the enemy that had not been killed or captured, all gave way, and, in attempting to escape along the ridge, ran into the arms of Johnson's division of the 14th corps and were captured. Our enemy, the prisoners stated, was Stewart's division; but few escaped. Osterhaus alone captured two thousand of them. This officer names the fourth Iowa, seventy-sixth Ohio, and twenty-seventh Missouri regiments, as having been especially distinguished in this engagement. Landgraeber's battery of howitzers also rendered brilliant service on this field. Here our business for the day ended, and the troops went into bivouac, making the welkin ring with their cheers and rejoicings, which were caught up by other troops in the vicinity, and carried along the ridge, until lost in the distance.

Soon after daylight every effort was made, by reconnoissance and inquiry, to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy, to no purpose. Within our hearing the field was as silent as the grave. Knowing the desperate extremities to which he must be reduced by our success, with his retreat seriously threatened by the only line left him, with a hope of success, I felt satisfied that he must be in full retreat, and accordingly suggested to the commander of the department that my column be permitted to march to Graysville, if possible, to intercept him. This was granted, and at the same time, re-enforced by Palmer's corps, all moved immediately in that direction, Palmer's corps in advance.

On arriving at the west fork of the Chickamauga river, it was found that the enemy had destroyed the bridge. To provide for this contingency, Major General Butterfield, my chief of staff, with his habitual foresight, had in the morning personally requested that three pontoons, with their barks and chasses, might be despatched for my use; but, as they had not come up, after a detention of several hours a bridge was constructed for the infantry, the officers swimming their horses, and not until after three o'clock were the regiments able to commence crossing, leaving the artillery and ambulances to follow as soon as practicable; also a regiment of infantry as a guard to complete the bridge, if possible, for the artillery to cross, and also to assist in throwing over the pontoon bridge as soon as it arrived. Partly in consequence of this delay, instructions were given for Palmer's command to continue on to Graysville, on reaching the Lafayette road, and for the balance of his command to proceed to Ringgold, Cruft now leading, as this would enable me to strike the railroad five or six miles to the south of where it was first intended Palmer was to rejoin me in the morning. Soon after dark, word was received from Palmer, through a member of his staff, that he had come up with the enemy, reported to be a battery and two or three thousand infantry. Instructions were sent him to attack them at once, and while forming his lines to the left for that purpose, the remaining part of the column was massed as it came up to the right of the road, and held awaiting the movements of Palmer. His enemy was discovered to be a battery of three pieces with small escort, and was the rear of the rebel army on the road from Graysville to Ringgold. Three pieces of artillery were captured, and subsequently an additional

piece, with, I believe, a few prisoners. I have received no report from this officer of his operations, while belonging to my command, although mine has been delayed six weeks in waiting. We were now fairly up with the enemy. At ten o'clock at night, Cruft's division advanced and took possession of the crest of Chickamauga hills, the enemy's abandoned camp-fires still burning brightly on the side; and we all went into bivouac.

My artillery was not yet up, and, in this connexion, I desire that the especial attention of the commander of the department may be called to that part of the report of General Osterhaus which relates to the conduct of the officers who had the pontoon bridge in charge. I do not know the names of the officers referred to. I was not furnished with a copy of their instructions, nor did they report to me. The pontoons were not brought forward to the point of crossing at all, and the balk and chessplanks only reached their destination between nine and ten o'clock p. m., distance from Chattanooga ten miles, and the roads excellent. Three tressles had to be framed, and the bridge was not finished until six o'clock the following morning. The report of Lieutenant H. C. Wharton, of the engineers, and temporarily attached to my staff, who was left behind to hasten the completion of the bridge, is herewith transmitted. No better commentary on this culpable negligence is needed than is furnished by the record of our operations in the vicinity of Ringgold. The town was distant five miles. At daylight the pursuit was renewed, Osterhaus in the advance, Geary following, and Cruft in the rear. Evidences of the precipitate flight of the enemy were where apparent; caissons, wagons, ambulances, arms and ammunition were abandoned in the confusion and hurry of retreat. After going about two miles we came up with the camps he had occupied during the night, the fires still burning. A goodly number of prisoners were also taken before reaching the east fork of the Chickamauga river. We found the ford, and also the bridge to the south of Ringgold, held by a body of rebel cavalry. These discharged their arms and quickly gave way before a handful of our men, and were closely pursued into the town. I rode to the front on hearing the firing, where I found Osterhaus out with his skirmishers, intensely alive to all that was passing, and pushing onward briskly. He informed me that four pieces of artillery had just left the rebel camp, weakly escorted, and ran into the gorge, which he could have easily captured with a small force of cavalry. The gorge is to the east of Ringgold, and we were approaching it from the west. A little firing occurred between our skirmishers, as they entered the town, and small parties of the rebel cavalry and infantry, the latter retiring in the direction of the gap. This is a break in Taylor's ridge of sufficient width for the river to flow through, and on its north bank room for an ordinary road and a railroad, when the ridge rises with abruptness on both sides four or five hundred feet, and from thence, running nearly north and south, continues unbroken for many miles; covering the entrance to it is a small patch of young trees and undergrowth.

It was represented by the citizens friendly to the cause of the Union, and confirmed by contrabands, that the enemy had passed through Ringgold sorely pressed, his animals exhausted, and the army hopelessly demoralized. In a small portion of it only had the officers been able to preserve regimental and company formations, many of the men having thrown away their arms, a still greater number more open and violent in their denunciations of the confederacy; and, in order to gain time, it was the intention of the rear guard to make use of the natural advantages the gorge presented to check the pursuit. The troops relied on for this were posted behind the mountain and the trees, and the latter were also used to mask a couple of pieces of artillery. Only a feeble line of skirmishers appeared in sight. The only way to ascertain the enemy's strength was to feel of him, and as our success, if prompt, would be crowned with a rich harvest in the trophies and spoils of war, without waiting for my artillery, (not yet up, though after nine o'clock,) the skirmishers advanced. Wood deployed his brigade in



rear of them, under cover of the embankment of the railroad, and a brisk musketry fire commenced between the skirmishers; at the same time the enemy kept his artillery busily at work. Their skirmishers were driven in, and as we had learned the position of the battery, the thirteenth Illinois regiment, from the right of Wood's line, was thrown forward to seize some houses from which their gunners could be picked off by our men. These were heroically taken and held by that brave regiment. Apprehensive that he might lose his artillery, the enemy advanced with a superior force on our skirmishers, and they fell back behind Wood's line, when that admirable officer opened on the rebels and drove them into the gorge, leaving their dead and wounded on the ground, our skirmishers at once occupying their line, the thirteenth Illinois all the time maintaining its position with resolution and obstinacy.

Simultaneous with these operations in front of the gorge, Osterhaus detached four regiments under Colonel Williamson, half a mile to the left, to ascend the ridge and turn the enemy's right. Two of them, the seventy-sixth Ohio, supported by the fourth Iowa, were thrown forward, and, as the enemy appeared in great force when they had nearly gained the crest, Geary ordered four of his regiments still further to the left, under Colonel Creighton, for the same object, where they found an overwhelming force confronting them. Vigorous attacks were made by both of these columns, in which the troops exhibited extraordinary daring and devotion, but were compelled to yield to numerical superiority, the first to take shelter in a depression in the side of the ridge, about fifty paces in rear of their most advanced position, and there remain. The other column was ordered to resume their position on the railroad. All the parties sent forward to ascertain the enemy's position and strength were small; but the attacks had been made with so much vigor, and succeeded so well in their object, that I deemed it unwise to call up the commands of Palmer and Cruft and the remaining brigade of Geary to deliver a general attack without my artillery, and accordingly gave instructions for no advance to be made, and for the firing to be discontinued except in self-defence. These orders were conveyed and delivered to every officer in command on our advanced line. Word was received from General Wood that appearances in his front were indicative of a forward movement on the part of the enemy, when Ireland's brigade of Geary's division was sent to strengthen him; Cobham's brigade, of the same division, took a well-sheltered position behind the knoll midway between the depot and the opening to the gap. These officers were also ordered not to attack or to fire, unless it should become necessary.

I may here state, that the greatest difficulty I experienced with my new command, and the one which caused me the most solicitude, was to check and curb their disposition to engage, regardless of circumstances, and it appeared almost of consequences. This was the case on Lookout mountain, on Missionary ridge, and at Ringgold. Despite my emphatic and repeated instructions to the contrary, a desultory fire was kept up on the right of the line until the artillery arrived; and I see by the reports of the commanders, that under cover of elevated ground between my position and our right, several small parties advanced to capture the enemy's battery and harass his flank at the gap. It is with no dissatisfaction that I refer to these circumstances in evidence of the spirit animating the troops, and with no feeling of resentment, for of that I was disarmed by the abiding remembrance of their glorious services and achievements. It has never been my fortune to serve with more zealous and devoted troops.

Between twelve and one o'clock the artillery came up, not having been able to cross the west fork of the Chickamauga until eight o'clock. On the morning of the 27th, under my acting chief of artillery, Major Reynolds, in conjunction with Generals Geary and Osterhaus, one section of 24-pounder howitzers was placed in position to bear on the enemy and to enfilade the gap, another section of 10-pounder Parrotts to silence the enemy's battery, and one section further to the left

to bear on some troops held in mass in front of Geary's regiments. At the same time a regiment of Cruft's division had been sent around to the bridge to cross the Chickamauga, and, if possible, to gain the heights of the ridge on the south side of the river, the possession of which would give us a plunging fire upon the enemy in the gorge. Two companies had nearly gained the summit when they were recalled. The artillery had opened with marked effect. The rebel guns were hauled to the rear, his troops seen moving, and before one o'clock he was in full retreat. Williamson's brigade followed him over the mountain, while skirmishers from the sixtieth and one hundred and second New York regiments pursued through the gap. Efforts were made to burn the railroad bridges, but the rebels were driven from them and the fires extinguished. During the artillery firing the major general commanding the division of the Mississippi arrived and gave directions for the pursuit to be discontinued. Later in the day, soon after three o'clock, I received instructions from him to have a reconnoissance made in the direction of Tunnel Hill, the enemy's line of retreat, for purposes of observation, and to convey to the enemy the impression that we were still after him. Gross's brigade was despatched on this service. About two miles out he ran upon a small force of rebel cavalry and infantry, and pursued them about a mile and a half, when he fell upon what he supposed to be a division of troops posted on the hills commanding the road. The brigade returned at eight o'clock and went into bivouac. Colonel Gross's report in this connexion concludes by saying "that we found broken caissons, wagons, ambulances, dead and dying men of the enemy, strewn along the way to a horrible extent."

As some misapprehension appears to exist with regard to our losses in this battle, it is proper to observe that the reports of my division commanders exhibit a loss of sixty-five (65) killed, and three hundred and seventy-seven (377) wounded—about one-half of the latter so severely that it was necessary to have them conveyed to the hospital for proper treatment. They also show of the enemy killed and left on the field, one hundred and thirty, (130.) Of his wounded we had no means of ascertaining, as only those severely hurt remained, and they filled every house by the wayside as far as our troops penetrated. A few of our wounded men fell into the enemy's hands, but were soon retaken. We captured two hundred and thirty (230) prisoners and two flags, to make no mention of the vast amount of property and materials that fell into our hands. Adding to the number of prisoners and killed, as above stated, the lowest estimated proportion of wounded to killed usual in battle, would make the losses of the enemy at least three to our one.

From this time the operations of the "right wing," as it was called, became subordinate to those of the column marching to the relief of the garrison at Knoxville.

Instructions reached me from the headquarters of the military division to remain at Ringgold during the 29th and 30th, unless it should be found practicable to advance towards Dalton without fighting a battle, the object of my remaining, as stated, being to protect Sherman's flank, with authority to attack or move on Dalton should the enemy move up the Dalton and Cleveland road. In retreating, the enemy had halted a portion of his force at Tunnel Hill, midway between Ringgold and Dalton, and as he evinced no disposition to molest Sherman, my command rested at Ringgold. I was kept fully advised of the rebel movements, through the activity and daring of the second Kentucky cavalry. They joined me on the 28th.

In obedience to verbal directions given me by the commander of the division, the railroad was thoroughly destroyed for two miles, including the bridges on each side of Ringgold, by Palmer's and Cruft's commands; also the depot, tannery, all the mills, and all material that could be used in the support of an army. We found on our arrival large quantities of forage and flour. What was not required by the want of the service, was either sent to the rear or burned. Our

wounded were as promptly and as well cared for as circumstances would permit. Surgeon Moore, the medical director of the army of the Tennessee, voluntarily left his chief, to lend his heart, head, and hands to their relief; and under his active, skilful, and humane auspices, and those of the medical directors of the divisions, they were comfortably removed to Chattanooga on the 28th. My sincere thanks are tendered to all the officers of the medical staff for their zealous and careful attention to the wounded on this, as well as on former fields. Especially are they due to Surgeon Ball, medical director of Geary's division, and to Surgeon Menzies, medical director of Cruft's division.

On the 29th, Major General Palmer returned to Chattanooga with his command, having in charge such prisoners as remained in Ringgold. On the 30th, the enemy, being reassured by the cessation of our pursuit, sent a "flag of truce" to our advanced lines at Catoosa, by Major Calhoun Benham, requesting permission to bury his dead, and care for his wounded, abandoned on the field of his last disaster at Ringgold. Copies of this correspondence have heretofore been forwarded. Also, on the 30th, under instructions from department headquarters, Gross's brigade, Cruft's division, marched for the old battlefield at Chickamauga to bury our dead, and on the 1st of December, the infantry and cavalry remaining left Ringgold; Geary and Cruft to return to their old camps. Osterhaus to encamp in Chattanooga valley.

The reports of commanders exhibit a loss on the campaign, including all the engagements herein reported, in killed, wounded, and, missing, of nine hundred and sixty, (960,) inconsiderable in comparison with my apprehension, or the ends accomplished; nevertheless, there is cause for the deepest regret and sorrow. Among the fallen are some of the brightest names of the army. Creighton and Crane, of the seventh Ohio, Acton of the fortieth Ohio, Bushnell of the thirteenth Illinois, Elliott of the one hundred and second New York, and others whose names my limits will not allow me to enumerate, will be remembered and lamented as long as courage and patriotism are esteemed as virtues among men. The army and the country deplore their loss.

The reports of commanders also show the capture of six thousand five hundred and forty-seven (6,547) prisoners, (not including those taken by Palmer at Graystown, of which no return has been received;) also seven (7) pieces of artillery, nine (9) battle flags, not less than ten thousand (10,000) stand of small-arms, one (1) wagon train, and a large amount of ammunition for artillery and infantry, forage, rations, camp and garrison equipage, caissons and limbers, ambulances, and other implements. The reports relative to the capture of the flags are herewith transmitted.

In the foregoing it has been impossible to furnish more than a general outline of our operations, relying upon the reports of subordinate commanders to give particulars and discriminating information concerning the services of divisions, brigades, regiments, and batteries. These reports are herewith respectfully transmitted. The attention of the major general commanding is especially invited to those of division commanders. As to their own distinguished services, I cannot speak in terms of too high praise. They served me day and night, present or absent, with all of the intelligent, well-directed earnestness, and devotion they would have served themselves, had they been charged with the responsibilities of the commander. The confidence inspired by their active and generous co-operation and support, early caused me to feel that complete success was inevitable.

My thanks are due to General Carlin and his brigade for his services on Lookout mountain on the night of the 24th. They were posted in an exposed position, and when attacked repelled it with great spirit and success. I must also express my acknowledgments to Major General Palmer and his command for services rendered while belonging to my column.

Lieutenant Ayres, of the signal corps, with his assistants, rendered me valu-

able aid in his branch of the service during our operations. Major Reynolds, the chief of artillery of Geary's division, proved himself to be a skilful artilleryman, and requires especial mention for his services. His batteries were always posted with judgment and served with marked ability. The precision of his fire at Lookout and Ringgold elicited my admiration.

To my staff have I been more than ever indebted for the assistance rendered me. Major General Butterfield, chief of staff, prompt and able in counsel, was untiring and devoted on the field. Captain H. W. Perkins, assistant adjutant general, Colonel James D. Fessenden, Major William H. Lawrence, Captain R. H. Hall, Lieutenants P. A. Oliver, and Samuel W. Taylor, aides-de-camp, bravely and intelligently performed all their duties.

Lieutenant H. C. Wharton, a promising young officer of engineers, reported to me from the staff of the major general commanding the department, and was unwearied in his assistance, both as an engineer and as an officer of my personal staff. Major General Howard has furnished me for transmittal his very able report of the operations and services of the 11th corps, from the time it passed from my command, November 22, to that of its return, December 17. As it relates to events of which I had no personal knowledge, it only remains to comply with his wishes, with the request that the major general commanding the department will give it his especial attention. I may add that the zeal and devotedness displayed by this corps and its distinguished commander in performing all the duties assigned them, cheerfully encountering its perils and sharing its privations, afford me great satisfaction.

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER,

*Major General Commanding.*

Brig. General WILLIAM D. WHIPPLE,

*Assistant Adjutant General Army of the Cumberland.*

A true copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

#### HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION OF CAVALRY,

*Near Chattanooga, November 28, 1863.*

SIR: In obedience to directions received I have the honor to report as follows in reference to the late expedition to Cleveland, Tennessee:

The first point at which I struck the Cleveland and Chattanooga railroad to do it damage was at Tyner's station, where a considerable portion of the track was torn up. The next place was about fifteen (15) miles this side of Cleveland, where a small piece of trestle-work over culvert was burned and track torn up. At Oultawah another trestle was burned and the track destroyed for some distance. Five (5) miles this side of Cleveland, and at several places between that and Cleveland, the road was destroyed to considerable extent.

On the Cleveland and Dalton railroad the rails were torn up in numerous places for a distance of ten (10) miles out of Cleveland. The Cleveland and Charleston road was damaged in quite a number of places from Cleveland to within one and a half ( $1\frac{1}{2}$ ) mile of Charleston.

The points at which the track was destroyed on the latter two roads cannot be well particularized, as there were no large bridges or culverts destroyed which would specify the localities. The only large culverts and bridges I saw on any of the roads were built of stone and could not be readily destroyed.

The first road I travelled after leaving Chattanooga was the dirt road to Cleveland which runs alongside the railroad. This road has been much travelled

and is in bad condition, and would soon become impracticable to heavily loaded wagons in the present weather. It runs in some places through gorges and cañons with abrupt hills on each side. I travelled for some eight (8) miles on a road nearly parallel to this, and from two to four miles to the right, which runs, I think, direct from Chickamauga station to Cleveland. This is somewhat better than the last mentioned road.

Returning from Cleveland I came through Harrison on a good dirt road all the way not much travelled. There are no heavy grades on either of the roads travelled. The country is generally good, in an agricultural point of view, but most of the forage has been already consumed. There is, however, enough left to supply a command for a short time; more of long than short forage.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ELI LONG,

*Col. Com'dg Second Brigade, Second Cavalry Division.*

GEORGE K. LEET,

*Assistant Adj. General Mil. Div. of the Mississippi.*

True copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

On the 27th of November, I recalled General Granger's command from Mission ridge and sent it towards Knoxville, by the following order :

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*Chattanooga, November 27, 1863—7 p. m.*

GENERAL : The general commanding department directs that you march without delay with the divisions of Sheridan and Wood to the relief of General Burnside at Knoxville. You will take as much artillery as you can, and move without wagons. Ten days' rations for your entire command and extra ammunition will be transported on the steamer Paint Rock, now at the wharf. Take three days' rations and forty rounds of ammunition on the persons of the men.

By command of Major General Thomas :

J. J. REYNOLDS,

*Major General and Chief of Staff.*

Major General GORDON GRANGER,

*Commanding 4th Army Corps.*

I also sent General Elliott in the same direction :

CHATTANOOGA, November 27, 1863.

Brigadier General W. L. ELLIOTT, *Murfreesboro' :*

Move with what cavalry you have with you to Kingston, taking up Colonel Byrd at that place; thence south in the direction of Athens, seeking the enemy and harassing him as much as possible when found. If you cannot find him report to General Burnside at Knoxville. More definite instructions cannot be given you at this time. Crook will probably be sent south.

By command of Major General Thomas :

WILLIAM D. WHIPPLE,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Howard's corps and Davis's division of the 14th corps were with General Sherman, already marching on Knoxville, leaving no troops at Chattanooga except the regular garrison and two divisions of Palmer's corps. Hooker was then recalled from Ringgold by the following order :

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*Chattanooga, November 30—9 a. m.*

GENERAL: The general commanding department directs that you leave Ringgold with the forces under your command, starting shortly after the moon rises to-night and move towards Chattanooga. The troops of the 12th corps and those of the 4th corps will resume their original positions west of Lookout mountain and on the road to Bridgeport. Osterhaus's division will be halted at a convenient point between Chattanooga and Rossville, and the commanding officer will report to General Grant for instructions. Execute the orders received from General Grant in reference to the destruction of property at Ringgold. It is reported, on what seems good authority, that some of our dead lie unburied on the battle-field of Chickamauga. Order a detail from the command of General Cruft, or the whole command if necessary, to return via Chickamauga and bury them.

Very respectfully your obedient servant,

J. J. REYNOLDS,

*Major General and Chief of Staff.*

Major General JOSEPH HOOKER.

General Granger reached the Hiawassee on the 30th of November, with his command, and reported as follows:

## HEADQUARTERS 4TH ARMY CORPS,

*Kincannon's Ferry, November 30, 1863—5 p. m.*

GENERAL: Reached this point at 2 p. m.; roads horrid, and marches difficult and laborious. Steamer (with flats) has just arrived. We are crossing as rapidly as possible. I expect to get everything over by 12 m. to-morrow. I have no news whatever from Knoxville or elsewhere; in fact this country is depopulated. My programme is as follows: to move directly to Kingston, cross the Tennessee river, and attack Longstreet's right flank. I am in hopes to reach Kingston on the 3d, and be in front of Knoxville by the 5th or 6th at the latest. I have ordered Spear's brigade to join me at Kingston; also all the cavalry and troops at that point to be in readiness to move at a moment's warning. I have been seriously embarrassed for want of cavalry, and was fired into on our arrival here by the rebel cavalry from the opposite side of the Hiawassee. Please inform me if any movement is being made by our troops upon my right flank above Calhoun; if not, Longstreet can easily cross the Tennessee river, near Knoxville, and escape southward by roads a short distance east of the Cleveland and Dalton railroad.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. GRANGER,

*Major General.*

Major General GEORGE H. THOMAS.

The above was answered as follows:

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*Chattanooga, December 1, 1863—5 30 p. m.*

Major General G. GRANGER, *Commanding 4th Army Corps:*

Yours of 5 p. m. yesterday received. General Sherman is on your right, and has orders, on uniting his forces with yours, to assume the direction of affairs. Elliott is ordered to Kingston; left on the 25th. Colonel Palmer is also ordered with his regiment and tenth Ohio cavalry direct to Kingston; leaves to-day. Steamer Dunbar, loading with 150,000 rations hard bread and salt, and about

half that quantity of coffee, sugar, and bacon will start to-night or in the morning. We will endeavor to send you more supplies by river.

Enemy's main body reported south of Dalton.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. J. REYNOLDS,

*Major General and Chief of Staff.*

The following communication from my chief commissary to my chief quartermaster at Nashville will illustrate how severely taxed were our means of supply to maintain the army in East Tennessee:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Chattanooga, December 5, 1863.*

Colonel J. L. DONALDSON, *Chief Quartermaster, Nashville:*

We require, daily, one hundred and twenty-five thousand rations for this army, including Sherman's command. Have on hand three hundred and ten thousand rations salt meat; one million three hundred and ninety-two thousand rations flour and bread; seven hundred and sixty-six rations coffee and tea; one million four hundred and eighteen thousand salt; we require, daily, about one hundred and seventy (170) head of cattle.

A. PARKER PORTER,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Chief Commissary.*

General Sherman's movement on Knoxville caused the enemy to raise the siege of that place and retreat towards southwest Virginia, when, there being no longer any necessity for retaining so large a force in East Tennessee, the column commanded by General Sherman returned to Chattanooga, leaving General Granger's corps with General Burnside's command, which, with other re-enforcements, left ample force for the protection of that section. On the 14th of December General Elliott's cavalry command was added to the forces in East Tennessee, and operated with them throughout the remainder of the winter.

*December 17.*—The 11th army corps, and Davis's division of the 14th corps, returned to Chattanooga, the first of which was posted to protect the railroad north of Lookout mountain, and the other went into camp on Spring creek, south of Mission ridge. With the return of the above-mentioned troops I had control of three corps—the 14th, 11th, and 12th—to defend Chattanooga and hold open railroad communication with Nashville, 150 miles distant. There were also small garrisons and detachments operating against the numerous guerillas infesting Middle Tennessee, of which mention was made in my report of the operations of my command during December, 1863, a copy of which I forward herewith. I had with me at the front two brigades of cavalry—Long's, posted at the Hiawassee river, and Watkins's, stationed at Rossville, from which two points a number of scouting parties were sent out to observe the enemy's movements in the direction of Dalton.

On the 25th of December Colonel Leibold (second Missouri) started from Chattanooga to march to Knoxville with a large supply train and a number of convalescents belonging to the 4th army corps. He was attacked at Charleston, on the Hiawassee, when, being re-enforced by troops from Colonel Long's cavalry command, he drove the enemy off, and Colonel Long's men pursued them as far as an unfordable creek, several miles from where the attack was made. The behavior of the troops was most praiseworthy; they being in inferior numbers to the enemy, and great credit is due to both commanders for the calm and deliberate manner in which they handled their commands. The following are copies of their reports of the affair:

## ATTACK ON CALHOUN, TENNESSEE.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION CAVALRY,  
*Calhoun, Tenn., December 28, 1863.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to forward, for the information of the major general commanding the department, report of attack made this a. m. upon this place by the rebel General Wheeler. The attack was made at about 10 o'clock by a force of from twelve (12) to fifteen (15) hundred cavalry and mounted infantry, led by General Wheeler in person. Brigadier General Kelley, with his brigade, formed part of this force. Their object was evidently the capture of the supply trains which arrived here last evening under charge of forces commanded by Colonel Leibold.

Colonel Leibold encamped on the Charleston side of the river, and his skirmishers were at work with the enemy before I was apprised of their approach. I immediately mounted the small command which remained in camp not on duty, (about 150 men,) moved across the bridge, and found the infantry pretty sharply engaged, the enemy occupying position in the woods. The latter shortly afterwards gave way, and I then started rapidly after them. Discovering a small portion of their force now cut off on the right, I ordered a sabre charge, and followed a retreating column of several hundreds which had taken out the Chatata road running up the Hiawassee.

Our rapid pursuit and vigorous use of the sabre completely demoralized this force, which was thrown into great confusion and scattered in every direction; their men throwing away large numbers of arms, accoutrements, &c. Several of the enemy (number not known) were killed and wounded, and we captured one hundred and twenty-one (121) prisoners, including five (5) commissioned officers. Drove the remainder till I had arrived at a creek, which was scarcely fordable, and deemed it prudent to follow no further. The main rebel column had fled out the Dalton road. I sent a small force out that road, who followed some five miles, and the enemy is still retreating towards Cleveland. My own loss is one man seriously wounded.

Since returning to my headquarters I have received a despatch from the officer commanding couriers at Cleveland. He was attacked early this morning by a force of about 100 men, and drove them off.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ELI LONG,

*Colonel Commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.*

Brigadier General Wm. D. WHIPPLE,

*Chief of Staff, Army of the Cumberland.*

## ACTION ON THE HIAWASSEE.

CAMP NEAR CALHOUN, *December 28, 1863.*

SIR: It affords me great pleasure to report to you that I have given the rebel General Wheeler a sound thrashing this morning. I had succeeded, in spite of the most abominable roads, to reach Charleston on the night of the 27th; and this morning shortly after daylight I was moving my train across Hiawassee river bridge, when Wheeler's cavalry, reported 1,500 strong, with four guns, which, however, they had no time to bring into action, appeared in my rear. I placed the infantry in line of battle, then got my train over the bridge safely, and next asked Colonel Long to place a regiment of cavalry at my disposal. These arrangements made, I charged with the infantry in double-quick on the astonished rebels and routed them completely, when I ordered a cavalry charge to give them the finishing touch. The charge was made in good style, but the number of our cavalry was insufficient for an effectual pursuit, and so the enemy got away, and was even able to take his guns along, which, with innumerable prisoners, must have fallen into my hands could I have made a hot pursuit.



I have now with me, as prisoners, five commissioned officers, among whom the inspector general of General Kelley's division; and a surgeon, and 126 men of different regiments. Wheeler commanded in person, and it was reported to him, as the prisoners state, that I had 600 wagons in my train, which he expected to take without great trouble. The casualties on my side are as follows: Third division, two commissioned officers wounded, two men killed, eight men wounded, one man missing; second division, four men wounded.

The rebels lost, besides the number stated, several severely wounded, which I am obliged to leave behind, and probably several killed. The number of small-arms thrown away by them is rather large, and they will undoubtedly be gathered up by Colonel Long. I shall pursue my march at daybreak to-morrow.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BERNARD LEIBOLD,

*Colonel Second Infantry, Missouri Volunteers.*

Brigadier General W. D. WHIPPLE,

*Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Cumberland.*

The following is a copy of the report of operations of my command during December, 1863, and January and February, 1864:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*Chattanooga, Tennessee, January 1, 1864.*

GENERAL: The following report of the operations of the army of the Cumberland since the date of my last report is respectfully submitted to the major general commanding:

*December 1, 1863.*—General Hooker returned to Chattanooga with Geary's division, 12th corps, and Osterhaus's division of 15th corps; Cruft's two brigades of the first division, 4th corps, were ordered to proceed to Chickamauga battleground and bury such of our dead as still remained unburied by the rebels. This duty finished they were to return to their former position on the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, between Whitesides and Bridgeport. General Hooker, on evacuating Ringgold, destroyed the railroad depot and other buildings, as well as such captured property as could not be removed. General Granger's corps marched to the relief of Knoxville, via Calhoun, to act in connexion with General Sherman's command, which was also moving towards that place. Watkins's brigade of cavalry stationed at Rossville, supported by two regiments of infantry, to guard our south front. The ninety-second Illinois mounted infantry, Colonel S. D. Atkins commanding, ordered to proceed to Caperton's ferry to guard that place and vicinity. Brigadier General Elliott, with the first division of cavalry, was ordered to proceed from the neighborhood of Sparta to Kingston.

*December 3.*—Information given by deserters from the enemy places the rebel army as follows: Cleburne's division at Tunnel Hill, and the balance of Bragg's army at Dalton; they also state that the rebel army is very much demoralized, and the men scattered from their regiments, and that desertions were numerous. Buckner's corps was not in the battles in front of Chattanooga, it having gone to the assistance of Longstreet seven or eight days previous. Colonel Buell, fifty-eighth Indiana volunteers, commanding pioneer brigade, commenced constructing a double-track wagon road over the nose of Lookout mountain.

*December 5.*—Guerillas made their appearance in the neighborhood of Harrison, without doing much damage, however. A cavalry reconnoissance sent out by Colonel Watkins from Rossville proceeded as far as Ringgold, and returned without having found any signs of the enemy except stragglers and deserters.

*December 10.*—General Elliott received instructions that, in case he did not reach Kingston in time to join in the pursuit of Longstreet, he was to take up a position on the northeast side of the Hiawassee river, pushing outposts as far as possible to the southeast, to observe the movements of the enemy in that direction.

*December 13.*—Brigadier General Gillem reports as follows from Nashville: Just returned from the Tennessee river. Work on the Northwestern railroad progressing. Guerillas between the Cumberland and Duck rivers broken up. Perkins and Ray disposed of—the former killed, and the latter captured. Refugees and conscripts from south side of Tennessee river report that Forrest and Pillow are at Jackson, West Tennessee, with 4,000 men, about 1,000 of whom are well organized.

*December 14.*—Colonel Watkins, with detachments from the fourth and sixth Kentucky cavalry, about 250 men, made a reconnoissance to Lafayette, surprising the town, and capturing a colonel of the Georgia home guards, six (6) officers of the rebel signal-corps, and about thirty horses and mules; our loss none.

*December 15.*—A small party of rebels, under Major Joe. Fontain, Roddy's adjutant, was captured by General Dodge near Pulaski.

They had been on a reconnoissance along the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, and the Nashville and Decatur railroad. At one point they had tapped the telegraph, and taken off several despatches. Orders were then immediately sent to General Slocum, commanding 12th corps, to be vigilant along his line. General Elliott, commanding cavalry, ordered to establish his headquarters at Athens, and post pickets at Calhoun, Columbus, and Tellico Plain.

*December 17.*—Howard's corps returned to Chattanooga from Knoxville; also Davis's division of the 14th corps. The latter was posted along Spring creek, south of Mission ridge. The former returned to its position in Lookout valley.

*December 19.*—Information brought by scouts that the enemy are strengthening their position between Tunnel Hill and Dalton. Also at Resaca, near the Oostenaula river, and the Altoona mountain, south of the Etowah, the last named place being a formidable position.

*December 20.*—General Crook, commanding second division of cavalry, ordered by General Grant to assemble his command at Huntsville, and move to Prospect, with a view to operate against Forrest. Crook to be relieved in his present position by troops from General Sherman's command. General W. S. Smith, chief of cavalry, military division of the Mississippi, with the third, fifth, and seventh Kentucky, second and fourth Tennessee, and eighth Iowa cavalry regiments, started for Savannah, to cross the Tennessee river, and operate on the flank and rear of Forrest, and drive him from West Tennessee.

*December 22.*—A party of Wheeler's cavalry, numbering about 15, at 9 p. m. attacked a party of the fourth Michigan cavalry, stationed at Cleveland. Our loss one or two captured, some revolvers, sabres, and saddles lost, also some overcoats and blankets; enemy finally driven off. Railroad bridge at Chattanooga completed.

*December 23.*—Colonel Watkins sent out a scout of 150 men from fourth and sixth Kentucky cavalry, under command of Major Willing, of the sixth Kentucky, which proceeded as far as Lafayette, Georgia, capturing at that place one commissioned rebel officer and sixteen non-commissioned officers and privates; also ten citizens, said to be violent rebels, and 38 horses and mules.

Information from various sources leads to the belief that Hardee is making the Oostenaula river his front, defended by rifle-pits and fortifications; also the Etowah river. All deserters and scouts agree in their statements that the rebels in our front are disheartened and demoralized. President Lincoln's amnesty proclamation was having a good effect in encouraging desertions from the rebels, measures having been taken to circulate it extensively within the enemy's lines.

*December 28.*—Colonel Eli Long, commanding second brigade second division cavalry, reports as follows from Calhoun, Tennessee: "Rebel General Wheeler attacked this place at about 10 a. m. to-day, with a force of from 1,200 to 1,500 cavalry; Brigadier General Kelly, with his brigade, formed part of this force. Their object was evidently the capture of the supply train which arrived here

last evening in charge of forces under Colonel Leibold. Colonel Leibold was encamped on the Charleston side of the river, and his skirmishers were at work with the enemy before I was apprised of their approach. I immediately mounted the small command which remained in camp not on duty, (about 150 men,) moved across the bridge, and found the infantry pretty sharply engaged, the enemy occupying position in the woods. The latter shortly afterwards gave way, and I then started rapidly after them. Discovering a small portion of their force now cut off on the right, I ordered a sabre charge, and followed a retreating column of several hundred which had gone out on the Chatata road, running up the Hiawassee; our rapid pursuit, and vigorous use of the sabre, completely demoralized this force, which was thrown into great confusion and scattered in every direction; their men throwing away large numbers of arms, accoutrements, &c. Several of the enemy (number not known) were killed and wounded, and we captured 121 prisoners, including five commissioned officers.

"We drove the remainder until I had arrived at a creek which was scarcely fordable, and I deemed it prudent to follow no further. The main rebel force fled out on the Dalton road. I sent a small force out that road, who followed some five miles, and the enemy is now still retreating toward Cleveland. My own loss is one man seriously wounded. The courier station at Cleveland was also attacked on the morning of the 28th by a force of about 100, and they drove the rebels off."

Also Colonel Bernard Leibold, (second Missouri,) who was in charge of the train and escort above referred to, reports as follows from camp near Calhoun: "It affords me great pleasure to report to you that I have given the rebel General Wheeler a sound thrashing this morning. I had succeeded, in spite of the most abominable roads, to reach Charleston on the night of the 27th; and this morning, shortly after daylight, I was moving my train across the Hiawassee river bridge, when Wheeler's cavalry (reported 1,500 strong, with four guns, which however they had no time to bring into action) appeared in my rear. I placed my infantry in line of battle, then got my train safely over the bridge, and next asked Colonel Long to place a regiment of cavalry at my disposal. These arrangements made, I charged with the infantry in double-quick on the astonished rebels, and routed them completely, when I ordered a cavalry charge to give them the finishing touch. The charge was made in good style, but the number of our cavalry was insufficient for an effectual pursuit, and so the enemy got away, and was even able to take his guns along, which, with innumerable prisoners, must have fallen into my hands could I have made a hot pursuit. I have now with me as prisoners five commissioned officers, among whom the inspector general of Kelley's division and a surgeon, and 126 men of different regiments.

"Wheeler commanded in person; and it was reported to him; as the prisoners state, that I had 600 wagons in my train, which he expected to take without great trouble. The casualties on my side are as follows: Two commissioned officers and twelve men wounded, two men killed and one missing. The rebels lost several wounded and probably several killed.

"The number of small-arms thrown away by them, is rather large, and will undoubtedly be gathered up by Colonel Long. I shall pursue my march at day break to-morrow."

Nothing of importance has occurred since the 28th instant.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General U. S. V., Commanding.*

Brigadier General L. THOMAS,

*Adjutant General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*

True copy :

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Chattanooga, Tennessee, March 10, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the operations of my command for the months of January and February, 1864, as follows:

From the 1st until as late as the 20th of January, no movements of any consequence took place. Small scouting parties of both cavalry and infantry were sent out from time to time to watch the movements of the enemy, but failed to find him in any considerable force in our immediate front.

Information gained through scouts and deserters placed Johnston's army at Dalton and vicinity, occupying the same position he had taken up after the rebel army had fallen back from Mission ridge, November 26, 1863, and showing, as yet, no disposition to assume the offensive. Desertions from the enemy still continued numerous, averaging thirty per day; nearly all of whom wished to embrace the terms of the President's amnesty proclamation, which, with Major General Grant's General Orders No. 10, of December 12, 1863, headquarters military division of the Mississippi, had been freely circulated within the rebel lines for some time previous.

On the 20th of January, General G. M. Dodge, at Pulaski Tennessee, having ascertained that a force of rebel cavalry, under Roddy, was constructing flat-boats, and hiding them in Little Bear creek, Spring creek, and Town creek, and also that one of Roddy's regiments was foraging on the north side of the Tennessee river, he immediately informed General Grant of these movements of the enemy, who directed me to organize an expedition at once of sufficient force to drive Roddy away from where he was reported to be, and to destroy all boats and materials that might in any way be used by the enemy in crossing the Tennessee river. On the 22d, information was received that Johnson's and Morrison's brigades of Roddy's command had crossed the Tennessee somewhere between Florence and Clifton, on the 18th, intending to make a raid on our railroads. The guards along the railroads were cautioned against an attack from this party, and measures were immediately taken to drive Roddy across the river. Colonel H. O. Miller, seventy-second Indiana, commanding one expedition, reports from Blue-Water, on the 26th, via Pulaski, 27th, that he engaged Johnson's brigade near Florence, routed them, killed fifteen, and wounded quite a number, taking many prisoners; among them three commissioned officers. Our loss was ten (10) wounded.

Brigadier General Gillem also reports having sent out parties from along the line of the Northwestern railroad, and their having returned with Lieutenant Colonel Brewer, two captains, three lieutenants, and twenty men as prisoners.

A party of guerillas, numbering about 150 men, attacked Tracy City on the 20th, and, after having three times summoned the garrison to surrender, were handsomely repulsed by our forces.

Colonel T. J. Harrison, thirty-ninth Indiana, (mounted infantry,) reports from Cedar Grove, 21st instant, that he had sent out an expedition of 200 men to Sparta, to look after the guerillas in that vicinity. They divided into five parties, concentrating at Sparta. Having passed over the localities of Curtis's, Champ Ferguson's, Bledsoe's, and Murry's guerillas, his (Harrison's) force remained on the Calf Killer five days, and during that time killed four, (4,) wounded five or six, and captured fifteen, including a captain and lieutenant, thirty (30) horses, and twenty (20) stand of arms.

The Nashville and Chattanooga railroad having been completed on the 14th instant, and trains running from Nashville to this point, steps were immediately taken to commence repairing the East Tennessee and Georgia railroad. The first division of the 4th corps, Major General D. L. Stanley commanding, was ordered on the 24th to take up a position north of Chattanooga, between Chickamauga depot and the Hiawassee river, to protect the repairs on the railroad

General Hooker, commanding 11th and 12th corps, was ordered to relieve Stanley's division, then stationed on the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad between Whitesides and Bridgeport.

*January 28.*—Major General John M. Palmer, commanding 14th army corps, with a portion of his command, made a reconnoissance towards the enemy's position on Tunnel Hill. He found them still in force at that point, and the object of the movement having been fully accomplished, General Palmer returned to Chattanooga.

*February 7.*—Colonel W. B. Stokes, fifth Tennessee cavalry, reports from Alexandria, Tennessee, that, in pursuance to orders, he had recently scouted in the vicinity of Sparta after certain bands of guerillas infesting that neighborhood, and had succeeded in killing seventeen (17) and capturing twelve (12) guerillas, besides twenty (20) horses and mules. Another force, under Colonel O'Connell, succeeded in killing twenty-three (23) and capturing forty (40) of the same gang. Colonel Stokes ascertained that, when concentrated, the guerillas in that section of the country will number 600 men, finely mounted. A scout also brought me information of an attack by Roddy, with a heavy force, upon our troops stationed at Lebanon, De Kalb county, Alabama, on the 30th instant. The rebels were repulsed and driven in confusion towards Gadsden, when, learning that Roddy was being re-enforced by Wheeler, our troops withdrew to Sand mountain, taking possession of Saltpetre cave, near Fort Price.

About the 10th instant, various reports having been received that the enemy under Johnston had weakened his force by sending re-enforcements to Polk, then opposing the advance of our forces under General Sherman, also that he had sent troops to aid Longstreet, in East Tennessee, and it being the desire of the commanding general of the military division effectually to clear out the rebel army directly opposed to our forces at Knoxville, I received orders on the 10th instant to prepare to start for Knoxville on the 13th with such force as could safely be spared from the protection of Chattanooga and its communications, to co-operate with the army of the Ohio in driving Longstreet from East Tennessee.

The army at this period had been very much weakened by the absence of many regiments, who had gone to their respective States to reorganize as veteran volunteers, (a list of which regiments I have the honor to annex hereto,) so that in making my preparations I found but a small force available. My transportation was in a very poor condition, notwithstanding all the efforts made to replace the animals lost by starvation, during the close investment of Chattanooga by the enemy, and for want of horses scarcely any of the artillery could be moved.

On the 13th the East Tennessee and Georgia railroad was in running order to Loudon. The same day, Matthias's brigade of the 15th corps (army of the Tennessee) arrived at Chattanooga from Huntsville, in pursuance to orders from General Grant, and was immediately placed in position at Cleveland, in reserve. On the 14th I received a communication from General Grant, countermanding the orders he had given me on the 10th to proceed with a force from my command to East Tennessee, and stating that from a conversation he had had with General Foster, he (General Grant) was convinced that all that could be accomplished by the proposed campaign would not compensate for the hardships upon our men, and the disqualifying effects it would have upon them and our war material for a spring campaign. He then went on to say, that as I had been preparing for a move, he deemed it advisable to make one to my immediate front, the object being to gain possession of Dalton and as far south of that as possible.

In accordance with the above instructions, everything being in readiness, Johnson's and Baird's divisions moved out from Chattanooga and occupied Ringgold, Georgia, on the 22d, taking up a position on the ridge west of East

Chickamauga creek, with two regiments of mounted infantry, (Colonel Boone's 28th Kentucky and Colonel Harrison's 39th Indiana, on the east side of the creek,) the former on the right flank and the latter on the left. Carlin's brigade of Johnson's division was stationed about midway between the main line and Taylor's ridge.

Cruft's division of the fourth corps moved on the 22d from Blue Springs, near Cleveland, to Red clay. Long's brigade of cavalry co-operated with Cruft's column, Long's instructions being to establish communication with Cruft at Red Clay, and then push on as far as possible towards Dalton, on the Spring Place road, observing well the movements of the enemy, so as to give timely warning of any attempt to turn Cruft's left flank, and should the enemy retire, to notify Cruft, so that the latter might advance from Red Clay. During the evening of the 22d General Palmer notified me, from Ringgold, that he had reliable information that Johnston had despatched Cheatham's and Cleburne's divisions to the relief of Polk in Alabama, who was falling back before General Sherman's column. On the 23d Davis's division of the 14th corps closed up on the balance of General Palmer's command at Ringgold. Brigadier General Mathias, commanding a brigade of the 15th corps stationed at Cleveland in reserve, was directed to send six regiments from his command to re-enforce General Cruft at Red Clay. Colonel Long, having established communication with Cruft the evening before, advanced with his brigade of cavalry along the Spring Place road, driving in the enemy's videttes, when within four miles of Dalton, attacking a regiment of rebel infantry which was encamped one mile beyond, driving them from their camp and capturing some prisoners. The enemy then formed, and Long withdrew his command to Russell's mills, four miles east of Varnell's station, on the Cleveland and Dalton railroad, and encamped there for the night. Cruft, by instructions from General Palmer, took position on the 23d at Lee's house, situated at the cross-roads on the road leading from Red Clay to Tunnel hill. The command being at this time well concentrated in the vicinity of Ringgold, and having reconnoitred thoroughly on both flanks, General Palmer advanced to feel the enemy in his position at Tunnel Hill, skirmished with him three or four miles, and, finally, drove him from his position entirely, to a point about one mile beyond Tunnel Hill, where he formed line and opened on us with his batteries. The main force then withdrew and went into camp about three miles northwest of Tunnel Hill, and on the morning of the 24th the line stood as follows: Baird's division south of Taylor's ridge, near Ringgold, with Cruft's division closed well on his left, Johnson's and Davis's division in advance, towards Tunnel Hill, with Boone's and Harrison's regiments of mounted infantry, (the former on the left,) and Harrison's men leading the advance towards Tunnel Hill, Long's brigade of cavalry at Varnell's station, on the Cleveland and Dalton railroad, supported by Gross's brigade of Cruft's division. An advance was then made in three columns. After the right and left columns had moved out some distance, the centre, with the mounted infantry in advance, pushed forward and met with a fire at long range from a battery of Parrott guns, the enemy's practice being excellent and succeeding in checking the column. The right and left columns were then set in motion and succeeded in flanking the enemy's battery, forcing it to retire. Davis's division of the 14th corps was started in pursuit, and on the 25th came up with a heavy force of rebels at Buzzard's roost, a pass through what is called Rocky-face ridge, which, as its name would suggest, is very precipitous and is a very strong position. Johnson's division of the 14th corps was advanced to the support of Davis; Baird's division of the 14th corps started from Tunnel Hill, at daylight on the morning of the 25th, to join General Cruft, at Lee's house, on the road leading to Red Clay, with instructions to move, in conjunction with Cruft and Long's cavalry, down the eastern side of Rocky-face ridge, and endeavor to force the enemy out of his position in the pass by threatening his right and

rear, while Davis, supported by Johnson, attacked him in front. In the meantime, Harrison's regiment of mounted infantry (thirty-ninth Indiana) occupied a gap in Rocky-face ridge, six miles south of Buzzard's roost and nearly opposite to Dalton, his instructions being to hold it as long as possible. Baird and Cruft found the enemy east of the ridge in heavy force and very strongly posted, skirmished heavily with him until nightfall, when both divisions were withdrawn, ascertaining before leaving that the enemy was in much stronger force than was supposed, and that in consequence of late movements on our part he had been obliged to order back to Dalton the re-enforcements he had sent to relieve Polk in Alabama, as Cleburne division (one of those reported to have gone south) attacked Colonel Harrison's mounted infantry command at daylight, on the morning of the 26th, and forced him to retire from the gap. Being convinced that the rebel army at Dalton largely outnumbered the strength of the four divisions I had opposed to it, and the movement against Johnston being a complete success, inasmuch as it caused the recalling of re-enforcements sent to oppose General Sherman's expedition against Meridian I concluded to withdraw my troops to the positions they had occupied previous to the reconnoissance.

Baird's division was to fall back on the evening of the 25th to Lee's farm, and on the 26th take position on a line of hills about a mile north of the town of Tunnel Hill, to cover the retirement of Johnson's and Davis's divisions from Buzzard's roost; Davis being ordered to take post at his old camp in front of Rossville, leaving one brigade to support Baird, (ordered to take post at Ringgold,) until General Baird had sufficient time to establish his picket lines. Johnson was ordered to take post at Tyner's station with two brigades of his command, sending one brigade to Graysville, and placing a strong guard in Parker's gap, northeast of Ringgold, to protect Baird's left flank. Cruft was ordered to take up his old position at Ottawah, and at Blue springs, (near Cleveland,) sending a depot guard to protect his supplies at Cleveland. Long's brigade of cavalry ordered to take post at Cleveland, and keep the left flank well patrolled. Colonel Harrison, commanding 39th Indiana mounted infantry, with the 28th Kentucky, (mounted infantry,) Colonel W. P. Boone, commanding, was posted at Leet's tan-yard, with instructions to patrol the country in the direction of Lafayette, and to picket strongly all the roads leading from Leet's in the direction of Lafayette, Resaca, and Dalton. In accordance with these instructions, Johnson withdrew on the night of the 26th to Catoosa platform, Davis, Baird, and Harrison to Ringgold, and on the 27th they all took up the positions indicated above. Cruft and Long's cavalry also fell back to Catoosa platform, on the night of the 26th, and thence took up the positions assigned them.

I have the honor to forward herewith a consolidated report of casualties; also the report of Colonel Eli Long, commanding 2d brigade 2d division of cavalry, and a statement of a refugee from Dalton, showing how matters stood at that place during the late reconnoissance. The monthly returns, for January and February, of Colonel J. G. Parkhurst, ninth Michigan veteran volunteers, (infantry,) provost marshal general, and that of Lieutenant Colonel A. P. Porter, chief commissary of subsistence, giving the average daily issue of rations to destitute citizens during the above named months.

The following named regiments, &c., have reorganized as veteran volunteers since the 31st December, 1863, viz:

*Infantry.*—2d Minnesota, 58th New York, 68th New York, 45th New York, 10th Illinois, 59th Illinois, 36th Illinois, 51st Illinois, 44th Illinois, 42d Illinois, 82d Ohio, 55th Ohio, 21st Ohio, 17th Ohio, 74th Ohio, 26th Ohio, 41st Ohio, 19th Ohio, 31st Ohio, 33d Ohio, 51st Ohio, 64th Ohio, 15th Ohio, 49th Ohio, 13th Ohio, 71st Ohio, 65th Ohio, 40th Ohio, 5th Connecticut, 30th Indiana, 44th Indiana, 31st Indiana, 42d Indiana, 22d Indiana, 33d Indiana, 57th Ind-

iana, 51st Indiana, 58th Indiana, 40th Indiana, 73d Pennsylvania, 109th Pennsylvania, 46th Pennsylvania, 77th Pennsylvania, 21st Kentucky, 4th Kentucky, 18th Kentucky, 23d Kentucky, 3d Maryland, 13th Wisconsin, 13th Michigan, 15th Missouri, 8th Kansas.

*Mounted infantry.*—17th Indiana, 14th Michigan.

*Cavalry.*—4th Kentucky, 6th Kentucky, 3d Kentucky, 7th Pennsylvania, 5th Iowa, 1st Ohio, 4th Ohio, 3d Ohio.

*Artillery.*—5th Wisconsin battery; 2d Illinois, battery H; 2d Illinois, battery I; 1st Ohio, battery C; 1st Ohio, battery F; 1st Ohio, battery B; 1st Ohio, battery G; 12th independent battery; 13th New York independent battery; 1st Michigan, battery E; 13th Indiana battery.

*Detachments.*—5 companies, 2d Massachusetts; company I, 37th Indiana; 47 men, 37th Indiana; 56 men, 10th Indiana; 6 companies, 27th Indiana; 67 men, 15th Indiana; 7 companies, 5th Ohio; company F, 7th Ohio; company D, 24th Ohio; 62 men, 18th Ohio; 41 men, 69th Ohio; company I, 27th Illinois; 90 men, 27th Illinois; 34 men, 22d Illinois; company C, 21st Illinois; company D, 10th Maine; 64 men, battery I; 64 men, battery M; 1st New York artillery; 40 men, battery C; 1st Illinois; 48 men, battery F; 4th United States artillery; 52 men, battery K; 5th United States artillery; 41 men, 9th Ohio, independent; 85 men, 1st Michigan engineers; 84 men, 1st Missouri engineers.

*Recapitulation.*—52 regiments of infantry, 2 regiments mounted infantry, 8 regiments of cavalry, 11 batteries of artillery, 24 detachments.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General U. S. V., Commanding.*

Brigadier General L. THOMAS,

*Adjutant General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*

True copy:

S. C. KELLOG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

I have the honor to submit the following correspondence, illustrating the position in East Tennessee:

[By telegraph from Wartrace, January 1, 1864.]

I received the following, which I report for your information:

“PULASKI, *December 29.*

“Major General GRANT:

“We captured a mail to-day from Bragg’s army. The letters all speak of going into winter quarters at Dalton, Resaca, and Rome; also appointment of J. E. Johnston to command of that army. The Chattanooga Rebel, of 20th, announces his appointment and states he would take command the next week.

“G. M. DODGE,  
*Brigadier General.*”

E. S. PARKER,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Major General THOMAS.

[By telegraph from Knoxville, January 1, 1864.]

To Major General THOMAS:

I arrived here yesterday morning. Send forward all the supplies for General Foster with as little delay as possible, and clothing particularly. Keep



a careful watch on the river between Chickamauga and the Hiawassee, to prevent interference with the steamboats.

U. S. GRANT, *Major General.*

[By telegraph from Strawberry Plains, January 3, 1864.]

To Major General THOMAS, *Chattanooga, Tenn.:*

Send forward clothing for this command as fast as it arrives at Chattanooga, or if you have clothing on hand that can possibly be spared, send it forward, and deduct the same amount from that coming forward for forces here. The troops here are badly off for clothing, and before making much advance must be supplied.

GRANT, *Major General.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Chattanooga, January 5, 1864.*

Major General GRANT, *Knoxville, Tenn.:*

Despatch of 3d received. Orders have already been given to despatch clothing as fast as it arrives. If contractors can be relied on, the railroad will be completed to Chattanooga by the middle of next week. I can then put more boats on the river between here and Knoxville. Colonel Donaldson telegraphs me that he has sent a large quantity of subsistence stores to Carthage for Foster, and is ready to send stores to the mouth of the Big South fork. He asks orders; will you give them to him?

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Chattanooga, January 8, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

I have just seen Colonel McCallum, superintendent of military railroads in Virginia. He tells me he has engaged twelve hundred men to come to this department to work on the railroads, but that Mr. J. B. Anderson, military director of railroads in this department, tells him he does not want them. Knowing that their services are needed badly, I have requested Colonel McCallum to send for them and set them to work on the Northwestern railroad, and when that is completed to send them here to repair the railroad from this place to Knoxville. Unless we have these roads put in order very soon we shall fail. I have refrained heretofore from giving an opinion on the merits of the present system, but we have been on the verge of failure long enough, and now that there appears to be a chance of getting the roads in condition, I cannot afford to lose it.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General United States Volunteers.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Chattanooga, January 9, 1864.*

Major General FOSTER, *Knoxville:*

Your telegram regarding small rations received. Will do all I can to help you out, but you must remember that I have but five small steamboats to bring supplies for my troops from Bridgeport to this place. We have to stint ourselves to send you what we do. When the railroad is completed I will have more boats for the upper part of the river.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General United States Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Chattanooga, January 11, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington :*

The necessity for promptly putting the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad in efficient running order, particularly since there are so many demands made upon it from Knoxville, is so urgent, and the present condition of this road, with its management, is so lamentable, that I urgently request that Colonel McCallum may be called to Washington to explain fully the whole situation to the Secretary of War, and, if necessary, take orders to place the road in an efficient condition.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General United States Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Chattanooga, January 14, 1864.*

Major General GRANT, *Nashville :*

I am assured by the engineer of the Running Water bridge that the road will be completed to this place to-day by 2 p. m. Day before yesterday I telegraphed Colonel Donaldson to have trains loaded for this place and started from Nashville yesterday. We are to-day entirely out of forage and short of rations the result of endeavoring to supply General Foster and ourselves by steamboat. Now that the railroad is finished, Mr. Anderson should be required to have as many trains running as can be put on the road. So far, instead of getting ahead, our supplies are decreasing. With the railroad operated to its full capacity we certainly ought to accumulate supplies here and be able to give two or three steamboats to Foster. I will write you at length to-day.

GEO. H. THOMAS, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Chattanooga, January 13, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your letter of the 8th instant is before me. From the condition of our supplies here I do not know how you can be supplied from this place with anything like half rations. It takes all the means we have to supply the troops here. The railroad management is entirely unequal to the emergency, and as that management is not under my control, I cannot say how we shall succeed after the road is opened to this point. All I can do is to promise you all the aid I can give after supplying our absolute necessities here. My animals are dying from starvation, too. And seeing this inevitable state of affairs, I have concluded to starve with them until we can better their condition as well as our own. My only hope is that we can stand it longer than the enemy.

Very respectfully and truly yours,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.*  
 Major General J. G. FOSTER,  
*Commanding Department of Ohio.*

Official :

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

KNOXVILLE, *January 15, 1864.*

General George H. THOMAS :

It is reported that the Dunbar is aground on White shoals, about thirty miles below Kingston, and it may be that the Paint Rock is stopping to aid her, as

she has not yet arrived at Loudon. I fear the pilots of these boats are not expert; if so, good pilots can be obtained from Colonel Byrd's command at Kingston. My necessities are so great that I am forced to distribute my army to forage, and abandon for the present all idea of active operations. Many thanks for your kind efforts in my behalf.

J. G. FOSTER,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Chattanooga, January 15, 1864—3 p. m.*

Major General GRANT:

The railroad is now completed to this place and there is a prospect of getting some forage here. I would therefore like to have Elliot's cavalry, now in East Tennessee, moved down to Charleston, on the Hiawassee, where he can procure some forage, and with what he can get from here his horses can be kept in condition to demonstrate on the enemy's position at Dalton and completely occupy his attention. As soon as Granger's command can be sent back other movements can be made to withdraw the enemy's attention from operations from the direction of Memphis or Vicksburg, should you contemplate making any from either.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General United States Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

NASHVILLE, *January 16—12.30 a. m.*

Major General THOMAS:

Longstreet is said to be marching towards Knoxville. Enemy re-enforced by one division from Ewell's corps, with another expected. I have advised Foster to keep his force between Longstreet and you. Should he be forced back south of the Tennessee it may become necessary for you to re-enforce him from your command. In that case I would fill the place by troops taken from Major General W. T. Sherman's command. Send Foster all the provisions you can. The question of provisions alone may decide the fate of East Tennessee.

Major General GRANT.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Chattanooga, January 16, 1864.*

Major General GRANT:

Your despatch of 12 m. to-day received. Will send all the provisions I can possibly spare without starving my own men. Will increase number of boats as soon as railroad is in full operation. Have given directions about repairing the Hiawassee and Loudon bridges.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General United States Volunteers.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Chattanooga, January 18, 1864.*

Major General FOSTER, *Knoxville:*

The Dunbar has been back four or five days. The Lookout is now up river, and I will send you the Chattanooga and Kingston. They are now on the way

up. Have also ordered the railroad to be repaired as rapidly as possible. Work will be commenced to-morrow.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General United States Volunteers.*

[By telegraph from Washington, January 18, 1864—8.30 p. m.]

Major General THOMAS :

In the absence of Major General Grant you will please give particular attention to the situation of Major General Foster's army, in East Tennessee, and give him all the aid he may require and you may be able to render. The line of Knoxville and Cumberland gap must be maintained at all hazards. Communicate freely with Major General Foster and give me such information as may be important. It is reported, from the army of the Potomac, that no troops have left Lee recently to re-enforce Longstreet.

Major General HALLECK.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Chattanooga, January 18, 1864.*

SIR: The Nashville and Chattanooga railroad being now completed to this place it is desirable to work the road to its full capacity, not only to accumulate supplies here for a depot from which this army is to be supplied in its advance further south, but also to supply the army of the Ohio now concentrated near Knoxville, East Tennessee. To supply the army of the Cumberland, and accumulate a supply in this place, will require at least thirty-six trains. To supply the army of the Ohio at Knoxville will require twenty-four additional trains, and thirty-six trains will be required to follow up this army when the spring campaign commences. In your letter of appointment the Secretary of War authorizes you to make such purchases and arrangements as are necessary to place the railroad in a thoroughly efficient condition. I therefore hope, if you have not already done so, that you will take immediate steps to provide the rolling-stock necessary to operate the three above-mentioned roads to the greatest advantage. You will please inform me, as early as practicable, what number of locomotives and freight cars you now have on hand, and what number have been contracted for, as well as what means you have at command for manufacturing and repairing freight cars.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General United States Volunteers.*  
J. B. ANDERSON, Esq., *Military Manager.*

KNOXVILLE, January 20, 1864—12 m.

Major General GRANT:

No evidence has reached me to prove that either Ewell or A. P. Hill have re-enforced Longstreet, although scouts and deserters report troops from both corps. I am not convinced that he has received anything but the third division of his corps. I am doubtful of his intention to attack us here. He will certainly meet with a defeat if he does. I am now moving cavalry up the south side of the French Broad to secure the forage grounds in that section. As soon as the infantry can retire from Strawberry Plains, after first taking down the bridge and sending the material here to be used in the bridge at this place, I shall send the 4th and 23d corps to forage up the French Broad, retaining the 9th corps as garrison at this place, Lenoir, and Loudon.

J. G. FOSTER.

NASHVILLE, *January 20, 1864—12 m.*

Major General THOMAS:

Major General Foster telegraphs that he is being forced back from Danbridge towards Knoxville. General Morgan is also said to be advancing from towards General Johnston's army. If Foster should be besieged it will be necessary for you to send a force from Chattanooga to his relief. They can subsist on the country as far as the Hiawassee in such a contingency, and send forward to Loudon, by steamboat, all the supplies possible.

Major General GRANT.

[By telegraph from Knoxville, January 24, 1864—11 a. m.]

General GEO. H. THOMAS, *Chattanooga*:

The enemy has retired and I am now putting the tired troops in cantonment, where they may rest a little before the spring campaign. The 4th corps is ordered to hold Kingston, Loudon, and half of the railroad line to this place, with a brigade at Marysville to collect supplies. Sheridan's division is at Loudon, where he will push the work on the railroad bridge with a view to the opening of that line to Chattanooga. The bridge will be completed in thirty days if no interruption occurs. Please to honor any requisition for tools, nails, spikes, &c., which Sheridan may send to you, to save time. I hope you will be able to put the lower portion of the road in running order and to rebuild the bridge at Hiawassee by the time the bridge at Loudon is completed.

J. G. FOSTER,  
*Major General Commanding.*HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Chattanooga, January 27, 1864.*Major General J. G. FOSTER, *Knoxville*:

The enemy is evidently retiring from my front. Please report what he is doing in front of you?

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General United States Volunteers.*HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Chattanooga, January 27, 1864.*Major General HALLECK, *Washington*:

Colonel Boone, with a force of 450 men, twenty-eighth Kentucky mounted infantry and fourth Michigan cavalry, left Rossville, January 21st, moved through Maclemore's cove, crossed Lookout mountain into Broomtown valley; thence across Taylor's ridge to eight miles beyond Dirttown towards Dalton; attacked camp of home guards, Colonel Culbertson commanding, routed them, destroying camp, considerable number of arms and other property, and returned to camp without any casualties in his force. Friday, 22d January, sent flag-of-truce, under Colonel Burke, tenth Ohio infantry, with rebel surgeons and a proposition to exchange our wounded at Atlanta for rebel wounded here. Messenger from Colonel Burke returned for rations Monday morning, January 25, having left the party the day before, ten miles below Lafayette, still going forward, not having met any rebel pickets. I shall send an expedition towards Dalton tomorrow and ascertain if the rebels have fallen back from there as reported. Despatch from Colonel H. O. Miller, seventy-second Indiana, commanding division, Blue Water, 26th, *via* Pulaski, 27th, says: "Johnson's brigade of Roddy's command crossed Tennessee river at Bainbridge, three miles above, and Newport ferry, six miles below Florence, intending to make a junction with a brigade of infantry who were expected to cross the river at Lamb's and Brown's ferries;

thence proceed to Athens and capture our forces there. We engaged them near Florence, routed them, killing fifteen, wounding quite a number, and taking them prisoners—among them three commissioned officers. Our loss ten wounded. Prisoners report Corinth evacuated and burned.”

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.*

[By telegraph from St. Louis, January 23, 1864.]

Major General THOMAS:

General Halleck telegraphs that one brigade left Ewell's corps on the 17th, and one on the 20th, to re-enforce Longstreet or Joe Johnston. If the former, the moves indicated before I left should commence as soon as possible. Telegraph any information you have and what you are doing.

Major General GRANT.

[By telegraph from Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, Chattanooga, January 29—8 p. m.]

Major General GRANT, *St. Louis, Mo.:*

Your despatch 28th, 10.30 received. General Stanley's division is now between Chickamauga and Hiawassee. Colonel McCallum is at Knoxville, looking into the condition of the railroad, which I will push forward as rapidly as possible. I have just made a demonstration toward Dalton and find affairs unchanged, except the brigades which are supposed to have gone to Mobile. I will push matters forward as fast as possible.

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.*

[By telegraph from Knoxville, January 30, 1864—7 a. m.]

General GEO. H. THOMAS, *Chattanooga:*

Telegram received. The enemy have crossed the French Broad river, in some force, below Dandridge. General Sturgis, whose cavalry gained decided victory over the enemy's cavalry on the 28th, is now obliged to retire towards Marysville. McCook's division behaved very handsomely on the 28th, and finally cleared the field with a sabre charge, capturing two steel rifle guns and over one hundred prisoners.

J. G. FOSTER,

*Major General Commanding.*

[By telegraph from Knoxville, January 31, 1864—2 p. m.]

General GEO. H. THOMAS, *Chattanooga:*

I am preparing to take the offensive. To do this with effect, in the face of Longstreet's re-enforcements, will require at least ten thousand infantry from you. In addition, that you place working gangs on the road to the Hiawassee bridge, so as to increase our supplies, which may be boated over the Tennessee at Loudon, and afterwards sent by rail to this place. I also require a pontoon train of twelve hundred feet length. Colonel Babcock will come down in the first boat to attend to this. The cavalry from Atlanta is reported to be moving into East Tennessee through North Carolina. Seven regiments started on the 13th instant. Please telegraph what is the extent of the assistance you can give me. I have on hand over a million rations of meat, but no bread or bread-stuffs. Please load the boats with all the bread you can spare from forward.

J. G. FOSTER,

*Major General Commanding.*

[By telegraph from Headquarters Department of Cumberland, Chattanooga, February 1, 1864.]

Brigadier General J. A. RAWLINGS, *Nashville*:

The latest information I have is that the rebels have two regiments of cavalry, four regiments of infantry, and three guns at or near Tunnel Hill; one division between Tunnel Hill and Dalton; three brigades and some other troops between Dalton and Tilton. Six pieces (new) artillery just arrived at Dalton were being trained on the 28th. No other artillery there. Eighteen thousand (18,000) rations are issued for all the troops at Dalton, Tunnel Hill, and Tilton. Four divisions have been sent down the railroad to Mobile, Alabama, and Rome, Georgia. The pickets extend twelve miles north of Dalton, in direction of Charleston. There are no troops east of Dalton. Governor Brown has ordered all families dependent on the government for support to move south of the Etowah river.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[By telegraph from Nashville, February 6, 1864—2.30 p. m.]

Major General THOMAS:

Reports of scouts make it evident that Joe Johnston has removed most of his force from your front. Two divisions going to Longstreet. Longstreet has been re-enforced by troops from the east. This makes it evident the enemy intends to secure East Tennessee if they can, and I intend to drive them out or get whipped, this month. For this purpose you will have to detach at least ten thousand men besides Stanley's division, (more will be better.) I can partly relieve the vacuum at Chattanooga by troops from Logan's command. It will not be necessary to take artillery or wagons to Knoxville, but all the serviceable artillery horses should be taken to use on artillery there. Six mules to each two hundred men should also be taken, if you have them to spare. Let me know how soon you can start.

Major General GRANT.

[By telegraph from Headquarters Department of Cumberland, Chattanooga, February 8, 1864.]

Major General GRANT, *Nashville*:

Your despatch of 2 p. m., February 6, was received that evening, but only so much of it could be translated as to make me understand that I am expected to detach from my command ten thousand men, in addition to Stanley's division, and to report when I can start. I can start a portion of the additional troops day after to-morrow, but I do not see how they can be fed, in an exhausted country, until the railroad is completed to Loudon. I am in hopes of getting the railroad completed and in operation to Loudon by Thursday next. These ten thousand should be replaced, by troops from Logan's command, immediately, else the enemy might take advantage of my move towards Knoxville, and attack and capture this place. It will require an entire division to hold the railroad secure from here to Loudon.

GEO. H. THOMAS, *Major General.*

[By telegraph from Chattanooga, February 10, 1864.]

Major General GRANT, *Nashville*:

The engineer reports that he will have the railroad finished to Loudon on Friday next. As they are very much in need of supplies at Knoxville, I think it will be best to allow time for an accumulation there, before the troops from here move up. I will try to provide for the defence of the place by placing a division of General Logan's corps at Chickamauga station, and Davis's division

in front of Cleveland, to cover the railroad, taking with me Stanley's, Johnson's, and Baird's divisions. Will you order the division of Logan to move to this place as soon as possible?

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General United States Volunteers.*

[By telegraph from Nashville, February 10, 1864.]

Major General THOMAS :

Prepare to start for Knoxville on Saturday. I will order Logan to send to Chattanooga all the troops he can, and still hold his line of the road. The number will probably be about 5,000 men. One division of your command will have to move out to hold the road to the Hiawassee.

Major General GRANT.

[By telegraph from Nashville, February 12, 1864.]

Major General THOMAS :

Conversation with Major General Foster has undecided me as to the propriety of the contemplated move against Longstreet. Schofield telegraphs the same views. I will take the matter into consideration during the day, after further talk with Foster, and give you the conclusion arrived at. If decided that you do not go I will instruct Schofield to let Granger send off his veterans at once.

Should you not be required to go into East Tennessee, could you not make a formidable reconnoissance towards Dalton, and if successful in driving the enemy out, occupy that place, and complete the railroad up to it this winter?

Major General GRANT.

[By telegraph from Chattanooga, February 12, 1864.]

Major General GRANT, *Nashville* :

I think an attack on Dalton would be successful if you will let me have the division of Logan's during the movement.

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General United States Volunteers.*

[By telegraph from Chattanooga, February 15, 1864.]

Major General GRANT, *Nashville* :

Your communication of the 13th, by General Elliot, was received yesterday. Seven regiments of Logan's force have arrived. General Matthias reports that the remainder will reach here to-morrow. My plan was to place Matthias in reserve, near Cleveland, and march with Stanley's division, supported by two brigades of Matthias's, on the road from Cleveland to Dalton, and, with the 14th army corps, take the direct road from here to Dalton, covering my advance and right flank with cavalry. I have thought of the route you suggest, but find upon inquiry that the roads across the mountains are so difficult that they can hardly be considered practicable at this season of the year. I have been considerably embarrassed by having Generals Stanley and Davis summoned before the McCook court of inquiry, just at this time; but if it continues to rain through the day, as it did all night, I think nothing will be gained by starting just yet.

In the mean time, Stanley and Davis can get back by Wednesday. Should the weather clear up, however, I will not wait. I intend to relieve as much of the cavalry at Calhoun as I can with infantry, and send it (the cavalry) toward Dalton, *via* Spring Place, in co-operation with Stanley's force.

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General Commanding.*



[By telegraph from Chattanooga, February 16, 1864.]

Major General GRANT, *Nashville* :

I have just received a telegram from General Schofield, dated February 14, stating that he had reliable information that Longstreet had advanced to Strawberry plains, and had brought up pontoon boats. Schofield thought that he might intend to make a cavalry raid to cut his communication with Loudon, or that he might advance to attack Knoxville, and asks me to send him re-enforcements as early as practicable. What shall I do? If re-enforcements are sent to Knoxville they will be detained there for the winter, and cannot make an advance on Longstreet until the Loudon and Strawberry plains bridges are rebuilt. It will also become necessary to give up any demonstration against Dalton. But if Schofield can hold Knoxville the demonstration on Dalton can be made, and I hope with success. Captain Gay, just from Knoxville, and gone to Nashville, does not mention such reports.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General United States Volunteers.*

[By telegraph from Nashville, February 17, 1864.]

Major General THOMAS :

Longstreet cannot afford to place his force between Knoxville and the Tennessee. If he does, it will then be time to move against him. The work of a raid on the road can soon be repaired, if it cannot be prevented. Make your contemplated move as soon as possible.

Major General GRANT.

[By telegraph from Chattanooga, February 19, 1864.]

Major General GRANT, *Nashville, Tennessee* :

Assistant Surgeon Jacob Miller, sixth Missouri volunteer infantry, arrived here yesterday from Dalton. He was captured at Lebanon, Alabama, when General Logan sent out an expedition towards Rome. He reports Cleburne's division at Tunnel Hill; Stewart's division between Tunnel Hill and Dalton; Walker two miles out from Dalton, towards Spring Place; Cheatham at Dalton, and Stevenson's and Bate's divisions to the west of Dalton two miles. He saw all of the camps, and estimates their force between thirty and forty thousand. He moreover states that no troops have been sent away except one brigade of infantry, which went to Rome about the first of this month.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General United States Volunteers.*

[By telegraph from Tunnel Hill, February 26, 1864—7½ a. m.]

Major General U. S. GRANT, *Nashville* :

I arrived here last night. Davis and Johnson occupy the pass at Buzzard's roost. They have a force equal to theirs in their front, who outnumber them in artillery. It is not possible to carry this place by assault. General Palmer made the attempt to turn yesterday, with Baird's and Cruft's divisions, but was met by an equal force, exclusive of their cavalry, and in an equally strong position as at Buzzard's roost. After expending nearly all of his ammunition he retired during the night to Catoosa platform. Our transportation is poor and limited; we are not able to carry more than sixty rounds per man. Artillery horses so poor that Palmer could bring but sixteen pieces. The country is stripped entirely of subsistence and forage. The enemy's cavalry is much supe-

prior to ours. Prisoners taken yesterday report that a portion of Cleburne's division has returned. I will await the development of this day, and advise you further.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General United States Volunteers.*

[By telegraph from Nashville, February 27, 1864.]

Major General GEO. H. THOMAS :

It is of the utmost importance that the enemy should be held in full belief that an advance into the heart of the south is intended, until the fate of General Sherman is fully known. The difficulties of supplies can be overcome by keeping your trains running between Chattanooga and your position. Take the depot trains at Chattanooga, yours and General Howard's wagons; these can be replaced temporarily by yours returning. Veterans are returning daily. This will enable you to draw re-enforcements constantly to your front. Can General Schofield not also take a division from Howard's corps? It is intended to send Granger to you the moment Schofield is thought to be safe without him.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Major General.*

[By telegraph from Nashville, February 27—6 p. m.]

Brigadier General WHIPPLE, *Chief of Staff* :

Information has reached Washington that orders have been given for Johnston's army to fall back. General Thomas should watch any such movement and follow it up closely. Can't you draw teams from Bridgeport and Stevenson to send supplies to the front? They have teams in great numbers at those places. Every energy should be exerted to get supplies and re-enforcements forward. Troops will leave here at the rate of two or three thousand a day for the front. Many of them go to Chattanooga.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Major General.*

[By telegraph from Chattanooga, February 27, 1864—10 p. m.]

Major General GRANT, *Nashville* :

Your two despatches of this date received. I have just returned from the front. My troops, after ceaseless labor under the greatest embarrassment for want of transportation, reached within three miles of Dalton, where they were received by the enemy strongly posted, and in force fully equal to my own in infantry. His artillery and cavalry was not only in better condition, (as regards horses,) but was at least two to our one in pieces and men. We found the country entirely stripped of everything like forage, and our mules being in such poor condition that double the number of teams we now have could not supply the troops. I thought it best to come back to Ringgold, and, if workmen can be found by Colonel McCallum, to go to work deliberately to repair the railroad and advance as it progresses. The present condition of the roads is not good and one day's rain would render the part across Chickamauga bottom impassable for loaded wagons. So it would be absolutely necessary to repair the railroad to supply the troops at Ringgold. The fact of working on the road would hold Johnston at Dalton, unless he intended to leave under any circumstances Howard's teams, and the depot teams at this place and Bridgeport, are in no better condition than those belonging to the divisions, all being composed of such mules as we have been able to keep up after a fashion during the winter. Johnston has no idea of leaving Dalton until compelled; and having a force greater

than what I now have under my immediate command, I cannot drive him from that place.

If Longstreet has retired, why can I not get Granger's two divisions and my first cavalry division back. The little cavalry I had on the expedition is completely worn down from constant work and for want of forage.

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General United States Volunteers.*

[By telegraph from Nashville, February 28, 1864.]

Major General THOMAS, *Chattanooga* :

General Schofield was notified, as soon as it was reported that Longstreet was leaving East Tennessee, to return Granger's corps the moment it was known to be safe to do so. With the limited command now left to Schofield, you will, with Granger returned, have to hold to Loudon. Send Logan's troops back at the earliest moment you can dispense with them. Notify me when they start.

U. S. GRANT, *Major General.*

[By telegraph from Chattanooga, February 28, 1864--8.45 p. m.]

Major General GORDON GRANGER, *Loudon* :

As soon as the services of your command can be dispensed with by General Schofield concentrate it in the vicinity of Cleveland, placing a sufficient number of troops on the Hiawassee to prevent the enemy from crossing that stream to raid on the railroad between Calhoun and Loudon. I wish the whole of McCook's division of cavalry to be concentrated as near Cleveland as possible that he may be foraged easily, and that I may have his full services in observing our front in the direction of Dalton. I wish these dispositions to be made as soon as you are notified that your services in East Tennessee can be dispensed with. When so informed make your headquarters at Cleveland, posting your infantry and artillery between that place and Dalton, so as to effectually guard the depot of supplies at Cleveland. Inform me as soon as you are relieved.

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General United States Volunteers.*

[By telegraph from Chattanooga, February 28, 1864.]

Major General GRANT, *Nashville* :

General Butterfield, by my direction, has recently examined the line between here and Nashville, and reports that he thinks six thousand men will be sufficient to guard that line, two regiments of which force should be cavalry. From what I know of the road between Nashville and Decatur, two thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry will be sufficient to protect that line. One thousand infantry will be sufficient to protect the line from Athens to Stevenson. Probably both lines of communication can be guarded by six thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, a great portion of which should be made up from the local militia of Tennessee, or troops organized especially for the preservation of order in the State.

I believe if I can commence the campaign with the 14th and 4th corps in front, with Howard's corps in reserve, that I can move along the line of the railroad and overcome all opposition as far, at least, as Atlanta. I should want a strong division of cavalry in advance. As soon as Captain Merrill returns from his reconnoissance along the railroad lines, I can give you a definite estimate of the number of troops required to guard the bridges along the road.

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General United States Volunteers.*

The above proposition was submitted to General Grant for his approval, and if obtained it was my intention (having acquired by the reconnoissance of February 23d, 24th, and 25th, a thorough knowledge of the approaches direct upon Dalton, from Ringgold and Cleveland,) to have made a strong demonstration against Buzzard's roost, attracting Johnston's whole attention to that point, and to have thrown the main body of my infantry and cavalry through Snake Creek gap upon his communications, which I had ascertained from scouts he had, up to that time, neglected to observe or guard. With this view I had previously asked for the return to me of Granger's corps and my cavalry from East Tennessee, and had already initiated preparations for the execution of the above movement as soon as the spring opened sufficiently to admit of it. See the following telegrams in illustration :

CHATTANOOGA, *February 28, 1864.*

Major General GRANT, *Nashville :*

I have caused a thorough examination of the railroad between this and Tunnel Hill to be made. The officer reports that with four hundred of Colonel McCallum's construction corps the road can be put in complete running order in six weeks from the time they commence. General Baird is now at Ringgold, and the whole of the road in his rear is protected, so this party can commence work immediately. The road from Cleveland to Dalton can be finished in a week, provided we can get the necessary rails.

Major General THOMAS.

CHATTANOOGA, *February 29, 1864.*

Major General GRANT :

I have given orders for General Matthias to rejoin his command. He will start to-morrow. Has General Schofield been directed to relieve Granger and McCook and send them to me? I wish to place Granger's troops in front of Cleveland, protecting the road from there to Loudon; one or two regiments of McCook's cavalry at Calhoun, to prevent any flank movement of the enemy from Dalton in that direction. The balance of his troops to cover and observe our front. I have been making arrangements to-day to commence the reconstruction of the railroad between this and Dalton.

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General United States Volunteers, Commanding.*

NASHVILLE, *February 29, 1864.*

Major General THOMAS :

I have not heard from Schofield since the 26th. He was directed to relieve Granger as soon as it was known that Longstreet had gone beyond striking distance. Telegraph Schofield what orders to give Granger when relieved. McCook's cavalry, I expect, is now far up the Holston.

U. S. GRANT, *Major General.*

LOUDON, *March 1, 1864.*

Major General THOMAS :

Your despatch of the 28th has been received by me. My forces will be concentrated as you direct as soon as relieved by General Schofield.

GORDON GRANGER,

*Major General.*

CHATTANOOGA, *March 1, 1864.*

Major General GRANT :

I will have four hundred men at work on the railroad between here and Ringgold to-morrow. The reconnoissance towards Dalton demonstrated that

the enemy was still there in force. I have since heard from different sources (all confirmatory) that Johnston had received orders to retire behind the Etowah and send re-enforcements to Selma or Mobile. One informant, B\*\*\*\*, reports that some of the troops had already started, but that our demonstration has brought them back. He is now in Dalton and will report to me immediately any changes Johnston makes. I have signified to General Schofield my willingness to transfer to him all the East Tennessee troops under my command if he will release the 4th corps and McCook's division of cavalry. I am entirely crippled for want of cavalry. I am pushing forward the works for the defences of the railroad between this and Nashville; when they are completed I am in hopes I can order to the front Howard's entire corps, and perhaps a part of Slocum's.

\* \* \* \* \*

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General United States Volunteers.*

NASHVILLE, *March 2*—12.30 a. m.

Major General THOMAS :

I have directed General Schofield to send the cavalry you ask for, if possible. The cavalry with Smith have returned to Memphis and may be looked for in your department soon.

U. S. GRANT, *Major General.*

NASHVILLE, *March 4*, 1864—10 a. m.

Major General GEORGE H. THOMAS :

You will have to watch the movements of the enemy closely in front. Should Longstreet join Johnston they will likely attack your advance. At present most of Longstreet's force is up Holston valley. I will direct Schofield to keep you advised of the movements of the enemy.

U. S. GRANT, *Major General.*

CHATTANOOGA, *March 4*—12 p. m.

Major General GRANT, *Nashville, Tennessee :*

Your two despatches of this date are just received. The information that I get from the front to-day is that Johnston's infantry, (about 30,000 strong,) still remains in Dalton, and, as yet, no changes have been made in his transportation; that is, his transportation being sent to the rear, before the reconnaissance from this post was made, has not returned to Dalton. Deserters say it was understood in the army that they would fall back, and that the movements had commenced already, but the troops were all ordered back, Johnston supposing we had advanced against Dalton in full force. Not having brought back his transportation makes me believe he will fall back yet, but I am nevertheless taking every precaution to get the earliest information should he advance against me. None of Longstreet's troops have joined him as yet.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Major General United States Volunteers.*

KNOXVILLE, *March 5*—12.30 p. m.

Major General GEORGE H. THOMAS :

General Carter has just informed me of your return to Chattanooga. Is it not practicable to commence operations against Longstreet? My possession of the railroad bridge at Strawberry Plains removes, to a very great extent, the difficulty of advancing at this season. I hope to have the bridge completed within ten (10) days. My troops have been as far as Russellville and found the road uninjured. Do not think Longstreet has sent any infantry to Georgia. He seems to be moving slowly towards Virginia. If you can help me to drive Long-

street out I will then be able to help you. It does not seem probable that we will have troops enough for both operations at once. Please give me your views on this subject.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
*Major General.*

CHATTANOOGA, *March 5, 1864—11 p. m.*

Major General SCHOFIELD, *Knoxville :*

I have just received reliable information that Johnston has been re-enforced by ten thousand men from South Carolina, and by Roddy, and that he contemplates making an offensive movement in this direction. Can you spare Granger's corps and the cavalry? If so, please direct them to concentrate at Cleveland, leaving a brigade of infantry and battery at Calhoun to guard the railroad at that place.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major General United States Volunteers.*

CHATTANOOGA, *March 5, 1864.*

Major General JOHN M. SCHOFIELD, *Knoxville :*

It has been reported to Major General Thomas to-day, and also two days since, that the enemy were heavily re-enforcing at Dalton. General Grant thinks it is not improbable that he may advance against us here. In that case we shall need the 4th corps, and wish you to hold it in readiness to send, if it be needed. Cannot send you any assistance while this contingency is hanging over us.

WILLIAM D. WHIPPLE,  
*Brigadier General and Chief of Staff.*

KNOXVILLE, *March 6, 1864—9 a. m.*

Major General THOMAS, *Commanding :*

I have no immediate use for Granger's corps, and will order it to Cleveland if you so direct. If Longstreet returns I will be unable to hold the railroad bridge at Strawberry Plains, and all my work there will be lost. I could not even hold this place more than a few days without Granger's troops. I must leave it for you to judge whether, under these circumstances, I can spare these troops.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
*Major General.*

CHATTANOOGA, *March 6, 1864—12 m.*

Major General SCHOFIELD, *Knoxville :*

I do not wish to withdraw Granger's corps unless there be an absolute necessity for it, but there is a great necessity for cavalry in my front. Can you spare McCook's command? It seems to me that there is very little danger to your communications between Calhoun and Loudon if the crossings of the Hiawasse, at Calhoun and Columbus are well guarded. Please consider what arrangement you can make with a view of sending me the cavalry, and let me know as soon as possible.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major General United States Volunteers.*

KNOXVILLE, *March 6, 1864—5 p. m.*

Major General G. H. THOMAS :

I will send you McCook's command at once. I understand he has but six brigades left. The others were ordered to report to you several days ago. I

will send a small force of cavalry to take McCook's place. If your cavalry cover the approaches from the southeast, very little cavalry will be necessary between the Little Tennessee and the Hiawassee. It will take two or three days for the force I send to reach McCook's position. Meanwhile let him direct his movements so as to protect the railroad from the east and southeast. There is no present danger from the northeast.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
*Major General.*

CHATTANOOGA, *March 15, 1864.*

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT, *Nashville.*

My troops occupy essentially the same position as when I telegraphed last. Information regarding the enemy locates Hardee's corps on the road from Dalton to Cleveland, and Hindman's corps on the railroad between Dalton and Tunnel Hill. His cavalry is at Tunnel Hill and on the Lafayette road. I am still very deficient in the latter arm and artillery horses, notwithstanding all the exertions of myself and Colonel Donaldson. The railroad will be finished to Ringgold by the end of this week.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General U. S. Vols.*

NASHVILLE, *March 17, 1864.*

Major General THOMAS:

[GENERAL ORDERS, No. 1.]

In pursuance of the following order of the President:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
*Washington, D. C., March, 1864.*

Under the authority of an act of Congress to revive the grade of lieutenant general in the United States army, approved February 29, 1864, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, United States army, is assigned to the command of the armies of the United States.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

I assume command of the armies of the United States, headquarters in the field, and until further orders will be with the army of the Potomac. There will be an office, headquarters in Washington, to which all communications will be sent except those from the army where headquarters are at the date of their address.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

NASHVILLE, *March 17, 1864.*

Major General THOMAS:

Major General Sherman has been assigned to the command of this military division, and having arrived at Nashville this evening, hereafter all official communications will be addressed to him.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

Shortly after his assignment to the command of the military division of the Mississippi, General Sherman came to see me at Chattanooga to consult as to the position of affairs, and adopt a plan for a spring campaign. At that interview I proposed to General Sherman that if he would use McPherson's and Schofield's armies to demonstrate on the enemy's position at Dalton by the direct roads through Buzzard Roost gap, and from the direction of Cleveland, I would throw

my whole force through Snake Creek gap, which I knew to be unguarded, fall upon the enemy's communications between Dalton and Resaca, thereby turning his position completely, and force him either to retreat towards the east, through a difficult country, poorly supplied with provisions and forage, with a strong probability of total disorganization of his force, or attack me, in which latter event I felt confident that my army was sufficiently strong to beat him, especially as I hoped to gain a position on his communications before he could be made aware of my movement. General Sherman objected to this plan for the reason that he desired my army to form the reserve of the united armies, and to serve as a rallying point for the two wings, the army of the Ohio and that of the Tennessee, to operate from.

(Later, when the campaign in Georgia was commenced, the army of the Tennessee was sent through Snake Creek gap to accomplish what I had proposed doing with my army, but not reaching Snake Creek gap before the enemy had informed himself of the movement, McPherson was unable to get upon his communications before Johnston had withdrawn part of his forces from Dalton, and had made dispositions to defend Resaca.)

Throughout the months of March and April every exertion was made to prepare my army for the approaching campaign, with what success and against what difficulties, the following telegrams will bear testimony :

NASHVILLE, *March 19, 1864.*

General WHIPPLE, *Assistant Adjutant General* :

There is on hand and to arrive in the next 48 hours, fourteen thousand troops for the front. I cannot take off or transport this number unless I cut down subsistence and forage, and this must not be done. I recommend that Brigadier General Granger be instructed to order these troops to march down by short journeys, and I will transport the rations and baggage in concert with General Granger. We can arrange to subsist the troops at given points, they carrying five days rations in haversacks.

J. L. DONALDSON,  
*Senior Quartermaster.*

NASHVILLE, *March 21, 1864.*

Brigadier General WHIPPLE, *Assistant Adjutant General* :

I have not ceased urging their sending me cavalry and artillery horses and mules. I am disappointed in their coming forward so slow. I have on hand fourteen hundred thousand bushels of grain, and large amounts of other supplies. My receipts now average thirty thousand tons a week. The commissary departments should hasten their arrangements to drive their beef cattle down, and I would thereby have (10) ten cars released to me daily for forage.

J. L. DONALDSON,  
*Senior Quartermaster.*

CHATTANOOGA, *March 23, 1864.*

Major General SHERMAN :

Two days before General Grant left Nashville he telegraphed me to send my surplus troops on Nashville and Decatur railroad to relieve General Dodge's troops between Columbia and Decatur. Your letter of March 18 informed me that each department commander would be allowed to cover his own communications and organize all his effective force into a fighting column, from which I inferred that you did not expect me to relieve General Dodge on the Nashville and Decatur railroad. Please let me know if I am to send troops to relieve Dodge.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General U. S. Vols.*



NASHVILLE, *March 24, 1864*—noon.

Major General GEO. H. THOMAS :

Your despatch is received. General McPherson is now here, and we will go to-morrow to Decatur, to Huntsville, Larkinsville, &c. I will then come up to see you, and afterwards General Schofield. For the present you may confine your attention to covering your own communications, and from Nashville as far as Columbia. General McPherson will cover from Columbia around to Stevenson. Unless the returning regiments are greatly needed to the front, I will order all troops coming forward to disembark at Nashville and march by easy marches. This will relieve our road, and also do the troops good. We will be pressed for wagons, and I wish you to arrange to strip all troops left to guard roads, of their mules, horses, and wagons, to be used in our offensive operations, until McPherson's troops arrive on the line of the Decatur road, from the Tennessee river. I must move the cavalry division, now at Huntsville and here, to some point near Duck or Elk river, to our right flank, and I may use it to cross the Tennessee at Decatur to Lafayette, straight to the south. I shall prohibit all citizens using any of our railroads south of Nashville, for passage or use; and if citizens can't live at the front, they must move to the rear. We must use our roads exclusively for freight 'til a supply is in store.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

CHATTANOOGA, *March 24, 1864.*Major General SLOCUM, *Tullahoma :*

It will not be necessary to send troops to the Decatur road. You will therefore prepare to relieve Coburn's brigade, so that it can come to the front. As soon as the block-houses are finished, place them in the garrisons designated by the chief engineer, and come to the front with the remainder of your command, except the necessary garrisons at Murfreesboro' and Nashville. The estimate of garrisons for block-houses will be forwarded you by mail.

W. D. WHIPPLE,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

NASHVILLE, *April 2, 1864.*Major General G. H. THOMAS, *Commanding :*

Am at Nashville. Have telegraphed to Washington for authority to make the changes we agreed on. To-night the railroad superintendents, Anderson, Colonel Donaldson, and I, will meet and arrange about the railroad management. I will also compel the beef-contractors to drive cattle. Unless we devote the railroad solely and exclusively to the use of dead freight, we cannot accumulate the surplus (?) required for our plans. Watch Johnston close. Your weak point is Cleveland. As soon as General Schofield can ascertain for certain that Longstreet is no longer in force in East Tennessee, he will let your troops come below Hiawassee. I will make the order the moment I hear from Washington.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

CHATTANOOGA, *April 3, 1864*—9 p. m.Major General SHERMAN, *Nashville :*

Your despatch of yesterday received: Will watch Johnston as close as possible, but shall only feel perfectly safe when I can get my troops back from East Tennessee. My outposts report no movements of the enemy, except a reconnoissance on the Spring Place and Cleveland road yesterday, which resulted in nothing.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General U. S. V.*

KNOXVILLE, *April 3, 1864—11.30 p. m.*

Major General THOMAS :

Longstreet appears to have gone to Virginia with his main force. I will know the facts in a few days. If he is gone I will at once send you Wood's division, and will send you Sheridan as soon as my troops, now *en route* from Nashville, arrive.

J. M. SCHOFIELD, *Major General.*NASHVILLE, *April 4, 1864—12 m.*Major General THOMAS, *Commanding :*

I will strengthen Schofield as fast as possible, to enable him to send you back your own troops. Should Johnston take the initiative, you can bring forward one of Slocum's divisions ; also one or two of Logan's. Now that Schofield has a surplus of provisions, a temporary interruption of the railroad would not be serious, but we should hold Ringgold and Cleveland at all hazards.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*NASHVILLE, *April 5, 1864—10 a. m.*

Major General JOS. HOOKER :

The following orders have just been received by telegraph from War Department :

Major General Hooker to command the 1st corps, composed of the 11th and 12th.

Major General O. O. Howard to command the 4th corps.

Major General J. M. Schofield to command the 23d corps.

Major General H. W. Slocum is ordered to command of Vicksburg.

WM. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*LOUDON, *Tenn., April 10, 1864.*

Major General THOMAS :

I have assumed command of the 4th army corps. Headquarters will be moved to Cleveland to-morrow. I wish to remain over until Tuesday morning to review General Wagner's division, with your permission. General Wood's division is here. Is now crossing the river.

O. O. HOWARD, *Major General.*KNOXVILLE, *April 12, 1864.*

Major General GEO. H. THOMAS :

The troops of the 4th corps, now at Loudon, will march for Charleston in a few days. I will have to detain those on the railroad between Loudon and Charleston a few days longer, and will also have to depend upon your troops to hold the Hiawasse until Hovey arrives. I will stop him at Charleston.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
*Major General.*CLEVELAND, *April 16, 1864.*Brigadier General WHIPPLE, *Assistant Adjutant General :*

General Wood has arrived, and has gone into camp as directed ; Cruft's brigade will be relieved on Tuesday morning ; Wagner has been relieved by General Schofield, and will start Monday morning.

O. O. HOWARD, *Major General.*

CHATTANOOGA, April 20, 1864.

Major General SHERMAN, *Commanding**Military Division of the Mississippi, Nashville, Tenn. :*

Nearly the whole of Howard's corps is already at Cleveland. Hovey passed here to-day. He will be at Charleston on Hiawasse, day after to-morrow. I have taken measures to repair the railroad from Cleveland to Red Clay at once, and for further repairs as we advance. The enemy remains quiet. A deserter reports to-day some of Roddy's cavalry going from Gadsden towards Guntersville, last Thursday, and another reports Johnston's army concentrated on my front, and that he has neither received re-enforcements nor sent any of his troops away.

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General.*

NASHVILLE, April 21, 1864.

Major General G. H. THOMAS :

Despatch of yesterday received. All accounts concur in your statement of the position and strength of our enemy. His cavalry is patrolling from Gadsden to Guntersville and Decatur, watching McPherson. Wilder is supposed to be marching from Louisville towards Columbia at this time. I will make further inquiries, and see that all of Garrard's division is assembled there. Allen is moving heaven and earth to get mules for you, but I would undertake to reach the Coosa with our present means.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General.*

CHATTANOOGA, April 22, 1864.

Major General SHERMAN, *Nashville :*

A rebel chaplain came into Baird's division to-day. He left Dalton day before yesterday, and reports Hardee's, Hood's, and part of Polk's corps, there; that Johnston is making no preparations for moving, but expects us to march on him. He estimates Johnston's army at sixty thousand. I also have Atlanta papers of the 20th. They state that the remainder of Wheeler's cavalry has arrived at Atlanta, *en route* for Dalton. Colonel Lagrange returned to Cleveland to-day from a scout towards Spring Place, near which place he surprised an outpost of the enemy, capturing two commissioned officers, twelve men, six horses, eight saddles, and fifteen rifles.

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General U. S. V.*

NASHVILLE, April 23, 1864—midnight.

Major General G. H. THOMAS :

Colonel Comstock is here from General Grant, and I expect orders to move quite as early as May 1st. I know all the difficulties, but want you to draw in your forces and make every possible preliminary preparation. Cannot one of the gunboats be got ready to patrol the river from Bridgeport to Guntersville? When McPherson moves on down, all the cavalry to his front will disappear. McPherson's force will be less than we estimated, for A. J. Smith is still at Red river, and his two furloughed divisions are not yet up; therefore, increase your forces as much as possible as far out as the Coosa, whence the surplus (?) will be sent back. Can you start with 50,000, counting Garrard as 5,000? Answer.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General.*

CHATTANOOGA, *April 24, 1864—10 a. m.*

Major General SHERMAN, *Nashville:*

I have given orders for the distribution of General Rousseau's troops along the railroad from Nashville to this place, General Hooker being at the same time directed to concentrate his command in Lookout valley. These dispositions can be completed, I hope, by the end of the month. One of the gunboats is now ready to receive her armament and crew. Admiral Porter agreed with General Grant to furnish both if desired. I should prefer it, but willingly leave the choice to you. I can take into the field between forty-five and fifty thousand men. I shall lose from five to eight thousand men by the middle of June, by reason of expiration of service.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General United States Volunteers.*

NASHVILLE, *April 25, 1864.*

Major General G. H. THOMAS:

General Grant telegraphs me to be ready May 2. Make dispositions accordingly, McPherson is least ready.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

NASHVILLE, *April 27, 1864.*

Major General G. H. THOMAS:

It will be impossible to get up McPherson's two veteran divisions in time, and instead of putting his force, twenty thousand, (20,000,) with Garrard's cavalry, (5,000,) by way of Lebanon and Somerville, I will order all to Chattanooga, so we may start from a common centre.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

While preparing for an advance from Chattanooga that portion of my command stationed in Middle Tennessee guarding our communications was actively employed operating against guerillas. The following are copies of the reports of the operations of my command during March and April, 1864:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Chattanooga, Tennessee, April 5, 1864.*

MAJOR: I have the honor to report as follows the operations of my command during the month of March:

On the 1st, the positions of the different divisions remained nearly as mentioned in my last report, viz: Johnson's division of the 14th army corps, (Palmer's,) at Tyner's station, except King's brigade, which was at Graysville; Davis's division, 14th corps, at Shallow ford, near Rossville; Baird's division, 14th corps, at Ringgold; Stanley's division, 4th corps, (Granger's,) at Blue spring, near Cleveland; the balance of Granger's command being still on duty with the army of the Ohio. Long's brigade of cavalry was at or near Calhoun, picketing towards Columbus and Benton. The thirty-ninth Indiana, (mounted infantry,) Colonel T. J. Harrison commanding, was stationed at Leet's farm, on the road leading from Gordon's mill to Ringgold and Lafayette, covering Baird's right flank. The 11th and 12th corps, Major General Joseph Hooker commanding, were guarding the railroad from Nashville to this point.

*March 1.*—General Matthias and his command were ordered to rejoin the 15th corps at Huntsville, their services being no longer required; Long's brigade of cavalry was ordered to take position at Cleveland; Colonel Jones, with eight companies of the first Michigan engineers and mechanics, and two

regiments of colored troops, ordered to commence the construction of block-houses and other defences along the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad; the first Missouri engineers and mechanics being detailed for similar duty along the Nashville and Decatur railroad.

On the 3d, General Gordon Granger, commanding 4th army corps, was directed to send one brigade of his command to Calhoun, with instructions to picket the approaches from Dalton, at Columbus and Benton; Wagner's brigade, of Sheridan's division, accordingly took position at that place; Colonel A. P. Campbell, commanding first brigade, first division of cavalry, having reported the arrival of his command at Calhoun, was ordered on the 4th to proceed to Cleveland and remain at that place for the present. Major General Gordon Granger sends the following information from Loudon, on the 5th: "Longstreet's cavalry is said to be making its way to join Johnston *via* Marshall. Quallatown, and Murphy, thence to Benton. It was expected at Murphy to-night."

On the 5th, Colonel Daniel McCook, commanding third brigade, Davis's division, 14th army corps, was ordered to move his brigade to Lee's & Gordon's mill, on Chickamauga creek; Colonel T. J. Harrison, commanding thirty-ninth Indiana mounted infantry, stationed at Leet's tan-yard, was driven from his position by a heavy force of rebel cavalry, which, as was subsequently ascertained through a deserter, amounted to two brigades. They attempted to gain Harrison's rear, but failing to do so, retired by the same way they came.

Information was received from a reliable source that Johnston was being reinforced by infantry and Roddy's cavalry; Colonel Edward McCook, commanding first division of cavalry, was instructed on the 8th to place his command in camp at Cleveland, and endeavor to recruit his animals as much as possible, sending out scouting parties along our front.

This division had been serving with the army of the Ohio since the withdrawal of Longstreet from before Knoxville, and with long marches, together with the difficulty of procuring forage, the horses and transportation of the command were in poor condition. On the 8th, Colonel Harrison was directed to move his command from Lee's & Gordon's mills to a position on the road leading from the mills to Ringgold, throwing out pickets to Leet's tan-yard and to Wood's gap. Colonel W. P. Boone, commanding twenty-eighth Kentucky mounted infantry, ordered to move his command to Lee's & Gordon's mills, and report to Colonel Daniel McCook, commanding the brigade at that place.

On the 9th, Colonel Harrison reconnoitred the gaps in Tayler's ridge and found the enemy in larger force than they were previous to the demonstration of the 5th. On the 13th, Long's brigade of cavalry left Cleveland for Ringgold. The Western and Atlantic railroad was in running order to Graysville the same day. During the evening Colonel McCook reported, by signal, from Lee's and Gordon's mill, that Colonel Boone had just returned from beyond Lafayette, and that he found no rebels at the gaps.

On the 16th the following information was received direct from Dalton, and from a reliable source: "Rebel force 45,000, comprising Hood's four (4) divisions; Stevenson, on the left, southeast of Dalton, 6,000; Breckinridge, on the left centre, 4,000; Stewart on the right centre and Hindman on the right; Hardee's four divisions; Clebourn's on the left, east of Dalton, 5,000 strong; Cheatham's on the right, and two others on the railroad; Roddy's cavalry was near Varnell's station, numbering 2,000 men; Wheeler was in front with 11,000 men; total cavalry, 12,000 to 14,000."

*March 18.*—The balance of Johnson's division, 14th corps, reached Graysville from Tyner's station and went into camp at that place.

On the 20th the Western and Atlantic railroad was in running order to Ringgold. About this time information was sent me from Dalton confirmatory of the report received from General Gordon Granger, on the 5th, to the effect that a

part of Longstreet's cavalry was re-enforcing Johnston, said to be Martin's division. Brigadier General G. M. Dodge, of the army of the Tennessee, reported from Athens on the 23d, by telegraph, that he had pushed down both sides of the Tennessee river and found the enemy very strong on the south side, and that he had no doubt they were preparing for a raid. He could not tell whether it was the whole of Forrest's force or not. Brigadier General Kenner Garrard, commanding the second cavalry division at Huntsville, was instructed to move his force to the support of General Dodge. In a second despatch General Dodge says his troops struck the enemy three miles south of Moulton, and after a sharp fight fell back with a loss of four (4) killed and ten (10) wounded, the enemy following for a distance of fourteen (14) miles. A number of the enemy were killed and wounded, and our force took several prisoners—among them a captain of artillery belonging to Forrest's command. Information from various sources went to show a concentration of a heavy force of cavalry in northern Alabama, parties of rebels showing themselves in the vicinity of Caperton's ferry on the south side of the Tennessee, and extending nearly as far west as Tuscumbia.

Colonel Wm. B. Stokes, commanding fifth Tennessee cavalry, reports on the 29th from Sparta, Tennessee, the operations of his command against the guerrillas in that vicinity, having had several engagements with them in the space of a fortnight, in which he succeeded in completely routing and scattering them, killing and wounding a number, among them two of their most active leaders, Bledsoe and Champ Ferguson.

The organization of colored troops within my command is progressing rapidly and satisfactorily. There are now on duty six fully organized regiments, with an aggregate force of 4,000 men, and three more regiments of infantry organizing, besides a battery of light artillery.

The following named regiments, &c., have reorganized as veteran volunteers during the month of March, 1864.

*Infantry.*—10th Michigan, 36th Ohio, 61st Ohio, 69th Ohio, 60th Illinois, 38th Illinois, 21st Illinois.

*Mounted Infantry.*—28th Kentucky.

*Cavalry.*—2d Kentucky.

*Artillery.*—Battery G, 1st Missouri, 8th Wisconsin battery.

*Detachments.*—3d Wisconsin battery; 79th Pennsylvania infantry; 3 companies 37th Indiana volunteer infantry; 5 companies 30th Indiana volunteer infantry; 5 companies 8th Kentucky volunteer infantry; detachment 11th Ohio volunteer infantry; companies F and K, 40th Ohio volunteer infantry.

*Total.*—Seven regiments of infantry, one regiment of mounted infantry, one regiment of cavalry, two batteries of artillery, and seven detachments of all arms.

There had returned to the army from furlough up to March 31st, thirty-three (33) regiments of infantry, five (5) of cavalry, and ten (10) batteries of artillery, with 5,429 recruits. A list of which is annexed, marked A.

I have the honor to forward, herewith, the monthly return for March of prisoners, &c., from Colonel J. G. Parkhurst, provost marshal general, and a statement of the number of rations issued to destitute citizens during March, from Lieutenant Colonel A. P. Porter, chief commissary of subsistence.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.*

Major R. M. SAWYER,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Captain, Aide-de-Camp, and Brevet Major.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Chattanooga, Tenn., May 2, 1864.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to report the operations of my command for the month of April, as follows, viz:

On the 2d instant a force of rebels, said to be 1,500 strong, made a demonstration in the direction of Cleveland and Charleston, East Tennessee, approaching to within eight (8) miles of Cleveland, when they divided into parties; one going out in the direction of Ducktown, through the mountains, the other remaining and falling back towards Dalton on the appearance of a force of our cavalry sent out from Cleveland in command of Colonel Lagrange, of the first Wisconsin. A scout, who arrived at Cleveland on the 3d, reported that the above movement on the part of the enemy was for the purpose of covering the approach of a force from Longstreet's army which was on its way to reinforce Johnston by way of Murphy, North Carolina. This was afterwards ascertained to be Martin's division of cavalry.

On the 5th the following changes were ordered in the organization of the army of the Cumberland: the 11th and 12th army corps to be consolidated, and known as the 20th army corps, commanded by Major General Joseph Hooker. Major General Gordon Granger relieved of the command of the 14th army corps, and Major General O. O. Howard (formerly commanding the 11th army corps) in his stead.

Major General P. H. Sheridan having been relieved from the command of the second division 4th army corps, Major General John Newton was assigned to that command, and ordered to report to Major General Howard.

On the 10th, Brigadier General J. W. Geary, commanding second division, 20th army corps, stationed along the railroad from Bridgeport to Stevenson, was ordered to organize an expedition, consisting of two regiments, with ten days' rations, and embark on the steamer Chickamauga, taking one piece of artillery to protect the boat, and then proceed down the Tennessee river as far as Decatur, Alabama, examining carefully the south bank of the river, and all streams emptying into it from the south side; destroying all boats of whatever kind he might find, and notifying the inhabitants that no more boats would be permitted to be used or built, except with the permission of the commanding officer. On returning, General Geary was to examine the north bank in the same manner, and destroy all boats he might find, except such as Major General McPherson, commanding army of the Tennessee, should need, and the boats at Decatur or Larkin's ferry, which will be the only points at which communication across the river will be permitted, notifying the inhabitants of the same.

April 11.—The cavalry command of the army was reorganized, forming four (4) divisions of three (3) brigades each, averaging three regiments to a brigade.

Brigadier General Geary returned to Bridgeport on the 15th, reporting the result of his expedition down the Tennessee to be that he proceeded as far as Triana, Alabama, where he came upon the enemy in heavy force on both sides of the river; that deeming it advisable to proceed no further General Geary returned, having destroyed a considerable number of boats both going and coming.

Information gained from deserters and others estimate the strength of the rebel army at Dalton to be 45,000 infantry and about 12,000 cavalry. The enemy has two brigades of cavalry at Tunnel Hill, watching our movements at Ringgold and the gaps through Taylor's ridge, and one brigade on the road leading from Dalton to Cleveland, picketing the approaches from that direction.

The 4th army corps, Major General O. O. Howard commanding, having been relieved from duty with the army of the Ohio, was concentrated at Cleve-

land on the 22d, and camped at that place and vicinity. The first division of cavalry, Colonel Edward McCook commanding, was still at that point picketing and patrolling the country.

Frequent skirmishes have taken place during the month all along our front, between our own and the enemy's cavalry. In quite a sharp little affair near Leet's farm, on the 23d, we lost five (5) killed and ten (10) wounded, besides one officer and twelve men taken prisoners, the enemy having an overwhelming force, and succeeded in gaining our rear. A scout, who left Dalton on the 16th, reports that two divisions from Hardee's corps were to be sent to re-enforce Lee in Virginia; this force to be replaced by Loring's division from Mississippi. This man passed through the enemy's defences at Buzzard Roost, and reports them very strong.

On the 29th a reconnoissance was made towards Tunnel Hill from Ringgold, composed of three hundred cavalry under Kilpatrick and Van Devere's brigade of infantry. They advanced to within a short distance of Tunnel Hill, driving the enemy before them until they developed a largely superior force, when the expedition returned to Ringgold. About this time preparations were commenced for the proposed advance on Dalton in May. The second division of cavalry, Brigadier General Kenner Garrard commanding, started from Columbia, Tennessee, under instructions to report to General McPherson for further orders.

The 20th army corps, Major General Hooker commanding, was directed to concentrate in Lookout valley. General Rousseau's division, of that command, to garrison the block-houses and other points along the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad; the balance of the corps to be placed in marching order immediately.

The 14th corps, Major General J. M. Palmer commanding, was to concentrate at Ringgold, Georgia, as soon as possible; and the 4th corps was in readiness to move from Cleveland as soon as ordered.

Garrard's division of cavalry being under orders to report to General McPherson for duty, McCook's division (first) was to move on Howard's left, and Kilpatrick's (third) to operate with Palmer's corps from Ringgold.

Reliable information was received on the 30th from Atlanta (27th) that heavy re-enforcements to Johnston had been passing that point since the 20th, said to be from Mobile, estimated at 10,000. The same person reports from Rome (28th) that part of Polk's corps was there, numbering about 5,000, and still more arriving. Two trains with artillery, fourteen pieces, had arrived that day. Martin's cavalry division was also there, about 4,000 men; also, part of Polk's corps had reached Dalton the same day, (28th.)

A reliable scout, sent to Dalton from Chattanooga, reaching Dalton on the 25th, returned on the 30th, reporting that the whole of Hood's corps had been moved to the front from its old position in the immediate vicinity of Dalton. He went to Atlanta on the 27th, but learned nothing of importance there. At Resaca he saw the camps of Armstrong's division of cavalry, and at Rome he learned that Loring's and another division had arrived from Mississippi, thus corroborating information received from a different source.

During the month there have returned to this army from furlough, as veteran volunteers, eighteen (18) regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and four (4) batteries of artillery, with an aggregate of 2,697 recruits gained while absent.

The quartermaster's department has been particularly active constructing storehouses, &c., at Chattanooga. I have the honor to enclose, herewith, lists of steamers and other transportation employed by the quartermaster's department on the Upper Tennessee, and of the military storehouses at Chattanooga



and Bridgeport; also the monthly report of the transactions of the provost marshal's department.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.*

Lieutenant Colonel R. M. SAWYER,

*Assistant Adjutant General Military Division of the Mississippi.*

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Captain and Aide-de-Camp and Brevet Major.*

*List of military storehouses constructed at Bridgeport, Alabama, up to May 1, 1864.*

No.	Location.	Dimensions.	For what used.	Condition.
		<i>Feet.</i>		
1	At upper levee.....	450 by 30	Transfer storehouse..	Completed.
1	do.....	315 by 30	do.....	Do.
1	On line of railroad to upper landing.	100 by 30	Storehouse .....	Do.
1	do.....do.....	100 by 30	do.....	Do.
1	do.....do.....	300 by 90	do.....	Do.
1	do.....do.....	300 by 90	do.....	Do.
1	do.....do.....	256 by 30	Ordnance storehouse.	Do.
1	do.....do.....	65 by 30	Depot building .....	Do.

L. C. EASTON,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Chief Quartermaster.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*Office Chief Quartermaster, Ringgold, Ga., May 6, 1864.*

*List of military storehouses built and in process of construction at Chattanooga, Tennessee, May 1, 1864.*

No.	Location.	Dimensions.	By whom used.	Condition.
		<i>Feet.</i>		
1	On river front of Market street .....	150 by 40.....	Capt. C. K. Smith, A. Q. M.	Completed May 1, '64.
1	do.....	300 by 50.....	do.....	Do.
2	do.....	300 by 50 each.	Capt. A. D. Baker, C. S.	Do.
1	On river near Market street .....	50 by 20.....	Capt. H. M. Smith, A. Q. M.	Do.
1	In rear of depot quartermaster's office	204 by 40.....	do.....	Do.
2	On Market street.....	250 by 50.....	do.....	Do.
1	do.....	115 by 50.....	Buildings for eng. dep't...	One-fourth completed.
1	In rear of market-house.....	300 by 50.....	Buildings for com'y dep't.	Do.
1	On Market street.....	466 by 50.....	Buildings for ord. dep't...	Do.
1	On river bank.....	Brick magazine	do.....	One-third completed.
1	In rear of depot quartermaster's office	154 by 40.....	Buildings for qm. dep't...	Foundation being laid.

L. C. EASTON,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Chief Quartermaster.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*Office Chief Quartermaster, Ringgold, Ga., May 6, 1864.*

*List of United States steamers plying on the upper Tennessee river, May 1, 1864*

Chickamauga, built by quartermaster's department at Bridgeport, Alabama.  
 Chattanooga, built by quartermaster's department at Bridgeport, Alabama.  
 Kingston, built by quartermaster's department at Bridgeport, Alabama.  
 Lookout, built by quartermaster's department at Bridgeport, Alabama.  
 Missionary, built by quartermaster's department at Bridgeport, Alabama.  
 Paint Rock, captured at Chattanooga.  
 Gunboat A, built by quartermaster's department at Bridgeport, Alabama.  
 Gunboat B, built by quartermaster's department at Bridgeport, Alabama.  
 Fourteen barges, built by the quartermaster's department at Bridgeport, Alabama.

Three more boats have been built at Bridgeport, and are now receiving their engines and joiner work.

L. C. EASTON,

*Lieut. Colonel and Chief Quartermaster.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*Chief Quartermaster's Office, Ringgold, Ga., May 6, 1864*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*Office Provost Marshal General, Chattanooga, Tenn., May 3, 1864.*

CAPTAIN: In compliance with your instructions of the 1st instant, I have the honor to submit the following report of prisoners of war, rebel deserters, and oaths administered during the month of April, 1864:

By whom.	PRISONERS OF WAR.			REBEL DESERTERS.			OATHS.		
	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Aggregate.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Aggregate.	Amnesty.	Allegiance.	Aggregate.
By Col. Parkhurst, P. M. G.	.....	.....	.....	9	319	328	38	.....	38
By Capt. R. M. Goodwin, A. P. M. G. ....	30	237	267	3	32	35	.....	865	865
Total .....	30	237	267	12	351	363	38	865	903

Respectfully submitted:

H. M. DUFFIELD,

*Lieut. and A. A. Provost Marshal General,  
 For Colonel PARKHURST,  
 Provost Marshal General.*

Captain S. C. KELLOGG,

*Aide-de-Camp, Department of the Cumberland.*

**PART III.****ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND—ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.**

FROM MAY 1 TO SEPTEMBER 7, 1864.

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**OPERATIONS DURING MAY, 1864.****HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND,***In the field, near Dallas, Ga., June 5, 1864.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to report the operations of my command for the month of May as follows:

In obedience to instructions from the major general commanding the military division, I got my command in readiness for a forward movement on Dalton, Georgia, and was fully prepared to move on the 2d of May as directed. Major General Hooker, commanding 20th army corps, was directed to move from Lookout valley, *via* Lee's and Gordon's mill, on East Chickamauga creek, to Leet's farm, on the road leading from the mill to Nickajack gap, the movement to commence on the 2d; Major General Palmer, commanding the 14th corps, was to concentrate his command at Ringgold, Georgia, and Major General Howard, commanding 4th army corps, was to move from Cleveland, East Tennessee, on the 3d, and to concentrate his command in the vicinity of Catoosa springs, about three miles east of Ringgold; McCook's division of cavalry to move on Howard's left; Kilpatrick's division of cavalry was stationed at Ringgold, picketing towards Tunnel Hill, and patrolling on Palmer's right flank; Garrard's division was detached and operating under instructions from Major General McPherson, commanding the army of the Tennessee. The army got into position by the 5th and stood as above, direct communication having been fully established from the right to the left of the whole command.

According to instructions given on the 6th, the army moved on Tunnel Hill at daylight on the 7th in three columns; Palmer's corps on the direct road from Ringgold, Howard's *via* Lee's house, and Hooker's *via* Nickajack gap and Trickum. The enemy made some show of resistance in Palmer's front, but evacuated Tunnel Hill on the appearance of Howard's column on his flank, and fled towards Buzzard's Roost, our troops occupying Tunnel Hill ridge; Palmer's command was then moved forward and took position on Howard's right, along the ridge, and both corps remained there for the night. Hooker's column reached Trickum post office about 4 p. m., and camped for the night, picketing strongly the roads leading from Buzzard's Roost and Dalton, as well as the approaches from the direction of Villanow; General Kilpatrick's division of cavalry took post at or near Gordon's springs, to be in readiness to establish communication with the army of the Tennessee, which was expected at Villanow on the morning of the 8th; Harker's brigade of Newton's division, Howard's corps, was pushed along the crest of Rocky Face ridge to within half a mile of the rebel signal station. There it came upon obstructions of too formidable a character to admit of further progress except with very severe loss. It was instructed to hold the position. Wood's division of 4th corps, Davis's division of the 14th corps, and Butterfield's division of the 20th corps then pushed forward a line of skirmishers and drove the enemy to his intrenchments, our men occupying the mouth of Buzzard's Roost. Geary's division of the 20th corps made a reconnoissance well up the side of Chattoogata mountain, a high and precipitous ridge running due south from Buzzard's Roost. Geary's men fought their way well up to the enemy's intrenchments on the crest, but with considerable loss and without being able to gain possession of Mill gap. The troops were

then withdrawn to a position in the valley out of reach of the enemy's guns. Kilpatrick communicated with General McPherson's command at Villanow and then returned to Trickum. Brigadier General Ed. McCook was ordered to concentrate his cavalry division and take post on the left of General Schofield until General Stoneman's cavalry could arrive and relieve him. From a prisoner captured at Buzzard's Roost we learned that the force defending the passage of the gap amounted to 11,000 men, comprising Stewart's and Bates's divisions, supported by Hindman's and Stevenson's divisions, numbering 10,000 more. They had considerable artillery, but none heavier than 10-pound calibre. The enemy was fortifying all night of the 7th, and had masked batteries at points all through the pass. Heavy skirmishing was kept up along the whole line during the 9th and 10th with considerable loss in wounded and but few killed. General Hooker was directed on the 10th to send one division of his command to the support of General McPherson at Snake Creek gap, to enable the latter to operate more freely from danger to his rear. Kilpatrick's cavalry was also ordered to report to General McPherson. McCook's division of cavalry, posted on the left of General Schofield's command, had a heavy skirmish with three (3) brigades of the enemy's cavalry, on the road leading to Varnell station, resulting in our driving the rebels to their intrenchments on Poplar Creek Hill, where they opened on McCook's troops with two pieces of artillery. Our loss was 136 men and 15 officers killed, wounded, and missing; among the latter Colonel Lagrange, of the 1st Wisconsin, who was captured. The enemy's loss was greater than ours. General Hooker was directed to send another division of his command to Snake Creek gap, with instructions to repair the road through the gap, so as to facilitate the passage of infantry and wagons. On the 11th it was decided to leave one corps, Howard's, supported by Stoneman's and McCook's divisions of cavalry, and move to Snake Creek gap with the balance of the army, attacking the enemy in force from that quarter, whilst Howard was keeping up the impression of a direct attack on Buzzard's Roost. This movement was to commence on the 12th. Instructions were given to corps commanders to provide their commands with ten days' rations and a good supply of ammunition, sending all surplus wagons back to Ringgold. At 9 a. m. on the 13th General Howard's command occupied Dalton, it having been evacuated by the enemy on the evening of the 12th. Concentrating his troops in Dalton, General Howard pursued the enemy along the railroad in the direction of Resaca, capturing a considerable number of prisoners; the concentration of the balance of the army in Snake Creek gap having been completed by the night of the 12th. At 8 a. m. on the 13th Hooker's corps, preceded by Kilpatrick's cavalry, moved out on the Resaca road, in support of McPherson's troops, threatening Resaca. Palmer's corps moved out of Snake Creek gap two (2) miles northeast of Hooker, and then took a course parallel with the Resaca road, with orders to proceed as far as the railroad. On reaching the neighborhood of the railroad his skirmishers encountered those of the enemy strongly posted on the hills immediately west of the railroad, and continued a fierce skirmish with them until nightfall. Butterfield's division of Hooker's corps moved up in support of Palmer's right. About noon of the 14th Schofield's and Palmer's corps attacked the enemy's position on the hills bordering the railroad, meeting with very heavy resistance. General Schofield's left being threatened, and he having called on me for support, I directed Newton's division of Howard's corps, which had just arrived, to move to Schofield's assistance, and subsequently the whole of Howard's corps took post on the left of Schofield. During the afternoon Hooker's corps, which had been acting as support to General McPherson, was shifted to the left of Howard's command; and Williams's division reached the position assigned him just in time to meet and repel a fierce attack of the enemy, who was endeavoring to turn Howard's left flank. McCook's division of cavalry took post on the left of Hooker, to guard against any further attempt of the enemy in that direc-

tion. The fighting in Schofield's and Howard's front was very severe, but we drove the enemy from the hills he had occupied and forced him into his intrenchments beyond. From prisoners captured we learned that Johnston's entire army was confronting us.

At daylight on the morning of the 15th our lines stood nearly as follows: Palmer's corps on the right, connecting with the left of McPherson's line, then Schofield's, and Howard's, and Hooker's, with McCook's cavalry on our extreme left. Orders were issued during the night of the 14th for the whole line to advance at daylight on the 15th, provision being made for the retirement of Schofield's troops from the position they then occupied, and directions having been given them to take post on the left, where they properly belonged, as soon as crowded out from the centre of my line by the advance of Palmer and Howard. About 11 a. m. General Butterfield's division of Hooker's corps, supported by Williams's and Geary's of the same command, attacked and carried a series of hills strongly occupied by the enemy on the east of the road leading from Tilton to Resaca. The rebels were driven for nearly a mile and a half, our forces capturing four guns and a number of prisoners.

Information was received by daylight on the 16th that Johnston had evacuated Resaca, and directions were immediately given for the whole army to start in pursuit. Our troops occupied the town about 9 a. m., and commenced repairing the bridge over the Ostaunaula, which had been partially burned by the enemy. A pontoon bridge was also thrown across, above the railroad bridge, so that by night Howard's corps had got across, and marched on Calhoun. Hooker's command crossed the Conasauga at Figlet's ferry, and at a ford in its vicinity, thence marching south across the Coosawattie towards Adairsville. Palmer's command was to follow after Howard's, except Davis's division, which was detached, and sent towards Rome, to the support of Garrard's cavalry, then acting under special instructions from the major general commanding the military division.

On the 17th our advance skirmished with the enemy nearly the whole distance from Calhoun to within two miles of Adairsville, when a fierce skirmish ensued, completely checking our further progress, and occasioning considerable loss in wounded. Information was brought in about dark that the whole of Johnston's army was at Adairsville. The column was again set in motion on the morning of the 18th, the enemy having left during the night. Howard's and Palmer's commands moved on the direct road and along the railroad towards Kingston, camping at a point three (3) miles north of the latter place. Hooker's corps moved on a road running southeast from Adairsville, his instructions being to proceed as far as Cassville, and there await further orders. General Davis's division of the 14th corps occupied Rome, capturing a large amount of commissary and quartermaster stores, hospital supplies, and all sorts of ammunition, enough to supply his command for two weeks. The enemy tried to destroy the valuable iron works at this place, but failed to do much injury. Howard's troops entered Kingston about 8 a. m. on the 19th, skirmishing with the enemy on the southeastern side of the town. The column started again at about 10 a. m., and came up with what was reported to be Cheatham's and another division, in line of battle on a hill about halfway between Kingston and Cassville. Howard's troops shelled the enemy from this position, pushing on after him to within two miles of Cassville, skirmishing with his rear guard until dark, when the command halted for the night. Baird's division of Palmer's corps was posted on the right of Howard's corps. Hooker's troops engaged the enemy on the road leading direct from Adairsville to Cassville, skirmishing with him, and driving him into his works at the latter place.

At 10 p. m. General Howard reported the town in possession of his troops. A deserter came into our lines with the information that Johnston received a re-enforcement of 6,000 men on the 19th, and that his army was now estimated

at 70,000 strong. By direction of the major general commanding the military division, the whole command rested until the morning of the 23d. In the mean time, the railroad having been placed in running order as far as Cassville depot, twenty days' rations and forage were issued to the troops. Resaca was directed to be strongly held, and made a depot of supplies, only such stores and provisions to be brought forward to Kingston and Rome as could be moved by the wagons present with the army. My directions were to move my army at daylight on the morning of the 23d, on Dallas, by Euharley and Stilesboro'. The division of Brigadier General Jeff. C. Davis, at Rome, as soon as relieved by troops from General McPherson's army, to march direct on Dallas by way of Van Wert. The advance guard of McCook's division of cavalry reached Stilesboro' on the afternoon of the 23d, and found the place occupied by a strong force of the enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, which resisted his further advance, skirmishing with him until dark. The commands of Major General's Hooker, Howard, and Palmer camped on the south side of Euharley creek, in accordance with my directions. General Hooker was directed to send one division of his command, at daylight on the 24th, to push the enemy across Raccoon creek towards Allatoona, on the Alabama road, and hold him in that position until relieved by the army of the Ohio, covering the movements of the balance of the 20th corps directly through Stilesboro' upon Burnt Hickory, at which latter place his whole command was to encamp. McCook's division of cavalry was to precede the 20th corps in the movement upon Burnt Hickory, and then take up a position towards Allatoona, picketing the roads strongly, and covering the movements of the army. The 4th corps followed the 20th corps, camping on its right, and the 14th corps, not being able to reach Burnt Hickory, on account of the crowded state of the roads and the difficult nature of the ground passed over, camped at a point on Altoona ridge, about halfway between Stilesboro' and Burnt Hickory. McCook reached Burnt Hickory about 2 p. m., after skirmishing with the enemy about four miles. He captured a rebel courier bearing a despatch to the rebel General Jackson, commanding a division of cavalry, with instructions from General Johnston to observe our movements towards Burnt Hickory, and stating that Johnston was moving in the direction of Dallas and Powder Springs. General Garrard, commanding second cavalry division, informed me that he was camped on Pumpkin Vine creek, about three (3) miles from Dallas, and that in moving on that place, and when within a quarter of a mile from it, he was attacked by what was reported by prisoners to be Bates's division, the advance of Hardee's corps. Garrard repulsed this force and drove it back towards Dallas.

On the 25th the first division of cavalry (McCook's) moved on the road leading to Golgotha, preceding Butterfield's division of the 20th corps. The balance of General Hooker's command advanced on the road leading to Dallas, running south of the one used by Butterfield's division. Howard's corps followed Hooker's, and in rear of Howard, Palmer's. About 11 a. m. General Geary's division of the 20th corps, being in advance, came upon the enemy in considerable force at a point about four and a half ( $4\frac{1}{2}$ ) miles from Dallas. The country on both sides of the road being thickly wooded and covered with undergrowth, Geary skirmished heavily with the enemy, slowly driving him, until Butterfield's and Williams's division came up and relieved Geary's troops. Soon after the arrival of Williams, about 3 p. m., the column was again put in motion, Williams's division in advance, and although heavily engaged, drove the enemy steadily before it into his entrenchments. Our loss was heavy, but it is believed that the loss of the enemy was much greater. Shortly after 3 p. m. the head of Howard's column got within supporting distance of Hooker's corps, and Newton's division was placed in position on Hooker's left about 6 p. m., and by morning the whole of Howard's corps was in position on the left of Hooker. The roads were so full of wagons that Palmer's corps could not get into position by the

night of the 25th, but on the morning of the 26th, Johnson's division of the 14th corps was moved up to within a short distance of Hooker's and Howard's commands, and was posted in reserve. Davis's division 14th corps (which had reported back to its command, it having been relieved at Rome by troops from the army of Tennessee) was sent by General Palmer to move on Dallas by the most direct road from where he then was, to support General McPherson's command, and communicate with the right of General Hooker. Baird's division of the 14th corps was left at Burnt Hickory to protect the trains at that point, and the rear of the army. McCook's division of cavalry met the enemy's cavalry on the road leading from Burnt Hickory to Marietta, near its intersection with the lower Dallas and Altoona road. McCook's troops skirmished heavily with the force opposing them, inflicting on them considerable loss, and capturing fifty-two prisoners, from whom it was ascertained that the whole of Wheeler's cavalry was posted on the right of the rebel army. The left of General Howard's corps was swung around to the right, occupying a line of hills running nearly perpendicularly to the line occupied by Hooker on the 25th, thereby threatening the enemy's right. The 23d army corps, Major General Schofield commanding, was posted on the left of my command, Schofield's left extending to and covering the road leading from Altoona to Dallas, *via* New Hope church. There was light skirmishing all day whilst Howard and Schofield were working into position, and at dark on the 26th Howard's left connected with Schofield's right. In the mean time trains were brought up, and rations and ammunition issued where practicable. Strong breastworks were thrown up all along the line, the men working cheerfully, and prepared to resist any attack the enemy might see fit to make.

On the 27th, in accordance with instructions given by the major general commanding the military division, Hooker's and Howard's corps pressed the enemy, supported by considerable artillery firing. Wood's division of Howard's corps, supported by Johnson's division of Palmer's corps, was moved to the left of Schofield's line and swung round towards the right, attacking the enemy's right flank and driving him to his rifle pits, with considerable loss, however, to our troops. Our men had to contend with an almost hidden foe, the ground being cut up into ravines and covered by a dense forest filled with undergrowth; but notwithstanding all the difficulties of the country, officers and men did their work nobly, and having secured a position, were not to be moved from it. The enemy came out of his works in front of Newton's division of Howard's corps, attacking Wagner's and Kimball's brigades, but was driven back, after a short and warm contest. General Davis occupied Dallas with his division on the afternoon of the 27th, skirmishing with the enemy and driving him as far as he could without losing his connexion with General McPherson. Davis reported that after skirmishing all the afternoon he developed the enemy in force and strongly posted in front of his (Davis's) left, with a battery in position on a hill commanding the road between him and General Hooker. Davis had, however, cut a road through the forest to his rear by which he could communicate safely with Hooker. During the night of the 27th the enemy attacked Davis and was repulsed after a sharp fight, leaving behind him a few wounded and twenty-seven (27) prisoners, belonging mostly to Polk's corps. By this time it had been ascertained beyond a doubt that Johnston had his whole army with him, strengthened by Polk's command and detachments sent from various points to re-enforce him. He had taken up a strong position, which he was steadily strengthening with earthworks, evidently with the determination to make a firm stand where he then was.

On the 28th our line stood as follows: Hooker's corps (20th) on the right, with Davis's division of Palmer's corps still on his right, but acting as a support to the army of the Tennessee; two divisions of Howard's corps (4th) on the left of Hooker; then the army of the Ohio, Major General Schofield commanding;

Wood's division of Howard's corps on the left of Schofield's command, with Johnson's division of Palmer's corps on the left of Wood; Stoneman's division of cavalry holding a hill to the left of Johnson, and then McCook's division of cavalry, holding the road leading from Burnt Church to Marietta, *via* Golgotha, and guarding the left of the army. During the 28th there was considerable artillery firing, with skirmishing at intervals during the day and night.

During the night of the 29th the enemy felt our line at several points, without making a serious attack at any one place; they found our men vigilant and fully prepared for them.

Owing to the close proximity of the enemy's lines to the right of ours, neither McPherson nor Davis could withdraw from their positions without being attacked and forced to return, so that the project of using their commands to relieve Hooker, Howard, and Schofield, allowing these latter to take post on the left of the line, could not be carried out, although three attempts at a withdrawal were made by McPherson and Davis on the nights of the 29th, 30th, and 31st. In the meanwhile the position of the army remained unchanged up to the 31st, our skirmishers and those of the enemy exchanging occasional shots.

The detailed reports of the subordinate commanders will be forwarded as soon as handed in.

I have the honor to forward herewith a consolidated return of casualties for the month, as also a return of prisoners captured, and a list of captured property and ammunition expended.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General Commanding.*

Lieutenant Colonel R. M. SAWYER,

*Assistant Adjutant General, Military Division of the Mississippi.*

*Report of casualties in the army of the Cumberland during May, 1864.*

Corps.	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		Aggregate.
	Comm'd officers.	Enlisted men.	Comm'd officers.	Enlisted men.	Comm'd officers.	Enlisted men.	
14th army corps .....	14	210	54	1,100	2	75	1,455
20th army corps .....	22	387	127	2,880	2	499	3,917
4th army corps .....	30	493	120	2,471	4	284	3,402
Total .....	66	1,090	301	6,451	8	858	8,774

The report of the 4th army corps is to June 5th. Of the 284 missing 255 are from General Wood's division, and were lost at Pickett's mills, May 27th. General Wood says: "I am fully satisfied that nearly the whole of them were either killed outright on the field, or were wounded and could not be brought away, and fell into the hands of the enemy."

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General Commanding.*



*List of cannon, arms, accoutrements, &c., captured from the enemy and collected from the battle-field during the month of May, 1864.*

## CANNON.

Four 12-pounder guns, bronze; four 6-pounder guns, iron.

## GUN-CARRIAGES.

Four 12-pounder gun-carriages and limbers; four 6-pounder gun-carriages and limbers; two battery wagons; also several limbers, spare wheels, ammunition chests, and spare parts of carriages.

## SMALL-ARMS.

Two thousand and seventy-two Enfield rifles, calibre 57; one thousand one hundred and ten Springfield rifles, calibre 58; four hundred and eighty-four Austrian rifles, calibre 54; four hundred and sixty smooth-bore muskets, calibre 69; twenty-eight Confederate rifles, calibre 58; fifty-nine siege rifles; three Prussian muskets, calibre 69; one Sharp's carbine, calibre 52; one Colt's rifle, calibre 56; also several musket barrels.

## INFANTRY ACCOUTREMENTS.

One thousand and nine hundred and nineteen cartridge boxes and plates; eight hundred and eighty-two cartridge box belts and plates; one thousand and twenty-three waist belts and plates; nine hundred and twenty-three bayonet scabbards; nine hundred and eighty-two cap pouches.

## AMMUNITION EXPENDED DURING THE MONTH OF MAY, 1864.

Total number of rounds of 20-pounder Parrott, 434; total number of rounds of 24-pounder howitzer, 2; total number of rounds of 12-pounder gun, 5,221; total number of rounds of 10-pounder Parrott, 2,477; total number of rounds of 3-inch, 3,745; total number of rounds of artillery ammunition, 11,879; total number of rounds of E. B. cartridges, 2,608,210; total number of rounds of Spencer rifle, 3,000; total number of rounds of rounds of Colt's rifle, 2,500; total number of rounds of small-arms ammunition, 2,613,710;

T. G. BAYLOR,

*Captain and Chief of Ordnance, Dep't of Cumberland.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
OFFICE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL,  
*Brown's Mill Creek, Ga., June 4, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to report herewith the number of prisoners of war and deserters disposed of by the assistant provost marshals general at Nashville and Chattanooga, Tennessee, which have been received by them during the month of May, 1864.

I remain, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. G. PARKHURST,

*Colonel and Provost Marshal General.*

Brigadier General WM. D. WHIPPLE,

*Assistant Adjutant General and Chief of Staff.*

	PRISONERS OF WAR.		Deserters.
	Comm'd officers.	Enlisted men.	
Number passed through office at Nashville .....	34	1, 628	257
Number of deserters disposed of at Chattanooga .....			338
Number <i>en route</i> to Nashville not received up to May 31st.....		167	15
	34	1, 795	610
Of these were received from 4th army corps .....	9	355	-----
Of these were received from 14th army corps .....	2	223	9
Of these were received from 20th army corps .....	5	412	39
Of these were received from 23d army corps .....		221	60
Cavalry command .....	2	104	-----
Army of Tennessee .....	6	125	-----
Received at Chattanooga, Tennessee, and by officers in charge of prisoners <i>en route</i> to Nashville, and for which I am unable to give credit to any particular command .....	10	355	502
Total.....	34	1, 795	610

## OPERATIONS DURING JUNE, 1864.

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*In the field, July 16, 1864.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to report the operations of my command for the month of June, as follows:

*June 1.*—Hooker's, Howard's, and Palmer's corps were confronting the enemy's position at New Hope church, near Dallas, Georgia, with McCook's division of cavalry on the left of the army, guarding the approaches from the direction of Ackworth and Marietta.

*June 2.*—General Hooker's corps having been relieved in the position it occupied on the right of my army by General McPherson's troops, moved in support of the army of the Ohio, Major General Schofield commanding, and occupied the hills on the extreme left of my line, which had been previously held by Stoneman's and McCook's divisions of cavalry, McCook taking post on the left of Schofield on the Dallas and Ackworth road. Baird's division of Palmer's corps moved up from Burnt Hickory and took up a position in reserve behind Johnson's division of the same corps. Davis's division of Palmer's corps relieved General Schofield's troops at the same time that General Hooker was relieved by General McPherson's command. As soon as the troops got into their positions, Schofield's and Hooker's corps, and Baird's division of Palmer's corps, swung round towards the right, skirmishing with the enemy as they advanced, gaining some ground, which they immediately prepared to hold. Howard's corps, on the right of my line, occupied the enemy's attention, and was held in readiness to follow the general movement against the enemy's right.

*June 3.*—General Palmer advanced Baird's division about a mile in a southeasterly direction, and General Hooker moved Butterfield's and Geary's divisions toward the Ackworth and Dallas road, sending one brigade to take and hold the bridge across Altoona creek, four miles southwest from Altoona. General E. M. McCook, with his division of cavalry, took position on the direct road from Dallas to Ackworth, at the crossing of Altoona creek, one and a half mile south of and above the crossing held by General Hooker's troops; scouts were sent

into Ackworth, reaching there at 11 a. m., finding the town nearly deserted; they captured a few of the enemy's videttes. On reaching the new positions the troops were immediately set to work strengthening them by breastworks of logs, whilst continual skirmishing was being kept up with the enemy.

During the night of the 4th the enemy fell back from our front, his works being found completely evacuated on the morning of the 5th. After a careful reconnoissance of the ground lately occupied by him, the conclusion was that he had fallen back in the direction of Big Shanty, a point on the railroad about six miles from Marietta.

*June 6.*—General Hooker moved his command to the vicinity of McLane's house on the Sandtown road, near its intersection with the Burnt Hickory and Marietta road, and about three miles southwest from Ackworth; General Palmer's corps was posted on General Hooker's left, Palmer's left resting on Proctor's creek; General Howard's corps in the vicinity of Durham's house. By direction of the major general commanding the military division, the whole command remained in the above position until the morning of the 10th instant. In the mean time the railroad was completed through to Ackworth, and rations and ammunition were replenished.

*June 9.*—General E. M. McCook, commanding first division of cavalry, made a reconnoissance towards the enemy's position in our front. After passing two miles beyond the pickets of the 20th army corps, he came upon those of the enemy on the Marietta side of Altoona creek, and drove them in upon a heavier line about a mile beyond, coming in view of the enemy's camp on Pine hill, where they appeared in force.

*June 10.*—Palmer's corps moved out of camp on a road running in a southeasterly direction, passing by Owens's house, and found the enemy strongly posted on Pine hill, skirmishing with him until dark. Howard's corps moved on the Burnt Hickory and Marietta road, and took post on the right of Palmer in front of Pine hill. Hooker's corps moved on the same road with General Howard's command.

*June 11.*—The commands of Generals Howard and Palmer moved to the left and slightly in advance of their position of yesterday, General Palmer's left resting on the railroad and connecting with the right of General McPherson's army. The enemy was found to be strongly posted on a line of hills running west from Kenesaw mountain to Lost mountain, with a strong advanced work on Pine hill. The approaches to this position were over a very broken and thickly wooded country, which two days of rain had rendered almost impassable.

*June 14.*—Palmer's corps and the left of Howard's pushed forward to a position about a mile in advance of their line established on the 11th, Howard's right being already in close proximity to the enemy's position on Pine hill.

*June 15.*—The enemy having evacuated Pine hill during the night, it was occupied by General Howard's troops early in the day; about noon General Hooker's corps, on the right of Pine hill, advanced against the enemy's position directly in his front, driving him to his main works after very heavy skirmishing and considerable loss. Howard's corps also moved against the enemy on the left of Pine hill, and succeeded in driving him to his main fortification. Both Hooker and Howard established themselves within a hundred yards of the enemy's main line, and immediately secured the position gained. The right of Palmer's corps moved in connexion with General Howard's left.

*June 16.*—Hooker and Howard remained in the positions taken up by them yesterday, their skirmishers being close up to those of the enemy, keeping up a steady fire all day. Palmer advanced his centre division a short distance towards the enemy's works, shortening and more nearly perfecting the line established by yesterday's operations. Batteries were placed at commanding points along the entire line, and kept up a continuous fire on the enemy's works and camps.

*June 17.*—Having ascertained during the night that the enemy had evacuated his main line of works, the 4th and 20th corps were advanced early in the morning, passing over the fortifications lately occupied by the enemy, and, swinging around towards the southeast, proceeded until their skirmishers came upon those of the enemy, whose main force was posted on a line of hills bordering Mud creek, on the Marietta side of it, running nearly perpendicular to their earth-works lately abandoned and in a southwesterly direction from the Kenesaw mountain. The right of Palmer moved in conformity with Howard's corps, keeping up the connexion with the left of it, while Palmer's left still rested on the railroad in front of Kenesaw, connecting at that point with the right of the army of the Tennessee. Hooker's right rested a little in advance of Darby's house on the Sandtown road, nearly five miles due west from Marietta.

Part of General Howard's troops in the centre, under the fire of a heavy cannonade previously ordered, charged the enemy's outer rifle pits, and effected a lodgement in the woods close up to his main line. During the night the enemy made two attacks upon this force and was repulsed each time.

General McCook's division of cavalry turned the enemy's left during the afternoon, driving his cavalry across Mud creek on the Dallas and Marietta road, to within six miles of Marietta, and capturing two hospitals containing five officers and thirty-five enlisted men, fourteen nurses, and two surgeons.

*June 18.*—At 4 a. m. Wood's division of Howard's corps pressed up close to the enemy's works, finding him still in force. Shortly after, the right of Howard's skirmishers, strongly supported, advanced suddenly and carried an intrenched line of rebel works, capturing about fifty prisoners. The enemy tried hard to regain the ground, but failed in every attempt they made.

Howard's men pressed the enemy so closely that he could not throw out skirmishers from his works, while our pickets, and at some points our main line, kept up such a well directed fire of musketry that the rebels could not use their artillery. During the day and night batteries were worked into positions from which the enemy's works could be enfiladed should he remain in them till morning.

*June 19.*—At 5 a. m. each of my corps commanders notified me that the rebels had fallen back from our front, and an advance of the whole line was immediately ordered; Howard's troops came up with the enemy at 7 a. m., on the Burnt Hickory and Marietta road, finding him posted on a line of ridges just west of Marietta, and apparently in strong force. Skirmished with him nearly all day, capturing two hundred and fifty prisoners, among whom were fourteen commissioned officers. General Palmer formed his corps on the left of Howard's, close up to the base of Kenesaw mountain. General Hooker came up with the enemy across Noses creek, on the Dallas and Marietta road, strongly posted on a line of ridges, evidently a continuation of those in General Howard's front; skirmishing was kept up along the line until dark, the troops in the mean time getting well into position.

*June 20.*—Woods's and Newton's divisions of Howard's corps were moved to the right to relieve Williams's and Geary's divisions of Hooker's corps, posted across the Dallas and Marietta road, near Guas's house; the movement being made in order to enable General Hooker to operate more strongly against the enemy's left flank, and at the same time co-operate with and support General Schofield's army, which was nearly two miles distant on the Sandtown road, endeavoring to cross Noses creek, the enemy disputing his passage. Stanley's division of Howard's corps carried a hill to the right of the Burnt Hickory and Marietta road, driving the enemy from his skirmish rifle-pits and into his main works. The position gained was immediately strengthened by breast-works, which were scarcely completed when the enemy in strong force assaulted Stanley and was quickly repulsed with severe loss. He made a second attack in less than half an hour afterwards and was again driven off, our men capturing

about twenty prisoners; at dark the right of Palmer connected with General Howard's left.

*June 21.*—General Howard's troops carried a hill about 700 yards in advance of the position gained the night before; his main line was moved up about 500 yards, fortifying the position under a terrible artillery fire from the enemy, our skirmishers taking possession of an intrenched line lately occupied by the enemy; a number of prisoners were captured, and the conduct of the troops was admirable. General Hooker's troops carried and occupied a prominent hill about 500 yards in advance of his old line, and there connected his left with General Howard's right.

*June 22.*—Williams's division of Hooker's corps skirmished itself into position on the right of Geary's division, the right of Williams resting at Culp's house, on the Powder Spring and Marietta road. About 4 p. m. the enemy in heavy force attacked Knipe's brigade in its advanced position before his men had time to throw up any works, and persisted in the assault until sundown, when they withdrew, their ranks hopelessly broken, each assault having been repelled with heavy loss. While this attack on Hooker was in progress the enemy opened heavily with artillery along our whole line, to which we answered fully to his satisfaction, our practice being very fine. After dark General Howard's left, Stanley's division, was relieved by King's division of the 14th corps; Stanley in turn relieving the left division of Hooker's corps, which was transferred further to the right.

*June 23.*—It having been found desirable to gain possession of a prominent hill a short distance in advance of Stanley's position, on Howard's right, directions were given to the latter to advance a strong skirmish line towards the enemy's works in front of Stanley's and Newton's divisions, and if found practicable without too much sacrifice to carry the hill by assault. This movement was preceded by a heavy cannonade from Howard's batteries and part of Hooker's, lasting fifteen minutes; Stanley's skirmishers carried the enemy's skirmish rifle-pits, capturing a number of prisoners, but could not gain the main works on the crest of the hill. They held the ground gained until after nightfall, when, being attacked in front and flank by a greatly superior force, Stanley was obliged steadily to fall back to the position he occupied in the afternoon previous to the advance. On the centre and left of Howard the advanced line secured themselves in their positions and were able to hold them.

*June 25.*—Davis's division of Palmer's corps, being on the extreme left of my army, was relieved by troops from General McPherson's army, and moved to a position in reserve behind the right of Howard's line. This change was effected after dark, and by daylight on the 26th Davis's troops had reached the position assigned them. Baird's division of Palmer's corps, being relieved by troops from the army of the Tennessee, was also withdrawn from its position in line in front of Kenesaw mountain, and moved during the night of the 26th to a position in reserve near that occupied by Davis's troops.

*June 27.*—At 8 a. m. the enemy's works were assaulted at two points, one in front of Newton's division of Howard's corps, and the other in front of Davis's division of Palmer's corps; Davis having relieved the right division (Stanley's) of General Howard's line, Stanley moved his command a short distance to the left, and acted as a support to Newton's division in its assault on the works, Wood's division being in reserve. Davis's assault was supported by Baird's division of Palmer's corps on the right, and Hooker's whole corps was held in readiness to support the movements of Palmer's and Howard's commands. Although the troops were enabled to drive the enemy in his main works, and reached that point with their main line, they were unable to carry the positions, on account of the heavy fire of musketry and canister brought to bear upon them at short range, but held the ground gained. Our loss was 1,580 killed, wounded, and missing, some of our men being shot while on the parapet

of the enemy's works. We took 130 prisoners. General Davis immediately commenced fortifying in his advanced position, at the distance of about 75 yards from the enemy's fortifications, covering the working parties with such a heavy and well-directed fire of musketry that the enemy could not molest them in their operations. About midnight on the 29th the enemy attacked Davis, overwhelming his skirmishers and driving them back, when they rallied and drove the rebels back again to their works.

During the 29th and 30th all remained comparatively quiet along the line, the skirmishers in the most advanced positions only exchanging occasional shots with the enemy.

Throughout the month the enemy's cavalry, in small parties, assisted by guerillas and disloyal citizens, have been prowling along the railroad between Chattanooga and the points occupied by the main army. On a few occasions they succeeded in burning one or two unimportant bridges, and attacked several trains passing over the road, burning a few cars. The troops along the railroad were always on the alert, rendering it difficult for any very serious damage to be perpetrated. All breaks or interferences to travel were speedily removed by the well-organized construction party, under the immediate superintendence of Colonel W. W. Wright, (forty-fourth United States colored,) chief engineer military railroads of the military division.

I have the honor hereto to annex a consolidated list of casualties for the month, a return of prisoners captured, and the amount of ammunition expended.

The detailed report of the subordinate commanders will be forwarded as soon as handed in.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General United States Volunteers, Commanding.*

Lieutenant Colonel R. M. SAWYER,

*Assistant Adjutant General, Military Division of the Mississippi.*

*List of casualties in the army of the Cumberland during the month of June, 1864.*

Corps.	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		Aggregate.
	Comm'd officers.	Enlisted men.	Comm'd officers.	Enlisted men.	Comm'd officers.	Enlisted men.	
14th army corps .....	19	289	49	1,067	2	43	1,469
4th army corps .....	40	406	127	2,027	3	115	2,718
20th army corps .....	8	178	83	1,206	3	82	1,560
Total .....	67	873	259	4,300	8	240	5,747

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*Near Kenesaw Mountain, July 2, 1864.*

*Report of ammunition expended by the army of the Cumberland during the month of June, 1864.*

Total number of rounds of 20-pounder Parrotts, 186; total number of rounds of 24-pounder howitzer, 16; total number of rounds of 12-pounder guns, 10,153;

total number of rounds of 10-pounder Parrotts, 8,194; total number of rounds of 3-inch, 10,002; total number of rounds of artillery ammunition, 28,551; E. B. cartridges, calibre 57.7, 3,542,000; Spencer rifle cartridges, 49,536; Colt's rifle cartridges, 3,970; total number of small-arm ammunition, 3,596,577.

*Report of arms, accoutrements, &c., captured, lost, and becoming surplus in the army of the Cumberland, for the month of June, 1864.*

	Springfield rifle, calibre 58.	Enfield rifle, calibre 57.7.	Austrian rifle, calibre 54.	Spencer rifle.	Sporting.	Total.
Captured .....	40	24	73	-----	4	141
Lost .....	398	274	-----	-----	-----	672
Surplus* .....	475	418	-----	49	-----	942

\* Rendered surplus by reason of men being killed, wounded, and sent to the rear.

T. G. BAYLOR,

*Captain of Ordnance, Chief Ordnance Officer, D. C.*

NEAR ATLANTA, GA., July 31, 1864.

*Report of prisoners of war and deserters from the rebel army, received and disposed of during the month of June, 1864.*

From what corps received.	PRISONERS OF WAR.			DESSERTERS.			Aggregate of prisoners of war and deserters.
	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Aggregate.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Aggregate.	
From 4th army corps.....	16	346	362	1	18	19	381
From 14th army corps.....	3	126	129	-----	23	23	152
From 20th army corps.....	1	92	93	-----	23	23	116
From cavalry command .....	3	34	37	-----	1	1	38
From department of the Cumberland not credited to any corps.....	14	107	121	8	373	381	*502
Total received from department of the Cumberland .....	37	705	742	9	438	447	1,189
From department of the Tennessee...	22	371	393	2	52	54	447
From department of the Ohio .....	3	170	173	-----	30	30	203
Total .....	25	54	566	2	82	84	650
Grand total.....	62	1,246	1,308	11	520	531	1,839

\* At Chattanooga and Nashville.

Respectfully submitted:

U. M. DUFFIELD,

*Lieut. Ninth Mich. Vet. Vol. Inf't'y and Asst. Pro. Mar. Gen'l, D. C.*

## OPERATIONS DURING JULY AND AUGUST, 1864.

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*August 17, 1864.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to report the operations of my command for the month of July as follows:

The position of the army of the Cumberland on the morning of the 1st July remained as established immediately after the assault on the enemy's works on the 27th of June. Hooker's corps on the right, his right connecting with the left of the army of the Ohio near Culp's house, on the Powder Spring and Marietta road; Palmer's corps in the centre, except King's division, which occupied the works on the left of Howard's corps, and connected with the army of the Tennessee at the Burnt Hickory and Marietta road, in advance of York's house.

The first division of cavalry, Brigadier General E. M. McCook commanding, was operating on the right of the army of the Ohio, and protecting that flank; the second division of cavalry, Brigadier General R. Garrard commanding, was still detached from my army and operating under instructions from the commanding general of the military division of the Mississippi, and the third division, Colonel W. W. Lowe commanding, was stationed on the railroad between Cartersville and Dalton, scouting the country thoroughly between these two points. The troops of Generals Hooker, Howard, and Palmer had worked themselves, at considerable cost of life and labor, into positions close up to the enemy's fortifications, at some points within a hundred yards, and everywhere so near that they could advance no further without making a direct assault on almost impregnable works. It was then decided by the major general commanding the military division to leave my command where it then was, to hold the enemy in check, carefully watching his movement, while the army of the Tennessee would be withdrawn from my left and transferred to the right of the army of the Ohio, with a view to turn the enemy's left flank, and force him from the strong position he held to the southwest of Kenesaw mountain. This movement was in progress of execution during the night of the 2d, when, about daylight of the 3d, each of my corps commanders notified me that the enemy had left their respective fronts, and that our skirmishers were in possession of his works. A pursuit was immediately ordered by different routes, the concentration to be at Marietta, which place was entered by my troops about 9 a. m.

After a short delay the columns were again set in motion, Palmer's corps moving along the railroad by the main Marietta and Atlanta road, with Hooker's command on his right and Howard's on his left, all three within supporting distance of each other. About four miles out from Marietta they came up with the enemy's rear-guard and skirmished with him to near Ruff's station, where he was found strongly posted in earthworks, which had evidently been finished some time previous with a view to his being obliged to make his present retrograde towards the Chattahoochee. The lines were formed, and by nightfall the three corps had skirmished themselves into position close up to the enemy's works, having fully developed their situation and strength. Quite a number of prisoners and stragglers were picked up during the day, about five hundred being reported.

The next morning, July 4th, the line of battle was readjusted, and during the afternoon the enemy's skirmishers were driven into his main works, and our main line was advanced a short distance, our skirmishers intrenching themselves on the line formerly occupied by those of the enemy.

At 4 a. m. on the 5th, information was received that the enemy had evacuated his fortifications and our troops were in possession of them. A pursuit was ordered and made in three columns: Howard's corps on the left, coming up with the enemy near Pace's ferry over the Chattahoochee, just as he had safely effected a



crossing of the river at that point and had cut loose the pontoon bridge on which he had crossed. Our skirmishers advanced to the bank of the stream, and batteries were placed in position on the high ground behind, from which they kept up a vigorous shelling of the opposite shore. Palmer's corps got to within a mile of the river, where he found the enemy strongly posted on a commanding hill, occupying a strong earthwork at the northern extremity of the railroad bridge. This force was ascertained to be Hardee's corps. General Hooker found considerable difficulty in crossing Nickajack creek, not having effected it at nightfall. The railroad and telegraph were repaired and placed in running order to Vining's station, eight miles south of Marietta.

On the 6th Hooker's corps crossed to the east side of Nickajack creek, the commands of Palmer and Howard remaining in the same position as yesterday; McCook's cavalry took possession of Power's ferry, about five miles from Pace's ferry. The corps commanders were directed to remain as at present posted, camping their commands in the shade as much as possible and resting the men all they could. In the mean time details were directed to be sent to the rear to procure clothing, &c., of which the troops stood sorely in need.

In accordance with instructions given, a strong skirmish line was advanced on the 9th, to feel the enemy's position and to ascertain if he were still in force on the Marietta side of the river at the railroad bridge. His position was found to be unchanged since the 5th instant. General Howard sent Newton's division of his command to the support of Garrard's division of cavalry, which had seized Roswell's factory and the fords in its vicinity, Newton to be relieved by troops from the army of the Tennessee, then moving towards Roswell *via* Marietta.

On the 10th the enemy evacuated his fortifications on our side of the river and fell back towards Atlanta, destroying in his retreat the railroad and wagon bridges. The corps commanders were directed to throw forward a line of skirmishers and occupy the abandoned works. General Howard was directed to move to the left with the remaining two divisions of the corps and take post within supporting distance of the army of the Ohio, near the mouth of Soap creek.

On the 12th Howard's corps crossed the Chattahoochee at Power's ferry and advanced to Abernathy's house, where he formed on the right of the army of the Ohio, which had crossed at Phillips's ferry a few days previous. A deserter belonging to Walker's division, Hardee's corps, who came into our lines on the 13th, stated that Johnston's army was stationed around Atlanta, within a circuit of four miles, and that the fortifications of that place were being rapidly strengthened. In the mean time the citizens were leaving for further south, and the government property was being removed. McCook's division of cavalry moved on the 15th to a position near Vining's station and went into camp, his instructions being to post his command along the north bank of the river between Pace's and Turner's ferries, as soon as the balance of the troops had crossed, and guard the rear of the army.

On the 17th, according to instructions given the night previous, General Howard sent Wood's division of his corps down along the south bank of the river to a position across the Pace's Ferry road, leading to Atlanta, to cover the laying of a pontoon bridge at the ferry. As soon as Wood's troops had brushed away the enemy's pickets lining the south bank, leaving the pontoon train under charge of Colonel G. P. Buell, 58th Indiana volunteers, was moved forward to the river, and a bridge laid with remarkable celerity and precision by 11 a. m., and shortly afterwards a second. As soon as the first bridge was completed, Palmer's corps commenced crossing, and immediately after Palmer's, General Hooker's command went over. Palmer's advance division (Davis's), relieved Wood's division of Howard's command, and the latter immediately proceeded to rejoin the balance of its corps at Abernathy's house. About a

mile beyond the river Davis's division came upon the enemy in some force, posted among the turnings of the hills, who fired upon his advance, and, after some show of resistance, fell back towards Nancy's creek. The column was again set in motion, and proceeded to near Kyle's bridge, over Nancy's creek, where line was formed by Palmer's corps with Hooker's corps on its left, Palmer's skirmishers being pushed out from his right towards the junction of Nancy's and Peach Tree creeks. Light skirmishing continued until dark.

On the morning of the 18th the whole command crossed Nancy's creek, and driving the enemy before it in its advance, pushed forward to a position in front of the old Peach Tree road, leading from Turner's ferry to Decatur; Palmer's right resting near the junction of Nancy's and Peach Tree creeks, with Hooker's corps on his left, Hooker's left connecting with Howard's corps at Buck Head.

The advance of Howard's corps, moving down the main road leading from Buck Head to Atlanta, reached the crossing of Peach Tree creek at 6.30 a. m. on the 19th, finding the bridge destroyed and a pretty fair infantry work, constructed as a bridge-head just beyond, manned with infantry. During the afternoon a crossing was forced by Wood's division, a short distance below the Buck Head and Atlanta road, and by Stanley's above, both divisions effecting a lodgement on the south side by dark, the enemy stubbornly resisting their advance. By direction of the major general commanding the military division, Stanley's and Wood's divisions of Howard's command were closed to the left on the army of the Ohio, which was moving on a road leading to Decatur, leaving Newton's division of Howard's corps to the right of the Buck Head and Atlanta road.

During the afternoon of the 19th, parts of Hooker's and Palmer's corps were crossed over to the south side of Peach Tree creek, the latter meeting with considerable resistance. The whole command was across at an early hour on the 20th, and the line was adjusted. The left and centre advanced to feel the enemy during the afternoon, and while on open ground, and unprotected by any works, were assaulted furiously, the attack falling first on Newton's division, which gallantly stood its ground, repelling charge after charge, although his left was very much exposed throughout the contest; thence sweeping towards the right they assaulted Hooker's corps and the left brigade (McCook's) of Johnson's division of Palmer's corps. Each assault of the enemy was met gallantly by the whole line and hurled back, our men not yielding a foot of ground. The fighting continued throughout the afternoon until sundown, when the enemy, repulsed at all points, fell back to his works. Our loss was severe, numbering 1,600 in killed and wounded, but judging from the number of the enemy's dead left on the field and buried by us, (200 being found in Newton's front alone,) his loss must have been much greater. We captured 360 prisoners, of whom 122 were wounded, besides several stands of colors, small arms, &c. Wood's and Stanley's divisions of Howard's corps drove the enemy from two lines of outer works, capturing some prisoners, and developed a strong line of works still further on, and within three miles of Atlanta.

During the 21st there was considerable skirmishing along our entire line, our forces in the meantime crowding up to the rebel main line of works, which were quite formidable. During the night of the 21st the enemy fell back to the fortifications immediately encircling the city of Atlanta, and at an early hour on the 22d I had disposed my troops confronting the new line of defences taken up by him. Palmer's corps still held the right of my line, with his left resting near the Western and Atlantic railroad,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles northwest of Atlanta, connecting at that point with General Hooker's corps, which latter continued the line around to the main Buck Head and Atlantic road, where Howard's corps took it up; Howard's left connecting with General Schofield's army near Colonel Howard's house, on a road leading to Atlanta, about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  mile southeast of the

main Buck Head road. The position chosen by us was a strong one, and by nightfall of the 22d had been greatly strengthened by earthworks, and it having been ascertained that from several points Atlanta could be reached with rifled artillery, orders were given to keep up a steady fire upon the town, night and day. McCook's division of cavalry was crossed to the east side of the river and posted on the right of my army along Proctor's creek, extending over towards Mason and Turner's ferry on the Chattahoochee.

General Rousseau's expedition reached Marietta on the 22d from Opelika, where he had been sent to break the West Point and Montgomery railroad. He left Decatur, Alabama, on the 10th instant, with a mounted force numbering 2,500 men, and two pieces of artillery, and gives the result of his expedition as follows :

"The whole length of railroad destroyed was over thirty (30) miles, including a number of trestle bridges, a water-tank at Nota-Sulga, the station buildings, &c., at Opelika, Auburk, Loachapaka, and Nota-Sulga, and considerable supplies and materials at each of these points."

The enemy under General Clauton was met at Ten Island ford, on the Coosa river, where he endeavored to dispute the passage of the expedition, but after a spirited skirmish was driven off with some loss. Again, near Chehaw station, the enemy made an effort to prevent the disablement of the railroad, but after a stubborn resistance was obliged to retire, leaving in our hands about 40 of his dead and a large number of wounded. The command started from Opelika on the afternoon of the 19th to return, and marching *via* Carrolton and Villi Rica, reached Marietta on the 22d without meeting with any opposition. Although General Rousseau received his instructions direct from the major general commanding the military division, the expedition having been made up from troops belonging to my command, I take the liberty of mentioning their operations officially, for a detailed account of which I respectfully refer you to the accompanying official report of Major General Rousseau.

From the 22d to the 28th of the month the position of my troops remained unchanged, with the exception that at some points ground was gained at the front, and the general line shortened. Good permanent bridges were constructed across the Chattahoochee at Pace's ferry, and at the railroad crossing, the pontoon bridges at those two points being taken up and placed in condition for future movements.

On the 29th Davis's division of Palmer's corps, (14th,) supported by Ward's division of the 20th, was sent to take post on the extreme right of the army, beyond the army of the Tennessee, with directions to push out towards the Macon and Western railroad, and endeavor to reach it, if possible to do so without bringing on a general engagement. Davis's skirmishers had not proceeded far beyond the Green's Ferry road when they came upon those of the enemy intrenched. Line was then formed in front of the road, and connexion established with the right of the army of the Tennessee. In this position the troops remained for the night. By a reconnoissance made on the 31st by Davis's division, it was ascertained that the enemy was in force between him and the railroad, and posted in earthworks, from which they opened on him with canister. After having developed the enemy's position, the division returned to its former position along the Green's Ferry road. The third division of cavalry, Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick commanding, stationed along the railroad between Cartersville and Resaca, has been particularly active throughout the month, patrolling and scouting the country thoroughly, and guarding the railroad. The first and second divisions of cavalry, acting under instructions direct from the major general commanding the military division, were absent on a movement against the enemy's communications towards Macon at the close of the month. Mention of their operations will be made hereafter.

I have the honor to forward herewith a consolidated return of casualties; a return of prisoners and deserters received during the month, and a report from the chief of ordnance, giving amount of ammunition expended, &c.

The detailed reports of operations of the subordinate commanders will be forwarded as soon as handed in.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General U. S. V., Commanding.*

Lieutenant Colonel R. M. SAWYER,

*Assistant Adjutant General, Military Division of the Mississippi.*

*Report of casualties in the army of the Cumberland during the month of July, 1864.*

Corps.	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		Aggregate.
	Comm'd officers.	Enlisted men.	Comm'd officers.	Enlisted men.	Comm'd officers.	Enlisted men.	
14th army corps .....	16	166	50	737	6	129	1,104
20th army corps .....	20	310	86	1,380	9	202	2,007
4th army corps .....	4	71	33	475	2	13	598
Total .....	40	547	169	2,592	17	344	3,769

*Report of prisoners of war and rebel deserters received and disposed of during the month of July, 1864.*

From what corps received.	PRISONERS OF WAR.			DESERTERS.			Aggregate of prisoners of war and deserters.
	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Aggregate.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Aggregate.	
Received from 4th corps .....	15	604	619	.....	20	20	639
Received from 14th corps .....	3	307	310	1	163	164	474
Received from 20th corps .....	19	573	592	1	38	39	631
Received from cavalry com'd.	1	19	20	.....	14	14	34
Received from department Cumberland, not credited to any corps .....	77	1,104	1,181	8	331	339	*1,520
Total from department Cumberl'd	115	2,607	2,722	10	566	576	3,298
Received from army of Tenn..	1	190	191	1	54	55	246
Received from army of Ohio..	9	278	287	1	100	101	388
Total .....	10	468	478	2	154	156	634
Grand total .....	125	3,785	3,200	12	720	732	3,932

\* Received at Chattanooga.

*Report of arms captured, lost, and becoming surplus in the army of the Cumberland for the month of July, 1864.*

	Enfield rifle.	Springfield rifle.	Spencer rifle.	Whitney rifle.	Colt's rifle.	French rifle.	Dresden rifle.	Austrian rifle.	Harper's Ferry rifle.	Total.
Captured .....	303	143	.....	.....	.....	36	.....	291	21	798
Lost .....	73	274	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	347
Surplus .....	1, 146	1, 226	17	6	2	.....	14	1	.....	2, 412

Respectfully submitted :

H. M. DUFFIELD,  
Lieut. Ninth Mich. V. V. I. and A. P. M. G., D. C.

*Expenditures of artillery and small-arm ammunition in the army of the Cumberland for the month ending July 31, 1864.*

*Artillery ammunition.*—Number of rounds 20-pounder Parrott, 2,344; number of rounds 12-pounder Parrott, 4,115; number of rounds 3-inch Rodman, 8,261; number of rounds 12-pounder light gun, 6,814; number of rounds 24-pounder howitzer, 185; total number rounds artillery ammunition, 21,719.

*Small-arm ammunition.*—E. B. cartridges, calibre 57 and 58, 2,256,720; Henry rifle cartridges, 2,000; Spencer rifle cartridges, 41,978; Colt's rifle cartridges, 3,710; total number of rounds of small-arm ammunition, 2,304,409.

T. G. BAYLOR,  
Captain and Chief of Ordnance, D. C.

NEAR ATLANTA, GA., July 31, 1864.

#### HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Atlanta, Ga., September 13, 1864.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report as follows the operations of my command during the month of August, 1864.

On the 1st instant the army of the Cumberland was in position, as heretofore reported, viz: Palmer's corps (14th) on the right, posted between the Turner's Ferry road and the Western and Atlantic railroad, facing a little south of east; Williams's corps (20th) in the centre, extending from the railroad around to the Buck Head road; Stanley's corps (4th) on the left, between the Buck Head road and Howard's house, on roads leading from Buck Head and Atlanta. Stanley's left being refused so as to cover the Buck Head road, Gardner's division of cavalry took post on the left of Stanley's corps, with instructions to patrol the approaches to the left of the army from Decatur and Roswell factory; Kilpatrick's division of cavalry was ordered to take post on the railroad between Marietta and the bridge over the Chattahoochee. The army of the Cumberland held the left of the grand line investing Atlanta, besides sending two divisions (Ward's of the 20th, and Davis's of the 14th) to the support of the troops of other commands, operating on the extreme right of the grand army.

Major General Palmer was directed on the 2d to move with the two remaining divisions of his corps to a position in reserve in rear of the army of the

Ohio, then operating on the extreme right towards East Point; Brigadier General Williams, commanding the 20th corps, was directed to occupy the works vacated by the troops of General Palmer's command, on his right, by extending his line in that direction, and Ward's division was recalled from the support of the army of the Ohio to enable General Williams more fully to carry out the above instructions. The withdrawal of Palmer's corps left me with the 4th and 20th corps to hold a line of works nearly five miles in length, approaching at some points to within 300 yards of the enemy's fortifications.

On the 3d Major General Stanley pushed forward a strong line of skirmishers, and succeeded in carrying the enemy's picket line on the whole corps front, excepting on the extreme right of his line, where his men were met by a very destructive fire of musketry and canister. The enemy opened from at least twenty pieces of artillery. Our loss was about thirty killed and wounded, but we captured quite a number of prisoners, besides gaining considerable information regarding the positions of the enemy's troops and fortifications.

Both Stanley's and Williams's skirmishers again pressed those of the enemy during the afternoon of the 5th, with a view of diverting his attention from the movements of the armies of the Tennessee and of the Ohio, on our right. Palmer's corps, which had been placed in position on the right of the army of the Ohio by direction of Major General Sherman, pushed out from along Olley's creek, and pressed close up to the enemy's works, capturing a strong line of rifle-pits, vigorously defended. Our loss was considerable, but we took one hundred and fifty prisoners, and gained an advantageous position. At the close of the engagement the skirmishers of the enemy and our own were only thirty yards apart. Our main line was moved up to within four hundred yards of that of the enemy. On the morning of the 6th the enemy felt our line at various points from right to left, seemingly persistent in his efforts to find a weak point in the latter direction—on the line of Stanley's corps. From information gained by us through various sources, more or less reliable, we learned the enemy had posted his militia, supported by one division of his veterans, on that part of his line immediately confronting the 4th and 20th corps, and that he used the balance of his army in extending his line to the left towards East Point, as our movements in the same direction threatened his possession of the railroad. Although this necessitated his holding a large extent of ground, he formed his troops on very advantageous ridges, strengthened by works of a most impregnable character, rendering an assault on our part unjustifiable, from the useless sacrifice of life it would entail. While the enemy was busily engaged fortifying, our troops were not idle. Our position was also soon rendered impregnable to assault, and a constant shelling of the enemy's fortifications and the city of Atlanta was kept up day and night. In the meanwhile supplies of rations and clothing were being rapidly accumulated at the front, and our men enjoyed a season of rest—such rest as is to be found in the trenches. On the 6th, Major General John M. Palmer having been relieved from the command of the 14th army corps at his own request, Brigadier General R. W. Johnson, the senior division commander, took command of the corps.

On the 7th, under General Johnson's direction, the corps advanced upon the enemy's works in his front, and moving rapidly carried the first line of rifle-pits, capturing one hundred and seventy-two prisoners, and driving the enemy to their main works. The entire line of the 14th corps was then advanced and fortified. Our loss during the 6th and 7th, in the 14th corps, was seventy killed and four hundred and thirteen wounded, including seventeen officers.

Brigadier General E. M. McCook, commanding second cavalry division, reports as follows the result of his expedition to cut the enemy's railroad communications to Macon and West Point. His instructions are specified in Special Field Orders No. 42, of July 26, headquarters military division of the Mississippi: "Two and a half miles of the Atlanta and West Point railroad and telegraph

wire destroyed near Lovejoy's station, eleven thousand wagons burned, two thousand mules killed or disabled, one thousand bales of cotton, one thousand sacks of corn, and three hundred sacks of flour destroyed, besides large quantities of bacon and tobacco."

He carried out his orders and accomplished all he was directed to without opposition, and it was only when the command started on its return that General McCook ascertained that the enemy's cavalry was between him and McDonough, at which latter place he had expected to form a junction with General Stoneman's expedition. Finding the enemy across his road in that direction, and being burdened with a good many prisoners and considerable captured property, General McCook turned towards the Chattahoochee river by way of Newman, on the West Point railroad, and while on his way to that place was attacked by Jackson's division of cavalry, which he repulsed. Near Newman the railroad was cut in three places. Between there and the river he was surrounded by an overwhelming force of the enemy's cavalry, supported by a large infantry force. These troops he attacked in the hope of cutting his way through them, and in doing so broke the whole right of their line, riding over Ross's Texas cavalry brigade, and making General Ross and his staff prisoners. The enemy sent fresh troops to supply the place of those shattered by McCook's charge, when the latter, finding he could not break their line permanently, directed his brigade commanders to cut their way out with their commands, and endeavor to cross the Chattahoochee by detachments. In this they were successful, but with the loss of their artillery; the latter, however, was *deliberately* destroyed before being abandoned.

All the prisoners captured by us, about four hundred in number, were also turned loose. General McCook's loss in killed, wounded, and missing, as well as in material, is great, but that of the enemy is considered much greater proportionately, and is even so acknowledged by themselves. For details I have the honor to refer you to the report of General McCook accompanying this.

About the 10th information reached me that the enemy's entire cavalry force was concentrating in the neighborhood of Monticello and on the Ocmulgee river. Refugees and deserters from the enemy stated that it was intended to send this large concentration of cavalry under Wheeler on a raid into Tennessee against our communication.

On the afternoon of the 14th the enemy's cavalry, said to be 6,000 strong, attacked Dalton. Colonel Laibold, (second Missouri infantry,) commanding the post, occupied the fort with a small command, and bravely defended his position until re-enforced.

Early on the morning of the 15th Major General Steedman, with two regiments of white and six companies of colored troops, arrived at Dalton from Chattanooga and immediately attacked the enemy, driving him off towards Spring Place, after four hours' fighting. The enemy's loss was heavy; he left his dead and wounded on the field. Our loss was forty killed and fifty-five wounded; we captured about fifty (50) wounded and two (2) surgeons. Before appearing in front of Dalton Wheeler's men had destroyed about two miles of track on the railroad south of Dalton, but by noon of the 17th the road was again in running order. Believing General Steedman to have sufficient troops at his disposal to beat off any further attack on the railroad, our whole attention was directed to the reduction of Atlanta, and at the same time it was determined to take advantage of the absence of the enemy's cavalry to make one more effort to break the Macon and Western railroad. Accordingly, on the 18th, Brigadier General J. Kilpatrick, commanding third cavalry division, was directed to attack and destroy both railroads, and for this purpose he was re-enforced by two brigades taken from Garrard's cavalry division, stationed on the left of the army. With this force, numbering in all about four thousand men, and two batteries of artillery, General Kilpatrick moved out from Sandtown on the evening of the

18th. He met the enemy's cavalry pickets, when only a short distance out from Sandtown, on the Chattahoochee, and skirmished with them to Jonesboro', on the Macon railroad, driving them through that place. For six hours the command was engaged destroying the track, &c., until near midnight of the 19th, when part of his command was attacked one mile below the town and driven in, but subsequently the enemy was repulsed. Towards daylight of the 20th he moved in the direction of McDonough, and thence across the country back to the railroad near Lovejoy's station, reaching that point at about 11 a. m. on the 20th. There he met a brigade of infantry, and although repulsed at first, finally checked the advantage being gained by the enemy and drove him back with heavy loss. While thus engaged fighting infantry, a heavy force of cavalry with artillery came up in his rear, and he found he was completely enveloped. Determining at once to break the enemy's line and extricate his command from its delicate position, he decided to ride over the enemy's cavalry and retire on McDonough. The movement was successfully made, and resulted in a complete rout of Jackson's cavalry division, numbering 4,000 men, leaving in our hands four (4) guns, three (3) battle-flags, and all his wagons. Some prisoners were taken, and the enemy's loss in killed and wounded is known to be large. Reforming his command, Kilpatrick fought the enemy's infantry for an hour longer, when, finding his men running out of ammunition, he retired in the direction of Latimer's and Decatur without further molestation, reaching the latter place on the afternoon of the 22d. For details I have the honor to refer you to General Kilpatrick's official report, forwarded herewith, as also to that of Lieutenant G. A. Robinson, commanding Chicago Board of Trade battery, and to an article in the Chattanooga Rebel, published at Griffin, Georgia, August 25.

Pending the above movements to break the enemy's railroad communication, the troops in front of the city kept up a constant shelling of the fortifications and buildings of Atlanta, and, as refugees informed us, with marked effect.

The heavy cavalry force under Wheeler still continued to threaten our railroad in northern Georgia and East Tennessee, without seriously interrupting communication with Chattanooga and Nashville. This, however, gave us no uneasiness, as we had a good accumulation of supplies within safe proximity to the main army.

A considerable force of the enemy under Roddy had made its appearance in northern Alabama, threatening to cross the Tennessee river near Decatur with a view of destroying the railroad between that place and Nashville. Again, in the vicinity of Clarksville, Tennessee, and Fort Donalson, the enemy had become troublesome, although without doing very material damage. To the discretion and good judgment of Major Generals Rousseau and Steedman, commanding respectively the district of the Tennessee and of the Etowah, and to Brigadier General R. S. Granger, commanding the district of northern Alabama, was left the disposal of the troops and the defence of our communications with our depots at the north.

In compliance with the directions contained in Special Field Order No. 57, headquarters military division of the Mississippi, (appended marked A.) promulgated to my corps commanders on the 16th August, everything was placed in readiness for the execution of the contemplated movements by the time mentioned. The major general commanding the military division having, however, decided to await the return of General Kilpatrick's expedition, the army of the Cumberland did not withdraw from its works until after dark on the night of the 25th. Stanley's corps, as directed from my headquarters, (see instructions to Generals Stanley, Williams, and Garrard,) commenced the movement by withdrawing from the position he then held on the left of the army to a line of ridges and high ground beyond and to the rear of the position where the right of the 20th corps rested. Here he remained and covered the withdrawal of the 20th corps; the latter having been ordered to take post on the Chattahoochee at



the railroad bridge and at Pace's and Turner's ferries. Garrard's division of cavalry covered the movements of the 4th and 20th corps, then crossed the Chattahoochee at Pace's ferry on the 26th, and recrossing at the bridge at Sandtown on the 27th, took post on Stanley's left, picketing Utoy creek from Utoy post office to Sandtown.

The above movements were successfully executed, both corps being in the positions indicated at an early hour on the morning of the 26th. At 9 a. m. of the same day Stanley withdrew still further, to a point along Utoy creek, posting his command on some ridges facing the creek and across the Sandtown road.

The 14th corps, then commanded by Brevet Major General J. C. Davis, drew out from the position it had last held on the right of the army of the Tennessee, and moving across Utoy creek took post on the right of Stanley's corps. Garrard's division of cavalry was directed to operate on the left and rear of the army, while Kilpatrick's division was similarly employed on the right.

On the 27th Stanley's corps moved to Mount Gilead church, and forming line of battle along the road leading to Fairburn, skirmished lightly with the enemy's cavalry. The 14th corps (Davis's) moved as far as Holbrook's house, on the Campbelltown road, advancing one brigade to Patterson's house, about a mile beyond, to cover the wagon trains of the corps. The 20th corps was securely in position on the Chattahoochee river, guarding the crossings and protecting the depots at Marietta. Major General H. W. Slocum assumed command of the corps by virtue of General Order No. —, War Department.

At daylight on the 28th, Davis's corps moved from its encampment near Holbrook's house to Mount Gilead church, thence past the left of Stanley's corps, taking the road leading from Redwine's house to Red Oak on the West Point railroad. Davis reached the railroad at 4 p. m. and posted his corps on the right of it, facing towards East Point. Stanley's command came up immediately after Davis's, and formed line on the left of the road. In this position the command remained for the night. Shortly after dark orders were issued to destroy the road by burning the ties and twisting the rails after heating. The work of destruction was continued throughout the night of the 28th, and during part of the 29th, and when completed the railroad had been thoroughly dismantled for a distance of two miles north of my line, and a little over a mile south of it.

About 6 a. m. on the 30th the 14th and 4th corps moved from Red Oak towards the Macon railroad. The 14th corps (Davis) concentrated at Flat Shoal church about 9 a. m., and after resting for an hour moved on in an easterly direction towards Couch's house on the Decatur and Fayetteville road, at which point line was formed and the command went into camp.

Communication was opened with the army of the Tennessee at Renfro's house, two miles south of Couch's. The 4th corps formed on the left of the 14th, its right extending beyond Mann's house, the line of the corps running in a north-westerly direction from Couch's. The advance divisions of both corps skirmished with the enemy's infantry and cavalry during the day, and by sundown it was ascertained that the enemy was in force at Morrow's mill, on Crooked creek, about three-fourths of a mile distant from the left of Stanley's corps. Up to dark no communication had been established with the army of the Ohio. Garrard's cavalry was in the neighborhood of Red Oak, guarding the left and rear of the army.

On the morning of the 31st Stanley's corps moved to Marrow's mill, where it found the enemy in intrenchments, very well finished, but occupied only by dismounted cavalry; those were driven out.

The army of the Ohio having come up, both commanders pushed out for the railroad, which was reached at the Big bend between Rough-and-Ready, and Jonesboro'. General Stanley posted his corps between the railroad and Crooked creek, and in that position remained for the night. Part of the 14th corps, under Brigadier General Baird, made reconnoissance and demonstration in front

of Couch's house, and reached the Macon and Western railroad about two miles north of Jonesboro' with the advanced brigade, and destroyed about one mile of the track during the afternoon and night, although constantly annoyed by the enemy's cavalry. Whilst in this position a heavy column of the enemy's infantry was seen moving in a southerly direction, on a road still to the eastward of the one held by them. Some stragglers belonging to this column were picked up by our skirmishers, and from them it was ascertained that the troops we saw moving were Hardee's and Lee's corps.

Up to this period the enemy had evidently been deceived as to the nature and strength of our movement on his communications, and only at this late hour had he detached any considerable force from the army in Atlanta.

During the afternoon of the 31st the army of the Tennessee being heavily attacked in the position it had taken up the night before near Jonesboro', and General Howard having asked for re-enforcements, General Davis was instructed to send one division from his corps to its support.

Kilpatrick's division of cavalry, stationed on the right of the army of the Tennessee, found a passage across Flint river and drove the enemy's pickets to within one-half mile of Jonesboro'. He was then attacked in turn by a heavy force of infantry and forced to withdraw.

*September 1.*—At an early hour the remainder of the 14th corps moved from near Renfro's house, on the Decatur and Fayetteville road, to rejoin that part of the command which had advanced the day before to the Rough-and-Ready and Jonesboro' road. The junction formed, the corps moved south towards Jonesboro', and reached the pickets of the army of the Tennessee about two and a half miles from the point of concentration. A reconnoissance was then sent out towards the railroad, which drove in the enemy's skirmishers and gained possession of a ridge on the north side of Mill creek, with but small loss. Later in the afternoon two divisions of Davis's corps (14th) were formed on the ridge, and artillery was opened on the enemy's works with good effect.

The line of battle being finally adjusted, the command moved forward, attacking the enemy vigorously and driving him several hundred yards to his main works. An assault was then handsomely made on the works, which were carried along the entire line of Davis's command, after very heavy fighting and loss of over 1,200 men. Two field batteries of four guns each were captured in the enemy's fortifications, together with about one thousand (1,000) prisoners, including one general officer and several field officers, and a number of small-arms and battle-flags. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was very severe.

During this time the 4th corps (Stanley's) was moving from near Rough-and-Ready towards Jonesboro', along the railroad destroying it as the troops advanced. Arriving near Jonesboro' the column was deployed with a view to advance against the enemy's right flank, but it being already quite late, darkness came on and prevented an extensive movement. The line of Stanley's corps was on the left of the railroad facing southwest; Davis's corps passed the night in the enemy's works, the left of the line connecting with Stanley's right at the railroad.

During the night the enemy fell back from Jonesboro', retreating towards Lovejoy's station, where he was followed on the morning of the 2d by the 4th corps and the armies of the Tennessee and of the Ohio. Davis's corps was directed to remain at Jonesboro' to bury the dead and collect captured property.

Stanley's corps moved along the railroad and to the left of it, coming up with the enemy just north of Lovejoy's station about noon. Line of battle was formed and preparations made to advance against the enemy in conjunction with the army of the Tennessee on the right. It was only at a late hour, however, that the assault was made, and darkness prevented any decisive movement. Part of Stanley's troops gained the enemy's works and carried a small portion of

them, but could not hold possession of the ground for want of co-operation on the part of the balance of the line.

During the night information reached us that, at 11 a. m. on the 2d, the mayor and authorities of Atlanta had surrendered the city to a force of the 20th corps, Major General Slocum commanding, which, in obedience to instructions previously given, had been sent out from the Chattahoochee to feel the enemy's strength. The city had been evacuated the night previous, the army destroying, in its retreat, public property of considerable value, including eighty (80) carloads of ammunition; fourteen pieces of artillery and several thousand stand of small-arms were found.

On the 3d the major general commanding the military division issued orders to the effect that the campaign was ended, and that the grand army would return to Atlanta and vicinity until a new plan could be considered regarding future movements. Directions were at the same time given for the withdrawal of the troops. Corps commanders were instructed to send to the rear all surplus wagons, and whatever material could obstruct the movements of the troops. The enemy still remained intrenched at Lovejoy's, although he was discovered to be moving his trains towards Griffin, with the supposed intention of withdrawing his main army to that point or still further.

At 8 p. m. on the 5th, in conjunction with the rest of the army, the 4th corps quietly withdrew from its position and fell back to Jonesboro', reaching that place at daylight on the 6th. The withdrawal was admirably conducted, and executed with complete success, although much impeded by a rain storm and consequent bad condition of the roads.

Both corps, Stanley's and Davis's, remained quietly at Jonesboro' during the 6th, although Davis's rear-guard was attacked by the enemy as it was moving through the town to join the balance of the corps in position north of it. The enemy occupied Jonesboro' during the afternoon, but contented himself with exchanging a few shots with our skirmishers.

On the 7th, at 7 a. m., the 4th corps withdrew from its camp near Jonesboro', moved along the railroad to near Sykes's house, northeast of Rough-and-Ready, and took up a position for the night. The 14th corps fell back simultaneously with Stanley's command, marching on the main road leading to Rough-and-Ready, from Jonesboro', and was posted on the right of the 4th corps north of Rough-and-Ready. The enemy showed no disposition to follow the movements of either command.

The army of the Cumberland reached Atlanta on the 8th, and was posted on the outskirts of the town—Davis's corps on the right of the Campbelltown road, Slocum's corps in the centre, and Stanley's on the left. The pickets of all three corps were thrown out well to the front, and occupied commanding positions.

For a detailed report of the operations I have the honor to refer you to the reports of the several corps commanders.

Herewith I have the honor to forward returns of prisoners of war, captured property, ammunition expended, and a consolidated return of casualties.

In concluding this report I take the greatest pleasure in calling attention to the uniform gallantry displayed by the officers and troops of the army of the Cumberland in all the battles in which they participated, and in their unwavering constancy and devotion to duty at all times during the entire campaign, commencing with the contests at Rocky Face ridge, and around Dalton, and ending with the operations at Jonesboro' and vicinity, which forced the enemy to evacuate Atlanta. During these four months of active campaign, hardly a day has passed that some portion of this army was not engaged either in skirmishing or in actual battle with the enemy, and on every occasion behaving with that self-reliance which is the sure prestige of success. All may be justly proud of their participation in the campaign against Atlanta.

Among the many gallant and lamented dead who have given their lives to sustain and defend the honor of their country and government, we must enumerate Brigadier General C. G. Harker and Colonel Dan. McCook, fifty-second Ohio volunteer infantry, who were mortally wounded leading their respective brigades in the assault on the enemy's intrenchments near Kenesaw mountain June 27th. They were both skilful, brave, and accomplished officers.

The members of my staff were at all times efficient and active in the discharge of their various duties.

I enclose herewith the reports of subordinate commanders, which embody the operations of their respective commands, and to which I have the honor to invite the attention of the major general commanding the military division of the Mississippi.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General U. S. V., Comd'g.*

Lieut. Colonel R. M. SAWYER,

*Ass't Adj't Gen'l Military Division of the Mississippi.*

*Report of prisoners of war and deserters from the rebel army received and disposed of during the month of August, 1864.*

From what corps received.	PRISONERS OF WAR.			DESSERTERS.			Aggregate.
	Comm'd officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.	Comm'd officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.	
Received from 4th army corps .....	3	49	52	2	50	52	104
Received from 14th army corps .....	12	385	397	.....	70	70	467
Received from 20th army corps .....	.....	8	8	.....	43	43	51
Received from cavalry command .....	13	.....	.....	.....	28	28	135
Received from department of the Cumberland and not credited to any corps .....	5	94 153	107 158	2	267	269	427
Total rec'd from army Cumberland..	33	689	722	4	458	462	1,184
Received from army of Tennessee...	12	293	305	.....	1	1	306
Received from army of Ohio .....	4	112	116	.....	101	101	217
Total received from armies of Ten- nessee and Ohio .....	16	405	421	.....	102	102	523
Grand total .....	49	1,094	1,143	4	560	564	1,707

Respectfully submitted :

J. G. PARKHURST,

*Colonel and Provost Marshal General.*

*Report of arms captured, lost, and becoming surplus in the army of the Cumberland during the month of August, 1864.*

	Springfield rifles, 58.	Enfield ri- fles, 57.7.	Austrian ri- fles, 54.	U. S. rifles, 58.	U. S. rifles, 54.	Confederate rifles, 58.	Dresden ri- fles, 58.	Colt's rifles, 56.	Spencer ri- fles.	Total.
Captured .....	117	219	9	2	1	6	.....	.....	.....	47
.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	354
Lost .....	57	57	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	111
Surplus .....	197	85	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	232
.....	1,019	747	.....	2	.....	.....	3	1	15	1,787

*Report of artillery and infantry ammunition expended in the army of the Cumberland during the month of August, 1864, and up to September 8, 1864.*

	ARTILLERY AMMUNITION.					INFANTRY AMMUNITION.				Total number of rounds.
	12-pound'r guns.	3-inch Rodman.	12-pounder Par- rott.	4½-inch rifle.	Total number of rounds.	E. B. cartridge, cal. 57 and 58.	Spencer cart- ridge.	Henry cartridge.	Colt's cartridge, 56.	
August...	5,931	11,502	2,083	3,424	22,940	2,988,480	55,388	7,650	475	3,051,943
Septemb'r	824	698	.....	.....	1,522	242,150	6,887	590	105	249,732

O. E. MICHAELIS,

*Lieut. of Ordnance, Act'g Chief of Ordnance, D-p't of the Cumberland.*

ATLANTA, GA., September 15, 1864. .



HEADQUARTERS CHIEF OF CAVALRY DEP'T OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Atlanta, Georgia, September 13, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the cavalry during the recent campaign from Chattanooga, resulting in the capture of Atlanta, Georgia.

After the battle of Chickamauga and pursuit of Wheeler and Roddy, in their attacks upon our trains and lines of communication in the months of September and October, and the battle of Mission ridge, in November, 1863, the cavalry of the department, consisting of two divisions and unassigned regiments of cavalry and mounted infantry, was very much scattered and reduced in effective mounted force.

The first and second brigades of the first division were actively engaged during the months of December, 1863, January and February, 1864, in East Tennessee, men and horses exposed to cold, with but little shelter and subsistence. The third brigade, first division, occupied Rossville, Georgia, as an outpost.

The second division occupied a line from Washington, on the Tennessee river, to Mooresville, Alabama; also Calhoun, on East Tennessee railroad.

The fourth United States cavalry and seventy-second Indiana mounted infantry detached to Mississippi, under the command of Brigadier General W. S. Smith, United States volunteers. Many of the regiments and detachments of regiments, re-enlisted as veteran volunteers, went to their homes, which caused delay in concentrating, mounting, arming and equipping them for the commencement of the recent campaign.

On the 1st of April the cavalry and mounted infantry of the department was reorganized, consisting of four divisions, of three brigades each, and one battery to a division, the divisions commanded, respectively, by Brigadier General E. M. McCook, Brigadier General K. Garrard, Brigadier General J. Kilpatrick, and Brigadier General A. C. Gillem, with the fifteenth Pennsylvania cavalry, Colonel W. J. Palmer, unassigned. This organization required regiments to be moved before others could be withdrawn from stations occupied.

The first and second brigades, first division, were concentrated at Cleveland, Tennessee; the third brigade, but partially mounted, at Wauhatchee; the second division at Columbia, Tennessee; the third division at Ringgold, Georgia, and the fourth division, but partially mounted, occupied the line of railroads from Nashville, Tennessee, to Decatur and Bridgeport, Alabama.

The first division marched from Cleveland, Tennessee, for Dalton, Georgia, covering the front and left flank of the 4th corps, army of the Cumberland, and afterwards that of the 23d corps, army of the Ohio, near Varnell's station, until relieved by Major General Stoneman's cavalry. On the 11th of May the division marched to Ray's gap, west of Dalton, and upon the evacuation of that place marched with the 4th corps upon Resaca. The first and third brigades, second division, marched from Columbia, Tennessee, for Lafayette and Villanow, Georgia, under orders from the major general commanding the military division of the Mississippi, and to the right and rear of the army of the Tennessee; the general direction of its march, also the details of the same, I am unable to give, not having the orders received by General Garrard. The second brigade, second division, marched with 17th army corps from Pulaski, Tennessee, and Decatur, Alabama, *via* Rome, Georgia, joining the armies at Alatoona, Georgia. The third division marched from Ringgold, Georgia, covering the front and right flank of the 20th corps, army of the Cumberland, and afterwards that of the army of the Tennessee, on its march through Snake Creek gap upon Resaca, Georgia, covering its right flank by detachments and pickets along the right bank of the Oostenaule river, until the rebel army evacuated Dalton and concentrated at Resaca.

After the battle, which resulted in the retreat of the enemy from Resaca, the first division crossed the Oostenaula at Free bridge, marched to Cassville, Georgia, covering the front and left flank of the 20th corps. The second division crossed the Oostenaula at Lay's ferry, for Rome, Georgia, to strike the railroad between there and Kingston, Georgia, marching on the right flank of the army of the Tennessee. The third division crossed the Oostenaula at Lay's ferry, covering the front of the army of the Tennessee, and keeping up communications with the army of the Cumberland, on the left.

After the battle near Cassville, which resulted in the retreat of the enemy across the Etowah river to Alatoona, Georgia, the first and third divisions were concentrated on Two Run creek, near Cassville, Georgia, until the dispositions were made for pursuit.

The first division crossed the Etowah at Island ford, marched *via* Euharley to Stilesboro' as the advance of the army of the Cumberland, thence to Burnt Hickory and Burnt church, on the Marietta road, near its intersection with the Ackworth and Dallas road, covering the left flank of the 23d corps. The second division crossed the Etowah at Gillem's bridge, marching *via* Van Wert to Dallas, Georgia, and covering the front and right flank of the army of the Tennessee.

The third division, under the command of Colonel W. W. Lowe, General Kilpatrick being absent wounded, was left at Kingston to guard the line of the Etowah river, with orders to obstruct all fords, hold Gillem's bridge, but remove the planks from flooring to prevent its use by the enemy, and destroy all other bridges which could possibly be used by them. The division was subsequently assigned to stations as follows: third brigade at Calhoun, Georgia, headquarters with remainder of division at Cartersville, Georgia, with orders to patrol the line of railroad and scout from Cartersville to Spring Place, Georgia.

The second division marched *via* Burnt Hickory and near Stilesboro', on south side of Etowah river, to Alatoona, and this movement of the cavalry, in conjunction with that of Major General Stoneman's cavalry of the army of the Ohio, for Alatoona direct, contributed to cause the retreat of the enemy from Dallas and New Slope church to Kenesaw mountain.

The first division was posted on the right of the 23d corps, and near Lost mountain, which was the extreme right of the armies. The second division was posted on the left of the army of the Tennessee, the extreme left of the armies.

On the retreat of the enemy from Kenesaw to the Chattahoochee, the first division marched *via* Powder Spring to Rotten Wood creek, a tributary of the Chattahoochee, and on west side, to co-operate, if necessary, with the second division, posted at Roswell, Georgia.

On the retreat of the enemy to east side of Chattahoochee and Peachtree creek, the first division was posted from Vining's station to Turner's ferry. The second division forced and held the crossing of the Chattahoochee at Roswell, covering the front and left flanks of the army of the Tennessee, breaking the Georgia railroad near Stone mountain, and, on the 22d, making a successful raid upon that railroad by destroying two bridges and five wagon-road bridges, the track, a number of cars, a quantity of stores, capturing a number of horses and prisoners, and returning with the loss of only two men; it also marched as a support to Major General Stoneman, commanding cavalry of the army of the Ohio, on a raid on the Atlanta and Macon railroad; after waiting two days at Flat Rocks, by the orders of General Stoneman, and in the absence of further instructions, the second division returned to its camp, after engaging two divisions of the enemy's cavalry.

After the battle of the 20th July, and the retreat of the enemy upon Atlanta, the first division crossed the Chattahoochee and was posted on Proctor's creek, covering by pickets the Macon and Turner's Ferry road. The second division was posted on left and rear of army of the Tennessee, picketing the road from Decatur to Roswell.



On the 24th July the effective force of the first division, with the effective force of the fifth Iowa, eighth Indiana, second Kentucky cavalry of the third division, and fourth Tennessee cavalry of the fourth division, forming the greater part of the command which had recently arrived from the raid on the West Point and Montgomery railroad, under command of Major General Rousseau, made a raid on the Atlanta and West Point and Atlanta and Macon railroad, destroying large numbers of wagons, stores, and cars, with partial damage to the railroad track. This force encountered a greatly superior force of the enemy, and after severe fighting returned, with considerable loss of men, horses, and arms, and two pieces of artillery reported destroyed, inflicting, however, considerable damage upon the enemy.

The first division was ordered to occupy the station of the third division, and the latter, under command of General Kilpatrick, ordered from the district of the Etowah to west side of Chattahoochee, from Turner's ferry to Sweet Water creek, and afterwards posted at Sandtown, picketing to Camp creek. A reconnaissance was made by the third division to Fairburn, on the West Point and Atlanta railroad, developing only a small force of the enemy's cavalry, not disposed to offer much resistance. After destroying a portion of the track, some public buildings and stores, the command returned to its camp with but little loss.

On the 18th of August the third division, with first and second brigades of second division, commanded respectively by Colonel Minty and Brigadier General Long, with two sections of the battery attached to the division, made an attack on the Atlanta and Macon railroad, marching from Sandtown, crossing Atlanta and West Point railroad at or near Fairburn, to the Macon road at Jonesboro' and Lovejoy's station. A detachment of the command under Lieutenant Colonel Kleim struck the road at or near Bear Creek station; the enemy concentrated a superior force of cavalry, with infantry and artillery, which prevented the deliberate destruction of the railroad. After severe fighting, in which there is reason to believe the enemy suffered severely, the command returned to the army *via* McDonough, Whitehouse, Latimais, and Decatur, making a complete circuit of the rebel army.

On 24th of August, third brigade, second division, destroyed portion of railroad between Decatur and Stone mountain.

On the 25th day of August, in the movement of the armies upon the Atlanta and Macon railroad at Jonesboro', Georgia, the second division covered the withdrawal of the 4th corps, and also that of the 20th corps, in the movement of the latter to the railroad bridge across the Chattahoochee river, leaving one brigade to cover the front of the 20th corps from Race's ferry, on the Chattahoochee, to Sandtown. The other two brigades covered the rear and left flank of the 23d corps, conforming to its movements. The third division, leaving its dismounted men to hold the bridges over the Chattahoochee and Sandtown, and support the 18th Indiana battery of the first division, but temporarily assigned to duty with the command occupying Sandtown, covered the front and right flank of the army of the Tennessee, to Fairburn and down Flint river to Glass bridge, on road to Lovejoy's station.

The entire cavalry command, during the winter of 1863 and 1864, has performed service in a country affording but a limited supply of forage, particularly long forage; for want of this, and on account of the lateness of the season for grazing, the animals suffered. During the time the army depended for its supplies on its wagon transportation, the cavalry did not have transportation sufficient to haul its forage, and had to depend on the country, affording at that time corn of short growth and green wheat, the latter preventing starvation, but rather weakening than strengthening the animals. In withdrawing the armies from Lovejoy's station to Atlanta, the second division covered the rear and right flank of the 23d corps; the third division the rear and left flank of the army of the

Tennessee. On account of their absence on duty, from wounds, or as prisoners of war, for the details of the operations of the several regiments, brigades, batteries, and divisions, as also of individual services, I refer to the reports of the several commanders heretofore briefly stated, and others to be forwarded when received. The third brigade, first division, Colonel L. D. Watkins, sixth Kentucky cavalry, but partially mounted on horses from a convalescent camp established near Chattanooga, and occupying Lafayette, Georgia, was attacked by a largely superior force under the rebel General Gideon Pillow; handsomely repulsed, with great loss to the rebels in killed, wounded, and prisoners; General (then colonel) Croxton's fourth Kentucky mounted infantry's timely arrival contributed much to the retreat of Pillow.

In closing this report I can say with pride that the cavalry of the army of the Cumberland has performed its duty cheerfully, executing every order given by or through me, skirmishing almost daily, and in many instances the skirmishes assuming the proportions of a sharp fight.

The services rendered by Colonel O. H. La Grange, first Wisconsin cavalry, commanding second brigade, and Colonel L. D. Watkins, sixth Kentucky cavalry, commanding third brigade, first division; Colonel A. O. Miller, seventy-second Indiana mounted infantry, commanding third brigade, second division, entitles them to promotion by brevet or otherwise. Captain J. B. McIntyre, commanding fourth United States cavalry, is worthy of promotion, and I recommend that he be appointed a brigadier general, being a cavalry officer of several years' service. My personal staff, and that of the cavalry command, have promptly performed the various duties assigned them.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. L. ELLIOTT,

*Brig. Gen. and Chief of Cavalry, Dep't of the Cumberland.*

*Approximate report of casualties of the cavalry command in the department of the Cumberland, commanded by Brigadier General W. L. Elliott, during the campaign from the 3d day of May, 1864, to the 3d day of September, 1864.*

Troops.	COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.						ENLISTED MEN.					REBEL PRISONERS OF WAR.		
	Killed.	WOUNDED.			Missing.	Total.	Killed.	WOUNDED.			Missing.	Total.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.
		Slightly.	Mortally.	Severely.				Slightly.	Severely.	Mortally.				
Cavalry command:														
1st division.....	5	5	2	7	59	78	33	85	40	...	912	1,070	18	247
2d division.....	1	12	...	8	9	30	66	186	60	1	144	457	29	*427
3d division.....	3	5	1	2	...	11	16	67	38	5	45	171	14	264
4th division t.....														
Total .....	9	22	3	17	68	119	115	338	138	6	1,101	1,698	61	938

\* In addition to this number about 200 were turned over to the army of the Tennessee, it being impracticable to send them to headquarters. † No report.

W. L. ELLIOTT,

*Brig. Gen. U. S. A., Chief of Cavalry, Dep't of the Cumberland.*

HEADQUARTERS CHIEF OF CAVALRY,

DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Atlanta, Ga., September 13, 1864.

## REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF FOURTH ARMY CORPS DURING THE RECENT CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,  
*September 18, 1864.*

GENERAL: Having been assigned by the President of the United States, I assumed command of the 4th army corps, April 10, 1864. One division, Major General Stanley's, was stationed, two brigades at Blue springs, and one at Ottawa. The second division, then under command of Brigadier General Wagner, was at London, and the third division, General Wood's, was still in the department of the Ohio near Knoxville. My first duty was to concentrate the corps near Cleveland. This was effected by the 25th of April. About one week's time was given to refit and prepare for the field. A portion of the command had just completed a trying winter campaign in East Tennessee, and was quite badly off, in many respects, from shortness of transportation, clothing, and other supplies. The animals in General Wood's division, particularly, were in a wretched condition, on account of want of forage and overworking. The officers made extraordinary exertions to get everything in readiness, and when the order was given to march to Catoosa springs, the entire corps was prepared to move with the required number of rations; but it was soon found that the limited transportation, taken in connexion with its condition, was a source of constant embarrassment. I speak of these things in order to place in a clear light the difficulties that the officers and men of this corps met in the outset of the campaign and nobly overcame, for, when other portions of the army had full rations they were, at times, obliged to subsist on a diminished allowance.

The march commenced the third of May, upon the arrival of Major General Schofield at Cleveland with the left wing of the army. My command, in two columns, having pursued two distinct routes, one *via* Salome church, and the other *via* Red Clay, arrived at Catoosa springs on the morning of the 4th of May. Major General Thomas having already reached Ringgold with the rest of the army of the Cumberland, a junction was thus substantially formed with it. A very little skirmishing occurred to the east of Catoosa springs with a detachment of General McCook's cavalry that had covered my left flank during the march from Cleveland. Not feeling sure as to the intention or strength of the enemy, my command took a strong position covering its own approaches and those to Ringgold; here the corps remained until the 7th of May. The day before instructions were received to march on Tunnel Hill in such a way as to take the enemy in flank, if possible, while Major General Palmer, with the 14th corps, threatened him in front. Tunnel Hill is a portion of a ridge separated from Rocky Face by a narrow valley, and situated to the west of it. The tunnel on the Chattanooga railroad is through this hill.

From Catoosa springs my command marched on the Alabama road due east to the vicinity known as Lee's house. General Newton's division here formed, facing in the direction of the movement as a cover, while General Stanley, followed by General Wood, turned into a cross-road which led directly south towards Tunnel Hill; Stanley skirmished with the enemy's cavalry all of the way, and removed obstructions that had been placed in the road. He came in sight of Tunnel Hill station at about 9 a. m. Here the enemy appeared in considerable force on the next prominent part of the ridge, and was firing with artillery upon our advance, and also upon that of General Palmer in his direct front. We soon ascertained that this artillery was supported by cavalry, and General Stanley moved a force along the northern slope and carried the hill by 11 o'clock a. m., driving the enemy before him. The command was then posted in such a way as to hold Tunnel Hill in conjunction with Palmer's corps on my right.

The enemy occupied a strong position between us and Dalton, with the barrier

Rocky Face intervening. This barrier is a continuous ridge some five hundred feet high, exceedingly narrow at the top, except where an occasional spur juts out to the east or west. In many places six men could not march abreast along the crest. The western face is generally within sixty feet of the summit, and almost perpendicularly steep, that cannot be climbed. The eastern slope is for the most part more gradual. Buzzard's Roost gap is a pass through Rocky Face, a little southeast of Tunnel Hill. The railroad and a wagon road lead through this opening towards Dalton; besides, a small creek runs in the same direction, which the rebel general had dammed up to complete his defences. These defences consisted of several batteries, situated on the right and left of the gap, bearing upon the approaches to his position, and a well constructed line of intrenchments at right angles to the railroad; also enabling the enemy holding them to bring a strong musketry fire upon any column moving towards his position. General Thomas was directed to threaten the enemy in front on the 8th of May, while General McPherson was moving through Villanow in order to seize and occupy Snake Creek gap. My part of this movement was to endeavor to put a force on Rocky Face ridge and make a demonstration towards Buzzard's Roost gap, in conjunction with the 14th corps.

General Newton's division, on the morning of the 8th of May, moved to the north end of Rocky Face, some two miles above Buzzard's Roost gap, where he pushed up a small force at first, driving the enemy along the crest. He succeeded in taking about one-third of the heights from the enemy, and establishing a signal station upon a prominent point. He had attempted to get possession of a rebel station, but owing to the rugged nature of the heights and the ability of the enemy to defend so narrow a path, he could not reach it.

In the mean time Generals Stanley and Wood pushed strong skirmish lines, well supported, as far up the western slope as possible. During the night following, General Newton succeeded in getting two pieces of artillery upon the ridge. The next morning (May 9th) he attempted to make further progress, and succeeded in driving the enemy from fifty (50) to one hundred (100) yards. General Stanley, during the afternoon of the 9th, made a reconnoissance into the pass of Buzzard's Roost, developing a strong musketry and artillery fire, while General Wood's division continued the same operations as the day before. The casualties in my command resulting from these operations were between two and three hundred killed and wounded.

In accordance with instructions from General Thomas the 4th corps made preparations to remain near Buzzard's Roost gap, for the purpose of holding the enemy at Dalton, if possible, while the rest of the army, excepting Stoneman's cavalry, was moving through Snake Creek gap to turn the enemy's flank.

*May 11.*—The troops of the corps were disposed as follows: General Stanley to hold the gap; General Newton to hold Rocky Face and the roads leading around the north end of it, with General Stoneman's cavalry covering his left flank; and General Wood in reserve on Tunnel Hill. During the evening of this day, and on the morning of the 12th, the general movement was progressing, and the 4th corps found itself alone, confronted by the entire rebel army.

From the signal station on Rocky Face the enemy's movements could be distinctly seen. About 10 a. m. he moved out a strong force, as if to turn my left flank and give battle, but after pressing in the skirmishers the column returned within his works. The threat, however, was so strong that General Wood's division was moved to the support of General Newton. During the night following the enemy evacuated Dalton.

*May 13.*—At 6 a. m. I received the report of the enemy's having left, and immediately ordered pursuit. The corps moved at once to Dalton and came upon the enemy's rear-guard of cavalry there. We pushed forward toward Resaca, General Stoneman with his cavalry pursuing the direct route, McCook's

cavalry on a road near the base of Rocky Face, and my corps marched by an intermediate route. We skirmished with the enemy during the day and encamped at dark about eight (8) miles south of Dalton. Soon after we opened communication with the rest of the army, before Resaca, happily finding that we were only one mile from General Schofield's left flank.

Instructions were received from Major General Thomas at 5—15 on the morning of May 14, to wit:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*In the Field, May 14, 1864.*

GENERAL: You will move your troops down the main roads towards Resaca, until you form a junction with the rest of the army, when further orders will be given you. Report your approach when you get within sight of the troops in your front.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HOWARD,  
*Commanding 4th Army Corps.*

These instructions were substantially the same as those I had already issued to my command during the night. The general formation of General Sherman's army at this time was as follows:

The army of the Tennessee, General McPherson, on the right, with his right resting on the Oostenaula; centre, General Thomas's command, excepting the 4th corps; and the left, General Schofield, on the Sugar Valley road. The whole line faced easterly. In obedience to the above order General Newton, followed by General Wood, marched to the left of General Schofield, and General Stanley moved down the Tilton and Resaca road towards the enemy's extreme right. On reaching General Schofield we found him pushing his command towards the right and front; General Newton formed on his left; General Wood then changed direction so as to move on a Resaca road intermediate between Stanley and Newton. The three columns were not at first connected, but very adroitly made their concentration in immediate contact with the enemy's lines, having skirmished heavily in their respective fronts. By the advance movement the general line was shortened, so that a great part of Newton's division was reserved. Schofield's left carried a line of the enemy's works by assault and immediately a portion of General Newton's division was pushed up, relieving more or less of Schofield's left centre and holding every advantage gained. Meanwhile a part of General Wood's division came abreast of Newton's, driving the enemy from his rifle-pits, and secured the position, while General Stanley formed a junction on the extreme left, protecting his left flank by a brigade posted on the left of the Tilton and Resaca road.

The movements above described were necessarily slowly executed, from the nature of the country, which was exceedingly rough, and covered for the most part with thick woods; besides, the enemy disputed every inch of progress by his force already in position, meeting our advance with strong skirmish lines. The musketry firing during the day was quite heavy. After our troops had been satisfactorily formed, word came from General Stanley that the enemy was making a movement to turn his left flank. I saw General Thomas personally, representing the exact condition of things to him. He directed Major General Hooker to send a division to my extreme left. This was promptly done. The division was guided by Colonel Morgan, 14th United States colored troops, temporarily attached to my staff, by the most direct route. This division, General Williams, arrived just in time. Stanley's left had been turned, and was being forced back; all his reserves had been previously exhausted in ex-

tending his line. A battery, (Simonson's,) however, was doing splendid execution, staying the enemy's progress, when a brigade of Williams's was deployed in its support. The advance of the enemy was then immediately and effectually checked, and my thanks are tendered for the generous and opportune assistance rendered.

The casualties of the day were four hundred (400) killed and wounded in the corps.

During the night good intrenchments were made along my entire front.

General Hooker and myself were ordered to make an attack in conjunction on the 15th, everything to be in readiness by daylight. General Hooker was obliged to march about two-thirds of his command from the centre of the army to the extreme left, which movement took longer than was anticipated. His troops were massed and commenced the advance about noon. As he was the ranking officer I visited him early, learning his intentions as to the points and manner of attack, and prepared to support him in the way he asked. By artillery and musketry firing, by strong demonstrations opposite my centre and right, and by one real assault, I succeeded in keeping heavy forces of the enemy from leaving my front or passing to the left, but did not succeed in holding any point of the enemy's works. My command being on the right, and the first, necessarily conformed, in moving, to General Hooker's advance; he with a column of brigades very handsomely drove the enemy before him, seized and held two important heights, and also captured some artillery and prisoners.

The number of casualties during the day was large, among them Brigadier General Willich, of General Wood's division, was severely wounded, and obliged to leave us; Harker and Opdyke, of Newton's division, were wounded, but remained on duty, and some valuable officers were killed.

During the night of the 15th the enemy evacuated Resaca. Early on the 16th my corps led the pursuit along the direct road towards Kingston; skirmishing occurred with the enemy's rear-guard so as to make our progress slow. The corps camped that night at Calhoun; my command, General Newton leading, continued the march next day, starting at 5.30 a. m., along the wagon road, except Wood's division, which moved on the right down the railroad. We had heavy skirmishing all day.

The enemy's custom is, when retreating, to form his rear-guard of cavalry, with a section or battery of artillery, sometimes strengthened by infantry. During this day's march the resistance was unusually great. He formed three lines some half or three-quarters of a mile apart, and barricaded with rails, seeking the cover of woods with open fields in his front. As soon as we had succeeded in driving the first line, it passed to the rear of the third, and in some new and favorable position made another line. However, as we moved in two columns, we were enabled to make considerable progress. The resistance increased as we approached Adairsville. General Newton continued to deploy regiments as skirmishers, until he had a large brigade engaged. General Wood, abreast of him also skirmished heavily. About 4 p. m. it was found we had come upon the enemy's infantry in considerable force. Preparations were immediately made to assault and carry this position, if possible; but it required time to bring up the troops and get them in readiness. General Thomas deeming it best, on account of the nearness of night, to make a formal attack, the movement already set on foot was postponed. Yet, a real engagement was going on, since both parties continued to re-enforce their skirmish lines until they were tantamount to lines of battle. The enemy opened upon our column with artillery to which our batteries replied with spirit. During the night the enemy withdrew. We found that he had taken up a strong position and partially intrenched it, and that his whole army was present while the heavy skirmishing of the evening before was progressing. The casualties in my command at Adairsville were about two hundred (200) killed and wounded.

*May 18.*—The corps moved as ordered, six miles further, and encamped on Comosana creek.

*May 19.*—At 5 p. m. marched, General Stanley's division leading; reached Kingston at 8 a. m., the head of column towards Cassville. The enemy was discovered on high ground, just beyond the Two Run creek, and as soon as our troops came in view he opened fire upon us from a six-gun battery. General Stanley promptly brought up his artillery, supported by a brigade of infantry, and replied to the enemy's guns. He silenced them and drove them off. At this point I was directed by General Sherman in person to move forward four miles, to an old mill near the railroad, and there go into camp. As soon as General Stanley had dislodged the enemy from the high ground east of the creek, he moved forward. On reaching a point about half a mile from this mill severe resistance was made to our advance by the enemy's infantry skirmishers, and from a prominent height the enemy's infantry was discovered drawn up in two lines and advancing. General Stanley formed his lines, his left resting on the railroad; General Wood's division was moved to his right, and General Newton's moved to cover the left. As soon as our lines were formed the enemy halted and began to cover his front with rail barricades, nearly a mile in our front, but in plain sight. Our artillery opened from different points, whereupon the enemy's first line gave way, and passed to the rear in considerable confusion.

Having been directed by General Thomas to push on, I moved forward to the enemy's position, which he had in the mean time abandoned; the command here went into position, having formed a junction with a portion of General Hooker's corps that had been moving in a column to the east of us and parallel. The corps had hardly halted when an order was received to move at once on Cassville. Stanley's advance had hardly progressed a mile when a sharp fire was opened upon his head of column. He promptly deployed a portion of his command, and several batteries of artillery were placed in position to open the way. The enemy's resistance was so determined that General Wood's division was ordered upon Stanley's right. The promptitude with which this division was deployed afforded me great satisfaction. Newton's division was directed to take post on Stanley's left, but all but one or two regiments were crowded out by our forming a junction with General Hooker's corps. In this position, with General Hooker on the left and General Palmer on the right, continuous skirmishing and artillery firing was kept up until after dark. Before morning Johnston had abandoned another strongly intrenched position about Cassville, and fled across the Etowah river, destroying the railroad bridge.

*May 20, 21, and 22.*—The army rested in position near Cassville, renewed its supplies, sent back everything surplus, and made other preparations for a movement on Dallas.

*May 23.*—Crossed the Etowah river at Gillem's bridge, and went into position at Euharley creek.

*May 24.*—Crossed Euharley creek at Barrett's mills, and marched to Burnt Hickory, where we encamped for the night.

*May 25.*—Command marched by a settlement road, making a detour to the right of Burnt Hickory, and expecting to come into Dallas by the Van Wert and Dallas road. This route was taken to avoid collision with the numerous wagons of the corps in front of us that were obliged to move on one road. About two o'clock p. m. Lieutenant Colonel Mendenhall, department inspector general, met me at a point six or seven miles from Dallas, bringing an order from General Thomas for me to move by the first left-hand road across to the direct Burnt Hickory and Dallas road, as the enemy had been met by General Hooker's advance in considerable force. This corps was marched as rapidly as possible, its head of column reaching Pumpkinvine creek just as General Williams's division of the 20th corps was passing. At 5.15 p. m. General

Newton's head of column arrived, and his troops were placed in position in rear of General Hooker's troops that were already forming or formed for an advance. The rest of the corps was moved up as rapidly as possible, and moved on the right and left of the road. At 5.30 p. m. General Hooker's command moved forward, as I understood, with instructions to carry the cross-roads at New Hope church, supposed to be not more than a mile distant. I was directed to hold my command ready to move forward at 6.20 p. m. General Hooker sent me word by a staff officer that he had driven the enemy behind his breastworks; that he was holding his ground but was hard pressed, and requested me to send up a column of brigades on the right-hand side of the road. I commenced the march instantly with that formation, but finding that I was losing time, owing to the obstructions and difficulties of the ground, I directed the troops to march by the flank along the road as quickly as possible, until they approached General Hooker's position. Here I saw General Hooker himself, who requested me to form on the left of the road. Newton deployed his command as fast as he could, but by the time this was effected it was completely dark. The other divisions following General Newton's, were encamped for the night on the right and left of the road, it being too late to locate them otherwise in the thick woods.

I have been thus particular on this point because criticisms have been offered like this, "that, had the 4th corps come up on General Hooker's left, the enemy would have been completely driven from his strong position at New Hope church, and thus saved the army the long and fatiguing operations which succeeded General Hooker's assault." I do not doubt the truth of the allegation, but the facts are: first, that my head of column only had arrived at General Hooker's first position when his attacking movement commenced; second, that I was directed to hold myself in readiness to move forward if ordered; third, that I did so move forward, as promptly as possible, the moment I received word I was wanted, but arrived too late to partake in the engagement.

*May 26.*—General Newton's line was re-located so as to form a better connexion with General Hooker; General Stanley filled a gap on Newton's right with two or three regiments, the rest of his division in reserve; General Wood gradually developed his line on Newton's left, driving in the enemy's skirmishers, crossing Brown's Mill creek with the main force, and securing an important hill, then apparently opposite the enemy's right flank. These lines were found subsequently, at different points, to be within one hundred yards of the enemy's intrenchments; hence, the firing of skirmishers, or from main line to main line, was constant, and cost us many men. Our lines were thoroughly intrenched as soon as possible, and every battery that could be brought to bear upon the enemy was placed in position and covered by good works.

*May 27.*—General Stanley moved to the left of General Newton, and relieved General Wood's division preparatory to the latter making an assault on the enemy's line at a point which Major General Sherman had designated. On a careful reconnoissance made by General Thomas and myself, it was ascertained that the enemy were then prepared to bring a cross-fire of artillery and musketry upon the approaches of that position; therefore I was directed to move General Wood further to the left, and beyond all troops, and endeavor to strike the enemy's flank. Johnson's division, of the 14th corps, was sent to me as a support.

I have omitted to say that the 23d corps, Major General Schofield commanding, was already in position on the left of the 4th. Therefore I selected a field on the extreme left and rear of the 23d corps, which was pretty well concealed from the enemy by intervening woods, and in this massed the troops. Wood's division on the right formed in a column of six lines deep, and General Johnson's on the left with a brigade front. The advance from this position commenced at 11 a. m., and in an easterly direction.



The column moved forward with very little interruption for nearly a mile. I thought we must have reached the enemy's flank, whereupon General Wood wheeled his command towards the right, till he was faced nearly south. A brigade of the 23d corps, General McLean's, deployed so as to form a junction with General Wood on his right. The latter pressed forward his skirmishers till a large open field was reached; here it was discovered that the enemy's works were still in our front. Immediately the skirmishers were withdrawn, and the column moved rapidly by the left flank at least another mile to the eastward; the ground was carefully reconnoitred by General Wood and myself. We still found a line of works to our right, but they did not seem to cover General Wood's front, and they were new, the enemy still working hard upon them. I gave a little time for the troops of Wood's division to rest, and for Johnson's to form a little retired on his (Wood's) left.

From the position now occupied by the troops, woods, more or less open, extended up to the enemy's apparent flank. A road skirted the woods opposite our right, running perpendicular to the enemy's line; another road ran obliquely towards the left, and in rear of Johnson's position.

McLean's brigade was sent to a place in full view of the enemy's works, a little to the right of the point of attack, with a view to attract the enemy's attention and draw his fire. As soon as everything was in readiness, about 5 p. m., General Wood commenced his advance, Hazen's brigade leading.

The entire column marched briskly forward, driving the enemy's skirmishers, and vigorously assaulting his main line. Complaint came immediately that the supporting column under General Johnson was not far enough advanced. General Johnson was directed to push forward a brigade to Hazen's left. He answered that he was doing so, and that it would soon be in position. General Wood became very heavily engaged, so as to necessitate moving forward his supporting lines, and he found strong works on his front, except, perhaps, opposite his two left regiments. Colonel Scribner, who commanded General Johnson's advance brigade, finding his own left fired into from across Picket's Mills creek, halted and threw some troops across it for his protection. This delay occurring at precisely the same time with Wood's assault, was unfortunate, for it enabled the enemy with his reserves to force back the left of General Wood's line, and bring an enfilading and reverse fire upon his troops. Again, by some mistake of orders, McLean's troops did not show themselves to the enemy, nor open any fire to attract his attention on General Wood's right, so that the enemy was able to pour a cross-fire of artillery and musketry into his right flank. Under these circumstances it soon became evident that the assault had failed, and that the troops must be withdrawn with care, in order to bring off our wounded, and to prevent a successful sally of the enemy from his works.

General Johnson formed his troops in the rear of and to the left of the entire position, while General Wood carefully withdrew his division and formed on a ridge further to the right. General McLean having been requested to push further to the right, in order to make connexion with the rest of the army, disregarded the request, and moved off at once by the road, leaving these two divisions isolated. He (McLean) alleged in excuse that his men were entirely without rations.

Our losses were very heavy, being upwards of fourteen hundred (1,400) killed, wounded, and missing in General Wood's division alone.

Though the assault was repulsed, yet a position was secured near Picket's mills of the greatest importance to the subsequent movement of the army, and it has been subsequently ascertained that the enemy suffered immensely in the action, and regarded it as the severest attack made during the eventful campaign.

Johnson and Wood made strong intrenchments during the night. General Johnson received quite a severe wound from a shell, and was obliged to leave his command the next morning.

During the movement and fighting on the left, Stanley and Newton made strong demonstrations in their respective fronts. At 4 p. m. the enemy tried their lines, from which he was driven back with loss.

*May 28.*—Very little occurred on my front of interest except the readjusting lines. Stanley placed a brigade in reserve on the Ackworth road, opposite the interval between General Wood and Major General Schofield. At 4.30 p. m. the enemy made a slight demonstration in front of Generals Stanley and Newton, while he was making a regular assault upon General McPherson's lines near Dallas. The enemy was repulsed at every point.

*May 29.*—Very little of interest occurred during the day. An assault was made upon General Newton's lines at 11 p. m., which his troops handsomely repulsed. Heavy firing was heard in the direction of Dallas a little later, where-upon a strong demonstration by artillery and musketry firing was made by Stanley and Newton.

*May 30 and 31.*—Skirmishing and some slight reconnoissances by ourselves and the enemy, but no material change occurred.

*June 1.*—The movement of the army to the left commenced, General McPherson and General Davis having withdrawn from the extreme right position. On the 2d the movement was continued; the 20th and 23d corps and part of the 14th passed beyond our extreme left.

*June 3 and 4.*—Nothing of consequence excepting that I thinned and extended my lines so as to cover the ground occupied by the 23d corps, and afterwards by Davis's division of the 14th corps, relieving those troops in order to prolong our lines to the left. The result of these movements was to cause the enemy to abandon his lines on the night of June 4.

*June 5.*—The command rested.

*June 6.*—Marched towards Ackworth, crossing Alatoona creek, and massed the command near Dr. Peters's house, on the Ackworth and Sandtown road, about two miles from Ackworth, which was already in possession of our troops.

*June 7, 8, and 9.*—All that was done by the entire army was establishing the depots at Alatoona, rebuilding the bridge across the Etowah, and bringing up supplies.

*June 10.*—Movements were resumed. The 4th corps was directed to follow the 14th along the direct Marietta road. The 14th corps having passed to the left, this road was opened to my command. I pushed forward General Stanley's division in the advance until within view of Pine Top, which is an isolated hill just to the south of Burnt Hickory and Marietta road. We here encountered the enemy's skirmishers; pressing them back, we discovered that Pine Top was occupied by the enemy in force. At this point the command was halted to wait for the appearance of the 14th corps, which was to have the front in the order of march for the day. When it appeared, General Palmer formed his line facing southward toward Pine Top; the two corps formed in conjunction and pushed up to within cannon range of the enemy's line. During the night batteries were put in position, and good works were constructed.

*June 11.*—General Palmer's corps gained a little ground to his left and front; the interval left was filled by my command.

*June 12 and 13.*—Heavy rains occurred and no change took place.

*June 14.*—My lines were extended about three hundred paces, and advanced some three-quarters of a mile on the left towards the east of Pine Top, and in conjunction with the 14th corps. During the last three days much artillery firing occurred. We opened all of our batteries whenever the enemy showed any force.

During the night of the 14th the enemy abandoned his lines at Pine Top, and withdrew within his works, already prepared, running from Kenesaw to Lost mountain. My troops occupied Pine Top as early as 3 a. m.

June 15, at 11 a. m., I received an order from Major General Thomas to form

a column of attack, and to move southward, to the left of Pine Top, promptly at 2 p. m. Newton's division was selected to take the lead, followed by the divisions of Generals Stanley and Wood. General Newton was required to move forward briskly, with a strong skirmish line, and develope, if possible, a practicable point for attack, choosing his own formation. It took General Newton until 3 p. m. to get his column organized, when he pushed forward a strong line of skirmishers, which, in a few moments, encountered an intrenched skirmish line of the enemy. This line was carried with very little delay, whereupon General Newton moved up his main lines to the position gained. The skirmish line was advanced still further, but encountered so heavy a musketry fire that it was deemed prudent to deploy a portion of the advanced line. I moved up General Stanley to cover General Newton's right flank.

In the meanwhile General Newton had driven the enemy's skirmishers within his main works, and reported them so thoroughly constructed and so well manned, that I deemed it improper to risk an assault without a further reconnoissance; besides, the day was already nearly spent.

General Thomas approved of my action, and directed me to fortify where I was.

The next day, June 16, two batteries were constructed on our skirmish line. In the one on Stanley's front a valuable officer, Captain Simendson, General Stanley's chief of artillery, was killed.

During the night these two batteries were connected by main lines of intrenchments, and our troops moved into them. The position of a part of these lines was such that the enemy's skirmishers had to be pushed back to gain it. The whole line was then in close proximity to the enemy's works.

Doubtless believing that we could carry several points in our front by assault, the enemy determined to withdraw during the night; at any rate my troops entered his abandoned works by daylight on the morning of the 17th. Our skirmish line found that of the enemy about a mile beyond these works, and in such a position as to indicate that he had simply withdrawn his left, without moving his right flank. My lines were formed facing eastward, General Wood on the right, General Newton on the left, General Stanley in reserve, and advanced well covered with skirmishers. The difficulties of the ground were such that the enemy was enabled to resist our progress more than usual. It took until night to drive the enemy's skirmishers across Mud creek. After dark our skirmishers having secured a favorable position, thoroughly intrenched it. Twice before daylight the enemy attempted to drive them back but failed.

June 18.—At 6 45 a. m. it was reported to me, by one of General Wood's staff officers, that the enemy appeared to be leaving, whereupon I directed Generals Newton and Wood to advance a strong line of skirmishers to ascertain whether this report was true. This movement commenced at once on Newton's front; the enemy seemed taken partially by surprise, and was driven from a main line of works. General Harker, perceiving the advantage gained, without waiting for orders deployed two of his regiments to secure and hold this advanced position. I directed General Newton to move up his entire division in support. General Baird's division of the 14th corps came up very promptly on his left. General Wood having gained the ridge on the east of Mud creek, intrenched the position, making a continuous work. General Newton's troops were in such close contact with the enemy that three men were detailed from each company in the front line to keep up a continuous fire to prevent him from opening his artillery or musketry, which, however, in spite of this precaution, was occasionally done. As soon as it was dark, Newton's division intrenched strongly within less than one hundred yards of the enemy's works. The advantage gained by these movements was great; the line seized was that portion of the old line that jutted out from the new, which was necessary for the enemy to hold to prevent a successful assault upon the new position. It had rained hard during the

whole day, and Mud creek was swollen so that horses had to swim it, yet the troops managed to bridge it and cross with infantry and artillery and secure the important ground before described. General Thomas, as soon as he was apprised of the position of things, directed an assault for the next day, but the enemy again withdrew before morning.

*June 19.*—As soon as I discovered that the enemy had gone, I directed General Stanley, at 6 a. m., to push forward towards Marietta, which he did, followed by the other two divisions. He encountered the enemy's skirmishers near Wallace's house, on the Marietta road, about three-quarters of a mile from Nose's creek, beyond which he drove the enemy with his infantry and artillery. General Newton came up, and did the same on his left. The command then took position on the western bank of this creek. The enemy's position was in plain sight and within musketry range. His lines seemed to extend along the crest of Little Kenesaw and the southern spur, refusing to his left after reaching the base of it. This line was apparently unassailable, being as strong as possible by nature, and having plenty of felled trees in its front. General Hooker, who had moved in a parallel column, had crossed Nose's creek further south, and moved northward until his left division was near my right flank. The next morning, June 20th, General Hooker's left division (William's) was relieved by General Wood's division, and one brigade of General Stanley's division. During the forenoon Stanley crossed the creek in his front and constructed a line of works. During the afternoon he carried a wooded hill in front of Whittaker's brigade; also another, called Bald knob, in front of his right brigade, Colonel Kirby. Whittaker rapidly barricaded his new front. He had hardly got his works constructed when they were fiercely assaulted by the enemy, who were repulsed with heavy loss. The attempt was renewed several times, but with no better success. On Kirby's front, however, it was attempted to hold the knob by skirmishers while the pioneers intrenched. These skirmishers, with the pioneers, were forced back by the assault on Whittaker's brigade which extended to them, and this position was lost for the day.

*June 21.*—General Newton's division having been relieved by General Palmer was moved to the right of General Wood's, relieving a part of General Hooker's troops. At 11.30 a. m. I ordered that Colonel Kirby and Colonel Nodine, commanding General Wood's left brigade, move in conjunction, and seize and hold the Bald knob that Kirby had lost the evening before; the enemy had then intrenched it pretty strongly, and it was under the hottest kind of a fire from his guns. I directed a concentrated artillery fire of a half hour's duration upon this point, and ordered the advance, which was promptly made. The enemy was driven off, a number of prisoners were taken, the knob was secured, and the crest was intrenched while the enemy were firing upon it from two batteries of artillery. General Wood pushed two of his regiments still further to the front and right, and took possession of a height, which made the enemy abandon a long intrenched skirmish line and enabled us to move forward our right across an open field, four or five hundred yards.

*June 22.*—General Hooker advanced his corps in an easterly direction on my right, and my right division was wheeled up in connexion with the movement, occasioning heavy skirmishing in its front. About 5 p. m. the enemy made an assault on General Hooker's right division, (General Williams's,) and I was soon requested to relieve his left division (General Butterfield's,) for a re-enforcement with my troops. I sent every regiment that I had out of line at once. General Thomas had already directed that General Stanley's should be relieved by General King's, but this could not be effected until after dark, owing to King's close proximity to the enemy. As soon as relieved during the night, Stanley pushed his entire command to my right.

*June 23.*—In accordance with request of General Thomas, I tried an intrenched height in front of General Newton's and Stanley's position, it being doubted

whether or not this was a position of the enemy's main line. I opened upon it a concentrated artillery fire from as many guns as I could bring to bear, and immediately afterwards advanced a strong skirmish line, which drove the enemy within his works and developed a heavy artillery and musketry fire. By this operation I advanced our lines particularly on the extreme right, to very close proximity to the rebel works. These proved to be his main lines, covered by troublesome abatis and other entanglements.

*June 24, 25, and 26.*—The corps remained in the same position.

*June 27.*—In General Thomas's Special Field Order of June 26th I was required to assault the enemy's works at some point near the left of General Stanley's division. General Palmer, with his column on my right, was directed to carry the enemy's works in his front. The whole movement was to take place at 8 a. m. After a careful examination of the ground I found only two points where the troops could have a reasonable cover in Stanley's front, and decided to make two columns of attack. Brigadier General Harker led one column and General Wagner another, while General Kimball moved in support, in echelon with Wagner's brigade. These columns had each a regimental-division front, and were separated by about one hundred yards interval; the whole front was covered by a strong line of skirmishers. Such troops of Stanley's and Wood's as were free to move were massed in support. The artillery of the corps was so placed as to bring a heavy fire on the points of attack. General Palmer's arrangements were made simultaneous with mine. The artillery opened from all points, and continued firing for about fifteen minutes. At a preconcerted signal the columns pushed rapidly forward, driving in the enemy's skirmishers, and were not checked until they reached the entanglements in front of the enemy's works. At this place the artillery and infantry fire was so galling that the advance was stopped. General Harker is reported to have made a second advance, when he received the wound which caused his death. Some of his men succeeded in reaching the enemy's works, but failed to secure a lodgement. As soon as it became evident that the enemy's intrenchments could not be carried by assault, the command was directed to resume its former position. Our losses were very heavy, particularly in valuable officers. I call special attention to report of Brigadier General Newton of this attack, and to his opinion as to the causes of its being unsuccessful. My experience is, that a line of works thoroughly constructed, with the front well covered with abatis and other entanglements, well manned with infantry, whether with our own or that of the enemy, cannot be carried by direct assault; the exceptions are when some one of the above conditions are wanting, or where the defenders are taken by surprise. The strength of such a line is, of course, increased by well-arranged batteries. Notwithstanding the probabilities against success, it is sometimes necessary to assault strong works, as has occurred in several instances during the present campaign.

From June 28 to July 2, inclusive, preparations were made and partially executed for resting the left of the entire army opposite the southern extremity of Little Kencsaw, so as to extend the right and turn the enemy's left flank. The enemy, doubtless perceiving these movements, evacuated his position in our front on the night of the 2d.

*July 3.*—The corps marched from camp in pursuit of the enemy at 5 a. m., Stanley's division leading. After passing through Marietta the corps followed a route to the left of the railroad, and came upon the enemy's skirmishers near Neal Dow station, between three and four miles south of Marietta. Stanley's division was deployed confronting the enemy, the right resting on the railroad, and the other two divisions were massed in reserve a little south of this point, at a place known as Smyrna camp-ground. The enemy had constructed another good system of works behind a wide, open field, almost covering his entire front.

Having come upon the enemy's intrenched skirmish line, and it being late in the day when the troops had arrived, no further advance was ordered.

*July 4.*—General Newton's and General Wood's divisions were moved up into line, on the left of General Stanley's, at 9 a. m. General Stanley was ordered to strengthen his skirmish line and assault and carry the skirmish line of the enemy, which was unusually strong. It had intrenched pits, with from ten to twenty men in each, and these, in many places, were not more than twenty yards apart. Generals Newton and Wood were ordered to move their skirmish lines in conjunction with General Stanley's. The movement commenced at about 11 a. m. The lines were handsomely carried in Stanley's front under a trying artillery fire, in addition to the musketry fire from the rifle-pits. Immediately, General Stanley moved up his main line and intrenched the position gained. This was within short musketry range of the enemy's continuous works. General Newton took a part of the same line, as also did General Wood, at a later hour. During the night the enemy again retreated.

*July 5.*—Pursuit was continued by my corps along the railroad, General Wood leading; very little skirmishing until the head of the column reached Vining's station. From this point a road led to the east toward Atlanta, crossing the Chattahoochee river at Pace's ferry, where the enemy had a pontoon bridge. Wood's skirmishers encountered a brigade of dismounted cavalry, which had its front covered by rail barricades along a ridge at right angles to the above-named road, and one quarter of a mile from the station. He quickly drove the enemy from his barricades and pushed on to the river, where he arrived in time to save a greater part of the enemy's bridge. The dismounted cavalry seemed to have retreated by a river road, that we did not then know, towards the railroad bridge, and therefore escaped capture. This accomplished, the command went into camp on a high ground near to and facing the river.

*July 6, 7, and 8.*—Remained in position, making an occasional demonstration and feint as if to throw a bridge, with a view to keep as large a force of the enemy on the opposite bank as possible.

*July 9.*—In accordance with instructions from department headquarters General Newton's division was sent to Roswell factory to support General Garrard's cavalry in effecting a crossing of the Chattahoochee at that point. He crossed and made a bridge-head.

*July 10.*—Stanley's and Wood's divisions moved to near the mouth of Soap creek in support of General Schofield, who had crossed the river at that point.

*July 11.*—At 5 p. m. received orders to secure the heights opposite Powers's ferry, on the south side of the Chattahoochee, to protect the laying of a bridge at that point. Stanley's division fulfilled these instructions the next morning at daylight, passing the river at Schofield's bridge.

*July 12.*—At 3 a. m. received the order from General Thomas to move my entire corps to the south side of the river, crossing a pontoon bridge at Powers's ferry that Colonel Buell was directed to lay. Wood's division moved over as soon as the bridge was completed, while General Newton's division returned from Roswell factory and crossed the next morning. The two later divisions formed a strong line on Stanley's left and front.

*July 13, 14, 15, and 16.*—My command remained in position.

*July 17.*—General Wood's division moved down the south side of the river three miles, to clear the way for laying a bridge at Pace's ferry and cover the crossing of the 14th corps. As soon as this was accomplished the division returned. Owing to the rugged nature of the country, the want of roads, and the proximity of the enemy's masses to Pace's ferry, Wood's movement was an important and delicate one. It was satisfactorily executed, and without an engagement.

*July 18.*—An intimation was given by signal despatch about midnight that orders would be received by daylight. Upon this despatch the corps was di-

rected to move. The order of instructions was not received till 5 a. m., just as the corps was moving. As far as concerned this command, it was to march directly on Buckhead, and go into position on the left of the place along the Turner's ferry and Buckhead road. Newton's head of column left camp at 4.30 a. m. Very little opposition was encountered till near Nancy's creek, on the opposite side of which the enemy's cavalry was disposed, supporting a section of artillery. The bridge across the creek was partially burned. The enemy opened his artillery on Newton's advance; batteries, however, were placed in position and fired, driving off the enemy's guns. After some little delay the creek was crossed, the enemy driven away, and the bridge rebuilt. The column progressed, skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry, reached Buckhead about noon, and took up the position above indicated.

*July 19.*—In accordance with instructions from General Thomas, General Wood's division made a reconnoissance down the Buck Head and Atlanta road reaching Peach Tree creek at 6.30 a. m. The enemy's outposts, driven in by General Wood, burned the bridge after crossing. Having accompanied this reconnoissance I discovered a well-constructed bridge-head on the high ground beyond the creek. The enemy had artillery and infantry and was in considerable force. Stanley meanwhile reconnoitred on the Decatur road, driving the enemy's skirmishers; he seized the bridge, just burning, across the north fork of Peach Tree creek, and saved the most of it. Newton pushed a reconnoissance on an intermediate road to Peach Tree creek, but found the bridge already destroyed, and the enemy intrenched in force on the opposite bank. All of these facts were immediately reported to General Thomas. 11.20 a. m., instructions were received from General Thomas to cross Peach Tree creek, whereupon General Wood was required to effect a crossing near his position; he succeeded in crossing the creek beyond the enemy's left flank, turned his position, forced him from the bridge-head and moved over two brigades of his division to hold the points gained. He immediately commenced to rebuild the bridge. Stanley also, on the Decatur road, repaired the old bridge and constructed a new one. Newton's division was moved to Peach Tree creek in support of General Wood. Stanley moved across the north fork and encamped for the night.

*July 20.*—There being a slight conflict of orders received, I visited department headquarters at daylight, and was instructed to push one division on the direct Atlanta road, and to move the other two as directly as possible to the support of General Schofield. General Newton was instructed to relieve the troops of General Wood in his vicinity, and General Wood to close up on General Stanley on the Decatur road. General Stanley commenced the march at 7 a. m., and proceeded to the crossing of the south fork of Peach Tree creek, followed by General Wood. Here the bridge was found to have been burned; having pushed over a strong skirmish line, a new bridge was built. At 10 a. m. General Stanley began to cross his column. His skirmishers were already engaged. Communication was had with General Schofield who was moving on a road about a mile to our left. This road and mine gradually converged towards Atlanta. Soon the enemy fired with shells and canister upon Stanley's advance, and the resistance became obstinate, thus indicating that we were in the presence of a large force. General Stanley drove in the enemy's outposts and came up in sight of intrenchments, well made and located, in front of which the usual line of skirmishers was formed. Little was done until near night, except to deploy our lines, and make works in close proximity to the enemy's position; General Wood forming to the right of General Stanley. During the afternoon and evening General Stanley had a severe skirmish, driving in a portion of the enemy's picket line, and capturing the rest in his front. Newton's division, in accordance with instructions from department headquarters, endeavored to push on towards Atlanta on the direct road. As General Newton was separated from the other two divisions of the corps by an interval of nearly two miles, and as

it was difficult, if not impossible, to communicate with him, I directed that he should report for orders to General Thomas. The latter instructed him to wait till the 20th corps had formed a junction with him, and then advance. About 1 p. m. he ordered forward his skirmishers, driving in those of the enemy, securing for himself important ground and ascertaining that the enemy was near by in strong force; whereupon he located two brigades in line, nearly perpendicular to the road, on the right and left, and moved the other up in column for support. Between the two deployed brigades a battery of four guns was placed. General Newton covered his front as rapidly as possible with rough rail barricades. Soon he was severely attacked in front by a division of the enemy. Another division had already pushed back his skirmishers and passed his left flank, thrusting itself between the Pea Vine and Peach Tree creeks. Immediately after the front attack a third rebel division attacked his right. The general seems to have given his attention first to the left; his artillery, not in position in front, was located in the rear, and together with some musketry fire from detached regiments, checked and drove back this flanking force into the woods. Next the front attack, which enveloped the left, was handsomely met, and the enemy was driven back with loss. The attack upon his right was repulsed by his right brigade, which was obliged to protect his flank by forming a line at right angles to its position. This flank was, however, soon covered by the advance of the 20th corps. A second attempt was made on Newton's left and rear. This time General Thomas had sent him an additional battery from the 20th corps, which, in conjunction with the guns already in position, and another four-gun battery belonging to Newton, opened fire upon the enemy's columns. He was then easily repulsed, after the first attack. Several subsequent assaults were made upon Newton's lines, the action lasting until dark. The brigade commanders, Brigadier General Kimball, Colonels Bradley and Blake are highly complimented for gallantry, also other officers, in General Newton's report. The position held was vital, securing as it did the Buck Head and Atlanta road, and constituting the left of our right wing while the army was divided. The loss of the division was small compared with that of the 20th corps engaged in its immediate right. This resulted from the peculiar dispositions of the troops, and that they had time to cover their front with slight barricades. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded, in front of this division, amounted to upwards of fifteen hundred, (1,500,) while the casualties of the division itself were about one hundred (100.) General Newton's division held possession of the field and buried the enemy's dead. In the night the enemy withdrew from the angle between Newton's left and the north fork of Peach Tree creek, enabling General Wood, in the morning, to swing up a mile and a half upon his extreme right.

*July 21.*—Generals Stanley and Wood again pressed up close to the enemy's new lines and skirmished sharply with him during the entire day. Batteries were placed in position and fired continuously at every point where they could produce any effect. During the night the enemy evacuated his works and moved into Atlanta.

*July 22.*—At daylight General Stanley and General Wood moved on different roads towards Atlanta. Stanley came upon the skirmishers about two miles from the city, and immediately deployed his lines; General Wood formed upon his right, pushing well to the front, and taking possession of an important ridge; General Newton moved upon the Buck Head road and formed a junction with Wood's division.

In this general position my lines were established and fortified, and the batteries of the corps, for the most part, placed in such a position as to bring a fire upon the enemy's works or the city beyond. During the day a terrific battle occurred between the enemy and the army of the Tennessee, on the extreme



left; meanwhile, in accordance with instructions received, I held my command in momentary readiness to move.

*July 23, 24, 25, 26.*—My corps remained substantially in the same position, having completed a system of works strong enough to be held by a thin single line.

*July 27.*—In obedience to orders from Major General Sherman, I took leave of the 4th army corps, and assumed command of the army of the Tennessee.

In conclusion I wish to say that it pains me not to be able to give a substantial reward to officers who have so faithfully, so energetically and unselfishly co-operated with me during our prolonged and arduous campaign. I leave the gallant officers and soldiers in the hands of division, brigade, and regimental commanders for honorable mention, wishing it understood that I am the earnest friend of every one who is true and patriotic.

Major General Stanley, Brigadier General Newton, and Brigadier General Wood, commanding divisions, have served the country for the last hundred days with ability and constancy, and to them I tender my warmest thanks. All under their command I must leave without special notice, from the fact that otherwise the list would be too extended. For gallantry, efficiency, unflinching activity, and gentlemanly deportment, I commend the different members of my staff, viz :

Colonel F. T. Sherman, chief of staff, captured while reconnoitring, July 7; Lieutenant Colonel J. S. Fullerton, assistant adjutant general; Lieutenant Colonel C. H. Howard, assistant inspector general; Lieutenant Colonel H. Hayes, chief quartermaster; Lieutenant Colonel D. Remick, chief commissary of subsistence; Surgeon Theo. H. Heard, medical director; Captain E. P. Pearson, seventeenth United States infantry, commissary of musters; Captain Henry Kaldenbaugh, provost marshal; Captain Joseph A. Schoesinger, staff quartermaster; Captain H. M. Stinson, aide-de-camp, seriously wounded through the lungs, May 27; Captain F. W. Gilbreth, aide-de-camp; Captain E. H. Kerlin, volunteer aide-de-camp; Captain Lyman Bridges, chief of artillery.

It may not be inappropriate, now that I am separated from your army, to express my appreciation of the uniform confidence reposed in me by the commanding general, and to acknowledge that I owe any success or reputation I may have gained while in command of the 4th corps in a great measure to himself. Herewith please find a list of casualties, also of recommendations for promotion.

Major Francis Mohrhardt is highly commended for his carefulness in mapping the country passed over by the troops.

*Report of casualties in fourth army corps from May 3, 1864, to and including July 26, 1864.*

Command.	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		CAPTURED OR MISSING.		TOTAL.		Aggregate.
	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	
Headquarters fourth army corps.....			2	3			2	3	5
First division.....	15	217	66	1,149	3	78	84	1,444	1,528
Second division.....	32	375	114	1,864		73	146	2,312	2,458
Third division.....	27	370	89	1,822	4	267	120	2,459	2,579
Total.....	74	962	271	4,838	7	418	352	6,218	6,560

Aggregate strength on leaving Cleveland, excluding the regiments left back as guards at that place and Ottawah, twenty thousand, (20,000,) very nearly.

Promotions for effective service and gallantry in action have been recommended from time to time apart from this report.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

O. O. HOWARD,  
*Major General.*

Brigadier General WHIPPLE,  
*Chief of Staff, Department of the Cumberland.*

Official:

S. C. KELLOGG,  
*Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

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*Report of the operations of the 4th army corps, from the 27th day of July before Atlanta, until after the battle of Jonesboro' and the reoccupation of our position about Atlanta.*

HEADQUARTERS 4TH ARMY CORPS, DEP'T OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Atlanta, Georgia, September 15, 1864.*

I have the honor to report that, upon the morning of the 27th of July, General Howard, commanding 4th army corps, turned the command over to me and left the same morning to take command of the army of the Tennessee. The corps was at this time occupying a line of works confronting the fortifications of Atlanta extending from a quarter of a mile northwest of the Buck Head road to the neighborhood of what was known as the Howard house, General Newton holding the right, Wood the centre, and the first, my old division, commanded by Colonel Gross, the left. During the 27th the position was strengthened and batteries were put into play upon Atlanta. On the 28th we were directed to make a strong demonstration against the enemy, and, if possible, carry a point of his line. This was done by a strong re-enforced skirmish line, and the enemy's rifle-pits were carried upon Wood's and Grose's front; but the fire of artillery was so severe, and the main work of the enemy seemed so well filled, that no attempt was made to carry it. We took, upon this occasion, about fifty (50) prisoners, and retained and fortified for our skirmish line that of the enemy. During the 29th, 30th, and 31st, no changes were made upon our lines. Being notified that the army of the Ohio would be withdrawn, leaving the 4th corps upon the flank of the army, a new flank was constructed upon the 1st of August running from the point at which the Buck Head road intersected our front line along the line of Spring creek. This line we subsequently did not need to use.

The army of the Ohio moved out the night of the 1st of August, and it was deemed advisable to keep up a show of force in the line occupied by them; the first division were accordingly so extended as to occupy all the line occupied by General Schofield. This was intended as only a temporary arrangement to be maintained twenty-four hours, but was finally kept up until the investment of Atlanta was abandoned. The second was employed strengthening our line. On the 3d a demonstration was made to attract the attention of the enemy from Schofield's movements. The rebel picket line was again captured, and thirty (30) of their men fell into our hands. On the 4th, 5th, and 6th, the demonstrations were continued, with such variations as our judgments could suggest, but, however, tending to confirm the opinion that the enemy held his line in too strong force to be carried by any sudden dash. From this date to the seventeenth, no special movement was made. Our lines were very thin, probably not more than one rank in many parts of the work; but the lack of force was supplied by the

material defences we constructed, consisting of abatis, fraises, &c., so well applied as to make our line almost invulnerable. On the 17th orders were received directing the withdrawing of the corps from their investing line, and the massing of the troops behind the 14th corps; this order also directed the providing of forage, rations, and ammunition for an expedition of fifteen days. The movement was to commence on the night of the 18th; but the same day orders were received delaying the order until further instructions, in anticipation of favorable results from a contemplated raid upon the Macon railroad by General Kilpatrick's command. During the 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st, demonstrations were constantly kept up against the enemy's position to favor the movements of Kilpatrick. By the display of troops, exhibition of flags in new places, and by strong reconnoissances pushed south of the Decatur road, the enemy were impressed with the belief that we had extended our lines to the left, and considerable change was made in his disposition of troops to meet us. These demonstrations, always resulting in severe skirmishes, were not without some loss to us; but our men never failed to drive the enemy into his main works. On the night of the 25th, the movement of withdrawal directed to take place on the 18th was successfully carried out; the troops quietly withdrew from the left at nightfall. The pickets, under charge of Colonel Bennett, seventy-fifth Illinois, came away so secretly that the enemy continued firing all night, only discovering our absence at day-break. One surgeon, one captain, and two privates were captured by the enemy, the result of their own inexcusable straggling. The rear guard of the division (Newton's) reached Proctor's creek at 3 o'clock in the morning. The corps was formed in line at this point. The enemy's skirmishers followed and engaged ours about 8 a. m. On the 26th, after wasting an hour, and finding that we were followed only by a skirmish line, the corps was put in motion, General Kimball's division, west of Proctor's creek, covering the movement. About the time the troops were stretched out on the road the attack upon our pickets became more serious, and General Kimball had to send two regiments, which had first gotten in position behind an old breastwork, when the rebel skirmish line charged. They received a volley which dispersed them, and our rear came away without any further molestation. The day was exceedingly sultry, and the most trying upon the men, of any during the campaign. The corps, however, made a good march, crossing Utoy creek, and taking position in line of battle, facing east, in the vicinity of Utoy post office. On the 27th we moved by a road leading south, and took position at Mount Gilead church, forming line, facing nearly south. The enemy's pickets were just in front of us. At this place they fired a few shots from artillery at our pickets. On the 28th the corps moved to the vicinity of Red Oak, on the West Point railroad, following the 14th corps, (the artillery and trains following a parallel road to the west of the one used by us.) We encamped for the night in line of battle, facing east. On the 29th General Wood, with two brigades of his division, and Taylor's brigade of Kimball's division, co-operated with the 14th corps in the destruction of the West Point railroad. The road was thoroughly destroyed to a point three and a half miles from East Point. On the 30th moved by Ballard's to Mrs. Long's, on the Atlanta and Fayetteville road. The enemy's skirmishers were found, and proved very obstinate. On the Shoal Creek road, which was east from Mrs. Long's, General Newton's division was left in position to guard the road and woods; Kimball's division were encamped in line upon the Atlanta and Fayetteville road. This position of the troops (it was learned just at night-fall) was not in accordance with the views of the department commander, but owing to the lateness of the hour, it was not deemed advisable to move the whole force, and one brigade of General Wood's division and the pickets of the command were pushed out to cover the road leading by Morry's mill to Decatur.

General Newton, at Mann's house, on the Shoal Creek road, reported the enemy in considerable force, and intrenched between himself and Morry's mill.

Early August 31 the corps was moved in the direction of Rough-and-Ready, by way of Thorn's mill. General Newton was instructed to remain in position until he should be joined by General Schofield's force, and then to follow. Arriving in sight of the mills on Crooked creek, on the Decatur road, a long line of breastworks could be seen on the opposite side of the creek; these were occupied, but in what force we could not at once determine. Kimball's and Wood's divisions were deployed, and pushing forward a strong line of skirmishers, the enemy, who proved to be dismounted cavalry, abandoned the works, and took to their heels. Verbal instructions having been received to push a strong reconnoissance to the railroad southeast of Rough-and-Ready, in conjunction with General Schofield, Newton's division was put in position, covering the direct road to Jonesboro' and protecting the artillery and trains; and Wood's and Kimball's divisions were pushed forward to the railroad. As the 23d army corps occupied the main road leading to the railroad, we had to explore roads leading further south, and as nearly parallel as possible. Owing to the delays occasioned by searching for roads, and the brushy nature of the country, we did not arrive at the railroad until about 4 p. m., and just a few moments after General Cox's division of the 23d army corps. A small break was made in the road, but deeming a secure lodgment the most important thing, the troops were formed in line facing Jonesboro', forming with the 23d corps a V, with the apex resting east of the road. The troops were strongly barricaded in this position, and a strong force, including all the pioneers of the corps, was ordered to commence breaking up the road. At 3 o'clock in the morning General Schofield sent me a copy of his instructions from district headquarters, and proposed that Cox's division should go back on the road, in the direction of Rough-and-Ready, assisting Garrard to break up the road, and that I should move on in the direction of Jonesboro', breaking the road, and that he would follow with his corps, and make the work complete. In answer to this, I objected to his plan of separating forces, not knowing the position of the enemy, but informed him that I should undoubtedly receive instructions from department headquarters. At 10 o'clock in the evening I received instructions from department headquarters, directing me to move early towards Jonesboro', destroying the road, and apprising me that I would probably overtake Baird's division similarly employed, and if I found Baird, to report for further instructions. At daylight the corps was put in motion, Kimball's and Newton's divisions down the railroad; Wood's division on the Rough-and-Ready and Griffin road in charge of the extra artillery and baggage. In starting out in the morning I passed General Schofield's headquarters. In conversation he asked me if I ranked him; I told him that I did. He then said if a battle occurred he would be under my command. I said to him that there was little likelihood of a battle until reaching Jonesboro', and that our common superiors would probably be near at hand. No intimation, from any quarter, was given me that General Schofield was under my command, nor did I so consider him. I had no right to command him unless so instructed from competent authority. At 10 o'clock a. m. the head of the corps arrived at the point struck by General Baird's division the day before. My chief of staff, Colonel Fullerton, was at once sent to General Thomas for instructions. At quarter past twelve Colonel Fullerton returned, saying that General Thomas had sent Wood's division to join the corps, and that as soon as Wood had joined, and I was ready to advance, I should inform the department headquarters. Major Sinclair, assistant adjutant general, having also returned from General Thomas, with instructions to keep down on the left flank of General Davis, 14th corps, the troops were moved down the railroad, the head of the column abreast with the advance of the 14th corps. Colonel Fullerton brought a message from General Thomas about 4 p. m. to push on down the railroad towards Jonesboro'. This was done. The pickets of the enemy were struck about 4 p. m. Kirby's and Gross's brigades of Kimball's division were deployed and instructed to push the enemy vigorously.

Newton's division was also deployed on the left of Kimball's, and urged to push forward as rapidly as possible. It was past 5 o'clock when Kirby's and Gross's brigades got up in the face of the enemy. This delay, which was fatal to our success, was in part owing to the very dense nature of the undergrowth in front of the enemy's position, and, further, to the slow progress the skirmishers made in pushing back those of the enemy. General Gross and Colonel Kirby, both reported they could not carry the position in their fronts, owing to the perfect entanglement made by cutting down the thick undergrowth in front of the rail barricade the rebels had hastily thrown up. Newton's division had a much larger circuit to make, and when moved forward the right brigade (Wagner's) found no enemy in front, but received a fire from the rear of their right flank. The flank of the enemy had been found and turned, but it was now pitch dark, and nothing more could be done. Very early in the night the enemy retreated. The formation and advance of the troops of Kimball's and Newton's divisions was done under a severe cannonade, and although the men were perfectly cool and behaved well, I have no doubt but this delayed the deployment. Just before dark General Davis sent me word that he had positive information that we were on their flank, which was the first intimation I had of the position of the enemy. No one regrets more than myself the escape of Hardee's corps, and it is easy, after the facts are revealed, to see how he might have been caught; but the position of the enemy was entirely unknown to me, and had to be developed, and the time necessary to overcome the difficulties brought us to night, and with night the opportunity for the enemy to escape. I carried out all orders and instructions received without delay, and when the enemy was found I used all the personal exertions in my power to push the troops rapidly forward. I believe the subordinate commanders put their troops in position, and advanced then to the best of their ability and understanding; that we did not succeed, was simply because the daylight was not an hour longer. Wood's division was kept in reserve, as the 23d corps was not closed up upon the 4th, and I had no knowledge of what I might expect from the enemy on my left flank. The loss principally in Kimball's division was about one hundred men killed and wounded. We captured one hundred and thirty-seven (137) prisoners, including seven commissioned officers. Early on the morning of the 2d September the enemy was found to have retreated. About 9 o'clock the corps was started in pursuit, under instructions from General Sherman, to keep down the east side of the railroad, leaving the roads on the right for the army of the Tennessee. We marched upon the McDonough road and cross county roads three miles south of Jonesboro', when, finding that we could find a road for artillery alongside the railroad, this route was followed. At 12 m. the enemy was found in position, busily fortifying across the road and railroad, about one mile north of Lovejoy's station. Arrangements were made at once for advancing upon the position, Newton's division forming the right of the line, Wood's the centre, and Kimball's the left. General Howard, commanding the army of the Tennessee, notified me that he would advance in concert with the 4th corps, and that he would notify me when ready to advance. This he did at half past 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The troops of his corps were immediately put in motion. In an examination of the enemy's position upon the railroad, with General Newton, I had agreed with him that an assault at that point would not be advisable, as the artillery of the enemy had too full a sweep of the ground we must pass over. I was under the impression that if the army of the Tennessee attracted the attention of the enemy, I should be able to reach the rebel right flank. Generals Wood and Kimball met very bad ground in their advance. The country about the head of Indian creek, over which they passed, is very broken, and intersected by difficult little streams and marshes; owing to these difficulties it was nearly 6 o'clock before Kimball's and Wood's divisions arrived at the enemy's position. Their skirmishers were soon driven in, and General Wood was engaged selecting a point of

attack when he was severely wounded and disabled from attending to the management of his advance. Colonel Kneffler's brigade, the left one of Wood's division, charged and carried the enemy's work, but were unable to maintain themselves, owing to a sweeping enfilading fire coming from both flanks. General Kimball pushed his brigade well forward, but was struck in flank by a sweeping artillery fire, and finding that he would have to cross the open field to gain the enemy's work, which they were laboring might and main to complete, the assault was countermanded. Indeed the enemy had concentrated force enough to hold nearly as long a line as ourselves, and from our observations, Kimball's left brigade was about opposite the rebel flank. As night had fallen, at this time, the troops were ordered to intrench, and remain in the position gained. The 23d corps came in sight behind our right flank during the engagement, but gave no support to our movement. The loss in Kneffler's brigade was quite severe, including the dangerously wounding of Colonel Manderson, 18th Ohio, and Colonel Baily, 9th Kentucky, and the killing of Captain Miller, assistant adjutant general of the brigade. We remained in our position, confronting the enemy, until the night of the 5th, when the troops were withdrawn, falling back to Jonesboro'; remained in bivouack at Jonesboro' the 6th, on the 7th fell back to the vicinity of Rough-and-Ready, and on the 8th marched to our present camp, east of Atlanta.

In concluding this report I take pleasure in recommending to the commander of the department the division commanders of this corps, Generals Newton, Wood, and Kimball. Quick and ready to comprehend, they were always zealous and careful to carry out my directions. I believe they all most honestly deserve promotion. General Wood especially, whose experience is part of the history of this army since its first organization, and who has taken part in all the battles of this army, has peculiar and strong claims for promotion.

To my staff I take this occasion to pay a compliment for their industry and efficiency; Colonel J. S. Fullerton, assistant adjutant general and chief of staff; Major W. H. Sinclair, assistant adjutant general; Surgeon Heard, medical director; Major Francis Mohrhardt, topographical engineer, who has prepared for the engineer department a very complete set of maps of the marches and positions of the corps; Captain W. H. Greenwood, corps inspector; Captain J. W. Steel, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant L. L. Taylor, aide-de-camp, Captain Pearson, C. M., acting aide-de-camp. Captain Foreaker and Lieutenants Berry and Burton, signal officers, rendered good services as volunteer aids. Lieutenant Colonel Remick, chief commissary, and Captain Schoeninger, chief quartermaster, deserve great credit for the efficiency with which their departments were managed. Captain Kaldenbaugh, provost marshal, always had his department in the best of order. The artillery brigade was under command of Captain Lyman Bridges, Illinois light artillery. His report and those of battery commanders have been forwarded to the chief of artillery, department of the Cumberland. The artillery was well managed in action, and the horses well cared for on the march and in camp. Captain Bridges deserves credit for the efficiency of the artillery arm.

Appended will be found a tabular statement of the casualties of the corps from the 3d day of May, the commencement of the campaign, to 8th day of September, the date of the return to Atlanta.

Respectfully submitted :

D. S. STANLEY,

*Major General Commanding 4th Army Corps.*

Brigadier General W. D. WHIPPLE,

*Chief of Staff, Army of the Cumberland.*

*Consolidated report, showing total number of casualties in 4th army corps during the campaign beginning May 3 and ending September 8, 1864.*

	KILLED.			WOUNDED.			MISSING.			TOTAL.		Aggregate.
	Com'd officers.	Enlis'd men.	Total.	Com'd officers.	Enlis'd men.	Total.	Com'd officers.	Enlis'd men.	Total.	Com'd officers.	Enlis'd men.	
JUNE.												
Staff 4th army corps .....				1	2	3						
MAY.												
1st division .....	2	63	65	17	249	266		24	24	19	436	455
2d division .....	2	156	164	37	781	818		10	10	55	937	992
3d division .....	20	271	291	61	1,249	1,310	4	251	255	85	1,771	1,856
JUNE.												
1st division .....	10	136	146	39	634	673	2	52	54	51	822	873
2d division .....	23	194	217	71	943	1,014	1	56	57	95	1,193	1,288
3d division .....	7	76	83	16	448	464		7	7	23	531	554
JULY.												
1st division .....	3	18	21	10	175	185	1	2	3	14	195	209
2d division .....	1	27	28	9	152	161		7	7	10	186	196
3d division .....		26	26	14	148	162	1	4	5	15	178	193
AUGUST.												
1st division .....	2	14	16	1	81	82	2	15	17	5	110	115
2d division .....	2	2	4		37	37	1	7	8	3	46	49
3d division .....	1	17	18	3	55	58		3	3	4	75	79
SEPTEMBER.												
1st division .....	1	18	19	14	151	165		5	5	15	174	189
2d division .....	1	9	10	7	67	74	1	15	16	11	89	100
3d division .....	3	6	9	6	52	58	1	1	2	10	59	69
AUGUST.												
Artillery .....					1	1		2	2		3	3
SEPTEMBER.												
Brigade .....		1	1		2	2					3	3
Total .....	84	1,034	1,118	306	5,329	5,635	14	461	475	416	6,810	7,226

D. S. STANLEY,  
Major General Commanding.

ATLANTA, GA., September 15, 1864.

### HEADQUARTERS 14TH ARMY CORPS, White Hall, Georgia.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the 14th army corps from the 22d on August, on which day I assumed command of it, to the 8th day of September, when it went into camp at this place.

At the time of assuming command the position of the corps was located on Utoy creek, and west of Atlanta, and nearly opposite East Point. It was, and had been for some days, detached from the army of the Cumberland, and was acting under the immediate direction of Major General Schofield, commanding the army of the Ohio, in our movement against the enemy's position at East Point.

After the receipt of Special Field Order No. 57, headquarters military division of the Mississippi, directing the movements of the army against the Macon rail-

road, the corps was held in readiness until the 26th, when, as a preliminary movement, it withdrew from the field-works and went into bivouac on the south side of Utoy creek. This movement was, of necessity, made during the night, and, owing to the excessive rain, bad roads, and darkness of the night, was not accomplished until after daylight the next morning. On the 27th the corps remained in camp awaiting the movement of other commands, cutting roads, &c., preparatory to marching the next morning.

At 4 a. m., the 28th, the corps moved to Mount Gilead church, where it passed the fourth corps, and taking the advance, reached its designated camp, near Rough-and-Ready, late in the afternoon. During the day's march Morgan's division had the advance and skirmished quite lively with the enemy's cavalry at and south of Camp creek.

On the 29th the location of my camp remained unchanged. A part of the troops were kept vigorously at work during the day destroying the railroad track, making reconnoissances, and cutting roads to facilitate our advance the next morning.

On the morning of the 30th, in compliance with instructions from Major General Thomas, the corps moved at an early hour to Shoal Creek church in the neighborhood, where it bivouacked for a few hours, the troops getting their dinners during the halt. From this position it marched to Couch's house, on the Rough-and-Ready and Jonesboro' road, in the following order: Baird's division on the left, in co-operating distance with the 4th corps, Morgan's division, followed by Carlin's, and the train moved on a more direct road to the right, in supporting distance of Baird. The enemy offered little resistance, and the whole command went into camp before night; my left connected with the 4th corps, my right one mile from Renfro's cross-roads, at which point the army of the Tennessee was operating.

On the morning of the 31st General Baird, with his own and one brigade of General Morgan's division, was ordered to make a reconnoissance in the direction of the Macon railroad. The road was reached and a party kept at work destroying the track until the following day. Baird intrenched his command on the Rough-and-Ready road, near Smith's house, where it remained until joined by the corps the next day. Carlin's division moved in the morning to Renfro's cross-roads for the purpose of guarding the different trains collecting at that place. Late in the evening this division was hurriedly ordered to the support of the army of the Tennessee, then reported to be engaged with the enemy, and Morgan's division was ordered to take its place at Renfro's, and to picket well to the front on the Fayetteville road; this it did. The emergency for which Carlin's division had been called to the support of General Howard's troops ceased to exist, the enemy having been repulsed; and the facts being reported to me, I ordered Carlin to return to his camp of the previous night.

On the morning of the 1st September I received orders from department headquarters to move with Morgan's division and two brigades of Carlin's, and join with Baird, and then to move in support of General Howard's left. Leaving one brigade at Renfro's to guard the trains, as directed, Carlin marched promptly to the Rough-and-Ready road, and halted his command a short distance in advance of Baird's field-works on the right. Morgan with two brigades marched promptly from Renfro's, and following Carlin, reported to me at General Baird's headquarters, where, in compliance with orders, Mitchell's brigade rejoined its division. Here I was informed, by the department commander, of the movement of General Stanley's corps (4th) down the railroad, and of his desire that the two corps should move in co-operating distance towards Jonesboro'. I immediately put the column in motion in the following order: Carlin in advance, followed by Morgan; Baird in reserve. In this order the whole corps moved rapidly and reached Smith's house, near Moker's creek, where it found the pickets of the army of the Tennessee.



As the next movement of my troops would evidently be made over the ground lying between the left of the position of the army of the Tennessee and the railroad, along which Stanley was moving, I directed Carlin to send a brigade to make a reconnoissance of the ground in that direction. While this was being executed, I conferred with Major General Howard and received from him the position of his own troops, and such information concerning the enemy's as he was able to give. An inspection of the ground between the head of the column and that part of the enemy's works which could be seen, and which was supposed to be his extreme right, showed a commanding ridge immediately beyond the creek, from which an attack could be made with advantage. The enemy occupied this ridge in some force, both of infantry and artillery, but how strong could not be determined, until Edie's brigade, in executing its reconnoissance, solved the question by gallantly advancing, and after a sharp skirmish, took possession of the hill, pressing the enemy's artillery very close. The department commander arriving at the head of my column at this time, I reported to him, and he ordered me to move forward in the direction of Jonesboro', expressing at the same time some apprehension that General Stanley's column might be in advance of mine. To advance beyond the ridge, now held by Edie's brigade, involved a general engagement or a retreat of the enemy, and I determined to push forward my troops to that point in column and deploy for action. Resuming the advance, Carlin was ordered to move forward with the remainder of his division, and to form on the left of his second brigade already in position. Morgan was ordered to move rapidly by the main road, and after crossing the creek at Chamber's mill, to move to the left and take position on Carlin's right on the ridge in taking position to be guided by the natural advantages of the ground. Baird moving forward, closed upon Carlin's left, in reserve. These movements were promptly executed, notwithstanding the rough nature of the ground, and the fire of artillery from the enemy's works, to which Morgan's division was frequently subjected. By this time Prescott's battery had taken a good position on the ridge and opened an exceedingly well directed fire upon the enemy's works. In this he was soon followed by Gardner, and a general artillery fight ensued, which, as results showed afterward, was exceedingly complimentary to our artillerymen.

General Stanley's corps was reported as having arrived and was taking position on my left, his right resting on the railroad. The ridge upon which my troops were now concentrated was, in its main direction, nearly east and west, and faced nearly parallel with that part of the enemy's line of works which was refused and formed his right, his main works running, in general direction, northeast and southwest, as shown by the accompanying map. From information believed to be reliable, I was satisfied the enemy's works had not been extended to the railroad at a late hour in the forenoon; and that a well directed attack would rout this part of his lines, and turn his position completely.

Morgan's division and the two brigades of Carlin's were to form the attacking forces, and were deployed in two lines, as nearly contiguous to each other as the rough and difficult ground over which the advance had to be made would permit; one brigade of Baird's division was deployed in rear of Carlin's left in close support. The distance to be passed in front of Morgan, where the enemy's works could be seen, was about one thousand yards. Where the enemy might be found in Carlin's front, owing to the dense thicket before him, could not be determined without an advance, which I ordered about 4 o'clock p. m. The troops moved promptly, but owing to the thick undergrowth of brush in Carlin's front, swampy ground and ditches in Morgan's, the troops necessarily moved slow, and with great difficulty observed alignments and direction. These obstacles were as speedily overcome as could be expected, and the whole line advanced to the slope of the hill and the open field, within from three to four hundred yards of the enemy's position. Here the ground offered some protection to the

troops, and a momentary halt was made, and the lines rectified. Up to this point the effect of the enemy's fire had been but lightly felt generally along the line, except by Edie's brigade, which was some distance in advance of the general line, and had struck a projecting flank of the enemy's work, and charged and carried it with considerable loss. The position thus gallantly gained was only partially held, owing to the impossibility of supports getting up in time.

Estes's brigade of Baird's division was ordered to report to General Carlin, as a support to this part of the line, and was promptly placed in position so as to relieve this brigade in the following attack. The other two brigades of Baird's division were held close in reserve in the rear of the left of the corps, with a view to pushing our success on this flank after the position had been carried. At a quarter to 5 o'clock, I ordered the lines as now formed (and represented by the accompanying map) to advance and attack. The desultory firing which had been kept up by the enemy during the temporary pause in the advance, did but little damage, but served to locate the enemy's lines more definitely, which, owing to the dense thicket intervening, could not be well defined. The attack was vigorously and promptly made along the whole line. The enemy, self-confident and exultant at our audacity in attacking lines thus defended, made a most determined resistance. The fight was short and bloody. The entire line of works was carried, except the extreme left, formed of Moore's brigade. Here from natural obstructions, heavy timber and underbrush, as well as a severe fire from his left coming from the opposite side of the railroad, this brigade operated under great disadvantage and was for awhile held in check, notwithstanding the troops fought with great gallantry and were well handled.

Elsewhere at all points the assault was decisive and complete along the entire line. Eight hundred and sixty-five officers and men surrendered themselves in the works; about one thousand more were captured or surrendered themselves to different commands during the night and the following day, which should be credited to the assault, as a result of it. Two field batteries, consisting of four guns each, were captured, complete. The troops charged these batteries under a murderous fire of canister, and took them in the works. Seven battle-flags, and fourteen officers' swords were captured, and have been forwarded as required by existing orders of department headquarters. These trophies were won behind the breastworks of the enemy, at the point of the sword and the bayonet. They will ever be preserved and cherished as evidence of the discipline and valor signaling the conduct of the troops in this bloody conflict. A want of knowledge of the ground over which the several commanders were required to manœuvre their troops, and its exceedingly rough surface, rendered their duties sometimes exceeding difficult, and I deem it both a duty and pleasure to report the energy and skill displayed in the execution of them.

To the division commanders, Brigadier Generals Baird, Morgan, and Carlin, and their staffs, my thanks are due for their active assistance and co-operation during the engagement. The immediate presence of these old and well known commanders among the troops during the movements of heaviest battle, did much toward inspiring that coolness and determination, so strikingly exhibited on this occasion. As so often occurs, night came with our victory and prevented us from reaping the full fruits of it. An entire corps of the enemy was completely routed, and could, beyond all doubt, have been captured, had pursuit been possible. The corps bivouacked on the field during the night, and on the following morning formed and took position in the column of pursuit, but was immediately afterwards ordered, by the major general commanding the department, to form the rear guard of the army in its movements further south. Colonel Taylor's brigade, of Carlin's division, here joined its division. Going into camp at Jonesboro', awaiting orders, it remained in reserve during the intervening days of active operations of the troops near Lovejoy's station, until the morning of the 7th, when, in compliance with orders announcing the evacua-

tion of Atlanta and directing the movements of the troops in the return to that place, it withdrew from Jonesboro', and marched to Rough-and-Ready and went into camp.

On the morning of the 8th, marched and went into permanent camp at this place, thus ending the long and eventful campaign.

A list of casualties showing the loss in the corps from the beginning of the campaign is transmitted; also reports of the several division, brigade, and regimental commanders are transmitted, and attention is called to them as valuable records of the operations of their respective commands. They will aid the commanding general in reviewing that part of the operations of the corps from the commencement of the campaign to the date of my assuming command, during which time the corps was commanded by Major General Palmer, now absent, but who will, no doubt in time, furnish this part of the corps record.

The efficiency and *morale* of the corps is excellent. A return of absentees and a few recruits to fill vacancies in the ranks is all that is required to make it as efficient as at the commencement of the campaign.

The organization of the staff had undergone a number of changes since the commencement of the campaign, but consisted, during the time above described, of Captain A. C. McClurg, assistant adjutant general, chief of staff; Captain T. W. Morrison, assistant adjutant general; Captain John F. Squier, seventy-fourth Illinois infantry, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant Colonel A. Von Schroder, United States volunteers, assistant inspector general; Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Paul, United States volunteers, chief commissary of subsistence; Captain J. E. Remington, United States volunteers, chief quartermaster; Major Charles Houghtaling, first Illinois artillery, chief of artillery; Surgeon F. Soller, United States volunteers, medical director; Major John B. Lee, one hundred and twenty-fifth Illinois infantry, provost marshal; Captain Jesse Feilmer, fifteenth United States infantry, commissary of musters; Captain L. Drury, third Wisconsin battery, assistant chief of artillery; Captain J. C. Martin, thirty-first Ohio infantry, staff quartermaster; Captain A. L. Messmore, one hundred and thirteenth Ohio infantry, staff commissary of subsistence; Captain A. S. Cole, chief signal officer; Captain Wm. H. Collins, one hundred and fourth Illinois, chief of ambulances, and Captain George Estep, artillery ordnance officer.

The efficiency of these officers in their respective duties has been highly satisfactory, and it affords me pleasure to recommend them to the consideration of the general commanding, and also to acknowledge my indebtedness to them for their valuable assistance.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JEFF. C. DAVIS,

*Brevet Major General, Commanding.*

Brig. Gen'l WM. D. WHIPPLE,

*A. A. General and Chief of Staff, Dep't of the Cumberland.*

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HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION 14TH ARMY CORPS,  
*Near Atlanta, Ga., August 7, 1864.*

CAPTAIN: In accordance with military usage, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division, from the opening of the campaign of the armies under the command of Major General Sherman down to the 13th of June, at which period I was compelled, by a disability resulting from injuries received in action, to turn over the command to Brigadier General King, and from July 12, till August 7. On the 3d of May, pursuant to instructions received from the major general commanding corps, I moved from Graysville, Georgia, to Ringgold, Georgia, leaving an outpost of two regiments, the nine-

teenth Illinois infantry and twenty-fourth Illinois infantry, at Parker's gap, to hold that pass until the advance of the troops from the direction of Cleveland should cover it. On the day but one following, these regiments, having been relieved, were transferred to the brigade of General Turchin, in the 3d division.

The 4th, 5th, and 6th of May, were spent in bivouack near Ringgold, waiting the concentration of the army, and completing our preparations for the campaign.

On the 7th, leaving all transportation save the ambulances and ordnance trains, I marched at daylight, in rear of General Davis's division, by the main Ringgold and Dalton roads, in direction of Tunnel Hill, near Terrill's house. By direction of the major general commanding corps, I filed to the right and formed my division, with two brigades on the line and one in reserve, on the right of General Davis's division, my right brigade, General Carlin's, resting across the east Chickamauga, but in good communication with my left and reserve brigade, by the bridge at Dunn's mill, which lay directly in rear of the left of Carlin's second line.

Later in the day, General Davis having driven the enemy out of Tunnel Hill and within their works at Buzzard Roost pass, I advanced my line, swinging to the left, to conform to the movement of Davis's troops, and again formed line of battle as before, upon his right, my right brigade covering the Trickham road, near widow Rogers's house. In this position my troops bivouacked for the night, strong pickets being thrown out to a considerable distance on all the roads in the direction of Trickham and Villanow.

The 8th was occupied in maneuvering in front of Buzzard Roost, my final position being with my left resting near the high knob, known to us as Signal Hill, and my line stretching southwardly so as to command and practically close up all roads leading out of Buzzard Roost gap to the west and southwest. Towards evening I caused a section to be placed in position on the ridge which terminates the open field, to the westward of the gap, and opened upon a line of the enemy's works beyond the pass. This, with the advance of part of General Davis's division, and part of Wood's brigade, of Butterfield's division, to the ridge beyond the field, developed two batteries of determined strength, one upon the point of Chattoogata mountain, to our right; the other in the rear of the pass, to our left, evidently in the enemy's main line.

Early on the morning of the 7th I advanced Carlin's brigade across Mill creek, to relieve some of the regiments of Wood's brigade, which had been thrown in there on the evening previous, and was occupying the ground at the base of Chattoogata mountain.

About eleven o'clock a. m. I was, by direction of Major General Palmer, (he having gone to his headquarters in the rear, sick,) to report at department headquarters to receive instructions, and heard it reported to Major General Thomas, by an officer of General Wood's staff, that the troops of that command had felt all along Chattoogata; that they found but a small force there, and that in the judgment of this officer it would not be difficult to carry the crest of the mountain by assault. To verify the report of this officer, I was instructed to advance Carlin's brigade, so as, if possible, to clear the mountain to its top, supporting him with another brigade. This was accordingly done; Carlin, with a strong but well extended skirmish line, seized the long isolated ridge which, lying south of the railroad, almost closes the westerly mouth of the gap, and swept the mountain of the enemy's skirmishers, clear to the foot of the abrupt palisade which crowns the slope. In the hope that some path might be found at which we could force our way, relying confidently on the tried troops of Carlin's brigade to advance wherever footing could be found, I ordered my reserve brigade (General King's) across Mill creek to within close supporting distance. A careful reconnoissance by General Carlin all along his line, and to a consid-

erable distance below his right, disclosed no practicable footway to the crest of the ridge. An attempt to jump round the nose of the mountain, so as to ascend from the reverse side, which was supposed to be less abrupt, developed a heavy force of infantry and artillery, strongly intrenched in our front, upon the line by which we must at first advance, and so placed as to enfilade us whenever we should wheel to ascend the mountain. To have assaulted this position would have brought my command within the fire of nearly the whole of the enemy's artillery, and that of perhaps a superior force of infantry, without the possibility of receiving adequate support. To attempt to carry the mountain without first clearing this position would have been hopeless; accordingly, after a stubborn and well pressed attack, by a strong line of skirmishers from some of Carlin's and Scribner's regiments had verified my own previous observations and the report of Brigadier General Carlin, I ordered the attempt to be given up. My loss from the enemy's artillery in this affair was unusually heavy, the battery on Chattoogata mountain, and one near their left and which I judged to be on the eastern slope of Rocky Face, burst their shell among us with remarkable accuracy.

*May 10th.*—We remained in the position in which the previous night had left us, skirmishing being kept up all day along my whole line. During the day I caused the bridges over Mill creek (which, owing to the dam thrown across the stream within the gap by the enemy, was here too deep to be conveniently forded) to be repaired and others built, to facilitate the withdrawal of my troops, in case such a movement should be ordered, or their re-enforcement, in case it should be thought advisable to renew the attempt to carry the mountain. Late in the evening, having obtained the consent of the major general commanding corps to the withdrawal of one brigade, I gave orders that Scribner should relieve Carlin's brigade, and then strengthen his position by intrenchments, and that Carlin, upon being relieved, should withdraw across the creek, to the position from which he had at first advanced. Before these orders could be carried into execution, however, a heavy rain-storm coming on, I consented, at the request of General Carlin and Colonel Scribner, that the movement should be postponed until morning, directing Carlin, however, to keep an eye upon the bridges, and to cross at once and notify me, in case there should be indications of a rise in the stream sufficient to carry them away. The night passed, however, without the anticipated disaster.

At 3.10 p. m. of the 11th, in pursuance of orders received from the major general commanding corps, I sent off my wagon train, with the other trains of the corps, towards Snake Creek gap, to which place, on the 12th, I marched with my division, following that of Brigadier General Baird, and arriving at a late hour in the night.

Early on the morning of the 13th, pursuant to instructions received during the night previous, I replenished my supply of ammunition, issued rations, and got my troops under arms, ready to march, but, owing to the crowded condition of the only road from our position into Sugar valley, it was nearly noon before we got fairly into motion. I moved out on the Resaca road about one mile, and then, under the direction and personal supervision of the major general commanding corps, formed to the left of this road, in double line, Carlin's brigade on the right, King's on the left, and Scribner in reserve, then out as skirmishers, and advanced in a direction nearly east for about four (4) miles, over a very broken and heavily wooded country; the last mile of this distance my skirmishers driving those of the enemy before them. About one mile beyond the military road constructed by the enemy from Dalton to Calhoun, we found the enemy in force and strongly posted, and the purpose of the movement being, as I understood, accomplished, I halted, by order of Major General Palmer, corrected my lines, and waited for further instructions. My division remained in this position, skirmishing with the enemy, until late in the evening, relieved by that

of Major General Butterfield. My instructions were, as soon as relieved, to form on the left of General Butterfield's division, my line being slightly refused from his; but it was found impossible at the late hour at which his troops got into position to form the new line, with any probability of its approximating to correctness as to the position, or scarcely as to direction.

At daybreak on the following morning, however, I formed my lines as directed, connecting my left with General Baird's division. The relative position of my brigades remained the same as on the 13th. Having met Major General Palmer on the field, he informed me that the 14th corps, (General Davis's division being in reserve,) the 23d corps, and 4th corps, to their left, would, as soon as he proper disposition could be completed, swing to the right on the left of General Butterfield as a point, through an arc, of  $130^{\circ}$  or thereabouts, or, at any rate, until the works and position of the enemy should be developed, and directed me to hold my troops in readiness for the movement. My division began to move at 9 o'clock precisely; the advance was necessarily slow, owing to the extremely rugged character of the ground passed over, the dense underbrush, and the necessity for deliberation, on my part, in order that the troops to the extreme left might follow the movement. My left having swung around by a march of something like one mile, I found the enemy strongly posted and fortified on the higher slope and near the crest of a long elevated ridge, their right slightly refused from the direction of my line. In front of their position was an open field of some 400 yards wide, sloping gradually down to a creek directly to my front. The general course of this creek in front of my line was nearly parallel to the enemy's works; the bottom was in some places miry, with a considerable depth of water, in others quite the reverse. Its crooked channel, filled in some places with a dense underbrush, in others obstructed by fallen trees and drift, it afforded a serious obstacle to the advance of troops in line, as the result proved. As the land rose immediately from the creek in an abrupt bluff of nearly the same height as the enemy's position beyond, and then gradually sloped down again to the westward, with my skirmishers posted along the creek, I re-formed my lines in the woods behind the slope, to the rear of it, and awaited instructions.

At about 11 a. m. I received notice from the major general commanding corps that as soon as the left should get into position an assault would be made along the whole line. I was ordered to advance as soon as, by the firing, I should be warned of the movement of the troops on my immediate left. Accordingly about 11.30, heavy firing on the lines of Baird's division indicating that his troops were advancing, my two brigades in the line moved forward, Scribner's having already, in anticipation of the movement, been brought up into close supporting distance. General Carlin, who lay very near the creek mentioned, threw forward his skirmishers, driving those of the enemy within their works, and moved forward his lines across the creek. No sooner had his first line emerged from the cover of the woods than the enemy, infantry and artillery, opened upon it with terrible effect. Notwithstanding this, however, Carlin pushed forward both lines beyond the creek, and nearly half-way across the open field. The passage of the creek had, however, sadly disordered his lines, and finding it impossible to reform them, while advancing so rapidly as the emergency of occasions required—hopeless, moreover, of holding his position even if the assault should succeed—Carlin fell back to the cover of the creek, the eastern bank of which offered, in some places, all the protection of a well-constructed fortification. There he remained, by my direction, all day, keeping up a desultory but effective fire in reply to the enemy's. King's brigade, which lay considerably further from the creek than Carlin's, did not advance so far, and when it was seen that Carlin had suffered a repulse, halted. Two 12-pounder guns of the enemy's in my front had opened upon our advance, and continued their fire, subsequently, at intervals, with damaging effect. As soon as a prac-

ticable road could be found, I brought forward two (2) pieces of Captain Delger's battery I, first Ohio light artillery, and caused them to be placed in position on the crest of the bluff, overlooking the creek, and near my centre. The admirable practice of this section, conducted under the supervision of Captain Delger in person, soon closed out the enemy's pieces, and was quite as annoying to them as theirs had been before to us more than once; their infantry were driven from their works by Delger's shell, and were shot down by my sharpshooters before they could gain the cover of the works in their rear. Subsequently I brought the whole of this battery into position at the same place. In this affair General Carlin's brigade suffered severely, losing considerably over two hundred in killed and wounded, this including many valuable officers. The loss in General King's brigade was comparatively light. On the evening of this day, Scribner's brigade was thrown into line on the left of King, to relieve Turchin's brigade.

On Sunday his line was extended so as to relieve Van Derveer's brigade, and Carlin, who had been relieved on the evening previous by McCook's brigade, of Davis's division, was put in on Scribner's left, to relieve Hovey's division. Sharp skirmishing was kept up all day on my line, from which both my own troops and the enemy's suffered slightly. My artillery, 12 pieces, played all day with precision, and, I have good reason to think, effect.

*Monday, May 16.*—I marched to Resaca, and bivouacked in rear of the village.

*May 17.*—Crossed the Oostenaula and marched by Damascus court-house, through Calhoun, towards Adairsville; bivouacked at 11.30 p. m. about seven miles south of Calhoun, on the left of General Baird's division.

*May 18.*—Marched through Adairsville, following, as on the day previous, Baird's division; bivouacked for the night at 12, midnight, on the railroad, within three miles of Kingston.

*May 19.*—Marched in rear of Baird's into Kingston. Here, at 2.30, I was ordered by Major General Palmer to move as rapidly as possible to seize a bridge (Gillam's) over the Etowah, south of Kingston, toward which a force of the enemy were supposed to be making, either to secure their retreat or destroy it. Reaching the bridge at 4 p. m., I found some of Garrard's cavalry, which had passed me, already there. I formed my lines here so as to cover all approaches, and remained until morning, seeing nothing of the enemy.

*May 20.*—Marched by the Cassville road four miles, passing the confederate saltpetre works, which I caused to be destroyed by my rear guard, and formed on the right of Baird's division, my left resting on the railroad, my right considerably refused.

*May 21 and 22.*—My division lay in bivouack. On the 22d my preparations for the ensuing march were arranged by stripping my regiments of all baggage, except that which might be carried on the persons of officers, or their horses, and sending back the surplus. I was able to provide transportation for the 20 days' rations and forage required by the orders of Major General Sherman.

On the 23d I marched, crossing Etowah river at the Island ford, bivouacked in line and on Euharley creek, my left resting immediately in rear of Barnett's mill, and my right on the Cedartown road.

On the 24th, at 10 a. m., I moved by my right, crossing Euharley creek (not fordable) on the rickety bridge near widow Smith's house, which, however, it was found necessary to repair before I could pass my artillery over it. Within two miles of this my march was delayed until late in the afternoon by General Stanley's column, which I found passing on to the same road, from the left, in front of me. I did not make more than two miles beyond this, the road being very difficult and blocked with the wagons, ambulances, and artillery of the troops which had preceded me. At 8 p. m., in the midst of a driving rain-storm which lasted until 11 p. m., I went into bivouack on the Raccoon creek.

The 25th was spent in clearing the way for our trains by assisting the wagons

of the 20th corps over the difficult hills which border Raccoon creek. By 10½ o'clock that night, all of my wagons were across and in parks beyond my troops, toward Burnt Hickory.

At one o'clock a. m., of the 26th, I marched again, reaching Burnt Hickory before break of day. Two miles south of this, on the Dallas road, at 7 a. m., under instructions from Major General Palmer, I halted in order to enable him to communicate with Major General Thomas. At 11½ a. m. we renewed the march, and early in the afternoon I formed my troops in rear of the 4th corps, about three miles east of Pumpkinvine creek, which we had crossed by the bridge near Owen's mill.

On the 27th two brigades of my division participated in the assault upon the enemy's right, being in support to the division of Brigadier General Wood. General Wood's division was formed in column by brigade, each brigade being in two lines; General King's brigade was formed in the same manner, in rear of Wood, and Scribner's at first, on the left of King; before the assault finally commenced, however, he was advanced to the left of Wood's centre brigade, and in this position advanced with the column. For the particulars of their participation in this affair, as well as in the attack made upon our lines by the enemy on the night following, in which Scribner's brigade behaved with distinguished gallantry, I refer to the reports of Brigadier General King and Colonel Scribner, which I presume have before this been forwarded. When the assault of the 27th had failed, I withdrew my division to the position upon which the column had originally formed for the assault, a short distance to the south of Pickett's mill, on what I understood to be the little Pumpkinvine creek. That night Carlin's brigade, which had before been in reserve during the day, was placed in position on the extreme left. My line was an exceedingly bad one, but it seemed impracticable to correct it. Here the division remained, skirmishing heavily with the enemy at periods, and suffering considerable loss, until the evacuation by the enemy of their position, on the 5th of June. From the morning of May 29th to the morning of June 6th I was unfitted for duty by the injuries before alluded to, and during this time the division was in command of Brigadier General King. For the operations of this period I must, therefore, refer to his report.

On the morning of the 6th of June I marched, following Baird's division, toward Ackworth. At dark I formed my lines, connecting with General Hooker's corps on my right, and General Baird's division on the left, and bivouacked near John Pritchard's house. At this place we rested during the 7th, 8th, and 9th. On the morning of the 10th we marched, passing by Durham's house, and thence up to Owen's mill, just in front of Newton's house. One mile south of Owen's I was put into a position, by a staff officer of Major General Palmer, on the left of Brigadier General Baird's division, whose skirmishers had already found the enemy. My skirmishers were thrown out to connect with those of General Baird's line, but we remained in that position all night without any indications of the enemy.

On the 11th, under the direction of the major general commanding corps, I moved my troops about one division front to the left, forming in two lines along the crest of a wooded ridge, my centre resting just in rear of Whitfield's house. With great difficulty, owing to the continuous heavy rains of the week previous, and the emaciated condition of my artillery horses, I got both batteries in favorable position upon the line. Late in the evening I was obliged to change my line about one brigade front to the left and front, to conform to a change in the position of Brigadier General Davis's division. I was not able to move my batteries on to the new line.

We remained in this position during the 12th and 13th, without seeing anything of the enemy, although there was continuous skirmishing and occasional artillery firing on my right and left.



My thanks are due to my brigade commanders, Brigadier General King, Brigadier General Carlin, and Colonel B. F. Scribner, and to my chief of artillery, Captain L. H. Drury, for the cheerfulness and good judgment with which they have at all times executed my orders, and furthered the objects of every movement, as also to the officers of my staff, particularly Surgeon S. Marks, medical director; Captain E. F. Deaton, commissary of subsistence; Lieutenant John Borham, acting assistant quartermaster, for the uniform fidelity and intelligence with which they have discharged their duties.

*June 13.*—I was compelled to leave my command on account of injuries received in battle, and was absent until July 13th when I assumed command of my division.

*July 14, 15, and 16.*—Quiet, with occasional artillery firing.

*July 17.*—Crossed the Chattahoochee, and found General Davis in line, about 500 yards in front, upon one of a series of ridges which run in every direction, in deep woods. The third brigade (Colonel Moore commanding) was formed on the left of General Davis, his skirmishers were advanced, the enemy retiring slowly; the first brigade (Colonel A. G. McCook's) was formed on the left of the third, and King's brigade was formed in reserve with the artillery.

At 4 o'clock p. m. Colonel Moore advanced his line southeast on the Buck Head road, over a very rough and rugged country, to Nancy's creek, when he bivouacked for the night.

*July 18.*—At 7 a. m., I directed McCook to take the advance. Skirmishing commenced at 9 a. m. and continued, the enemy falling back slowly, until about 2 p. m., when the line of battle was formed on the Buck Head and Howill's ferry road. A heavy line of skirmishers were thrown forward to drive the enemy beyond Peach Tree creek. On retiring beyond the creek the bridge was destroyed by the rebels, and they opened up a vigorous fire with shell and case-shot upon the reserves.

*July 19.*—Bridges were constructed to cross the command, and on July 20th the creek was crossed, the troops thrown into line, and temporary breastworks constructed. About 3 p. m. a heavy fire began along the whole line of the 20th corps, gradually approaching us, and finally involving my first brigade, (McCook's,) which repulsed every attack made upon it with slight loss. My efficient and gallant assistant adjutant general (E. T. Wells) was severely wounded.

*July 21.*—About 3 p. m. my line was ordered forward; the enemy was driven from his rifle pits, and back over a ridge, in which my entire line intrenched itself.

*July 22.*—At 2 o'clock a. m. my skirmishers and main line occupied the first line of the enemy's defences of Atlanta. At 8 a. m. the column was put in motion on the direct road to Atlanta. When near the city a heavy skirmish line was encountered. Instantly the troops were put in line of battle, the artillery brought forward, and a heavy fire directed upon the enemy, in plain view. The troops at once entrenched themselves.

From the 22d of July to August 3d, the troops were engaged in advancing their lines and strengthening their position.

*August 3.*—Was relieved by the 20th corps and transferred to the right of army of Tennessee.

*August 4.*—King's brigade made a reconnoissance to the right and returned.

*August 5.*—Moved out the Sandtown road, thence to the left, and came up in rear of Davis's division, fronting the reserve of the line. Late in the evening made a reconnoissance to the right to find the flank of the rebel lines, which was undertaken too late to accomplish much. On the 6th relieved General Harcoll's division, which was moved to the right to join its proper corps.

*August 7.*—Was ordered to assume command of the 14th army corps, by virtue of seniority.

In this hurried report I am unable to do the troops justice. When the campaign ends will forward a list of those whose good conduct deserves special mention.

R. W. JOHNSON,  
*Brigadier General Volunteers, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION 14TH ARMY CORPS,  
*Jonesboro', Ga., September 5, 1864.*

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report to the general commanding the 14th corps the operations of this division since the 17th of August, the date on which I assumed command. The positions of brigades, and their unimportant movements, prior to the beginning of the great movement against the Macon railroad, need not be described, as the record of all such information would encumber the headquarters of the division and corps without affording necessary or interesting data.

On the 26th of August the second and third brigades were withdrawn from the position they had held before the enemy near Atlanta, and marched to a position on the left of the 23d corps, the third brigade having preceded the other two; which position was held till the 28th, when the entire division marched to Redoak, on the Atlanta, West Point, and Montgomery railroad.

On the 29th the second and third brigades were engaged till 2 o'clock p. m. in destroying the railroad towards East Point, while the first brigade made a reconnaissance in the same direction on the right of the railroad, and covered the working parties. There was slight skirmishing between the first brigade and the enemy, resulting in no loss to us.

On the 30th the division marched ten miles towards Jonesboro', Georgia, and encamped near Mrs. Evans's, on the Fayetteville and Atlanta road.

On the 31st the division marched to Renfro's and remained there till near sundown, when I received orders from Major General Thomas to move at once to support General Howard, who was then confronting the enemy near Jonesboro', which movement was made without delay. Being informed, through General Howard's staff officer, that he wished me on the Fayetteville road, that is, near Renfro's, I countermarched to that place, where instructions were received from General Davis, commanding the corps, to proceed to my former camp, at Mrs. Evans's, and remain there that night.

On the first day of September I received orders to move to the support of General Baird and take a position on his right, which was then on the Atlanta and Jonesboro' road, east of Mrs. Evans's. Before going into position there I received orders to proceed about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles towards Jonesboro' and take a position facing the town. Having marched till within two miles of that place, and reached the pickets of the 17th corps, I took position parallel to the road and facing the Macon railroad, one and a half miles distant. (I have omitted to state above that the first brigade and nineteenth Indiana battery were detached at Mrs. Evans's and sent to Renfro's to protect the trains of the army, in accordance with orders received.) From the point designated above I sent the third brigade on a reconnaissance towards the railroad, with also one regiment of the second brigade as skirmishers. The skirmishers of both brigades soon encountered the enemy at a creek near the road and drove them back to a strong position, where they contested the ground obstinately with infantry or dismounted cavalry and one or two pieces of artillery. The position of the enemy was soon taken by the third brigade and the sixteenth United States infantry, and one

caisson filled with ammunition captured. The second brigade was immediately moved up to the right of the third, and the skirmishers pushed on to the railroad. While here, Captain Edmonds, of my staff, pointed out a very fine position for a battery, and I immediately ordered Prescott's battery to take position there. Prescott moved to it as rapidly as his horses could go, unlimbered, and opened his guns, which created great havoc among the rebels. It may here be stated that much of the success later in the day was due to the execution of this battery, both on the infantry and artillery of the rebels, as Prescott was almost immediately on the right flank of the enemy, facing Morgan's division of the 14th corps and of the army of the Tennessee. While occupying the position last described, I sent out a regiment on the left front to open communication with the 4th corps, which was accomplished by Lieutenant Colonel McMahan, commanding the twenty-first Ohio volunteer infantry. I then changed the front of my division again to the right, the left of the third brigade resting on the railroad, and formed line of battle, when I received orders from General Davis to move forward towards Jonesboro' till I should find the works of the enemy. Moving through a dense forest to an open field, the enemy was encountered in a thicket beyond. I ordered an assault, which was made with great energy and gallantry by both brigades. The position of the enemy was very strong, and the approach almost impossible, in consequence of a dense growth of small bushes. The second brigade reached the works at the first dash, and captured many prisoners. They would have held the works and gone on but for the unfortunate loss of Captain Kellogg, commanding the eighteenth United States infantry, who was on the extreme right; he was badly wounded while crossing the works. The enemy brought up re-enforcements and compelled the right to fall back about one hundred (100) yards. A portion of this brigade gallantly clung to the works till the second brigade made another charge. I received information from General Davis that he had ordered Colonel Este's brigade of Baird's division to support me. As it was fresh and well formed, I placed it in position for a charge, when General Baird arrived and gallantly led it himself. It is an agreeable duty I perform in saying that the conduct of this brigade was truly admirable, and that they deserved the success they achieved. Colonel Este deserves promotion for his gallantry and good management. The third brigade continued the fight till every rebel was driven or dragged from the works. The thirty-eighth Indiana volunteer infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Griffin commanding, deserves great credit in this part of the fight, as they had to contend almost alone against a very obstinate foe, strongly intrenched. The enemy, having lost his works, brought infantry and artillery on the road still further towards Jonesboro', and opened so heavy a fire that no further advance could be made; darkness closed the fight. The two brigades captured about three hundred (300) prisoners and many small-arms. The second brigade lost, in killed, wounded, and missing, 168; the third brigade, killed, wounded, and missing, 203; total, 371. The greater portion of the wounded will recover.

My thanks are due General Baird for the readiness displayed to support me at all times, as well as for the support actually received. It is not a mere empty custom when I acknowledge the great assistance rendered during the hottest of the fight by Captain Edmonds, ninety-fourth Ohio volunteer infantry, Captain G. W. Smith, eighteenth United States infantry, and Lieutenant W. B. Roby, thirty-third Ohio volunteer infantry, and Lieutenant George H. Tracy, all of my staff. Dr. Solon Marks, chief surgeon of the division, Lieutenant H. G. Litchfield, ordnance officer, and Lieutenant W. R. Maize, in charge of ambulances, are deserving of mention for the faithful performance of their duties in their respective departments. Colonel M. F. Moore, sixty-ninth Ohio volunteer infantry, commanding third brigade, deserves special mention for the promptness with which he obeyed orders and put his command in motion. The staff officers of the second brigade, Captain Mills, Lieutenant Este, and Lieutenant St. Onge,

and especially Captain W. J. Fetterman, acting assistant adjutant general, displayed great gallantry and spirit in assisting Major J. R. Edie, fifteenth infantry, in advancing the brigade. The regimental officers and enlisted men cannot be over-praised for their conduct.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. P. CARLIN,

*Brigadier General, Commanding.*

Captain A. C. McCLURG,

*Assistant Adjutant General and Chief of Staff, 14th Army Corps.*

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HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION 14TH ARMY CORPS,

*Near Atlanta, Ga.*

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by this division during the campaign of the united armies under the command of Major General Sherman against the enemy's forces in Georgia, from the 1st day of May to the 22d day of August, at which time I assumed command of the 14th army corps.

After the return of this division from the campaign in East Tennessee in December, 1863, it went into camp at McAfee church, near Rossville, Georgia. Comfortable quarters were soon built by the troops, and the remainder of the winter was well occupied in drilling, outfitting, and preparing the command for active operations in the spring. Several expeditions and reconnoissances were made by the division or parts of it during the winter and spring, special reports of which have already been made.

On the 1st of May, at which time orders were received for the commencement of active operations, the division consisted of three brigades and two field-batteries, organized and commanded as follows, viz:

First brigade, commanded by Brigadier General J. D. Morgan, consisting of the 10th Illinois veteran volunteer infantry, Colonel John Tillson; 16th Illinois veteran volunteer infantry, Colonel Robert F. Smith; 60th Illinois veteran volunteer infantry, Colonel William B. Anderson; 10th Michigan veteran volunteer infantry, Colonel Charles M. Lum; 14th Michigan veteran volunteer infantry, Colonel Henry R. Mizner.

Second brigade, commanded by Colonel J. G. Mitchell, consisting of the 34th Illinois veteran volunteer infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Oscar Van Tassel; 78th Illinois veteran volunteer infantry, Colonel Carter Van Uleck; 98th Ohio volunteer infantry, Colonel John S. Pearce; 10th Ohio volunteer infantry; 121st Ohio volunteer infantry, Colonel H. B. Banning.

Third brigade, commanded by Colonel Daniel McCook, consisting of the 22d Indiana veteran volunteer infantry, Lieutenant Colonel William M. Wiles; 85th Illinois volunteer infantry, Colonel C. J. Dalworth; 125th Illinois volunteer infantry, Colonel O. F. Harmon; 86th Illinois volunteer infantry, Lieutenant Colonel A. L. Fannestock; 52d Ohio volunteer infantry, Lieutenant Colonel C. W. Clancey; 110th Illinois volunteer infantry, Lieutenant Colonel E. H. Topping.

Artillery, commanded by Captain C. M. Barnett; 5th Wisconsin battery, commanded by Captain George Q. Gardner; Veteran battery I, 2d Illinois artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Veteran.

The tenth Michigan and fourteenth Michigan regiments, at the commencement of the campaign, were on veteran furlough, and rejoined the division respectively at Resaca and near Ackworth; the third Ohio regiment had been detailed by department commander for permanent garrison duty at Chattanooga, Tennessee, where it served until the expiration of its term of enlistment; the tenth Illinois regiment was stationed at Nashville, Tennessee, for the purpose of bring-

ing forward transportation when obtained. Transportation overtook the division on the 26th May. The regiment for some time after was kept with the train as guard, &c.; it reported to its brigade for duty on the 20th day of July.

On the morning of the 2d of May, in compliance with orders, Morgan's and Mitchell's brigades and the batteries marched to Ringgold, Georgia, and went into camp on East Chickamauga creek. On the morning of the 3d McCook's brigade marched from Lee's and Gordon's mill and joined the division at Ringgold. On the morning of the 5th the division passed through the gap at Ringgold, and went into bivouac near the stone church at the forks of the Dalton and Cleveland roads. The enemy's pickets were encountered by Morgan's skirmishers in small force. On the morning of the 7th the advance of the army was assigned to my division, and at daylight McCook's brigade, followed by the rest of my command, moved on the direct road to Tunnel Hill. The enemy's cavalry was soon encountered, and some sharp skirmishing kept up until the head of column reached Smith's house, within cannon range of the enemy's position at Tunnel Hill. At this point the enemy opened his artillery, but being familiar with the ground, I soon made disposition of my troops, and placed a few guns in position and ordered them to return the fire, which was promptly executed. In accordance with the general plan for the advance upon that place, Major General Howard's corps moved from Cherokee Springs, from the direction of Cleveland, and formed a junction with my command at this point. General Howard sent a force to operate on the north end of Tunnel Hill, while a strong line of skirmishers from McCook's brigade, gallantly commanded by Major Holmes, fifty-second Ohio infantry, attacked the enemy's position below the town, near where the road leading to Dalton crosses the hill. These movements, assisted by the action of the batteries, caused the enemy to withdraw from his position and retreat toward Buzzard Roost. In compliance with orders I moved my entire division beyond the town, and took position on the right of the Dalton road, and sent a regiment from Morgan's brigade to take possession of a high round hill immediately in my front, known to us as Signal Hill. This duty was well performed by the tenth Illinois regiment, commanded by Colonel Tillson. McCook's brigade had the advance during the day, and most of the fighting required to be done in driving in the enemy's pickets and skirmishers was gallantly performed by his troops, superintended by himself.

The division remained in this position until the forenoon of the 9th, when an advance into the gap of Buzzard Roost was determined upon. Mitchell's brigade was ordered to advance along the left of the road and drive in the enemy's pickets, occupying a little group of round-shaped hills in front of the enemy's works which obstructed the gap. This duty was performed by a line of skirmishers, supported by his whole brigade. The ground thus gained was held, and my entire division took position in the gap. During the succeeding three days my troops were kept more or less under fire. The enemy, after persistent and sometimes heavy skirmishing, was driven into his works in the gorge, and upon the top of Rocky Face. The operations of these three days were mostly executed and the fighting done by General Morgan's brigade. Much of the fighting consisted in heavy skirmishing, and, on several occasions, when attempts were made to feel of the enemy's works, it became almost a general engagement in severity. Captain Barrett, my chief of artillery, with much difficulty succeeded in getting a part of his artillery in position, and operated very successfully with it against the enemy's batteries and works. The privations and hardships my troops were compelled to undergo during these few days' operations against the enemy's skirmish line and sharpshooters, and the consequent heavy loss in killed and wounded, gave the highest proof of their discipline and courage, and the zeal with which they were entering upon the long and arduous campaign. On the 12th my command was relieved from its position in the gap by troops from the 4th corps, and, following the other divisions of the corps, marched at sunrise for

Snake Creek gap, which place it reached at dark. During the night it passed through the gap, and bivouacked early on the 13th near the field-works thrown up by General McPherson's command in the vicinity of Resaca. In compliance with instructions, after a few hours' rest, the division took a position in line on the left of the corps, in the general advance upon the enemy's position near Resaca. During the night of the 13th the division occupied a position a little in reserve of the left of the corps, and connected pickets with Major General Schofield's right. On the 14th, conforming to the movement of troops on the right, and the general plan of advance, the division moved forward from one position to another until the enemy's main lines were reached. The troops, on several parts of our lines, had become warmly engaged with the enemy during the forenoon, and his main line of battle, in front of our right, was well developed. In the afternoon, in compliance with orders, I sent Mitchell's brigade to the support of a part of our lines, composed of Brigadier General Judah's command, of the 23d corps, and Brigadier General Turchin's brigade, of the 14th corps, which was reported as being hard pressed by the enemy. This brigade moved promptly and gallantly into position; relieving these troops, they entered immediately into the fight. The conduct of this brigade was highly creditable to both officers and men. Colonel Mitchell's conduct was conspicuous on this occasion for personal gallantry. My batteries were exceedingly well posted on a high ridge overlooking the enemy's works, and were well manned all day. Their conduct was very conspicuous on this occasion. The effect of the projectiles was unusually severe upon the enemy's lines, driving him several times from his rifle-pits.

During the night, in obedience to orders, I moved the entire division, except the batteries, to the right, and relieved the division of General Butterfield, of the 20th corps, and the brigade of General Carlin, of the 14th corps, from their position in the front line. The troops worked assiduously all night strengthening and completing the works previously commenced by General Butterfield's troops. The 15th my skirmish line was sharply engaged all day, but no general movement of my troops was made. Early on the morning of the 16th instant it was ascertained that the enemy had abandoned his position and was crossing the river. I received orders to march, with as little delay as possible, with my command down the west bank of the Oostenaula river to the mouth of the Arcumuchee creek, with a view of co-operating with the cavalry forces in that vicinity. It was supposed that a bridge existed across the river at this point, over which the forces operating on this flank of the army could cross and cut the railroad between Kingston and Rome, and rejoin the main column in its pursuit of the retreating enemy. The division made a rapid march of fifteen miles, and encamped at dark a few miles from the Arcumuchee. During the night the cavalry forces, under the command of Brigadier General Garrard, passed through my camp *en route* for Lay's ferry, near Resaca. General Garrard reported his inability to find any bridge across the Oostenaula above Rome, and his determination to return and cross the river with the main column near Resaca. This condition of affairs placed me in an embarrassing position as to how to act under the circumstances. Believing, however, that the main object of the expedition could best be obtained by pushing on to Rome with my command, and try to secure the bridge and capture that place, I immediately sent a communication to Major General Thomas of my determination, and early on the morning of the 17th resumed the march in that direction. About noon, the first of the enemy's pickets were found at Farmer's bridge, over the Arcumuchee. This is eight miles from Rome. Here I determined to pack the trains, and allow the troops time to rest, and get dinner. About 2 o'clock p. m. the column, except two regiments left behind to guard the trains, resumed the march.

Mitchell's brigade had the advance, and pushed rapidly forward, driving in the enemy's cavalry, until within cannon range of the enemy's works on De Soto

Hill, on the west side of the Oostenaula. Colonel Mitchell reported the enemy in strong force in his front, and his advanced guard, thirty-fourth Illinois regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Van Tassell, sharply engaged with his skirmishers. I immediately made disposition of my troops for the purpose of driving in the enemy's outposts so as to reconnoitre his works. This was scarcely commenced before he opened with a battery of artillery upon the advance troops, and at the same time a brigade of infantry advanced from the works to attack us. I immediately ordered Colonel Daniel McCook to move his brigade as rapidly as possible to the front, and take position on a commanding ridge to the left of the Resaca and Rome road, still held by our skirmishers. McCook moved promptly into position, and deployed his troops so as to be able to give or receive an attack at any time. By this time the enemy was observed advancing, apparently with a view of taking possession of a ridge directly in front of the one first taken by McCook's brigade, and extending some distance to his right. This ridge offered a better and more extended line of battle, and I ordered McCook to advance and take possession of it. The movement was promptly executed, just in time to meet the enemy, in about equal force, ascending the opposite slope to the attack. Both parties opened fire with great determination, and the enemy at this time indicated a disposition to give a general battle outside of his works. From the best information I could get I was well satisfied his forces did not exceed mine in number. The gallant manner in which McCook's brigade went into battle and sustained it, notwithstanding a march of eighteen miles since morning, determined me to accept the issue, and Mitchell's brigade was promptly deployed on the right of the road in supporting distance of McCook. The batteries were put in position and opened fire for a few rounds. Morgan's brigade was massed in reserve during the attack on McCook's brigade, but a report received at this time that the enemy was moving in heavy force to my right, together with the demonstrations his skirmishers were making in that direction, determined me to move Morgan to that flank, with orders to push out skirmishers to the Alabama road. The emergency, as well as the approach of night, required great promptness in the execution of the movement. The emergency was fully met, and by dark Morgan had driven in the enemy's skirmishers and formed his entire brigade on the Alabama road, close up to the enemy's works. McCook and Mitchell reported the enemy repulsed on their fronts, and I ordered a strong skirmish line to be thrown out, with instructions to force those of the enemy back into his works, behind which his main forces had taken refuge. This was handsomely done, and our main line established upon the most advantageous ground that could be selected. My lines, as now established, completely invested the enemy's works on the west bank of the river, my left being so near the Oostenaula and my right so near the Coosa as to prevent my flank from being turned from either direction. My loss in killed and wounded did not exceed one hundred and fifty (150) men. Lieutenant Colonel Wiles and Major Shea, of the twenty-second Indiana regiment, were both seriously wounded.

Notwithstanding the long march of eighteen miles, and the fatigue of the field manoeuvres and fighting during the day, the troops stacked their arms and went vigorously to work building breastworks, and by morning the entire line was well fortified. The dense fog which prevailed in the morning prevented any movement under the circumstances until 9 o'clock a. m., at which time it began to rise, and I ordered the works to be vigorously attacked in front of each brigade with a strong line of skirmishers. This was done, and the works soon taken possession of, having been abandoned during the night, except by a skirmish line which fled rapidly across the river, burning the bridge behind them. His rear guard was pursued so closely by our skirmishers that their attempts to destroy the pontoons across the river were only partially successful. A few troops advanced into the works on the De Soto hill was sufficient to draw the

enemy's fire from the two formidable field-works, one situated on the east bank of the Oostenaula and the other on the south bank of the Coosa. The works were situated on two high hills, and completely commanded all approaches to them from the opposite side of the river as well as the works just abandoned by the enemy and now held by us. In order to test the full strength of the enemy I ordered Barnett's and Gardner's batteries to be put into position on De Soto hill and open fire. This was done, and after an hour's practice, the superiority of our batteries was gratifyingly manifested by an almost complete silence of the enemy's guns. While these movements were being made the skirmish line had gradually closed to the river bank, and was sharply engaged with the enemy on the opposite side. The city was now completely at our mercy. This fact, considered in connexion with the best information I could obtain, convinced me that the enemy intended to evacuate the city, and was only prolonging his resistance in order to remove, as much as possible, his public stores. To complete the capture of the city it was necessary to throw troops across the Oostenaula. A point some distance above the enemy's works near McCook's left, during the engagement of the previous evening was selected, and his brigade designated to execute the movement.

The hazardous enterprise of effecting the first crossing was gallantly accomplished by the eighty-fifth Illinois regiment, commanded by Colonel Delworth, on rafts built of rails and logs hastily collected on the bank. This regiment was crossed in an astonishing short space of time, and soon began to drive in the enemy's pickets in the direction of the city. The enemy, finding himself unexpectedly attacked from a direction which soon must result in his capture, retreated in the most precipitate manner over the Etowah river, destroying the bridge behind him. Delworth advanced his skirmishers down the Oostenaula, driving in those of the enemy until his line reached the city and extended to the Etowah, thus covering the railroad and all approaches to the city between the forks of the two rivers. This enabled him to reach the crossings over the Oostenaula and secure what yet remained undestroyed of the bridges. The main bridges were entirely destroyed, but the pontoons were secured and repaired, and a bridge made in a few hours sufficient to cross the whole of McCook's brigade.

On taking possession of the city considerable public stores were found, notwithstanding the efforts of the enemy to destroy and remove them. These stores consisted of quartermaster, commissary, and medical supplies, and were issued to the troops of my command, except one large train of cars loaded mostly with salt, sent to Kingston. A large amount of private property was found in the city abandoned by the owners. This consisted mostly of cotton. All such stores were placed under guard, and in this condition was turned over to my successor, Colonel Barie, commanding brigade of 17th corps, army of the Tennessee. Three field-pieces, five thirty-two (32) pounders, garrison guns, and two 8-inch howitzers were abandoned and fell into our hands. The large iron works and machine shops of Noble & Co., upon which the enemy relied for a large part of his ordnance supplies and repairs, were captured in good condition. It was the intention of the enemy to destroy these shops and stores, but so sudden was the attack of Delworth's skirmishers that he precipitately fled, and they fell into our possession. The city was occupied by McCook's brigade until the advance was resumed. Morgan's and Mitchell's brigade went into camp on the west bank of the Oostenaula, occupying the works. The enemy's pickets continued to hold the south bank of the Coosa for several days, and kept up at intervals a vicious skirmish firing into the city, killing and wounding soldiers and citizens indiscriminately until the 22d, when, in compliance with instructions, Morgan crossed a part of his brigade in pontoon boats which had been sent me from the main column by order of Major General Thomas, and took possession of the opposite bank of the river. The pontoon bridge was soon laid, and the



whole of Morgan's brigade moved across and occupied the works, driving the enemy from that entire front. On the 23d Mitchell's brigade and the batteries moved across the two rivers and bivouacked preparatory to commencing the advance the next morning. The 24th the entire division moved from Rome to Euharley creek, when it struck General McPherson's column and went into camp. The following morning it resumed the march to Van Wert, where it again came in contact with General McPherson's troops. At this point I ascertained that a road running over the Alatoona mountains, between the one occupied by McPherson's command and the 14th corps, could be found. I determined to move upon it. The roads proved passable, and by a rapid march I was enabled to encamp my whole command at night within three miles of Dallas, and in close support of main column. On reporting the arrival of my command on the morning of the 26th, I received orders from General Thomas to make a reconnoissance in the direction of Dallas, with a view of finding out the enemy's position on that flank, and to open, if possible, communication with General McPherson's command. Taking the Burnt Hickory road and passing over Bishop's bridge, across Pumpkinvine creek, two miles from Dallas, the advance of Morgan's brigade drove in the enemy's pickets and pushed into the town. The whole division followed and formed line of battle on the East Marietta road. The head of General McPherson's column arrived at this time and went into position, his lines running across the Villa Rica road. Skirmishers ordered out soon found Hardee's corps intrenched in a strong position covering the Marietta and Villa Rica road, his right resting on the west end of Elsberry mountain.

During the night the troops erected temporary breastworks, and early on the morning of the 27th I ordered McCook's brigade to advance about a mile into a gorge in the mountain, through which a road passes connecting the two roads leading from Dallas to Marietta. A regiment, deployed as skirmishers, after some hard fighting, discovered a brigade of the enemy's infantry strongly posted in this defile. McCook's whole brigade was, during the day, posted and intrenched so as to completely control this pass. A regiment from Mitchell's brigade was sent to open communications with the right of General Hooker's corps, then operating near the northeast end of Elsberry mountain. This communication was preserved, by a line of sentinels from my command, during the remainder of our operations on this flank. During the day the twenty-second Indiana regiment, after considerable fighting, reached the enemy's lines on top of the mountain, and held its position until night; but while attempting to withdraw, the enemy sallied out in pursuit in considerable force. The one hundred and twenty-fifth Illinois regiment was at this time moving out to take position as a picket, and very opportunely arrived at the point of conflict. A general melee ensued, in which a number were killed and wounded on both sides. The night was intensely dark, and, where friend could not be distinguished from foe, the conflict became exceedingly exciting. It resulted, however, favorably to us. The position was held and a number of prisoners fell into our hands.

On the morning of the 28th, in order to render the position between my left and General Hooker's right more secure, I selected a strong position about midway between the two points, the distance being three miles, and ordered Mitchell to intrench his brigades there, and to cut roads to his rear connecting with the main command near New Hope church. This work was well executed by Colonel Mitchell and command, and much facilitated the subsequent movements of our troops in that direction. As now posted, my command remained without change of position until early on the morning of the first of June, when, in concert with the army of the Tennessee, I withdrew and joined the corps, then occupying a position near the left of the whole army, in the vicinity of New Hope church. Relieving a part of the army of the Ohio—Hovey's command—it took position in the front line, during the night, where it remained, en-

gaged in constant skirmishing with the enemy, until the 4th, when it withdrew and took a commanding position on Stoneman's hill, filling with two brigades a gap between General Hooker's command on the right and the 14th army corps on the left.

During the night of the 5th the enemy evacuated his works, and early on the morning of the 6th, taking the right of the corps in pursuit, the division went into camp in the afternoon, on Proctor's creek, covering the road leading from Ackworth to Big Shanty, two miles from the former place, where it remained in comparative quiet until the 17th, when it moved, in concert with the other divisions of the corps, to a position in front of Pine mountain, and formed on the right of Baird's division, connecting with the left of the 4th corps in the afternoon.

During the 18th and 19th the division changed position several times in the general advance of our lines to the enemy's position near Kenesaw mountain, and the skirmishing was frequently very sharp, particularly between a part of Morgan's brigade, which was ordered to drive in the enemy's skirmishers and to feel his position on top of the mountain. This duty was gallantly done by the sixtieth Illinois regiment, commanded by Colonel Anderson. This demonstration, and the appearance of the troops at the base of the mountain while going into position, drew forth a heavy fire from the enemy's batteries on the summit, and showed conclusively that he was there in force, and strongly posted. The batteries of the division came into action, and during the remainder of the day contested the ground with good success. The troops were intrenched and field-works thrown up for the batteries during the night. The troops remained in this position, with but little change, until the night of the 25th, during which time sharp skirmishing frequently engaged the infantry, and fierce artillery contests sprang up between the contending batteries. In these encounters our batteries invariably manifested their superiority and discipline over that of the enemy. My command, except the batteries, was relieved by a division of the 16th corps of the army of the Tennessee, and moved during the night to the rear of our lines, and bivouacked during the 26th in rear of General Stanley's division of the 4th corps, preparatory to storming the enemy's works at some point near that place on the following morning.

Being informed by Major General Thomas of the distinguished duty for which my division had been designated, in company with Generals Stanley, Braddon, and Baird, I made a thorough reconnoissance of the enemy's works and selected the point of attack. The point selected was immediately in front of General Whittaker's brigade, of Stanley's division of the 4th corps. The enemy's line here, conforming to a projecting point in the ridge upon which his works were built, presented a salient angle, and in the absence of abatis, fallen timber and other obstructions which generally confront their works, this point seemed the most assailable. Early on the morning of the 27th the brigade commanders accompanied me to the ground and familiarized themselves with it. McCook's and Mitchell's brigades had been designated for this conspicuous duty, and at 8 o'clock were massed in an open field in rear of our breastworks, now occupied by Morgan's brigade as a reserve, some six hundred yards from the point to be carried. No place nearer the enemy's line could the troops be massed without receiving the enemy's fire, both of infantry and artillery. The ground to be passed over was exceedingly rocky and rough, and a considerable part of it covered with forest trees, interspersed with undergrowth. The signal was given a little before nine o'clock, and the troops, following the example of their admired leaders, bounded over our own works, in the face of the enemy's fire, and rushed gallantly for the enemy, meeting and disregarding, with great coolness, the heavy fire, both of artillery and infantry, to which they were subjected until the enemy's works were reached. Here, owing to exhaustion produced by the too rapid execution of the movement, the exceedingly rough

ground and the excessive heat, the troops failed to leap and carry the works to which their noble daring and impetuous valor had carried them. McCook had fallen dangerously wounded, and Harmon, next in rank, had assumed command, but fell immediately. Delworth, the next senior in rank, promptly took command of the brigade, and with great personal gallantry held his command to the fierce contest, now being fought so near the works that a number of both officers and men were killed and wounded at the trenches. Mitchell's brigade, moving in column parallel with McCook's, received and returned the fire with the same impetuosity and invincible determination, but failed from the same cause to carry the works. The position of the troops at this juncture was one of extreme solicitude, and presented a problem of some difficulty of solution. To retire and thus receive the full effect of the enemy's unrestrained fire, now considerably diminished in severity by the effect of our own, was sure to incur an additional loss. A renewal of the assault in the present exhausted condition of the troops was exceedingly hazardous. Under the circumstances, after a thorough examination of the ground and the enemy's works, I reported to Major General Thomas, and recommended that the position be held and the troops intrenched where they were. This he ordered to be done, and intrenching implements were immediately furnished the troops, and both brigades threw up works a few yards from, and nearly parallel to, those of the enemy. This was done under fire so severe that at times it might almost be termed a general engagement. Works thrown up under such circumstances were of necessity of rude character, but sufficed to protect the men until night, during which the whole command intrenched itself in excellent works.

During the succeeding six days the position was held, the troops sleeping on their arms at night. Details were kept engaged in throwing up new works wherever an advanced line could be established, until the morning of the 3d of July, when it was discovered that the enemy had abandoned the position. The assault failed in its immediate objects, but the courage and discipline exhibited by the troops in the attack, the determined manner in which they clung to the works afterwards, and the noble physical endurance displayed by them during the six days and nights have never been exceeded in modern soldiery. Colonel Daniel McCook, long the admired and gallant commander of his brigade, fell with a severe wound, of which he subsequently died at his home in Ohio. Colonel Harmon, of the one hundred and twenty-fifth Illinois, succeeded him in command, but fell immediately afterwards. He was a brave and skillful officer. The loss of these two noble leaders was at the time a great misfortune to the troops; and will ever be to the army and country a great loss. In the list of killed are the names of Lieutenant Colonel James McShane, ninety-eighth Ohio infantry; Major John Yager, one hundred and twenty-first Ohio infantry; Captain M. B. Clason, one hundred and twenty-first Ohio infantry; Captain W. W. Fellows, fifty-second Ohio infantry, acting brigade inspector; Captain Charles H. Chatfield, eighty-fifth Illinois infantry; Captain Patrick, one hundred and twenty-first Ohio infantry, and Captain Bowersock, one hundred and thirteenth Ohio infantry, whom I think it my duty to mention in this report. In the list of wounded are Lieutenant Colonel D. B. Warner, one hundred and thirteenth Ohio infantry; Captain Henry O. Mansfield, fifty second Ohio infantry; Captain Durant, one hundred and thirteenth Ohio infantry; Adjutant C. Andrews, eighty-fifth Illinois volunteer infantry; Lieutenant Samuel T. Rodgers, eighty-sixth Illinois infantry; Captain Van Antwerp, eighty-sixth Illinois infantry; Captain Howden, seventy-eighth Illinois infantry; Lieutenants Lippencott, Bently, Baxter, Watson, and Dungan, of the one hundred and thirteenth Ohio infantry; and Lieutenants Thomas and Lindsey, of ninety-eighth Ohio infantry. These gallant officers fell in leading their men to the enemy's works; some of them at the ditches.

On the morning of the 3d of July the division moved in pursuit of the enemy,

again in retreat. Passing through Marietta, and following the 20th corps, went into bivouack at Nickajack creek, in sight of the enemy's works at that place.

*July 4.*—Opened with both battries, and pushed a heavy line of skirmishers across the creek and swamp. In the afternoon Morgan's whole brigade was crossed, and skirmished heavily with the enemy and succeeded, in driving him into his main works. This brigade bivouacked during the night close to the abbatiss of the enemy's works.

At daylight on the morning of the 5th Major Bennett, of the nineteenth Michigan infantry, commanding the skirmish line, reported through General Morgan that the enemy had retreated, and the pursuit was resumed. Passing through the enemys works, the rear guard of the enemy was pressed by the thirty-fourth Illinois regiment to within a few hundred yards of his works on the Chattahoochee river. His skirmishers made a determined stand, and the fourteenth Michigan, the one hundred and twenty-fifth Illinois, and the ninety-eighth Ohio regiments were deployed, and after a severe skirmish drove the enemy from his rifle-pits into his main works, from which after occasional skirmishing, and considerable artillery fighting, he withdrew on the 9th of July. The enemy's works thus vacated, were immediately occupied by a brigade and battery of my troops, until the general crossing of the river and advance upon Atlanta was resumed. The short respite of a few days here given to the troops was well spent in a general burnishing up of guns and accoutrements, and outfitting the men with clothing. On the morning of the 17th Morgan's and Mitchell's brigades and the batteries moved to the river at Pace's ferry at daylight. After some delay on account of the pontoons not being laid, the command commenced to cross, and Morgan, being in advance, found the enemy about one mile from the river, and after a sharp skirmish fight, in which a part of General Johnson's skirmishers took part, with his cavalry dismounted, drove them to and across Nancy's creek. The troops here bivouacked for the night.

On the morning of the 18th Delworth's brigade joined the division, moving from its previous camp before daylight, and took the advance of the column. Little resistance was offered by the enemy to our advance during the day, and before night I was able to report my troops in camp on Peach Tree creek, a short distance below Howell's mill, picketing the bank from my front to its mouth. On the 19th, in compliance with verbal instructions from Major General Thomas, I ordered Delworth to move his brigade to the mouth of Green Bone creek, in search of a crossing said to exist there. A point over which troops could be passed was found; it was also found strongly picketed by the enemy. Delworth was ordered to drive these away, and to effect a lodgement of his troops on the opposite bank if possible. This, after a severe skirmish, was accomplished in the afternoon. The remainder of his brigade was ordered across, but had hardly formed on the opposite bank when a brigade of the enemy sallied out from their works to the support of their skirmishers, then driven back. Delworth immediately pushed his lines forward in order to meet his foe on an advantageous ridge which lay in his front. The two forces here met in about equal numbers, and at once brought on an engagement. The fighting was very sharp on both sides, but soon resulted in a signal repulse of the enemy. The loss was heavy on both sides, considering the numbers engaged and the short time the fight lasted. This day's work was exceedingly creditable to both Colonel Delworth and command. Mitchell's brigade was ordered to the support of Delworth. It moved with great promptness, and succeeded in crossing in time to assist in the closing of this gallant little fight, and repulse of the enemy. Baird's division crossed and took position on my left during the night. Morgan's brigade, with Banning's regiment, the one hundred and twenty-first Ohio, of Mitchell's brigade, and the batteries, were held as reserved forces on the north bank of the creek. Heavy details were required from these to picket the creek to its mouth, and some severe fighting was done at different points when attempts were made by us to cross the stream.

On the 20th I changed the position of my batteries. Gardner crossed the creek and was placed in the main line of Delworth's works, and after a few rounds of excellent firing drove the enemy from his rifle-pits in front. The rest of my troops remained in nearly the same position, and skirmished sharply all day. On the morning of the 21st it was reported that the enemy had fallen back, and I ordered a reconnoissance to be made. General Baird did the same in his front, but it was soon discovered that he had only withdrawn his picket line closer to his main works. The enemy retreated during the night.

On the morning of the 22d, keeping to the right of Baird's division, I moved my whole command to the west side of Marietta road and took position on the Turner's Ferry road, connecting with General Baird's right. The position was a strong one, and being for some time the extreme right of the whole army, I ordered it to be well fortified. My batteries bore upon the city from their works with great ease.

My command remained in this position without change until the 28th, when I received orders to make a movement in the direction of Turner's ferry and East Point, and from thence towards Howard's right. At this time my health, which had not been good for some days, required me to turn over the active and immediate command of the troops to General Morgan. The movement was promptly commenced by General Morgan, but before being completed the enemy attacked General Howard's command on the right, in heavy force, and in compliance with instructions from Major General Sherman, I sent a staff officer to order Morgan to Howard's support. Morgan, who, when the messenger reached him, was several miles off, turned his column at once in the direction of the fighting. Every effort was made by General Morgan to reach the position, but he was unable to do so until the enemy had been repulsed. The troops went into bivouac long after night, much fatigued from the long march and excessive heat.

On the 29th the division took position on the right of the army of the Tennessee and intrenched itself, where it remained, with little change, until the 4th, when in accordance with orders it moved across Utoy creek, and took position on the right and rear of Baird's division. This was accomplished after some heavy skirmishing, in which the enemy's artillery took part.

On the 5th the division took ground to the right and front, the left brigade connecting with Baird's right flank, where it remained much exposed to the enemy's shell until the 7th, when, in compliance with instructions, it moved forward, wheeling on the left, formed a new line close to the enemy's works. In the execution of this movement there was some fighting and a number of prisoners were taken.

On the 8th four regiments from the first and second brigades were sent to the right of the 23d corps, which was making some demonstrations against the enemy, and acted as a reserve to that command during the day. At night they returned to camp.

On the morning of the 20th, in compliance with instructions from corps headquarters, I ordered General Morgan to make, with his own and Delworth's brigade, a reconnoissance in the direction of Red Oak, and, if possible, to reach the railroad at that point. Two brigades of Baird's division, and one from Carlin's, reported to me on the Campbelltown road, to be used if necessary in support of this movement. General Morgan pushed the reconnoissance with vigor, and reached the railroad as desired. After destroying a small portion of the track, and reporting to me his success, I ordered the troops to return to their respective camps. During the 21st and 22d the location of the troops remained without change.

On the 22d I turned over the command of the division to Brigadier General Morgan, and in compliance with Special Order 241, War Department, dated August 9, 1864, assumed command of the 14th army corps, relieving Brigadier General R. W. Johnson. This ends my connexion with the division as its im-

mediate commander, but before closing this report and taking leave of the troops with whom I have so long been associated amid scenes of active operations unparalleled in the history of war, I feel it my duty, as it is my greatest pleasure, to record a few words expressive of my high appreciation of the zeal, endurance, and courage exhibited by them throughout this long and bloody campaign—a campaign which required the highest skill in commanders to meet its varying exigencies, and demanded from the ranks sacrifices which none but the soldiers of a brave and intelligent people, struggling for the preservation of their government, could make. The list of casualties will show how nobly the troops met the stern demands of the battle-field, but the patriotic zeal and devotion displayed by them in meeting the no less stern requirements of the bivouack, the march, and the trenches, their immediate commanders and companions in arms can only know and record. These will long be remembered by all, and a grateful country will appreciate and reward such heroism and devotion in her cause. Among those officers whose rank and position brought them more immediately under my observation during the campaign, of whom I desire to make special mention, are Brigadier General James D. Morgan, commanding first brigade and next to me in rank in the division. To him I am under many obligations for his active and efficient co-operation at all times and under all circumstances. He has, in my judgment, earned promotion, and I earnestly recommend him to the consideration of the government for it. Colonel John G. Mitchell, commanding the second brigade of the division, has been recommended by me for promotion to the rank of brigadier general in special recommendation for faithful services as brigade commander, and distinguished conduct throughout the campaign. Colonel C. J. Delworth, of the eighty-sixth Illinois regiment, has commanded the third brigade since the assault on the enemy's works on the 27th of June. His efficiency as a commander and personal gallantry on that, as well as other and more recent occasions, have made it my duty to recommend him for promotion.

The following regimental commanders are recommended for the appointment of brevet brigadier generals for their abilities as commanders and distinguished conduct throughout the campaign: Colonel H. B. Banning, one hundred and twenty-first Ohio regiment, and Colonel W. B. Anderson, sixtieth Illinois regiment. There are a number of other regimental commanders, whose rank is less than that of colonel, who have richly earned another grade. I hope their regiments will soon be filled by the necessary recruits, and they commissioned accordingly by the governors of their respective States. Where so many subordinate officers have distinguished themselves, it is impossible to discriminate. The artillery attached to this division consisted of battery I, second Illinois artillery, and the fifth Wisconsin battery. The efficiency, discipline, and good conduct on the march and in battle of both officers and men was in the highest degree commendable.

Captain Charles M. Barnett, chief of artillery, proved himself a skilful and energetic officer by his excellent management of his batteries throughout the campaign. Captain Gardner and Lieutenant Coe, battery commanders, performed their duties ably and efficiently; their batteries are among the best in the service.

To my staff, consisting of Captain T. W. Morrison, assistant adjutant general; Major John H. Phillips, medical director; Thomas H. Daily, captain and aide-de-camp; Lieutenant Thomas J. Carney, aide-de-camp; Captain James L. Orr, commissary of subsistence; Captain J. E. Remington, assistant quartermaster; Captain Leonidas A. Cole, commissary of musters; Captain Charles M. Barnett, chief of artillery; Captain Hamilton W. Hall, inspector; Captain John F. Squier, provost marshal; Lieutenant John Paul Kimtze, topographical engineer; Lieutenant George Scroggs, ordnance officer, I am again under obligations for zealous assistance throughout the campaign. Their duties were often exceedingly arduous, and were always performed by them with skill and alacrity, whether on the field of battle or elsewhere.

No list of casualties accompanies this report. This will be found in General Morgan's report, which closes with the termination of the campaign.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JEFF. C. DAVIS,

*Brevet Major General, Commanding.*

Captain A. C. McCLURG,

*Assistant Adjutant General 14th Army Corps.*

#### HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION 14TH ARMY CORPS,

*Jonesboro', Ga., September 7, 1864.*

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part performed by this division in the campaign which begun with the movement of the army from Chattanooga, Tennessee, in May last, and terminated with the capture of Atlanta, Georgia, on the first instant:

On the 22d of February this division marched from Chattanooga, together with the other two divisions of the corps, to Tunnel Hill and Buzzard Roost gap, for the purpose of making a reconnoissance of the enemy's position in front of Dalton, and having ascertained, by feeling him closely for two days, that his army was still there in force, strongly posted and fortified, we withdrew upon the night of the 26th to Ringgold, where this division took post, the remainder of the troops being removed to other points. From February until May the division continued to occupy that place as the extreme advance post of the army. Our pickets and those of the enemy were always in close proximity, and affairs of minor importance between them were of constant occurrence. On two occasions reconnoitring parties of large force were sent as far as Tunnel Hill, both of which were highly successful, and chiefly useful in inspiring our cavalry with greater confidence in their superiority over that of the enemy. In each of these expeditions Brigadier General Kilpatrick, whose division of cavalry was placed under my charge, commanded the cavalry, and Colonel F. Vone Dwire, of the thirty-fifth Ohio, one infantry brigade. Both of these officers displayed on these occasions the high soldierly qualities for which they are known, energy and boldness, guided by the coolest judgment.

During the interval from the 1st to the 6th of May, the divisions and corps of the army of the Cumberland were concentrated about Ringgold—the army of the Ohio taking a position on our left, and the army of the Tennessee, a line of march passing to our right. My division was at that time constituted as follows:

*First brigade—Brigadier General J. B. Turchin commanding.*

	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
11th Ohio volunteers, Lieut. Colonel Ogden Street.....	15	263	278
17th Ohio volunteers, Colonel Durbin Ward.....	22	569	570
31st Ohio volunteers, Colonel M. B. Walker.....	26	583	609
89th Ohio volunteers, Major J. H. Jolly.....	10	211	221
92d Ohio volunteers, Colonel B. D. Fearing.....	13	310	323
82d Indiana volunteers, Colonel M. C. Hunter.....	17	252	269
19th Illinois volunteers, Lieut. Colonel A. W. Rappin.....	15	239	254
24th Illinois volunteers, Captain A. Mauff.....	14	211	225
Total effective force .....	132	2,618	2,750

*Second brigade—Col. F. Van Derveer, thirty fifth Ohio infantry, commanding.*

	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
2d Minnesota volunteers, Colonel J. George .....	22	380	402
35th Ohio volunteers, Major J. L. Budd .....	15	277	292
9th Ohio volunteers, Colonel G. Kemmerling .....	20	380	400
87th Indiana volunteers, Colonel H. Gleason .....	17	316	333
105th Ohio volunteers, Lieut. Colonel G. T. Perkins .....	15	337	352
101st Indiana volunteers, Lieut. Colonel Thomas Doan .....	19	359	378
75th Indiana volunteers, Lieut. Colonel W. O'Brien .....	23	408	421
Total effective force .....	131	2,457	2,588

*Third brigade—Colonel G. P. Este, fourteenth Ohio volunteers, commanding.*

	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
10th Kentucky volunteers, Colonel W. H. Hayes .....	23	343	368
10th Indiana volunteers, Lieut. Colonel W. B. Taylor .....	32	653	685
14th Ohio volunteers, Major J. W. Wilson .....	36	498	518
18th Kentucky volunteers, Lieut. Colonel H. K. Milwood .....	28	454	482
38th Ohio volunteers, Lieut. Colonel W. A. Choate .....	25	651	676
74th Indiana volunteers, Lieut. Colonel M. Baker .....	15	380	395
Total effective force .....	143	2,979	3,122
Total infantry of division .....	406	8,054	8,460

### *Artillery.*

	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.	Horses.	Guns.
7th Indiana battery, First Lieut. Os. C. Morgan .....	4	157	161	100	6
19th Indiana battery, First Lieut. W. P. Stackhouse .....	3	144	147	118	6
Total .....	7	301	308	218	12

### NARRATIVE.

*May 7.*—Leaving Colonel Este's brigade (the third) in garrison at Ringgold, the remainder of the division marched, on the morning of the 7th, to Tunnel Hill. The other two divisions of the corps, being in advance, had already brushed away, with their advanced guards, the pickets of the enemy at



that place, and had gone into position when we arrived. This division went into line on the right, a little to the south of the village, where it remained during the night.

*May 8.*—On the morning of the 8th the division moved south three miles upon the Villanow road, so as to form a connexion with the corps of Major General Hooker, and, at the same time, to cover the right flank of Brigadier General Johnson, who was swinging forward into the south end of Tunnel Hill ridge. In the afternoon we crossed that ridge and moved up in support of Brigadier Generals Johnson and Davis, then in front of Buzzard's Roost gap.

*May 9, 10, and 11.*—During these days we remained in our position in reserve, no active operations being carried on in our front.

*May 12.*—My division, in advance of the corps, marched, at daybreak, towards the right, to the support of Major General McPherson, who had passed his army through Snake Creek gap, and had taken his position in Sugar valley, threatening Resaca. Being detained by the 20th corps in advance of me, I did not get into position until after dark. The other divisions of the 14th corps were behind me, and they were followed by the 23d corps.

*May 13.*—Moved forward at noon, along with the remainder of the army, and about dark got into position on the left of Brigadier General Johnson's division, upon a series of steep and difficult hills, covered with a dense wood and undergrowth. Major General Schofield was somewhere on my left and rear, but not connecting. Brigadier General Johnson's skirmishers became engaged with those of the enemy, but mine did not come in contact with them.

*Resaca, May 14.*—Having received orders during the night from the major general commanding the corps to swing forward my entire line along with that of Brigadier General Johnson's, his right having been taken as the pivot, and to push on until the enemy was encountered, I put my troops in motion at daybreak. Colonel Van Derveer was on my right, formed in two lines, and Brigadier General Turchin, on the left, formed in the same manner. My right had moved some three-fourths of a mile, and the direction of our line was about due north and south, facing east, when I received another order from the same source informing me that Major General Schofield, whose corps was then in line a half mile to my rear, with his right overlapping nearly the whole of my left brigade, was about to advance and charge the enemy's works, and directing me to move forward with him and assault at the same time. I had not previously known that the enemy had works in our vicinity, nor was I then informed as to their position, their character, or manner in which the attack was to be made. There was, of course, no time for a reconnoissance by me, without neglecting to advance along with General Schofield as ordered. I had barely time to give the proper instructions to Brigadier General Turchin, on my left, and was communicating the same to the right brigade, when the troops of Brigadier General Judah, on General Schofield's right, came up with my left. His front line passed through my rear line before mine began to advance, and, thus interlaced, both went forward together. It was subsequently ascertained that the rebel line of works ran along the western slope of a ridge which extended from near Resaca northward, on the west side of the railroad. A narrow valley, intersected along its length by a boggy creek, separated this from another ridge which lay parallel with and in front of our line. This our troops had to pass. It was covered for a space of near half a mile by so dense a growth of wood that an individual alone could make his way through it only with difficulty. It was utterly impossible, in this thicket, for a regimental, much less a brigade commander, to see and control the two extremities of his command, yet our lines of battle worked through it, and reached the crest overlooking the valley, in as much order as could have been expected. From this position the rebel works could be distinctly seen, and could our men have been allowed to halt here to reform and readjust their lines whilst an examination of the position could be made,

better results might have ensued. It would appear Major General Schofield's left, in open ground, did not encounter the same difficulties as his right, and pressing forward, the impulsion was communicated along his line to the right, and carried my left brigade with it. It was the affair of a moment, and before I could learn, at three hundred yards distance upon the right, of the condition of affairs, it was too late to stop the movement. Descending about one hundred feet the almost vertical slope of the ridge, our men emerged into the open valley, and into direct view, at short range, of rebel works, and immediately received a fire of artillery and musketry. The tried veterans of this division, who have never failed to accomplish anything that was possible, did not falter, but pushed forward until they reached the creek. Few got beyond this. Many stuck under the miry banks of the stream, and the few isolated groups that got beyond, not being in sufficient force to sustain themselves, were soon driven back. It was at once apparent that this effort had failed, and was at an end, and most of the men were withdrawn to the summit of the ridge to be reformed. A few, unable on the account of the sharp fire of the rebel works to leave the banks of the creek, remained there until dark, doing valuable duty as sharpshooters. The movement of the first brigade along with Major General Schofield's troops had been so sudden, and the distance to go being less, the 2d brigade did not reach the crest of the hill until after the failure of General Schofield's right and my left had become known, and I did not have it advance further. Over the whole line, from the right of the 20th corps to the left of the 23d, continued to occupy this ridge during the afternoon, and, having placed numerous batteries in position, shelled the rebel works with fine effect. The loss which my command sustained in the operations of this day were as follows:

*Casualties of May 14, 1864.*

	Killed.	Wounded.
Commissioned officers .....	2	14
Enlisted men .....	7	112
Total .....	9	126

During the day the 3d brigade, with the exception of the 18th Kentucky volunteer infantry, which remained to garrison Ringgold, came up and was placed in reserve behind the other brigades.

*May 15.*—On the morning of the 15th my division was withdrawn from the line and sent to the extreme right of the corps to aid in filling a gap caused by Major General Hooker being taken out to operate on the left of Major General Schofield. I there connected on my right with the left of the 15th corps, of the army of the Tennessee. The position was an important one, and my men worked industriously during the day and the following night in advancing and strengthening our works so as to give more perfect command of those of the enemy in our front. Our skirmishers were during this time hotly engaged with those of the rebels.

*May 16.*—During the night the skirmishers in front of my 3d brigade discovered signs of a movement of the enemy, and pressing forward shortly before daybreak entered his lines and found them evacuated. Together with a party from the 1st division of the corps, which advanced about the same time, they pushed on to Resaca, and were the first to enter that place, and the first to discover the entire withdrawal of the rebel forces to the south side of the river—

Lieutenant Colonel Whorton, of the 10th regiment Kentucky volunteers, in charge of skirmishers from my 3d brigade, being the first officer who entered Resaca. The division was marched into the town and remained there until night to await the construction of a bridge on which to cross the Oostenaula in pursuit. At Resaca the 11th regiment Ohio volunteers was detached from the 1st brigade and left in garrison at that place, thus reducing the command to 278 men. It was soon after mustered out of service.

*May 17.*—My wagons having been crossed over during the night, the division passed the river at 3 o'clock a. m., and, following closely upon the heels of the 4th corps, encamped at night two miles north of Adairsville. The advance guard of Major General Howard had closed up with the enemy and was skirmishing throughout the afternoon with his rear.

*May 18.*—The march was continued as upon the day previous, the enemy resisting strongly to cover the withdrawal of his trains. Passing through Adairsville my division encamped for the night four miles north of Kingston.

*May 19.*—Marching through Kingston I was there informed by Major General Palmer that the enemy was exhibiting himself in a threatening attitude in our front, and I was ordered to post my division on a range of hills south of the town. This order was duly executed; but later, during the afternoon, other orders were received, directing me to move out to the east of the town and go into line on the right of the 4th corps. When I got to the position designated that corps was already four miles out from the town. My line when formed connected with the right of Brigadier General Wood, resting on the railroad. During the afternoon, previous to my arrival, I was informed that the enemy had displayed quite a formidable line of battle, but before my division reached the ground it had been retired from view.

*May 20.*—On this morning the rebel force was found to have again fallen back, having succeeded in passing his trains over the Etowah river at or near the railroad bridge, which was afterwards destroyed. Throughout this and the two following days our troops remained in position, fitting themselves with supplies, so as to be able to quit the railroad and move upon the enemy's flank.

On the 22d the ninth Ohio regiment of the second brigade, whose term of service had expired, went north for the purpose of being mustered out. At the same time the twenty-fourth regiment Illinois volunteers from the first brigade, and the tenth Indiana volunteers from the third brigade, were detached and left in garrison at Kingston. The twenty-fourth Illinois never after joined the command, as its term of service soon expired.

*May 23.*—My division again marched, and, crossing the Etowah at Island ford, encamped on Euharley creek. From this time until the end of the month we remained in rear, guarding or escorting trains generally, not far from Burnt Hickory.

*June 1.*—Leaving the first brigade in charge of the trains at Burnt Hickory, I marched to the front with the other two, and joined the main army, then going into position on the line running northerly from Dallas toward Ackworth, east of Pumpkinvine creek.

*June 2.*—Having relieved a portion of the first division, 14th corps, and extending the line to the left, I at once advanced my front to a more commanding position and intrenched. We were then in close proximity to the strongly constructed works of the enemy, my right connecting with the first division, 14th corps, and Major General Schofield operating a little distance on my left. During the 3d and 4th my men worked constantly, both night and day, advancing our lines, by pushing our skirmishers to the front and then intrenching the troops upon the ground which they had gained. I thus, with trifling loss, drove the rebel skirmishers into their main works and put up batteries within short range of them.

*June 5.*—At daybreak it was discovered that the enemy had withdrawn under

the cover of night, abandoning a line of elaborately constructed field-works of great strength; we received no orders to pursue, but remained all day in our position.

*June 6.*—We again marched to the front upon the Burnt Hickory and Big Shanty road, and at night I got into line on the left of the 20th corps, near Denham's house, continuing at this point until the morning of the 10th; the first brigade, relieved from duty with the trains, came up and joined the division. It had lost while away two regiments, the eleventh Ohio and the twenty-fourth Illinois, by expiration of service. The tenth Indiana, of the third brigade, came up to us about the same time.

*June 10.*—This division marched at 6 o'clock a. m. in front of the corps. The army of the Tennessee on our left moving along the railroad, we took such roads as we could parallel to it; and after crossing Proctor's creek at the old mill, our advance guard of the third brigade soon struck the rebel skirmishers. These were readily driven back, and my lines formed upon an eminence in front of Pine mountain, in full view of the rebels' works upon it, and within range of their batteries. Our artillery was at once put in position and kept up an effective cannonade during the afternoon, while the 4th corps was coming into position on our right. The object in view at this point was to obtain control of the Burnt Hickory and Marietta road. Pine mountain lying on this road, commanded it.

*June 11.*—Early in the day the rebel skirmishers were driven back nearer to the base of the mountain, and my lines were advanced, but in the afternoon our whole corps was moved about a mile to the left, so as to make room for the 4th corps to deploy. In my next position I was on the right of my corps, connecting with the 4th corps, our first division on my left. My line faced toward the south and was located about a mile north of the Marietta and Big Shanty road, fronting the northeast end of the Pine mountain.

*June 12 and 13.*—No movement took place upon our portion of the line.

*June 14.*—Our whole line advanced, and my left reached the Big road, where it intrenched; directly in front, on the south side of the road, the strongly built lines of the enemy, stretching from the base of Pine mountain to the east, were discovered at a few hundred yards distance. My right, nearer to the mountain, was more strongly resisted, and, although skirmishing hotly through the day, with heavy loss, did not until dark succeed in dislodging the rebels from their rifle-pits, or in gaining the road.

*June 15.*—The enemy having discovered that our lines were rapidly enveloping his advanced position of Pine mountain, abandoned it in the night, and on the morning of the 15th we took possession of that portion of his works. He had only, however, fallen back a short distance to a line of works already constructed; but it enabled the 4th corps, and the two right divisions of our corps, to swing forward a considerable distance. My own division moved about one and a half mile to the vicinity of Smith's house, where it again came upon the pickets in front of the rebel works, and was ordered to intrench and put up batteries. I was connecting with the troops of Major General Howard on my right, and with our first division on my left.

*June 16 and 17.*—Gradually driving the enemy from the woods and other strong positions held by his advanced parties, I steadily pushed forward my lines, and at length established my artillery in positions highly advantageous and commanding. During this time the practice of our gunners had been skilful and effective. We were again close up to the rebel fortifications, and they were of great strength, constructed with extreme care, and everywhere fully garnished with artillery. There were field-works requiring the slow operations almost of a siege to approach them.

*June 18.*—Having been instructed by the corps commander that Major General Howard with the 4th corps intended to swing forward towards the left,

so as to sweep along the enemy's line, I was at the same time ordered to conform to this movement and advance with those troops. My line of march was through a very difficult wood and morass, nearly a mile in width, impassable for artillery; it was therefore sent around to the left, while the troops worked their way through the woods. Passing through this we came into open ground, immediately in front of works of the enemy. The 4th corps at the same time came up on my right, and a sharp encounter ensued between our men and the rebels behind their breastworks, but the unceasing and rapid fire of our line kept theirs subdued, and our loss was less than could be expected. I immediately ordered my men to creep forward as well as they could and construct a cover for themselves on the crest of the open ground, facing directly into the embrasures of the rebel batteries. Having no artillery with me, Captain Hulet Gilgar, of the first Ohio artillery, belonging to the first division, 14th corps, volunteered to bring up his guns, and placing them upon the line where my men were intrenching, opened fire and maintained them there throughout the afternoon, displaying a splendid courage not often witnessed. The coolness and bravery of my men exceeds all praise, and by dark they had constructed a line of rifle-pits in open ground confronting the finished works of the enemy, and within five hundred (500) yards of them. I had obtained a magnificent position, and lost forty (40) men in so doing.

*June 19.*—The earliest dawn revealed to us another evacuation and falling back of the rebel army; this time to the lines of Kenesaw mountain. My division pursuing, came up in front of the central knob of the mountain near Kirk's house, and, after a sharp skirmish, got into position close to the base of the mountain.

*June 20.*—The lines of the division were rectified, and the works for protection strengthened and improved. During the day we lost thirty (30) men, killed and wounded by shell and sharpshooters firing from the side of the mountain. From this time until the evening of the 26th, our position was not materially changed. Under direct fire from the rebel skirmishers, no man could expose himself without being a mark for their bullets. They kept our men closely confined to their trenches, and the only variety they had was the constant succession of artillery duels between our batteries and those on the mountain top, which might be looked for at any time of the day or night; at times these displays assumed a degree of magnificence, as particularly the cannonade from our batteries on the afternoon of the 21st. My average daily loss, killed and wounded, in camps and behind the works, was about twenty (20) men.

*June 26.*—The division of Brigadier General Davis having been sent to the right of the 4th corps, to unite with a division of that corps in an assault of the enemy's works, I was ordered there, likewise, to support him and being relieved after dark by Brigadier General Osterhaus's division, of the army of the Tennessee, I marched at once, and by midnight got into bivouac near department headquarters.

*June 27.*—At an early hour my division was formed in rear of the assaulting columns of Brigadier General Davis, to support him in case of disaster, and after his repulse, went forward into the line on his right, relieving Brigadier General Geary's division of the 20th corps, which was next to us on that side. On the 27th, Colonel F. Van Derveer, commanding my second brigade, who had long been suffering from disease, was compelled to go north for relief, and turned over the command of the brigade to Colonel Gleason, of the eighty-seventh Indiana volunteers, who has since retained it. In losing Colonel Van Derveer, my command, and the service generally, was deprived of one of its most gallant and best officers, and most accomplished gentlemen. Always prompt, judicious, and brave, he had distinguished himself on many fields, and his promotion had been strongly urged upon the government.

*June 28.*—From this time until the 3d of July the locality of the division

was not changed; our works were at this time so close to those of the enemy that no man on either side dared show his head during the day, and the only advance we gained was in the constant pushing forward of our trenches towards theirs, under the cover of night.

To exhibit the changes which have taken place in the division up to this period, and its subsequent strength, a new table of "effective force," is here given taken from the report of July 4.

*First brigade—Brigadier General J. B. Turchin commanding.*

	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
17th Ohio, Colonel D. Ward.....	20	426	446
31st Ohio, Colonel N. B. Walker.....	20	449	469
89th Ohio, Colonel C. H. Carleton.....	10	189	199
92d Ohio, Colonel B. D. Fearing.....	12	274	286
82d Indiana, Colonel M. C. Hunter.....	14	190	204
Total effective force.....	76	1,528	1,604

*Second brigade—Colonel W. Gleason, eighty-seventh Indiana volunteers, commanding.*

	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
2d Minnesota volunteers, Lieut. Colonel J. W. Bishop.....	19	349	368
35th Ohio volunteers, Major J. L. Budd.....	15	258	273
105th Ohio volunteers, Lieut. Colonel G. T. Perkins.....	19	290	309
75th Indiana volunteers, Lieut. Colonel Wm. O'Brien.....	20	352	372
87th Indiana volunteers, Lieut. Colonel E. P. Hammond.....	15	274	289
101st Indiana volunteers, Lieut. Colonel Thomas Doan.....	24	319	343
Total effective force.....	112	1,842	1,954

*Third brigade—Colonel George P. Este, fourteenth Ohio volunteer infantry, commanding.*

	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
10th Kentucky volunteers, Colonel W. H. Hayes.....	23	254	277
10th Indiana volunteers, Lieut. Colonel W. B. Taylor.....	22	351	373
14th Ohio volunteers, Major John Wilson.....	15	376	391
38th Ohio volunteers, Lieut. Colonel W. A. Choate.....	25	516	541
74th Indiana volunteers, Lieut. Colonel M. Barker.....	19	296	315
Total effective force.....	104	1,793	1,897
Total infantry of division.....	292	5,163	5,455

*Artillery.*

	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.	Horses.	Guns.
7th Indiana battery, First Lieut. O. H. Morgan.....	4	133	137	60	4
19th Indiana battery, First Lieut. W. P. Stackhouse.....	3	134	137	65	4
Total artillery.....	7	267	274	125	8
Effective force of division.....	299	5,430	5,729	125	8

*July 3.*—The enemy having again abandoned his works and fallen back during the night, my command entered them before daybreak and were prompt in pursuit, capturing a large number of prisoners. We marched at an early hour, and passing through Marietta had advanced about two miles along the right side of the railroad, when we came upon a new line of works, in which the rebel army had taken position. It was here that the last stand to cover the passage of the trains over the Chattahoochee was made.

*July 4* was spent in reconnoitring the position. Our troops were pressed close up to the works, and a constant skirmish was kept up along our front during the day, but no general assault was made. At this point my second brigade was detached and sent to Marietta to constitute the garrison at that place.

*July 5.*—The enemy, not waiting for an attack, had again given up his laboriously constructed works and retreated to the river during the night. So soon as this was discovered our troops pursued, my division taking a road leading towards Vining's station, and lying a short distance south of the railroad. Prisoners were taken and stragglers picked up almost from the outset, and some distance before reaching Vining's the head of my column came upon a strong rear-guard of the enemy. The tenth Indiana volunteers, skirmishing in our front, pressed this party handsomely and vigorously, driving it beyond the road, and the conduct of Colonel M. B. Taylor, commanding that regiment on this occasion, is worthy of praise. On reaching the heights overlooking the station, a rebel train was discovered moving south beyond the river, and one of my batteries hastily brought up shelled it with much apparent effect. My line of march would, at this point, have led me to cross the railroad and move in the direction of Pace's ferry, but encountering the head of Brigadier General Wood's division of the 4th corps, which came down the road and arrived soon after I did, his column, to avoid confusion, was turned to the left towards Pace's ferry, while mine, turning to the right, pursued the railroad. I had marched about one and a half mile along this road, skirmishing lightly, but not strongly resisted, when I came upon the head of my first division, 14th army corps, column, which, taking a shorter road, was coming in on my right, and reached the railroad in front of me. These troops immediately abutted upon the strong works on the road, a part of the continuous line constituting the *tête-de-pont* of the railroad crossing. My troops were then formed, by direction of the major general commanding the corps, so as to connect with the left of the first division and extending back along the line of the railroad.

*July 6, 7, and 8.*—During these days, while other portions of the army were working themselves into position, this division remained stationary, the skirmish line alone keeping up a constant and continuous fire from their pits.

*July 9.*—Having received orders to push out my skirmishers and feel for the

enemy, for the purpose of developing his position, I caused Colonel Este, whose brigade was the most advanced, to deploy a heavy line, and supporting it by a regiment, directed him to make the advance required. I at the same time was informed that the skirmishers of the first division on my right would advance with ours, and I directed those of the first brigade, although more remote from the enemy's works, to keep up their connexion with Colonel Este's left. Having selected the tenth Kentucky to support his advance, Colonel Este began his movement at 8 o'clock a. m. The more advanced pickets of the enemy were readily driven back, and our men gained some hundreds of yards distance to the front. They came, however, upon a very heavy line posted in strong pits, and these supported by heavy reserves. The troops on the right had at the same time gained a portion of the rebel works, but were almost immediately driven back, and the enemy then pushed out in superior force upon my men and compelled them to retire almost to their original position. The arrival of another regiment again gave us the command of the position, and the rebels fell back to their pits; but as their presence in considerable force, both in their works and in front of their skirmish line, had been ascertained, a second advance was not ordered. In this little fight, which was brief but severe, we lost four (4) men killed and nineteen (19) wounded. Colonel Este, who commanded the line in person, was sorely bruised by a bullet, and narrowly escaped losing his leg. He displayed the utmost bravery, as did the officers and men generally who were engaged. In the afternoon I advanced my whole line and intrenched it, and the 4th corps connected with me on the left.

*July 10.*—The passage of the river some miles above having been at length effected by the 23d corps, the last of the rebels were withdrawn to the south bank during the previous night and the bridges were burned. Major General Howard then moved his troops to the support of the 23d corps, and my division replaced him in his position at Pace's ferry. I moved into this position before night.

*July 11.*—From this date until the 17th my command remained stationary, picketing the river bank. In the interval, the twenty-third regiment Missouri volunteers, assigned by Major General Thomas to my first brigade, came up and joined the command. The second brigade likewise came forward from Marietta, leaving only the second regiment Minnesota volunteers at that place, and rejoined the division. In the same interval also Brigadier General Turchin was compelled to go north for the benefit of his health, and the command of the brigade devolved upon Colonel M. B. Walker, thirty-first Ohio, who has retained it until this time.

*July 17.*—Pontoon bridges having been completed at Pace's ferry, and the 4th corps from above having cleared the opposite shore, we crossed the river, the first and second divisions preceding mine.

*July 18.*—The corps advanced, passing Nances' creek at Kyle's ferry, and encamped at night with our advance at Howell's mills on Peachtree creek, the 20th corps being a little above us on our left.

*July 19.*—Most of the day was spent in reconnoitring the creek, which was deep, and the bridges being destroyed the passage was difficult. In front of Howell's mill, the point occupied by first division, 14th corps, the crossing was strongly disputed, and the character of the ground admitted of such easy defences that to have forced a passage must have been hazardous and attended with much loss. In the afternoon, however, the second division succeeded in getting over lower down, and I, being in reserve, sent out my first brigade to cross with it. I had at first been directed by Major General Thomas to cross my division at that place, but on going there and finding it occupied by Brigadier General Davis, the order was modified by the corps commander, and a single one of my brigades sent out to support. This brigade having crossed, got into position after dark, after a brisk skirmish on the left of the second division.



The 20th corps, higher up the stream, had likewise got over during the afternoon, and this doubtless induced the force in front of Brigadier General Johnson to retire. As soon as it had done so I was ordered, with my second and third brigades, to pass to the front of him and cross at the mill. I began the movement soon after dark, being obliged in the first place to build a temporary bridge, and by midnight had the two brigades well intrenched upon the heights on the south side of the creek.

*July 20.*—At daylight Brigadier General Johnson's division crossed over and went into position on my left. I also made a connexion with the 20th corps on the other flank. I at the same time moved forward my third brigade, and forming it on the left of the first, which had crossed with the command of Brigadier General Davis, pushed the two out and obtained possession of an important range of wooded hills, half a mile to the front of my first location. As these troops went into position, and, indeed, throughout the day, they were subjected to a very galling fire from rebel batteries, which were posted beyond the ridge and out of our reach. To enable these two brigades to make a still further advance, I posted my two batteries at a point on Brigadier General Johnson's front, from which they would have a cross-fire upon the wooded ground over which the troops must pass. The batteries had gone into position, but had not opened fire, when the great assault made that day on the 20th corps and the first division of our corps took place, and they did good service in aiding to repel that attack. No part of the rebel assaulting columns reached my lines; but throughout the whole attack, and until dark, my troops were subjected to an artillery fire as constant and as terrible as any that I have ever witnessed, and the loss in the division from this cause, and upon the skirmish line, was considerable. Throughout the whole both officers and men behaved themselves with a degree of coolness and bravery highly commendable, and showing them to be veteran soldiers.

*July 21.*—About this time the batteries were relieved from duty with the division and ordered to report to corps headquarters. After a hot skirmish of some hours my lines were again moved forward nearly a mile, established and entrenched at a short distance from the works of the enemy, in a position so advantageous and commanding that it must have contributed largely to compelling him to retire.

*July 22.*—During the night previous the rebel army fell back finally from our front into the works about Atlanta, and my division marching forward until it came to the Marietta and Atlanta road, followed it until it struck the railroad two miles from the city. We there came up with the first division, 14th corps, whose advanced guard was then skirmishing close up to the line of works surrounding that place. The 20th corps was immediately to the left, and the army of the Tennessee some miles to the eastward on the Augusta railroad. I immediately received orders from Major General Thomas to move to the south, along the west side of the town, until I came to the intersection of the Atlanta and Turner's ferry road with that leading from White Hall to the latter place, and there to post my command. This point was reached without opposition, and my troops were put in position under the supervision of the department commander, who had come to that place. The second division, on arriving, formed on my right, a little retired, and all our troops intrenched themselves during the afternoon, so as to be covered while within camp from the shells and sharpshooters of the enemy. It was at this time that the great battle with the army of the Tennessee, in which the gallant McPherson was killed, took place, and we waited anxiously expecting orders to take part in it.

*July 23*—From this date until the 3d of August the general location of the division was not changed. A constant and venomous skirmish was kept up between the pickets on both sides, and our lines were so close that our men in camp were, at any moment that they exposed themselves, liable to be picked off by

the enemy's riflemen and batteries, and those upon the rebel forts kept up an unceasing exchange of compliments, so that our loss in killed and wounded in camp was not inconsiderable. Numerous 20-pounder shells and shell of 64 pounds weight, from the old 32-pounder, rifles, came regularly into our camps, a weight of metal entirely out of proportion to our light field-pieces. While in this position two regiments of the first brigade of the eighty-second Indiana and the twenty-third Missouri, drove the enemy, after sharp skirmishing, from some wooded heights on our right and in front, which they fortified and held until turned over to the second division. These hills were not properly in our front, but, in the hands of the enemy, were annoying to us, and the regiments deserve honorable mention for this service.

On the 27th the army of the Tennessee passed around to our rear and took position on our right, and on the 28th was attacked by the rebel army in force, making one of the chief battles of the campaign. A slight change in the strength of my command took place at this time. The thirty-fifth Ohio volunteers being ordered to Vining's station on August 3d, never afterwards returned, being mustered out at that place.

*August 3.*—The 14th army corps having received orders to move to the extreme right of the army, with a view of forming a column of support upon the right flank of Major General Schofield's command, to protect, cover, and sustain him in certain different operations which he proposed to carry into execution, marched on this morning. My division, in rear of the other two, came up with them already encamped about two miles to the north of Utoy creek, and passing through them and also through the lines of Brigadier General Cox's division of the 23d corps, the head of my column came up to the creek near an old mill. On the way I was informed that Brigadier General Hascall's division of the same corps was about to cross the stream, and I was ordered to move my column so as to cover his right flank. When I arrived at his position he had already got over, and, with but little resistance, was establishing his line on the first range of open hills to the left of the road. It was then about 5 p. m., when, meeting Major General Sherman, I was ordered by him to put my division in line on Brigadier General Hascall's right, but to throw back my own right so as to rest on the creek. This order was at once carried into execution, yet it was quite dark before all the troops got into position. My line, taking the highest ground, stretched along the road for the length of a brigade beyond Brigadier General Hascall's, and then lent to the rear. Its length was so great that I was required to put nearly all my troops in a single line, while the division just formed on my left was compactly formed and held a brigade in reserve. This disposition I thought strange, since I had been sent out simply to support another division while it performed a certain work.

*August 4.*—In the morning my lines were rectified so as to conform better to the ground, the batteries put in position, and the works thrown up during the night strengthened. About midday, as no movement of the troops on my left seemed to be in preparation, although I was told an advance was contemplated, I reported in person at the headquarters of the corps, two miles back of the creek, and while there I saw the first and second divisions of the corps just moving out and passing towards the front. I then returned to my command, and soon after received a written order from Major General Palmer, directing me to advance my right, with a view to gaining the high ground on my right front, and informing me that Brigadier General Morgan would cross the creek on my right and support the movement. It also stated that this movement was intended as preliminary to an advance upon the enemy's works, should that be judged expedient or ordered, and for which I would be expected to furnish the assaulting column. It further directed me to push out my skirmishers and begin the movement as soon as Brigadier General Morgan should begin crossing. A little later I received another written order, also from Major General Palmer, stating that

it was intended I should push out with Brigadier General Hascall as far as practicable and reconnoitre the enemy's works, and directing me to attack in column if the works could be carried. The first part of these instructions had already been carried out before the order was received, for I had the night previous taken possession of all the high ground in that vicinity, and it only remained for me to await the other contingencies—the arrival of Brigadier General Morgan or the advance of Brigadier General Hascall. I had made full preparations and was waiting accordingly, when, about 4 o'clock p. m., Major General Palmer came up in person and asked me if my brigade was ready for the reconnoissance; I replied that no special mention had been made of sending out a brigade on that duty, and asked if he wished me to send one. He replied that he did, and I at once detailed Colonel Gleason's brigade for that purpose. The brigade was formed in the shortest possible time, in two lines, with a strong skirmishing party in front, and at once moved out. The operation was vigorously conducted, and two lines of skirmish pits captured. The party kept on until the location and character of the rebel main line was fully developed, and a heavy fire of artillery and musketry drawn from it. This accomplished, and no movement whatever of the troops on our left having been made, and no tidings received of Brigadier General Morgan, I, at dark, directed Colonel Gleason to bring his men back to their works, leaving the skirmishers in the first pits. Colonel Gleason and his officers and men deserve the highest praise for the manner in which this affair was conducted. They brought in twenty-five (25) prisoners, and our brigade sustained a loss of twenty-six (26) in killed and wounded.

*August 5.*—At half past 4 o'clock in the morning I received, directly from Major General Schofield, commanding the 23d army corps, an order prescribing movements for the 14th and 23d army corps upon that day, embracing operations proposed for this division, and I at once wrote to him, stating that I knew of no authority under which he could presume to give orders to my division, which belonged to the army of the Cumberland, but informing him that I would communicate his wishes to my commanding officer. As the order of Major General Schofield detailed operations for all the troops acting on the right of the army, and being always anxious to perform my part in whatever may be calculated to promote the success of our arms, I immediately went to my troops to prepare them for the execution of the orders, in case they should receive the proper sanction of my commander, or to be in readiness to co-operate, on my own responsibility, in any movement which the troops near me might undertake. The order from Major General Schofield, alluded to above, directed me to move at 6 a. m.; to push forward my whole line, conforming it to the direction of that of the enemy, and, driving in his skirmishers, to press on until I had drawn the fire of his lines. The second division, commanded by Brigadier General Morgan, was directed to support my right in the movement, and, if possible, to prolong my line when formed. I was also directed to move without reference to my connexion with Brigadier General Hascall, as Brigadier General Cox would stand ready to fill any interval between us. It was 4½ o'clock a. m. when I gave notice to Major General Schofield that I did not recognize his authority, and both his headquarters and those of our corps were within a mile of mine, yet it was not until 6½ a. m. that he wrote me another note saying that my corps commander would communicate the order to me properly, and at about 7 o'clock a. m. notice was given me that the corps would act during the day under the direction of Major General Schofield. About that same time, I found the head of Brigadier General Cox's column well closed up in rear of my left, but I was informed that Brigadier General Hascall would make no movement during the day, as his lines were already so close to those of the enemy that a further advance was not possible. When I did finally receive authentic orders from my commanding officer for a movement, I had not yet heard from Brigadier General

Morgan, who was to move on my right flank; I did not know how far below he had crossed the creek, nor how far distant he might be; but convinced from my experience of the day before that if anything was to be accomplished, I must act independently of connexions, taking care of my own flanks, I instructed my officers accordingly. The reconnoissance of the night previous had made us thoroughly acquainted with the ground we were to pass over, as well as with the position which we wished to take up, and it took but a short time to prepare for the move. A doubly strong skirmish line was thrown out from each brigade, supported by heavy reserves, and the troops were prepared to follow. A perfect understanding was then established between the officers along the line, and at a signal given, about 8 o'clock, the skirmishers dashed forward. The more distant rifle-pits, which had been taken the evening before, but not held by us, had been occupied by a largely increased force and much strengthened, with orders to the rebel officers in charge to hold them to the last extremity. This order, by keeping them there, enabled us to take more prisoners than we would otherwise have done. Our men were met by a very heavy fire, but pushed on so rapidly that the struggle was of short duration, and a few minutes put us in possession of all the ground up to within short musket range of the rebel main works. With the capture of the rebel skirmish line the forward movement of my troops was brought to an end, but their exposure to the fire of the main works did not cease. The regiments being brought up to take position and intrench themselves upon the new line, were subjected throughout the day to a galling musketry fire from the rebel main works, as well as from his batteries, from which our loss was considerable. In the very handsome charge of the skirmish line, Captain Michael Stone, of the thirty-first Ohio volunteers, commanded the skirmishers of the first brigade; Major R. C. Sabine, eighty-seventh Indiana, those of the second brigade; and Major William Irvine, thirty-eighth Ohio, those of the third brigade, and deserve special mention for their gallantry. Major Irvine was wounded in the leg, which has since been amputated, and a little later in the day the brave Lieutenant Colonel Myron Baker, commanding the seventy-fourth Indiana, was shot dead while putting his regiment in the line. My casualties amounted in all to five (5) officers and seventy-eight (78) enlisted men killed and wounded, while we captured about one hundred and forty (140) prisoners. All engaged in this affair, both officers and men, behaved as handsomely as men could do, and are deserving of the highest praise. When I first got into position, the second division had not yet come up, and my two right regiments were refused so as to cover that flank; but later, when those troops did arrive, all were brought up on to the same line. While I was making my advance, and throughout the day until dark, no movement was made by troops of the 23d corps on my left, although the line of rebel rifle-pits captured by my men extended along Brigadier General Hascall's front, and could have been carried easily by a charge simultaneous with mine. They were the same pits which were taken two days later by the troops of our first division, (14th army corps.)

*August 6.*—About daybreak in the morning the troops of the 23d army corps were withdrawn from my left to be transferred to the extreme right, and were replaced by the first division of our corps, commanded by Brigadier General King. The operations of the two corps for that day again were detailed and promulgated in a lengthy order from Major General Schofield issued the night previous, but as the part to be performed by my division was dependent upon Brigadier General Cox and Hascall, who were expected to turn the enemy's left flank or to break into his line in the vicinity of the Sandtown road, and as these movements did not appear to be carried into execution, my men remained in their works. It was on the same day that Major General Palmer relinquished command of the 14th corps and turned it over to Brigadier General Johnson.

*August 7.*—The first division having made arrangements to push out and take the skirmish pits of the enemy, corresponding with those captured by my men

on the 5th, I ordered a strong demonstration along the whole line to aid them. In some places my works were so close to those of the rebels that the men could not go out of them, but in others the skirmishers were pressed out strongly, and a sharp encounter of some duration ensued. It ended in my advancing my left regiment some two hundred (200) yards, and those on the right, which had been retired, came up on a line with the others. Brigadier General Morgan moved forward at the same time, and our divisions joined near the junctions of the Sandtown and Lick Skillet roads. In the operations of that day I lost sixty-six (66) men killed and wounded. The loss in the first division was of course heavy, but it gained both prisoners and an advanced position. I have been thus minute and circumstantial in my narrative of events since coming in contact with the 23d corps, inasmuch as complaint was made to the major general commanding the department of the Cumberland that the 14th corps had failed to accomplish its portion of the work marked out, when in point of fact every advantage of any kind that was gained, from the time that we moved to the right up to the 8th of August, was achieved by the 14th corps.

*August 8.*—From this date until the 26th the general position and disposition of my troops was not changed; the necessary location of our camps was such that they were constantly exposed to the enemy's fire, and there were few points that a man could show himself without the risk of being shot. On certain portions of the line a temporary truce would be arranged with the troops that chanced to be in front, while at others a vicious skirmish would be kept up, and for days the men would be imprisoned in their trenches, not daring to show their heads above the parapet; and this varied by the fire of artillery or more active demonstrations begun by one or the other party. In this passive condition, with no other operations on hand, our daily reports presented not unfrequently a list of ten, (10,) twenty, (20,) or thirty (30) casualties, and the long continuance of the confinement and privation was extremely trying, yet the men bore all with a degree of cheerfulness, patience, and heroism that can find its reward only in the consciousness of duty well performed, and of devotion to the holy cause in which they were engaged. During our long stay in such close proximity to the enemy deserters from their lines, chiefly from Alabama regiments, came in constantly and in large numbers. They finally became so numerous that the most strenuous means were resorted to by the rebel officers to prevent them.

On the 22d of August Brigadier General Davis having received the brevet of major general and been assigned to the command of the 14th corps, relieved Brigadier General Johnson, who was transferred out of the corps.

*August 26.*—A general movement of the entire army to the right, by which we were to break off from our railroad communication and throw ourselves upon the Atlanta and Macon railroad, having been decided upon, the 4th and 20th corps had already been withdrawn from the city, and on the night of the 26th the 14th corps and the army of the Tennessee were also to withdraw and pass to the right, going in rear of the 23d corps, and of the 4th corps, then in position on the right of the former. The operation of withdrawing from such close proximity to the enemy was one of much delicacy.

At 8 o'clock p. m. the army of the Tennessee and the first division of our corps (14th) drew out and began the march, leaving my division on the extreme left. I should have marched immediately after them but for detentions and delays caused by the trains of other commands and the artillery. I did not feel authorized to quit my position until nearly 3 o'clock. The enemy was doubtless apprised by the noise of our trains and artillery that some movement was taking place, and opened upon us from the batteries, but beyond this we were not disturbed, and withdrew most successfully.

*August 27.*—Arriving at the left of the 23d corps our troops were formed

upon it, facing to the north, to cover the further withdrawal and arrangement of the trains, and we remained in that position until the following morning.

*August 28.*—We again marched; my division following the second, which formed the head of the column. The advanced guard of that division had some little skirmishing, which did not delay our march, and in the afternoon we went into position near Red Oak station, on the West Point railroad. We formed line south of the road—Brigadier General Morgan on my right and Brigadier General Carlin, commanding the 1st division, on my left, reaching to the railroad. The 4th corps prolonged our line, and was north of the road.

*August 29.*—The army remained stationary, and the troops were employed in destroying the railroad, in making reconnaissance, and in cutting roads.

*August 30.*—We marched on in a southeasterly direction, reaching the Rough-and-Ready and Fayette road at Conck's house, and took position there for the night. The army of the Tennessee was a few miles distant on the right. The 4th corps connected with the 14th on the left, and the 23d corps still further to the left, towards Rough-and-Ready.

*August 31.*—Having heard trains of the enemy during the night moving south along our front, our skirmishers pushed out, and at daybreak discovered them, although at a considerable distance, still moving in that direction. They were on a road to the east of Flint river, and until it reached the Rough-and-Ready and Jonesboro' road near Smith's; and immediately afterwards the entire division, with Colonel Mitchell's brigade of the second division, ordered to report to me, were brought up and posted at this point. As soon as our troops had secured themselves in this position, about 4 o'clock p. m., I detailed Colonel Carleton's regiment of the first brigade, together with large parties from each of the other two brigades, and sent them forward, with orders to reach the Macon railroad, if possible, and, if they were able, to hold themselves upon it. The party struck that road at Morrow's or Chapman's station, a point four (4) miles from Jonesboro', seven (7) miles from Rough-and-Ready, and about two and a half ( $2\frac{1}{2}$ ) miles from our position. The road was reached about 6 o'clock p. m., and a considerable party of rebel cavalry encountered there, and as the nature of the country admitted readily of our men being cut off from the division, Colonel Carleton, after destroying three cars which he had captured, fell back some fourth of a mile to higher ground on the edge of the woods. As soon as I learned of his success and that the railroad was so remote from the rest of our troops, I sent out Colonel Gleason's brigade to occupy a ridge nearly a mile in our front, and detached three other regiments to strengthen the party on the railroad. The whole of this detachment being then under command of Colonel Hunter, eighty-seventh Indiana volunteers, the senior officer, he again moved it up to the road; after putting up a defensive work, which occupied most of the night, he set his men to work to take up the track.

It was not until late that I learned that the 4th and 23d corps had also reached the railroad near Rough-and-Ready and were then intrenching. My little party moved out independent of every one else, and although opposed and constantly menaced by the rebel cavalry, struck the road some miles in advance of any other. Colonel Hunter and his officers and men deserve much credit for their enterprise and determination.

*September 1.*—About 8 o'clock a. m. I received notice that the 14th corps would be concentrated at my position on the Jonesboro' road, to move by it to that place, while the 14th corps would move simultaneously along the railroad, I being also directed to withdraw my men from it so soon as to be ready for the movement. Brigadier General Carlin's division coming in from the rear took the advance along the road, and was followed by that of Brigadier General Morgan. While waiting for these troops to stretch out upon the road, my party from the railroad came in, but it was not until 12 o'clock m. that the road was clear for me to march.

## BATTLE OF JONESBORO'.

On arriving near the creek, two miles north of Jonesboro', I met Major General Thomas, and was informed that Brigadier General Morgan had already formed beyond the creek, connecting with the left of the army of the Tennessee. That Brigadier General Carlin had also crossed, and was forming to the left of Brigadier General Morgan, and I was expected to go into line on the left of Carlin. Morgan's skirmishers were then engaged with those of the enemy, but Carlin had not yet struck them. I at once turned to the left, leaving the high road to march toward my position, and as the head of my column passed the creek I met one of my staff officers whom I had sent out in advance, bringing orders from General Davis. He directed me to post my division in rear of an interval between Brigadier Generals Morgan and Carlin, through which he was fearful the enemy would pass, and the precise ground on which it was desired that I should form was pointed out. General Davis coming up immediately afterwards, confirmed the correctness of the disposition. Before, however, this order could be executed I received another directing this division to form on Brigadier General Carlin and prolong his line to the left. My column was at once turned in that direction, and I rode forward along the intrenchments which Brigadier General Carlin's men had thrown up, to find the point at which my right would rest. Finding this point I also found that division just put in motion, marching towards the right and front, and I followed a short distance to discover the direction which I would have to take and the best route for getting into position. My column followed closely in rear of the first division, and by the time that it had become stationary and was formed, was close up in rear of the left flank. Not one moment was lost by this division, for at the very moment that the point where it was to rest became determined, it was on the spot. Brigadier General Carlin's left reached just to the railroad, and there joined the head of Major General Stanley's column, the 4th corps, which had arrived. I accordingly caused my troops to be massed in rear of Brigadier General Carlin's left. Having seen Major General Stanley, and finding that he was willing to make way for me, and understanding it to be the intention of Major General Thomas's order that our line should be prolonged beyond the railroad, in case it should reach that far, I rode forward to examine the ground. I passed along the east side of the road some distance beyond our lines without meeting with opposition, and having discovered an advantageous position, was about to bring my division up to it. I had given the order and the troops were about to march when I received contrary instructions, requiring me to hold my division west of the road as a reserve to support the other two. Soon after that, at near 4 o'clock, Brigadier General Carlin's line moved forward, and, by direction of General Davis, I moved Colonel Este's brigade in line of battle behind General Carlin's left brigade, the left flanks of both keeping along the railroad. My other two brigades moved in column on the road leading along the right of the railroad. The deployed lines of my third brigade had to work their way through a thick wood nearly a third of a mile in width before reaching the open ground, stretching in front of the wood in which were the rebel works, and, having put this brigade in motion, I moved forward with the other two. On reaching a cabin beyond the woods marked on the accompanying map I met General Davis, who informed me that he had sent Colonel Este's brigade, which came up in advance of me, to support the right brigade of Brigadier General Carlin, which had been severely handled in an attempt to advance upon the rebel works. A staff officer arriving at the moment with a message from Brigadier General Carlin created the impression that there was some misunderstanding of the respective relations between that officer and Colonel Este, whereupon General Davis sent word to Colonel Este that he was to report to General Carlin and to be subject to his orders. Fearful that some ill results might

arise should the orders still not be understood, and notwithstanding that the brigade was thus placed under the control of another division commander, I volunteered to go myself and give personal supervision to the execution of all orders. General Davis told me, as he started, that he wished Colonel Este to replace the right brigade of Brigadier General Carlin, (the regular brigade,) and then to advance upon the enemy along with the other troops on the right and left when they advanced. As I passed to the right I had an opportunity for a hasty glance at the ground constituting the field of fight, and the rough map which is attached to this report, made from actual bearings and distances taken by myself, gives the most accurate representation of it that I have seen. It represents the rebel works and the position of my three brigades quite accurately, and that of Brigadier General Carlin's two brigades approximately, at the moment when Colonel Este began to move forward. Our troops were in open ground, which was bordered on the south by a very regular line of woodland, running due east and west, and extending from near the railroad to the west a distance of nearly six hundred and twenty (620) yards or steps. The line of woods then turned and ran south, facing westward upon another field, in which were the troops of Brigadier General Morgan. The rebel works lay within the woods and were entirely concealed from view. They approached at the nearest point to within fifteen (15) yards of the open ground, but at others were sixty, (60,) eighty, (80,) or one hundred (100) yards back in the woods. From the northwest angle of the woods ran northerly a kind of ravine and thicket, apparently an old fence line, which separated the field in which the second division lay from that occupied by the first and third divisions. I found Colonel Wood's brigade of the first division formed in two lines, the one near the cabin and the other intrenched along the edge of the woods, its left on the railroad. Apparently the regular brigade had endeavored to take up a position on the same line, in the edge of the woods, but the rebel works in their front approaching so much nearer to the open ground it was of course impossible, without first taking the works in the woods. It was in this way, doubtless, that it lost so heavily before my men came up. I found it to be the right of the other brigade of the first division; and some two hundred (200) yards back in the open field, partially covered by an undulation of the ground in front. Colonel Este's brigade, when it came up, was formed, in the position represented on the map, fifty (50) yards in rear of the regular brigade, in two lines of battle—the tenth Kentucky on the right and the seventy-fourth Indiana and fourteenth Ohio in the second line, the seventy-fourth on the right. Colonel Walker's and Colonel Gleason's brigades were in reserve, and then just coming up to take position. Seeing that to relieve Major Eddie's brigade required Colonel Este to pass to the front of it, and that to come into line with Colonel Moore, so as to advance at the same time with the other troops, might involve a serious assault of works hidden in the woods, I directed the troops to unsling and pile their knapsacks, and fix bayonets, so as to be ready for heavy work. Our uncertainty with regard to the works we might encounter was increased from having been told that the rebels had two lines, one of which had been taken by our men, some of whom remained in them. All of which turned out to be a delusion. The order to move forward was given at 4 $\frac{3}{4}$  o'clock p. m., when the lines moved off handsomely, attended by a single staff officer, Captain Acheson, assistant adjutant general, and two orderlies. I accompanied Colonel Este, so as to be ready to give him any assistance he might require. Our men, passing over the line of the regular brigade, soon reached the crest in front, and about one hundred (100) yards from the works began to receive a murderous fire of musketry and canister. They were immediately put at the charge, and without faltering the whole line moved splendidly into the woods. On the right the success was immediate and complete. The tenth Kentucky, followed by the seventy-fourth Indiana, struck upon the short projecting point of rifle-pits called the first line,



and carried it, as well as the main line, extending thence to the right—a single dash after entering the woods gave them the victory. The rebel troops, confident in themselves and in their ability to hold their works, were totally unprepared for a charge of this kind, and were taken completely by surprise. They delivered a single volley, and before they could reload found our men in the trenches with them, bayonetting all who would not surrender. Three companies on the right of the seventy-fourth Indiana, which overlapped the tenth Kentucky, obliquing to the right, entered the woods at the east end of the battery of four (4) guns, on the angle, and driving the enemy out, took possession of the guns; they belonged to a battery of the consolidated eighth and nineteenth Arkansas regiments, and Lieutenant Kruger, of the seventy-fourth regiment Indiana volunteers, capturing the battery flag, brought it away with him. After holding the battery for some minutes, until the troops of the next brigade on the right came up in the rear and entered it, these companies closed to the left on their own regiments, leaving the guns with the new comers. As the only material evidence of the capture brought away was the flag, (the guns themselves being left with the second division,) Colonel Este has procured statements from several of his officers and men who were present, and forwards them with his report. On the left our men were not immediately so successful. The thirty-eighth and fourteenth Ohio regiments, after entering the woods, formed a line extending from the short projecting works to the left, but the distance to the rebel main works being greater than on the right, and the approach to it more obstructed by fallen trees, they could not at once reach it. They remained in this position, subject to a most terrible fire coming obliquely down the woods from the rebel right, for some minutes after the right wing had achieved its success. Colonel Este, who was at this point of the line, finding that the troops on our left did not or could not move forward with us, as we had been led to expect that they would, began to fear that his men could not hold on where they were, and sent for re-enforcements. Seeing at the same time a regiment of Brigadier General Morgan's left brigade, the seventeenth New York, marching up to go into place in rear of our right, where it was no longer needed, Colonel Este appealed to the commanding officer, requesting him to put in his regiment on our left, where it could be most useful, and guided him to the place. The fire of the enemy at this point was most destructive, yet the gallant Colonel W. G. C. Groer carried his regiment into position with an heroic bravery, challenging the highest admiration, and was himself almost the first to fall before it. The regiment seeing this, for a moment faltered, but was at once reassured, and the order to charge being given, rushed forward with the fourteenth and thirty-eighth Ohio, and capturing not only the works, but nearly all in them. This ended the battle, as all that followed was desultory firing, or shots from distant artillery. This charge of my third brigade, one of the most magnificent on record, and the first during this campaign in which works on either side have been assaulted and carried, was productive of the greatest results, in opening the way for the advance of the troops on our right and left, and destroying the morale of the boldest and most confident troops in the rebel army. The losses sustained attest the severity of the struggle. Out of eleven hundred (1,100) officers and men who went into the action, seventy-five (75) were killed and two hundred and fifty-five (255) wounded, nearly one out of every three being hit, and all in a space of thirty minutes time. Among those who fell was the gallant Colonel Choate, of the thirty-eighth Ohio, who has since died of his wounds. Major Wilson, commanding the fourteenth Ohio, lost his leg, and numerous others of our best officers and men, on this glorious occasion sacrificed themselves upon the altar of their country. For the names of those who particularly distinguished themselves I refer to reports of brigades and regiments.

On no occasion within my own knowledge has the use of the bayonet been so general or so authenticated. Three brothers named Hoe, of the tenth Kentucky,

went over the rebel parapet together, and two of them pinned their adversaries to the ground with the bayonet, and as an officer of the seventy-fourth Indiana was about to be bayoneted by a rebel, a soldier warded off the blow, and after some minutes of fencing, transfixed his antagonist. These, as the wounded rebels show, are not isolated instances. The brigade captured four hundred and twenty-six (426) prisoners, including fifty-five officers, from the rank of colonel down. They were from the second, fourth, fifth, sixth, and ninth Kentucky; the sixth, seventh, and eighth Arkansas; the twenty-eighth, thirty-fourth, and forty-sixth Alabama; the twenty-fourth South Carolina, and sixty-third Virginia regiment. It also captured the battle-flag of the sixth and seventh Arkansas regiment, and the battery flag heretofore spoken of.

In closing the report of this battle, and while testifying to the heroic conduct of all officers and men of the brigade, I cannot overlook the splendid gallantry of Colonel Este, commanding it. His horse was shot from under him and his clothing torn with bullets, yet he retained the utmost coolness, and managed his command with a high degree of judgment and skill. I hope he will receive the reward which his services merit. I must also make honorable mention of the bravery of Captain Acheson, the only staff officer I had with me, who was wounded while riding with me in the charge. My first and second brigades were not actively engaged in this battle, but held themselves close in reserve. After dark Colonel Walker relieved Colonel Este's brigade on the line, and remained in that position during the night. Colonel Gleason remained in reserve. Both of these brigades sustained slight losses.

*September 2.*—The enemy having evacuated Jonesboro' during the night and fallen back on the Macon road, our army pursued. The 14th corps was left behind as the rear guard of the grand army.

*September 3.*—It was announced that Atlanta had been evacuated and our campaign was at an end. In this long, remarkable, and glorious campaign, the soldiers of this army have endured fatigues, sufferings, and privations which has been undergone, and duty performed, while establishing for them the high tide will never be known or related. The quiet and heroic patience with which all reputation as soldiers, will still tend to cause their hardships to be forgotten. Starting without transportation, and with only the supplies for an expedition of three or six weeks, these things have been required to last for four months, so that often our officers, lying in the dirt and rain for days without shelter, have been unable to preserve the ordinary cleanliness which is essential to health, and many have broken down for want of proper food. During the greater part of the time our men have lain constantly under the enemy's fire, at any moment likely to be picked off, while the sound, not of distant artillery and musketry, but of the closely whistling bullet and bursting shell, has seldom been out of their ears; the rest which they have experienced by the simple cessation of these noises has been great. Our losses in the slow operations of the trench, on picket, on daily and nightly skirmishes, as well as in the battle, although distributed over a great length of time, yet equal in the aggregate the casualties of the greatest battles.

*The following report exhibits the total loss of the division in killed and wounded during the campaign from the 7th of May to the 7th of September.*

	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL.		Aggregate.
	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	
Division staff.....			1		1				2
1st brigade.....	7	35	15	297		2	22	334	256
2d brigade.....	3	23	10	179		4	13	206	219
3d brigade.....	4	129	31	467		16	35	606	641
Total infantry.....	14	187	57	843	1	16	70	1,146	1,216
Artillery.....				9				9	9
Total of division....	14	187	57	852	1	16	70	1,155	1,225

This loss of 1,225 officers and men is to be compared, not with the aggregate effective force of 8,460 men with which we entered upon the campaign, but with a much smaller average in the field, as the time of many regiments soon expired, reducing our strength, at the end of the campaign, to an aggregate of 4,840, officers and men.

The following table of effective force, made since the close of the campaign, may be profitably compared with that of the 7th of May:

EFFECTIVE FORCE OF THE THIRD DIVISION 14TH CORPS, SEPTEMBER 12, 1864.

*First brigade—Colonel M. C. Hunter, 82d Indiana, commanding.*

	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
Headquarters first brigade.....	10	60	70
17th Ohio volunteers, Colonel Durbin Ward.....	21	47	438
31st Ohio volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel F. W. Lister.....	15	371	386
89th Ohio volunteers, Colonel C. H. Carleton.....	9	187	196
92d Ohio volunteers, Colonel B. D. Fearing.....	16	275	291
82d Indiana volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Mathew.....	16	196	212
23d Maryland volunteers, Colonel W. B. Robinson.....	24	500	524
Total effective force.....	111	2,006	2,117

*Second brigade—Colonel N. Gleason, eighty-seventh Indiana, commanding.*

	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
Headquarters second brigade.....	7	43	50
2d Minnesota volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel J. N. Bishop.....	17	376	393
105th Ohio volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel G. F. Perkins .....	14	245	259
75th Indiana volunteers, Major C. I. McCall.....	17	304	321
87th Indiana volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel E. T. Hammond.....	14	235	249
101st Indiana volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Doan.....	17	262	279
Total effective force.....	86	1,465	1,551

*Third brigade—Colonel George P. Este, fourteenth Ohio volunteer infantry, commanding.*

	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
Headquarters third brigade.....	8	56	64
10th Kentucky volunteers, Colonel W. C. Hays .....	12	185	197
74th Indiana volunteers, Major Thomas Morgan .....	15	242	257
38th Ohio volunteers, Captain J. Wagstaff.....	9	297	306
14th Ohio volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel H. D. Kingsbury .....	15	333	348
Total effective force.....	59	1,113	1,172
Regiments detached:			
10th Indiana volunteers, Lt. Col. M. B. Taylor, at Marietta, Ga..	18	293	311
18th Kentucky volunteers, Lt. Col. H. K. Milwood, at Ringgold, Ga.	22	268	290
Effective force of detached regiments .....	40	561	601
Total effective force of division .....	296	5,145	5,441

The division captured during the few months nine hundred and eight (908) men, including sixty-one (61) officers. One hundred and forty-seven of these desired to be sent to the rear and classed as deserters, the rest as prisoners of war. It will be seen by this that, while the division has not lost in all twenty (20) prisoners, it has taken from the rebel army, independent of those killed and wounded, almost as many men as it has lost in battle. Some flags have been captured, but not all turned over to me; of material trophies, however, we have obtained little, except arms of no great value to our army. This long record would be incomplete should I fail to mention especially the five officers who, as brigade commanders, have been my chief assistants in the campaign.

Brigadier General J. B. Turchin, one of the most thoroughly educated and scientific soldiers in the country, and a more devoted patriot than most of those born upon our soil, commanded the first brigade with distinguished ability during the first half of the campaign. He was then, by a failure of health, compelled to resign, thus inflicting a great loss upon the service.

Colonel F. Van Derveer, thirty-fifth Ohio volunteers, the brave and accom-

plished commander of the second brigade at Chickamauga and at Mission ridge, remained with the command until the end of June. He also has, by expiration of service, been returned to civil life.

Colonel G. P. Este, who has commanded the third brigade during the campaign; Colonel W. Gleason, who succeeded Colonel Van Derveer in command of the second brigade, and Colonel M. B. Walker, who has succeeded Brigadier General Turchin, have all exhibited a high degree of capacity. Their devotion to duty, their bravery in action, and their distinguished services throughout the campaign merit reward, and I recommend them for promotion or brevets.

To the officers of my own staff my own thanks and the thanks of the command are due for the efficient manner in which their duties have been performed, and the promptness with which we have been kept supplied.

Those who have remained with me in the field, sharing all the hardships, privations, and dangers of the campaign, are deserving of special honorable mention. They are: Major J. A. Lowrie, assistant adjutant general; Major J. A. Connelly, one hundred and twenty-third Illinois volunteers, assistant inspector general; Captain John Moulton, second Minnesota volunteers, provost marshal; Captain E. K. Buttrick, Wisconsin volunteers; Captain John W. Acheson, assistant adjutant general; Lieutenant Ira C. Lawver, ninety-second Illinois, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant George K. Anderson, fifteenth United States infantry, acting commissary of musters and acting aide-de-camp; Surgeon F. Lloyd, United States volunteers, medical director.

I commend these officers to the favorable notice of my commanders with whom they may hereafter serve.

Respectfully submitted:

A. BAIRD,

*Brigadier General, Commanding Division,*

Official:

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

A true copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,

*Brevet Major and Aide-de-camp.*

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HEADQUARTERS 20th CORPS, ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*Atlanta, Ga., September 19, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have the honor of enclosing, herewith, a report of the division and brigade commanders of this corps of the operations of their respective commands during the recent campaign.

The corps was under the command of Major General Hooker from the commencement of the campaign till July 27. A report of its operations during this period will probably be forwarded you by General Hooker. I have sent him duplicates of the enclosed papers.

Brigadier General A. S. Williams was in command of the corps from July 27 to August 27. I enclose his report for this period. The corps marched from its position near Atlanta during the night of August 25, and took position on the Chattahoochee river, covering the railroad bridge and the fords at Pace's and Turner's ferries—the first division near the bridge, the second at Pace's ferry, and the third at Turner's ferry. From the 27th of August till September 1 the troops were engaged in constructing works, strengthening their works, and reconnoitring parties out daily to observe the movements of the enemy in Atlanta.

On the night of September 1 heavy explosions were heard in direction of Atlanta, and a force was at once ordered from each division to make reconnoissance in this direction.

The command from the third division, under Colonel Coburn, on approaching the city was met by the mayor, who made a formal surrender of the town to

him, and informed Colonel Coburn that the enemy had evacuated during the previous night; that the only troops then in the city consisted of a force of cavalry under General Ferguson. On entering the city a few shots were exchanged between our troops and this body of cavalry; about one hundred prisoners were taken. I at once moved forward seven brigades of my command and occupied the works of the enemy. The enemy left in his works and in the city twenty (20) pieces of artillery and several hundred small arms. He destroyed six locomotives, and eighty-one cars loaded with ammunition, small-arms, and stores.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. SLOCUM,

*Major General Commanding.*

Brig. Gen. W. D. WHIPPLE, *Assistant Adjutant General,*  
*Headquarters Department Cumberland.*

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HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, 20th ARMY CORPS,

*Atlanta, Ga., September 20, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following reports of the movements of the 20th army corps while under my command, from July 28 to August 27 last, inclusive.

On the 28th of July, in obedience to Special Orders No. 215, department of the Cumberland, I assumed command of the corps, Major General Hooker having been relieved at his own request.

At this time the first division of the corps occupied the breastworks, still incomplete, connecting on its right with the 14th corps, near the Western and Atlanta railroad, about two miles from the centre of Atlanta, and extended northeasterly, with the second (Geary's) division on its left, connecting with the works of the 4th corps. The third (Ward's division) was in reserve.

On the 29th of July Ward's division was sent, pursuant to the orders of the major general commanding the department, to support Davis's division of the 14th corps in making a reconnoissance to the right of the army.

On July 30 Brigadier General Knipe, commanding first division, was ordered to take and occupy a hill not over three hundred (300) yards distant from one of the enemy's field-works on the Marietta road, and about the same distance in front of the interval between first and second brigades of first division. It was occupied by the enemy's pickets in strong pits and defences, and its crest and approaches were under close fire of his works. The picket line of this division, supported by two small regiments, made a dash for the hill and seized it with a loss of but four (4) men, capturing one hundred and eleven (111) men and eight (8) commissioned officers, and one wounded of the enemy's picket. Before the crest could be intrenched, the enemy opened upon our men from several batteries, and during the day detachments from the first division lost, in holding it, two (2) officers killed, and eleven (11) men killed and fifty-seven (57) wounded. We, however, held and strongly fortified the hill, compelling the enemy to permanently close all the embrasures on the front face of his nearest works. The hill remained in our possession till the corps withdrew to the Chattahoochee. For the purpose of burning some buildings upon it, this same hill had been previously taken by our picket line, supported by the thirteenth New Jersey volunteers, under Colonel E. A. Cannan, general officer of the day, in which affair we captured about twenty of the enemy, with a loss of one killed and three (3) wounded. No effort was made to hold the hill at that time, and the enemy strongly re-enforced the picket upon it.

On the 3d of August Ward's division returned from the reconnoissance towards the right, and on the 4th relieved two divisions of the 14th corps, and occupied their works. The third brigade, first division, 14th corps, remained, and was temporarily placed under the orders of Brigadier General Ward, commanding the third division, 20th corps. Our line at this time extended two and

a half ( $2\frac{1}{2}$ ) miles. From the 5th to the 10th of August the line of Ward's division was several times moved forward, (gaining towards the enemy's works from a half to three-quarters of a mile,) and new works were built, keeping up connexion on the right of Corse's division of the 16th corps. The line of Rodgers, second brigade, was also moved forward, to perfect the line between the left of Ward's division and first division, first brigade. Geary also established and completed his line in advance on the extreme left of the corps connecting with the 4th corps.

From 11th to 25th August no changes of consequence were made in the line. The firing of the light and rifled guns of the corps was daily kept up upon the town and the enemy's works, and several noisy demonstrations were made by our heavy skirmish line, in obedience to superior orders. No organized advance upon the enemy's position was attempted. Casualties, though not large, were of daily occurrence.

On the 25th of August the wagons, ambulances, and a portion of the artillery having been removed the previous day, and the remainder just after dark, the several divisions were withdrawn from our main line about 8 o'clock p. m., and massed about eight hundred yards in the rear. The first division, General Knipe commanding, with Harrison's brigade of the third division, was placed near the Montgomery ferry road; the second (Geary's) division, near the Powell Mill and Pace's ferry road; and two brigades of the third (Ward's) division, near the Turner's ferry road. These several columns were ordered to move on these roads towards the Chattahoochee as soon as the rear of the 4th corps, marching from our left, had passed their respective positions.

Knipe was ordered to take up a line on the south side of Montgomery ferry, at the rail crossing, and to protect the bridges there, throwing Harrison's brigade on the north side of the river. Geary was directed to occupy the high ground about the military bridge at Pace's ferry with two brigades, and send one to the prominent bluff about a mile north of the railroad crossing at Montgomery ferry. Ward was to hold the hills on the south side of the river at Turner's ferry. The columns were not able to move before 2 o'clock at night. The picket line was not withdrawn from our works until near daylight. Each column reached its proper position on the river, and the pickets rejoined their commands without molestation and without loss. Subsequently attacks of no very serious character were made upon both Geary's and Ward's defences and were easily repulsed.

On the 27th of August I was relieved by Major General H. W. Slocum, appointed by the President to command the corps, and on the following morning resumed command of my division. During my brief command of the corps I received the cheerful and effective co-operation of the division commanders and of the staff officers of the corps. I ought especially to name Lieutenant Colonel H. W. Perkins, assistant adjutant general, whose industry, experience, and capacity in his department, I found of especial value. Lieutenant Colonel C. W. Asmussen, assistant inspector general, who, in addition to his office duties, rendered me most valuable assistance in establishing lines and constructing new defensive works; Captain S. E. Pitman, assistant adjutant general; Captain A. T. Masoy, one hundred and twenty-third New York volunteers, assistant aide-de-camp, and First Lieutenant George Robinson, aide-de-camp, acted as my personal staff while I was in command of the corps.

The report of division commanders, which have already been forwarded, will give a list of casualties and additional detail of the movements and operations of their respective commands during the period covered by this report.

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. S. WILLIAMS,

*Brigadier General of Volunteers.*

Brig. General W. D. WHIPPLE,

*Assistant Adjutant General, Dep't of the Cumberland.*

## HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION 20TH ARMY CORPS,

*Atlanta, Ga., September 15, 1864.*

COLONEL: In pursuance of orders, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command during the campaign just terminated by the capture of Atlanta. The consolidation of the 11th and 12th army corps having been ordered, the three brigades composing the second division of the corps were, with the exception of the one hundred and ninth regiment, Pennsylvania veteran volunteers, (which remained as a nucleus of a new brigade,) consolidated into two, the first and third. The first brigade consisted of the twenty-eighth and one hundred and forty-seventh Pennsylvania volunteers, and the fifth, seventh, twenty-ninth, and sixty-sixth regiments of Ohio volunteers, composing an effective force of 2,846 officers and men, commanded by Colonel Charles Candy. The second brigade was composed of the twenty-seventh, seventy-third, and one hundred and ninth Pennsylvania volunteers, of the one hundred and nineteenth, one hundred and thirty-fourth, and one hundred and fifty-fourth New York volunteers, and of the thirty-third regiment New Jersey volunteers, containing an effective force of 1,762 officers and men, commanded by Colonel Adolph Buschbeck. With the exception of the one hundred and ninth Pennsylvania volunteers all the regiments comprising this brigade were formerly connected with the 11th corps. The third brigade consisted of the twenty-ninth and one hundred and eleventh regiments of Pennsylvania volunteers, and of the sixtieth, seventy-eighth, one hundred and second, one hundred and thirty-seventh and one hundred and forty-ninth New York volunteers, containing an effective force of 2,643 officers and men, commanded by Colonel David Ireland. The artillery attached to the division, comprised Independent Pennsylvania battery E, commonly known as Knapp's Pennsylvania battery, and the thirteenth New York battery, both commanded by Captain William Wheeler as chief of the division of artillery, which numbered 256 officers and men effective for the field. The total effective force of the division, including officers and men of the headquarters of the division, was 7,043; the aggregate of officers and men of all conditions present in the division being 7,607.

At the date of the reception of marching orders, as for some time previously, the first brigade garrisoned the post of Bridgeport, Alabama, and vicinity; the third brigade occupied Stevenson and the railroad westward to Anderson; the second brigade, lying near the base of Lookout mountain, formed part of the guard for the valley.

On the 1st of May orders were received directing me to convene my division at Bridgeport, at which place Ireland's brigade joined me on the evening of the second.

On the morning of the second I received a despatch from Major General Hooker directing me to hold my command in readiness to move, and during the day, from the same source, an order to move on the morning of the third towards Chattanooga valley.

May 3, 1864.—At 9 o'clock a. m. the first and third brigades set forward, and after marching until 2 p. m., I halted them at Shellmound in order that my wagon train might reach me without overtaking the mules, many of which had never before been harnessed. A few days previously, under orders from Major General Thomas, I had detached Colonel Pardee, one hundred and forty-seventh Pennsylvania volunteers, with 400 of the first brigade, to take charge of and man one of the gunboats recently built at Bridgeport for the purpose of patrolling the river (Tennessee) westward. The duties required of this detachment were performed; and having taken up the pontoon bridge at Larkinsville it was brought safely to Bridgeport, where the gunboat was turned over to Captain Edwards, assistant quartermaster and on the evening of the third, Colonel Pardee joined me at Shellmound. Another detachment of my division joined me



at the same place, being a party of mechanics whom I had detailed to construct, under my personal supervision, a roadway for wagons on the railroad bridge across the Tennessee at Bridgeport.

*May 4.*—The weather being sultry I marched at early dawn, and with scarcely an incident worthy of note passed Whiteside and Lookout valley, crossed Lookout mountain, and encamped in the Chattanooga valley; the distance travelled being twenty-two miles. Here I was joined by Buschbeck's brigade, which had marched from Lookout valley during the afternoon.

*May 5.*—My division for the first time entirely united. Marched *via* Rose gap, under orders to proceed to Gordon's springs, but the roads in that direction being thronged with troops, my orders were changed and I marched to Post Oak church, four miles from Ringgold. Near this point the division encamped.

*May 6.*—Marched thence to Pea Vine church, which was reached before noon. Here the division encamped in order of battle.

*May 7.*—Leaving Pea Vine church my command crossed Taylor's ridge, passed Gordon's springs, near which I met General Kilpatrick, in his movements upon Villanow, with the other brigades. I reached Thornton's farm, on the Rome road, shortly before dusk. Here I encamped, my line moving parallel to the road, which was commanded on my right by a section of the thirteenth New York battery. The night passed without an attack.

#### MILL CREEK GAP.

*May 8.*—I received orders as follows: "March without delay to seize the gap in the Rocky Land ridge called Babb's, and to establish yourself strongly at that place. Take your two brigades, and send word as soon as you are in position. Take no wagons and but few ambulances." Having no map of the road or country I took a citizen as guide and moved as ordered with my two brigades and two batteries of artillery at 11 o'clock a. m. The road taken was narrow and hilly, but was by several miles the most direct to the point designated, the distance by it being five miles. On reaching Mill Creek valley, at the foot of Chattooga ridge, (named in the order Rocky Land ridge,) my skirmishers came upon the enemy's cavalry pickets near Babb's house; these retreated hastily across Mill creek, pursued by my skirmishers, and made their way to the mountain crest, by the only road, that leading to Dalton. My preparations were immediately made for attacking the enemy, who were in plain sight along the crest of the mountain. The entire range here is known as the Chattooga ridge, one of that numerous class in northern Georgia to which Mission and Taylor ridges also belong; its sides, steep, covered with forest and corrugated with ridgy spurs and formation of rock, rise abruptly from the banks of Mill creek, which flows along its base in a northerly direction. The banks of the creek are fringed with marshy thickets, and the creek itself is a sluggish muddy stream with treacherous bottom.

John's mountain is a peak continuous with the ridge, but rising above the remainder of it about 200 feet, and situated south by west four miles from Dalton. The main road from Lafayette to Dalton crosses Mill creek at Hall's mill, thence winds up the steep ascent to an elevation of 800 feet from the valley, and there crosses the ridge. This roadway has been cut out from the mountain side and through the pallisades which crest the mountain, from which fact comes the name of Dug gap. Along the top, facing westward for miles on either side of the pass, rise pallisades of rock impossible to scale and to be passed only through a few narrow clefts filled with loose rocks and wide enough to admit five or six men abreast. This summit I closely scanned while forming for the attack on either side of the pass and along the crest of John's mountain. In addition to the natural strength of the position were breastworks occupied by the enemy but in what force could only be tested by attack. McGill's Pennsylvania bat-

tery, 3-inch Rodman guns, were placed in position in the field near Babb's house, from which they could reach the crest with their fire, and the fifth and sixty-sixth Ohio volunteers, and one hundred and forty-seventh Pennsylvania volunteers of my first brigade, were left as guard to the artillery. The one hundred and ninety-ninth Pennsylvania volunteers and thirty-third New Jersey volunteers of my second brigade were both absent, the former as guard to the train, (wagon,) the latter having been on picket duty. With the rest of my command I crossed the creek in front of Babb's house at 3 o'clock p. m., and advanced the one hundred and nineteenth New York volunteers, deployed as skirmishers, up the mountain, followed by Buschbeck's brigade on the right and Candy's on the left, each disposed in two lines of battle; knapsacks had been unslung and piled before commencing the ascent. Half-way up the firing became lively. The enemy had posted skirmishers thickly across the steep face of the ridge behind rocks, logs, and trees, and their fire was galling and destructive. Our skirmish line advancing rapidly, though they had to fairly climb up the rough ascent, drove those opposed to them back with loss, and reached the foot of the palisades. Meantime my main lines pressed steadily forward, under a severe musketry fire from the top of the palisades, until the advance regiments were halted to rest and form on the ground held by our skirmishers. The general line of advance had inclined at an angle towards the Dalton road, and my extreme left was now across it. The atmosphere was hot and stifling, and the ascent was one of the greatest difficulty. After a halt of fifteen minutes the palisades were charged impetuously by portions of both brigades, Buschbeck's on the right, and Candy's on both sides of the road. The attack was a most gallant one, officers and men rushing through the few narrow apertures or climbing the precipice. Many of them gained the crest, but were met by a tremendous fire from a second line of works, which were invisible from below, and were shot down or were compelled to jump back for their lives. Here hand-to-hand encounters took place, and stones as well as bullets were used as elements in the combat, the enemy rolling them over the precipice, endangering our troops below. Failing to hold the crest after two separate assaults, our front line was withdrawn about 150 yards, and reformed in preparation for another effort. Knowing that the enemy would hasten re-enforcements to the point attacked, I deemed it important to lose no time. One plan remained to be tried. My rifled battery (McGill's) had crossed the creek near Babb's house, and taken position on a cleared knoll at the base of the ridge. By my order it now opened a steady and well directed fire on the enemy's position. Under cover of this fire the thirty-third New Jersey volunteers, which had just arrived, was ordered to ascend the mountain and attempt to gain the crest about half a mile to the right of the point previously attacked, and at a place where the enemy did not show a strong force. In the mean time my main body were directed to keep the enemy in their front busy, and to support the movement promptly, again charging the crest in their front as soon as cheers from the thirty-third New Jersey volunteers should indicate their success on the enemy's flank. The order was promptly executed, but it was found impossible, by the thirty-third New Jersey volunteers, to gain the palisades at the point aimed at on account of their high precipitous formation, and they were obliged to oblique a little to the left. There, finding a few narrow apertures, they rushed through, where but two or three could climb abreast, and the first of them reaching the crest, their loud cheers were re-echoed along the lines. At this signal the other regiments rushed again to the assault, and a portion of the twenty-eighth Pennsylvania volunteers and one hundred and thirty-fourth and one hundred and fifty-fourth New York volunteers again reached the summit, but it was impossible to hold it; so few at a time could clamber up through the narrow clefts, that the enemy overwhelmed them and forced them off the cliffs. During these several assaults to the right of the pass the twenty-ninth Ohio veteran volunteers had fought heroically on the left of it, and having lost very heavily, the fifth and

sixty-sixth Ohio volunteers had been brought up to its support. It was now dusk, and official information was brought me from Colonel Ireland, commanding my third brigade, that the movement on Snake Creek gap was successful, and it was in full possession of the army of the Tennessee. The object of my effort having been fully accomplished by securing the attention of the enemy while General McPherson's movement was made on Snake Creek gap, I deemed further continuance of the action unnecessary, and decided to withdraw to the foot of the mountain. Two sections of McGill's battery were brought across Mill creek at Hall's mill, and from a position at the foot of the ridge, on the left of the road, they kept up a continuous fire on the enemy. The fifth, seventh, and sixty-sixth Ohio volunteers, which had not been seriously engaged, were so deployed as to cover the movement. Our dead and wounded were all removed to the field hospitals, and my entire command was withdrawn and encamped around and near Babb's house, such disposition being made of the troops as to hold the position against attack from any direction. During the night breast-works were constructed encircling our encampment in an almost continuous line. Ireland's brigade, having marched from Snake Creek gap, rejoined me about 10 o'clock p. m. The work assigned to this brigade had been successfully performed. In conjunction with General Kilpatrick's cavalry it had marched from Gordon's Springs to Villanow, and from thence to Snake Creek gap, which it held until General McPherson arrived there, thus covering the movement of the army of the Tennessee from the observations of the enemy. For the particulars of this expedition I respectfully refer to the official report of the operations of Colonel Ireland's brigade. I learned from prisoners and deserters that the troops opposed to us in this action comprised a brigade of Arkansas infantry, two regiments of Kentucky cavalry, and Cleburn's division, which was brought as support during the pendency of the battle; also that the enemy lost in killed 69, which exceeded the number killed in my command, indicating that their casualties at least equalled mine.

To Colonel Charles Candy, commanding first brigade, I am indebted for his promptness and efficiency in handling his troops under a persistent and galling fire. Captain Wheeler, my chief of artillery, proved himself a master hand in this his first action under my command.

I must mention, with special commendation, Captains Davis, Veals, and Lambert, of my staff, who exhibited more than ordinary gallantry, forming the troops and assisting personally in the heroic assaults made to the very summit of the ridge. Lieutenant Colonel Flynn and Major Fitzpatrick, of the twenty-eighth Pennsylvania volunteers, Colonel Fitch and Lieutenant Colonel Hayes, of the twenty-ninth Ohio volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Jackson, of the one hundred and thirty-fourth, and Lieutenant Colonel Allen, of the one hundred and fifty-fourth New York volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Fourat, thirty-third New Jersey volunteers, and Major Cresson, seventy-third Pennsylvania volunteers, also deserve special mention. They with their regiments sustained the burden of the conflict, and performed their duty in the most trying positions. Captain H. C. Bartlett, thirty-third New Jersey volunteers, an officer of great bravery and merit, was killed at the head of his company after he had reached the crest of the palisades. The loss in the twenty-ninth Ohio volunteers was particularly severe, Colonel Fitch and Lieutenant Colonel Hayes, two of my best field officers, both received wounds that will probably disable them for further service in the field. The adjutant of that regiment was mortally, and several of the line officers severely wounded. Major Fitzpatrick of twenty-eighth Pennsylvania volunteers, a most gallant officer, was wounded by three bullets passing through both legs.

*Casualties in the battle of Mill Creek gap, May 8, 1864.*

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Aggregate.
Commissioned officers .....	3	12	-----	15
Enlisted men .....	46	245	51	342
Total .....	49	257	51	357

*May 9, 10, and 11.*—The division remained encamped near the foot of the mountain, guarding the approaches to it and from it for a distance of five miles. In compliance with orders from Major General Hooker, early on the morning of the 11th, I sent one regiment of my division, the thirty-third New Jersey volunteers, to the trace on my left, where it relieved two of Butterfield's regiments.

*May 12.*—My whole command was relieved by the cavalry division, under Colonel Edward McCook, and I marched to and through Snake Creek gap, encamping a short distance beyond its eastward opening.

*May 13.*—Marched to a farm near Isaac King's house, two and a half miles from Resaca, and at 3.45 p. m. formed in columns of battalions across a narrow road leading into the main road from Dalton to Calhoun, Butterfield's division being in our immediate front, and Williams in our front and left. At 7 p. m. formed line of division front, occupying Williams's position, covering the main road from Dalton to Rome, and throwing up a line of works. The first brigade resting its left upon the road, was deployed up the hill on the right, the second and third brigades occupying the works on the left.

## BATTLE OF RESACA.

*May 14.*—At 4 o'clock p. m., in accordance with orders, I moved with my first and third brigades, following the first division, passed the rear of the army to the extreme left on the Dalton and Resaca main road, at which point the enemy making a strong attack had already gained some advantage. The distance marched was about four miles through fields and woods. Being delayed by the time occupied in taking position by the division preceding me, it was after dark when my division reached the position assigned it. The two brigades were placed in line on the left of Williams's division, covering the Dalton road; Ireland's brigade, being the extreme left flank of the army, was refused in line. These dispositions were completed and a connected picket line established before midnight. The enemy (Stevenson's division) had been met in their successful onset by the advance of our corps and driven back quickly in confusion to their main lines. We passed the night in quiet, having hastily erected breastworks of rails and logs.

*May 15.*—At 3 o'clock a. m. Buschbeck's brigade, which had been left behind by order from the major general commanding the corps, arrived and formed on Ireland's left and in his rear. My artillery and trains also came up during the night. At 7 o'clock a. m. I received orders to send a strong reconnoitring party with a staff officer to explore eastward towards the railroad. The sixtieth New York volunteers, Colonel Goddard, and seventy-eighth New York volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Cheatfield, were detailed for the purpose, and, accompanied by Captain Forbes, inspector on my staff, performed the duty, striking the railroad near Isaac Adams's house, where they ascertained the enemy's cavalry to be posted, and also found our outposts from McCook's command, (cavalry.) By 11 a. m. they had returned, and in accordance with orders, by which our

entire corps was directed to attack the enemy at that hour, my division moved to the right about three-fourths of a mile, and there formed column for attack. Owing to the extremely rough and hilly nature of the ground, and the small compass within which the entire corps was to operate in the first charges, the only formation by which my command could be handled to advantage was that of column by regiments. Ireland's brigade was formed in advance, next Buschbeck's, last Candy's. The position occupied by the enemy was one strongly intrenched on an irregular conglomerate of hills with spurs running in every direction. The general direction of their main lines of intrenchments on these hills inclined northeastward, towards a bend in the Conasauga river, forming a refused right flank to their army. On the most of the elevations they had batteries protected by earthworks of various descriptions, and so disposed as to sweep in every direction the lines of approach. The very irregular formation of the ground gave the enemy unusual facilities for cross-firing and enfilading the ground to be passed over, and they, in posting both their artillery and infantry, availed themselves fully of these advantages. The hills, steep and rough, were thickly wooded, the narrow ravines between generally cleared. Immediately in front of the position on which my command formed the attack, a small road passed a narrow ravine running from the enemy's main line to Dalton road. Everything being in readiness, the advance was ordered. Ireland's brigade crossed a ravine and a hill swept by the enemy's artillery and musketry fire, and drove the enemy impetuously from another hill, and turning a little to the right charged with wild, ringing cheers for the capture of a battery which, from a key position, was dealing death on every side. At the same moment, on Ireland's left, a portion of Butterfield's division was racing with him for the same deadly prize. The advance of both commands reached the battery nearly together, the one hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania volunteers, of Ireland's brigade, under Colonel George A. Cobham, leading, and forcing its way through the jaws of death till they had their hands upon the guns and their colors on the earthworks, from which part of the gunners had been driven and the rest killed or captured. This work was a sunken one at the crest of the hill, and open towards its rear. Twenty yards in rear was a line of breastworks, from which a deadly shower of bullets, poured around and into the battery, rendered it impossible for men to live there. Colonel Cobham, with that cool and accurate judgment which never failed him, found his little line now augmented by other portions of the brigade within fifteen (15) yards of the guns, where, by the formation of the ground, his troops were less exposed to the terrible fire, while at the same time his own muskets covered the battery from the front. During the advance of Ireland's brigade a body of troops from another division, sweeping through the brigade, had severed it, and by my orders all of it, excepting three regiments, were posted in reserve, and Colonel Cobham was directed to take command of the three regiments which had now silenced and held under command of their guns the battery. The regiments of Buschbeck's brigade, which had advanced gallantly, driving the enemy from two hills on the left of Cobham, were not far from him. With these three regiments Colonel Lochman was now ordered to report to Colonel Cobham, which he did promptly. Between 3 and 4 o'clock p. m. I received orders from Major General Hooker, commanding the corps, to relieve whatever of General Butterfield's division was then holding position in the front line—half of my second and third brigades were then with Cobham—from the remainder of my command. The order was at once complied with, and all of General Butterfield's were relieved; and by the direct order of Major General Hooker, as well as my own, Colonel Cobham was directed to make every effort to secure and bring off the battery in his front. To this end I sent him as re-enforcements the fifth Ohio volunteers from Candy's brigade, and other regiments from the second and third brigades, numbering in all ten regiments, and invested him with full command of all the troops at that isolated

point. I had now sent him one-half of my entire division. Our lines were now strengthened and established in readiness for further movements, General Williams's division being formed entirely on my left, and General Butterfield's division wholly withdrawn and posted in reserve. Musketry fire was kept up during the afternoon and night, and strong works were thrown up on the hills occupied by our main lines. In the isolated position held by Cobham it was impossible to erect even a slight barricade without receiving a terrible fire from the enemy, fifty (50) yards distant. In front of my left and Williams's right was a long, cleared field, occupying two hills and a narrow ravine, and extending to a wooded hill, on which was the enemy's main line. In front of my right was a field occupying a long, wide ravine, extending from the right of my line to a cleared hill, on which was also the enemy's main line. Through this ravine ran the road previously referred to. Across the ravine to my right were lines of intrenchments held by the 4th corps, and facing eastward at right angles to my front. In front of the centre of my main line a series of timbered spurs and knobs extended half a mile towards the enemy's main lines to the detached position held by Cobham. The troops sent by me to his support were so disposed as to hold his flank as well as possible. The only route of communication with him was by way of these timbered ridges, which were swept in most places by musketry and artillery fire from the enemy's main lines. About 5 o'clock p. m. the enemy (Stevenson's division) debouched from the woods in front of my left and General Williams's right, and charged in column, with the effort to gain possession of the ridge in our front. The attempt, if successful, would have exposed Cobham to attack from every side, and have forced him to abandon his position; but, though the enemy's attack was a spirited one, it failed. A tremendous fire, concentrated on him from the lines of my division and those of General Williams, almost destroyed his leading regiments, (of Brown's rebel brigade,) and sent the attacking column back in confusion to their intrenchments after a half an hour of sharp fighting. In this affair the artillery of both sides took an active part, canister and shrapnel being principally used. During the engagement Colonel Ireland was wounded by a piece of shell, and the command of the brigade devolved upon Colonel Cobham; that officer being already intrusted with the command of six regiments and the special work of securing the battery in his front, I directed Colonel William Richards, commanding twenty-ninth Pennsylvania volunteers, to assume command of such regiments as remained in the main line. Wheeler's battery had taken position in my line behind log-works constructed for the purpose. About dusk Colonel Cobham reported to me in person, and received instructions to dig through the works in front of the guns and bring them off with drag-ropes during the night. The necessary tools were sent out, and the work performed with alacrity and tact by the officers and men under his immediate supervision. In the darkness of the night the men crept silently on hands and knees to the little fort, and carefully removed the logs, earthworks, and stones in front of the four guns. At midnight all was ready; the drag-ropes were attached and manned, a line of brave men lay with pieces aimed at the crest of the hill, and at one effort the guns were drawn out and taken rattling down the hill. The enemy, on the alert, sprang over their breastworks and furiously attacked Cobham's line. The sharp musketry fire aroused all our troops. Those in the intrenchments to our right, across the ravine, not knowing the meaning of it, evidently believed it to be an attack upon their main line, and opened a tremendous musketry fire, much of which poured into Cobham's lines from his right and rear. Word was sent quickly to them and their fire was stopped. Cobham held his position, drove back the enemy, and sent the guns, four 12-pounder brass pieces, to my headquarters. This important achievement was immediately reported in writing by me to Major General Hooker, commanding the corps, and by my orders the four brass pieces were next day turned over to the ordnance department of the corps.

In concluding the report of the battle of Resaca I must award the highest praise to Colonel George A. Cobham, one hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania volunteers, whose distinguished bravery, persistence, and coolness of judgment contributed so much to our success. The officers and men temporarily assigned to his command entered heartily into the performance of the duty allotted them, while death threatened on every side. The position taken and held, and the duty performed, including the capture of a strongly-intrenched and well-defended battery, were such as required no ordinary amount of skill and heroism.

Colonel Lochman and Lieutenant Colonels Randall, Kilpatrick, Lloyd, and Fould, with the troops under their command, rendered good service in their execution of all orders, the execution of which was intrusted to Colonel Cobham. Colonels Candy and Ireland, and Captain Wheeler, my chief of artillery, performed their important shares in the work bravely, skilfully, and efficiently. Lieutenant Colonel E. F. Floyd, one hundred and nineteenth New York volunteers, fell mortally wounded at the head of his regiment while charging the enemy's battery. In the same charge, Captain Charles Woolty, one hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania volunteers, lost his life while his hand was on the cannon.

*Casualties in the battle of Resaca, Georgia.*

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Aggregate.
Commissioned officers .....	2	5	-----	7
Enlisted men .....	21	210	28	259
Total .....	23	215	28	266

*May 16.*—Shortly before daylight in the morning it was found that the enemy had evacuated, which was immediately communicated to General Hooker. The sixtieth New York was sent to reconnoitre in the direction of Resaca. With my entire command in advance of the corps, I followed closely to within a mile of Resaca, where I turned to the left, and after waiting for orders upwards of an hour at the crossing of the Newton road, and ascertaining that the ferry at Newton could not be crossed, I proceeded eastward to Fiter ferry, which was reached about 9 a. m. Here I crossed half of my command in a ferry-boat which was brought from the opposite shore, the other half, with the artillery, crossing a quarter of a mile below, the water at the ford being about three feet deep. Passing through the cavalry command of General Stoneman, I pressed on to McClure's ferry on the Coosawattee, a beautiful stream, one hundred yards in width, on the southern bank of which I found the enemy's scouts. Posting a section of artillery on a prominent knoll commanding the opposite bank, to protect the passage, I crossed my infantry on two old ferry-boats, upon which I subsequently constructed a bridge, over which the artillery and wagons of my own and other divisions of the corps were crossed during the night, and on the following morning encamped about a mile south of the ferry.

*May 17.*—At one p. m. marched out the Resaca and Adairsville road, camping near the junction of the Adairsville and the Calhoun road, about 4 miles from Calhoun.

*May 18.*—Broke camp at 8½ oclock a. m., and made a forward march of about 15 miles to the foot of Gravelly Plateau, on the Cassville road, eight miles from Kingston, where I encamped. Butterfield in my front, Williams in my rear.

*May 19.*—Being ordered to send one regiment on a reconnoissance towards

Kingston, and to be ready to support it with the entire division, I sent out the fifth Ohio volunteers, and soon after, under further orders, I followed it with the whole command. Marching across Gravelly Plateau in a southerly direction, through unbroken forests, over deep ravines, and moving my artillery with great difficulty, I connected with the 14th corps at 10.30 a. m. I moved until within sight of railroad at Kingston, then moving eastward and at 3 p. m. connected with Butterfield at Price's house, on the Cassville and Kingston road. Here I found Butterfield in line of battle, shelling the enemy in the woods by order. By a reconnoissance, sent out towards the railroad, I connected with Newton's division of the 4th corps, and then moved forward (crossing Two Run creek) south of the main road, to Cassville, pressing the rear-guard of the enemy (retreating) and capturing a number of prisoners. Formed line with the 4th corps on my right, Butterfield and Williams on my left. Artillery and musketry firing upon the evacuating foe continued until long after dark, when my command went into camp half a mile west of Cassville near Pendegrast's house.

*May 20, 21, and 22.*—Remained in camp. Inspected my command, prepared in every way for the further prosecution of the campaign. On the 20th received orders to be in readiness to march on the 23d, with 20 days' rations, and to send all sick and wounded to the rear.

*May 23.*—The term of service of the twenty-seventh Pennsylvania volunteers (Colonel A. Buschbeck) having expired, it returned home. By the departure of Colonel Buschbeck, Colonel J. F. Lochman, one hundred and nineteenth New York volunteers, being senior officer present, was placed in command of the second brigade. Marched at 6 a. m., following Butterfield, and crossed the Etowah on pontoon bridge, near Milan's bridge, encamping on high ground one and a half mile south of the river, Williams on my right, Butterfield on my left.

*May 24.*—Under orders from General Hooker to push the enemy across Rawson creek towards Alatoona, I broke camp at daylight and pushed rapidly to the creek, resting a line of skirmishers upon it to hold the Alatoona road. In this position, covering the movements of Williams and Butterfield towards Burnt Hickory, I remained until noon, when I was relieved by the 23d corps. I then moved to the right, through fields and woods, in two parallel columns, with skirmishers moving by the flank, along the creek, which I crossed about noon, passing through a deep ravine, and up the sides of spurs of the Alatoona range. Reaching the summit I halted in column, and going in person to the creek about 200 yards above the point where my troops had passed, found the artillery and entire transportation of the corps detained on account of the unserviceable condition of the road. After bridging the creek, at this point almost impassable, and cutting a road along the mountain side up which the trains had to pass, I remained until the artillery and wagons had all crossed, and then moving on through dense woods, giving the road to the artillery and transportation, took the road to Burnt Hickory, a short distance beyond which I encamped on the extreme right, Williams on my left.

#### NEW HOPE CHURCH.

*May 25.*—At 7 a. m. I marched, with my command, taking the road to Dallas, *via* bridge across Pumpkinvine creek, at Owens's mill; William's and Butterfield's divisions, moving respectively by roads on my right and left, were to cross the creek by other bridges. The point of concentration ordered was to be Dallas. (See order of march for May 25, dated May 24, headquarters Department of the Cumberland.) The major general commanding corps and myself, with our staffs and escort, preceded the troops to the bridge at Owens's mill, which we found burning, having just been fired. While engaged in extinguishing the flames and repairing the bridge, we were fired upon from the



hill opposite, proving that the enemy were here in our front. A portion of Major General Hooker's cavalry escort, fording the creek, deployed and advanced on the opposite side through the woods, driving before them a short distance what proved to be an outpost of 25 cavalymen. My infantry soon came up, and the repairs of the bridge being finished by the pioneer corps, the entire division crossed. The seventh Ohio volunteers preceding, deployed as skirmishers, advanced rapidly in the direction of the New Hope church, Candy's brigade leading. Near Hawkins's house,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  mile from the bridge, our skirmishers became heavily engaged with those of the enemy, and almost immediately a furious charge was made upon us. Our skirmishers resisted; Candy's brigade was deployed into line on the double-quick, and after a sharp engagement the charge was repulsed. The skirmish line was now re-enforced, and was extended to the length of a mile, by the twenty-eighth Pennsylvania volunteers. The remaining four regiments of Candy's brigade were deployed in line of battle, and, supported by my other two brigades, moved forward, attacking and driving steadily for a half a mile a heavy force of Hood's corps which opposed us. From prisoners captured we learned that Hood's entire corps was in our front, and Hardee's not far off, in the direction of Dallas. My division—isolated at least five miles from nearest supporting troops—had been sustaining a sharp conflict with the enemy for four hours. Close in my front was an overwhelming force. My command was, by the order of the major general commanding the corps, (who was with me,) halted and formed on a ridge in the woods advantageous for defence, and a slight barricade of logs hastily thrown up. My skirmish line was deployed to a still greater extent than before, and ordered to keep up an aggressive fire, the object being to deceive the enemy as to our weakness by a show of strength. During this halt a charge made by a brigade of the enemy in column upon that part of my skirmish line occupied by the seventh Ohio volunteers, was handsomely repulsed. The skirmish line there formed nearly a right angle towards the enemy, who charged upon the centre line, not seeing that upon their flank. When the three regiments neared the angle they were met by a sharp fire in front, and a heavy enfilading fire from the left flank, and retreated in hasty disorder and with considerable loss. Orders had been sent as soon as the enemy was found in force in my front, by the major general commanding corps, to General Butterfield and General Williams to march their divisions to the point where mine was engaged. By 5 p. m. both had come up and massed, Williams's on my right and Butterfield's on my left and rear. Each division was quickly formed for attack in column by brigades, Williams leading, Butterfield next, my division as a reserve, and the corps advanced upon the enemy. In the advance Butterfield's brigade moved towards the flanks, leaving me in support of Williams, who had been heavily engaged, driving the enemy some distance. I received orders to push forward and relieve his troops. This was between 6 and 7 o'clock p. m. The movement ordered for my division was made with great rapidity through a dense wood swept by a heavy artillery and musketry fire. The discharges of canister and shell from the enemy were heavier than in any other battle of the campaign in which my command was engaged. The troops of General Williams's division were relieved by this movement, and Cobham's brigade and portions of Candy's brigade engaged the enemy furiously at short range, driving him again until dark, when my command was halted close under the enemy's batteries and intrenchments near New Hope church. The night was intensely dark, and a very severe thunder storm, with cold pelting rain, added to the gloom. It was, therefore, impossible to form a regular line with the troops, and all the disposition of them we could make were by the fitful flashes of lightning. Breastworks were thrown up as fast as possible during the night, and the dead and wounded were all cared for before morning.

*May 26.*—When dawn came I found the position held by my troops to be a ridge of considerable natural strength, confronting another ridge at a distance of eighty yards on the left, to three hundred yards on the right, on which were the enemy's main lines. Around us, in every direction, were thick woods. The road to New Hope church passed through my lines occupied by Candy's brigade, the flank of which on the left of the road was not in connexion with any other troops. At this point, near the road, my lines were closest to those opposing us, and sharpshooters from Candy's brigade were so posted as to command a battery in his front, preventing the enemy from working his guns, excepting now and then to deliver an occasional shot. Another battery in Cobham's front was similarly commanded by sharpshooters from his brigade. Strong skirmish lines were posted along our front, and drove the enemy's skirmishers into their main line of works, and kept them there for the most part of the succeeding days that we remained in this position. The battle of the 27th was altogether in the woods, affording no opportunity for the use of artillery on our side. In my front this day I ascertained that the enemy had seventeen pieces of artillery well intrenched in their second line of works on the top of the ridge occupied by them. This line of works was very strong, with re-entering angles. From my skirmish line it could be closely reconnoitred, being distant only about one hundred yards. In addition to this they occupied a line of breastworks at the foot of the ridge. To this work their skirmishers were all driven, and my skirmishers, advanced to the furthest point possible, were ordered to hold them there, and to cover, with their own fire, if possible, every piece of artillery in our front. Directions were also given, when night came on, for the construction of log rifle-pits of the V pattern, for the protection of my skirmishers and sharpshooters, the number of casualties among them being quite large during the day. At noon troops of General Stanley's division (4th corps) came up, and connected on my left by a refused line, and, by order of Major General Thomas, relieved five regiments of Candy's brigade, which had held the left of the road since the evening of yesterday. My entire division was now formed on the right of the road, from left to right, in the following order: Candy's brigade, Lochman's, then Coburn's brigade of Butterfield's division, and on his right Cobham's brigade of my division. Two-thirds of each brigade formed the front line; the remainder was placed in reserve near the foot of the ridge, under protection of our sharpshooters. Breastworks were erected during the day, and wherever possible the timber in front was slashed, forming an abatis. All of my artillery (twelve pieces) was placed in position along my line during the day and night. The enemy made frequent sorties, attempting to drive in my skirmishers, establish their own line, and prevent our throwing up works, but in every case they were driven back with severe loss. Their artillery was rendered almost entirely inefficient, by the constant watchfulness of our sharpshooters, and our works progressed rapidly. After dusk, Cobham's brigade being relieved by Ward's, of Butterfield's division, took the place in line held by Coburn, thus bringing my entire command into a connected line. My losses during yesterday and to-day were 376, killed, wounded, and missing; a full statement of them will be found hereto appended. I have to enumerate among the dead, fallen in the battle of New Hope church, Colonel John H. Patrick, fifth Ohio volunteers, a brave officer, who had served with his regiment since April, 1861, and here fell mortally wounded by a canister shot, and Lieutenant Joseph W. Hitt, of Colonel Candy's staff, a promising young officer. My three brigade commanders, Colonels Candy, Lochman, and Cobham, all displayed personal gallantry, and performed their whole duty in the most efficient manner. The behavior of the officers and men under their command was excellent throughout. For twenty-four hours they were actively engaged with the enemy, without opportunity to cook a single meal or make a cup of coffee. I sustained a personal loss in the capture of Captain L. R. Davis, of the seventh Ohio volunteers, who

had served as aide-de-camp on my staff for two years, and had earned a widespread reputation for his extreme gallantry and personal daring.

*May 27.*—Lively skirmishing all day, our sharpshooters preventing the enemy's free use of their guns, (artillery.) The enemy made occasional attempts to drive in our skirmishers, but were each time driven back to their intrenchments with heavy loss. My artillery kept up a destructive fire, enfilading portions of the enemy's works. In this constant watchful war between skirmishers, kept up night and day, here as well as elsewhere in similar positions during this campaign, my troops thoroughly proved their superiority as sharpshooters, invariably driving them from their posts.

During the 28th, 29th, 30th, and 31st days of May, our positions and daily routine of artillery practice and sharpshooting were unchanged. Small outworks for the protection of the skirmishers were thrown up at every available point, thus diminishing my daily returns of casualties.

From the 25th of May until the 1st of June my entire division was under fire without an hour of relief. Owing to the proximity of the lines and the nature of the ground, no one, whether in front or rear, could rest with any assurance of safety. No opportunity being offered for proper shelter, rest, and diet, the necessary result of this series of operations was a large increase of sickness.

*Casualties in the battle at New Hope church, Georgia.*

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Aggreg'te.
Commissioned officers .....	3	17	1	21
Enlisted men .....	49	422	17	488
Total .....	52	439	18	509

*June 1.*—Being relieved by Harrow's division of the 15th corps, I withdrew my command from the works, and forming on the Dallas road, marched to the rear of the left of Johnson's division of the 14th corps, where division encamped, with Butterfield on the right and Williams on the left.

*June 2.*—Moved still further to the left, in the direction of Alatoona church, within about two and a half miles of which I placed my command in position on a thickly wooded ridge, in rear and in support of the 23d corps. During the day heavy storms of rain and hail prevailed, making the ground heavy, and swelling the creeks so as to render them almost impassable. Active artillery and musketry fire was kept up in the front, during which many shots passed through our camp, in which also several shells exploded.

*June 3, 4, and 5.*—Remained in same position.

On the 3d the third brigade was detached, and at 4 p. m. proceeded to the bridge on the Ackworth road over Alatoona creek, with orders to hold the bridge and the ford. It found the bridge in a shattered condition, but placed it in good order, remaining at this point during the 4th and 5th.

*June 6.*—The enemy having evacuated the works in the immediate front of the army, the division marched to the Marietta road, encamping on Hall's farm, near the junction of the roads leading to Big Shanty and to Lost mountain. Butterfield and Williams on the right, the 4th corps on the left.

*June 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.*—Remained in same position, having thrown up breastworks to cover the roads approaching the front. Advancing my skirmishers and feeling the enemy, who were formed, fortifying the ridges connecting Lost mountain and Pine hill.

On the 7th, Colonel P. H. Jones, one hundred and fifty-fourth New York volunteers, having reported for duty, and being the senior officer, was assigned to the command of the second brigade.

On the 10th orders were received to move on the Marietta road towards Kenesaw station, but the 4th and 14th corps occupying the road with troops and train, prevented any movement on the part of my command.

On the 11th the term of service of the seventh Ohio volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel McClellan, having expired, the regiment departed for the north. During its long connexion with my division this regiment, by gallant service upon many fields, on which it lost heavily, earned for itself a reputation of which Ohio may well be proud.

*June 13.*—By direction of the major general commanding corps, I moved at noon with my three brigades and two batteries of artillery to the right of the Marietta road, passed through the intrenched lines of Williams's division, and formed on a wooded spur, projecting at right angles from his line of works. My left then connected with the right of Stanley's division of the 4th corps, near Williams's left. The general front of the 4th and 20th corps was southward, my troops in the new position taken faced nearly east, my right rested near to one of the principal branches of Alatoona creek, on the north bank of which were my pickets, on the other those of the enemy, between whom skirmishing was maintained. From this position to the top of Pine hill was about one thousand two hundred yards, in direct line of fire; the enemy, reaching from Kenesaw mountain on the right to Lost mountain on the left, held this summit as an advanced post in front of their centre, their main line round in rear of it. Pine hill is very steep, conical in form, and by far the highest between Kenesaw and Lost mountain. On its summit were batteries strongly intrenched, and around the hill, a short distance below the summit, were circumvallating works held in force. A signal station was also in full operation on this eminence, which commanded a view of the position and movements of our army. Now commenced the work for its reduction. During the day my front was strongly intrenched, and my skirmish lines were advanced well out towards the hill. Under the supervision of Captain Wheeler, my chief of artillery, McGill's battery of 3-inch rifled guns was posted in our works, and the guns were trained upon the summit.

*June 14.*—Early this morning my first and second brigades were brought up and massed respectively in rear of Ireland's right and left; McGill's battery opened upon the enemy's position on the summit of Pine hill, and kept up an accurate and effective firing by battery during the day, with occasional replies from the enemy. I noticed a group of rebel officers collected near some tents near the summit; calling Captain McGill's attention to it, I directed him to bring his battery to bear upon the spot, the shells struck in the midst of and around them, causing evident consternation among them and their immediate retreat. Prisoners afterwards taken pointed out that as the spot where Lieutenant General Polk was killed.

*June 15.*—It was discovered that Pine hill had been evacuated during the night. Our skirmish line southward was pushed forward across open fields to a stream in the woods, running westward from the hill. While troops from General Stanley's division on my left occupied the summit, and, reversing the works, planted batteries there, Generals Sherman, Thomas, Hooker, Howard, Stanley, and others, myself among them, were soon assembled at that point, from which the relative positions held by the two armies were readily determined. A lively artillery engagement was then progressing several miles to our left, along the railroad, in front of Kenesaw; also far to the right, in the direction of Lost mountain. At noon, in pursuance of orders from Major General Hooker, I advanced my division (Candy's brigade leading) from our line of works, in a southeasterly direction, one mile, crossing two streams, until we reached a posi-

tion in the woods to the right of and not far from Pine hill. Here my command was halted and formed, each brigade in two lines, Ireland's on the right, Candy's on the left, and Jones's in the centre. This advance was covered by the one hundred and forty-seventh Pennsylvania volunteers, deployed as skirmishers. The skirmish line drove in that of the enemy, and took possession of a line of works on the flank of Pine hill, which the enemy had not quite completed. The ground on which my division was now placed was entirely in the woods, and furnished a series of steep ridges with narrow ravines between their general inclination, being east and west, with frequent deviations by way of irregular spurs and small hills. No troops connected with me on either right or left. The one hundred and thirty-fourth New York volunteers was immediately deployed in skirmish line to my left, and formed connexion with the 4th corps skirmishers at the base of Pine hill, three-quarters of a mile distant from my left flank. The one hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania volunteers was deployed in like manner in front of Ireland, and to his right, but could make no connexion with any troops in that direction. While making these dispositions I received orders from the major general commanding corps to push forward at once in assault upon the enemy. The orders were brought to me verbally by Lieutenant Colonel Perkins, assistant adjutant general, and Colonel Fessenden, aide-de-camp, who added at the same time that the 4th corps would assault to my left, and Butterfield's division to my right, 2 o'clock p. m. being the hour for the concerted movements. At 2.15 p. m. I advanced rapidly with my entire command, formed as stated above, Major General Hooker then being present. The enemy in heavy force was encountered at once, and the battle became severe, lasting until after dark. All of my brigades were handled very handsomely by their commanders, preserving their formation in two lines while advancing, and fighting desperately over rough and timbered ridges. The enemy were driven from two ridges which they held with rifle-pits, strongly occupied, and my troops charged impetuously up to the very mouths of their cannon, which were in a line of powerful works, on a high ridge which forms a part of the chain south of Pine hill, and connecting Kenesaw with Lost mountain. There the fighting was desperate. The enemy, driven with heavy loss into powerful intrenchments, on which they bestowed a week's labor in preparation, and in which, in my front, they used eighteen (18) pieces of artillery, fought from these works, knowing that if they were carried by us all to them was lost. In front of them the timber was slashed and strong abatis and chevaux-de-frise of pointed stakes had been formed. Their artillery, which had played steadily into my ranks, was now used with redoubled effort. My troops charging into the abatis, in some places within fifty yards of the guns, by dark had silenced many of them. There had been no co-operating attack, either on my right or my left, both of which the enemy had attempted to flank during our assault. This attempt of theirs was repulsed without checking my advance, the attack on my right being met by a regiment from the second line of Ireland's brigade changing front to the right; that on the left by a regiment from the second line of Candy's brigade changing front to the left. The one hundred and thirty-fourth New York volunteers, under Lieutenant Colonel Jackson, as skirmishers also rendered most effective service, holding the ground between Candy's brigade and the 4th corps, and following upon movements with the right of his line. Darkness coming on the battle diminished to heavy skirmishing, the enemy also keeping up a brisk enfilading artillery fire upon us from their works extending beyond my left. My lines were established in the position gained, close to the enemy's main works; so near were the opposing forces that it was extremely hazardous to attempt the construction of breastworks. The sound of an axe was the signal for a volley of bullets and canister from the enemy; but by cutting timber some distance in the rear and carrying it up, by the help of old logs, and active use of the spade, a tolerable line of intrenchments was thrown up in our front during the

night. I ascertained that the position held by Ireland's brigade was in the opening of an inside re-entering angle of the enemy's works, this exposing him to a severe fire of artillery and musketry from both flanks as well as in front. His brigade, which in this position was within a very few yards of the enemy, (so close, indeed, that the slightest word could be heard by the opposing force,) was toward morning quietly withdrawn about one hundred and fifty yards to the rear; this forming a refused line on my right flank, in his front a strong line of breastworks was finished by morning. My skirmish line connected during the night with that of Butterfield to my right. At 5 p. m. Williams's division had come up and marched in my rear. Colonel Robinson's brigade of that division reported to me for orders, and by my direction took position in line on a small spur about one hundred and fifty yards in rear of centre of my line. On this spur his troops erected a temporary breastwork of logs. About the same time Knipe's brigade of Williams's division formed on Ireland's refused right, and Ruger's brigade on Candy's refused left. Knipe's brigade was withdrawn from that position in the night, after my skirmishers had connected with Butterfield's. The nature of the ground on which the battle of Pine Hill was fought prevented the use of artillery on my part. During the night works with embrasures were constructed on the left of my line for the purpose of using them next day.

My thanks are due to Brigadier General Williams, commanding first division of this corps for his courtesy in tendering me the services of Colonel Robinson's brigade; also to Colonel Robinson for his promptness in responding to my wishes. His brigade, although not brought into action, was placed in a position in reserve, where, in case of attack by the enemy, it would have rendered efficient service; Colonels Candy, Jones, and Ireland deserve the highest commendation for the manner in which their respective brigades were manoeuvred; Colonels Cobham and Pardee, and Lieutenant Colonel Jackson, in command of a very extended skirmish line, conducted their advance with skill and gallantry. Indeed, it is difficult to select names for special mention in this battle, where every officer and man acted with heroic determination.

The members of my staff rendered me quick, intelligent, and unwearied services. The proportion of casualties among officers in my command was unusually great, among them Captain Veal, assistant commissary of musters, who, acting, as aide-de-camp, was severely wounded through the lungs in the early part of the action.

Among field officers wounded was Major Cresson, seventy-third Pennsylvania volunteers; Captain Gumber, commanding one hundred and ninth Pennsylvania volunteers; Colonel Rickard's twenty-ninth Pennsylvania volunteers; Major Stegman, one hundred and second New York volunteers, all of whom were in command of their respective regiments.

*Casualties in battle of Pine Hill Georgia.*

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Aggregate
Commissioned officers .....	1	25	-----	26
Enlisted men .....	81	407	5	493
Total .....	82	432	5	519

*June 16.*—Early this forenoon Butterfield's division connected with my right. Both of my batteries were placed in position, near my right and left, and opened

on the enemy, enfilading portions of their works. The enemy's artillery fired as much as they could while closely watched by our sharpshooters. The casualties during the day on the skirmish line, especially in the second brigade, were severe. The enemy made several sorties upon us during the day, our close proximity being very harassing to them.

*June 17.*—Before 1 o'clock a. m. Major Symmes, fifth Ohio volunteers, division officer of the day, sent me word that the enemy had evacuated and the skirmishers under his command had entered the works. I immediately communicated this information to the major general commanding corps, and without awaiting orders occupied the evacuated works with my entire division, and advanced a line of skirmishers, under Major Symmes, a mile to the front, through woods, until they reached a road running eastward towards Kenesaw. Here were large cleared fields, and the cavalry videttes of the enemy were found posted in the edge of the woods beyond, and in the field. My skirmishers were at this time connected with those of the 4th corps on their left, and of Butterfield's division on the right.

#### MUDDY CREEK.

At 10 a. m. my entire command advanced, Jones's and Ireland's brigades in front, formed in two lines; Canyd's brigade in reserve following. At the same time Butterfield's division advanced on my right and Williams's on my left. On reaching the cleared fields, above referred to, the corps halted for a few moments while the enemy's cavalry skirmishers were driven in. I then pushed forward in accordance with orders through an extremely dense woods, guiding the centre of the two front brigades by a road running from Hard Shell church to the Marietta and Dallas road; general direction of the advance southeast. The picket sent out in the morning had been withdrawn, and my advance was covered by the eighteenth New York volunteers, deployed as skirmishers. A body of the enemy's cavalry, who had been bivouacked in the thick woods, were unexpectedly routed by heavy volleys from my advance lines, and retreated in the utmost haste and confusion across the field near Darby's house and by way of the Marietta road, over Muddy creek, being closely followed by my command. At Darby place my division, emerging from the woods into a cleared country on the Marietta and Dallas road, formed connexion with Cox's division of the 23d corps, which, coming from the direction of Lost mountain, had just reached that point; here, filing to the left, my brigade formed in line on the low ground between the Darby house and Muddy creek, Cox's division at the same time forming to my right, with its left resting on the Marietta and Dallas road. My skirmishers, which were finely handled by Lieutenant Colonel Chatfield, continued their advance, crossing, under a sharp artillery and musketry fire, the open fields in our front, and establishing themselves close to Muddy creek, the opposite bank of which was occupied by the enemy's pickets. In front of Darby's house is the valley of Muddy creek, which here extends close to the foot of the hill opposite, on which the enemy were strongly intrenched, with several batteries bearing upon our position, which they used freely on us. The banks of the creek were low and very swampy, with fringing of thickets. The hills occupied by the enemy were heavily timbered, rising abruptly from the creek, and crowned with a very strong line of works. Their batteries posted here swept, short range, to the Marietta road, from Darby's house to the bridge, on the creek; also the entire position taken by my troops, which, necessarily in the open field, were exposed to full view of the enemy. In order to silence their batteries, I directed Captain Wheeler to advance the thirteenth New York battery to a bald hill held by my skirmishers, within four hundred yards of the enemy's main line; and Ireland with this brigade to co-operate and sustain the movements. These directions were in pursuance of instructions received from the

major general commanding corps, who directed me to occupy the ground to the left of the Marietta road, the 23d corps being ordered to connect with me at that point on my right; meanwhile, McGill's battery, upon my first reaching Darby's house, taking position on the bare hill near the house, sustained a heavy artillery engagement with the enemy. The movement ordered was executed by Captain Wheeler and Colonel Ireland with great spirit and in splendid style, the battery commanded by Lieutenant Bundy charging on the rear, through open fields swept by musketry and artillery, and reaching the bald hill indicated before the enemy knew their purpose. Here the horses and limbers were left at the foot of the hill, the guns drawn up by hand, and quickly sunk in the crest by the aid of my pioneer corps. Ireland's brigade, advancing on the double-quick in concert with the battery, instantly formed in support, rear of it, and on both flanks; Bundy's six guns, sunken four hundred yards from the embrasures opposite, opening a rapid and accurate fire by battery, quickly silenced the enemy's guns, and, enfilading their right, produced great havoc among their works and troops; the effect of each shot that went crashing through their works was plainly visible from our position. Two of the enemy's guns were dismounted, two knocked end over end, and the rest silenced. Their embrasures were literally destroyed, and, as I afterwards learned from a prisoner, a large number of their troops killed and wounded. Jones's brigade was now advanced and formed in line on the left of Ireland's; Candy's formed in reserve; all three brigades being in open fields with the advanced lines close to the enemy. During the afternoon Butterfield came up and formed on my left. Immediately after Bundy's battery had taken its advance position, McGill's was moved to a little elevation on the left of my line, from which he delivered an effective cross fire, assisting materially to quiet the enemy in our front. Their sharpshooters, driven early in the day from the bank of the creek to their main line, posted themselves in trees and attempted during the afternoon to harass our gunners. Sharpshooters detailed from my command prevented the intended effect, and some of them were shot in their elevated hiding places. At dark my skirmishers were advanced close to the creek, where they dug pits in the soft ground for their protection. During the night the troops threw up breastworks of rails and earth. After dark commenced a series of very severe rain storms, which lasted, with occasional short intermissions, for several days and nights. Our skirmish-pits filled with water and the occupants suffered much from cramps. All the troops bivouacked in fields of soft low ground and without adequate shelter, suffering much from these rains, which were accompanied by chilly winds. Muddy creek and its small tributaries became swollen to the size of torrents, and the low grounds adjoining (parts of which were unavoidably occupied by my troops in line) were flooded with water.

*June 18.*—Our general position unchanged during the day; sharpshooting continued, with a number of casualties on our side. Both of my batteries continued to pour their destructive fire into the enemy's works. The enemy replied feebly and seldom.

*June 19.*—Suspecting the enemy would evacuate his line, at 2 o'clock in the morning I pushed my skirmishers forward, who crossed the swollen creek in my front without opposition, entered the works which they found abandoned, and moved half a mile beyond, the cavalry of the enemy's rear-guard retiring. Having sent the one hundred and thirty-ninth New York volunteers to support the skirmishers, I followed soon after in person. Scouts of the enemy were visible on the hills about a mile beyond the creek. The works of the enemy gave abundant indications of the splendid execution of my artillery; many of the embrasures were shattered; the woods in front, cut and torn, showed how truly the artillery was aimed and what execution had been accomplished.



## NOSE'S CREEK.

At 7 o'clock I advanced my whole command on the Dallas and Marietta road, having previously rebuilt the bridge over Muddy creek, which had been carried away by the swollen current, crossed the creek, and reached Nose's creek, where I was detained a short time to repair the bridge crossing it. After considerable difficulty, the bridge being swept away while crossing by the furious stream, which was still swelling rapidly, I succeeded in passing my entire division. Moving on over the miserable road, I encountered the enemy's skirmishers three-quarters of a mile beyond the creek, and pressing them, found the enemy intrenched a short distance beyond. I speedily formed line, placed the third brigade on the right of the road, the first on the left, connecting with Williams's, holding the second in reserve. Both batteries were placed in position and opened upon the enemy; my skirmish line advancing drove the enemy's sharpshooters behind their rail defences, within short distance of their main line. Towards evening Butterfield came up and formed on my right, a small branch of Nose's creek intervening. Rain continued heavily during the day and night, rendering the roads very bad and the creeks almost impassable; skirmishing continued steadily during the day and night.

*June 20.*—In the morning I relieved the third brigade by the second, the third retiring to the rear on my right. My artillery continued to play with considerable effect upon the rebel lines during the day. At dark my first and third brigades were relieved by a brigade from Wood's division, 4th corps. Leaving my second brigade in position on the left of Butterfield, I moved Candy and Ireland and the artillery to the right across the creek; Candy's brigade going upon the right of the third division, Ireland and the artillery bivouacking in the rear of Butterfield's right.

*June 21.*—The second brigade, being relieved, joined me early in the morning, when I moved out the second and third brigades to the right of the first, forming a continuous line along the road and connecting on the right with Williams's division, which had been moved on the previous evening. This position I intrenched strongly, placing all my artillery in the line. In the morning I sent out the one hundred and thirty-seventh New York volunteers, and the one the one hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania volunteers, under the command of Colonel Cobham, on a reconnoissance towards Marietta and Powder Springs road, similar reconnoissance having been sent out at the same time by the other divisions of corps. Cobham developed a strong line of rebel skirmishers about three-quarters of a mile in front of my breastworks, where he maintained an active contest all day, crowding the rebel line back from our line upwards of a quarter of a mile. The reconnoitring parties of the first and third divisions were withdrawn during the night; hoping to secure the object sought, I directed mine to remain.

## KNOBB'S FARM.

*June 22.*—At 3 o'clock in the morning Cobham's party drove the rebels from a high hill one mile in front of the main line of the division. Early in the morning I moved the command forward upon the hills gained by my skirmishers. I at once set to work fortifying my main position, which was upon an important and commanding ridge, completely developing to our view the disposition of the enemy. Perceiving the great importance of the place, I immediately communicated its capture to Major General Hooker, who came in person; he directed me to hold the place at every hazard. I set about reversing the enemy's works and throwing up such others as were necessary to cover my whole command, in single line, including the artillery; while in this position the enemy opened a tremendous cannonade, which was not permitted to interrupt the prosecution of the work. From prisoners captured by my advance posts I learned that

Hood's and Hardee's corps were massed at no great distance in my front. This was also communicated to the major general commanding corps, who, without delay, advanced Butterfield's division to the ridge on my left, and Williams's to a corresponding ridge on my right, but separated by a deep ravine and low ground. Skirmishing almost to battle continued during the morning, our lines gaining ground. My works were scarcely completed, when, to close a gap between me and Williams, I ordered the second brigade to extend still further to the right, reaching to the ravine before mentioned—posting this new line on a small knoll held by the thirteenth New York battery, the ground in front consisting of cleared fields with gradual slope. The brigade had scarcely extended to the point designated when a furious attack burst upon Williams, driving in his pickets and engaging his main column. The pickets of the first division being driven in, the flank of my line was completely exposed, which the enemy attacked furiously, taking advantage of the cover afforded by the houses in the vicinity; the line maintained its position, keeping up a heavy and constant fire, the enemy contenting himself with assaulting my skirmishers, not attacking my main line. At the moment of the attack my artillery opened upon the charging column of the enemy and continued it with great effect during the entire fight, completely enfilading the rebel ranks and literally sweeping them down. After repeated attempts to carry Williams's works, the enemy retired repulsed, their retreat harassed by the fire from my own and Williams's batteries; my position on the surrounding hills enabling me to form a concentrated fire upon the enemy, sweeping with great effect the ravine in which they sought refuge. Although my losses in this engagement, compared with those on former occasions, were small numerically, my artillery sustaining the force of the battle, I suffered severely in the death of my chief of artillery, Captain William Wheeler, of the thirteenth New York battery, who fell shot through the heart by one of the enemy's sharpshooters, whilst gallantly fighting his battery. During the short time of his connexion with my division he has shown himself a gentleman of refined education and a gallant officer. The losses of the enemy under the fearful cannonade were heavy; from the appearance of the field, and from statements of prisoners, I estimate their losses between two and three thousand.

*June 23.*—In the afternoon I advanced to the left my skirmish line, and after a spirited contest captured thirty (30) of the enemy's pickets.

*June 24, 25, and 26.*—Remained in position; skirmishing maintained throughout, the accuracy of the enemy's fire causing some loss daily.

On the 26th I received orders to advance; on the 27th to co-operate with a movement of the 4th and 14th corps on my left.

#### KENESAW.

*June 27.*—Early in the morning I massed my command in rear of centre of my line, second brigade in front, first next, and third brigade in rear. About 7 o'clock the second brigade of Williams's division moved to the works on my left in readiness to occupy the line vacated by my movement. At 8 o'clock I moved over my works, advancing rapidly under a well-directed fire from three of the enemy's batteries, and under an effective fire from a heavy picket line, across the cleared ground in front, through a belt of woods beyond, halting at its outer edge; so rapidly and well executed was the movement that many of the enemy were captured in their pits, and their line fell back speedily, not without loss. McGill's battery, in position upon the hill from which my infantry had moved, maintained a steady fire upon the main rebel line beyond the woods. The second brigade having halted on gaining the woods, and the 14th corps now being heavily engaged on a high hill on my left, I formed line, placing first brigade on the left, third brigade on the right. The second brigade, holding the centre, was well advanced, the first brigade retired almost at right angles, this formation being necessitated by the 14th corps having been repulsed in the attack

on my left; and the first division not yet having advanced upon my right at the time of the advance of the 14th corps, my skirmish line, consisting of the fifth Ohio volunteers, under Major Symmes, went forward on the double-quick across the open ground between the left of my main line and the right of the 14th corps, driving the enemy's skirmishers before them and capturing a small house upon the immediate right of the hill on which the enemy were strongly fortified. The position thus seized being one from which the enemy's left could be enfiladed with artillery, I determined to hold it, and therefore send forward re-enforcements with intrenching tools to throw up works; I also sent forward the thirteenth New York battery to open upon the enemy's works. The battery had just reached its new position, and was preparing to open fire, when the lines of the 14th corps withdrew and the enemy opened fire upon our artillery. To hold the position without support was impossible, and I accordingly withdrew the artillery to a knoll in rear of the left of my line, from which I opened a steady fire upon the enemy in my immediate front. The skirmishers held the position they had gained despite every effort to dislodge them. The skirmish line being so far advanced, it became dangerous to fire from the battery on the hill I had left in the morning, I therefore moved McGill's battery forward to the knoll immediately in rear of my own line; from this point the battery renewed its fire, continuing it throughout the day. My main line, now well intrenched, extended through the belt of woods to the open fields on the left, and on the right to a swampy marsh, impassable for troops. About 3 o'clock a brigade of Williams's division came up on my right on the opposite side of the marsh; skirmishing continued briskly through the day and heavy artillery firing by the enemy.

*June 28 and 29.*—Remained in same position, skirmishing lively with the enemy, with artillery firing during the day.

*June 30.*—After dark was relieved by Baird's division of the 14th corps, and moved to the right about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles, where I relieved Hascall's division of the 23d corps, in works just beyond the Powder Spring road, my whole division in line before daylight.

*Casualties in the actions of Muddy creek, Nose's creek, Knobb's farm, and Kenesaw mountain.*

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Aggregate.
Commissioned officers .....	2	11	-----	13
Enlisted men .....	26	229	2	257
Total .....	28	240	2	270

*July 1 and 2.*—There being no troops on my right other than a picket from Cox's division of the 23d corps, which extended half a mile beyond the flank of my division, I strengthened and changed the direction of the line of works so as to protect well my right flank, placing one regiment on a post of observation, well intrenched, half a mile in advance of the main line of works.

#### MARIETTA.

*July 3.*—The enemy having evacuated his line in our front during the night, I moved in pursuit at daylight, pushing across a thickly wooded country towards Neil Dow station, the third division advancing on my left along the Powder Spring road. Passing through the enemy's abandoned works, very lively skirmishing ensued with their rear-guard, consisting of cavalry and infantry. Pres-

sing in rapidly I reached Maloney's church, near which the enemy made a stand, on the opposite side of the railroad. The enemy was behind the railroad embankment and hastily constructed breastworks, from which he opened with musketry and artillery upon my advance. My troops now being on hand, I immediately placed a section of McGill's battery in position, and opened upon them, while my skirmishers, charging forward, drove them from the railroad and the works. On the ground from which the rebels were driven were found the bodies of a colonel and seven privates, besides seven dead horses. At this point I made connexion with the 14th corps upon my left. Changing direction and moving to the south about two miles, I found the enemy strongly posted on a commanding ridge. Here I formed line upon the extreme right of the corps. During the day took one hundred and seventy prisoners. The night passed with the usual picket firing.

*July 4.*—Skirmishing in my front. The enemy busily engaged in strengthening their works, and slashing timber. During the day Butterfield and Williams moved to my right and I extended my line to the left across the gap thus made, to connect with Davis's division of the 14th corps.

*July 5.*—The enemy evacuated during the previous night, and at daylight, with my command, I started in pursuit; passing through his works, elaborate and strong, marched south by east over a succession of rough and densely wooded ridges without regular roads, crossing Nickajack creek near Ruff & Daniels's mill. I then moved towards Turner's ferry, the 14th corps still upon my left, the army of the Tennessee on my right, Williams and Butterfield following me. During the morning my skirmishers became slightly engaged with the enemy's cavalry, who routed before my advance. At 3 p. m. found the enemy occupying a strong line of works on hills skirting the north side of the Chattahoochee. Posting a strong picket here along the Nickajack, closely fronting the enemy's works, I massed the division in the woods near the Old Factory road, and on Dobbs's farm, my right connected by picket with the army of the Tennessee. No connexion upon my left with the 14th corps, which was across Nickajack creek. From my camp we could plainly discern the steeples and chimneys of Atlanta. The sight of the city gave great encouragement to my men, who, seeing the prize which was to crown the campaign, looked cheerfully forward to its speedy possession.

*July 6.*—Relieved at 3 p. m. by the first division 15th corps, and moved northward, following the first division to the ridge road leading to Vining's station; then going east, encamped in open woods east of Nickajack creek.

*July 7.*—Early in the morning moved two miles southward, and formed line on the right of the third division, connecting on the right at Nickajack creek with first division 15th corps; advanced my picket line so that I might closely observe the enemy in their fortifications near the river. No skirmishing during the day. Ward and Williams's divisions upon my left.

*July 8.*—Remained in position of the previous day. During the night the enemy evacuated and withdrew across the river.

*July 9.*—At daylight advanced my pickets to the river bank, about one mile distant, taking a number of prisoners and deserters. The enemy's pickets in plain view on the opposite side of the river. Country on both banks rough and wooded. The evacuated works of the enemy were very elaborate and strong, comprising breastworks, rifle-pits, bastions, stockades, abatis, chevaux-de-frise, and palisades.

*July 10.*—Remained in camp, making every disposition for a few days' rest, and for the health and comfort of the troops.

*July 11 to 16.*—Remained encamped. On the 12th the 15th corps moved up the river. I relieved their picket line on our immediate right.

*July 17.*—At 5 o'clock in the evening moved to the right, following the third division. Reaching Pace's ferry, crossed the Chattahoochee on pontoon bridge

just before dark, and taking the road branching to the left from the Buck Head road, marched two miles and encamped near a white house, west of Nances' creek.

*July 18.*—After a careful reconnoissance of the country by the second brigade, as far east as Nances' creek, above the crossing of the Buck Head road about noon, under orders from the major general commanding corps, I advanced, following the third division, constructing two bridges over Nances' creek at Williams's saw-mill. Advancing skirmishers up Buck Head road, they became slightly engaged with the enemy's cavalry. I followed immediately with the division, and on reaching the junction of the Howell's Mill road (one mile east of Buck Head) encamped, throwing up works in my front covering the road.

#### PEACH TREE CREEK.

*July 19.*—At daylight (in accordance with orders from Major General Hooker directing me to advance *via* Howell's mill) I moved with my division two miles to the hill overlooking Howell's mill, where I found Davis's division, 14th corps, whose skirmishers were hotly engaged with those of the enemy across the creek at this point. Having communicated these facts to the major general commanding the corps, by his direction I moved to the left post, (Casey's house,) and massed my division in the woods on hill skirting Peach Tree creek. My position here was about three-quarters of a mile from Howell's mill; my skirmishers connected with those of the 4th corps on my left. They were ordered to conceal themselves in the woods and bushes close to the creek, and not to disclose their locations by firing. To my right the country was cleared; no connexion was formed in that direction with the 14th corps, because to do so would disclose a portion of my movements to the enemy. Silence was enjoined upon the troops, and preparations were quickly and quietly made to force a crossing, and seize a prominent hill opposite, which was held by the enemy with rifle-pits. Peach Tree creek at this point was twenty feet wide, and deep, with marshy banks and muddy bottom. The hills on both sides were steep and irregular, and heavily timbered, while along both banks was a narrow steep of cleared land, widening beyond my right, and extending out into an open country to my left, in front of the right of the 4th corps. No bridge or roads crossed the stream in my front. Under personal supervision of Major General Hooker, and also of myself, both batteries of the division were quietly posted on prominent points in the woods opposite the hill mentioned above, which projected nearer the creek than any other of those held by the enemy. Small epaulments of logs were constructed for the protection of the gunners, while the pioneer corps prepared stringers, logs, and rails for bridge construction. At 3 p. m. my twelve pieces of artillery opened on the hills opposite, and my skirmishers, which had been re-enforced to a very heavy line, poured in a furious musketry fire. Under cover of this a foot bridge was constructed by the pioneer corps, and Ireland's brigade filed across on the double-quick, formed on the other side, and charged and carried the hill. All was done very quickly. The enemy, completely surprised, fled, leaving twenty-three prisoners and their intrenching tools in our hands. My other two brigades followed immediately, formed on Ireland's right, and erected strong breastworks as a *tête-du-pont* for our place of crossing. My skirmish lines were advanced in the dusk until they encountered the newly established picket line of the enemy about a quarter of a mile to my front. During the night two other brigades were thrown across the creek in my rear, and roads to them were cut for the artillery and wagons. The enemy during the afternoon opened a battery about three-quarters of a mile obliquely in front of my left flank, and fired a number of shots at the troops crossing the bridge, but without effect.

*July 20.*—Early in the morning Williams's division crossed and formed on the hills to my right. About the same time Ward crossed and formed line in the

valley to my left. At 10 a. m., in compliance with orders, my skirmishers moved forward, supported by Candy's brigade, Jones's brigade following Candy's; crossing two timbered ridges in front of my breastworks, the enemy's skirmishers were driven, after a sharp engagement, from the third ridge in the woods, and from a cornfield on the right of it. The position gained was a most important one, and was immediately, at 12 m., occupied by Candy's brigade in line; a few rails were piled up by the troops as a protection along their front. While Canby's brigade took position on the ridge, a closely contested skirmish was going on between the enemy and the skirmishers of Ward's division—the latter attempting to gain possession of a large cleared hill directly to my left. A section of Bundy's battery was brought, went into position on my left in the edge of the woods, and opened an enfilading fire upon the enemy opposed to Ward; Ward's skirmishers advancing at the same time, the enemy fled. I now placed Jones's brigade in two lines in support of Candy's, brought up all of my artillery and posted it on Candy's line, and had Ireland's brigade massed on the ridge behind Jones. Major General Hooker informed me that General Williams had been directed to advance on my right and connect; the left of General Williams was then about 500 yards directly in rear of my right, which was much exposed, inclining (necessarily from the shape of the ridge) slightly towards the front. The position here, to be understood with reference to the heavy battle of July 20, needs accurate description. The ridge occupied by Candy and Jones was heavily timbered, as was the country in their rear, and to their left the surrounding country presented broken ridges, with deep ravines and thickets, while here and there were isolated hills and spurs. In front and to the right of my first brigade the country was densely timbered for two miles. Directly in front of Candy and to his left it was cleared. The cleared space in his front was about 600 yards wide; that to his left opened out into the valley of Peachtree creek. About 80 yards to his left ran a swampy stream, a tributary of that creek; beyond this stream rose the broad hill held by Ward's skirmishers, while his division lay in line on the lower slope of that hill in Peachtree valley. Thus it will be seen that my main line occupied a position equally advanced with the skirmishers of the other division. My skirmishers had advanced across a swampy rivulet about 300 yards in front of my main line, their left in the open field, and their right on a high, narrow, timbered hill in front of my right. Deeming that hill an important outpost, I directed Colonel Jones to send a regiment to occupy it. The thirty-third New Jersey volunteers was immediately sent, and I went to the hill to reconnoitre, directing another regiment from Colonel Jones's brigade to follow the thirty-third New Jersey volunteers. On reaching the hill I found my skirmishers on the crest of it, and the thirty-third New Jersey just arriving. On my way I met three prisoners sent in from the skirmish line; they were quite communicative, saying that there were no large bodies of their troops within two miles. The thirty-third New Jersey formed in line on the hill, and I directed a portion of the skirmish line to advance a short distance along the slope of the ridge to develop the intentions of the enemy, who were keeping perfectly quiet; not a man was to be seen or heard of in any direction. These skirmishers had advanced but a few rods when the enemy opened in a continuous fire upon us from our right and front, and were found to be advancing in very heavy force on all sides, being already within seventy-five yards of us; their heaviest attack being on my right. The thirty-third New Jersey volunteers, together with my skirmish line, were quickly forced back to my main line, with considerable loss. Scarcely had they rejoined the main body when the enemy, in immense force, rapidly and fiercely burst upon the right flank of Candy's and Jones's brigades, and passed their flanks to their rear, at the same time charging on Candy's right, front, and rear. It was necessary to change front with a portion of my command to meet the impending danger. The one hundred and forty-seventh Pennsylvania volunteers, holding that part of the front line in which my artillery was posted, remained

to fight the enemy in that direction. The sixtieth New York volunteers of Ireland's brigade, and the one hundred and nineteenth New York volunteers, and seventy-third and one hundred and ninth Pennsylvania volunteers of Jones's brigade, assisted in supporting the artillery; these five regiments, with the aid of the batteries, fighting on all sides and holding the hill, while, with the rest of my command, I quickly changed front and formed in the midst of the battle, connecting with General Williams's division. This was done by changing the front to the right, with all of Candy's brigade, except the one hundred and forty-seventh Pennsylvania volunteers, and deploying Ireland's and Jones's brigades in one line, connecting Ireland's left with Candy's and Jones's right with General Williams's left. The following diagram will show the position. All these changes were completed within an hour, during which the battle raged on every side with terrific fury. The five regiments, with the batteries as already mentioned, held throughout the hill occupied by them at noon. All my artillery was in position there, and was served rapidly from the beginning to the end of the battle with great heroism, coolness, and skill. That hill was the key position of the entire battle; once gained by the enemy, the day was lost. The enemy, perceiving its importance, surged in immense masses against it, while the dispositions of my command were being made as before stated, but they stood as firm as a rock, and mowed down column after column of that vast struggling mass that charged them from three sides. I have never seen more heroic fighting; for three hours the fury of the battle along our entire line could not be surpassed. Then the tempest of sounds and missiles began to decrease gradually, and by dark nothing but the heavy skirmishing remained.

General Hood had massed the greater part of his entire army in this furious assault upon a single corps, and that one the smallest one in our army, and was whipped back to the ground he had left in the morning. It is with a feeling of unusual admiration for the troops under my command that I record the history of their part in the battle of Peachtree creek, attacked by overwhelming numbers from front, right flank, and rear. Five regiments, with the artillery, held the key position, while fighting terribly all the time. The rest of my command changed its front, formed a connected line, and threw themselves into the combat with such determination and valor that they overcame five times their number. This result was largely due to the fact that by changing my front in the manner described, our troops delivered an effective and persistent cross-fire upon the enemy at the moment when they were flushed with the anticipation of victory, and, supposing themselves entrapped, they retreated broken and dismayed. This battle was a very remarkable one, as a test of the discipline and valor of our troops, and as the first defeat of the newly appointed commander of the rebel army; it was glorious in its result. The trees everywhere bore marks of the extreme severity of the contest, and recalled to my mind the scene of conflict when the same division fought at Gettysburg. Not a tree or bush within the entire range but bore the score of battle. The appearance of the enemy as they charged upon our front across the clear field was magnificent; rarely has such a sight been presented in battle. Pouring out from the woods, they advanced in immense grey and brown masses (not lines) with flags and banners, many of them new and beautiful, while their generals and staff officers were in plain view, with drawn sabres flashing in the light, galloping here and there as they urged their troops on to the charge. The rebel troops also seemed to rush forward with more than customary nerve and heartiness in the attack. This grand charge was Hood's inaugural, and his army came upon us that day full of high hope, confident that the small force in their front could not withstand them; but their ardor and confidence were soon shaken. My artillery, served with the utmost rapidity, even while receiving volleys from the rear, poured out steady discharges of canister and shell, and we could see the great gaps in that compact mass of human beings as each shot tore through the ranks. Those masses

of the enemy that charged upon my right and rear reached, at one time, within five yards of Bundy's battery, but, by the cool bravery of my officers and men, were driven back. I cannot refrain from especially mentioning Major Reynolds, chief of artillery of the corps, who, with Captain Aleshire, my own chief, was present on my line, and rendered distinguished services throughout the severest portion of the battle. Colonel Andrew Pardee, of the one hundred and forty-seventh Pennsylvania volunteers, deserves special mention for the determination, discipline, and personal gallantry displayed in holding his position, in support of the artillery, under a terrible fire from his flank and rear. My loss, in valuable officers, was particularly severe. Captain Thomas A. Elliott, assistant adjutant general on my staff, was killed instantly in the thickest of the battle. His death was a severe loss to me personally, as well as to my division. He had served with me, as assistant adjutant general, for nearly three years, and was distinguished for his ability and gallantry. Colonel George A. Cobham, one hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania volunteers, a model gentleman and commander, fell mortally wounded. For one year previous to the organization of the 2d corps, by the consolidation of the 11th and 12th, he commanded the second brigade of my division, and lead it with great credit through the battle of Gettysburg, Wauhatchie, Lookout mountain, Mission ridge, and Ringgold. He participated, with his regiment, in all the battles and movements of our present campaign, and, during the absence of Colonel Ireland, commanded my third brigade in the battle of Resaca and New Hope church. His loss is deeply felt and deplored throughout the division. Lieutenant Colonel Randall, one hundred and forty-ninth New York volunteers, a brave and excellent officer, was killed while fighting gallantly in command of his regiment.

*Casualties in the battle of Peachtree creek, Georgia.*

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Aggregate.
Commissioned officers .....	4	24	9	37
Enlisted men .....	78	205	156	439
Total .....	82	229	165	476

Four hundred and nine of the enemy's dead were buried by fatigue parties from my division, in my front, and I had information, deemed reliable, that about two hundred (200) were carried back and buried by them from the same portion of the field. From these statements, and from the terrible punishment inflicted upon the enemy crowded together in dense masses, I can safely estimate their loss in my front, at the least, at 2,500 men.

*July 21.*—Early this morning my skirmishers were advanced about 400 yards and found the enemy's pickets beyond. The day passed quietly, my details being occupied in burying my own and the enemy's dead.

*July 22.*—At 5 a. m. I advanced my skirmishers and found that the enemy had withdrawn. A general advance being ordered (of the corps) at 6 a. m., I moved with my division through the woods, across a very rough broken country, in the direction of Atlanta. My second and third brigades moved in parallel columns, 1st brigade following. After marching about a mile we crossed the fortifications evacuated by the enemy the night before. The works were very strong and were the outer line of the defence of Atlanta. Turning here to the right, in a few minutes I reached the broad road running from Howell's mill to Atlanta. On this road the fourteenth corps and General Williams's division



were advancing with my third and first brigades. I followed until near its junction with the Marietta road, when my skirmishers connecting with those of General Williams's division, engaged with those of the enemy, driving them to the main fortifications of Atlanta. My second brigade, which had moved nearly a mile through the woods further to the left, joined me at this point. The enemy opened upon us with artillery from a fort in our front, on Marietta street, at 10 o'clock a. m. By direction of the major general commanding corps I took position on a cleared ridge half a mile east of Howell's mill road, and deployed my entire division except two regiments in front, line facing south and confronting the forts on Marietta street, about 1,000 yards distant. Ward's division connected with my left, and Williams's with my right. Here, within two hours, my troops erected strong breastworks, and my artillery took position on commanding points in the line. My skirmishers advanced close to the enemy's fortifications and then constructed outpost defences. From my location here to the centre of Atlanta was two miles. Sharp skirmishing and artillery duelling continued during the day and late into the night, shells from our guns being thrown far into the city. At 1 p. m. the enemy made a strong dash on our pickets, but were quickly driven back. My intrenchments were completed during the afternoon, and abatis constructed along my front.

*July 23.*—Artillery duelling and skirmishing continued. At noon the enemy made another unsuccessful attempt to drive in our pickets. Continued to strengthen my intrenchments and abatis.

*July 24.*—My command was employed constructing an advance parallel about six hundred yards in front of the first line. At 9 p. m., in pursuance of orders from the major general commanding the department, a strong demonstration was made by Williams's division, arousing the enemy along our entire front and eliciting from him a sharp fire. My troops, keeping well under cover, suffered very few casualties.

*July 26.*—My new line of works, elaborately and strongly constructed, was finished and occupied by my troops at night. This parallel shortened the line of the corps so much that Ward's division was entirely relieved by a portion of mine, and the fortifications of the corps were occupied by the first and second divisions, the third withdrawing behind our centre in reserve.

*July 27.*—At 6 a. m., in pursuance of orders transmitted from Major General Sherman, I sent out from my division two hundred men, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Walker, one hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania volunteers, to make a demonstration against the enemy. This force drove in the pickets, and established our outposts where those of the enemy had been. The army of the Tennessee passed my rear all day, moving from the left to the right of the army. The order relieving, at his own request, Major General Hooker from command of the corps, was received to-day, and caused expressions of profound regret throughout the command. Brigadier General Williams was, by the same order, assigned to temporary command of the corps.

*July 28.*—The forenoon passed in comparative quiet, the enemy throwing occasionally 64-pounder shells of the James projectile pattern in our direction from heavy guns recently mounted in a fort near the railroad and close to Mrs. Pender's house. About 1 p. m. the sounds of battle came from the direction of the army of the Tennessee, several miles distant to our right, and lasted until 3 p. m. at which time the enemy opened heavily on my own lines with artillery, continuing their fire until dark, but causing very few casualties among our troops.

*July 29.*—In pursuance of orders my pickets felt of the enemy frequently during the night, and again strongly at daylight, but discovered no signs of their giving way. Considerable artillery firing from both sides to-day along my front. By order of the brigadier general commanding corps, I sent out the sixtieth New York volunteers, under Colonel Goddard, in the forenoon, to make

a strong demonstration on the enemy's lines. The duty was performed in fine style, driving in their pickets with the loss, on our side, of but one man slightly wounded.

*July 30 and 31.*—Nothing of interest to record.

*August 1 and 2.*—Picket firing throughout the day, which became very heavy at night; artillery firing on both sides, sharp firing at intervals throughout.

*August 3.*—At 5 p. m. the pickets made a demonstration in their front, exciting a lively artillery fire from the rebel works, our artillery replying occasionally.

*August 4.*—Received orders to have the whole command vigilant at its post. At 1 p. m. the sound of heavy fighting was heard on the extreme right, which ceased shortly after 3 p. m., all remaining quiet, until about 8.30 p. m., when heavy artillery and musketry firing was again heard from the same direction. The firing lasted only about twenty minutes, after which fitful firing occurred along the lines.

*August 5, 6, 7, and 8.*—Usual picket and artillery firing. Five deserters came into my lines.

*August 9.*—A detail from the command was engaged in constructing six embrasures for siege artillery in the works of the one hundred and forty-ninth New York volunteers on my left. By order of General Sherman all the artillery opened upon the city, firing about fifty rounds per gun. The enemy responded feebly in my front, firing from but one fort. The enemy could be seen constructing bomb-proofs in their works. Three deserters came in.

*August 10.*—The embrasures were finished, and three 4½-inch guns were placed in position; opened fire upon Atlanta at 4 p. m., which was maintained throughout the night. Two deserters came in.

*August 11 and 12.*—Ordinary firing from pickets and artillery.

*August 13.*—By order of Major General Sherman all the artillery bearing upon the city was directed to open and continue a regular fire upon it during the afternoon and night. About 11 p. m. a large fire broke out in the city; bells and cries of fire were plainly audible. The fire became larger and continued until daylight.

*August 14.*—Artillery still playing at intervals upon the city. Deserters coming into my lines agree in representing great dissatisfaction existing in Hood's army. Shortly after dark another large fire broke out in the city, lasting about three hours.

*August 15 and 16.*—Picket and artillery firing as usual. Verbal orders received to withdraw my command from the works in the night of the 18th, and move quietly and quickly to Pace's ferry on the Chattahoochee, then to hold the bridge, and guard the approach to the railroad.

*August 17.*—Received written orders suspending the proposed movement until further notice.

*August 18.*—At 4 a. m. the enemy opened heavily with artillery along his entire line, inflicting but little damage. Batteries on our line promptly and actively replied. The cannonade lasted heavily until 7 o'clock a. m.

*August 19.*—At 4 a. m. the artillery opened along our entire line furiously upon the enemy, firing twelve rounds per gun.

*August 20, 21, 22, and 23.*—Ordinary firing of pickets, and artillery.

*August 24.*—The movement previously ordered, and which had been suspended on the 17th instant, was again ordered, and all the trains of the command crossed the Chattahoochee.

*August 25.*—At 7 a. m. received orders from corps headquarters directing me to withdraw during the night to Pace's ferry, the hour of withdrawal to be designated at a later period of the day. At daylight sent one regiment and the pioneer corps from each brigade to Pace's ferry to construct defensive works on

the east side of the river. At 8 o'clock I proceeded in person to the ferry, superintended laying out the tête-du-pont, and surveying grounds in vicinity with especial reference to forming a line of works. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon, in consultation with General Williams, decided upon the details for the movement during the night. The troops to withdraw at 9 o'clock to the second ridge in rear of the works, and there await the movement of the 4th corps past my rear; the command to move to its position on the river as soon as the 4th corps had passed; Bundy's battery to accompany my division, the pickets to remain until the movement was completed, and then to follow the main body to the river. At 9 p. m. my troops withdrew from the works and massed at the point indicated. The 4th corps was to have moved at 9 p. m., but from some cause unknown to me failed to do so. By night only two brigades of the 4th corps had passed my position. I decided not to await the passage of the remainder of the corps, as to do so would delay me until after daylight; and the road being clear I moved my division out (without interrupting in the slightest degree the march of the 4th corps) to the main road, over a new one through the woods, which I had cut during the day, and moved rapidly on, and reached Pace's ferry about 4 a. m. on the morning of the 26th. The command was immediately posted; third brigade on the left, extending across the Buckhead road, covering the bridge at the ferry; the second brigade in the centre, joining the third; the first on the right, joining the second and connecting with Williams's division on the north side of Peachtree creek; Bundy's battery, placed in the works before Atlanta, joined my command at 6 o'clock a. m. The withdrawal from my works before Atlanta, and the march of nine miles to the ferry, were all accomplished without the loss of a man or of any material.

*Casualties in front of Atlanta from July 23 to August 25.*

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Aggregate
Commissioned officers .....	1	3	-----	4
Enlisted men .....	14	108	4	126
Total .....	15	111	4	130

About noon the enemy's cavalry appeared in my front, and slight skirmishing commenced between them and my pickets. At 3 o'clock a body of cavalry dismounted charged the picket line, but were driven back with a loss of eight killed left on the field, some twenty-five wounded, and three prisoners, with no casualties in my command. Skirmishing continued throughout the afternoon. The artillery firing a few shells into the cavalry caused them to disperse rapidly. The enemy was busily engaged in feeling my lines at 8 p. m. Colonel Minty, commanding a brigade in General Garrard's cavalry division, reported to me that the seventh Pennsylvania cavalry was left on the opposite side of the river with orders to patrol up the river as far as Soap creek. During the afternoon Major General Slocum, assigned to command the corps, rode along my lines and was received with hearty enthusiasm by the men of his old command.

*August 27.*—During the day was very busily engaged perfecting my lines, constructing breastworks, rifle-pits, and abatis. The line to be held by my division, being about  $2\frac{3}{4}$  miles in length, required a vast amount of labor to place in proper condition. Two pieces of Knapp's battery were placed in position in a work thrown up on the right of the line for the purpose of defending the railroad bridge and other bridges at Montgomery ferry. Major General Slocum to-day formally took command of the corps.

*August 28, 29, and 30,* passed with slight skirmishing on the extreme picket line, the troops busily engaged working on the defences.

*August 31.*—At 6 a. m., in obedience to orders from corps headquarters, I sent out a reconnoitring party of two hundred men under Colonel Flynn, twenty-eighth Pennsylvania volunteers. Colonel Flynn, moving on the Buckhead road, found the enemy's cavalry pickets on the west side of Nances' creek. Moving to his left, he flanked and drove them, and then crossed the creek, moving on the road to the right about a mile, when he again found the enemy posted in rail works on the further edge of the cleared hill. He exchanged a few volleys with them, but believing their numbers to be too great to be driven, and his object being to find, not to fight, the enemy, he retired, recrossed the creek, and moving down the road turned northward on a smaller road, over which the corps had marched on the 18th of July. On again reaching the creek, he found the enemy's cavalry pickets on the west side; these he quickly drove, and again crossing the creek, and moving about a mile and a half, met the enemy intrenched in a field near the junction of the road on which he was marching; this being the right of the same line he had encountered below. Having fulfilled his orders by ascertaining the position of the enemy, Colonel Flynn returned without loss.

*September 1.*—Day passed without change.

*September 2.*—In obedience to orders from corps headquarters, I sent out a reconnoitring party. The reconnoissance was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Walker, one hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania volunteers, and was composed of the one hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania volunteers, sixtieth New York volunteers, and details from the one hundred and second New York volunteers and twenty-ninth Pennsylvania volunteers, and twenty men from the seventh Pennsylvania cavalry. Captain Lambert, acting assistant inspector general, and Lieutenant Schelling, of my staff, accompanied Lieutenant Colonel Walker. The reconnoissance moved out at 6 a. m. on the Buckhead road. Skirmishers were thrown to the front immediately after passing the pickets, but the column advanced rapidly until after crossing Nances' creek, and to the point at which the road branched to Buckhead. At this point the road gave indications of the recent passage of a column of cavalry. The main body was here halted, and the sixtieth New York volunteers sent down the Buckhead road to the junction of the Howell's Mill road. Having received intelligence of the arrival of the sixtieth New York volunteers at the point indicated, the column moved on, and the sixtieth New York volunteers was ordered to move towards Howard's mill and there join the main body. On reaching the creek at the mill it was learned that Ferguson's rebel cavalry brigade, which had been encamped there, had moved a few hours previously towards Atlanta. The bridge over Peachtree creek at this place had been destroyed. Little delay, however, was experienced; the infantry crossing on a large log, the cavalry fording, the column moved on towards the city. Lieutenant Colonel Walker, accompanied by the cavalry, preceded his infantry and entered the outskirts of the city, where he met Colonel Coburn, commanding the reconnoissance of the third division, who had also preceded his troops, discovering that, with the exception of Ferguson's cavalry brigade, there were no troops in the city. It was agreed that their commands should enter the city at the same time, which was done, the enemy's cavalry retiring before them. Lieutenant Colonel Walker's command was the first to reach the city hall, upon which the colors of the sixtieth New York and one hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania volunteers were immediately hoisted. To these regiments, representing my division, belong the immortal honors of placing upon the rebel stronghold the first Union flags, and to give the first practical announcement that the long campaign had ended in glorious victory; that the gate city of the south was ours. Receiving the intelligence of the evacuation of the city, I immediately ordered forward the second and third brig-

ades and Bundy's battery, preceding them in person, thus leaving the entire line of works at the ferry to be held by the first brigade, under command of Colonel Ario Pardee. The troops arrived during the evening, and were massed on McDonough and Whitehall streets.

*September 3.*—Early in the morning my two brigades were placed in position in the fortifications; the third brigade in the southwestern portion of the line from the East Point railroad to the McDonough road and south of the city.

*September 4.*—The first brigade, being ordered from the Cattahoochee, arrived in the city at 3 o'clock, and was placed in the works on the right of the third brigade, west of the city. The second brigade was relieved towards the evening by the third brigade, third division, and moved to the right of the McDonough road, the lines of the third brigade having been shortened. The one hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania volunteers was to-day detached for provost guard duty, and reported to Colonel Cogswell, commanding. Post orders were received from Major General Sherman announcing the accomplishment by the army of its undertaking in the complete reduction and occupation of Atlanta, and indicating that the spring campaign was closed.

*The casualties in the battles and intervening marches described in the preceding report amount to an aggregate as follows:*

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Aggregate.
Commissioned officers .....	16	97	10	123
Enlisted men .....	315	1,826	263	2,404
Total .....	331	1,923	273	2,527

The loss of field officers during the campaign has been unusually heavy. All of the regiments save three, and all the brigades, changed commanders at least once during the campaign. These frequent changes have caused great difficulty in procuring the proper reports, and, in consequence, prevented me from submitting my report at an earlier period. In addition to these losses, I have, since the close of the campaign, been deprived of the services of a gallant officer and efficient brigade commander by the death, from disease, on the 10th instant, of Colonel David Ireland, one hundred and thirty-seventh New York volunteers, and captain in the fifteenth United States infantry. Colonel Ireland had commanded the third brigade of my division for upwards of ten months, and greatly distinguished himself by his gallantry in all the engagements in which his command has participated. In his death I lose a valued personal friend; the country one of its noblest defenders. My staff suffered severely. Captain Elliott, my assistant adjutant general, and Captain Wheeler, chief of artillery, having been killed; Captain Veal, assistant commissary of musters, severely, and Captain Wilbur, aide-de-camp, slightly, wounded, and Captain Davis, aide-de-camp, captured.

I cannot close this report without special reference to the officers composing my personal and departmental staff. To Captain William F. Forbes, for a time assistant inspector general, and assistant adjutant general after the death of the lamented Elliott; Captain R. H. Wilbur, aide-de-camp, and commissary of musters after the brave Captain Veal was wounded; Captain William H. Lambert, aide-de-camp, and assistant inspector general after the promotion of Captain Forbes; and to Captain J. J. Cantine and Lieutenants Sherwood and Amor, I tender my warmest and special thanks for the hearty accord and energetic support they at

all times gave to every movement that seemed to be for the interest and success of our cause. To Captain Ire B Seymour, provost marshal, Captain Schilling, topographical engineer, and Lieutenant Chapman, chief of ambulances, I return my thanks for their faithfulness and readiness to perform their respective duties, no matter what was to be done or what risk to be encountered. Captain Parkin, assistant quartermaster, Captain Gillette, commissary of subsistence, and Captain Wilson, ordnance officer, are deserving of the highest commendation for the successful manner in which their several departments were conducted. To my surgeon in chief, H. E. Goodman, myself and my entire command are under the deepest obligations for the manner in which, under his own personal supervision, the sick and wounded of my division have been attended.

Thus triumphantly ended this campaign, unequalled in the present war for glorious victory over almost insurmountable difficulties, and unsurpassed in modern history. Thus has ended a campaign which shall stand forever a monument of the valor, the endurance, the patriotism of the American soldier; four months of hard, constant labor, under the hot sun of a southern summer; four months scarce a day of which has been passed out of the sound of the crash of musketry and roar of artillery; two hundred miles travelled through a country in every mile of which nature and art seemed leagued for defence—mountains, rivers, lines of works—a campaign in which every march was a fight, in which battles followed in such quick succession and so intimately connected by a constant series of skirmishes that the whole campaign seems but one grand battle, which, crowned with grander victory, attests the skill and patriotism of the hero who matured its plans and directed their execution.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN. W. GEARY,

*Brigadier General, Commanding Division.*

Lieutenant Colonel H. W. PERKINS,

*Assistant Adjutant General 20th Army Corps.*

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#### HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION 20TH CORPS,

*Atlanta, Ga., September 12, 1864.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to make the following report of the movement<sup>s</sup> and operations of this division during the recent campaign, which closed with the occupation of the city of Atlanta.

On the 28th of April, when orders were received to move to the front, the division was occupying posts along the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, from Wartrace to Anderson, with large detachments at Fayetteville and Shelbyville. One brigade, (third,) recently attached to the division in the organization of the new corps, was encamped in the valley opposite Bridgeport, Alabama. On the 1st of May the whole division was concentrated near that place, and on the 3d of May reached Chattanooga valley, at the eastern base of Lookout mountain, and reported to Major General Hooker, commanding corps. The organization of division at this time was as follows:

First brigade, by Brigadier General Knipe commanding, composed of the one hundred and twenty-third New York volunteer infantry, Colonel McDougall; fifth Connecticut volunteer infantry, Colonel W. W. Packer; forty-sixth Pennsylvania veteran volunteer infantry, Colonel James L. Selfridge; one hundred and forty-first New York volunteer infantry, Colonel William R. Logie.

Second brigade, General Thomas H. Ruger commanding, composed of twenty-seventh Indiana volunteer infantry, Colonel Silas Colgrove; thirteenth New Jersey volunteer infantry, Colonel Ezra A. Carman; one hundred and fiftieth New York volunteer infantry, Colonel John H. Ketcham; third Wisconsin

veteran volunteer infantry, Colonel William Hawley; one hundred and seventh New York volunteer infantry, Miriom M. Crane, and second Massachusetts veteran volunteer infantry, Colonel William Cogswell.

Third brigade, Colonel James S. Robinson, eighty-second Ohio veteran volunteers, commanding, composed of sixty-first Ohio veteran volunteer infantry, Colonel Stephen J. McGreary; eighty-second Ohio veteran volunteer infantry, Colonel David Thompson; one hundred and forty-third New York volunteer infantry, Colonel Horace Broughton; forty-fifth New York veteran volunteer infantry, Colonel Adolphus Dobke; one hundred and first Illinois volunteer infantry, Lieutenant Colonel John B. Le Sage, and eighty-second Illinois volunteer infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Edward S. Salamon. There was then attached to this division two batteries of artillery, viz: battery M, first New York artillery, Captain J. D. Woodbury, six 12-pounder guns, and battery I, first New York artillery, Lieutenant (now Captain) Winegar, six three-inch rifled guns, Captain Woodbury acting as chief of artillery. The returns at this time showed an effective force of 6,771 officers and men in the division, exclusive of sixty-first Ohio volunteers, which did not rejoin from veteran furlough until May 8, at Trickum post office. Pursuant to orders, the division marched from Chattanooga valley on the 4th of May, bivouacked at Gordon's mills that night, and encamped near the middle Chickamauga on afternoon of 5th, at Pleasant Grove church, three miles southwesterly of Ringgold.

On the 7th May the division crossed Taylor's ridge through Nickajack pass, and encamped at Trickum post office. Leaving Trickum, 1 o'clock of 10th of May, the division reached Snake Creek gap at 8 o'clock in the morning of the same day. Pursuant to orders I reported to Major General McPherson, commanding the army of the Tennessee, and, following his instructions, took position with two brigades (Knipe's and Robinson's) in the westerly entrance of the gap, and moved Ruger's brigade through the gap in reserve behind the lines occupied by the army of the Tennessee.

On May 13, the division having been reunited the previous night, was moved forward to Camp creek and took position, covering the approach from the direction of Dalton.

On the morning of 14th May, pursuant to orders, I massed the division in support of the third division, which was in line of battle in face of the enemy's forces before Resaca. About 4½ p. m. I received orders to march my division as rapidly as possible to support the left of Stanley's division, 4th corps, which was heavily engaged some miles distant. I moved at once by the left flank, under guidance of a staff officer of 4th corps, and in about an hour and a half, without halt, reached the position designated by the major general commanding the corps (who had preceded the column) for deployment of the division. This position was a wooded ridge facing and bordering a narrow cultivated valley of considerable length along the Dalton road, near the head of which were the defiles and steep hills held by the enemy for the defence of Resaca. Robinson's third brigade deployed quickly along the left of this ridge, and the other brigades were ordered to proceed along the line of the ridge, south of a deep gorge which bisects it. In front of Robinson's brigade Symonson's battery (fifth Indiana) of Stanley's division was in position looking towards Resaca and supported by a detachment of that division. Scarcely was Robinson's brigade in line before numerous fugitives from our own troops came pouring in confusion over the opening in front, followed by the exultant enemy, making confidently for the battery. After a fruitless effort with my staff officers to rally and organize the fugitives, I sent orders to them to clear the front, and rode back to bring forward Robinson's brigade. At the brigade I found Lieutenant Colonel Perkins, assistant adjutant general, with orders to move at once to the opening and support the battery. Robinson marched with great promptness down the steep wooded ridge, crossing a difficult creek at the foot, and changing front forward on his

right regiment in good order, he opened a volley upon the astonished enemy. They fled in greater haste than they had advanced, and in fifteen minutes not a rebel gun was heard in the valley. Orders were sent Ruger to advance his brigade so as to take the enemy in flank, but before it could be done they had fled. The division bivouacked for the night on the plain fronting Resaca. The brave and efficient conduct of Robinson's brigade in this affair served to create a strong confidence and good will between troops recently brought together from different corps in a new organization—a feeling closely cemented by the subsequent events and occurrences of the campaign.

*May 15.*—The division was ordered to support Butterfield and Geary's divisions, and marched at 12 o'clock. While on the march information was sent to me by the major general commanding corps, that the enemy was threatening our left from the direction of the railroad, and I was ordered to cover and protect that flank. Facing by the left, brought the division in line of battle, and in this formation I advanced it towards the menaced point, the brigades being in line according to numerical order. The ground occupied by Knipe's first brigade on the right was very broken, trending off, however, towards the north in a ridge of slight elevation, running almost parallel with the railroad, partly through woods and partly through clearings.

At a point where a road towards Green station from the Dalton road crossed the ridge, there rises a considerable knoll or knob, upon which stands a dwelling-house known as Scales's house. Ruger's second brigade, extending from Knipe's left, reached and occupied this knoll, upon which slight breastworks were hastily thrown up. Two regiments of Robinson's brigade were deployed on the left of the knoll where the ground sinks down into a timbered plain. Three other of his regiments were held in reserve on the extreme left, and one regiment placed in support of Winegar's battery, which was with much difficulty put into position on a high hill somewhat in our rear, but commanding much of our front. Woodbury's light twelvees were placed in the line near our left, on ridges which commanded the approaches to what I regarded as the key to our position. The enemy massed his forces in the woods near the railway, which was distant from three to six hundred yards from the different portions of my line; advancing under cover as far as practicable, he attacked the whole line with great vigor and apparent confidence. The attack was received with perfect steadiness and repulsed with ease. The assaults were repeated several times, and each time with signal failure; my line in no part was shaken or disturbed, and we literally had no skulkers. The main efforts of the enemy were directed against the knoll heretofore mentioned, and were continued in that direction till near dark. The position was held at the close by two of Robinson's regiments, which had relieved Ruger's. The artillery of the division had performed an important part in punishing and repulsing the enemy. I made no efforts to pursue, as my orders were to cover and protect the left, and I was ignorant of the condition of affairs with the assaulting columns on the right; besides, the enemy's intrenchments, to which at each repulse he fell back, were but a few hundred yards in my front. It was evident too that the assaulting force (at least two divisions of Hood's corps) greatly outnumbered ours. The colors and colonel, with other officers, of the thirty-eighth Alabama were captured by the twenty-seventh Indiana volunteers, Colonel Colgrove, of Ruger's brigade, and the division took about 125 prisoners. In front of one brigade five officers and eighty (80) men were buried of the enemy.

Our early march the following day made it necessary to leave much the greater number to be buried by details from other commands. The casualties of my division, 48 killed, 366 wounded, and 3 missing. Aggregate 417.

The division leaving the battle-field on the morning of the 16th of May, with the rest of the corps following the retiring enemy, crossed the Conasauga above Resaca, and bivouacked at Bryant's or McClure's ford, on the Coosawatee.



Crossed the Coosawattee on the morning of the 17th of May, and bivouacked that night three miles east of Calhoun, Georgia. On the 18th May, reached a point near Spring mills, southeast of Adairsville, and bivouacked at 9½ p. m. on the so-called Gravelly plateau.

On the 19th May, marched at 1 o'clock p. m. to the support of Butterfield's division, reported as having the enemy strong in his front. The division was put in line on his left, and advancing in this order over a very rough country and through the thickest underbrush reached the vicinity of Cassville, after some skirmishing with the enemy, about 8 o'clock p. m.

*May 20*—The enemy having withdrawn from his intrenched lines behind Cassville, Knipe's brigade was ordered to hold the town, and the others were put in camp on the north side, and remained in this camp 21st and 22d of May.

*May 23*—The division marched at daylight, crossing the Etowah on pontoon bridge near Milan's, and encamped on Euharley creek, connecting with 4th corps on the right of Geary's division on the left.

On 24th we marched by by-paths and mountain roads, reached Burnt Hickory at 5½ p. m., and bivouacked in a heavy storm, Geary's division on my right and Butterfield's on my left.

*May 25*—Orders were received to advance by the road to the right, and take position in advance of Dallas. Geary's division was to move on a central route, and Butterfield's on the left. Having passed Pumpkinvine creek on a bridge which the enemy had partly burned, and which we repaired, the head of my column had reached within a mile and a half of Dallas when I received an order from the commander of the corps to countermarch and move as rapidly as possible to the support of Geary's division. I marched left in front, recrossed the creek, and finding my way along the left bank crossed again on Geary's route, and, after a rapid march of over five miles, came up with Butterfield's and Geary's divisions, massed on the road towards New Hope church, and passed to the front. Receiving orders from the corps commander to put my division in order of attack, I deployed the division in three lines of brigade front. Two regiments, sixty-first Ohio and thirteenth New Jersey, were sent forward as skirmishers. The division, without sufficient halt to recover breath, moved promptly in advance for a mile and a half, driving the enemy before us, and forcing back his strong skirmish line and heavy reserves at double-quick. It was quite dark when the column reached the foot of the slopes upon which the enemy were strongly intrenched, and across which he threw shot and shell and canister in murderous volleys. During the advance the second, Ruger's, brigade passed lines with and relieved the third, Robinson's, which was leading, and Knipe's, first, brigade in turn relieved a portion of Roger's brigade and covered its right flank. Robinson later relieved Ruger's brigade, which had nearly exhausted its ammunition. The division forced its way close up to the enemy's works, but darkness, rendered doubly dark by dense clouds of pouring rain, put a stop to further efforts. Butterfield's and Geary's divisions relieved most of my division during the night, and in the morning it was placed in reserve within a few hundred yards of the enemy's works. The major general commanding the corps followed the advance of my brigade of my division in this attack, and I feel confident he will bear testimony to the steadiness and good order, perseverance and spirit with which it went forward until darkness put an end to the conflict. The loss of the division in this attack was one hundred and two killed, six hundred and thirty-nine wounded, four missing, total seven hundred and forty-five. Among the severely wounded on this occasion (since died) was Colonel Archibald L. McDougall, one hundred and twenty-third New York volunteers, a most faithful, patriotic, and valuable officer. Six other field officers of the division were reported wounded.

The division occupied its position in reserve from May 26 to 31, always within range of the artillery and musketry fire of the enemy, losing several val-

uable men by casualties, a list of whom appears in the report of brigade commanders.

*June 1.*—The division, relieved by a portion of the army of the Tennessee, moved to the left, and on the 2d occupied several strong knobs, its left, Knipe's brigade, covering Brownlow's Hill near Pickett's Mill creek, the right of the division connecting with Carlin's brigade of the 14th corps. I held this position on the 3d and 4th, keeping up a constant skirmish with the enemy.

On the 5th of June Davis's division of the 14th corps relieved my division, and I moved from four to five miles to the left, taking up a position across Alatoona creek, my left covered by McCook's division of cavalry near Harris's farm, on Hillsboro' road.

On the 6th of June I advanced the division, and occupied a ridge near Kemp's mills, on Sandtown road, right resting on Alatoona creek, Butterfield's and Geary's divisions on my left. The enemy's skirmishers constantly in our front and contesting the ground.

*June 11.*—Moved about a mile and a half to the left and connected with Stanley's division of the 4th corps, looking toward Pine mountain.

On the 13th and 14th Geary's division relieved a portion of the 14th corps, and connected with my left.

*June 15.*—The enemy having evacuated Pine mountain my division was ordered to pursue to the right of Geary's division. At 4 o'clock p. m. I crossed a deep ravine on my left, and ascending a high hill massed my whole division in rear of Geary's right reserved brigade. Soon after, hearing heavy firing, I deployed Knipe's and Ruger's brigades, and took the double-quick in that direction. I found Geary engaging the enemy in his works. Knipe's brigade was sent to form on Geary's right, and Ruger's brigade was moved to the left flank. Robinson's brigade was held behind Geary's left centre. Subsequently it formed line in rear of Geary, and after dark made rifle-pits for his line to withdraw to.

On the 16th Knipe's brigade was withdrawn from the right to the left of Ruger's. It threw up breastworks connecting with the 4th corps. Robinson's brigade was placed in reserve. The enemy on both days kept up a vigorous fire of shot and shell.

On the 17th followed closely again the enemy, who abandoned his works and fell back. I halted the division, with left resting on Burnt Hickory and Marietta road, near Kink's house, connecting with the 4th corps, Butterfield's division on my right, the line facing Mud creek.

On the 19th the division was again put in pursuit of the retreating enemy. Crossing Mud creek, Nose's creek, I found the enemy in their works from two to three miles beyond. The enemy's skirmishers opposed us all day. The losses of the division from the 15th to the 19th of June, inclusive, in killed and wounded, were between ninety and one hundred officers and men.

On the 20th of June, the division being relieved by the 4th corps, was moved to the right of Butterfield's division, and in the afternoon was moved to the right and front as far as Atkinson's plantation, and made connexion with Hascall's division, 23d corps. The other divisions afterwards took position on my left.

On the 21st, after reconnoitring to my front, sent out two regiments under Colonel Hawley, third Wisconsin volunteers, and took possession, with small loss, of an important hill in direction of Culp's farm. The enemy made fruitless efforts to regain it.

*June 22.*—I advanced the division, preceeded by a strong skirmish line, especially on the right, and on to the left of the Powder Spring and Marietta road. The division was massed by brigades in the woods, the right near the Powder Spring road at Culp's house; Ruger's brigade on the right, Knipe's in the centre, and Robinson's on the left. In front of Knipe's was an open elevated plateau, with a deep gully along its front, beyond which the ground rose gently

to the woods occupied by the rebel's pickets reserves in strong rifle-pits, five or six hundred yards distant. Robinson occupied a hill about two hundred yards to the rear and left of Knipe, placing his brigade in echelon to Knipe. He had before him an open space of at least a thousand yards, and extending to the low ground in front of Geary on my left, from whom I was separated by a swampy ravine. Ruger had thick woods in his front, except the ground for two regiments on Knipe's right. Soon after arriving on this ground I strengthened my skirmishers by an additional regiment, and drove back the enemy's pickets to the woods in our front, where his reserves were strongly fortified, not far from his main works. I placed Winegar's battery (3-inch rifles) in front of Robinson's brigade, Woodbury's light (12-pounders) in front of Knipe's brigade, positions that commanded all the open ground in front. About 3 o'clock p. m., hearing there were credible rumors of an attack, I reported in person to the major general commanding the corps, at Culp's house, and received orders to deploy my division in one line and throw up breastworks without delay. The information seemed reliable that the whole of Hood's corps was advancing to attack us. I had barely reached the left of my line, (conveying the orders in person to each of my brigade commanders,) as I returned from corps headquarters, before the peculiar yell of the rebel mass was heard as they emerged from the woods, and dashed forward towards our line. The heaviest columns were directly in front of Woodbury's battery, and in three lines. He swept them fearfully with canister from those effective guns, and rolled them into a confused mass. A few volleys from Knipe's brigade and the two left regiments (the thirteenth New Jersey and one hundred and fiftieth New York) of Ruger's brigade speedily compelled those who were not driven back into the woods to take shelter in the deep ravine and a dense clump of woods and underbrush on Knipe's front and left. While this was transpiring a very heavy column came rapidly from the woods into the open ground on our extreme left, and were brought to a standstill by the first shell from Winegar's battery exploding in its front division; A few additional rounds, taking effect in the midst of the column, threw the whole mass into confusion, and it broke in the utmost disorder for the woods. No further attempt was made to attack this part of my line. In the mean time the forces of the enemy which had taken shelter in the ravines, and others which had got up under cover, attempted to take advantage of the woods on Knipe's left front to turn that flank. The sixty-first Ohio, of Robinson's brigade, was sent to reinforce that part of the line, and Winegar was ordered to open with canister and case along the ravine and through the woods. The punishment to the enemy must have been very severe; he at once discontinued his movements and relapsed into silence. It was now quite dark, and under cover of the darkness the enemy withdrew his troops, carrying away, during the night, many of his dead and most of his wounded. He left, however, in our front, abundant proofs of his severe loss, which was acknowledged by the rebel journals of Atlanta to have exceeded one thousand men. During the night the third division was placed in reserve to mine.

Our loss in this engagement did not exceed one hundred and thirty men, including some nineteen reported missing in action, who were captured by the sudden rush on my picket line. Major D. C. Beckett, sixty-first Ohio volunteers, a very superior officer, was among the killed. The division remained in this same position in front of the enemy's works until the 2d of July. During the assault by the 4th and 14th corps, on the 27th of June, it was held in readiness to advance. Winegar's battery was placed in position on the left of the corps, and was engaged all day with some loss.

*July 3.*—The division, moving on to the left of the corps, crossed the abandoned works of the enemy, and following on several difficult by-paths reached the main road about a mile and a half west of Marietta. From this point it followed the third division on the Turner's Ferry road, and coming up with the enemy's intrenched line, encamped about 4 o'clock p. m. on left of second di-

vision. The 14th corps, coming up later, took position on the left of 20th corps. The enemy's works were in plain sight.

*July 4.*—In the afternoon I moved my division about two miles to the right and took position between the second and third divisions, the latter connecting with the 23d corps.

*July 5.*—The enemy having again fallen back, the division, in pursuit, crossed the creeks and fields in front, striking the Turner's Ferry road just in rear of the enemy's works. After a most fatiguing march partly along this encumbered road, and partly over by-paths through a very rough and broken country, the division went into position on a high ridge, overlooking a position of the enemy's new intrenched line in front of the Chattahoochee river. From this ridge was caught the first sight of the distant Atlanta.

*July 6.*—The corps was moved across Nickajack creek. My division formed on right of 14th corps, and threw up breastworks. The other divisions extended to and connected with 23d corps. The division remained in this position near Nickajack creek until 17th July. On the afternoon of that day it crossed the Chattahoochee at Pace's ferry on a pontoon bridge, and, turning to the left a mile or so from the bridge, encamped on Powell's Ferry road. On the morning of the 18th I sent out two regiments under Colonel E. A. Carman, thirteenth New Jersey volunteers, to find the right of 4th corps. Colonel Carman had quite a spirited contest with the skirmishers, in which he inflicted upon them considerable loss; part of the skirmish line being surprised, he lost, as prisoners, ten men and one wounded. The enemy were driven off. In the afternoon the division, with the corps, moved across Nancy's creek, and took position along the Buckland and Marietta road, connecting with 4th corps on the left.

*July 19.*—In the afternoon I moved my division to the front, and encamped on the north side of Peach Tree creek, above Powell's mills.

*July 20.*—Battle of Peach Tree creek. The division crossed the creek early in the morning, and passing through Geary's division, following a farm road, along a wooded ridge, which intersects Howell's mills or Pace's Ferry road at the house of H. Emery. At this point the enemy had established a large post, strongly intrenched. The head of my column having reached a group of deserted houses, about six hundred yards from the enemy, I was ordered by the major general commanding the corps to halt. Knipe's brigade was massed on the right, and Robinson's on the left of the road; Ruger's brigade, on the rear, was moved to the right to connect with 14th corps. Later in the day Geary's division was brought up on my left, one brigade occupied an eminence, separated from my position by a deep hollow or ravine, which, passing between our positions, turned to the left, behind Geary's advanced brigade, and terminated in the open ground where was posted Ward's division. One of Geary's divisions lay at the foot of the hill occupied by his advance, and near the lower end of this ravine; a similar ravine, but of less depth, lay between my position and the 14th corps, which, having somewhat refused its left, was constructing rifle-pits at an angle to the ridge I occupied, and considerably to the right and rear. My whole front was covered by dense woods and thickets. About 3½ o'clock p. m. I was in the act of advancing a section of artillery and a strong reserve to the skirmish line, for the purpose of dislodging the enemy from his breastworks at Emery's house, when heavy volleys of musketry, commencing on the right of the 4th corps, and rolling in an increased volume towards my position, warned me that the enemy were attacking in force. I immediately ordered Knipe to deploy his brigade at double-quick across the ridge, in advance of the group of houses, and Robinson to extend from Knipe's left, along a farm road on the north edge of the ravine, to connect with Geary and cover the ravine. Ruger's brigade was held in reserve to await the development of the attack. One section of Winegar's battery was placed in the line of first brigade to sweep the ridge; one section of Woodbury's battery was placed between Knipe's and Robinson's brigades to command the ravine on our left front, and one section of same battery

was placed so as to observe the broad ravine on the right. Three other sections were in reserve. Hardly had these dispositions been made before the enemy advanced upon us in great force, driving in our skirmishers with his line of battle, and, under cover of the thickets and undergrowth, coming close upon our lines before being seen. His main attack was along the ridge in the direction of Emery's house, but strong columns were sent down the ravines upon the right and left, that on the right, passing my flank unseen, fell upon the left regiment of 14th corps. Finding, from the enemy's fire, that he was moving down the right ravine, I ordered a regiment (twenty-seventh Indiana volunteers) from Ruger's brigade to re-enforce Knipe's right. This regiment, with one wing of the forty-sixth Pennsylvania volunteers, on Knipe's right, speedily checked and drove back the enemy on this flank, and held the ground until the close of this action. In the left ravine the enemy advanced in stronger force, and pushing his way down to the lower end, momentarily forced back a brigade of the second division. He suffered severely, however, for his temerity. The fire of Robinson's brigade swept across the lower and through the upper portion of the ravine, while the brigade of second division, rallying across to the lower end, poured volleys through half its length. A section of Woodbury's light twelves, throwing canister, helped much to effectually expel the enemy from this part of the field. In the mean time Knipe's brigade, in the centre, had heroically withstood and thrown back repeated assaults. Finding that the enemy's attacks in that direction were persistently continued, after his attempts in the ravines had been much weakened, I directed Ruger to send one wing, of one hundred and fiftieth New York, and Robinson's two regiments (one hundred and first, and eighty-second Illinois) to re-enforce Knipe's line. No other changes were made. After sunset the enemy withdrew to his intrenched line, leaving a strong post in his rifle-pits at Emery's house, and a heavy picket line, which was, however, withdrawn in the night; with most of his wounded. I cannot too strongly praise the conduct of my division on this occasion not a regiment was broken or shaken, but, without cover, and in a fair field, a little over two-thirds of my force received and rolled back the repeated assaults of a numerically superior and confident force of the enemy. Prisoners were taken from two different corps. The casualties of the division were, killed, 119; wounded, 458; missing, 3. Among the killed was Colonel W. R. Logie, one hundred and forty-first New York volunteers; Lieutenant Colonel W. H. H. Brown, sixty-first Ohio volunteers, and Major Lathorp Baldwin, one hundred and seventh New York, have died since of severe wounds, all excellent and gallant officers. Among the severely wounded were Silas Colgrove, colonel twenty-seventh Indiana volunteers, Colonel L. J. McCroarty, sixty-first Ohio volunteers, A. J. McNett, one hundred and forty-first New York, and Major C. W. Clanherty, one hundred and forty-first New York volunteers, most of whom, I fear, will be disabled from active duty in the field. Captain Bennett, assistant topographical engineer on my staff, was severely wounded in the head during the action.

*July 21.*—The division was engaged in bringing in our own and the enemy's dead. I regret that no sufficient memoranda was kept by the burying parties to report the latter with accuracy. During the day I had the misfortune to lose a most brave and valuable officer, Captain Edward H. Newcomb, aide-de-camp, who was mortally wounded, on the picket line, and fell into the hands of the enemy.

*July 22.*—The division moved towards Atlanta, along the Pace's Ferry road, preceded by a strong skirmish line. A position was taken, within about two miles of the town, connecting on the right with the 14th corps, and on the left with Geary's division.

On the 24th, 25th, 26th, and 27th, the lines were straightened and strengthened.

*July 28.*—Major General Hooker having been relieved, at his own request, from the command of the corps, I assumed temporary command, pursuant to the orders of the major general commanding the department of the Cumberland, and

remained in command until the 28th day of August, when I was relieved by Major General Slocum, appointed by the President to the command of the corps. Brigadier General J. F. Knipe commanded the division in this interval, and will report upon its operations. I shall forward a separate report of the movements of the corps for the month I was in command.

*August 28.*—I resumed command of the division, then lying in intrenched lines on the south side of the Chattahoochee, near the railroad crossing. Strong working parties were employed each day in strengthening the lines, and reconnoitring parties were sent forward, toward Atlanta, every morning, without discovering the enemy in force outside the works around the city.

On the night of 1st September repeated explosions, followed by what seemed reports of light artillery and heavy guns on the southeasterly side of Atlanta, aroused our whole camp, and attracted the earnest interest of all for at least two hours.

*September 2.*—By order of the major general commanding the corps, before daylight, I ordered a reconnoitring party of three regiments, under Colonel Crane, one hundred and seventh New York volunteers, to march as soon as practicable toward Atlanta, and report upon the condition of affairs. I subsequently ascertained that a portion of Ward's division had entered the city. Knipe's brigade, with one regiment of Boughton's (late Robinson's) brigade, was sent forward, and later in the day the rest of the division, by order of the corps commander, was moved into Atlanta and placed in the rebel works on the northeast portion of the city.

On the 3d four regiments of Boughton's brigade, left to guard the works at Montgomery's ferry, were moved into town and placed so as to cover the Buckhead or Peach Tree Creek road. The pickets of the division are now posted from the Turner's Ferry road to near the railway to Augusta, and guards occupy the outer line of works over the same distance. During the protracted and eventful campaign of four months, the casualties of the division have been as follows: killed, three hundred and forty-eight, (348;) wounded, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-seven, (1,877;) missing, fifty-one, (51;) aggregate, two thousand two hundred and seventy-six, (2,276.) From these causes, (sickness, expiration of term of service, and discharges for disability,) the effective force, according to last report, is reduced to 4,535, officers and men. This does not include the two batteries which were detached from my command on arriving at the front of Atlanta. One large regiment, the thirty-first Wisconsin volunteers, Colonel West, exchanged with forty-fifth New York volunteers, sent to Nashville, which reported on 21st July, has considerably increased the strength of the third brigade, to which it is attached. Before closing this long, but incomplete report, I desire to bear testimony to the valor, constancy, cheerfulness and general good conduct, of the officers and men of my command, through all the hardships, exposures, and vicissitudes of one of the most memorable campaigns in the history of war. For weeks continuously under the fire of the enemy, for days and nights in succession drenched by excessive rains, and exposed on hard marches to a mid-day southern sun, working on breastworks and in trenches by night, they have borne all with a patience and cheerfulness that creates profound admiration. In the longest marches there have been but few stragglers, and in several battles no skulkers; surely such soldiers deserve well of the republic. My personal thanks are due to the commanders of brigades for the capable and zealous manner in which they have discharged their duties.

On 24th July, Colonel James S. Robinson, commanding third brigade, was obliged to relinquish his command and ask for leave, on account of sickness and the effect of a severe wound received at Gettysburg. This excellent officer has not been able to return to the brigade. He was succeeded by Colonel Horace Boughton, one hundred and forty-third New York volunteers. The zealous, faithful, and capable services of my staff officers deserve special notice and commendation. These have been with me since the commencement of the campaign.

Captain Samuel E. Pittman, assistant adjutant general; Captain Edward H. Newcomb, sixty-first Ohio volunteers, assistant aide-de-camp, killed on 21st July; Lieutenant George Robinson, aide-de-camp; Major James Fracis, second Massachusetts volunteer infantry, assistant inspector general; Captain Samuel A. Bennett, one hundred and seventh New York volunteers, assistant topographical engineer; Captain W. P. Whitney, division provost marshal; Captain E. W. Pattison, second Massachusetts volunteers, A. C. M., left the service 22d May, by expiration of term, and was succeeded by Captain E. A. Hicks, one hundred and fiftieth New York volunteers; all these officers, not only in their respective bureaus but as acting aides on the marches and battle-fields, have rendered valuable service. Surgeon C. N. Campbell, one hundred and fiftieth New York volunteers, acting surgeon-in-chief, Captain H. M. Whittlesey, assistant quartermaster, Captain J. C. Ramsay, commissary subsistence, and William J. Augustine, division ordnance officer, have all been zealous and efficient in their respective departments.

I append hereto a tabular statement of the casualties in each brigade and of the artillery during the campaign, and a list of field officers of the division killed and wounded.

I have the honor also to forward, herewith, reports of the brigade and subordinate commanders, with complete lists and dates of the killed and wounded during the campaign. To these reports I respectfully refer for details, and for whatever of especial praise is due to the officers of their respective commands.

I have the honor to be, colonel, your obedient servant,

A. S. WILLIAMS,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

Lieut. Colonel H. W. PERKINS,

*Assistant Adjutant General 20th Corps.*

*Report of casualties in first division staff during the campaign of 1864.*

Name.	Rank.	Regiment.	Date.	Locality.	Remarks.
Samuel A. Bennett..	Captain..	107th N. Y. vols.	1864. July 20	Peach Tree creek.	Wounded.
Edw'd H. Newcomb.	.....do.....	61st Ohio vols...	July 21	.....do.....	Killed.

*Recapitulation of casualties in the first division of the 20th corps during the campaign.*

Command.	COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.				ENLISTED MEN.				Aggregate.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	
Headquarters .....	1	1	.....	2	.....	.....	.....	.....	2
1st brigade .....	10	33	1	44	125	604	25	754	798
2d brigade .....	4	33	.....	37	96	622	17	735	772
3d brigade .....	6	25	1	32	101	544	7	659	684
Artillery .....	.....	.....	.....	.....	5	15	.....	20	20
Total .....	21	92	2	115	327	1,785	49	2,161	2,276

A. S. WILLIAMS,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION 20TH CORPS,  
*Atlanta, Ga., September 7, 1864.*

COLONEL: In obedience to your order I make the following report of the operations of the third division 20th army corps, from the 2d day of May, 1864, to the 2d day of September, 1864, inclusive.

From the 2d day of May to the 29th day of June, Major General Butterfield commanded the division; on the latter date he left for New York, taking with him all the reports which had been made up to that date. I can make but an indefinite report of the operations of the second and third brigades prior to my assuming command of the division, therefore I append copies of the reports of Colonels Coburn and Wood, also a copy of my own report as commander of the first brigade; in these you will find full and minute details of all operations.

On the 2d of May, the division left Lookout valley, Tennessee, and marched to Snake Creek gap, having stopped for several days near Buzzard's Roost gap, Georgia, when the third brigade was sent out on a reconnoissance towards the Roost and had some little skirmishing. In Snake Creek gap we remained two days, a major portion of the time working on the roads. From here the division moved towards Resaca, where the enemy was then in force. Near Resaca, on the 13th day of May, at about 12 o'clock, the division formed line of battle on the left of the 15th corps; we then moved forward one and a half miles to the rear of a division of the 15th army corps, whose troops were skirmishing with the enemy. We then moved to the left and relieved a part of General Johnson's command; the first brigade relieved General King's brigade; the division remained here until the morning of the 25th instant, when we moved to the left about two miles and were halted; at this place an order was given me to attack the enemy with my first brigade formed in battalion column, at intervals of forty paces between regiments. The charging column was to be supported on the right by the second, and on the left by the third brigade; we formed as directed, about one mile from the enemy's works, about 12 o'clock, the third brigade going forward and attacking before any order was given me to make the attack; the second brigade, except nineteenth Michigan, also moved forward; both brigades drove back; I was then ordered to charge; my command moved forward in fine order through the thick woods; after moving forward about two hundred yards, the column debouched into an open field; I immediately gave the order "double-quick," it was obeyed promptly, the men moving steadily; rapidly carried a lunette beyond the field in a dense wood on a commanding position and four pieces of artillery, (light twelves,) which we carried next day into Resaca and turned into the depot ordnance officer. When we came on to the open field the first and second regiments took the double-quick sooner than did the third, fourth, and fifth regiments; this made a gap in the column; I was then with the second regiment. I turned back and ordered those behind to close up, on the double-quick. At that time a battery on the right, and that one in front were pouring shell and canister into the column; the musketry from the rebel lines was also very heavy, and doing great execution, yet the column moved forward in pretty good order; the last regiments were impeded in the march by a large number of men belonging to other brigades lying upon the ground, over which they had to pass; however, they got through these and the bushes as fast as possible, reached the hill in front of the lunette, and extending along the enemy's breastworks to the left of said lunette. Two of my regimental flags were placed on the works and there remained until 9 o'clock that night, when we were relieved. Owing to some mistake in the transmission of orders, a portion of my command fell back; when I reached a point of high ground between the captured lunette and the enemy's breastworks, I found about four hundred of my men. Colonel Gilbert, of the nineteenth Michigan, came up at this time with his regiment. I ordered him to form with my men; he executed the order promptly. All this time the



enemy was firing upon us; we returned the fire as soon as the men were formed. I ordered them to move forward towards the breastworks, and continue the fire. About this time a captain of the one hundred and twenty-ninth Illinois volunteers came to me from towards the works, saying, "For God's sake, general, don't fire, those are our men in those works." I replied that it was impossible, as our men would not fire upon us as those in the works were doing. I started the captain to make a minute examination and report, when the whole line of works opened a heavy fire, which threw the men into some confusion, and many, in spite of all I could do, fell back and retreated. Those who remained I ordered to take trees, lie down and crawl up to the works, saying that we could carry them, and that I could lead; a gallant determined band followed about thirty paces; some fifteen or twenty were killed by or near me, yet we moved on until we got within about fifteen paces of the works, when I was shot; I then ordered them to hold their places under cover as much as possible, stating that re-enforcements would soon come up; that I would remain, sending for a surgeon to come to the foot of the hill behind us; this I did. We remained at this place, under cover of some bushes and trees, for some fifteen or twenty minutes, the men insisting on carrying me off and I refusing to let them, in hopes that sufficient force would soon come up to assist us in carrying the works or to relieve us; none came. Thinking that by this time my messenger should have returned to the foot of the hill with a surgeon, I consented to go there, have my wounds dressed and return. I was shot through the left arm, the same ball wounding me in the side, and I then thought it had remained in my body; the slight movement caused by my starting seemed to arouse the enemy, (they had been quiet for some time,) and he opened upon me first from his whole line, driving my men and forcing them to retreat on double quick time. I could only follow their retreating steps. On reaching the bottom, I found some hundred men of my command. I ordered them forward to aid their comrades, who were already in and near the works. They quickly and promptly started, but as they reached the road, covered by the enemy's battery on our right, they were thrown into confusion by the shells, and it was impossible to rally and reform them at that point; this was between 4 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon. With the aid of two of my soldiers I returned to our works on the hill, found a surgeon, had my wounds dressed, and returned to the road at the foot of the hill. Here I found that portion of my brigade which had fallen back, formed and ready to re-assault the enemy. I sent my aid, Lieutenant Harryman, to General Butterfield, for permission to assault the works again; this he refused to give. On the charge all my officers and men, (except two field officers, now out of service,) are entitled to praise. But for a fire in the rear, (by mistake,) I am satisfied we would not only have succeeded in carrying the battery, but should also have carried the breastworks. We lost in this fight many brave men, but the enemy lost more; we buried fifty-four of our men and about ninety rebels, they having left their works during the night, leaving their dead on the ground. My brigade was ordered to bury the dead and to gather the trophies. We turned in the four pieces of artillery, and about two thousand stand of small arms. The part taken in the battle by the second and third brigades can be better shown in the brigade commander's report. I knew but little; I saw the third brigade advance, attack and return before I was ordered to advance; I saw none of the second brigade, except the nineteenth Michigan, and that I placed with my command. This regiment fought bravely, losing some fifteen or twenty killed and a great many wounded. Colonel Gilbert was mortally wounded and died in a few days; he behaved most gallantly, fighting like a hero. The loss of the division in this battle was nine hundred and sixty-three; thirty-seven officers and nine hundred and twenty-six enlisted men. The division moved on the 16th instant to Field's ferry, crossing the river at that point. On the 17th we moved on towards Calhoun; on the 18th towards Two Run creek, near Cassville. We skirmished over a gravelly plateau, the enemy disputing

the ground stubbornly. On the 19th instant we occupied Cassville. Here the army rested three days. We then moved, crossed the Etowah, and passed through Burnt Hickory. On the 25th of May, we struck the enemy at New Hope church, near Dallas; here Johnston had intended to make a stand. Our division met and fought him at this place, the second and third brigades only being engaged; they behaved well, driving the enemy into his works. The second brigade lost 8 officers and 108 men; the third, 9 officers and 112 men; the first, 4 officers and 27 men. The first brigade, being formed in the rear of the second and third, was not engaged, but lost men by shells bursting in the lines. That night we advanced and threw up works, occupied them a day or two, when the right of the first brigade was thrown forward on new works built. We then remained stationary until the first day of June, when we were relieved by the 15th army corps, and marched to the left of the 23d army corps, which was in front of Ackworth. We were constantly working or skirmishing all the time. The men of the division behaved with great coolness and bravery, fighting or working, whenever and wherever ordered to do one or the other; they showed themselves true soldiers. The morning we reached the left of the 23d corps it was engaged with the enemy. One division was formed to support the corps. The second brigade was in the front line, throwing up works; the first brigade in the second line, the third brigade in reserve.

On the 3d day of June this division moved towards Ackworth, in support of Hovey's division of the 23d corps. We camped for the night near Morris Hill church, on the left of our entire army. The next day we moved into the works built by General Hovey's command, they having advanced. We remained in these works until the enemy retreated. We then moved on Ackworth and Sandtown road, and took position at Mount Olivet church, near Kemp's sawmills; here we remained until the 15th of June, the men having built breastworks. The 23d corps moved to our right, towards Lost mountain; the 4th and 14th corps on our left, towards Pine Knob, where the rebel camps were plainly seen.

On the 15th the division moved to Gil Gal, known as the Golgotha church, and halted near the lines of the enemy, on the left of the Sandtown road, and formed lines of battle. As soon as the formation was completed General Butterfield (then commanding division) ordered me to send out one of my regiments to drive the enemy's skirmishers out of a wood about three-quarters of a mile in our front; between us and this wood there was a large cleared field. I sent the one hundred and second Illinois, Colonel F. C. Smith, who deployed his regiment at the foot of the hill on which we had formed line of battle; returning one-half, to be used as a reserve, he moved off; when the regiment was about half-way across the field General Butterfield directed me to send another regiment to support the one hundred and second. I sent the one hundred and fifth Illinois, Colonel Dustin. I was then ordered to move my brigade and take possession of two hills on my right and left front. I moved with the three regiments, resting the right on one of the hills, and ordering the one hundred and fifth Illinois to fall back into line, resting on the hill to the left, thus taking the two hills as directed. I was then ordered to immediately move my line forward into the woods; the men moved forward promptly, like veterans; the enemy's pickets and sharpshooters firing upon us; the men and officers were cool, moving as regularly as though on drill. When I reached a road about one hundred and fifty yards in the wood, I halted the line. During this time the enemy had opened a heavy fire on my left, and also upon General Geary's division, which was to the left of my line. General Butterfield had, without my knowledge, ordered the one hundred and fifth Illinois out of the line of battle and retired it to a cover. While remaining in the road I was ordered to throw my skirmishers forward to ascertain the number and position of the enemy. They returned, reporting him in full force, behind strong breastworks, 500 or 600 yards in advance of us. This information was transmitted to General Butterfield. He ordered me to attack

the enemy vigorously, and drive him from his works, saying that there was nothing but a line of skirmishers behind the works; that the main body had retreated. The last order was given near dusk. In obedience, I ordered my brigade forward; they moved rapidly and in perfect order. The rebel skirmishers opened upon us, and my men briskly returned the fire, advancing as they fired. We soon reached their first line. I ordered the seventy-ninth Ohio volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Doane, to fix bayonets and charge the line, and they promptly obeyed, driving the enemy out of the line in their immediate front. The seventieth Indiana, Colonel Harrison, on the right of the seventy-ninth Ohio, did the same thing. The enemy fell back, firing. It was as heavy musketry as I ever heard, but the two regiments moved on; the rebels did not stop until they got into their second main line of works, when they opened with artillery, (eight pieces,) in our immediate front, and a battery on either flank. I then halted the line, ordered the seventy-ninth Ohio to lie down under cover of a hill and to cease firing. The seventieth Indiana having nothing to shield them, I ordered their fire to be kept up, and the ground they occupied to be held. I sent out a reconnoitring party from the seventy-ninth Ohio, to find out, if possible, what we had to do to take the works, but they were forced back by the terrific fire. My other regiment, the one hundred and twenty-ninth Illinois, Colonel Case, had not yet come up, having been impeded by a ravine and a thicket of underbrush, but it finally reached the line of battle. The officers and men behaved well. It was now dark and I sent back to General Butterfield to know what I must do, whether to storm the works in the dark, or to throw up works where I was, and remain until daylight. I was ordered to go no further, but to hold and fortify the position then held by my line. This I commenced, and was twice attacked by the enemy when working, but each time they were quickly repulsed. The seventieth Indiana was now out of ammunition, and General Butterfield relieved my entire line by portions of the second and third brigades. The officers and men acquitted themselves nobly in this charge; I was forced to follow them on foot, consequently could note the actions of all. No men ever behaved more gallantly. The loss this day was in the first brigade 103 men, in the second and third 11 each. My brigade, when relieved, moved to the left and built works connecting on left with General Williams's division; the second brigade connected on the right with the 23d corps. A large portion of the third brigade was held in reserve. The enemy evacuated his works on the night of the 16th, moving towards Kenesaw.

On the 17th our division followed on Marietta road, crossed Noses's creek, and formed a line of battle on the right, one-half mile distant from the road. Moving forward we found the enemy in force, strongly fortified. We built works, and made some movements that will be found in reports of Colonels Coburn and Wood.

On the 22d instant we moved forward to attack a hill in our front; the division was formed as follows: Third brigade in front, the first supporting in rear, the second on the left; this attack was gallantly made, and the hill taken in fine style by the third brigade; it was held by the third and a portion of the first on the right of third, the second brigade on left. General Hood's corps that day made an attack on General Williams's division. The artillery of one division did good service, but the scene of action was too far off for our musketry to be brought into play. Two slight attacks were made on the second brigade, but they were easily and quickly repulsed. That night we were relieved by Major General Stanley's division, 4th army corps, and moved to the right, camping in rear of Generals Geary and Williams.

On the morning of the 25th we moved on the Marietta road and took up position between General Williams's right and the left of the 23d corps. This position was held until the 3d day of July; constant firing of artillery and musketry was kept up all the time.

On the 29th day of June, Major General Butterfield availing himself of a leave of absence, I, as senior officer present, assumed command of the division.

On the 3d day of July, about 3 o'clock a m., my skirmishers reported that the enemy had evacuated his works; the intelligence was at once transmitted to corps headquarters, and I was ordered to move my command to Marietta, on the main Powder Spring road. After leaving my works, and moving about a mile, I threw forward the one hundred and second Illinois volunteers as skirmishers; in another half mile they met the cavalry of the enemy, but drove them easily; in fact, as fast as the column moved, within about a mile and a quarter of Marietta. A column of the enemy's cavalry was discovered moving from the town, on or near the Atlanta railroad. Captain Smith's battery I, first Michigan, was quickly brought up, placed in position, and opened upon the column; it was quickly dispersed. They brought up two batteries, however, and opened fire, doing but little damage before they were silenced. In the mean time, Generals Thomas and Hooker having come up, I was ordered to move to a certain position, to be shown by Lieutenant Colonel C. W. Asmussen, acting inspector general 20th army corps. I marched with a strong line of skirmishers, well in advance of my column, for a mile or two; no enemy was seen; stragglers and deserters were picked up in considerable number. About 2 o'clock the rebel cavalry began feebly to resist our further progress, but they yielded the ground easily to the skirmishers, and the division moved on. We then came to the infantry pickets, drove them in, and took up position near the enemy. He shelled us viciously, but his firing was very poor. The 14th army corps was expected to come up along the railroad on my left; for some reason they failed to do so, but came up in the rear, relieved my division, and I moved off to the right of Generals Williams's and Geary's division.

On the 4th instant about 2 p. m. I moved off towards Nickajack creek, taking a position indicated by Major General Hooker, near the 16th and 23d corps.

On the 5th instant, the enemy having evacuated his works, we moved on the Turner's Ferry and Marietta road, my division following General Williams's ordnance train. This march was extremely fatiguing to my troops; those ahead of us moved haltingly. At night we camped on the left of the road, and in rear of the other two divisions of the corps.

On the 6th I took up position confronting the enemy's fortifications on the Chattahoochee river. General Geary was on my right, General Williams on my left. There was some skirmishing here, but it did not amount to much. So soon as the enemy crossed the river my pickets were advanced to the northern bank. There was no firing now from either side, the men having, for a time, formed an armistice.

On the 17th day of July I marched to Pace's ferry, crossed the river, and moved to the left of the Atlanta railroad, camping my command within about a mile of Nancy's creek.

On the 18th General Hooker ordered me to make a reconnoissance with one of my brigades towards Buckhead. Colonel Wood's third brigade went out, Nancy's creek was bridged, and the troops moved forward rapidly, meeting with no resistance from the enemy. About 1 o'clock p. m. General Hooker informed me that the 4th army corps was already at Buckhead, and ordered me to move my entire division and take up position on right of 4th army corps. This I did, and threw up a line of works for defence.

On the 19th my pioneers and working parties were busily engaged in building bridges across Peach Tree creek.

On the 20th instant I was ordered to march my division up in support of Generals Williams and Geary; before the position was gained the order was changed. I was to fill up the gap between General Geary's left and the right of the 4th army corps. After looking over the ground, I determined to cross the creek on a bridge in the rear of General Newton's division. There was a high

hill that completely hid my movements from the enemy, and at the same time it protected the main body of the troops, while the skirmishers were driving the rebel pickets from the ridge and valley which I was to occupy. The twenty-second Wisconsin and one hundred and thirty-sixth New York drove the enemy's skirmishers, and covered the commanding ground which I intended to occupy by forming line of battle. The troops now moved into the cornfield, and formed at the foot of the hill in the following order: first brigade on the right, second brigade in the centre, third brigade on the left. General Hooker, through Captain Hall, aide-de-camp, ordered that the division remain where it was until further orders. About 3 o'clock p. m. Colonel Coburn reported to me that the enemy was advancing upon us in strong force. I immediately despatched staff officers to order the brigade commanders to move their commands rapidly to the high ground in our front. The division moved at once in splendid order. The skirmish line, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Bloodgood, of the twenty-second Wisconsin, behaved most gallantly, refusing to fall back until sorely pressed by the rebel line of battle, and then only they retreated slowly, reluctantly yielding the ground, disputing every foot they gave up; they had fallen back to the ridge, covering the division, followed closely by the rebel line, where my line of battle reached. Colonel Bloodgood drew his men to the rear of the main line, and the battle began in earnest. The first line of the rebels was shattered in a few minutes. My advance was hardly checked a minute. The enemy had evidently believed themselves in a gap between General Geary and the 4th army corps. Meeting my line of battle seemed to completely addle their brains. Their first line broke, mixing up the second line. They were now in the wildest confusion, firing in all directions, some endeavoring to get away, some undecided what to do, others rushing into our lines. I still advanced, my men keeping up a steady fire, crossed a deep ravine to gain the next hill to make good my connexions with General Newton on my left and General Geary on my right, and also to gain a position which commanded the open country for 600 yards in advance. Once they had made a feeble effort to rally, but they were too badly broken. They succeeded in making a slight attack, but it was not a concerted movement; it commenced on the left, running at intervals towards the right; it only resulted in giving us more prisoners, two more battle-flags, and swelling the already frightful number of rebel dead and wounded; they then fled to the woods, leaving dead, wounded, and arms in our possession. I took up the chosen position and commenced to fortify it. The enemy was rallying his men in the woods, keeping up a constant fire on our lines, and made several attempts to charge; we returned the fire vigorously, repulsed the charges before they got far out of the woods; this was kept up briskly until 6 p. m., when the fire began to abate, but a brisk skirmishing fire was kept up until dark. The ambulance corps worked faithfully all night carrying off the wounded of both armies. Soon after daybreak on the 21st all were cared for. My division in this battle had no artillery, it having been impossible to move it across the country. Captain Gary had his batteries on the Buckhead road, where he was put in position by General Thomas; there he did good service in protecting General Newton's left flank. In the beginning of the battle Major General Thomas sent to me for a brigade to assist General Newton; as my whole line was hotly engaged, and only a portion of one regiment (one hundred and thirty-sixth New York) in reserve, I begged to be excused from parting with any portion of my command. General Thomas, as soon as he learned how I was situated, revoked the order, but requested me to send two regiments. This could not be done, as it would have made a gap in my line that would probably have proved fatal to my division, if not to the entire corps. General Thomas withdrew the request when the facts were communicated to him. During the engagement my troops never wavered, although troops to the right and to the left of them gave way. At nightfall, however, the rest of the corps

and Newton's division of the 4th corps had re-established themselves in their old positions. The fight in my front lasted three hours or more.

To my brigade commanders, Colonel Harrison, seventieth Indiana, (first,) Colonel Coburn, thirty-third Indiana, (second,) and Colonel Wood, one hundred and thirty-sixth New York, (third,) I am indebted for their prompt obedience to orders, for their gallant and unwavering support in discharge of duties as commanding officers. Each handled his command well, and in a manner alike creditable to himself and to the service. To all the members of my staff I am indebted for their efficient manner of conveying orders to the various parts of this bloody field; especially I am indebted to Major Lackner, Captains Speed and Tibbetts, and Lieutenants Harryman and Thompson, for their services on this day. In this engagement my division captured seven battle-flags, twenty-five officers' swords, and a large number of small-arms, one hundred and fourteen prisoners, and one hundred and thirty-two wounded rebels sent to hospital. These prisoners represented seventeen different regiments from Loring's and Walker's divisions; one man was from Cheatham's. The estimated loss of the enemy in my front was five hundred killed, two thousand five hundred wounded, and two hundred and forty-six prisoners. My loss in killed and wounded and missing five hundred and fifty-one.

July 21 was spent in burying the dead and caring for the wounded. The enemy's pickets were in the opposite woods, but fired little and without effect.

On the 22d I was ordered to move my command on left of Buckhead and Atlanta road towards the city. This I did, making connexion with the left of General Wood's (third division 4th army corps) skirmish line. I moved on until halted by an order from General Hooker to take up position and fortify. This was done, my right connecting with General Geary, my left with 4th army corps.

On the 23d I advanced my line, thereby shortening it. Division remained stationary until the 27th of July, when General Geary relieved my division and it was placed in reserve.

On the 28th General Williams assumed command of the corps, General Hooker having been relieved at his own request. At about 5 o'clock p. m. General Williams, through his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Colonel Robinson, ordered me to move to the right to support the army of the Tennessee, which was heavily engaged. After marching about a mile and a half the order was countermanded, and I moved back to the old camp in rear of the corps.

On the morning of the 29th I marched to the extreme right of the army to support General Davis's division in a reconnaissance. I moved in his rear; when he halted for the night I went into camp, throwing up works.

On the 30th I was ordered by Major General Thomas to take up a refused position on the right of General Morgan's (commanding Davis's) division. This I did, and threw up a strong line of rifle-pits.

August 2.—I was ordered to move back to the centre of the line, and hold my command in readiness to relieve the 14th army corps, except brigade on right, at daylight next morning. My troops were ready at the appointed time, but it was fully 10 o'clock before the 14th army corps was ready to leave the works. When they moved out my command moved in. The pickets were relieved, and I immediately commenced to straighten the lines. I pushed the lines forward from three hundred yards to three-fourths of a mile, building three sets of pits and forts, using a great deal of labor to strengthen the position to counterbalance my thin line of men. The pickets made a truce, and did not fire on one another. This was fortunate, as we had been losing a number of our men by the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters. Artillery firing was kept up at intervals, but this practice of the enemy was very poor, doing little or no damage to our works, killing and wounding but few of our men.

On the 25th day of August I was ordered to withdraw my command at 8 o'clock p. m. and march to Turner's ferry with two brigades, the first brigade

going to the railroad bridge. I withdrew at the appointed time; the roads being full of wagons and troops, we did not reach the ferry until daybreak on the 26th instant. I had working parties fortifying the position to be occupied, and one day was sufficient to finish the works, at least so far as was necessary. The enemy did not make his appearance until the 27th instant, when two brigades of French's division, with four pieces of artillery, came up to feel our lines. They drove in the pickets and opened with their artillery. They did not show themselves in force, keeping a respectful distance from our main line. Captain Smith opened on them with two guns, and soon drove away their artillery. The next morning Captain Tibbetts, aide-de-camp, with twenty-five mounted men, made a reconnoissance, but found no enemy. He went to the right as far as Nelson's ferry, then made a detour, and came into General Williams's lines at the railroad bridge.

On the 30th Major Higgins, seventy-third Ohio volunteer infantry, in command of 400 infantry, found the enemy strongly intrenched on Proctor's creek. Demonstrations being made on both his right and left flanks, he prudently withdrew.

On September 2d a reconnoissance was made which resulted in the capture of Atlanta. A report of this has already been forwarded.

On the third instant that portion of the second and third brigades which was left at Turner's ferry moved into the city. The first brigade is still at the railroad bridge on the Chatahoochee. For the information of the major general commanding, numerical and nominal lists of casualties are appended. Herewith are brigade and regimental reports.

I am, colonel, your obedient servant,

W. T. WARD,

*Brigadier General, Commanding Division.*

Lieut. Colonel H. W. PERKINS,

*Assistant Adjutant General 20th Army Corps.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE ETOWAH,  
*Chattanooga, Tenn., September 11, 1864.*

SIR: Pursuant to instructions of the 4th instant, from the major general commanding department Cumberland, received the 11th instant, I have the honor to report that, in obedience to orders from the major general commanding military division of the Mississippi, I assumed command of the district of the Etowah on the 15th of June last. A roster of the troops of my command at that time, and stations where posted, is herewith respectfully submitted. The main duty of my command was to keep open railroad communication with the army in the front.

On the 18th of June, I directed Colonel Watkins, commanding third brigade first cavalry division, then stationed at Wauhatchee, to proceed with his mounted force to Lafayette, Georgia, and patrol the country in that vicinity, then much infested by guerillas who were annoying our communications to the front.

On the 24th, at daylight, Colonel Watkins was attacked, at Lafayette, by rebel cavalry, some two thousand (2,000) strong, under General Pillow, and after having been refused a surrender of the place and forces, he attempted to surround and capture them. Our forces, numbering about four hundred, (400,) immediately took refuge in the court-house and adjacent buildings, from which they kept up a well directed fire, and were enabled to repel every assault of the enemy. After five hours' severe fighting, in which the enemy lost heavily without having gained any material advantage, Colonel Croxton, commanding fourth Kentucky mounted infantry, who I had ordered the day previous to proceed to the front by way of Ship's gap, arrived, and immediately attacking the enemy, caused him to make a hasty retreat in the direction of Alpine, leaving his dead and many of his wounded

in our hands. Our forces pursued a short distance. The enemy's loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, is estimated at 300, about 80 of whom were prisoners, among them several officers. Our loss does not exceed sixty, (60.) The conduct of all is reported as being highly commendable. So soon as I could learn the results of the affairs at Lafayette, I ordered pursuit, but owing to the condition of Colonel Watkins's horses, and Colonel Croxton having started for the front before the order could reach him, it could not be executed with any hope of overtaking the enemy. Had an immediate pursuit been made, I have no doubt but that it would have been attended with good result. I respectfully transmit herewith the official reports of Colonels Watkins and Croxton.

On the 28th of June, my force was increased by Brigadier General Smith's command, the third division 15th army corps, headquarters at Kingston, Georgia, and occupying the railroad from Tilton to Cartersville, and soon after to Altoona, the forces at that station and Etowah being ordered out of my district. With the exception of the capturing and partly burning of a train near Tilton on the 6th of July, and a temporary break of track at that place, no raid or military demonstration of importance was made within the district by the enemy until about the 14th of August, when, early in the morning of that day, the enemy's cavalry, in considerable numbers, attacked a herd of cattle near Calhoun, Georgia, dispersing a portion of the guard and driving off a large number of cattle, some portion of which were recaptured by Colonel Faulkner, who pursued the attacking party on the first receipt of the news. At 3 p. m. that day, I received information that rebel General Wheeler, with a strong force, was moving towards Dalton. I immediately ordered such troops as I thought I could safely spare from the garrison at Chattanooga to be held in readiness to move, on the receipt of orders; at the same time I ordered sufficient railroad transportation to be put in readiness to accommodate two thousand (2,000) men. At 6 p. m. I received the further intelligence that a demand had been made by Wheeler for the surrender of Dalton, which had been refused. I at once ordered the loading of the troops, but, owing to several trains running in wild from Dalton, I did not reach the bridge north of that place until after midnight, when, being told by a cavalry officer, direct from near Dalton, that our forces had been overpowered and captured, I awaited daylight before proceeding further. At daylight I advanced my command; soon became engaged with the enemy's skirmishers. About this time I heard firing in Dalton, and learning that the garrison was still holding out, I moved forward rapidly and soon cleared the town of the enemy, but being without cavalry, I could not pursue. I remained at Dalton until the following day, when learning that the enemy had no further design on the place, and fearing that he would attempt to destroy the bridges over the Chickamauga, I started for Chattanooga, where I arrived on the 17th instant. The enemy's loss at Dalton could not have been less than two hundred, (200.) He left thirty-three (33) dead and fifty-seven (57) badly wounded on the field. My loss was one officer and eight men killed; one officer and twenty-nine (29) men wounded; one officer and twenty-three (23) men missing; total, 63. The troops engaged were, second Missouri, twenty-ninth, fifty-first, and sixty-eighth Indiana, one hundred and eighth Ohio, seventy-eighth Pennsylvania, and fourteenth United States colored troops—in all 1,800, effective. I was much pleased with the conduct of my entire command. Colonel Laibold, second Missouri volunteers, commanding Dalton, is entitled to especial credit for his stubborn and spirited defence of the place previous to being re-enforced. For more detailed accounts, I beg to refer to the accompanying sub-reports. The same day, August 14, the enemy caused the surrender of a small garrison, (detachment seventeenth Iowa,) at a block-house between Dalton and Tilton, and destroyed some railroad track between those stations. I have ordered, through General Smith, to whose command the seventeenth Iowa belongs, an investigation and report of the facts



attending the surrender, but have not yet received the report; I am inclined to the belief that the surrender was made without a pretext for its necessity.

At 1 o'clock the 16th the enemy, some five hundred (500) strong, attacked a small garrison at Graysville, but soon withdrew beyond the reach of musketry, and, after tearing up some half mile of track, retired by way of Parker's gap. The enemy had now left our line of communication to the front, and were moving towards Knoxville. They had not captured an engine or car; the entire damage to the road, cut the evening of the 14th, was repaired on Thursday, the 8th, and to this date has hardly been interrupted for a moment. I am clearly of the opinion that Wheeler's command was not less than six thousand (6,000) strong, moving in detachments of from one to three thousand men within supporting distance of each other. The force that attacked Dalton I think numbered three thousand (3,000.)

On the 17th a detachment, several hundred strong, was diverted from the line of march taken by the enemy and menaced Cleveland, but did no damage other than destroy several hundred yards of railroad track. I enclose the official report of Colonel H. G. Gibson, commanding at that place, and with him keenly regret the casualties in his command, inasmuch as I am informed that they were wholly the result of a premature explosion of one of our own shell, but whether from inexperience in handling or from defective construction of the shell I am unable to state. I think Colonel Gibson has forgotten to mention this fact in his report.

On the 22d, learning from scouts that Wheeler was between the Hiawassee and Little Tennessee rivers, and that those streams were not fordable at that time, I determined to try and force him to an engagement or to flee to the mountains toward North Carolina. I therefore ordered the fifteenth Pennsylvania cavalry, then at Dalton, together with a detachment of the sixteenth Kentucky, then at Cleveland, to patrol the Hiawassee as far as the base of the mountain, and guard all practicable fords, at the same time communicating a wish to General Ammon that he should guard the Little Tennessee to the same purpose.

The next day, August 23, I proceeded to Calhoun, Tennessee, taking such troops as I could spare from the garrison at Chattanooga and Cleveland, with a detachment of General Smith's command, some fifteen hundred (1,500) strong, giving me a total of at least thirty-six hundred (3,600) men. I moved in the direction taken by Wheeler as far as Madisonville, when, learning that he had crossed the Little Tennessee, and that his advance was beyond the Holston, I returned to Chattanooga, where I arrived the evening of the 28th. The enemy had destroyed a large amount of railroad track between Calhoun and London; he had attacked and captured a portion of a gang of workmen employed by the quartermaster's department in getting out logs for the government near Sale Creek, together with some fifty (50) teams in use there, and had robbed the country generally—friends and foes seemed to suffer alike—but not an engine or car had yet been destroyed. After my arrival here, learning that Wheeler was moving towards Middle Tennessee, by way of Sparta and Pikeville, on the 31st of August, I sent the ninth Pennsylvania cavalry, some six hundred (600) strong, to the Sequatchie valley, with instructions to pursue the enemy, and prevent small detachments from being diverted from the main body for the purpose of destroying the railroad; at the same time, at the request of General Rousseau for assistance, I sent four (4) regiments, three hundred (300) strong each, to occupy the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad from Bridgeport to Tullahoma. The regiment sent to Cowan barely had time to unload from the cars before it was engaged with the advance of five hundred (500) rebel cavalry, who, finding a force at Cowan and the Tunnel, moved north, and destroyed some railroad track near Deckerd. On the — instant, having received reports that the enemy were demonstrating upon our lines of communication with Nashville, with some prospect of success, I moved by rail to Murfreesboro', taking with me, including

the four regiments placed on the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad the day previous by me, thirty-five (3,500) hundred men, and one section of artillery, making a total now from my command in the district of Tennessee nearly four thousand two hundred (4,200) strong. Of my operations in that district I will forward a report as soon as one can be made.

I am deeply indebted to the officers of my command for their prompt and energetic discharge of all duties required of them, and to the men for their readiness to respond to all orders, and their uncomplaining endurance of the most excessive fatigue.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES B. STEEDMAN,

*Major General.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,

*Department of the Cumberland, Atlanta, Ga.*

#### PART IV.

ARMIES OF THE CUMBERLAND AND DETACHED TROOPS OF THE ARMIES OF THE MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI SERVING IN TENNESSEE, NORTH ALABAMA, AND GEORGIA, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE TENNESSEE, FROM SEPTEMBER 7, 1864, TO FEBRUARY 1, 1865.

#### CAMPAIGN IN TENNESSEE.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*Eastport, Mississippi, January 20, 1865.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to report the operations of my command from the date of the occupation of Atlanta, Georgia, as follows:

From the 7th to the 30th of September, the 14th, 4th, and 20th corps, composing the army of the Cumberland, remained quietly in camp around the city of Atlanta. The enemy was reported posted in the neighborhood of Jonesboro'. During greater portion of the above-mentioned period an armistice existed between the two armies, for the purpose of exchanging prisoners captured on both sides during the preceding campaign.

About the 20th of September the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the Tennessee river, near Waterloo, and appeared in front of Athens, Alabama.

On the 23d, after having destroyed a portion of the railroad between the latter place and Decatur, Alabama, considerable skirmishing took place, and the garrison, Colonel Campbell, one hundred and tenth United States colored troops, commanding, withdrew into the fort. By nightfall the town was completely invested, and the quartermaster's and commissary buildings destroyed by the enemy.

On the morning of the 24th the enemy opened on the fort with a 12-pounder battery, firing from two directions, north and west, which was answered by the artillery of the garrison. Later two flags of truce were received demanding a surrender, which was declined by Colonel Campbell, when he was requested to grant Major General Forrest a personal interview, and complied with the request. At this interview Colonel Campbell allowed himself to become convinced by the rebel commander that it was useless to contend against the largely superior force of the enemy confronting him, and was induced to

surrender his command. The garrison at the time consisted of 450 men belonging to the one hundred and sixth, one hundred and tenth, and one hundred and eleventh United States colored troops, and about 150 men of the third Tennessee cavalry. Thirty minutes after the evacuation of the fort, re-enforcements, consisting of the eighteenth Michigan and one hundred and second Ohio regiments arrived, and after a severe fight were also forced to yield. Forrest then moved towards Pulaski, destroying the railroad as he advanced, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle, and skirmished heavily all day of the 27th with the garrison of Pulaski, but withdrew towards nightfall. Major General Rousseau was present at Pulaski during the engagement, having collected such troops as he could spare from other points of his command to assist in staying the progress of the enemy in the destruction of our railroad communications.

On the 29th Forrest withdrew from the immediate vicinity of the railroad, after having thoroughly destroyed it from Athens to within five miles of Pulaski; and on the same day the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad was cut near Tullahoma and Deckerd, by small parties from his command sent out for the purpose, but the road was again in running order on the 30th. As Forrest changed the scene of his operations from the Decatur railroad over to the one leading to Chattanooga, General Rousseau moved rapidly by rail around through Nashville to Tullahoma, and prepared for his reception. On the same day (29th September) five thousand men from the district of the Etowah, Major General J. B. Steedman commanding, crossed to the north of the Tennessee river to check Forrest's movements, and to protect and keep open the communication by rail with Chattanooga. Newton's division, 4th corps, was ordered from Atlanta, September 26, and replaced Steedman's command at Chattanooga on the 28th. Morgan's division of the 14th corps, started from Atlanta for the same purpose, on the 29th September, and to re-enforce the troops operating against Forrest. In compliance with verbal instructions from Major General Sherman, I left Atlanta with Morgan's division, to take immediate charge of affairs in Tennessee, and reached Nashville October 3. On the withdrawal of Forrest's troops from Athens, a garrison was sent to reoccupy the post, by Brigadier General R. G. Granger, commanding district of northern Alabama, who also sent a scouting party from Huntsville towards Fayetteville to locate the enemy. This party ascertained that Forrest passed through Fayetteville on the night of the 29th, and moved toward Deckerd. After passing Fayetteville, however, he divided his forces, part going south, through New Market, towards Huntsville, and the remainder, under Forrest in person, moved through Lynchburg towards Columbia. The first column, four thousand (4,000) strong, under Buford, appeared in front of Huntsville during the evening of the 30th, and immediately sent in a summons to the garrison to surrender, which the latter refused to do. The enemy remained throughout the night in the vicinity of the town, and repeated the demand for its surrender on the morning of October 1st, and meeting with an answer similar to the one received on the night previous, he moved off in the direction of Athens, which place was attacked by him at about 3 p. m. without effect, the garrison holding its own nobly. The second column, under Forrest in person, and estimated at three thousand (3,000) men, made its appearance near Columbia on the morning of the 1st, but did not attack that place. During these operations of Forrest in middle Tennessee, small parties of the enemy made their appearance in the neighborhood of McMinnville and Liberty, but made no serious demonstrations. Morgan's division of the 14th army corps, which started from Atlanta on the 29th of September, reached Stevenson during the morning of the 1st of October, and pushed on towards Huntsville immediately, reaching that place during the night, and set out for Athens at an early hour on the morning of the 2d, repairing the railroad as they advanced. The enemy, under Buford, resumed the attack on Athens on the 2d, but was again handsomely repulsed by the garrison, consisting of the seventy-

third Indiana, Lieutenant Colonel Slade commanding. Failing in this second attempt, Buford moved off towards Elk river, pursued by a small force of our cavalry, belonging to General Granger's command. The other column, under Forrest, started from near Columbia, on the morning of the 3d, and moved off in the direction of Mount Pleasant, paroling all his prisoners before his departure. During his stay in the neighborhood he destroyed about five miles of railroad between Carter's creek and Spring mill, including three bridges. The enemy's intentions to make good his escape to the south side of the Tennessee river being now evident, directions were given to General Morgan, at Athens, to move with his division towards Bainbridge and endeavor to secure the crossing at that place in advance of Forrest, while General Rousseau, already on the way to Columbia from Nashville, with a force of four thousand (4,000) mounted men, hastily collected together, was to push after the enemy through Mount Pleasant, and press him in the rear. Croxton's brigade of cavalry started from Farmington, and moving through Lewisburg, pursued a southwesterly course towards Lawrenceburg. The above was the position of the troops on the morning of October 3.

On the same day information reached me that Major General Washburn, with three thousand (3,000) cavalry and fifteen hundred (1,500) infantry, was moving up the Tennessee river to participate in the operations against Forrest. Directions were sent him on the 4th to leave his infantry at Johnsonville, move with his cavalry by water to Clifton, and thence across the country towards Pulaski, joining General Rousseau's column at that point. Lieutenant Commander Forrest, United States navy, commanding the naval force on the upper Tennessee, was requested to send some gunboats down the river to Florence, Alabama, and endeavor to prevent the enemy crossing in that vicinity, if the high stage of the water then prevailing in the Tennessee would admit of his crossing the upper shoals with his gunboats. Morgan's division reached Rogersville during the evening of the 4th, having been delayed in crossing the Elk river, and on the same night Forrest passed through Lawrenceburg. A report was received that Buford's command succeeded in crossing the Tennessee river at Brown's ferry on the 3d instant.

On the 6th General Washburn reached Waynesboro', still moving eastward, and on the same day came up with the enemy's rear guard at Shoal Creek bridge and skirmished with it slightly, but still not in time to prevent the main body of the enemy from safely effecting a crossing of the Tennessee at Bainbridge. Thus both columns of the enemy succeeded in escaping, although closely pursued by our forces.

On the 8th directions were sent to General Rousseau to destroy all ferry-boats and other means of crossing the river, and then move his command below Florence to await further orders; at the same time General Morgan was directed to return to Athens. Pending these operations in Tennessee, the whole aspect of affairs about Atlanta had undergone a change. Hood had crossed the Chattahoochee river, and had sent one corps of his army to destroy the railroad between Atlanta and Marietta, which he had effectually accomplished for a distance of over twenty (20) miles, interrupting all communications between the forces in Tennessee and the main army with General Sherman in Georgia. He then moved around and south of Rome to the west side of Coosa river, and taking a northeasterly course, marched towards Summerville and Lafayette, threatening Chattanooga and Bridgeport. The following dispositions were made on the 11th: Croxton's brigade of cavalry was to move to some point sufficiently near his supplies at Athens, and not too far removed from the Tennessee river to protect the crossings from Decatur down as far as Eastport; Morgan's division, of the 14th corps, to move without delay from Athens to Chattanooga by rail, and Steedman's command following Morgan's from Decatur to Bridgeport. General Rousseau's troops were recalled from below Florence

and ordered to concentrate at Athens without delay. The district of Northern Alabama, comprising the posts of Decatur, Huntsville, Stevenson, and intermediate points, was left with its ordinary garrisons, and our whole attention turned towards Hood's movements in northern Georgia.

On the 12th the enemy's cavalry attacked Resaca, but the place was resolutely held by Watkins's brigade of cavalry, and the railroad bridge saved from destruction. The same day Brigadier General Wagner reported from Chattanooga that the enemy's cavalry 250 strong, had occupied Lafayette, Georgia, whereupon instructions were sent him to call in the detachments at Tunnel Hill, Ringgold, and intermediate points along the railroad between these and Chattanooga, and quietly make preparations to defend his post.

On the 13th one corps of Hood's army appeared in front of Dalton, and a summons to surrender, signed by Hood in person, was sent in to Colonel Johnson, forty-fourth United States colored infantry, commanding the garrison. Colonel Johnson being convinced of the uselessness of contending against so overwhelming a force of the enemy and knowing there was no succor at hand, complied with the demand.

On the 14th Morgan's division reached Chattanooga, and General Steedman's command arrived at Bridgeport, where he received orders to proceed to Chattanooga. After remaining at Dalton one day, during which he destroyed about five miles of railroad, the enemy moved off to the westward, through Nickajack Gap, to rejoin the remainder of Hood's army near Summerville, to which point he had been followed by General Sherman with the 4th, 14th, 15th, and 17th corps, the 20th corps having been left behind at Atlanta to hold the place. In compliance with instructions from Major General Sherman, Morgan's division of the 14th corps, and Wagner's of the 4th, were sent from Chattanooga to rejoin their respective commands at Summerville. A force of fifteen hundred (1,500) men was set to work under the direction of Colonel W. W. Wright, chief engineer United States military railroads, to repair the railroad south of Chattanooga, there being twenty-four (24) miles of rails and ties totally destroyed, besides several important bridges carried away by the high water, yet with characteristic energy on the part of Colonel Wright and Captain J. C. Van Duger, superintendent of military telegraph, the repairs were rapidly carried forward. Telegraphic communication with Atlanta was restored on the 21st, and trains commenced running regularly on the 28th. On the latter date the enemy was at Gadsden, Alabama, while General Sherman's forces were at Gaylesville, both armies remaining inactive and watchful of the other's movements. While at the latter place Special Field Orders No. 105, military division of the Mississippi, was issued by General Sherman, and the substance of it sent to me by telegraph, as follows: "In the event of military movements, or the accidents of war separating the general in command from his military division, Major General George H. Thomas, commanding the department of the Cumberland, will exercise command over all the troops and garrisons not absolutely in the presence of the general-in-chief." A written communication received a few days previous, in which I was instructed to remain in Tennessee and defend the line of the Tennessee river, gave a detailed account of his plan for a campaign into the heart of Georgia. The 14th and 20th corps of my command were to go with General Sherman, the 4th corps remaining with me in Tennessee. My instructions were to pursue the enemy if he followed General Sherman's column, but in any event to hold Tennessee.

On the 26th the enemy's infantry made its appearance in strong force in front of Decatur, Alabama, and during the afternoon attacked the garrison, but not vigorously, and without effect. Re-enforcements amounting to two (2) full regiments were sent from Chattanooga to General Granger at that point, and he was directed to hold his post at all hazards.

On the 27th the enemy commenced intrenching his position around Decatur,

working steadily throughout the day and skirmishing continually, but no artillery was used. At night their camp fires showed a heavy force. Under cover of the darkness, and with a strong force, the enemy drove in our pickets and established a line of rifle-pits within five hundred (500) yards of the town.

On the 28th a sortie was made by a part of the garrison, which advanced, under cover of the guns of the fort, down the river bank and around to the rear of the enemy's pits, clearing them of their occupants, and capturing one hundred and twenty (120) prisoners belonging to Cheatham's division, besides killing and wounding a number. The same day, the fourteenth United States colored troops, Colonel Morgan commanding, carried one of the enemy's batteries up the river. After driving off the supports the guns were spiked, and the command returned to Decatur. Our loss was three officers killed and several officers and men wounded. General Granger estimated the force opposing him at one (1) corps, and his scouts informed him there was also a corps at Warrenton, Alabama, with Russell's brigade of cavalry at Guntersville, on the river. Roddy's division of cavalry was picketing the south side of the Tennessee from Decatur to Tusculumbia, and Forrest, with the main force, was reported at Corinth, Mississippi, with outposts at Eastport and along the west bank of the Tennessee.

On the 29th General Granger reported the enemy in his front to be withdrawing from Decatur towards Courtland. The same day, General Croxton, commanding the brigade of cavalry picketing the north bank of the Tennessee river, reported the enemy crossing at the mouth of Cypress creek, two (2) miles below Florence, stating, at the same time, that he would move with all the force he could spare to drive the enemy back. Directions were sent to General Hatch, commanding division of cavalry at Clifton, on the east bank of the Tennessee, to move to the support of Croxton at Florence, impressing upon both commanders the necessity of keeping the enemy from crossing to the north side of the river until the 4th corps, already on its way from General Sherman, in Georgia, could arrive and get into position to meet him. Hood's plans had now become evident, and from information gained through prisoners, deserters, and other sources, his intention was to cross into Middle Tennessee. To enable him to supply his army, he had been repairing the Mobile and Ohio railroad for some time previous, and trains were now running as far north as Corinth, and thence east to Cherokee station, bringing his supplies by that route from Selma and Montgomery. The advance division (Wood's) of the 4th corps reached Athens on the 31st, the other two (2) divisions of the corps following along rapidly. The 23d corps, Major General J. M. Schofield commanding, having been ordered by Major General Sherman to take post at Resaca and report to me for orders, was immediately ordered by me to Pulaski as soon as I learned Hood had appeared in force on the south side of the Tennessee, and was also on its way to Tennessee, moving in rear of the 4th corps. The enemy effected a lodgement for his infantry on the north side of the Tennessee, about three (3) miles above Florence, on the 31st, notwithstanding Croxton's endeavors to drive him back, and his cavalry, in large force, pressed Croxton across Shoal creek to its east bank. Orders were immediately sent to General Stanley to concentrate the 4th corps at Pulaski, and await further instructions. In the mean time Forrest was moving eastward from Corinth, Mississippi, and from Paris, Tennessee, making his appearance on the 28th at Fort Heiman, an earthwork on the west bank of the Tennessee, about seventy-five (75) miles from Paducah, where he captured gunboat No. 55 and two transports on the 31st, having previously burnt the steamer Empress. His force was composed of seventeen (17) regiments of cavalry, with nine (9) pieces of artillery.

On the 2d of November he succeeded in planting batteries above and below Johnsonville, one of our bases of supplies on the Tennessee river, and the western terminus of the Northwestern railroad, completely blockading the river, and isolating at that place three (3) gunboats, eight (8) transports, and about a dozen

barges. The garrison was composed of about one thousand (1,000) men of the forty-third Wisconsin, twelfth United States colored troops, and a detachment of the eleventh Tennessee cavalry, all under command of Colonel C. R. Thompson, twelfth United States colored troops. The naval forces, under command of Lieutenant E. M. King, attacked the enemy's batteries below Johnsonville, but were repulsed after a severe contest, but not before they recaptured from the enemy one of the transports above mentioned, having on board two (2) 20-pounder Parrott guns, and a considerable quantity of quartermaster's stores, and forcing the enemy to destroy the gunboat No. 55, captured on the 31st October.

On the 4th the enemy opened on the gunboats, transports, and on the town, from batteries posted on the opposite bank of the river, to which the artillery of the garrison and the gunboats gave a brisk response. The latter becoming disabled, and as great fears were entertained of their being seized by the enemy, it was resolved to fire them, as also the transports, to prevent their falling into his hands. In carrying this into operation the flames spread to the buildings of the commissary and quartermaster's departments, and also to a large amount of stores on the levee, soon converting the whole into a mass of ruins. The loss to the government, as far as estimated, is set down at one and a half million of dollars, of which about three hundred thousand dollars belonged to the subsistence department, and the remainder to the quartermaster's department. I believe there was no cause to apprehend that the enemy could effect a crossing at Johnsonville, and the destruction of property was consequently unnecessary.

On the morning of the 5th the enemy again opened fire on the garrison, and after a furious cannonade of more than an hour's duration, withdrew from his position across the river and disappeared. He crossed the Tennessee, above Johnsonville, by means of two large flat-boats constructed by his men, and two small boats belonging to one of the gunboats, and then moved off in the direction of Clifton. Major General Schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, arrived at Nashville on the 5th, and was immediately started towards Johnsonville by rail, reaching that place the same night, and found the enemy had already retreated. Directions were then sent General Schofield to leave a sufficiently strong force for the defence of that post, and with the balance of his command proceed to carry out the instructions already given him, viz: to join the 4th corps at Pulaski, and assume command of all the troops in the vicinity, watch the movements of Hood, and retard his advance into Tennessee as much as possible, without risking a general engagement until Major General A. J. Smith's command could arrive from Missouri, and Major General J. H. Wilson could have time to remount the cavalry regiments dismounted to furnish horses for Kilpatrick's division, which was to accompany General Sherman in his march through Georgia. At this time I found myself confronted by the army which, under General J. E. Johnston, had so skilfully resisted the advance of the whole active army of the military division of the Mississippi from Dalton to the Chattahoochee, re-enforced by a well-equipped and enthusiastic cavalry command of over twelve thousand, (12,000,) led by one of the boldest and most successful commanders in the rebel army. My information from all sources confirmed the reported strength of Hood's army to be from forty to forty-five thousand infantry and from twelve to fifteen thousand cavalry. My effective force at this time consisted of the 4th corps, about twelve thousand, (12,000,) under Major General D. S. Stanley; the 23d corps, about ten thousand, (10,000,) under Major General J. M. Schofield; Hatch's division of cavalry, about four thousand, (4,000;) Croxton's brigade, twenty-five hundred, (2,500,) and Capron's brigade, of about twelve hundred, (1,200.) The balance of my force was distributed along the railroad, and posted at Murfreesboro', Stevenson, Bridgeport, Huntsville, Decatur, and Chattanooga, to keep open our communications and hold the posts above named, if attacked, until they could be re-enforced, as up to this time it was impossible to determine which course Hood would take—advance on Nashville

or turn towards Huntsville. Under the circumstances it was manifestly best to act on the defensive until sufficiently re-enforced to justify taking the offensive. My plans and wishes were fully explained to General Schofield, and, as subsequent events will show, properly appreciated and executed by him.

From the 1st to the 10th of November the enemy's position at Florence had remained materially unchanged. He had laid a pontoon bridge by mooring it to the piers of the old railroad bridge at that place, and had crossed over one corps of infantry (S. D. Lee's) and two (2) divisions of cavalry; the other two corps (Stewart's and Cheatham's) were still on the south side of the river. His cavalry had pushed out to Shoal creek, skirmishing continually with Hatch's and Croxton's commands along the line of that stream, but showing no disposition to advance beyond.

General Sherman's uncertain position at Kingston, Georgia, where he still remained in camp, had much to do with detaining the enemy; doubtless causing considerable speculation as to his future movements.

On the 12th of November communication with General Sherman was severed, the last despatch from him leaving Cartersville, Georgia, at 2.35 p. m. on that date. He had started on his great expedition from Atlanta to the seaboard, leaving me to guard Tennessee or to pursue the enemy if he followed the commanding general's column. It was, therefore, with considerable anxiety that we watched the forces at Florence to discover what course they would pursue with regard to General Sherman's movements, determining thereby whether the troops under my command, numbering less than half those under Hood, were to act on the defensive in Tennessee, or take the offensive in Alabama. The enemy's position at Florence remained unchanged up to the 17th November, when he moved Cheatham's corps to the north side of the river, with Stewart's corps preparing to follow. The same day part of the enemy's infantry, said to be Lee's corps, moved up the Lawrenceburg road to Bough's mill on Shoal creek, skirmishing at that point with Hatch's cavalry, and then fell back a short distance to some bluffs, where it went into camp. The possibility of Hood's forces following General Sherman were now at an end, and I quickly took measures to act on the defensive. Two (2) divisions of infantry, under Major General A. J. Smith, were reported on their way to join me from Missouri, which, with several one-year regiments then arriving in the department, and detachments collected from points of minor importance, would swell my command, when concentrated, to an army nearly as large as that of the enemy. Had the enemy delayed the advance a week or ten days longer I would have been ready to meet him at some point south of Duck river, but Hood commenced his advance on the 19th, moving on parallel roads from Florence towards Waynesboro', and shelled Hatch's cavalry out of Lawrenceburg on the 22d. My only resource then was to retire slowly towards my re-enforcements, delaying the enemy's progress as much as possible to gain time for re-enforcements to arrive and concentrate. General Schofield commenced removing the public property from Pulaski preparatory to falling back towards Columbia. Two divisions of Stanley's corps had already reached Lynnvile, a point fifteen (15) miles north of Pulaski, to cover the passage of the wagons and protect the railroad. Capron's brigade of cavalry was at Mount Pleasant covering the approach to Columbia from that direction, and, in addition to the regular garrison, there was at Columbia a brigade of Ruger's division, 23d army corps. I directed the two remaining brigades of Ruger's division, then at Johnsonville, to move, one by railroad around through Nashville to Columbia, the other by road, *via* Waverly, to Centreville, and occupy the crossings of Duck river near Columbia, Williamsport, Gordon's ferry, and Centreville. Since the departure of General Sherman about seven thousand (7,000) men belonging to his column had collected at Chattanooga, comprising convalescents returning to their commands and men returning from furlough. These men had been organized into brigades to be made available at



such points as they might be needed. My command had also been re-enforced by twenty (20) new one-year regiments, most of which, however, were absorbed in replacing old regiments whose term of service had expired.

On the 23d, in accordance with directions previously given him, General Granger commenced withdrawing the garrisons from Athens, Decatur, and Huntsville, Alabama, and moved off towards Stevenson, sending five (5) new regiments of that force to Murfreesboro', and retaining at Stevenson the original troops of his command. This movement was rapidly made by railroad, without opposition on the part of the enemy. That same night General Schofield evacuated Pulaski and moved towards Columbia, reporting himself in position at that place on the 24th. The commanding officer at Johnsonville was directed to evacuate that post, after removing all public property, and retire to Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland, and thence to Clarksville.

During the 24th and 25th the enemy skirmished with General Schofield's troops at Columbia, but showed nothing but dismounted cavalry until the morning of the 26th, when his infantry came up and pressed our line strongly during that day and the 27th, but without assaulting. As the enemy's movements showed an undoubted intention to cross above and below the town, General Schofield withdrew to the north bank of Duck river during the night of the 27th and took up a new position, where the command remained during the 28th undisturbed. Two divisions of the 23d corps were placed in line in front of the town, holding all the crossings in its vicinity, while Stanley's corps, posted in reserve on the Franklin pike, was held in readiness to repel any vigorous attempt the enemy should make to force a crossing. The cavalry, under command of Brevet Major General Wilson, held the crossings above those guarded by infantry.

About 2 p. m., on the 29th, the enemy succeeded in pressing back General Wilson's cavalry, and effected a crossing on the Lewisburg pike. At a later hour part of his infantry crossed at Hewey's mills, six miles above Columbia. Communication with the cavalry having been interrupted, and the line of retreat towards Franklin being threatened, General Schofield made preparations to withdraw to Franklin. General Stanley, with one division of infantry, was sent to Spring Hill, about fifteen miles north of Columbia, to cover the trains and hold the road open for the passage of the main force, and dispositions were made preparatory to a withdrawal, and to meet any attack coming from the direction of Hewey's mills. General Stanley reached Spring Hill just in time to drive off the enemy's cavalry and save the trains, but later he was attacked by the enemy's infantry and cavalry combined, who engaged him heavily and nearly succeeded in dislodging him from the position. The engagement lasted until dark, although not attacked from the direction of Hewey's mills. General Schofield was busily occupied all day, at Columbia, resisting the enemy's attempts to cross Duck river, which he successfully accomplished, repulsing the enemy many times with heavy loss. Giving directions for the withdrawal of the troops as soon as covered by the darkness, at a late hour in the afternoon General Schofield, with Ruger's division, started to the relief of General Stanley at Spring Hill, and when near that place he came upon the enemy's cavalry, but they were easily driven off. At Spring Hill the enemy was found bivouacking within 800 yards of the road. Posting a brigade to hold the road at this point, General Schofield, with Ruger's division, pushed on to Thompson's station, three miles beyond, where he found the enemy's camp fires still burning, a cavalry force having occupied the place at dark, but had disappeared on the arrival of our troops. General Ruger then quietly took possession of the cross-roads. The withdrawal of the main force from in front of Columbia was safely effected after dark on the 29th. Spring Hill was passed without molestation about midnight, and, making a night march of twenty-five miles, the whole command got into position at Franklin at an early hour on the morning of the 30th. The cavalry moved on the Lewisburg pike on

the right or east of the infantry. At Franklin General Schofield formed line of battle, on the southern edge of the town, to await the coming of the enemy, and in the mean time hastened the crossing of the trains to the north side of the Harpeth river. On the evacuation of Columbia, orders were sent to Major General Milroy, at Tullahoma, to abandon that post and retire to Murfreesboro', joining forces with General Rousseau at the latter place. General Milroy was instructed, however, to maintain the garrison in the block-house at Elk River bridge. Nashville was placed in a state of defence, and the fortifications manned by the garrison, re-enforced by a volunteer force which had been previously organized into a division under Brevet Brigadier General J. L. Donaldson from the employes of the quartermaster's and commissary departments. This latter force, aided by railroad employes, the whole under the direction of Brigadier General Tower, worked assiduously to construct additional defences. Major General Steedman, with a command numbering 5,000, composed of detachments belonging to General Sherman's column, left behind at Chattanooga, (of which mention has heretofore been made,) and also a brigade of colored troops, started from Chattanooga by rail, on the 29th of November, and reached Cowan's on the morning of the 30th, where orders were sent him to proceed direct to Nashville. At an early hour on the morning of the 30th, the advance of Major General A. J. Smith's command reached Nashville by transports from St. Louis. My infantry force was now nearly equal to that of the enemy, although he still outnumbered me very greatly in effective cavalry, but as soon as a few thousand of the latter arm could be mounted I should be in a condition to take the field offensively and dispute the possession of Tennessee with Hood's army. The enemy followed closely after General Schofield's rear-guard in the retreat to Franklin, and, upon coming up with the main force, formed rapidly, and advanced to assault our works, repeating attack after attack during the entire afternoon, and as late as 10 p. m., his efforts to break our lines were continued. General Schofield's position was excellently chosen, with both flanks resting upon the river, and his men firmly held their ground against an overwhelming enemy, who was repulsed in every assault along the whole line. Our loss, as given by General Schofield in his report transmitted herewith, and to which I respectfully refer, is 189 killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 missing, making an aggregate of 2,326. We captured and sent to Nashville 702 prisoners, including one general officer, and 33 stands of colors. Major General D. S. Stanley, commanding 4th corps, was severely wounded at Franklin while engaged in rallying a portion of the command which had been temporarily overpowered by an overwhelming attack of the enemy. At the time of the battle the enemy's loss was known to be severe and was estimated at 5,000; the exact figures were only obtained, however, on the reoccupation of Franklin by our forces, after the battles of December 15 and 16, at Brentwood Hill, near Nashville, and are given as follows: Buried upon the field, 1,750; disabled and placed in hospital at Franklin, 3,800; which, with the 702 prisoners already reported, make an aggregate loss to Hood's army of 6,252, among whom were six general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. The important result of this signal victory cannot be too highly appreciated, for it not only seriously checked the enemy's advance and gave General Schofield time to move his troops and all his property to Nashville, but it also caused deep depression among the men of Hood's army, making them doubly cautious in their subsequent movements. Not willing to risk a renewal of the battle on the morrow, and having accomplished the object of the day's operations, viz., to cover the withdrawal of his trains, General Schofield, by my advice and direction, fell back during the night to Nashville, in front of which city line of battle was formed by noon of the 1st of December, on the heights immediately surrounding Nashville, with Major General A. J. Smith's command occupying the right, his right resting on the Cumberland river below the city, the 4th corps, Brigadier General Wood temporarily in command, in the centre, and General Schofield's troops, 23d army corps, on the left, his left extending to Nolens-

ville pike. The cavalry, under General Wilson, was directed to take post on the left of General Schofield, which would make secure the interval between his left and the river, above the city. General Steedman's troops reached Nashville about dark on the evening of the 1st of December, taking up a position about a mile in advance of the left centre of the main line, and on the left of the Nolensville pike. This position being regarded as too much exposed, was changed on the 3d, when the cavalry having been directed to take post on the north side of the river, at Edgefield, General Steedman occupied the space on the left of the line, vacated by its withdrawal. During the afternoon of the 2d the enemy's cavalry, in small parties, engaged our skirmishers, but it was only on the afternoon of the 3d that his infantry made its appearance, when, crowding in our skirmishers, he commenced to establish his main line, which, on the morning of the 4th, we found he had succeeded in doing, with his salient on the summit of Montgomery hill, within six hundred (600) yards of our centre, his main line occupying the high ground on the southeast side of Brown's creek, and extending from the Nolensville pike, his extreme right, across the Franklin and Granny White pikes in a westerly direction to the hills south and southwest of Richland creek, and down that creek to the Hillsboro' pike, with cavalry extending from both his flanks to the river. Artillery was opened on him from several points on the line without eliciting any response. The block-house at the railroad crossing at Overall's creek, five miles north of Murfreesboro', was attacked by Bates's division of Cheatham's corps on the 4th, but held out until assistance reached it from the garrison at Murfreesboro'. The enemy used artillery to reduce the block-house, but, although seventy-four shots were fired at it, no material injury was done. General Milroy coming up with three (3) regiments of infantry, four (4) companies of the thirteenth Indiana cavalry, and a section of artillery, attacked the enemy and drove him off. During the 5th, 6th, and 7th, Bates's division, re-enforced by a division from Lee's corps, and 2,500 of Forrest's cavalry, demonstrated heavily against Fortress Rosecrans, at Murfreesboro', garrisoned by about 8,000 men, under command of General Rousseau. The enemy showing an unwillingness to make a direct assault, General Milroy, with seven regiments of infantry, was sent out on the 8th to engage him. He was found a short distance from the place on the Wilkison pike, posted behind rail breastworks, was attacked and routed, our troops capturing 207 prisoners and two (2) guns, with a loss of 30 killed and 175 wounded. On the same day Buford's cavalry entered the town of Murfreesboro', after having shelled it vigorously, but he was speedily driven out by a regiment of infantry and a section of artillery. On retiring from before Murfreesboro', the enemy's cavalry moved northward to Lebanon, and along the bank of the Cumberland in that vicinity, threatening to cross to the north side of the river and interrupt our railroad communication with Louisville, (at that time our only source of supplies,) the enemy having blockaded the river below Nashville by batteries along the shore. The Navy Department was requested to patrol the Cumberland above and below Nashville, with the gunboats then in the river, to prevent the enemy from crossing, which request was cordially and effectually complied with by Lieutenant Commander Leroy Fitch, commanding eleventh division Mississippi squadron; at the same time General Wilson sent a cavalry force to Gallatin to guard the country in that vicinity. The position of Hood's army around Nashville remained unchanged, and with the exception of occasional picket firing nothing of importance occurred from the 3d to the 15th December. In the mean while I was preparing to take the offensive without delay, the cavalry was being remounted under the direction of General Wilson as rapidly as possible, and new transportation furnished where it was required. During these operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, under Breckinridge, Duke, and Vaughn, was operating in the eastern portion of the State against Generals Ammon and Gillen.

On the 13th November at midnight, Breckinridge, with a force estimated at

3,000, attacked General Gillem near Morristown, routing him and capturing his artillery, besides taking several hundred prisoners; the remainder of the command, about one thousand (1,000) in number, escaped to Strawberry Plains, and thence to Knoxville. General Gillem's force consisted of fifteen hundred (1,500) men, composing three regiments of Tennessee cavalry, and six guns, belonging formerly to the fourth division of cavalry, army of the Cumberland, but had been detached from my command at the instance of Governor Andrew Johnson, and were then operating independently under Brigadier General Gillem. To a want of co-operation between the officers directly under my control and General Gillem, may be attributed, in a great measure, the cause of the latter's misfortune. Following up his success, Breckinridge continued moving southward through Strawberry Plains to the immediate vicinity of Knoxville, but on the 18th withdrew as rapidly as he had advanced. General Ammon's troops, re-enforced by 1,500 men from Chattanooga, reoccupied Strawberry Plains on that day. About that period Major General Stoneman, left at Louisville by General Schofield to take charge of the department of the Ohio during his absence with the army in the field, started for Knoxville to take general direction of affairs in that section, having previously ordered Brevet Major General Burbridge to march with all his available force in Kentucky, by way of Cumberland gap, to Gillem's relief. On his way through Nashville General Stoneman received instructions from me to concentrate as large a force as he could get in East Tennessee against Breckinridge, and either destroy his force or drive it into Virginia, and, if possible, destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and the railroad from the Tennessee line as far into Virginia as he could go without endangering his command.

*November 23.*—General Stoneman telegraphed from Knoxville that the main force of the enemy was at New Market, eight miles north of Strawberry Plains, and General Burbridge was moving on Cumberland Gap from the interior of Kentucky, his advance expecting to reach Barboursville that night. On the 6th of December, having received information from East Tennessee that Breckinridge was falling back towards Virginia, General Stoneman was again directed to pursue him, and destroy the railroad as far across the State line as possible, say twenty-five miles. Leaving him to carry out these instructions I will return to the position at Nashville. Both armies were ice-bound for a week previous to the 14th December, when the weather moderated. Being prepared to move I called a meeting of the corps commanders on the afternoon of that day, and having discussed the plan of attack until thoroughly understood, the following Special Field Order No. 342 were issued.

“Par. IV. As soon as the state of the weather will admit of offensive operations the troops will move against the enemy's position in the following order: Major General A. J. Smith, commanding detachment of the army of the Tennessee, after forming his troops on and near the Hardin pike in front of his present position, will make a vigorous assault on the enemy's left. Major General Wilson, commanding the cavalry corps, military division of the Mississippi, with three divisions, will move on and support General Smith's right, assisting as far as possible in carrying the left of the enemy's position, and be in readiness to throw his force upon the enemy the moment a favorable opportunity occurs. Major General Wilson will also send one division on the Charlotte pike to clear that road of the enemy, and observe in the direction of Bell's landing to protect our right rear until the enemy's position is fairly turned, when it will rejoin the main force. Brigadier General T. J. Wood, commanding 4th army corps, after leaving a strong skirmish line in his works from Lawrens hill to his extreme right, will form the remainder of the 4th corps on the Hillsboro' pike to support General Smith's left and operate on the left and rear of the enemy's advanced position on the Montgomery hill. Major General Schofield, commanding twenty-third army corps, will replace Brigadier General Kimball's division of the 4th corps with his troops, and occupy the trenches from Fort Negley to Lawrens hill with a

strong skirmish line. He will move with the remainder of his force in front of the works and co-operate with General Wood, protecting the latter's left flank against an attack by the enemy. Major General Steedman, commanding district of Etowah, will occupy the interior line in rear of his present position, stretching from the reservoir on the Cumberland river to Fort Negley with a strong skirmish line, and mass the remainder of his force in its present position to act according to the exigencies which may arise during these operations. Brigadier General Miller, with the troops forming the garrison of Nashville, will occupy the interior line from the battery on hill 210 to the extreme right, including the enclosed work on the Hyde's Ferry road. The quartermaster's troops, under command of Brigadier General Donaldson, will, if necessary, be posted on the interior line from Fort Morton to the battery on hill 210. The troops occupying the interior line will be under the direction of Major General Steedman, who is charged with the immediate defence of Nashville during the operations around the city. Should the weather permit, the troops will be formed to commence operations at 6 a. m. on the 15th, or as soon thereafter as practicable."

On the morning of the 15th December, the weather being favorable, the army was formed, and ready at an early hour to carry out the plan of battle promulgated in the special field orders of the 14th. The formation of the troops was partially concealed from the enemy by the broken nature of the ground, as also by a dense fog which only lifted towards noon. The enemy was apparently totally unaware of any intention on our part to attack his position, and more especially did he seem not to expect any movement against his left flank. To divert his attention still further from our real intentions, Major General Steedman had, on the evening of the 14th, received orders to make a heavy demonstration with his command against the enemy's right, east of the Nolensville pike, which he accomplished with great success and some loss, succeeding, however, in attracting the enemy's attention to that part of his line and inducing him to draw re-enforcements from towards his centre and left. As soon as General Steedman had completed his movement, the commands of Generals Smith and Wilson moved out along the Hardin pike, and commenced the grand movement of the day by wheeling to the left and advancing against the enemy's position across the Hardin and Hillsboro' pikes. A division of cavalry (Johnson's) was sent at the same time to look after a battery of the enemy on the Cumberland river, at Bell's landing, eight miles below Nashville. General Johnson did not get into position until late in the afternoon, when, in conjunction with the gunboats under Lieutenant Commander Leroy Fitch, the enemy's battery was engaged until after nightfall, and the place was found evacuated on the morning of the 16th. The remainder of General Wilson's command, Hatch's division leading and Knipe's in reserve, moving on the right of General A. J. Smith's troops, first struck the enemy along Richland creek, near Hardin's house, and drove him back rapidly, capturing a number of prisoners, wagons, &c., and continuing to advance, while slightly swinging to the left, came upon a redoubt containing four guns, which was splendidly carried by assault at 1 p. m. by a portion of Hatch's division dismounted, and the captured guns turned upon the enemy. A second redoubt, stronger than the first, was next assailed and carried by the same troops that captured the first position, taking four more guns and about three hundred (300) prisoners. The infantry, McArthur's division of General Smith's command, on the left of the cavalry, participated in both of the assaults, and, indeed, the dismounted cavalry seemed to vie with the infantry who should first gain the works. As they reached the position nearly simultaneously, both lay claim to the artillery and prisoners captured. Finding General Smith had not taken as much distance to the right as I expected he would have done, I directed General Schofield to move his command (the 23d corps) from the position in reserve, to which it had been assigned, over to the right of General Smith, enabling the cavalry thereby to operate

more freely in the enemy's rear. This was rapidly accomplished by General Schofield, and his troops participated in the closing operations of the day. The 4th corps, Brigadier General T. J. Wood commanding, on the left of General Smith's command, as soon as the latter had struck the enemy's flank, assaulted the Montgomery hill, Hood's most advanced position, at 1 p. m., which was most gallantly executed by the third brigade second division, Colonel P. Sidney Post, fifty-ninth Illinois, commanding, capturing a considerable number of prisoners. Connecting with the left of Smith's troops, (Brigadier General Garrard's division,) the 4th corps continued to advance and carried by assault the enemy's entire line in its front, and captured several pieces of artillery, about five hundred prisoners, some stands of colors and other materials. The enemy was driven out of his original line of works and forced back to a new position along the base of Haspeth Hills, still holding his line of retreat to Franklin by the main pike through Brentwood and by the Granny White pike. Our line at nightfall was readjusted, running parallel to and east of the Hillsboro' pike, Schofield's command on the right, Smith's in the centre, and Wood's on the left, with the cavalry on the right of Schofield, Steedman holding the position he had gained early in the morning. The total result of the day's operations was the capture of sixteen pieces of artillery and twelve hundred prisoners, besides several hundred stands of small-arms and about forty (40) wagons. The enemy had been forced back at all points with heavy loss. Our casualties were unusually light. The behavior of the troops was unsurpassed for steadiness and alacrity in every movement, and the original plan of battle, with but few alterations, strictly adhered to. The whole command bivouacked in line of battle during the night, on the ground occupied at dark, while preparations were made to renew the battle at an early hour on the morrow.

At 6 a. m. on the 16th Wood's corps pressed back the enemy's skirmishers across the Franklin pike to the eastward of it, and then swinging slightly to the right, advanced due south from Nashville, driving the enemy before him until he came upon his new main line of works, constructed during the night, on what is called Overton's Hill, about five miles south of the city and east of the Franklin pike. General Steedman moved out from Nashville by the Nolensville pike, and formed his command on the left of General Wood, effectually securing the latter's left flank, and made preparations to co-operate in the operations of the day. General A. J. Smith's command moved on the right of the 4th corps, (Wood's,) and establishing connexion with General Wood's right, completed the new line of battle. General Schofield's troops remained in the position taken up by them at dark on the day previous, facing eastward and towards the enemy's left flank, the line of the corps running perpendicular to General Smith's troops. General Wilson's cavalry, which had rested for the night at the six-mile post, on the Hillsboro' pike, was dismounted and formed on the right of Schofield's command, and by noon of the 16th had succeeded in gaining the enemy's rear and stretched across the Granny White pike, one of his two outlets, towards Franklin. As soon as the above dispositions were completed, and having visited the different commands, I gave directions that the movement against the enemy's left flank should be continued. Our entire line approached to within six hundred yards of the enemy's at all points. His centre was weak as compared to either his right at Overton's Hill, or his left on the hills bordering the Granny White pike; still I had hopes of gaining his rear and cutting off his retreat from Franklin. About 3 p. m., Post's brigade of Wood's corps, supported by Streight's brigade of the same command, was ordered by General Wood to assault Overton Hill. This intention was communicated to General Steedman, who ordered the brigade of colored troops, commanded by Colonel C. R. Thompson, twelfth United States colored troops, to co-operate in the movement. The ground on which the two assaulting columns formed being open and exposed to the enemy's view, he readily perceiving our intention, drew re-enforcements from his left and centre to

the threatened point. This movement of troops on the part of the enemy was communicated along the line from left to right. The assault was made and received by the enemy with tremendous fire of grape and canister, and musketry. Our men moved steadily onward up the hill until near the crest, when the reserve of the enemy rose and poured into the assaulting column a most destructive fire, causing the men first to waver and then to fall back, leaving their dead and wounded, black and white indiscriminately mingled, lying amidst the abatis, the gallant Colonel Post among the wounded. General Wood readily reformed his command in the position it had previously occupied, preparatory to a renewal of the assault. Immediately following the effort of the 4th corps, Generals Smith's and Schofield's commands moved against the enemy's works in their respective fronts, carrying all before them, irreparably breaking his lines in a dozen places and capturing all his artillery and thousands of prisoners, among the latter four (4) general officers. Our loss was remarkably small, scarcely mentionable. All of the enemy that did escape were pursued over the tops of Brentwood and Harpeth Hills. General Wilson's cavalry dismounted, attacked the enemy simultaneously with Schofield and Smith, striking him in reserve, and gaining firm possession of Granny White pike, cut off his retreat by that route. Wood's and Steedman's troops hearing the shouts of victory coming from the right, rushed impetuously forward, renewing the assault on Overton's Hill, and although meeting a very heavy fire, the onset was irresistible, artillery and many prisoners falling into our hands. The enemy, hopelessly broken, fled in confusion through the Brentwood Pass, the 4th corps in close pursuit, which was continued for several miles, when darkness closed the scene, and the troops rested from their labors. As the 4th corps pursued the enemy on the Franklin pike, General Wilson hastily mounted Knipe's and Hatch's divisions of his command, and directed them to pursue along the Granny White pike, and endeavor to reach Franklin in advance of the enemy. After proceeding about a mile they came upon the enemy's cavalry under Chalmers, posted across the road and behind barricades. The position was charged by the twelfth Tennessee cavalry, Colonel Spaulding commanding, and the enemy's lines broken, scattering him in all directions, and capturing quite a number of prisoners, among them Brigadier General E. W. Rucker. During the two days' operations there were 4,462 prisoners captured, including 287 officers of all grades from that of major general, fifty-three pieces of artillery, and thousands of small-arms. The enemy abandoned on the field all of his dead and wounded.

Leaving directions for the collection of the captured property and for the care of the wounded left on the battle-field, the pursuit was continued at daylight on the 17th. The 4th corps pushed on towards Franklin by the direct pike, while the cavalry moved by the Granny White pike to its intersection with the Franklin pike, and then took the advance. Johnson's division of cavalry was sent by General Wilson direct to Harpeth river, on the Hillsboro' pike, with directions to cross and move rapidly towards Franklin. The main cavalry column, with Knipe's division in advance, came up with the enemy's rear-guard strongly posted at Hollow Tree gap, four (4) miles north of Franklin. The position was charged in front and in flank simultaneously, and handsomely carried, capturing four hundred and thirteen (413) prisoners and three (3) colors. The enemy then fell back rapidly to Franklin, and endeavored to defend the crossing of Harpeth river at that place, but Johnson's division coming up from below, on the south side of the stream, forced him to retire from the river bank, and our cavalry took possession of the town, capturing the enemy's hospitals, containing over two thousand wounded, of whom about 200 were our own men. The pursuit was immediately continued by Wilson towards Columbia, the enemy's rear-guard slowly retiring before him to a distance of about five (5) miles south of Franklin, where the enemy made a stand in some open fields just north of West Harpeth river, and seemed to await our coming. Deploying Knipe's

division as skirmishers, with Hatch's in close support, General Wilson ordered his body guard, the fourth United States cavalry, Lieutenant Hedges commanding, to charge the enemy. Forming on the pike in column of fours, the gallant little command charged with sabres drawn, breaking the enemy's centre, while Knipe's and Hatch's men pressed back his flanks, scattering his whole command and causing them to abandon their artillery. Darkness coming on during the engagement enabled a great many to escape, and put an end to the day's operations. The 4th corps, under General Wood, followed immediately in rear of the cavalry as far as Harpeth river, where it found the bridges destroyed and too much water on the fords for infantry to cross. A trestle bridge was hastily constructed from such materials as lay at hand, but could not be made available before nightfall. General Steedman's command moved in rear of General Wood, and camped near him on the banks of the Harpeth. General Smith and Schofield marched with their corps along the Granny White pike, and camped for the night at the intersection with the Franklin pike. The trains moved with their respective commands, carrying ten days' supplies and one hundred rounds of ammunition.

On the 18th the pursuit of the enemy was continued by General Wilson, who pushed on as far as Rutherford's creek, three miles from Columbia. Wood's corps crossed to the south side of Harpeth river and closed up with the cavalry. The enemy did not offer to make a stand during the day. On arriving at Rutherford's creek the stream was found to be impassable on account of high water, and running a perfect torrent. A pontoon bridge, hastily constructed at Nashville during the presence of the army at that place, was on its way to the front, but the bad condition of the roads, together with the incompleteness of the train itself, had retarded its arrival. I would here remark that the splendid pontoon train, properly belonging to my command, with its trained corps of pontoniers, was absent with General Sherman.

During the 19th several unsuccessful efforts were made by the advance troops to cross Rutherford's creek, although General Hatch succeeded in lodging a few skirmishers on the south bank. The heavy rains of the preceding few days had inundated the whole country, and rendered the roads almost impassable. Smith's and Schofield's commands crossed to the south side of Harpeth river, General Smith advancing to Spring Hill, while General Schofield encamped at Franklin.

On the morning of the 20th General Hatch constructed a floating bridge from the debris of the old railroad bridge over Rutherford's creek, and crossing his entire division, pushed out for Columbia, but found, on reaching Duck river, the enemy had succeeded the night before in getting everything across, and had already removed his pontoon bridge. Duck river was very much swollen, and impassable without a bridge. During the day General Wood improvised a foot bridge over Rutherford's creek, at the old railroad bridge, and by nightfall had succeeded in crossing his infantry entire, and one or two of his batteries, and moved forward to Duck river. The pontoon train coming up to Rutherford's creek about noon of the 21st, a bridge was laid during the afternoon, and General Smith's troops were enabled to cross. The weather had changed from dismal rain to bitter cold, very materially retarding the work in laying the bridge, as the regiment of colored troops to whom that duty was intrusted seemed to become unmanned by the cold, and totally unequal to the occasion. On the completion of the bridge at Rutherford's creek, sufficient material for a bridge over Duck river was hastily pushed forward to that point, and the bridge constructed in time to enable Wood to cross late in the afternoon of the 22d, and get into position on the Pulaski road, about two (2) miles south of Columbia. The water in the river fell rapidly during the construction of the bridge, necessitating frequent alterations and causing much delay. The enemy in his hasty retreat had thrown into the stream several fine pieces of artillery, which were rapidly becoming uncovered, and were subsequently removed. Notwithstanding the many delays to which the command had been subject, I determined to continue



the pursuit of Hood's shattered forces, and for this purpose decided to use General Wilson's cavalry and General Wood's corps of infantry, directing the infantry to move on the pike, while the cavalry marched on its either flank across the fields, the remainder of the command, Smith's and Schofield's corps, to move along more leisurely, and to be used as the occasion demanded. Forrest and his cavalry, and such other detachments as had been sent off from his main army while besieging Nashville, had rejoined Hood at Columbia. He had formed a powerful rear-guard, made up of detachments from all of his organized force, numbering about four thousand (4,000) infantry, under General Walthall, and all his available cavalry under Forrest. With the exception of his rear-guard, his army had become a disheartened and disorganized rabble of half-armed and barefooted men, who sought every opportunity to fall out by the wayside and desert their cause to put an end to their sufferings. The rear-guard, however, was undaunted and firm, and did its work bravely to the last.

During the 23d General Wilson was occupied crossing his command over Duck river, but took the advance on the 24th, supported by General Wood, and came up with the enemy just south of Lynnville, and also at Buford's station, at both of which places the enemy made a short stand, but was speedily dislodged with some loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Our advance was so rapid as to prevent the destruction of the bridges over Richland creek.

Christmas morning (the 25th) the enemy, with our cavalry at his heels, evacuated Pulaski, and was pursued towards Lamb's ferry, over an almost impracticable road, and through a country devoid of sustenance for man and beast. During the afternoon Harrison's brigade found the enemy strongly intrenched at the head of a heavily wooded and deep ravine, through which ran the road, and into which Colonel Harrison drove the enemy's skirmishers. He then waited for the remainder of the cavalry to close up before attacking, but before this could be accomplished, the enemy, with something of his former boldness, sallied from his breastworks and drove back Harrison's skirmishers, capturing and carrying off one gun belonging to battery I, fourth United States artillery, which was not recovered by us, notwithstanding the ground lost was almost immediately regained. By nightfall the enemy was driven from his position with a loss of about fifty (50) prisoners. The cavalry had moved so rapidly as to outdistance the trains, and both men and animals were suffering greatly in consequence, although they continued uncomplainingly to pursue the enemy. General Wood's corps kept well closed up on the cavalry, camping on the night of December 25th, six miles out of Pulaski, on the Lamb's Ferry road, and pursuing the same route as the cavalry, reached Lexington, Alabama, thirty (30) miles from Pulaski, on the 28th, on which date, having definitely ascertained that the enemy had made good his escape across the Tennessee, at Bainbridge, I directed further pursuit to cease. At Pulaski the enemy's hospital, containing about two hundred patients, fell into our hands, and four (4) guns were found in Richland creek. About a mile south of the town he destroyed twenty (20) wagons loaded with ammunition, belonging to Cheatham's corps, taking the animals belonging to the trains to help to pull his pontoons. The road from Pulaski to Bainbridge, and indeed back to Nashville, was strewn with abandoned wagons, limbers, small-arms, blankets, &c., showing most conclusively the disorder of the enemy's retreat. During the foregoing operations with the advance Smith's and Schofield's troops were in motion towards the front, General Smith's command reaching Pulaski on the 27th, while General Schofield was directed to remain at Columbia for the time being.

On our arrival at Franklin on the 18th I gave directions to General Steedman to move with his command across the country from that point to Murfreesboro', on the Chattanooga railroad, from whence he was to proceed by rail to Decatur, Alabama, *via* Stevenson, being joined at Stevenson by Brigadier General R. S. Granger, and the troops composing the garrisons of Huntsville, Athens, and

Decatur. Taking general direction of the whole force, his instructions were to re-occupy the points in northern Alabama evacuated at the period of Hood's advance, then cross the Tennessee with the balance of his force, and threaten the enemy's railroad communications west of Florence. General Steedman re-occupied Decatur on the 27th, and proceeded to carry out the second portion of his instructions, finding, however, that the enemy had already made good his escape to the south side of the Tennessee, and any movement on his railroad would be useless. On announcing the result of the battles to Rear-Admiral S. P. Lee, commanding Mississippi squadron, I requested him to send as much of his force as he could spare around to Florence, on the Tennessee river, and endeavor to prevent Hood's army from crossing at that point, which request was most cordially and promptly complied with. He arrived at Chickasaw, Mississippi, on the 24th, destroyed there a rebel battery, and captured two (2) guns, with caissons, at Florence landing. He also announced the arrival at the latter place of several transports with provisions. Immediately upon learning of the presence at Chickasaw, Mississippi, of the gunboats and transports with provisions, I directed General Smith to march overland from Pulaski to Clifton, *via* Lawrenceburg and Waynesboro', and take post at Eastport, Mississippi. General Smith started for his destination on December 29.

On the 30th December I announced to the army the successful completion of the campaign, and gave directions for the disposition of the command, as follows: Smith's corps to take post at Eastport, Mississippi; Wood's corps to be concentrated at Huntsville and Athens, Alabama; Schofield's corps to proceed to Dalton, Georgia, and Wilson's cavalry, after sending one division to Eastport, Mississippi, to concentrate the balance at or near Huntsville. On reaching the several positions assigned them, the different commands were to go into winter quarters, and recuperate for the spring campaign. The above not meeting the views of the general-in-chief, and being notified by Major General Halleck, chief of staff, United States army, that it was not intended for the army in Tennessee to go into winter quarters, orders were issued on the 31st December for Generals Schofield, Smith, and Wilson to concentrate their commands at Eastport, Mississippi, and that of General Wood at Huntsville, Alabama, preparatory to a renewal of the campaign against the enemy in Mississippi and Alabama. During the active operations of the main army in Middle Tennessee, General Stoneman's forces in the northeastern portion of the State were also very actively engaged in operating against Breckinridge, Duke, and Vaughn. Having quickly concentrated the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem at Bean's station, on the 12th of December General Stoneman started for Bristol, his advance, under General Gillem, striking the enemy, under Duke, at Kingsport, on the north fork of the Holston river, killing, capturing, or dispersing the whole command. General Stoneman then sent General Burbridge to Bristol, where he came upon the enemy under Vaughn, and skirmished with him until the remainder of the troops (Gillem's column) came up, when Burbridge was pushed on to Abingdon, with instructions to send a force to cut the railroad at some point between Saltville and Wytheville, in order to prevent re-enforcements coming from Lynchburg to the salt works. Gillem also reached Abingdon on the 15th, the enemy under Vaughn following on a road parallel to the one used by our forces. Having decided merely to make a demonstration against the salt works, and to push on with the main force after Vaughn, General Gillem struck the enemy at Marion early on the 16th, and after completely routing him, pursued him to Wytheville, Virginia, capturing all his artillery and trains, and one hundred and ninety-eight prisoners. Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, was destroyed, and also the extensive lead works near the town, and the railroad bridge over Reedy creek. General Stoneman then turned his attention towards Saltville, and its important salt works. The garrison of that place, re-enforced by Gittner's, Cosby's and Witcher's commands, and the remnant of Duke's, all under the com-

mand of Breckinridge in person, followed our troops as they moved on Wytheville, and in returning General Stoneman met them at Marion, where he made preparations to give Breckinridge battle, and disposed his command so as to effectually assault the enemy in the morning; but Breckinridge retreated during the night, and was pursued a short distance into North Carolina, our troops capturing some of his wagons and caissons. General Stoneman then moved on Saltville with his entire command, capturing, at that place, eight (8) pieces of artillery, and a large amount of ammunition of all kinds, two (2) locomotives, and quite a number of horses and mules. The extensive salt works were destroyed by breaking the kettles, filling the wells with rubbish, and burning the buildings. This work accomplished, General Stoneman returned to Knoxville, accompanied by General Gillem's command, General Burbridge proceeding to Kentucky, by way of Cumberland gap. The country marched over was laid waste to prevent its being used again by the enemy; all mills, factories, bridges, &c., being destroyed. The command had everything to contend with, as far as the weather and roads were concerned, yet the troops bore up cheerfully throughout, and made, each twenty-four hours, an average march of 42½ miles. The pursuit of Hood's retreating army was discontinued by my main forces on the 29th December. On reaching the Tennessee river, however, a force of cavalry numbering six hundred men, made up from detachments of the fifteenth Pennsylvania, second Michigan, tenth, twelfth, and thirteenth Indiana regiments, under command of Colonel W. J. Palmer, fifteenth Pennsylvania, operating with Steedman's column, started from Decatur, Alabama, in the direction of Hood's line of retreat in Mississippi. The enemy's cavalry, under Roddy, was met at Leighton, with whom Colonel Palmer skirmished, and pressed back in small squads towards the mountains. Here it was ascertained that Hood's trains passed through Leighton on the 28th of December, and moved off towards Columbus, Mississippi. Avoiding the enemy's cavalry, Colonel Palmer left Leighton on the 31st of December, moved rapidly *via* Lagrange and Russellville and by the Cotton Gin road, and overtook the enemy's pontoon train, consisting of two hundred (200) wagons and seventy-eight (78) pontoon boats, when ten miles out from Russellville. This he destroyed. Having learned of a large supply train on its way to Tusculumbia, Colonel Palmer started on the 1st of January towards Aberdeen, Mississippi, with a view of cutting it off, and succeeded in surprising it about 10 p. m. on the same evening, just over the line in Mississippi. The train consisted of one hundred and ten wagons and five hundred mules, the former of which were burned, and the latter sabred and shot. Returning *via* Tall Gate, Alabama, and on the old military and Hackburg roads, the enemy, under Roddy, Biffles, and Russell, was met near Russellville and along Bear creek, while another force, under Armstrong, was reported to be in pursuit of our forces. Evading the force in his front by moving off to the right under cover of the darkness, Colonel Palmer pushed for Moulton, and coming upon Russell when within twelve miles of Moulton, and near Thorn Hill, attacked him unexpectedly, utterly routing him and capturing some prisoners, besides burning five wagons. The command then proceeded to Decatur without molestation, and reached that place on the 6th of January, after a march of over two hundred and fifty miles. One hundred and fifty prisoners were captured, and nearly one thousand stand of arms destroyed. Colonel Palmer's loss was one killed and two wounded.

General Hood, while investing Nashville, had sent into Kentucky a force of cavalry, numbering about eight hundred men, and two guns, under the command of Brigadier General Lyon, with instructions to operate against our railroad communication with Louisville. McCook's division of cavalry was detached on the 14th of December, and sent to Bowling Green and Franklin to protect the road. After capturing Hopkinsville Lyon was met by La Grange's brigade near Greenbury, and after a sharp fight, was thrown into confusion, losing one gun, some prisoners and wagons. The enemy succeeded, however, by making a wide de-

tour *via* Elizabethtown and Glasgow, in reaching the Cumberland river and crossing at Burkeville, from whence General Lyon proceeded, *via* McMinnville and Winchester, Tennessee, to Larkinsville, Alabama, on the Memphis and Charleston railroad, and attacked the little garrison at Scottsboro' on the 10th of January. Lyon was here repulsed, and his command scattered, our troops pursuing him towards the Tennessee river, which, however, he, with about two hundred (200) of his men and his remaining piece of artillery, succeeded in crossing. The rest of his command scattered in squads among the mountains. Colonel W. J. Palmer, commanding fifteenth Pennsylvania cavalry, with one hundred and fifty men, crossed the river at Paint Rock, and pursued Lyon to near Red Hill, on the road from Warrenton to Tuscaloosa, at which place he surprised his camp during the night of the 14th of January, capturing Lyon himself, his one piece of artillery, and about one hundred of his men, with their horses. Lyon, being in bed at the time of his capture, asked his guard to permit him to dress himself, which was acceded to, when, watching his opportunity, he seized a pistol, shot the sentinel dead upon the spot, and escaped in the darkness. This was the only casualty during the expedition.

To Colonel Palmer and his command is accorded the credit of giving Hood's army the last blow of the campaign, at a distance of over two hundred miles from where we first struck the enemy on the 15th of December, near Nashville.

To all of my sub-commanders, Major Generals Schofield, Stanley, Rousseau, Steedman, Smith, and Wilson, and Brigadier General Wood, their officers and men, I give expression of my thanks and gratitude for their generous self-sacrifice, and manly endurance under the most trying circumstances, and in all instances. Too much praise cannot be accorded to an army which, hastily made up from the fragments of three separate commands, can successfully contend against a force numerically greater than itself and of more thoroughly solid organization, inflicting on it a most crushing defeat, almost an annihilation. Receiving instructions unexpectedly from General Sherman, in September, to repair to Tennessee and assume general control of the defences of our line of communication in the rear of the army of the Mississippi, and not anticipating a separation from my immediate command, the greater number of my staff officers were left behind at Atlanta, and did not have an opportunity to join me. After General Sherman determined on making his march through Georgia before the communications were cut, I had with me Brigadier General W. D. Whipple, my chief of staff; Surgeon George E. Cooper, medical director; Captains Henry Stone, Henry M. Cist, and Robert H. Ramsay, assistant adjutant generals; Captain H. C. Beman, acting chief commissary of subsistence; Captains John P. Willard and S. C. Kellogg, aides-de-camp; and Lieutenant M. J. Kelly, chief of couriers; all of whom rendered important service during the battles of the 15th and 16th, and during the pursuit. I cordially commend their services to favorable consideration. There were captured from the enemy during the various actions of which the foregoing report treats, thirteen thousand one hundred and eighty-nine prisoners of war, including seven (7) general officers, and nearly a thousand other officers of all grades, seventy-two pieces of serviceable artillery and — battle flags. During the same period over two thousand (2,000) deserters from the enemy were received, to whom the oath was administered. Our own loss will not exceed ten thousand (10,000) in killed, wounded, and missing.

I have the honor to transmit herewith a consolidated return of casualties, the report of Colonel J. G. Parkhurst, provost marshal general, and that of Captain A. Mordecai, chief of ordnance.

I have the honor to be, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Major General Commanding.*

Lieutenant Colonel R. M. SAWYER,

*Asst. Adjt. Genl., Mil. Div. of the Mississippi.*

*Report of prisoners of war captured by the army of the Cumberland, from September 7, 1864, to January 20, 1865.*

	Major general.	Brigadier generals.	Colonels.	Lieut. colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Non-commis'd officers.	Privates.	Surgeons and chaplains.	Grand total.
September 7 to 30, 1864.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	2	4	17	145	5	.....
October, 1864.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	12	40	151	1,135	1	.....
November, 1864.....	.....	.....	2	3	1	7	25	87	550	3	.....
December, 1864.....	1	7	14	10	18	173	487	1,512	6,336	77	.....
January 1 to 20, 1865.....	.....	.....	.....	1	2	18	15	120	842	3	.....
Total.....	1	7	16	14	22	212	601	1,887	9,008	89	11,857

*Report of rebel deserters received at Nashville, Tennessee, from September 7, 1864, to January 20, 1865.*

	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Non-commis'd officers.	Privates.	Surgeons.	Chaplains.	Grand total.
September 7 to 30, 1864.....	.....	1	6	70	.....	.....	.....
October, 1864.....	.....	.....	3	96	.....	.....	.....
November, 1864.....	.....	1	3	63	.....	.....	.....
December, 1864.....	2	6	28	281	2	1	.....
January 1 to 20, 1865.....	5	15	61	660	.....	.....	.....
Total.....	7	23	106	1,175	2	1	1,314

*Report of rebel deserters received outside of Nashville from September 7, 1864, to January 20, 1865.*

	Officers.	Privates.	Grand total.	Aggregate deserters.
September 7 to 30, 1864.....	.....	75	.....	.....
October, 1864.....	2	146	.....	.....
November, 1864.....	.....	80	.....	.....
December, 1864.....	.....	14	.....	.....
January 1 to 20, 1865.....	18	558	.....	.....
Total.....	20	873	893	2,207

*Report of ordnance and ordnance stores captured by the army of the Cumberland during the months of October, November, and December, 1864, and January, 1865.*

*Field guns.*—Guns captured in Columbia and Pulaski, Tennessee, 8; light 12-pounder guns, (rebel model,) 42; light 12-pounder guns, (U. S. model,) 7; light 12-pounder howitzers (U. S. model,) 7; 3-inch rifled guns, (rebel model,) 3; 10-pounder Parrott, calibre 29, (U. S. model,) 2; 3-inch wrought-iron rifle, (U. S. model,) 1; 6-pounder smooth-bore guns, (U. S. model,) 2; total number of guns, 72.

*Gun-carriages, caissons, limbers, &c.*—Field-carriages and limbers, (complete,) 59; field-carriages and limbers, (without wheels,) 2; field-carriages, (no limbers,) 2; field caissons and limbers, 20.

*Small-arms.*—Infantry small-arms, (no bayonets,) 3,079.

*Infantry accoutrements.*—Bayonets, 262; cartridge-boxes, 1,208; cartridge-box plates, 238; cartridge-box belts, 234; cartridge-box belt-plates, 141; waist belts, 178; waist belt-plates, 181; bayonet scabbards, 166; cap pouches, 364; gun slings, 231.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
Columbia, Tenn., December 31, 1864.

GENERAL: In accordance with the desire of the major general commanding, I have the honor to report the operations of the troops under my command from the time of the separation of the 23d army corps from the main army, under General Sherman, to the present time. On the 30th day of October, 1864, at Rome, Georgia, I received the orders of Major General Sherman, (enclosed herewith and marked A.) directing me to march with the 23d corps to Resaca, Georgia, and report by telegraph to Major General Thomas, then at Nashville, for further orders. I marched on the following day, and arrived at Resaca on the 1st of November, reporting by telegraph to Major General Thomas, from Calhoun, on the afternoon of the 31st of October. At Calhoun, on the 1st of November, I received orders from Major General Thomas, (enclosed herewith and marked B.) directing me to move *via* Tullahoma to Pulaski, Tennessee, which was subsequently changed, and I was ordered to move by way of Nashville, and to send my wagon trains forward to Chattanooga. Accordingly the troops commenced to move as soon as the first railroad train arrived, which was the 3d of November, but, owing to delays in the railroads, the last of the troops did not reach Nashville until the 9th of November. I arrived at Nashville in person on the 5th of November, and received the orders of the commanding general to go to Johnsonville instead of Pulaski, to repel an attack then being made on that place by a rebel force under Forrest. My advance (Colonel Gallup's brigade of the second division) reached Johnsonville on the night of the 5th of November, and found the enemy had already retreated. Upon reporting this fact to the commanding general, I was ordered to leave at Johnsonville such portion of my command as was necessary for a strong defence of that place, and to repair with the remainder of my troops to Pulaski, and assume command of all the troops in that vicinity. I left two brigades (General Cooper's and Colonel Gallup's) at Johnsonville, with instructions to strongly fortify the place according to plans furnished by the chief engineer of the department of the Cumberland; placed Colonel Strickland's brigade, second division, at Columbia, and the third division, (General Cox's,) about three miles north of Pulaski, the latter place being then occupied by the 4th army corps, Major General Stanley commanding. My instructions from the major general commanding were embraced in the accompanying telegram (marked C) to Major General Stanley a copy of which was furnished with

the order to assume command at Pulaski, and subsequent despatches explaining that the object was to hold the enemy in check, should he advance long enough to enable General A. J. Smith's corps, then expected from Missouri, to reach Nashville. Other troops in the department of the Cumberland to be concentrated, and General Wilson's cavalry to be remounted and fitted for the field. The re-enforcements thus expected were about equal to the force we then had in the field, and would make our entire force, when concentrated, equal or somewhat superior to that of the enemy. To effect this concentration was therefore of vital importance, a consideration to which all others were secondary. This required that the enemy's advance should be delayed as much as possible, and at the same time a decisive battle avoided, unless it could be fought on favorable terms. I reached Pulaski on the night of the 13th, and assumed command on the 14th of November.

The following is my report of the operations from November 14 to December 1, 1864, when the troops under my command reached Nashville, which is made part of this report. I assumed command at Pulaski, on the 14th of November, 1864. The forces at and near that place were the 4th army corps, Major General Stanley commanding, and General Cox's third division, 23d army corps; General Hatch's division, and General Croxton's brigade of cavalry were in front of Pulaski, along Shoal creek, and Colonel Capron's brigade was near Pulaski. My effective force was eighteen thousand infantry and four brigades of cavalry. The enemy, under General Hood, was lying about Florence, preparing for an aggressive movement; his force, consisting of the old army of northern Georgia, which had opposed General Sherman during the latter part of his operations, increased by such fragments as could be collected in Alabama and Mississippi, together with all of Forrest's cavalry. The enemy's force was variously estimated at from thirty to forty thousand infantry, and from ten to twenty thousand cavalry; the largest estimate for the infantry and the smallest for the cavalry are most probably nearly accurate.

*November 19.*—Hood commenced his advance, *via* Lawrenceburg and Waynesboro', towards Columbia. His advance reached Lawrenceburg, and drove our cavalry from that place on the 22d. I sent all the public property from Pulaski to Columbia, and fell back to Lynnville, and then to Columbia. My advance, General Cox's division, reached that place in the morning of the 24th, just in time to beat back a large rebel force which was driving in Colonel Capron's cavalry from Mount Pleasant. At Columbia I was re-enforced by one brigade and two regiments of General Ruger's division, 23d corps, the other half of that division having been sent, by order of the major general commanding, to guard Centreville and other crossings of Duck river, below Columbia. The troops were put in position, covering the pontoon bridge on the pike, at Columbia and the railroad bridge, two miles below. The position was much too extended for the troops I then had, but re-enforcements were expected daily, and it was essential to have that position, from which to take the offensive, when our force should become sufficiently large. Therefore, I determined to hold it as long as possible. I also intrenched an interior line covering the railroad bridge, and short enough to be held by the 4th corps.

On the night of the 25th, finding that the enemy had his entire army in my front, and that he might, without difficulty, effect a crossing of Duck river above Columbia, I sent General Cox, with two brigades of his division to the north bank, to check any such movement, and General Ruger's troops to the railroad bridge to construct and occupy a small bridge-head at that point, and withdrew two divisions of General Stanley's corps to the interior line. General Wood's division and a brigade of General Cox's were left on the exterior line, and our picket line was maintained in its original position. At daylight in the morning the pontoon bridge was floated down the river, and laid near the rail-

road bridge. In this way I hoped still to hold the south bank of the river until re-enforcements should arrive.

We succeeded in holding the outer line during the 26th and 27th against a heavy pressure, but the enemy did not assault, and it became evident that he intended to turn the position by crossing the river above. To hold the south bank longer would have hazarded the loss of the army. I therefore withdrew the whole force to the north bank during the night of the 27th. Left General Ruger to hold the crossing at the railroad bridge, General Cox in front of Columbia, and placed General Stanley in reserve, on the Franklin pike, ready to meet the enemy should he attempt to force a crossing at any point near Columbia. The crossings below Columbia were guarded by General Ruger's infantry, and General Wilson had all his cavalry, save one brigade, to guard the river above. The troops rested in this position during the 28th, and I had strong hopes of being able to hold the line of Duck river until re-enforcements should arrive. But I learned from General Wilson, about 2 a. m. on the 29th, that the enemy's cavalry had forced a crossing near the Lansinburg pike, and about daylight in the morning that his infantry was also crossing at Hewy's mill, five miles above Columbia, from which a road leads into the Franklin pike at Spring Hill. The enemy might endeavor to reach the latter place in advance of me, and thus cut off my retreat, or strike me in flank, near Duck river, or both. He had already forced a column of cavalry between General Wilson and me, and cut off all communication between us. I therefore sent General Stanley, with a division of infantry, to Spring Hill, to hold that point and cover the trains; General Cox was left in his position to hold the crossing at Columbia; Generals Wood and Kimball were put in line facing Hewy's mills, with a brigade thrown forward to reconnoitre, and General Ruger was ordered to move on to the pike in rear of Rutherford's creek, leaving one regiment to hold the ford near the railroad bridge, the bridges having been destroyed. General Stanley reached Spring Hill with General Wagner's division just in time to drive off a body of rebel cavalry and save our trains, which were assembling at that place. Late in the afternoon a division of rebel infantry arrived and attacked. A severe engagement ensued, lasting until dark. General Stanley held his position, except that his right was pressed back so as to nearly uncover the Columbia road, and the enemy's cavalry got possession of the pike, both north and south of Spring Hill. The enemy worked steadily and persistently all day to force a crossing and lay a pontoon bridge at Columbia. This was essential to him, since his artillery could not be crossed at Hewy's mill; but General Cox firmly held his ground, although it was in the concave bend of the river, and commanded from the opposite bank. The enemy was repeatedly repulsed with heavy loss. About 3 p. m. I became satisfied the enemy would not attack my position on Duck river, but was pushing two corps direct for Spring Hill. I then gave the necessary orders for the withdrawal of the troops after dark, and took General Ruger's troops and pushed for Spring Hill, to reopen communication with General Stanley, and was followed, at a short distance by the head of the main column. I struck the enemy's cavalry at dark, about three miles from Spring Hill, but we brushed them away without difficulty, and reached Spring Hill about seven o'clock. General Whittaker's brigade, which followed General Ruger, was put in position parallel to the pike, and confronting the enemy's left within eight hundred yards of the road, to cover the column as it passed, and I pushed on with General Ruger's division to clear the road at Thompson's station, which had been occupied by a large body of the enemy's cavalry at dark that evening. On our arrival at Thompson's the enemy had disappeared, his camp fires still burning, and General Ruger took possession of the crossroads without opposition. I then returned to Spring Hill, and met there the head of General Cox's column about midnight, he having withdrawn it from front of Columbia after dark. General Cox now took the advance, and pushed



rapidly for Franklin, the trains following under immediate guard of General Ruger, the men marching by the side of the wagons, and General Stanley marching in rear of the trains. General Wagner's division held on at Spring Hill until near daylight and then quietly withdrew, and followed the column as rear-guard. A small body of rebel cavalry made a dash upon the train a short distance north of Thompson's and succeeded in destroying a few wagons and stampeding a few cattle. With this exception, the whole column and trains arrived at Franklin without loss. I arrived at Franklin with the head of the column a little before daylight on the 30th, and found no wagon bridge for crossing the river, and the fords in very bad condition. I caused the railroad bridge to be prepared for crossing wagons, and had a foot bridge built for infantry, which, fortunately, also proved available for wagons, and used the ford as much as possible. I hoped, in spite of the difficulties, to get all my material, including the public property and a large wagon train at Franklin, across the river, and move the army over before the enemy could get up force enough to attack me; but I put the troops in position, as they arrived, on the south side, the 23d corps on the left and centre, covering the Columbia and Lewisburg pike, and General Kimball's division, of the 4th corps, on the right, both flanks resting on the river. Two brigades of General Wagner's division were left in front to retard the enemy's advance, and General Wood's division, with some artillery, was moved to the north bank of the river to cover the flanks should the enemy attempt to cross above or below. The enemy followed close after our rear-guard, brought up and deployed two full corps with astonishing celerity, and moved rapidly forward to the attack. Our outposts, imprudently brave, held their ground too long, and hence were compelled to come in at a run. In pressing over the parapet they carried with them the troops of the line for a short space, and thus permitted a few hundred of the enemy to get in; but the reserves near by instantly sprang forward, regaining the parapet and capturing those of the enemy who had passed it. The enemy assaulted persistently and continuously with his whole force from about 3.30 p. m. until after dark, and made numerous intermittent attacks at a few points until about 10 o'clock p. m. He was splendidly repulsed along the whole line of attack. The enemy attacked on a point of about two miles, extending from our left to our right centre, General Kimball's left brigade. Our two right brigades were only slightly engaged. I believe the enemy's loss in killed and wounded cannot have been less than five thousand, and may have been much greater. We captured seven hundred and two prisoners and thirty-three stand of colors. Our loss as officially reported is as follows:

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Aggregate.
First division, 4th army corps .....	5	37	18	60
Second division, 4th army corps .....	52	519	670	1,241
Artillery .....	10	51	6	67
Second division, 23d army corps .....	30	142	135	307
Third division, 23d army corps .....	48	185	97	330
Seventy-second regiment Illinois volunteers .....	10	62	86	158
Forty-fourth regiment Missouri volunteers .....	34	37	92	163
Total .....	189	1,033	1,104	2,326

I am not able at this time to give fully the names of the killed and wounded officers. Among the latter is Major General Stanley, commanding the 4th corps, who was severely wounded in the neck while gallantly urging forward his troops

to regain the portion of our line which had been lost. General Stanley is deserving of special commendation, and has my hearty thanks for his cordial support and wise counsel throughout the short but eventful campaign. Brigadier General J. D. Cox, commanding temporarily the 23d corps, deserves a very large share of credit for the brilliant victory at Franklin. The troops were placed in position and intrenched under his immediate direction, and the greater portion of the line engaged was under his command during the battle. I recommend General Cox to the special consideration of the government. Brigadier General Ruger, commanding second division, 23d corps, held the weakest portion of our line, and that upon which the enemy's assault was most persistent. He is entitled to very great credit. Brigadier General Reily, commanding temporarily the third division, 23d corps, maintained his lines with perfect firmness, and captured twenty battle-flags along his parapet. I am also under great obligations to the division commanders of the 4th army corps, Brigadier Generals Wood, Wagner, and Kimball, for the admirable manner in which they discharged every duty, and cannot refrain from expressing my high commendation, though in advance of the official report of their immediate commander. Colonel Emerson Opdyke, commanding first brigade, second division, 4th army corps, the reserve which recaptured the lost position of our line, is spoken of by Generals Stanley and Cox as having displayed, on that occasion, the highest qualities of a commander. I cordially indorse their recommendation. For other special instances of gallantry and good conduct I must refer to subordinate reports.

On my arrival at Franklin I gained the first information from General Wilson since the enemy commenced his advance from Duck river. I learned that he had been driven back, and had crossed the Harpeth above Franklin on the preceding day, leaving my left and rear entirely open to the enemy's cavalry. By my direction he sent General Hatch's division forward again on the Lewisburg pike to hold Forrest in check until my trains and troops could reach Franklin. This was successfully done, and General Hatch then retired before a superior force and recrossed the river, connecting with my infantry pickets on the north bank early in the afternoon. A short time before the infantry attack commenced the enemy's cavalry forced a crossing about three miles above Franklin and drove back our cavalry, for a time seriously threatening our trains, which were accumulating on the north bank and moving towards Nashville. I sent General Wilson orders, which he had, however, anticipated, to drive the enemy back at all hazards, and moved a brigade of General Wood's division to support him, if necessary, at the moment of the first decisive repulse of the enemy's infantry. I received the most gratifying intelligence that General Wilson had driven the rebel cavalry back across the river. This rendered my immediate left and rear secure for the time being. Previous to the battle of the 30th I had ordered all trains, except ammunition and hospital wagons, to Nashville, preparatory to falling back from Franklin when it should become necessary, which I expected on the following day. The enemy having nearly double my force of infantry, and quite double my cavalry, could easily turn any position I might take and seriously endanger my rear. Only one division of the enemy's cavalry having been engaged with General Wilson during the 30th, the remaining three divisions were free to strike my line of communications, which they could easily do about Bentwood by daylight the next morning. My experience on the 29th had shown how entirely inferior in force my cavalry was to that of the enemy, and that even my immediate flank and rear were insecure, while my communication with Nashville was entirely without protection. I could not even rely upon getting up the ammunition necessary for another battle. To remain longer at Franklin was to seriously hazard the loss of my army by giving the enemy another chance to cut me off from re-enforcements, which he had made three desperate, though futile, attempts to accomplish. I had detained the enemy long enough to enable you to concentrate your scattered troops at Nashville, and had succeeded in inflicting upon him very heavy losses, which was the primary

object. I had found it impossible to detain him long enough to get re-enforcements at Franklin. Only a small portion of the infantry and none of the cavalry could reach me in time to be of any use in the battle which must have been fought on the 1st of December, for these reasons: After consulting with the corps and division commanders, and obtaining your approval, I determined to retire the night of the 30th towards Nashville. The artillery was withdrawn to the north bank during the early part of the night, and at 12 o'clock the army withdrew from its trenches and crossed the river without loss. During the next day, December 1, the whole army was placed in position in front of Nashville. Information obtained since the above was written, and principally since the reoccupation of Franklin by our troops, makes the enemy's loss 1,750 buried upon the field, 3,800 disabled and placed in hospitals, and 702 prisoners—making 6,252 of the enemy placed *hors de combat*, besides the slightly wounded. The enemy's loss in general officers was very great, being six killed, six wounded, and one captured.

It is to be observed that more than half of our loss occurred in General Wagner's division of the 4th corps, which did not form part of the main line of defence. This loss arose in two brigades of that division from their remaining in front of the line after their proper duty as outposts had been accomplished, and after they should have taken their positions in reserve, and in the other brigade (Colonel Opdyke's) in its hand-to-hand encounter with the enemy over the portion of the parapet which had been temporarily lost by the precipitate retreat of the other two brigades. When it became apparent that we should have to fall back from Columbia, orders to rejoin the army were sent to General Cooper, commanding the troops guarding the crossings of Duck river below Columbia, at Centreville, both by myself and the major general commanding, which were obeyed as soon as received, and General Cooper marched for Franklin. Owing to delays in receiving his orders, and the time necessary to concentrate his troops, General Cooper could not reach Franklin before its occupation by the enemy, and turned his column direct for Nashville. Arrived at the Brentwood hill, by the Charlotte pike, on the night of December 2d, and again found the enemy between him and the army. He then marched to Clarksville, where he arrived in safety on the 5th, and rejoined my command on the 8th of December. General Cooper deserves great credit for the skill and judgment displayed in conducting his retreat.

#### BATTLE OF THE 15TH AND 16TH OF DECEMBER, IN FRONT OF NASHVILLE.

My command consisted of the second and third divisions of the 23d army corps, commanded respectively by Major General D. N. Couch and Brigadier General J. D. Cox. The effective strength of each division was 5,500 men. Previous to the battle the corps occupied the line of defence from Blockhouse casino to the Nolensville pike, including Fort Negley. According to the plan of battle as modified on the evening of the 14th, my troops were to be relieved by Major General Steedman's at dawn of day in the morning, pass in rear of General Wood's corps, and take position in reserve, the right to support the attack on the enemy's left. The movement commenced at daylight as ordered. General Couch's division debouched from our works on the Harding pike, and formed in rear of General Smith's left, and General Cox's, save one brigade, by the Hillsboro' pike, in rear of General Wood's right; General Cox's third brigade was left temporarily in his old works to support, if necessary, General Steedman, who was making a demonstration upon the enemy's right. As General Smith advanced against the enemy's position, General Couch moved forward, keeping within supporting distance, while the proper position of General Cox as reserve to the centre remained essentially unchanged. About 1 o'clock p. m. the major general commanding, remarking that General Smith had borne more to the left than had been expected, and had not reached the enemy's flank, ordered me to

move my corps to the right of General Smith, attack the enemy's flank, and gain, if practicable, before dark possession of a group of fortified hills near the Hillsboro' pike, which formed the left of the enemy's position. I at once put my troops in motion, moving rapidly by the flank in rear of General Smith's line, rode forward and found General Smith near the right of his line, and informed him of the movement I was making. General Smith then put in his reserve, extending his line about half a mile to the right, and assisted General Hatch's cavalry (dismounted) in assaulting and carrying a high hill, covered by a redoubt which proved to be a detached work, commanding the Hillsboro' pike, and constituting the extreme flank of the enemy's infantry position, but not connected with his main line of defence. General Couch, whose head of column had by this time arrived opposite the right of General Smith's line, at once moved forward, deploying as he advanced, passed immediately by the right of the hill just carried, and across the Hillsboro' pike, crossed an open valley, about half a mile in breadth, and swept by the enemy's artillery, and carried the left of a series of hills parallel to and overlooking the Granny White pike, one of the enemy's only two lines of retreat. This assault was made by General Cooper's brigade, led by its brave commander, and was most gallantly executed. The enemy now moved a considerable force towards our right with the evident design of turning our flank, and recovering the position just lost. General Couch sent Colonel Mehringer's brigade, the only one he had disengaged, to meet this movement. Colonel Mehringer met the enemy, much superior to him in numbers, in the valley which General Couch had just passed, and held him in check until General Cox, who had just come up, sent two brigades, Colonel Doolittle's and Colonel Casement's, to his support, when the enemy was repulsed and driven back. The engagement here was sharp, attended with considerable loss on both sides, and lasted until dark. Immediately south of the hill carried by General Couch was a still higher one, held by the enemy, without the possession of which his position north of Brentwood was untenable. I had ordered this hill to be carried, immediately after the success of General Cooper's assault, but the counter attack by the enemy occupied our whole available force until dark, and compelled us to rest with the success already gained. After dark the troops intrenched their position and bivouacked for the night.

#### BATTLE OF THE 16TH.

In the night of the 15th I waited upon the major general commanding at his headquarters, and received his orders for the pursuit of the enemy on the following day. Our operations during the 15th had swung the right and right centre forward so that the general direction of the line was nearly perpendicular to that before the attack, only the right was in contact with the enemy, and was therefore much exposed. Apprehensive that the enemy, instead of retreating during the night, would mass and attack our right in the morning, I requested that a division of infantry be sent to re-enforce the right, which was ordered accordingly from Major General Smith's command. In response to this order General Smith sent five regiments and a battery, (about 1,600 men,) which were put in reserve near the right. In the morning it was found that the enemy still held his position in our front, of which the hill in front of General Couch was the key, and had thrown up considerable breastworks during the night. He had also increased the force on his left during the night, and continued to mass troops during the early part of the day. During the morning, therefore, our operations were limited to preparations for defence and co-operation with the cavalry which was operating to strike the Granny White pike in rear of the enemy. About noon the troops on my left (Generals Smith and Wood) having advanced and come in contact with the enemy in his new position, the enemy again withdrew from his left a considerable force to strengthen his right and centre, when I ordered General Cox to advance, in conjunction with the cavalry, and endeavor to carry a high

wooded hill beyond the flank of the enemy's intrenched line and overlooking the Granny White pike. The hill was occupied by the enemy in considerable force, but was not intrenched. My order was not executed with the promptness or energy which I had expected, yet probably with as much as I had reason to expect, considering the attenuated character of General Cox's line, and the great distance and rough ground over which the attacking force had to move. The hill was, however, carried by General Wilson's cavalry, (dismounted,) whose gallantry and energy on that and other occasions which came under my observations cannot be too greatly praised. Almost simultaneously with this attack on the extreme right the salient hill, in front of General Couch, was attacked and carried by General Smith's troops, supported by a brigade of General Couch's division, and the fortified hill in front of General Cox, which constituted the extreme flank of the enemy's intrenched line, was attacked and carried by Colonel Doolittle's brigade of General Cox's division, the latter capturing eight pieces of artillery, and two to three hundred prisoners. These several successes, gained almost simultaneously, resulted in a complete rout of the enemy. The cavalry had cut off his line of retreat by the Granny White pike, and such of his as were not captured on the line could only escape by climbing the Brentwood hills. It is believed all of the artillery along the left and centre of the enemy's line fell into our hands. Our troops continued the pursuit across the valley and into the Brentwood hills, when darkness compelled them to desist, and they bivouacked for the night. During the operations of the 15th and 16th our troops behaved with their accustomed gallantry, and even more than their ordinary enthusiasm, attacking almost inaccessible heights crowned by breastworks, and covered by numerous artillery, with a confidence which presented a most striking contrast to the feeble and spiritless resistance offered by the already demoralized enemy. The losses of the 23d corps, during the 15th and 16th, amounted to only nine killed, one hundred and fifty-four wounded, and none missing. The division and brigade commanders displayed their usual high qualities of gallantry and skill. Brigadier General J. A. Cooper, commanding first brigade second division, is specially worthy of mention for gallantry in leading the assault on the 15th. The officers of my staff were then, as always, active and efficient, discharging every duty with honor and credit. The commanding general's orders for the pursuit of the enemy placed my corps in rear of the entire army, and the main portion of its trains. I was therefore able to do no more than follow slowly in rear from the 17th until the 26th, when I was ordered to halt at Columbia, my troops not being needed in advance.

On the 30th I received the order of the commanding general announcing that the rebel army had been driven entirely across the Tennessee river, and ordering the pursuit to cease. I enclose herewith report of Brigadier General J. D. Cox, commanding (temporarily) 23d army corps, of the operations during the retreat from Pulaski, including the battle of Franklin, and the reports of his subordinate commanders; also, the reports of Generals Couch and Cox, of the operations of their divisions during the battles of December 15th and 16th, including lists of killed and wounded. No report has yet been received from Major General Stanley, (he being absent, wounded,) of the operations of the 4th corps while the troops in the field were under my command. The numbers of killed, wounded, and missing, furnished by the division commanders, are embraced in my report of the battle of Franklin.

I also append, hereto, copies of orders and correspondence relative to operations of the troops under my command, which are made part of this report.

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. M. SCHOFIELD,

*Major General.*

Brigadier General W. M. D. WHIPPLE,

*Chief of Staff, Department of the Cumberland.*

*Report of the services of the 4th army corps from the time of separating from General Sherman's army at Gaylesville, Alabama, to and including the battle of Franklin, Tennessee.*

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS,  
*Huntsville, Ala., February 25, 1865.*

About the 1st of October it was first known that the rebel army, under Hood, had crossed the Chattahoochee, and was moving north upon the railroad to Chattanooga.

On the 3d the 4th corps moved in pursuit of the rebel army, being the leading corps of our army. The route in following Hood took us first to Marietta, thence *via* Pine Top and Lost mountain to Alatoona and Kingston, from Kingston to Rome, when, finding that Hood had struck the railroad north of Resaca, the corps marched to Resaca, and the 14th corps crossed Rocky Face mountain just north of Snake Creek gap, compelling the enemy to relinquish his hold on that pass. Our course following in pursuit of the enemy led us through Ship's gap and down the Chatooga valley to Gaylesville, Alabama. The marching was severe, but in the entire campaign, though the enemy could be seen on two occasions from the mountains, I do not know that a gun in the corps was fired at the enemy. We were lying quietly in the valley of the Chattanooga gathering our subsistence and forage from the country, when, upon the 26th of October, a reconnoissance of the army of the Tennessee, down the Coosa, confirmed the reports we had received that Hood's entire army had moved off towards the Tennessee river. On the same day I received Special Field Orders No. 104, directing me to move the entire corps, sick included, *via* Alpine and Winston's gaps, to Chattanooga or Bridgeport, as circumstances might require. It was thought I would receive instructions on the way from General Thomas. The second division, commanded by Brigadier General G. D. Wagner, which had been detached and at Chattanooga, joined at Alpine.

On the 28th the corps reached Lafayette, General Grose's brigade, of the second division, only taking the route *via* Winston's, on account of the very difficult mountain road.

In the morning of the 29th I received a despatch, *via* Valley Head, from Major General Thomas, in Nashville, directing me to march to Stevenson. Orders were sent to General Grose to cross Sand mountain to Bridgeport, and the main body of the corps, the same evening, reached the vicinity of Chattanooga. A despatch from General Thomas was received in the evening, directing the corps to move along the railroad, to be picked up by cars as they could be, and to move to Huntsville or Athens as early as possible. Upon consultation with Mr. Tindall, the railroad superintendent at Chattanooga, it was found that, owing to the superior facilities for loading troops at Chattanooga, the corps could be sooner embarked at that point. General Wood's division (the third) were all started before noon; no artillery or transportation was taken; officers' horses only were transported. A despatch was received from Major General Thomas, directing me to march to Pulaski upon arrival at Athens, unless it was ascertained that the enemy had not yet crossed the Tennessee river. I followed the third division myself, and arrived at Athens about 9 o'clock the morning of 31st. Here we first knew, definitely, that the enemy had crossed at Florence, by a copy of a despatch from General Croxton, forwarded me by General Granger. A despatch was also received from General Thomas, at 12 m., directing that the leading division march at once to Pulaski and prepare to defend that place; the rest of the corps to close up as rapidly as possible, the artillery to come by railroad, the supply train to march by Deckerd and Fayetteville. About 2 o'clock p. m. I left Athens with the third division for Pulaski. Just as I was leaving I received a despatch from Brigadier General R. S. Granger, saying the

enemy was in large force at Brown's ferry, and he anticipated they would try to force a crossing. As I was leaving Athens, and could not give assistance, I advised him that if the enemy did cross an infantry force at Brown's ferry, Athens should be evacuated, as the Garrison would be liable to capture. Athens was evacuated upon false rumors. At 4 o'clock p. m. the same afternoon, by General R. S. Granger's order, a very considerable amount of public property was destroyed, although no enemy had shown themselves between Elk river and the Tennessee. The troops were put in motion at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 1st of November; they forded Elk river and breakfasted at Elkton, and reached Pulaski at 4 o'clock in the evening. I found General Hatch, with his division of cavalry, at Pulaski, and by General Thomas's order directed him to await further orders, instead of pushing on to overtake General Sherman, as first ordered.

On the 2d I learned that Hood's army was in force in Florence, and intrenching; I also learned definitely that a pontoon bridge was laid at Florence. The same day Wood's division commenced intrenching our position at Pulaski. By the 4th all the infantry of the corps, excepting Kirby's brigade of the first division, with the trains, had joined at Pulaski. On the same day General Hatch's command was sent to connect with General Croxton's right, at Bough's factory, to watch the enemy and to keep him at Florence as long as possible. The defences of Pulaski were put under the direction of Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood, and were rapidly pushed forward to completion, forming a formidable line of intrenchments around the village of Pulaski. General Hatch, in command of the cavalry observing Hood's army at Florence, disposed his force so judiciously that not a movement of any consequence could be made by the enemy, in any direction, that we were not immediately apprised of it, and it is very much to the credit of this excellent cavalry officer that, for nearly one month, he maintained a line of pickets and outposts fifty miles in extent, and very nearly surrounding the rebel force of infantry, and the latter part of the time cavalry, and gave timely notice of their first advance northward, and this without any serious loss in his command.

On the 14th Major General Schofield arrived and assumed command by direction of Major General Thomas.

On the 21st it became positively known, from a despatch intercepted by General Hatch's pickets, and from other sources, that the enemy were moving north, and in the direction of Columbia. The roads, however, of the pickets were very bad, it having rained very heavily for some days, and then frozen; but not hard enough to bear wagons. It was believed the enemy could make but little speed, and the evacuation of Pulaski was made the afternoon of the 23d. The corps marched to Lynnvile that night, to which place the second division, General Wagner's, had moved the day before. During the night it was learned that the enemy had made good use of his time, notwithstanding the bad roads, and Colonel Capron's brigade had been driven out of Mount Pleasant, it was believed, by an infantry force. This information was received about 1 o'clock at night, and the troops were immediately waked up and put in motion for Columbia, twenty-one miles distant. General Cox's division, of the 23d corps, was ten miles nearer Columbia, and marched at the same hour as ourselves. He arrived in time to save Capron's brigade of cavalry from annihilation, and perhaps the town of Columbia from capture. Turning west at a point, three (3) miles south of Columbia, on the Pulaski pike, General Cox, by a cross-road, reached the Mount Pleasant pike, and immediately attacking the advancing rebels, drove them back. As fast as the divisions of the 4th corps arrived they were placed in line of battle, and immediately intrenched themselves. The first division, Brigadier General Whittaker, did not get quite into position until nearly night. The enemy's cavalry made some demonstrations on our left flank during the march,

but were easily driven off by a regiment of infantry, commanded by Colonel Knefler.

During the 24th and 25th a very strong and complete set of earthworks were constructed, but the line being very long, and leaving no disposable troops after properly occupying it, two divisions of the corps were withdrawn from it, on the night of the 25th, to occupy a short and interior line, leaving General Wood's division to hold the front line formerly held by the entire corps; Cox's division of the 23d corps at the same time crossed to the north side of Duck river, and General Ruger commenced the construction of a bridge-head. The enemy undoubtedly deployed their whole force upon our front, and they made several attacks upon our pickets, but it became evident, very soon, that Hood was moving to the east, and most likely with a view of crossing Duck river above us. The intention of the enemy became so apparent that it was determined to cross the entire of our force to the north bank of Duck river. The night of the 26th orders were given accordingly, but the night was so dark, and the rain poured down so, that no progress could be made crossing the artillery, and at midnight the movement was given up and the artillery replaced in position.

During the night of the 27th the withdrawal to the north side of the river was made very successfully, the pickets leaving the outside line and following back to the first line of works at 7 o'clock, and remaining one hour, when they fell back to the interior line, abandoned by the troops holding that line, until near daylight. The fort and magazine were fired, but the destruction was not very complete.

The morning of the 28th we occupied the high ground immediately north of Duck river, from below the railroad bridge to about a mile above Columbia; the railroad and pontoon bridges had been destroyed, and the enemy could be seen in full view across the river. The troops were employed on the 28th in strengthening their position on the north bank of Duck river. One brigade (Whittaker's) was sent back to Rutherford's creek to protect all trains of the army parked near the crossing, on the Franklin pike. About 3 p. m. it was learned that Forrest's cavalry had driven Colonel Capron's brigade of cavalry to the north bank of Duck river eleven miles above, and that the rebel cavalry had effected a crossing to the same side. Later in the evening the pickets of Wood's division reported the enemy crossing cavalry at Hughes's mills, five miles above Columbia. A reconnoissance, sent after dark, failed to find the enemy, but early on the morning of the 29th General Wilson sent word that the enemy had laid a pontoon bridge at Hughes's mills.

At 8 o'clock a. m. on the 29th I started to Spring Hill with the first and second divisions, all the artillery that could be spared, and all trains and ambulances to follow. The same time Colonel Post's brigade, of Wood's division, was sent up the river, and soon sent back word that the enemy was crossing infantry and wagons, and moving off rapidly to the north and parallel to the turnpike. It being apprehended that the enemy might make a flank attack upon the position of our troops between Duck river and Rutherford creek, the first division, General Kimball commanding, was halted and took up position to cover the crossing of the creek. At half past 11 o'clock the head of the second division was within two miles of Spring Hill. A cavalry soldier, who seemed to be badly scared, was met here, who stated that a scout had come in from the direction of Raleigh Hill and reported that Buford's division of rebel cavalry was half-way between Raleigh Hill and Spring Hill, and on the march for the latter place. The second division was pushed on, and attracted by the firing east of the village, double-quickened into the place, and deploying the leading brigade as they advanced, drove off a force of the enemy's cavalry, which was driving our small force of cavalry and infantry and would have soon occupied the town. General Wagner was ordered to deploy his division at once; Opdyke's and Lane's brigades to cover as much space about the village as would serve to park



the trains; General Bradley's brigade was sent to occupy a wooded knoll about three-quarters of a mile east of the pike, and which commanded the approaches from that direction. Up to this time it was thought we had only cavalry to contend with, but a general officer and his staff was seen reconnoitring our position, at whom we sent some complimentary shells, and very soon afterwards General Bradley was assailed by a force, which the men said fought too well to be any dismounted cavalry. I received General Schofield's despatch about the same time, telling me that the rebels had been crossing the river, and leaving no doubt but that we now confronted a superior force of rebel infantry. About the same time an attack was made upon a small wagon train, composed of some pressed wagons, which had passed on, by rebel cavalry at Reynold's station, three miles towards Franklin, and simultaneously the rebel cavalry appeared west of us, and threatened the railroad station of Spring Hill. Thus we were threatened and attacked from every direction, and it was impossible to send any re-enforcements to Bradley's brigade, which had become quite severely engaged, lest, in so doing, we should expose the train and artillery park to destruction. The enemy made two assaults on Bradley's position, and were severely handled and repulsed, but finding his flank the third time, they overlapped him on his right, and the general at the time receiving a severe wound while encouraging his men, his brigade was driven back to the outskirts of the village, where we rallied them and again formed them in line. The enemy attempted to follow up his advantage, but coming across the cornfield towards the village they fell under the fire of at least eight (8) pieces of artillery, at good range for spherical case shot, and received a fire in the flank from a section of a battery which had been placed on the pike south of the village. A part of the rebel force making the charge fled to their rear, and a portion ran down into a ravine between their own and our lines and concealed themselves in the bed of the small stream, neither able to crawl forward nor go back until nightfall. This was the condition of affairs when night fell. General Bradley's brigade had lost about one hundred and fifty men in killed, wounded, and missing. We now know that the enemy lost, according to the statement of one of their surgeons who was on the field, five hundred men. Our greatest loss was in the disabling of so intrepid an officer as General Bradley. As night closed we could see the enemy rapidly extending his lines, and by 8 o'clock it was evident that at least a corps of Hood's army was formed in line of battle facing the turnpike, and at a near distance of but little more than half a mile from it. General Schofield arrived from Columbia at 7 o'clock in the evening with Ruger's division; he found the enemy on the pike, and had quite a skirmish in driving them off. My pickets had reported seeing rebel columns passing east of our position as if to get possession of the hills at Thompson's station, and the anxious question arose whether we could force our way through to Franklin. It was determined to attempt this, and General Schofield pushed on with Ruger's division to ascertain the condition of affairs. He found that the enemy did not attempt to hold the road. It was now 11 o'clock at night, and Cox's division had just arrived from in front of Columbia. The division pushed on at once for Franklin. From a rebel officer, captain and adjutant general of Cleburn's division, we learned that it was his division of the rebel army we had been fighting. Wood's division of the 4th corps arrived just after Cox. The enemy's skirmishers fired into the column frequently, and stampeded a new regiment which had just joined the day before, but instructions were sent to push on and not get into a fight if the enemy kept off the road, and in half an hour after General Wood's division arrived. I had the satisfaction of meeting the head of General Kimball's column, which got through with some skirmishing. So close was the enemy on our flank, that when a column was not passing it was difficult for a staff officer or an orderly to get through on the road. General Cox's division was out of the way, and the train commenced to pull out at 1 o'clock the morning of the 30th. The number of wagons, including

artillery and ambulances, was about eight hundred. At the very starting point they had to pass singly over a bridge, and it was exceedingly doubtful whether the train could be put on the road by daylight. Unless this could be done, and the corps put in motion, we were sure of being attacked, and of being compelled to fight under every disadvantage. I was strongly advised to burn the train, and move in with the troops and such wagons as could be saved, but I determined to make an effort to save the train. My staff officers were busily engaged in hurrying up the teamsters, and everything promised well, when we were again thrown into despair by the report that the train was attacked north of Thompson's station, and that the whole train had stopped. It was now 3 o'clock in the morning. General Kimball was directed to push on with the first division and clear the road; General Wood's division, which had deployed in the night north of Spring Hill, and, facing the east, had covered the road, was directed to move on, keeping off the road and on the right flank of the train; and General Wagner's division, although wearied by the fighting of the day before, was detailed to bring up the rear. Before Kimball's division could reach the point at which the train was attacked, Major Steele, of my staff, had gotten up a squad of our stragglers and driven off the rebels making the attack; they had succeeded in burning about ten wagons. The train moved on again, and about 5 o'clock I had the satisfaction of seeing the last wagon pass the small bridge. The entire corps was on the road before daylight. The rebel cavalry was in possession of all the hills to our right and made numerous demonstrations on our flank, but were easily driven off by General Wood's skirmishers, and when, finally, a section of Canby's battery unlimbered and threw a few shells into them, the rebel cavalymen disappeared and troubled us no more. Colonel Opdyke's brigade formed the rear-guard and rendered excellent service, skirmishing all the way with the rebel force following us, and forcing our stragglers and lame men (of whom there were many) to make a final effort to reach Franklin. General Kimball's division reached Franklin soon after 9 o'clock, and took up position on the left of the 23d corps, the right flank of the division resting on the Harpeth, below Franklin. The line selected by General Schofield was about a mile and a half in length, and enclosed Franklin, resting the flanks upon the river, above and below the town. The trains were all crossed over to the north side of the Harpeth. Wood's division was also crossed and posted to watch the fords below the place. Colonel Opdyke reached the heights, two miles south of Franklin, at 12 m. He was directed to halt on the hills to observe the enemy; Croxton's brigade of cavalry was steadily pushed back by the enemy's infantry column on the Lewisburg pike, and at 1 o'clock General Wagner reported heavy columns of infantry approaching on the Columbia and Lewisburg pikes. General Wagner was instructed to fall back before the advance of the enemy, observing them. About the same time word was received that the rebels were trying to force a crossing at Hughes's ford, two miles above Franklin. From 1 o'clock until 4 in the evening the enemy's entire force was in sight, and forming for attack; yet, in view of the strong position we held, and reasoning from the former course of the rebels during this campaign, nothing appeared so improbable as that they would assault. I felt so confident in this belief that I did not leave General Schofield's headquarters until the firing commenced. About 4 o'clock the enemy advanced with his whole force, at least two corps, making a bold and persistent assault, which upon part of the line lasted forty minutes. When Wagner's division fell back from the heights south of Franklin, Opdyke's brigade was placed in reserve in rear of our main line on the Columbia pike; Lane's, and Comrad's brigades were deployed, the former on the right, the other on the left of the pike, and about three hundred yards in advance of the main line. Here the men, as our men always do, threw up a barricade of rails. By whose mistake I cannot tell—it certainly was never a part of my instructions; but these brigades had orders from General

Wagner not to retire to the main line until forced to do so by the fighting of the enemy. The consequence was that the brigades stood their ground until the charging rebels were almost crossing bayonets with them, but the line then broke, Conrad's brigade first, then Lane's, and men and officers made the quickest time they could to our main line. The old soldiers all escaped, but the conscripts being afraid to move under fire, many of them were captured. Conrad's brigade entered the main line near the Columbia pike; Colonel Lane's several hundred yards to the right of the pike. A large porportion of Lane's men came back with loaded muskets, and turning at the breastworks they fired a volley into the pressing rebels, now not ten steps from them. The part of the 23d corps stationed in the works for a distance of about three hundred or four hundred yards to the right of the Columbia pike, which space took in the first Kentucky and sixth Ohio batteries, broke and ran to the rear with the fugitives from Conrad's brigade. To add to the disorder the caissons of the two batteries galloped rapidly to the rear, and the enemy appeared on the breastworks and in possession of the two batteries, which they commenced to turn upon us. It was at that moment I arrived at the scene of disorder, coming from the town on the Columbia pike. The moment was critical beyond any I have known in any battle. Could the enemy hold that part of the line, he was nearer our two bridges than the extremities of our line. Colonel Opdyke's brigade was lying down about one hundred yards in the rear of the works. I rode quickly to the left regiment and called to them to charge, at the same time I saw Colonel Opdyke near the centre of his line urging his men forward. I gave the colonel no order, as I saw him engaged in doing the very thing to save us, namely, to get possession of our line again. The retreating men of Colonel Conrad's brigade, and, I believe the men of the 23d corps, seeing the line of Opdyke's brigade start for the works, commenced to rally. I heard the old soldiers call out "Come on, men, we can go wherever the general can;" and making a rush, our men immediately retook all the line excepting a small portion just in front of the brick house on the pike. A force of the rebels held out at this point, and for fifteen or twenty minutes, supported by a rebel line fifty yards to the rear, poured in a severe fire upon our men. So deadly was the fire that it was only by the most strenuous exertions of the officers that our men could be kept up to the line; our exertions, however, succeeded, and in twenty minutes our front was comparatively free of rebels, who fell back to the position formerly held by the two brigades of the second division in the commencement of the fight, from whence they kept up a fire until midnight, when we withdrew. Just after the retaking of the line by our troops, as I was passing towards the left to General Cox's position, my horse was killed, and no sooner had I regained my feet than I received a musket ball through the back of the neck. My wound did not prevent my keeping the field, and General Cox kindly furnished me a remount. The rapidity of the firing made it very difficult to keep up the ammunition. The train being some two miles distant, on the road to Nashville, when the battle commenced, our greatest danger at one period of the battle was that we would exhaust our ammunition. One hundred wagon loads of ammunition, artillery and musket cartridges, were expended in this short battle, belonging to the advance train of the 4th corps. This train, however, supplied in great part the wants of the 23d corps. After the first great attack and repulse, the enemy made several feeble demonstrations, and, until 9 o'clock in the evening, formed and advanced upon the Columbia pike three or four times. I think these movements were made to keep us from moving, or to ascertain the very moment we left. At the commencement of the engagements word came that the enemy's cavalry had forced a crossing at Hughes's fords, and calling upon me for support for our cavalry. General Wood was directed to send a brigade, and General Beatty's brigade had started, when information came that the re-enforcements would not be needed.

General Kimball's division, holding the extreme right of the line, had comparatively an easy thing in this fight, being well posted behind breastworks; their volleys soon cleared their front of rebels. One brigade, Colonel Kirby's, only had the opportunity to fire one volley—and this was a very effective one—at a rebel brigade, which endeavored to move obliquely across our front to gain the right bank of the river. It having been determined to withdraw the troops to Nashville, they were directed to leave the line at midnight, the flanks withdrawing first and simultaneously, the pickets to be withdrawn when all the troops had crossed. Some villain came very near frustrating this plan by firing a house in Franklin; the flames soon spread, and the prospect was that a large fire would occur, which lighting up objects would make it impossible to move the troops without being seen. My staff officers and General Wood found an old fire-engine, and getting it at work the flames were soon subdued, and the darkness was found to be increased by the smoke. At midnight the withdrawal was made successfully, although the enemy discovered it, and followed our pickets up closely. General Wood's division remained on the north side of the Harpeth until 4 o'clock in the morning, as rear-guard, destroying the bridges before he left. The enemy indulged in a furious shelling as soon as they found we had left. In the fight of the day before their artillery had not come up, and but two batteries were used upon us. These two batteries threw shells into the town during the entire fight. The march was continued to Nashville without interruption. The troops made a short halt at Brentwood to get breakfast, and to allow the train to move on. Our men were more exhausted, physically, than I have seen them on any other occasion.

From November the 23d, when we left Pulaski, until arriving at Nashville, we have been constantly in the immediate presence of the enemy. We knew him to be vastly superior to us in numbers, closely watching to attack us at disadvantage. With us both mind and body were kept at full stretch, and it was only by night marching and the constant use of intrenchments that we could hope to save ourselves. Many of our men were overtaxed and broke down; unable to travel any longer, they fell into the hands of the enemy. On two occasions the enemy was very near obtaining the advantages he sought of us. The first was when Cox drove back his advance just about entering Columbia; the second and greatest escape for us was at Spring Hill, where, with a whole corps in line of battle, the left of the enemy was within six hundred yards of the road. They allowed all our army, excepting Wagner's division, which fought them during the day, to pass them with impunity in the night. Upon arriving at Nashville I turned the command of the 4th corps over to Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood, and took advantage of a leave of absence on account of my wounds.

Before closing this report I must mention the distinguished and faithful service rendered by some of the officers of my command. To Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood I am under more than ordinary obligations for advice, and for his success in selecting every position which was occupied from Pulaski to Franklin. To General Kimball, who commanded the first division up to Columbia, to General Kimball who succeeded him, and to General Wagner, commanding the second division, I am under many obligations for their zeal in carrying out my plans and orders. To the members of my staff much is due for the cheerful and thorough manner in which they discharged their constant and severe duties during the campaign. Colonel J. S. Fullerton, assistant adjutant general and chief of staff, Colonel W. H. Greenwood, inspector of the corps, Major W. H. St. Clair, assistant adjutant general, Major J. W. Steele, aide-de-camp, Captain S. J. Firestone, acting aide-de-camp, Captain L. L. Taylor, aide-de-camp: all were most zealous in the discharge of their duties. Colonel Greenwood's duties were particularly important, and thoroughly attended to. To Captain Lyman Bridges, chief of artillery, Colonel Hayes, chief quartermaster, Surgeon J. T. Heard, medical di-

rector, Captain Hodgden, chief commissary, and to Captain Tousley, chief of ambulance corps, and Lieutenant Laubach, quartermaster at corps headquarters, I am much indebted for the efficient manner in which they discharged their respective duties.

Before closing this report I will mention the names of Colonel Opdyke, one hundred and twenty-fifth Ohio volunteer infantry, Colonel Conrad, fifteenth Missouri veteran volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur McArthur, twenty-fourth Wisconsin volunteers, Captain Morgan, assistant adjutant general, and Captain Tinney, of General Wagner's staff, as some of the officers whom I knew, and whom I saw behave most gallantly at the battle of Franklin. Colonel Opdyke's gallant services on that occasion I have before noticed in a communication to department headquarters. Although Brigadier General J. D. Cox was not in my command, he was my close neighbor in the battle of Franklin, and I take this opportunity to express to him my thanks for his gallant help at that time. A list of casualties has already been furnished. A recommendation for promotions will be forwarded.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. S. STANLEY,

*Major General.*

Brigadier General W. D. WHIPPLE,

*Chief of Staff, Army of the Cumberland.*

#### HEADQUARTERS 4TH ARMY CORPS,

*Huntsville, Alabama, January 10, 1865.*

GENERAL: In pursuance of orders received from the headquarters department of the Cumberland, to report the operations of the corps from the time it was detached from the main army of the military division of the Mississippi, in the latter part of October, to its arrival at Nashville on the 1st December ultimo, I have the honor to submit the following:

During the evening of the 26th of October ultimo, in the vicinity of Gaylesville, Alabama, an order was received from Major General W. T. Sherman, commanding the grand military division of the Mississippi, directing that the 4th corps should proceed to Chattanooga, and stating that the commanding officer of the corps would there receive instructions from Major General Thomas, commanding department of the Cumberland, regulating its future movements. By rapid marches, though a portion of the road was exceedingly heavy from the recent rains, the corps reached Rossville, four miles from Chattanooga, during the afternoon of the 29th. Here it encamped for the night.

During the night of the 29th an order was received by telegraph directing the corps to proceed by railway to Athens, Alabama.

Early on the morning of the 30th the corps moved into Chattanooga to take the cars. So soon as the trains could be got ready the third division was embarked, and before noon all the sections transporting the division moved out of Chattanooga and proceeded to Athens, where it arrived on the morning of the 31st.

The first division embarked the morning of the 1st November, and the second division as soon as the transportation could be obtained for it. The instructions from the commanding general were to concentrate the corps at Athens, with an intimation that it would have to march thence to Pulaski, but not to proceed to the latter place without a special order to that effect, unless it should be learned satisfactorily that the enemy had crossed the river, and was moving on that place. The artillery and transportation of the corps were ordered to follow by the way of Stevenson, Winchester, &c., and a brigade of the first division was left as an escort to convoy them.

At mid-day on the 31st of October, at Athens, instructions were received from the commanding general to move to Pulaski immediately. The third division being the only portion of the corps which had arrived at Athens, marched that afternoon ten miles, and the following day, November 1, after a march of twenty-four miles, involving the passage of Elk river, reached Pulaski.

On the following morning preparations were commenced for putting the town in defensible condition. General Hatch's cavalry, which had arrived there the preceding day, was despatched to the Tennessee river, in the neighborhood of Florence, to co-operate with General Croxton's command, already in that region, in gaining intelligence of the movements of the enemy, and to retard his march should he cross the Tennessee river and attempt to move northward. By Saturday, the 5th of November, the three divisions of the corps, less the brigade escorting the artillery and trains, were concentrated at Pulaski. On the following morning an elaborate system of field-works was laid out, a certain portion assigned to each division, and ground was immediately broken in their construction. The labor was vigorously continued, notwithstanding the inclemency of the weather, until the works were completed, and when completed the works were impregnable. The 4th corps could have easily held them against the entire rebel army commanded by General Hood.

The trains and artillery of the corps reached Pulaski on Saturday, the 12th.

On the following day the several batteries were assigned their position in the various works. The information received from the cavalry corroborated the information, which had been previously obtained, that the enemy was in force on the Tennessee river, and was preparing to advance. The vital questions were, what route would he take and where would the blow fall?

On the 13th November, Major General Schofield arrived at Pulaski, and on the 14th assumed command of all the forces. He brought with him a portion of the 23d corps.

The information received from the 14th to 22d stated that the enemy had not only crossed the river in heavy force, but was moving northward.

On the 22d it was satisfactorily settled that he was moving northward, through Lawrenceburg, towards Pulaski.

The afternoon of the 22d and during the forenoon of the 23d it was ascertained satisfactorily that the bulk of the enemy's force was moving northward from Lawrenceburg. Hence the remaining two divisions of the corps, the first and third, with the artillery and trains, moved to Linnville during the afternoon of that day. Information received during the night, at Linnville, indicated that the enemy was advancing rapidly on Columbia, and would probably reach that place on the 24th. This would have placed him between us and Nashville.

The head of the corps moved at 1 a. m. of the 24th, and by 3 a. m. the whole corps was in motion. By a rapid march the two leading divisions of the corps, the second and third, were concentrated at Columbia, and in position by 12 m., having marched a distance of twenty miles. They had been preceded by Cox's division of the 23d corps, which had barely arrived in time by turning westward, some two or three miles south of Columbia, and taking position on the Mount Pleasant road, to prevent the head of the enemy's column from occupying Columbia in advance of our forces. When the corps evacuated Pulaski on the 23d, the third brigade of the first division, Colonel Waters, eighty-fourth Illinois volunteers, commanding, was left to cover the rear. This service was well performed.

The afternoon of the 24th November was spent by the second and third divisions in throwing up strong intrenchments. The first division, which had marched in rear of the train, arrived during the evening and went into position on the left of the corps. The 23d corps was in position on the right.

Friday, the 25th, the work of intrenching was continued, and by nightfall a strong line of works was completed. An apprehension was raised at this time

that the 23d corps, occupying the right of our intrenched position, would not be able to maintain its position against a decided assault; it was hence deemed expedient to construct an interior line of works north and west of the town. This line would have the advantage of being much shorter, and of occupying much stronger ground than the exterior line, and of having its flanks resting more securely on Duck river. For the construction of the interior line, the first and second divisions of the 4th corps, and all of the 23d corps, less one brigade, were withdrawn from the exterior line. The third division was left to hold in the exterior line the entire former front of the corps, the remainder of the exterior line having been held by a brigade of the 23d corps. During the night of the 25th of November the first and second divisions were actively employed constructing the interior line, and the dawn of the 26th had it well advanced towards completion.

Just before daylight on the 26th the enemy made a decided assault on the pickets on and adjacent to the Pulaski road. He succeeded in driving back the pickets a considerable distance, but re-enforcements being promptly brought up the enemy was in turn driven back and the picket line substantially restored to its former position. It terminated in an affair of pickets, and would scarcely have deserved an official mention, (as so many such affairs occur in an active campaign) were it not that we have to lament, in connexion with it, the mortally wounding and subsequent death of Captain Greene, forty-ninth Ohio volunteers, picket officer of the first brigade, third division. When our pickets along a part of the front of his brigade were driven back, he rushed out, with all the gallantry and enthusiasm of his soldierly character, to the front, and his orders and the influence of his example succeeded in driving back the enemy. While he was so engaged he received a wound in the abdomen, from which he died in twenty-four hours afterwards. His gallant spirit winged its way to join the hosts of others that had preceded it, victims to their patriotic devotion to their country. No further effort was made by the enemy, so long as our force occupied the southern bank of Duck river, to molest us. During the 26th an intimation was communicated that the forces would evacuate Columbia and pass to the northern bank of the river that night, the movement to be commenced just after nightfall. Preparations were made accordingly, but just after dark instructions were distributed that the troops would remain in position, and that the evacuation would not take place until the following night, the 27th.

Sunday, 27th, was a dark, dreary, and cheerless day. An occasional picket skirmish broke the dull monotony of the day. The transportation of the corps and its reserve artillery were passed to the north bank of the river during the day. At 5 p. m. the artillery was withdrawn from the exterior line and sent across the river. At 7 p. m. the infantry of the corps commenced to withdraw from the lines and prepare to cross the river. The third division led, followed by the first, then the second. The pickets were ordered to remain in position for half an hour after the most advanced division. The third commenced to withdraw, then to retire quietly to the exterior line of works, where they were to remain for an hour, then to withdraw to the interior line, where they were to remain till midnight, or later, should the passage of the troops over the river not warrant their crossing at that hour. The whole operation was accomplished as directed. The enemy did not attempt to interrupt the movement. After crossing the river the troops bivouacked till daylight. The passage of the river had been made about two miles below the town. After the passage was completed, all the bridges were destroyed. Shortly after daylight of the 28th the corps moved up the river and took position to prevent the passage of the river should the enemy attempt to cross it near the town. Intrenchments were at once thrown up, and pickets and outposts were judiciously disposed to give an early intimation of the movements of the enemy. Near nightfall of the 28th some evidences were received that the enemy was crossing the river, some four miles

above our left. By daylight, on the morning of the 29th, these evidences were so far strengthened as to require immediate and vigorous action to prevent our being flanked and turned. A brigade, the second of the third division, Colonel Post, fifty-ninth Illinois, commanding, was ordered to make a reconnoissance eastward and up the river to watch the movements of the enemy, with instructions to report frequently during the day the result of his observations; and further, if the enemy, after crossing, should turn westward at once, with a view to attacking our left flank in the position we then occupied, to hold him in check as long as possible, by retreating slowly, and contesting the ground stubbornly. Orders were also issued for the first and second divisions of the 4th corps, with all the baggage and other trains of the entire force present and all the reserve artillery to commence moving to the rear at 8 a. m. on the 29th. At the appointed hour the movement was begun, but to check any immediate movement of the enemy to the left, after crossing the river, the first division was stopped on the hills on the south bank of Rutherford's creek. This stream is an affluent of Duck river, and is crossed by the turnpike road to Franklin, about four miles north of Columbia. Frequent reports were received from Colonel Post during the day, which were duly reported to Major General Schofield, commanding the forces present, showing that the enemy had crossed the river in force, and was moving northward and parallel with the Columbia and Franklin pikes with trains, &c. The second division of the 4th corps moved up the Franklin pike as a convoy to the trains and reserve artillery of the forces, and arrived at Spring Hill, a small village about twelve miles north of Columbia. At 12.30 p. m., as the head of the division approached the village, it was perceived that a regiment of infantry and one of cavalry, previously stationed in that vicinity, and which had deployed east of the road, were being forced back on the town. The first brigade second division, Colonel Opdyke, was immediately deployed into order of battle east of the road, to check the enemy, which, as his force was cavalry, was easily done. So soon as this was done the division was disposed so as to cover the passage of the trains, and the reserve artillery by the village. Opdyke's brigade was pushed northward with its left resting on the turnpike road; Colonel Lane's brigade was formed in the centre, and Brigadier General Bradley's brigade was formed on the right, with its right slightly refused, but not sufficient to rest on the road. Skirmishing was kept up during the afternoon, without, however, serious result, till 4.30 p. m. Then the enemy appeared in front, and on the flank of Bradley's brigade with a strong infantry force, (it was Cleburn's division, Cheatham's corps,) and made a vigorous attack. As Bradley's brigade was heavily outflanked while pressed in front, it was forced from its position, and its right doubled back on the road and into the village. A few prisoners were captured from us, including the assistant adjutant general of the brigade, but the heaviest loss was in the serious wounding of the gallant brigade commander, Brigadier General L. P. Bradley. While nobly attempting to stay his brigade, under the tremendous assault which was then being made on it, he received a serious wound, (fortunately for the country and the military service, it was only a flesh wound,) which compelled him to relinquish command of his brigade and leave the field. He was succeeded in command by that gallant soldier and useful officer, Colonel Joseph Conrad, fifteenth Wisconsin volunteers. Fortunately the enemy did not press the success he had gained. The casualties of the second division amounted to some three hundred and fifty killed and wounded. The immense trains and reserve artillery were parked in the village of Spring Hill and protected by the second division, crescent-shaped, with its convexity eastward, and its flanks resting on the road. The division maintained its defensive position. The enemy, encamped a short distance only from the division, did not renew the attack. At 7 p. m. the movement of withdrawing from the north bank of Duck river was commenced. Cox's division of the 23d corps led off. It was followed by the third division of the 4th corps, and lastly



came up the first division of the 4th corps, and covered the retreat to Spring Hill. The movement to Spring Hill was protracted and much drawn out by the delay in Rutherford's creek. By some unfortunate oversight no sufficient bridge had been constructed, and the troops arriving at it in the night were much delayed in crossing it. After the first division, followed the pickets. The head of the third division arrived at Spring Hill about midnight, passed rapidly and silently through the village and took post about a mile north of it, forming parallel to the road and east of it. The object of this disposition was to cover the movement of the trains out of Spring Hill and toward Franklin. Cox's division, of the 23d corps, had already moved on towards Franklin as rapidly as possible. The trains were drawn out of park and pushed towards Franklin. While this work was in progress the first division came up, passed rapidly through Spring Hill, and moved on as a convoy to the trains. It was necessary to move the troops rapidly and silently through Spring Hill to avoid a night attack from an entire corps of four divisions, (Cleatham's,) which lay encamped within eight hundred yards of the road. The effect of a night attack on a column *en route* would have been, beyond doubt, most disastrous. The embarrassment of the situation was greatly increased by the presence of a large number of wagons, artillery carriages, &c., which had to be protected and quietly withdrawn. By 5 a. m. of the 30th the whole of the trains had been put on the road, and the rear had passed a mile north of Spring Hill. The third division then moved out, marching east of the road a short distance, and parallel to it, as a cover to the train. The second division followed the third. A few miles north of Spring Hill, just before the dawn, the rebel cavalry made a dash at the train, but was promptly repulsed by a part of the division. The march was continued without further interruption till about 7 a. m., when the rebel cavalry made a second dash at the train, but was again quickly repulsed by two regiments of the third division, deployed as skirmishers, aided by a section of artillery. Without further interruption the command continued its march to the vicinity of Franklin. Much credit is due to Colonel Opdyke, whose brigade brought up the rear, for the energetic measures he adopted and carried out to get forward the greatly fatigued and wornout men of the entire command. But for these judicious measures many weary and sore-footed soldiers would inevitably have fallen into the hands of the enemy. Reference is made to Colonel Opdyke's report for more minute details. On arriving at Franklin the 23d corps had taken position in the suburbs of the village, with its left resting on the river, above the town, and its right extending across and west of the turnpike road. The first division of the 4th corps (Kimball's) was posted on the right of the 23d corps, with its right flank resting on the river, below the town. Intrenchments were at once thrown up by the 23d corps and Kimball's division of the 4th corps. The third division of the 4th corps arrived next, and was ordered to cross the river and take post on the north side; this was done. Wagner's, the second division, which was marching in rear, was ordered to halt on a range of hills nearly two miles south of the town, and deploy his command to hold the enemy in check should he attempt to press us. In the mean time the transportation was being passed rapidly across the river. At 12 m. General Wagner reported the appearance of the enemy in heavy force in his front, and later he reported that the enemy was evidently making preparations to attack him in force. The position General Wagner then held was entirely too extensive to be covered by one division, and, as the country was open on both flanks, and favorable for the movement of troops, the position could be readily flanked. Hence General Wagner very judiciously determined to retire his command nearer to the town. He posted his two brigades (Conrad's and Lane's) across the pike, with their flanks slightly refused, about a third of a mile south of the intrenched position of the 23d corps; the other brigade (Opdyke's) was sent inside of our main works—a most fortunate disposition of his brigade, as the sequel of this narrative will

show. Conrad's and Lane's brigades hastily threw up wide barricades to protect themselves from the coming storm. Their orders were to maintain their position as long as it could be done without becoming severely engaged, and then retire on the main line. At 4 p. m. the enemy made a vigorous attack on the front of these two advanced brigades, threatening, at the same time, their flanks with strong columns. Unwilling to abandon their position so long as there was any probability of maintaining it, unfortunately the gallant commanders remained in front too long, and, as a consequence, when they did retire they were followed so closely by the enemy as to enter the works through the break which had been caused by the burst over them of the retiring brigade. The enemy had come on with a terrible dash, had entered our intrenchments, and victory seemed almost within his grasp. Our line had been broken in the centre, two four-gun batteries had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and it seemed that it was only necessary for him to press the advantage he had gained to complete his success. But at this critical moment the gallant, prompt, and ready Opdyke was at hand, calling to his men in a stentorian tone "Forward to the lines," and adding example to command, he, with his bold brigade, with lowered bayonets, rushed forward, bore the exultant enemy back over our intrenchments, recovered the lost guns, and captured near four hundred prisoners. But this reverse did not seem to discourage the enemy; it seemed rather to add to his determination and increase the vigor of his assaults. On, on he came, until he had made four distinct assaults, each time to be hurled back with heavy loss. So vigorous and fierce were these assaults that the enemy reached the exterior slope of the rude intrenchments, and hand-to-hand encounters occurred between the enraged combatants across the works, and between the assaults the work of death was not stopped. The undulations of the grounds are such as to afford good protection to an attacking force. Under this cover the enemy pressed sharpshooters as near our lines as possible, and kept up a most galling fire. While these vigorous attacks were being made on our centre and left, the right head, by Kimball's division, also fiercely attacked three times, all of which assaults were handsomely repulsed with comparatively slight loss to us, but with terrific slaughter of the enemy. At no time did the enemy gain any advantage on this part of our lines. As night approached the enemy desisted from his fierce assaults, and his offensive efforts degenerated into a sharp skirmish fire. Thus terminated one of the fiercest, best contested, most vigorously sustained passages-at-arms which have occurred in this war. I am sure it will be no exaggeration to estimate the loss of the enemy in killed, wounded, and captured, at 6,000. His loss, as attested by the despatches of his commanding general, was particularly heavy in general officers—not less than \_\_\_\_\_ killed, wounded, and captured. After the conflict was over the ground was thickly strewn with the enemy's dead and wounded. Our captures amounted to 21 battle-flags and stands of colors, 11 swords and sabres, and 618 prisoners, including 46 officers. Our casualties amounted to 5 officers killed, 37 wounded, and 14 missing. Enlisted men killed, 62; wounded, 570; missing, 680; total casualties, 1,368. For more minute details of this interesting contest I must refer to the reports of division and brigade commanders, herewith forwarded. They will well repay perusal. The highest commendation is due to Brigadier Generals Kimball and Wagner, commanding first and second divisions of the 4th corps, for the skilful manner in which they handled their commands, and for personal gallantry displayed in trying positions. The division commanders unite in high terms of praise of the good conduct of their brigade commanders, and the latter of the soldierly conduct of their regimental commanders. Among so many who not only did their duty well but nobly it is difficult to discriminate individual officers or men for special mention; but I am sure it will not be deemed invidious if I signalize Colonel Emerson Opdyke, one hundred and twenty-fifth Ohio volunteers, commanding the first

brigade, second division, and Lieutenant Colonel G. W. Smith, eighty-eighth Illinois, commanding his regiment in Opdyke's brigade, whose good fortune it was, on this blood-stained day, the 30th November, 1864, to render the most important and distinguished service. The artillery was splendidly served, and made terrible havoc in the enemy's ranks both as he advanced and retired. The officers and men of the batteries are entitled to the highest praise for their good conduct. When the enemy had temporarily broken centre, Major General Schofield, commanding the force in the vicinity of Franklin, under the apprehension that our forces engaged on the south side of the river might be compelled to pass to the north side, ordered the following disposition, which was made, of the third division, then in reserve, of the 4th corps, with a view to cover the withdrawal of our troops, should it become necessary. Beatty's brigade was deployed on the north bank of the river above the town, Streight's brigade along the bank of the river immediately opposite the town, and Post's brigade on the bank of the river below the town. Fortunately the exigency for which this disposition was made did not occur in the progress of the contest, but these brigades retained their positions to cover the withdrawal at night, which had been ordered before the occurrence of the attack. To prepare for the withdrawal and retirement towards Nashville, the trains were started before nightfall of the 30th. At midnight the troops on the south side of the river began to withdraw from the lines and pass to the north side of the stream. This work was rapidly and successfully accomplished. The enemy probably suspected what was going on, but did not attempt to interfere with the movements. The third division of the 4th corps had been designated to move in rear and cover the retrograde movements. By 3 a. m. of the 1st December all the troops had been withdrawn from the south side of the river and the bridges were fired. So soon as the conflagration was so far advanced as to insure its being complete the third division commenced to withdraw, and by 4 a. m. the whole of it was on the road. As the flames rose from the bridges and communicated fully to the enemy our movements, he opened a heavy cannonade, which fortunately did no injury, and was soon suspended. Otherwise the enemy did not attempt to molest us. The rear of the command reached Brentwood, nine miles north of Franklin, at 9 a. m. There the command was halted an hour to allow the men to cook breakfast. Between 10 and 11 o'clock the march was resumed, and the rear of the troops reached the vicinity of Nashville at 1 p. m. The corps was reported to Major General Thomas, commanding the forces, and by him the position designated which it occupied from that date to the 15th of December, when offensive operations were commenced. In conclusion it is proper that I should remark that during the operations briefly sketched in this report the corps was commanded by Major General Stanley. He was wounded in the battle at Franklin, and was compelled by the casualty to relinquish command of the corps before he could submit a report of its operations; hence the duty has devolved on me.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS J. WOOD,

*Brigadier General U. S. V., Commanding.*

Brigadier General W. D. WHIPPLE,

*Assistant Adjutant General and Chief of Staff.*

#### HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,

*Eastport, Mississippi, January 10, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the operations of my command from the date of their arrival at Nashville, Tennessee, pursuant to orders from Major General William T. Sherman, commanding military division of the Mississippi, November 30, 1864, to the present date

Debarking the first and third divisions on the 30th, and the second division on the 1st of December, on the 1st, by your direction, the command was placed in line of battle for defence of the city of Nashville, as follows: The right resting on the Cumberland river, about three miles from the city in a direct line, and the left resting on the Hillsboro' pike, about two and a half miles in a direct line from the city, forming a line of three miles from right to left. Breastworks, strong enough to protect the men from either artillery or musketry, were immediately constructed by the troops along the whole line. The command not being sufficiently strong to form a continuous front line and still have any troops for a reserve, with your consent, one brigade was withdrawn from the works on the left and placed in rear of the left centre, immediately on the right of Harding pike, to be used as circumstances might require, their works on the left being occupied by a division of the 4th corps, which had then arrived. The enemy made his appearance on the evening of the 2d, and took position beyond artillery range in my front, which respectful distance was retained throughout the siege, with the exception of an occasional picket post or reconnoitring party. Until the 14th of December the troops were employed in strengthening the works, and some slight skirmishing. A spirited dash made by sixty of our cavalry, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Blackburn, of a Tennessee regiment, in which some few prisoners were captured from the enemy, and desultory artillery firing at long range at small parties of the enemy, were all that occurred in my front. In the mean time transportation was obtained, ammunition and commissary stores loaded, and everything placed in readiness to move at an hour's notice.

On the night of the 14th orders were received to move outside the works early the next morning, and form on or near the Harding pike, the left connecting with the right of the 4th corps, the cavalry passing behind and forming on my right, the whole to wheel to the left, with the 4th corps as a pivot, and make a vigorous assault upon the enemy's left. This movement was commenced by my command at 6 o'clock a. m. on the 15th. The second division, Brigadier General K. Garrard commanding, moved out on the Harding pike, and then moving by the left flanks until he connected with the 4th corps forming my left. The first division, Brigadier General J. McArthur commanding, moving out next by the Harding and Charlotte pike, formed on the right of the second division. The third division, Colonel I. B. Moore, thirty-third Wisconsin infantry volunteers, commanding, moved out by the Harding pike, formed in rear of the centre to act as a reserve to either flank. The first and second brigades of General McArthur's, which moved out by the Charlotte pike, owing to the roads diverging widely, and the stubborn resistance of the enemy's skirmishers, he having to silence one battery, did not connect with the main line until nearly half past eight. The cavalry then passed to our right, and the movement began about 10 a. m., our orders being to touch to the left and guide right. Throwing out a strong skirmish line they became almost immediately engaged with the enemy's skirmishers, driving them back easily, and the line advancing and wheeling gradually, assumed a position almost parallel with the Harding pike. Pressing forward we came to the first works of the enemy, about half a mile south of the Harding pike, and one and a half mile from the main line of works around Nashville, a small earthwork on the top of a hill, in which were four 12-pounder brass guns, the fort covered by another on a hill about four hundred yards west, in which were two 12-pounder brass guns. Four batteries opened on the first fort, soon silencing their guns, and General McArthur directed to take two brigades and carry the works by assault. Placing the first brigade, Colonel N. L. McMillen, in advance, supported by the second, Colonel L. F. Hubbard commanding, the work was carried at a run. The cavalry on our right at the same time charging directly under the guns of the rear fort on the hill, entered the rear fort simultaneously with our skirmishers; the guns in

the fort were all captured, and about 150 prisoners. The cavalry claimed the guns as their capture, and more for their gallant charge than because they were entitled to the pieces, they were conceded to them. The first and second brigades of McArthur's division, obliquing to the right without stopping, carried the second fort, capturing the two guns and about two hundred prisoners; the first brigade moving directly to the top of the hill, and second brigade flanking it on the left. During the assault upon the two forts the 23d corps passed in my rear by the flank to my right, and by the time the forts were taken had formed on my right. Advancing Colonel Ward's brigade of the third division to fill the gap caused by the oblique movement of Colonels McMillen's and Hubbard's brigades in the charge of the second fort upon the hill, the line again advanced, skirmishing heavily along its whole extent. A small earthwork containing two guns, on a hill in front of Colonel Hill's brigade, of McArthur's division, was carried by that brigade in gallant style, capturing the guns and many prisoners, the skirmishers from the second division entering at the same time from the east. On entering this work, Colonel S. G. Hill, thirty-fifth Iowa infantry, commanding third brigade, first division, was unfortunately struck in the forehead by a musket ball, and died almost immediately; in consequence the guns and prisoners were not properly taken care of and turned over, but were taken possession of by other troops, and the brigade did not get the credit which it fully deserves. At the same time Colonel E. H. Wolfe's third brigade, of the second division, crossed the Hillsboro' pike and carried the earthworks on the hill immediately to the left of that pike, capturing two guns in the fort and one more a short distance from it, which the enemy were endeavoring to take away. At the time these last two assaults were made, which were almost perpendicular to the Hillsboro' pike, the 4th corps charged, parallel with the pike, their works in their front, thereby crowding out the first and second brigades of the second division, the enemy's works at that point making nearly a right angle, with the salient angle in front of the right of the 4th corps and the left of my command. I therefore passed the first and second brigades, second division, by the right flank to the right and rear of third brigade, same division, and directed them to form on the right of that brigade. The 4th corps also took possession of the guns passed over by Colonel Wolfe. In the mean time the first division and the brigade of the third, advancing on the right, drove the enemy across the Hillsboro' pike, dislodging them from the stone wall on either side, capturing two pieces of artillery, a large number of prisoners, and about one thousand (1,000) muskets. Night coming on, the troops bivouacked in line of battle. During the night a request coming from General Schofield, commanding 23d corps, for re-enforcements, I sent him the third division, Colonel I. B. Moore commanding, just before daylight. On the morning of the 16th, advancing my line in the same order as on the previous day, the first on the right and the second division on the left, it was discovered that the enemy had taken position at the base of a chain of hills, called the Brentwood hills, with a front nearly perpendicular to our lines, and had strongly intrenched themselves by throwing up breastworks and massing artillery in every available position. Changing my front by a half wheel, by brigades, the command moved slowly in echelon from the right, so as not to break connexions with the 4th corps, and took a position directly in front of the enemy, at a distance of about six hundred yards, my right resting at the base of a hill, on the top of which was the enemy's left, and my line being the whole front, of the two divisions, extending about one mile. The enemy opening a heavy artillery fire upon my brigades as they went into position, all the batteries of the first and second divisions, six in number, were brought into action at a distance of about eight hundred yards, and after a fierce cannonading of about two hours, succeeded in quieting the enemy's guns in our front. The 23d corps was on my right in the intrenchments, thrown up by them the night before, and nearly at right

angles with my present line. Expecting that corps to take the initiative, as they were on the flank of the enemy, I held the command in its present position, keeping up a slow artillery fire, at their line, without eliciting any reply. About 1 o'clock I received a request from General Schofield, and a few minutes later an order from you to send another division to his assistance, he having retained the one sent at daylight that morning, not having any reserve, and my whole line being immediately in front of the enemy, and liable to be attacked and broken at any point wherever a brigade should be withdrawn. I therefore sent a staff officer to him to state the condition of my command, and ascertain if he could not get along without the division. The officer reported to me that General Schofield's line was not engaged, and upon the condition being reported to him that he said he did not need the additional force, consequently it was not sent. About 3 o'clock p. m. General McArthur sent word that he could carry the hill on his right by assault. Major General Thomas being present, the matter was referred to him, and I was requested to delay the movement until he could hear from General Schofield, to whom he had sent. General McArthur not receiving any reply, and fearing if the attack should be longer delayed the enemy would use the right to strengthen his works, directed the first brigade, Colonel N. L. McMillen, ninety-fifth Ohio infantry, commanding, to storm the hill on which was the left of the enemy's line, and the second and third brigades of the division to attack in front, when the first should be half way up the hill; accordingly Colonel McMillen formed his brigade in two lines, with the one hundred and fourteenth Illinois infantry, ninety-third Indiana infantry, and tenth Minnesota infantry in the first, and the seventy-second Ohio and ninety-fifth Ohio in the second line, and gave his men orders not to cheer or fire a shot until the works should be gained. Throwing out a strong party of skirmishers, under a rapid fire from them and his artillery, he commenced the assault. He had no sooner fairly commenced his movement than the second brigade, Colonel L. F. Hubbard commanding, eager in emulation, also took up the attack, immediately followed the third brigade, and lastly the second division. The enemy opened with a fierce storm of shell, canister, and musketry, sadly decimating the ranks of many regiments, but nothing save annihilation could stop the onward progress of that line. Sweeping forward, the right of the line up the hill, and the left through mud and over walls, they gained the enemy's works, calling forth the remark, from one of their general officers, that "powder and lead were inadequate to resist such a charge." The enemy was whipped, broken, and demoralized. Prisoners were taken by the regiment and artillery by batteries. The pursuit was continued until dark, when the troops bivouacked in line. In this one charge the two divisions captured twenty-seven pieces of artillery, complete; over four thousand prisoners, among whom were Major General Edward S. Johnson and Brigadier Generals Jackson and Smith; twelve stands of colors; General Johnson's headquarter wagons, and many ammunition and baggage wagons. I am not able to give you the exact number, as we left the next morning, in pursuit, without collecting them, leaving them to be taken care of by the reserve troops in Nashville. The second division claim that they captured four more guns on the left, which were afterwards taken possession of by the 4th corps, but as they were on the 4th corps' line, and they were undoubtedly assisted by that corps in their capture, I am not disposed to question their right to them. I only hope there may always be the same ardent desire to capture from a disloyal enemy his means and munitions of war. It is certainly a laudable rivalry. The three guns, however, taken by Colonel Wolfe on the 15th properly belong to, and should be credited to him. The sum total of the capture on both days is, thirty-six (36) pieces of artillery; five thousand one hundred and twenty-three (5,123) prisoners, among whom were Major General Edward S. Johnson and Brigadier Generals Jackson and Smith; about six thousand (6,000)

stand of small-arms; sixteen (16) battle-flags, and about thirty (30) wagons of various kinds. Instances of individual merit were numerous. Colonel McMillen deserves to be specially mentioned for his conduct of the charge of the second day. Colonel L. F. Hubbard, 5th Minnesota, commanding second brigade, first division, had three horses shot under him on the 16th; going into action with a total of fourteen hundred and twenty-one (1,421) muskets in his brigade, he captured over 2,000 prisoners, 9 pieces of artillery, and 7 stands of colors, and the casualties in his brigade number 315. For details and particulars, I refer you to the reports of division and brigade commanders, herewith enclosed. Enclosure<sup>1</sup>, also, is a complete list of casualties. The prisoners and artillery were all sent back to Nashville to be turned over to the proper officers there. The stands of colors are in possession of the officers and men who captured them, which I will send to you with a list of the names.

On the 17th, in compliance with orders, my command, the third division having joined that morning, moved out on the Granny White pike, about four miles, and thence south to the Franklin pike, with orders to fall in rear of the 4th corps. From thence we marched *via* Franklin, Columbia, Pulaski, Lawrenceburg, and Waynesboro' to Clifton, and from thence on transports to this place, without anything of importance occurring. My division commanders deserve much credit for the able and soldierly manner with which they managed their commands, and their ready and hearty co-operation in every respect. The third division, Colonel J. B. Moore, commanding, only needed as favorable an opportunity to have done equally as well as any of the troops that day upon the field; they were all tried soldiers who have fought many a battle with credit and honor to themselves. I have exceedingly to regret the loss of one gallant brigade commander, Colonel S. G. Hill, thirty-fifth Iowa infantry, who was killed in the charge on the 15th. Long with the command, he has endeared himself to every member of the brave and courteous; the service has lost a gallant officer, and society a gentleman, by his untimely death.

The officers of my staff, each and all, deserve especial credit for their personal services, both on the field and in their respective departments. They rendered invaluable aid on the field by their activity and discrimination, and their acute perception of the weak points, and the proper time and moment for executing the different movements with which they were charged.

In the supply department everything move with a prompt energy and reliability that gave an additional impulse forward to each officer and man.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. J. SMITH, *Major General.*

Brigadier General WM. D. WHIPPLE,

*Chief of Staff, Department of the Cumberland.*

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS MILITARY DIVISION MISSISSIPPI,  
*Gravelly Springs, Ala., February 1, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of the cavalry corps military division of the Mississippi, from the date of its organization, October 24, 1864, to the present time. Having been relieved from the command of the third division cavalry corps, army of the Potomac, on the 1st day of October, 1864, for the purpose of taking command of the cavalry forces in the armies operating under the command of Major General Sherman, I proceeded to join him in the field without delay. I arrived at Gaylesville, Alabama, (where the army was resting after its pursuit of General Hood,) on the 23d October.

On the 24th of October I was assigned, by order of General Sherman, to duty as chief of cavalry, and commanding officer of all the cavalry in the military

division of the Mississippi. By the same order the mounted forces of the armies of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee were detached from those armies, constituted one command, and designated the cavalry corps of the military division of Mississippi. Upon investigation, I found that the cavalry serving with the army of the Ohio consisted of one organized division, (Stoneman's,) nearly all dismounted; one brigade, under Colonel Capron, sent to Louisville, Kentucky, for remount; the other under Colonel Israel Garrard, at Atlanta, Georgia. Besides this division there were five or six regiments of good cavalry, and a division of one-year mounted infantry, in Kentucky and East Tennessee. This force being for local defence, however, was not detached, and therefore formed no part of the cavalry corps. I found the cavalry of the army of the Cumberland organized into four divisions, three of which were composed of four regiments from the northwestern States, well organized and efficiently commanded respectively by Brigadier Generals McCook, Garrard, and Kilpatrick, and having done very hard service during the Atlanta campaign. The fourth division consisted entirely of Tennessee regiments, serving in Tennessee. The cavalry of the army of the Tennessee had been organized into two divisions, by order of Major General Howard, commanded respectively by Brigadier General Hatch, United States volunteers, and Colonel Winslow, fourth Ohio cavalry; both were at that time serving in West Tennessee. The divisions contained from six to ten regiments, organized into three brigades each. In the new organizations the four divisions of the army of the Cumberland, were the first, second, third and seventh; the two divisions of the army of the Tennessee were designated, respectively, fifth and fourth, and the division of the army of the Ohio the sixth division. The Tennessee troops were divided among the other divisions, so as to intermix them with troops from other States. From the lack of general and staff officers to simplify organization, and to counteract a tendency to use the third brigades as reserves, each division was organized into two brigades, except the sixth, which, for special reasons, was allowed three. The chiefs of cavalry of the different departments were relieved from duty and directed to report to their commanding generals for assignments. In pursuance of General Sherman's instructions, measures were at once taken to collect, reorganize, remount, and bring into the field the largest possible force of cavalry; in order that he might have such a preponderance in that arm as would enable him to throw the enemy on the defensive, while, with his infantry, he could march to the sea-coast unmolested. It was thought that if Hood followed him, instead of crossing the Tennessee river into Tennessee, in a short time my entire cavalry force could be put upon a footing to harass and annoy him beyond endurance. With this in view, General Hatch was ordered to march with the fifth division from Clifton, Tennessee, by the most direct route to Rome, Georgia; Brigadier General Grierson was designated as the commander of the fourth division, and directed to assemble as much of it as possible, put it in a thorough condition, and be ready to march, when orders should be sent him, through Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia, and join the army of General Sherman. It soon, however, became apparent that Hood would march north, instead of following General Sherman, and that operations would be precipitated upon us before the cavalry forces could be organized. A reconnoissance by General Garrard, with the second division, towards Gadsden, on the Coosa river, on the 25th of October, and on the 27th and 28th to the south of the Coosa towards Jacksonville, revealed the fact that the rebel army under Hood had left Gadsden on the 22d of October, marching in the direction of Warrenton, on the Tennessee river. As soon as General Sherman became thoroughly convinced of this, he issued his orders for the concentration of his army at Atlanta, and hurried his preparations for the campaign. Finding that he could wait no longer, all the serviceable horses of McCook's and Garrard's divisions, and Colonel Garrard's brigade, were turned over to the third division, and every effort was made to put it upon a thoroughly



efficient footing; while the dismounted men of the first and second divisions were ordered by rail to Louisville, Kentucky, for remount and re-equipment. Having made these dispositions, I was ordered by General Sherman to Nashville, for the purpose of completing the cavalry organization and assisting in the operations of General Thomas against the rebels under General Hood. I arrived at Nashville on the 6th day of November, and reported to Major General Thomas, commanding department of the Cumberland and the military division of the Mississippi. General Croxton's brigade of the first division, having been recently remounted at Louisville, Colonel Capron's (now Harrison's) brigade of the sixth division, and the fifth division, while on the march to join General Sherman, were halted by General Thomas, and directed to act in conjunction with the infantry forces assembling at Pulaski under General Stanley to resist the march of Hood.

On the 24th of October Croxton's brigade, about one thousand strong, was stationed on the Huntsville and Florence road, at Centre Star, with outposts and pickets, watching the Tennessee river from the mouth of Elk river to Florence, and a detachment of the tenth and twelfth Tennessee, of General Hatch's division, were stationed at Cypress creek, at Martin's mills, three miles west of Florence, watching Pride's, Gaines's, and Cheatham's ferries on the Tennessee river.

On the 29th of October General Croxton sent a despatch to General Thomas, informing him of General Hood's proximity to the river, and of his intention to cross it at Bainbridge that night.

About 3 p. m. on the 30th, two brigades of Lee's corps landed on the north side, about three miles below Bainbridge. General Croxton concentrated his command and attempted to repel them, but was driven back. He retired to the east bank of Shoal creek and took position near Shoal Creek bridge, where he remained reconnoitring until November 5, when he was forced to retire by the advance of Johnson's division, of Lee's corps. He reported to General Hatch, at Lexington, on November 6.

On the 4th of November General Hatch, in compliance with the instructions of General Stanley, moved from Pulaski towards Florence, with orders to assume command of all the cavalry in that neighborhood, and watch closely the enemy's movements. In executing these orders, General Hatch the next day opened communication with General Croxton, and, in conjunction with him, drove the enemy's cavalry pickets across Shoal creek, and established pickets of observation along the line of that creek and the Tennessee, from the mouth of Elk river. While engaged in observing the movements of the enemy frequent skirmishes were had with his cavalry.

On the 9th of November a general attack was made by the small force under General Hatch. The rebel cavalry was driven back upon the infantry at Florence; a part of the unfinished works at that place captured by Colonel Coon's brigade of the fifth division, and the information in regard to Hood's position, previously obtained, verified. By great activity, watchfulness, and good judgment on the part of General Hatch, every movement of the enemy and indication of his intentions were promptly reported to Generals Stanley, Schofield, and Thomas.

On the 13th and 14th of November General Hatch, having become convinced that Hood would march north at an early day, used his command in cutting trees into the roads crossing Shoal creek, for the purpose of retarding the rebels in their movements.

On the morning of November 19th the enemy was reported marching north on the west side of the creek. Colonel Coon made a forced reconnoissance in that direction; captured the headquarters train of Buford's and Chalmer's division; met the enemy's cavalry in force, and, after a severe engagement, discovering the march of the rebel infantry, was compelled to rejoin the main force on

the east side of the creek. General Hatch concentrated his forces without delay at Lexington, and on the 21st retired to Lawrenceburg, where he was attacked early the next morning by the enemy's cavalry. A severe fight ensued, in which the enemy, with twelve pieces of artillery and a large force of cavalry, fighting dismounted, made every effort to drive the forces of General Hatch from their position, but the latter held on with great tenacity until night, and then withdrew one mile towards Pulaski.

On the 23d General Hatch withdrew by that road, turning towards Campbellsville. When within nine miles of Pulaski, Croxton's brigade had the rear, and was attacked by the rebel cavalry at the junction of the roads leading to the two places just mentioned. It, however, resisted every attack until after dark, holding its position, and retiring at leisure, by night, to the neighborhood of Campbellsville.

On the 24th the army resumed its march, and at the latter place was again attacked by the entire rebel cavalry, supported by infantry. At first the enemy was severely repulsed by the first brigade, Colonel Wells, twelfth Missouri cavalry, commanding, but in return the enemy drove back Colonel Wells, and compelled General Hatch to retire by the road to Lynnvile. This road leading through a very hilly country, a small rear-guard was sufficient to hold the enemy in check. The ninth Illinois cavalry, Captain Harper commanding, was directed to occupy a strong gorge near the turnpike, and to delay the rebels as long as possible. He performed the duty assigned him with great gallantry, giving the main body of the command an opportunity to take position at Lynnvile. Sharp fighting was continued at that place until after dark, when, in accordance with my orders, General Hatch withdrew to Columbia. Colonel Capron's brigade of the sixth division had been sent by General Schofield towards Waynesboro' to observe the movements of the enemy in that direction, while Hatch's and Croxton's were on Shoal creek. Upon the advance of the rebel cavalry Colonel Capron retired, skirmishing with the enemy, directing his march towards Mount Pleasant and Columbia.

On the morning of November 25th the entire force, including the infantry, was concentrated at Columbia. Having made all possible arrangements at Nashville for expediting the re-organization of the cavalry, in pursuance to General Thomas's instructions, I started to the front to take command of the force in the field, and on the 23d of November met General Schofield between Lynville and Pulaski. The fifth division contained at this time but 2,500 men, Croxton's brigade about 1,000, and Capron's 800—in all about 4,300 men, to contend with three divisions, estimated at not less than ten thousand men, and commanded by Lieutenant General Forrest, hitherto the most successful of rebel cavalry leaders. After the concentration of the forces at Columbia, and while General Schofield was making arrangements to withdraw from that place to the north side of Duck river, the cavalry crossed and was disposed of so as to watch every movement either to the right or left. Hatch's division and Croxton's brigade were stationed about six miles east of Columbia, on the road to Shelbyville. Capron's brigade, to which had been added the fifth Iowa cavalry, Major J. M. Young commanding, took position at Rally Hill, on the Lewisburg turnpike. It was further strengthened, after taking position, by the arrival of the seventh Ohio cavalry from Louisville. This brigade and Croxton's were temporarily formed into a division, under the command of Brigadier General R. W. Johnson. Three regiments of the first brigade of Hatch's division, Colonel R. R. Steward, eleventh Indiana cavalry, commanding, were ordered to take post to the west of Columbia for the purpose of watching the fords and crossings between that place and Williamsport. General Hatch sent the sixth Illinois cavalry, *via* Chapel Hill, to Shelbyville, with directions to feel well out from that place towards Lewisburg and Connorsvil

if possible, returning by the south side of the river to the crossing of the Lewisburg pike.

At noon of November 27th the pickets from Croxton's and Capron's brigades gave notice of the appearance of the rebel cavalry at the various fords between Columbia and Lewisburg pike, particularly at Huey's mill, eight miles above Columbia, in such force as to leave no doubt of their intentions. The pickets in the vicinity of Huey's mill were soon driven in, and the rebels immediately began crossing. At 2.10 p. m. I sent a despatch to Major General Schofield, notifying him of the enemy's movements, informing him that I should endeavor to concentrate my force at Hunt's Creek road, on the Lewisburg pike, and requesting him to send Stewart's brigade to me by way of Spring Hill. Colonel F. J. Harrison, eighth Indiana cavalry, had already been sent by General Johnson to the brigade at the Lewisburg crossing, with orders to hold the enemy as long as possible at the river. By 7 p. m. the entire force was concentrated at Hunt's cross-roads. Colonel Harrison, however, had not reached his brigade, but having been posted by Colonel Capron it held on as long as possible. Colonel Capron himself, with a small portion of the command, fell back rapidly in disorder towards Franklin. The detachments at the various fords held on bravely until night, when they were collected by Major J. Morris Young, fifth Iowa cavalry, and withdrew by the pike.

The enemy having crossed lower down, marched by the Murfreesboro' road and arrived at Rally Hill before the detachments under Major Young. The latter, finding his retreat cut off, formed his own regiment with sabres drawn, dismounted others to cover the flanks, boldly charged, broke through the rebels, and brought off his command with trifling loss. By this time it had become evident that the entire rebel cavalry force (three divisions) had crossed, and were directing their march towards the Lewisburg pike, an excellent macadamized road, leading to Franklin, and therefore, at 8 p. m., I sent a despatch by courier to General Schofield, informing him of the fact, and that no part of Forrest's force, up to dark, had moved towards the Franklin pike. During the night several prisoners were brought in, from whom I received valuable information. At 1 a. m. I sent a despatch to General Schofield, informing him that the force which had crossed at Huey's mill was Forrest's corps of cavalry, consisting of Chalmer's, Jackson's, and Buford's divisions, and Biddle's regiment; that the rebel infantry were to have begun crossing two hours before by three pontoon bridges under construction at the same place. Believing this information to be perfectly correct, I therefore suggested that our infantry should reach Spring Hill by 10 a. m. of that day. I regarded my force too small, with Hammond's and Stewart's brigades absent, to cover the Lewisburg pike and, at the same time, the dirt roads leading to Spring Hill; and believing that General Schofield with the infantry would have plenty of time, marching by the Franklin or any intermediate point, before the enemy, marching by bad dirt roads, made worse by the heavy rains which had recently fallen, I determined to keep my entire force on the Lewisburg pike and hold the enemy as long as I could, hoping by good management to get no further back that day than to the Ridge meeting-house. I had previously sent orders for Colonel Stewart to join me on the Lewisburg pike, marching by the way of Spring Hill, and all night if necessary. Similar orders were sent, at the same time, to Brevet Brigadier General J. H. Hammond, then momentarily expected with two regiments of the seventh division, freshly remounted. On the presumption that no general engagement would be risked until our forces were strengthened, and that of the enemy's movement had become sufficiently developed, I directed General Hatch to retire slowly by the pike, following Capron's brigade, and General Croxton to cover the rear, fighting the enemy, and to fall back only when compelled to do so by movements upon his flanks. Soon after daylight the enemy attacked Croxton's pickets, but finding them strongly posted moved off the road and struck well

around his flanks, causing him to withdraw. Heavy skirmishing ensued, the enemy pressing forward with the greatest celerity, endeavoring to push around and strike our column in flank, as was anticipated. At Mount Carmel meeting-house, five miles from Hunt's crossroads, a strong barricade, erected by Capron's brigade, was occupied by Coon's brigade of Hatch's division. Croxton's brigade passing through it, the enemy made two determined charges upon it, but were repulsed with severe loss. From this point the enemy ceased to press upon the rear of the column. No news having come from Hammond or Stewart, it was hoped they had arrived at Spring Hill in time enough to form a junction with the infantry, and to resist any movement of the rebels in that direction. I continued the march slowly, and by the middle of the afternoon I arrived at Douglas church, four miles from Franklin. Near this place I found General Hammond, and was joined by a detachment of Stewart's brigade, from whom I learned that the latter and some of our infantry had been skirmishing with the rebel cavalry during the day near Spring Hill. I remained with Hammond's brigade to hold the road near Douglas church and cover Franklin, while Hatch's division and Johnson's crossed to the north side of the Harpeth at Huey's ford, and went into camp on the road from Franklin to Triune at Mathew's farm, two and a half miles east of Franklin. After it was dark a reconnaissance out the Lewisburg pike to the meeting-house revealing no enemy on that road, I withdrew General Hammond's brigade to the north side of the Harpeth, and directed him to march *via* Petersburg to the Nolensville pike at at Triune's, and from the latter place to watch the movements of the rebels in that direction.

Early in the morning of the 30th, by my direction, Brigadier General Johnson sent Croxton's brigade to the south side of the river with orders to take position at Douglas church, cover Franklin as long as possible, and, if compelled to fall back, to recross the Harpeth at a ford a mile and a half above the town.

General Hammond having reported by daylight no enemy in the direction of Triune, was ordered to retire by Petersburg to Wilson's mill, on the Wilson or Brentwood pike. At 10 a. m. the enemy's advance attacked General Croxton's position, but was handsomely repulsed. At 2 p. m. he was again attacked by infantry, but after repulsing the enemy the rebel cavalry moved to his left as if to cross at Huey's ferry. This movement caused him to retire to the north side of the river by McGavock's ford. He had scarcely reached the north bank when the pickets higher up the river reported the enemy's cavalry crossing at various places.

The command was immediately got under arms, and dispositions made to attack and drive them back. General Croxton's brigade on the right, General Hatch's division in the centre, moved promptly out and engaged the enemy, charging him with a strong line of dismounted skirmishers, while Capron's brigade, under Colonel Harrison, looked out well to the left and rear. The fifth Iowa cavalry was sent to Hillsboro' pike. The action had hardly begun when General Croxton was informed that the rebel infantry were crossing the river between his right and the town of Franklin. Leaving two regiments, the first Tennessee and second Michigan, to assist in the attack against the rebel cavalry, he proceeded at once with the balance of his brigade to drive back the force reported to be crossing below. He soon discovered, however, that the report was false, and moved promptly against the rebel cavalry. Hatch had already attacked with vigor, and began driving them rapidly back. The men seemed inspired with the greatest courage and determination, and in a very short time had repulsed the enemy at every point. By night the whole force was driven beyond the Harpeth. The accompanying sketch will show the importance of this success on the part of the cavalry over Forrest's forces. While the hard pressed infantry were nobly repelling Hood's furious assaults against the defences of Franklin, General Schofield having withdrawn the infantry to the north bank of the river during the night, and determined to continue this march towards

Nashville, directed me to remain with the cavalry corps in the position it then held until daylight on the morning of December 1, and then to retire covering the rear and flanks of the infantry. This order was complied with, the enemy having been so severely handled the day previous as to be unable to follow until he found the road clear. Hammond's brigade, followed by Hatch, moved by a country road to the Wilson pike, near Edmonson's house; Croxton marched parallel to the Franklin pike. At Wilson's mill Hammond was found encamped, and left to bring up the rear; Stewart's brigade, of the fifth division, having halted to feed. Hammond was delayed longer than was intended, and in withdrawing was attacked by the rebel cavalry, but succeeded, with slight loss, in repelling the enemy from the neighborhood of Brentwood. After the infantry had halted, the whole command marched, by various country roads, to Thompson's chapel, on the Wolensville pike, where it took up a strong defensive position for the night. Before daylight next morning it marched to Nashville, and later in the evening crossed to the north side of the Cumberland river, and encamped in Edgefield. During the ensuing ten days every effort was made to put the corps into an efficient condition, clothes were drawn for the men, the horses were shod, extra shoes were fitted, and every horse that could either be drawn from the corrals of broken-down stock, or reached in Tennessee and southern Kentucky, was taken. By these means the cavalry corps, exclusive of La Grange and Watkins's brigades of the first division, was increased to nearly 9,000 mounted men. Besides this, two brigades, of fifteen hundred men each, were organized out of the dismounted men previously assigned at the cavalry depot near Nashville. While in camp the river was carefully watched by the seventh Ohio cavalry from Nashville to the vicinity of Clarksville.

On the 2d of December Brevet Brigadier General Hammond was ordered, with his brigade, to Gallatin, for the purpose of watching the Cumberland river, as far up as Carthage. Having heard from his scouts that a rebel force had taken post at Lebanon, by the assistance of gunboats sent for that purpose on the night of the —, he crossed the river with a strong force, well mounted, and made a reconnoissance to and beyond that place, but found no enemy.

On the 11th of December, in pursuance of instructions from Major General Thomas, I ordered Brigadier General E. M. McCook to take his battery and Watkins's brigade towards Bowling Green until he met La Grange's brigade, and with the united force go in pursuit of General Lyon, who crossed the Cumberland river below Clarksville on the 9th December, and was supposed to be marching, *via* Hopkinsville, to destroy Green River bridge, on the Louisville and Nashville railroad. General McCook came up with the rebels on the morning of the 16th at Hopkinsville, and after a sharp fight captured two pieces of artillery, and drove them from the place. They retreated rapidly towards Green river, pursued by La Grange's brigade. He was compelled to disband his conscripts, and leave many of his men. With the balance he pushed on through Madisonville, Ashbysburg, and Elizabethtown, crossing Tradewater, Green river, and the Louisville and Nashville railroad in his route. La Grange was greatly delayed by the muddy roads, swollen streams, and the destruction of the bridges and boats. The pursuit was relinquished at Hodgesville, Lyon's command having become reduced 400 or 500 men, more bent on escaping from Kentucky than to inflict injuries upon the forces sent against him. For a detailed account of the operations of General McCook's command I respectfully refer you to his report, submitted herewith.

On the 9th of November I received orders from Major General Thomas to move my command to the north side of the Cumberland, to take position between the Hillsboro' and Hardin pikes, and to be in readiness to join in the attack against General Hood the next day. But a heavy rain setting in, General Thomas delayed his operations; snow, sleet, and intense cold followed, covering the ground so thickly with ice as to render it impossible to move cavalry not specially shod

for such an occasion. In fact, neither infantry nor cavalry could have marched over a country so undulating and broken as that separating our lines from those of the enemy.

On the evening of the 11th the weather changed, and the ice began to melt. The cavalry corps (all detachments having been drawn in) in the morning began crossing, and by night was in the position assigned it, ready to move against the enemy as soon as the condition of the ground would allow it. By the night of the 14th everything seemed favorable, officers and men confident of the result that would follow a well directed attack. In the order of battle made by General Thomas, the cavalry was directed to attack upon the right of the infantry, conform to its movements, drive the enemy's force from the Charlotte and Hardin pikes, and the banks of the Cumberland at Bell's landing, turn and envelop the enemy's left flank, and, if possible, strike them in the rear. In making arrangements to comply with these instructions, I conferred with General A. J. Smith, commanding the detachments of the army of the Tennessee. His troops having been engaged in holding that part of the defences from the Hillsboro' pike, westward to the river, it was necessary for them to assemble in such a way as not to encumber the ground upon which the cavalry was to operate. To accomplish this the general assured me he would march the division on my right to the left, by roads to the rear of my command inside of the intrenchments. The commanding officers of brigades and divisions, having personally examined the ground upon which they were to operate, were assembled at my headquarters, and received their instructions verbally. To prevent any misunderstanding they were furnished with written orders, to the following effect, on the night of the 14th November. The fifth division, Brigadier General Edward Hatch commanding, was directed to debouch from the fortifications at or near the Hardin pike, and move with its right flank on or near the pike, its left flank connected with the infantry of Major General Smith to clear its own front, and as soon as Smith should carry the rebel advanced position to swing to the left, envelop and take in reverse the enemy's left flank. Croxton's brigade, of the first division, was ordered to debouch near the Hardin pike by a direct road between that and the Charlotte pike, to move with its left flank connecting with Hatch's division and its right, following the line of the ridge between the Charlotte and Hardin pike. After clearing the Hardin pike of the enemy, and crossing Richland creek, General Croxton was directed to conform to the movements on his left. The sixth division, (one brigade mounted, the other having no horses,) Brigadier General R. W. Johnson commanding, was ordered to move by the Charlotte pike, clear that road of the enemy, keeping connexion with Croxton's by skirmishers or patrols, and to push as far as Davidson's house, eight miles from the city, so as to cover the movement of the balance of the corps from the enemy's cavalry. General Johnson was specially charged with looking out for the guns at Bell's landing, and the force with them. Brigadier General James F. Knipe, commanding the seventh division, (one brigade mounted, the other dismounted,) was directed to debouch on the Hardin pike after the movement had begun, and hold himself in readiness to move in any direction. Brigade and division commanders were informed that the operations of the cavalry corps were designed to clear the enemy from its immediate front, cover the right of the infantry, envelop the enemy's left flank, attack him in the rear, and, if possible, to force its way to the Franklin pike, at or near Brentwood. The country being ploughed fields or heavily timbered hills, very abrupt and difficult, they were directed to leave all wheels, except those of the artillery, behind. The whole command was under arms, ready to move by 6 a. m., December 15, but owing to a dense fog the attack was delayed. By 8.30 a. m. it had cleared away, but McArthur's division not having been directed to march, as General Smith had promised, moved across the front of my command, thereby delaying the general advance until about 10 a. m. Had the enemy been specially alert this delay might have been very detrimental

to the execution of the plan of attack. As soon, however, as the infantry on Hatch's left began moving he advanced but his left, touching the Hardin pike, and his right extending towards the Charlotte pike. The position which the infantry occupied being further to the right than was originally intended compelled a corresponding change on the part of the cavalry. Simultaneously with the advance of the infantry the cavalry forces moved as directed. Hatch's division was still further delayed, after beginning to advance, by McArthur's infantry, but finally, having a clear road, advanced rapidly with a strong line of skirmishers. The enemy (Ecton's brigade of infantry) were found posted beyond Richland creek, on commanding ground well intrenched, but by a gallant charge by Stewart's brigade were driven rapidly beyond Hardin's house with the loss of some prisoners and intrenching tools. When near the latter place the twelfth Tennessee cavalry, Colonel Spaulding commanding, charged the enemy, capturing forty-three prisoners, the headquarters train of General Chambers, fourteen wagons, containing baggage, papers, and records. Having cleared his front, General Hatch marched rapidly by the left flank with his first brigade to join the second brigade, which, wheeling with the infantry, found itself on the flank of a four-gun battery posted in a redoubt covering the enemy's left. Having posted his battery I, first Illinois light artillery, so as to enfilade the enemy, General Hatch pushed forward Colonel Coon's brigade, (dismounted,) charged the rebel infantry supports, broke them, and captured the redoubt with its guns. Lieutenant Budd, of the second Iowa cavalry, was the first man in the redoubt, closely followed by Lieutenant Colvier, acting assistant adjutant general of the division. In this attack a portion of the infantry skirmish line gave assistance. The captured guns were turned upon the enemy, occupying a higher hill strongly intrenched, still further on. Hastily forming, the second brigade pushed boldly forward, the first brigade following the movement still further to the right. The enemy's rear position was very strong; the left of their line occupied a hill still higher than the one already carried, and with steep sides. On the top of it they had constructed an irregular enclosed work of rails and earth, in which a four-gun field battery was placed. To men less brave and determined than the dismounted horsemen of Hatch's division, it would have seemed like madness to attack such a position. I have seen columns of infantry hesitate to attack positions not half so strong, but Coon's brigade, armed with the Spencer carbine, and in strong line of skirmishers, at the command of General Hatch advanced at the charge. In spite of the steep acclivity and withering fire of artillery and musketry from the rebel parapet, the redoubt was carried with the battery of four guns, and about two hundred and fifty prisoners. While the second brigade was collecting and forming its scattered ranks General Hatch, with the first brigade, crossed the Hillsboro' pike, and again attacked the enemy on another range of hills, drove them from it, and took possession of a battery of four guns in the valley beyond. It was almost dark; the cavalymen, having been fighting all day on foot, owing to the roughness of the country, were exceedingly fatigued. General Hatch was directed to bring up his horses, collect his men, and bivouack on the Hillsboro' pike. The 23d corps, Major General Schofield commanding, had moved to the right of Smith's corps, and carried the hills in its front just before dark. General Hatch was directed to connect with Schofield's right, and cover it from the enemy. As soon as Hatch had broken through the enemy on Hardin pike Knipe was directed to move out and pass to Hatch's right, conform to his movements, and push in upon the enemy's rear. The first brigade, Brevet Brigadier General Hammond commanding, advanced to the Hillsboro' pike, striking it near the six-mile post, and three miles further on turned up a branch of Richland creek and reached the Granny White pike just at dark. The dismounted brigade took position on the Hillsboro' pike, covering Hatch and Hammond from an advance of the rebel cavalry on that road. Croxon's brigade and Johnson's division having been delayed, like Hatch, by McAr-

thur's infantry, moved promptly forward at the word, and found the enemy posted beyond Richland creek. The rebel cavalry, with four guns well posted, seemed determined to hold their ground, but strongly attacked by Harrison's brigade of Johnson's division in front, while Croxton's pressed on their right, they were forced to give way. Croxton, after following several miles, turned to the left, crossed the Harding pike, and marched through the country, skirmishing with Chambers, moving in the same direction, and, finally, after dark, bivouacked near the six-mile post on the Hillsboro' pike. Johnson continued his advance along the Charlotte pike and came up with the rebels, strongly posted, beyond a small creek emptying into the Cumberland river, near Bell's landing. After some sharp skirmishing, General Johnson made dispositions to attack the rebels' right in conjunction with Croxton, hoping thereby to drive them from the road and separate them from the main rebel army. The gunboats dropped down and opened upon their flanks, while Lieutenant Smith, with battery I, fourth United States artillery, opened upon them in front. General Croxton having by my orders turned towards the left, General Johnson did not think himself strong enough to risk an attack upon the rebel position; night coming on he bivouacked in their front, intending to attack before daylight the next morning. This plan was frustrated by the withdrawal of the rebels after night. The first day's operations having resulted in driving back the enemy's entire left wing four miles, with our cavalry on the left flank and rear of the enemy, orders were issued for the continuance of operations the next day.

Early on the morning of the 16th Hammond's pickets, on the Granny White pike, were attacked and driven in, but ordering him to strengthen them with his entire brigade, if necessary, he in turn drove the enemy back. At the same time I directed General Hatch to move upon the enemy's rear, passing towards Hammond's left. The country, very hilly and densely covered with timber, was entirely impracticable for mounted men. The whole force was, therefore, dismounted and pushed forward. Croxton moved to the front, ready to support either Hammond or Hatch, and orders were sent to Johnson to march across the country to the Hillsboro' pike. By noon the skirmishers of Hatch and Hammond had formed a continuous line, stretching from the right of Schofield's corps across the Granny White pike. This line was parallel to that of the enemy, and facing in the direction of Nashville. The men of the fifth and seventh divisions, urged forward by their gallant officers, steadily pressed the enemy back at every point, skirmishing heavily. Having informed Generals Thomas and Schofield of the position occupied by my command, and what it was doing, the infantry was ordered forward on the right, and as they charged the front of the rebels' works, Coon's brigade of Hatch's division attacked them in the rear. Pressed in front, flank, and rear, about 4 p. m. the enemy broke and fled in confusion from the field; Croxton's was hurried from the Hillsboro' pike, towards Brentwood, but could not reach the flying army before dark. Hatch and Knipe were ordered to mount their commands and pursue with all possible rapidity. As on the day before, from the difficult character of the ground, and the distance travelled dismounted, considerable time was unavoidably lost before the horses could be led to the men. Hatch was directed to push down the Granny White pike, and if possible reach the Franklin pike that night. He had not, however, gone more than a mile when his advance encountered the enemy's cavalry, (Chalmers's division,) strongly posted across the road beyond a barricade of rails. A portion of the command were hastily dismounted and deployed on both sides of the road. While the skirmishers were advancing, the twelfth Tennessee cavalry, led by Colonel Spaulding, charged the enemy, broke his lines, scattered them in all directions, and captured Brigadier General Rucker, then in command of the division. Night having closed in, the enemy was enabled to make his escape. The pursuit was necessarily discontinued; men and horses being worn out and hungry. The



corps bivouacked for the night; Knipe, Croxton, and Hatch's on the Granny White pike, and Johnson, on the Hillsboro' pike, near the Harpeth river. Before daylight they were in motion again; Knipe's, in the advance, marched through the country to the Franklin pike; Croxton crossed and marched over on the other side, through the fields, to its left; Hatch marched down almost simultaneously with Harrison's advance. Hatch and Croxton crossed soon after at the fords above the town. At Franklin the enemy's hospitals, with about two thousand wounded, fell into our hands; two hundred of our own wounded, left there on the retreat to Nashville, were also recovered, together with 1,700 rations. The pursuit was immediately continued, Knipe and Hatch moving in parallel columns along the Carter's Creek pike and Columbia pike; Johnson down the Carter's Creek pike, and Croxton on the Lewisburg pike. The flanking columns were directed to push rapidly forward, and endeavor to press round the flanks of the enemy's rear-guard, composed almost entirely of infantry, while a strong force of skirmishers across the pike should press it continually, and compel it to form line as frequently as possible. By these means I hoped to break up their last organized force, and disperse their disorganized and flying mass they were covering. My orders were obeyed with great alacrity, but the enemy finding his flank so much endangered, retired as rapidly, but skirmishing heavily with Hatch and Knipe. Late in the evening, apparently exhausted with rapid marching, the rebels took a strong position in open fields, about a mile north of the West Harpeth. It was then almost dark from fog and approaching night. The men of General Hatch's advance, by their rapid movements, had become so intermingled with the sullen and disheartened enemy, he began to doubt that the forces in his front were really those of the rebel rear-guard. The momentary hesitation caused by this uncertainty gave the rebels an opportunity to put their batteries in position and reform their line. I immediately gave orders for Hatch and Knipe to collect their men and charge both flanks of the enemy, and directed my escort, the fourth United States cavalry, about two hundred strong, Lieutenant Joseph Hedges commanding, to charge their centre on the pike. These orders had scarcely been given, before the enemy opened a rapid fire from their battery, not over three hundred yards from us. Hatch's battery promptly replied; Lieutenant Hedges, thinking that I simply wished him to ascertain the real character of the force in our front, hastily moved his regiment about, and to the side of the road, out of the range of the rebel guns, but, at my order, as promptly resumed his original formation in column of fours, in the road, and dashing forward at the gallop, with sabres drawn, broke through the enemy's battery. Hatch's division and Hammond's brigade, dismounted, dashed forward at the same time. The enemy, broken in the centre and pressed back on both flanks, fled rapidly from the field, withdrawing his guns at a gallop. Lieutenant Hedges, outstripping his men, was captured three different times, but throwing away his hat and raising the cry, "the Yankees are coming; run for your lives," succeeded in getting away. The rout was complete, and although it was then very dark, everybody pressed rapidly forward; the fourth cavalry and General Hatch, with a handful of men, in advance on the pike, and the fifth division on the right and left. General Hammond, with the tenth Indiana cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel Gresham commanding, fording the West Harpeth, a few hundred yards to the right, again struck the rebels on the flank. Pressed in all directions, the artillerymen left their guns and saved themselves as best they could; the infantry scattered in all directions. Darkness alone enabled the entire command to escape. The rebel force was found to be Stevenson's division of Lee's corps, under command of General Forrest, who had just returned from Murfreesboro'. Early the next morning the cavalry corps, although out of rations, again renewed the pursuit; Croxton and Johnson endeavoring to strike the enemy at Spring Hill; Hatch and Knipe moving as the day before. The enemy having encamped at Spring Hill, marched rapidly

towards Columbia, but could not be again brought to a stand. The densely wooded country, muddy roads, and ploughed fields, rendered almost impassable by the constant rain, made it very difficult for the troops, travelling on the right and left of the pike, to get forward fast enough to overtake the enemy marching on the pike. Late in the afternoon the command halted seven miles north of Columbia, for rations, having had nothing to eat since the day before, and nothing in the country for them to take. Supplies arrived during the night, and early in the morning the pursuit was resumed, notwithstanding a heavy storm of rain and snow then prevailing. General Hatch arrived at Rutherford creek at an early hour, followed closely by the 4th corps. Owing to the inclemency of the weather, by order of General Thomas, the balance of the cavalry corps remained in bivouack. Rutherford creek, swollen by the rains, and having steep and abrupt banks, could not be forded. The pontoon train was behind, and did not arrive until the next day.

The enemy occupied a strong position, commanding the site of the old bridge. General Hatch succeeded in crossing a few skirmishers on the ruins of the upper railroad bridge, about a mile from the pike, but after some skirmishing withdrew them to the north bank after dark.

The morning of the 26th, General Hatch constructed a floating bridge out of the debris of the lower railroad bridge, and crossed his entire command; but the enemy had succeeded in getting everything across Duck river the night before. This stream being also much swollen, could not be crossed until the pontoon bridge was laid. Brigadier Generals Johnson and Knipe were sent to Nashville to remount their dismounted brigades on the 20th.

On the 24th of December, the whole corps having crossed Duck river, resumed the pursuit, but General Hood had improved his opportunity, and re-formed his rear-guard by selecting all of the well armed infantry of his command. They were organized into eight brigades of about five hundred men each. The available cavalry that could be controlled were also used, all under the command of Lieutenant General Forrest. The teams and body of the army were hurried towards the Tennessee river, marching to Pulaski, and thence by the dirt roads to Bainbridge. The rear-guard had thus a clear road, and when pressed could fall back rapidly. The country on the right and left of the pike, very broken and densely timbered, was almost impassable; the pike itself passing through the gorges of the hills, was advantageous to the enemy. With a few men he could compel the pursuing force to develop a front almost anywhere. In the vicinity of Lynnville, the country being open, the rebels were driven rapidly back, and at Buford's station, near Richland creek, while Hatch was pressing them on the pike, Croxton struck them in flank, and drove them in confusion beyond Richland creek. In this affair one flag and a number of prisoners were captured, and the rebel General Buford wounded through the leg. The rebels retreated that night to the vicinity of Pulaski, but the next day were driven through that place, closely pressed by Harrison's brigade. The brigade across Richland creek was saved by the celerity and good management with which Colonel Harrison handled his command, so that without delaying he continued the pursuit, and by 2 p. m. came up with the enemy strongly intrenched at the head of a heavily wooded and deep ravine through which ran the road. The country was so difficult and broken that the men of Harrison's brigade were necessarily in weak order, but nothing daunted, they pressed the enemy's skirmishers back to their fortified position. Here they were compelled to halt, and while the troops of Hatch's, Croxton's, and Hammond's commands were marching through the woods to their support, a few hundred of the enemy's infantry, for the first time since the battles about Nashville, sallied forth from their breastworks and drove back Harrison's attenuated skirmish line, and captured one gun of Smith's battery I, fourth United States artillery. They were promptly driven back, but had succeeded in getting the captured gun off. Hammond, Croxton, and Hatch

moving on the flanks of their position, they abandoned it hastily just before night, leaving about fifty prisoners in our hands.

On the 26th the pursuit was continued to the Sugar creeek, the enemy falling back, and making but slight resistance. At the latter place they took up a strong position, and held it until General Hammond had developed his forces, and got ready to attack. Hastily withdrawing, they continued their march throughout the night. It has now become evident that no effort on the part of my command could again bring Forrest to such another engagement. Having neither rations nor forage, and learning that the main body of the rebel troops had already reached the south side of the Tennessee, I directed the corps to halt, and the next morning I sent Colonel Spaulding, of the twelfth Tennessee cavalry, with five hundred picked men, after the enemy, with directions to continue the pursuit until he had reached the Tennessee river. He reached the river at Bainbridge early on the morning of the 28th, the last of the enemy having crossed and taken up the bridge during the night. The road from Pulaski to Bainbridge was as bad as it could possibly be, the country through which it runs almost entirely denuded of forage and army supplies. Both men and horses suffered greatly. Hood having effected his escape, the corps was ordered to Eastport for the purpose of refitting and resting. Before this order was received, however, Hatch, Hammond, and Harrison had marched to Athens, on the road to Huntsville, in pursuance of previous instructions from General Thomas. The report of the provost marshal shows that during these operations the corps captured from the enemy thirty-two guns, eleven caissons, twelve colors, three thousand two hundred and thirty-two prisoners, including one general officer, and compelled them to abandon or destroy over one hundred wagons, eight ambulances, and one thousand three hundred and forty-eight mules. Detachments of the sixth and seventh divisions accompanied the movement of Major General Steedman south of the Tennessee, and burned the rebel pontoon and a large supply train—in all eighty pontoons, and one hundred and twenty-five wagons. Our losses were one gun, one hundred and twenty-two officers and men killed, five hundred and twenty-one wounded, two hundred and fifty-nine missing.

For the details of these operations, and acts of special gallantry, I respectfully refer to the reports of Generals McCook, Hatch, Hammond, Johnson, and Croxton, which I submit herewith. Reports of other commanders will be sent forward as soon as obtained.

The operations of the third division, extending from Atlanta to Savannah, are fully detailed in the report of General Kilpatrick and his subordinate officers, submitted herewith.

General Kilpatrick and his gallant command are specially worthy of praise for the admirable manner in which they co-operated with the movements of the infantry in their long and tiresome march, as well as for the confidence and bravery with which they attacked and defeated, at various times, the superior numbers of the rebel cavalry under General Wheeler.

The officers of my staff have performed their duties most efficiently throughout the entire campaign, but I am particularly indebted to Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Alexander, assistant adjutant general 17th corps, chief of staff, Major E. B. Beaumont, assistant adjutant general, Captain E. B. Carling, chief quartermaster, and Captain J. C. Reed, chief commissary. These officers have fully earned the promotion for which they have been already recommended to the War Department.

It is with great pleasure I mention the services of Major W. P. Chambliss and Captain John Green, United States army, inspectors of cavalry. In furnishing re-mounts, arms, and preparing troops for the field, they have done more than all other persons towards promoting the efficiency of the cavalry service in this military division.

Before closing this report it may not be improper to say that through the

entire campaign the bravery and steadiness of the cavalry troops, new and old, were most conspicuous. Nothing could have been more admirable than their conduct on the Harpeth, in the two days' battle at Nashville, in the affair on the West Harpeth, or in the pursuit which followed. I know of no battles in the war where the influence of the cavalry was more patient, or of any pursuit sustained so long and well. The results of the campaign, added to those following the same policy in the army of the Potomac, clearly demonstrate the wisdom of massing the cavalry of an army, and it is to be hoped will obtain from the War Department a recognition of the corps already organized.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. WILSON,

*Brevet Major General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.*

Brigadier General W. D. WHIPPLE,

*Assistant Adjutant General and Chief of Staff,*

*Headquarters Department of the Cumberland.*

#### HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF ETGWAH,

*Chattanooga, Tenn., January 27, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command during the recent campaign, which resulted in the defeat of the enemy before Nashville and his retreat to Alabama.

In obedience to orders of Major General Thomas, my command, consisting of the eighteenth regiment Ohio volunteers, sixty-eighth regiment Indiana volunteers, sixth Indiana dismounted cavalry, fourteenth, sixteenth, and forty-fourth United States colored troops, detachment of the 14th, 20th, and 17th army corps, organized into a provisional division and commanded by Brigadier General Charles Craft, and the eighteenth and twentieth Indiana batteries, amounting in the aggregate to about fifty-two hundred men, moved from Chattanooga, by railroad, on the 29th day of November, and proceeded to Cowan, Tennessee, where I took my command from the cars the next morning at 8 o'clock and placed it in position.

At 6 o'clock p. m. of the same day, I received an order by telegraph, from the major general commanding, to proceed as rapidly as possible with my command and report to him at Nashville, arriving at that place at 5 o'clock p. m. on the first day of December. By an accident to one of the trains, the command of Colonel Johnson, of the forty-fourth United States colored infantry, was detained until the morning of the 2d of December, when the train conveying the troops was attacked by the cavalry of the enemy five miles south of Nashville. I herewith submit Colonel Johnson's report of the encounters with the enemy.

On the 2d day of December I moved my command, by order of the major general commanding, into position, and occupied and fortified the ridge between the Murfreesboro' and Nolensville pike, and crossing the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad on Rain's farm.

*December 3.*—By order of Major General Thomas, I withdrew my command from the position occupied the day previous and placed it on a line indicated, nearer the city of Nashville, on the north side of Brown's creek, extending from the Nolensville pike across the Murfreesboro' pike, the left resting near the house of Major Lewis, a short distance from the Lebanon pike. This position was strongly fortified by my troops and held until they were withdrawn to participate in the action of the 15th of December.

*December 5 and 7.*—By order of Major General Thomas, I directed a small brigade of colored troops, under command of Colonel T. J. Morgan, of the fourteenth United States colored troops, and the sixty-eighth Indiana volunteers and sixth Indiana dismounted cavalry, under command of Colonel Biddle, to

reconnoitre the position of the enemy in my front. This force on both days drove the enemy from the left of the works, constructed by my command on Rain's farm, which he had taken possession of after my troops abandoned them. These reconnoissances were conducted by the officers in command with prudence, energy, and ability, and were successful in developing the enemy's position. A detailed account of the results will be found in the report of Colonel Morgan herewith forwarded.

*December 11.*—In compliance with the order of Major General Thomas, I directed Brigadier General Craft to reconnoitre the enemy's position. This reconnoissance, made by a brigade under the command of Colonel J. G. Mitchell, owing to the whole surface of country being covered with ice, rendering it impossible for men or animals to move over uneven ground, and on account of the steep slopes to be ascended in approaching the enemy's position, was a difficult duty, but it was accomplished and the position of the enemy developed.

*December 13.*—In obedience to the order of Major General Thomas, a brigade of General Craft's troops, under the command of Colonel A. A. Mulley, reconnoitred in front of my position and felt the enemy's right. The ground being still covered with smooth ice rendered the movement tedious and hazardous, but under all the disadvantages was skilfully executed, the enemy forced into his works, and the objects of the reconnoissance accomplished. The movement was made under the immediate direction of General Craft.

*December 15.*—The weather having moderated and the ground thawed sufficiently to enable men and animals to stand up, in obedience to the orders of Major General Thomas, the provisional division of troops, under the command of Brigadier General Craft, moved at 4 o'clock a. m. and relieved the troops of the 4th and 23d army corps, occupying the exterior line of works, and protecting the front of this line from the Acklin Place to Fort Negley, and commanding the approaches to the city by the Granny White, Franklin, and Nolensville pikes. Brigadier General J. F. Miller reported his command to me at 4 o'clock a. m., and occupied the works from Fort Negley to the Lebanon pike, commanding the approaches to the city by the Murfreesboro', Chicken, and Lebanon pikes. Brigadier General J. L. Donaldson reported his command at 6 o'clock and occupied the works from the right of General Craft's command to the Cumberland river, commanding the approaches to the city by the Harding and Hillsboro' turnpikes. Having thus disposed the troops as directed for the protection of the city, fully commanding all its approaches, and rendering the public property and supplies secure against sudden attack from either flank, I moved at half past 5 o'clock a. m., in obedience to the orders of Major General Thomas, with the twelfth, thirteenth, and one hundredth regiments of colored troops, under the command of Colonel Thompson, of the twelfth colored; the fourteenth, seventeenth, forty-fourth, and a detachment of the eighteenth regiment colored troops, under command of Colonel T. J. Morgan, of the fourteenth colored; the sixty-eighth Indiana volunteers, eighteenth Ohio volunteers, and the second battalion of the 14th army corps, under command of Lieutenant Colonel C. H. Grosvenor, and the twentieth Indiana and eighteenth Ohio batteries, to attack the enemy's right, employ his forces at that point, and as far as possible by my movement to mislead him as to the real point of attack. The fog was very dense and delayed, somewhat, movement on the entire line. A few minutes before 8, when the fog had partially cleared away and all my dispositions had been made for attack, Brigadier General William D. Whipple, chief of staff of the department of the Cumberland, instructed me, by order of Major General Thomas, as to the line of attack; at 8 o'clock, the time designated, the attack was made by the troops of Colonel Morgan and Lieutenant Colonel Grosvenor, Colonel Morgan commanding, advancing from the Murfreesboro' pike towards Riddler's Hill, rapidly driving in the pickets of the enemy, and assaulting his line of works between the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad and the Murfreesboro' pike. In this

assault the troops behaved well, carrying a position of the enemy's works, but as they were exposed to destructive fire, the enemy rapidly re-enforcing that point of his line, and as my object was to deceive the enemy as to the purposes of the major general commanding, I withdrew this force and immediately reformed it for an attack on a force occupying an earthwork east of and within short musket range of the Rains house. This attack was made at 11 o'clock a. m. and resulted in my troops getting possession of the Rains house and other adjacent brick out-buildings, which were loopholed and held until next morning. While these attacks were being made by the troops under Colonel Morgan, Colonel Thompson's command moved across Brown's creek, between the Nolensville and Murfreesboro' turnpikes, and attacked and carried the left of the front line of works of the enemy resting on the Nolensville pike. This portion of the enemy's line was held by Colonel Thompson's command until the morning of the 16th. During the operations of my command against the enemy's right, General Craft, holding the exterior line protecting the city and watching vigilantly all the movements, saw an opportunity to use his artillery on a flying column of the enemy's troops, and promptly ordered the twenty-fourth Indiana battery, Captain Sturm, to open, which he did with effect, scattering and demoralizing this force. Darkness closed the operations of the day; all the orders I received from Major General Thomas had been executed, his plans successful, and victory crowned our efforts. Throughout the day, and until the action closed at dark, my command behaved nobly, making the several assaults ordered with cool, steady bravery, retiring only when ordered to do so. A portion of the command suffered severely; but no troops behaving as gallant as they did, in assaulting fortified positions, could have suffered less or borne their losses more heroically.

*December 16.*—At 6 o'clock a. m., in obedience to the orders of Major General Thomas, my command moved on the enemy's works and found that he had evacuated the right of his line in my front during the night. Pushing out my troops on the Nolensville pike, rapidly driving his cavalry, I took up a position between the Nolensville pike and the left of the 4th corps, commanded by Brigadier General T. J. Wood, my right resting on the railroad, my left refused near the Nolensville pike and covering the entire left of our line, engaging and putting to flight a portion of the enemy's cavalry. General Craft, as I advanced with the troops under my command, uncovering the approaches to the city by the way of the Murfreesboro' and Nolensville pike, promptly pushed forward a brigade of his troops under the command of Colonel John G. Mitchell, and occupied Riddler's Hill, protecting our rear against any attempt of the enemy to use his cavalry to annoy us or interfere with our ammunition or ambulance trains. At 1 o'clock p. m., in obedience to an order of Major General Thomas, my command formed a junction with the command of General Wood, and my troops united with General Wood's in assaulting the enemy, who was strongly posted and fortified on Overton Hill. In this assault, although unsuccessful, the troops engaged—two brigades of General Wood's, and Colonel Thompson's brigade of colored troops, and Lieutenant Colonel Grosvenor's brigade, from my command—exhibited courage and steadiness that challenged the admiration of all who witnessed the charge. The concentrated fire of musketry and canister from the enemy's works forced back the men with severe loss. They were immediately reformed to renew the assault which would have been promptly made, but a division of General Wood's troops, as I was informed, on the right of the Franklin pike, taking advantage of the withdrawal by the enemy of a portion of his troops in their front to re-enforce Overton Hill, made a charge, which caused the entire line of the enemy to give way and retreat rapidly and in disorder. My troops, in conjunction with General Wood's, immediately pursued rapidly, taking a number of prisoners. The pursuit was continued until after dark, when our exhausted troops bivouacked for the night near Brentwood.

*December 17.*—My command, in obedience to orders, continued the pursuit covering and protecting the left of our line, moving from Brentwood, on the Wilson pike, to a point four miles south of Brentwood, and crossing from that point by a southwest road to Franklin, where it bivouacked for the night, not being able to cross the Harpeth river, which was much swollen by the heavy rains of the night and day previous, and the bridges destroyed by the enemy.

*December 18.*—My command moved across the river and proceeded about three miles beyond Franklin, on the road to Spring Hill, when, in obedience to orders, I returned with my troops to Franklin and marched to Murfreesboro' to proceed by rail to Decatur, moving General Craft's troops from Nashville by the Murfreesboro' pike. The whole command was concentrated at Murfreesboro' on the evening of the 20th. At Murfreesboro' I received despatches from Colonel A. J. Mackay, chief quartermaster of the department, informing me that the transportation necessary to move my command by rail to Decatur was on the way from Chattanooga, and transports conveying supplies would meet me at such point as I might designate. These orders and dispositions of Colonel Mackay were all perfect, but the severe cold weather and the criminal negligence, incompetency, and indifference of a portion of the railroad employes occasioned serious delay.

On the morning of the 22d of December my command moved from Murfreesboro', reaching the mouth of Limestone river on the evening of the 26th, where I found Brigadier General R. S. Granger with his command, with four gunboats, one armed transport, (the Stone River,) and five transports, with rations and forage, forwarded from Chattanooga for my command.

*December 27.*—Having constructed the trestles and secured the plank necessary to bridge a lagoon on the south side of the Tennessee river, the night previous, I moved a portion of my command, with the transports conveyed by the gunboats, down the river to a point three miles above Decatur, where a landing was effected, the lagoon rapidly bridged, the troops crossed and pushed out in the direction of Decatur. The enemy attempted to check the crossing of the troops with artillery, which he posted within half a mile of where we were crossing the lagoon; but my advance having crossed before this artillery opened, was rapidly pushed out and drove it off. At 3 o'clock p. m. the whole of my infantry had crossed, and at 7 o'clock p. m. was in possession of Decatur.

*December 28.*—My artillery and cavalry were crossed, the command rationed, and moved out three miles on the road to Courtland. The cavalry, the fifteenth Pennsylvania, Colonel Palmer, and detachments of the second Tennessee, tenth, twelfth, and thirteenth Indiana, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Prosser, amounting in the aggregate to about 650 men, Colonel William L. Palmer, of the fifteenth Pennsylvania, commanding, moved from Decatur at 8 o'clock p. m. and pushed rapidly forward, encountering the enemy six miles from the river in the Courtland road, and at once attacked and routed him, capturing his artillery, a section of 6-pounder brass guns.

*December 29.*—My command moved at daylight, the cavalry in advance, and went into camp at 5 o'clock within four miles of Courtland. The infantry met no opposition; the cavalry skirmished most of the day in advance of the infantry, driving the enemy rapidly towards Courtland. At Pond spring, three miles northeast of Courtland, he made a stand, but was immediately charged and routed by my cavalry. The report of Colonel Palmer, commanding the cavalry, herewith forwarded, gives a full account of this affair.

*December 30.*—My infantry moved to Courtland and went into camp on the south side of the Tennessee, on Big Nancy creek; the cavalry pushed on as far as Leighton, thirteen miles west of Courtland. At 5 o'clock p. m. I received a despatch from Colonel Palmer, written at Leighton, asking my permission to pursue, capture, and destroy Hood's pontoon train. I immediately gave him permission to exercise his own judgment in the matter. He decided to pursue, and in the

most splendid manner not only accomplished all he proposed, the destruction of the pontoon train, but pursued, captured, and destroyed a supply train of one hundred and ten wagons. Colonel Palmer's command, in this enterprising and daring expedition, captured and destroyed upwards of three hundred wagons, nearly one thousand stand of arms, a large number of mules and oxen, and captured and turned over two pieces of artillery, two hundred prisoners, including thirteen commissioned officers and one hundred and seventy serviceable mules. To support the movement of Colonel Palmer, I advanced two brigades of infantry, under command of Colonel Thompson, to Town creek, seven miles west of Courtland, and one brigade, under command of Colonel Salm to Leighton. General Craft's division, with the artillery, remained at Courtland.

*January 3.*—Having learned that Colonel Palmer had been successful, and receiving an order from Major General Thomas to return my command to Chattanooga, I moved with my infantry and artillery for Decatur, reaching that place on the evening of the 5th of January.

*January 4.*—At 1 o'clock a. m. I moved with the artillery and sick of the command, on board the transports for Chattanooga, leaving Brigadier General Craft to return with the infantry by rail. General Craft was delayed several days on his return by an order of Major General Thomas, directing him to pursue the rebel General Lyon. This portion of the campaign, owing to the heavy rains swelling all the streams out of their banks, and rendering the roads almost wholly impassable, was very arduous, but was skilfully and satisfactorily conducted by General Craft, resulting in the capture of a part of Lyon's men, and driving all that escaped out of the country, utterly demoralized. The report of General Craft, herewith forwarded, gives a detailed history of his operations in pursuit of General Lyon.

*January 13.*—General Craft returned to Chattanooga with his command.

The following table will show the casualties of my command during the entire campaign :

Commands.	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL.		Grand total.
	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	
14th U. S. colored troops*.....	.....	4	.....	41	.....	20	.....	65	.....
44th U. S. colored troops.....	1	2	.....	27	2	49	3	78	.....
16th U. S. colored troops.....	.....	1	.....	2	.....	.....	.....	3	.....
18th U. S. colored troops.....	.....	1	.....	5	.....	3	.....	9	.....
17th U. S. colored troops.....	2	14	4	64	.....	.....	6	78	.....
12th U. S. colored troops†.....	3	10	3	99	.....	.....	6	109	.....
13th U. S. colored troops.....	4	51	4	161	.....	1	8	213	.....
100th U. S. colored troops.....	.....	12	5	46	.....	.....	5	128	.....
18th Ohio infantry†.....	2	9	2	38	.....	9	4	56	.....
68th Indiana.....	.....	1	.....	7	.....	.....	.....	8	.....
Provisional div. A. C. ....	1	19	3	74	.....	33	4	126	.....
20th Indiana battery§.....	.....	.....	2	6	.....	.....	2	6	.....
Aggregate.....	13	124	23	640	2	115	38	879	917

\* Organized in the first colored brigade, Colonel T. J. Morgan commanding.

† Organized in the second colored brigade, Colonel C. R. Thompson commanding.

‡ Included in the provisional division army of the Cumberland, Brigadier General Craft commanding.

§ Captain Osborn.



The larger portion of these losses, amounting in the aggregate to fully twenty-five per cent. of the men under my command who were taken into action, it will be observed, fell upon the colored troops. The severe loss of this part of my troops was in their brilliant charge on the enemy's works on Overton Hill, on Friday afternoon. I was unable to discover that color made any difference in the fighting of my troops; all, white and black, nobly did their duty as soldiers, and evinced cheerfulness and resolution such as I have never seen excelled in any campaign of the war in which I have borne a part. In closing this brief report of the operations of my command during the campaign, I feel that justice compels me to mention several officers who distinguished themselves by their energy, courage, and unremitting efforts to secure success.

Brigadier General Charles Craft performed herculean labor in organizing, arming, and equipping the detachments of recruits, drafted men, and furloughed soldiers of the army of the Tennessee to the number of fourteen thousand, ten thousand of whom took part in the campaign, in battles before Nashville, and in guarding the railroad defences south of the Tennessee river. Six thousand of these men were commanded by the general in person, in the field, from the commencement until the close of the campaign. The general deserves the thanks of the country for the able and efficient manner in which he has performed his duty. Brigadier General John T. Miller, commanding post of Nashville, displayed energy, efficiency, and promptness in placing his troops in position to hold a portion of the exterior line protecting the city of Nashville. I am much indebted to Brigadier General Donaldson, chief quartermaster of the department, for his efficient and energetic efforts to fit out my command on its arrival at Nashville, and for the assistance he rendered, with the armed men of his department, in protecting the city of Nashville pending the engagement. My thanks are due to A. J. Mackay, chief quartermaster of the army of the Cumberland, for his promptness in furnishing transportation to convey my command from Murfreesboro' to Decatur, and forwarding supplies for my troops, by transports, to the mouth of Limestone river. Colonel Felix Prince Salm, sixty-eighth New York veteran volunteers, commanded a provisional brigade of my troops, and exhibited high qualities as a soldier. I respectfully recommend him for promotion. Colonel T. J. Morgan, fourteenth United States colored troops, behaved gallantly. I respectfully recommend him for promotion. Lieutenant Colonel C. H. Grosvenor, eighteenth Ohio volunteers, behaved nobly in leading a charge on the rebel works on the Rain's farm.

The following officers of my staff accompanied me on the campaign and discharged all the duties that devolved upon them in a most satisfactory manner:

Colonel C. S. Cotter, first Ohio light artillery, chief of artillery; Major S. B. Moe, assistant adjutant general; Captain A. Mills, eighteenth United States infantry, inspector; Captain M. Davis, fourteenth Ohio volunteers, aide-de-camp; Captain W. M. Steedman, fourteenth Ohio volunteers, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant I. G. M. Adams, sixth Kentucky cavalry, assistant commissary subsistence. Colonel S. C. B. Banning, one hundred and twenty-first Ohio volunteers, served me ably as provost marshal; Captain A. R. Keller, assistant quartermaster, reported to me and rendered me efficient service as quartermaster for my command. I am deeply indebted to Major S. B. Moe, my assistant adjutant general, for his efficient and gallant services on the field, as well as for the valuable aid which his large experience as a railroad man enabled him to render me in pushing through the trains conveying my troops from Chattanooga to Nashville, and from Murfreesboro' to Decatur. Captain Osborn, twentieth Indiana battery, and Captain Ayleshire, eighteenth Ohio battery, deserve praise for the effective and gallant manner in which they handled their respective batteries. I am pleased to mention Mr. Stevens, superintendent of the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, Mr. Tallmadge, master of transportation at Chattanooga, and

Mr. Bryant, assistant superintendent of the Nashville and Chattanooga road, as most honorable exceptions among the railroad men who have been censured by me for neglect of duty. These gentlemen did everything in their power to aid me in getting over the road with my command. I respectfully commend them for their efforts. I respectfully recommend Colonel William L. Palmer, fifteenth Pennsylvania cavalry, for promotion for distinguished, gallant, and successful services in pursuing, capturing, and destroying the pontoon and supply train of the enemy. I fully concur in all General Craft has said in his report in commendation of the officers of his command. Mr. James R. Flavel, of Chattanooga, accompanied me throughout the campaign, and rendered me efficient and valuable services as volunteer aid.

Respectfully submitted.

JAMES B. STEEDMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., January 6, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to make for your information, and the information of those concerned, the following official report of the operations of the United States forces under my command during the months of November and December, 1864, in East Tennessee and southwestern Virginia:

During the month of November General Breckinridge, of the rebel army, collected together all the forces at his disposal, and drove the brigade of Tennessee troops, under the command of Brigadier General A. C. Gillem, from Bull's gap, East Tennessee, to Knoxville. It was thought that Breckinridge, after this success, might think it expedient to continue to act on the aggressive and extend his operations either to Middle Tennessee or into the western portion of Kentucky. Acting upon this contingency, and with the sanction of General Thomas, I directed Brevet Major General Burbridge, commanding the district of Kentucky, to concentrate every available man he could mount at some convenient point in the route from Lexington, Kentucky, to Cumberland gap, and in order to enable him to mount as many men as possible, I ordered him to impress horses wherever he could find them. Subsequently, I ordered him to push his forces by forced marches to Cumberland gap, where he would receive further instructions; and went myself, by rail, to Knoxville, Tennessee, to take the direction of affairs in that region. Upon my arrival in Knoxville I found the condition of affairs far from what could have been wished or I had expected. I immediately took measures to concentrate the forces in East Tennessee and put them in condition to take the field. The deficiencies in the quartermasters' and subsistence supplies were, by a free use of the railroad and river transportation, soon supplied; personal animosities were somewhat abated; criminations and recriminations by commanders, and which had extended to the commands themselves, were, in a great measure, silenced, and confidence was restored to a badly stampeded community. The force under General Burbridge arrived at Cumberland gap on the 24th of November, and, according to his official report, amounted to about 4,200 aggregate, and four guns.

On the 29th of November I directed General Burbridge to move over to Bean's station, and to rest and to put his command in condition to move in any direction at a moment's warning. General Gillem was endeavoring to reorganize and refit his command, and to that end I ordered to be turned over to him everything on hand in Knoxville, and which was not otherwise assigned, that he required, which enabled him to put in the field about 1,500 effective men. The dismounted force under Brigadier General J. Ammen, and the supply and ordnance trains, were put in readiness to move at any moment.

On the 26th of November I submitted to yourself and General Thomas a plan of operations as follows :

"GENERAL: \* \* \* \* \*

"The enemy, variously estimated at from 3,000 to 6,000, were yesterday between New Market and Bull's gap, engaged in effectually destroying the railroad, and I am in hopes he will remain there until we are ready to move. If he does, I propose by a rapid and forced march to concentrate all the cavalry at Estillville, and at the same time to move the supplies and foot up to Bean's station or Rogersville. It is possible, by this move, that we will be able to reach Bristol before the enemy can, and thus cut him off from Saltville and force him across the mountains into North Carolina, and maybe to destroy the salt-works. Should he get the start of us we can drive him up the valley, and North Carolina thus is opened up to us, and for that matter South Carolina too. Four days' march would take the cavalry to Salisbury, from which point we could act north or south, according to circumstances. The foot, with a small portion of the cavalry, could cover our movements or fall back to Knoxville, according to the necessities of the case. Breckinridge would have either to follow us, remain to guard the salt-works, or make a counter-move into Kentucky. If he does the first, it will be the means of effectually relieving Kentucky from an invasion; or if he does either of the two latter, we shall be free to operate unmolested.

"I submit this for your consideration, and if you approve of the idea please inform me by telegraph. I hope you will not disapprove it, as I think I can see very important results from its execution. I owe the southern confederacy a debt I am anxious to liquidate, and this appears a propitious occasion.

\* \* \* \* \*

"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"GEORGE STONEMAN,

*"Major General Commanding."*

"Major General SCHOFIELD,

*"Commanding Forces in the Field."*

To which I received, per telegraph, the following reply :

"NASHVILLE, December 6, 1864—8 p. m.

"To Major General STONEMAN, Knoxville :

"I approve of the first part of the plan proposed in your letter, November 26, 1864, viz., to push the enemy as far back as possible into Virginia and destroy the salt-works and railroad. I cannot decide as to further operations until affairs have taken a more definite shape, therefore do not undertake the other enterprise without further orders. Inform me by telegraph when you start, and keep me advised of your progress.

"J. M. SCHOFIELD,

*"Major General."*

On the 7th of December I sent the fourth Tennessee and the third North Carolina infantry, *via* Sevierville, to Paint Rock with instructions to hold the passes over the mountains into North Carolina until East Tennessee was evacuated by the enemy; after which, Colonel Patterson, with his fourth Tennessee, was to move down the French Broad river and protect the government trains in collecting forage, and the third North Carolina, Colonel Kirk, was to scour the mountain region between Tennessee and North Carolina and clear it of rebels.

On the ninth of December the two regiments of Ohio heavy artillery, which had been for some days at Strawberry plains, and the supply trains, were ordered to Blair's cross-roads, followed the next day by Gillem's command and myself.

On the 11th we were all at Bean's station, where General Burbridge joined me and received his instructions. Up to this time no one knew where we were going or what were my instructions, not even my staff officers; nor until the day following did the enemy find out that we had moved from Knoxville. During the night of the 11th the men were supplied from the trains with all the ammunition or rations they could carry on themselves and horses. Leaving Bean's station on the morning of the 12th we reached the north fork of the Holston river, opposite Kingsport, at daylight on the morning of the 13th. Here General Gillem, who was in the advance, found Duke's command. This was John Morgan's old command, and was at that time under the command of Colonel Richard Morgan, a brother of John, Duke being absent on leave. After a short contest Gillem succeeded in crossing the river, and afterwards in killing, capturing, or dispersing the whole force, capturing Morgan himself and his whole wagon train.

During the afternoon and night of the 13th I pushed Burbridge's command on to Bristol with instructions to endeavor to intercept Vaughn, who had for a long time been at Greenville with a force variously estimated, but which I thought to be about 1,200 strong. During the night I followed with Gillem's command, and reached Bristol early in the day of the 14th. On the way I received two messages through staff officers from General Burbridge, asking for re-enforcements. The roads being very heavy, I directed the caissons to be destroyed, which enabled us to add more horses to each gun and move much more rapidly. Arrived at Bristol, I found that only picket firing had taken place; a dense fog prevailed, and fearing that Vaughn would get past us during the night and into Saltville and make a junction with Breckinridge, I pushed Burbridge on to Abingdon with directions for him to send a regiment from that point with instructions to strike the railroad at some point between Saltville and Wytheville, the object being to prevent re-enforcements from reaching the salt-works from the direction of Lynchburg. After having waited at Bristol until Gillem's command had completed the destruction there which had been commenced by Burbridge, started back the prisoners, &c., I left with Gillem and reached Abingdon about daylight on the morning of the 15th. Here, learning that Vaughn was moving up on a road parallel with and running eight or ten miles from the one we were on, I pushed Gillem on to Glade springs, Burbridge following a few hours afterwards; the whole command spending the fore part of the night at that point.

At 2 a. m. of the 16th we were again in motion. I was informed that the 12th Kentucky cavalry, the regiment sent ahead from Abingdon, had passed the day previous and was pushing on, after having threatened the salt-works and cut off and destroyed two railroad trains, which had brought Breckinridge with a battery of artillery and re-enforcements down from Wytheville. The question with me now was, whether to move on the salt-works and attempt to capture and destroy them first, or to pass them by with the main force, threatening them with a brigade, and to endeavor to capture or disperse Vaughn, destroy the railroad as far as possible, destroy Wytheville and the lead-works on New river, and returning take the salt-works at our leisure. I decided on the latter. Gillem was directed to push on, and try and overtake Vaughn; and if he should, to pursue him to Wytheville or beyond. By his request I re-enforced him with two regiments from Burbridge, the eleventh Kentucky and the eleventh Michigan, threatened the salt-works with Wade's brigade, and moved on to Marion with the rest of the command. Gillem attacked Vaughn at Marion early in the morning of the 16th; and attacked, routed, and pursued him to Wytheville, which point he reached about dark. Vaughn escaped with about 200 of his men, leaving in the hands of Gillem's troops all his artillery and trains, and 198 prisoners of war. Wade's brigade having come up, and our horses having been well fed, I, with Burbridge's command, moved at 11 p. m. and reached Mount Airey before

day of the 17th. Here I detached Colonel Buckley with his brigade, with instructions to move as rapidly as his horses would carry him to the lead mines, about twenty-five or thirty miles distant, to make a complete destruction of everything that was destructible, and to return by another route to Seven Mile ford, seven miles this side of Marion, and there await orders.

During the night of the 16th Gillem completed the destruction of Wytheville and the stores and supplies of all kinds therein contained, and having sent a portion of his command to Reedy creek, thirteen miles beyond Wytheville, and destroyed the important railroad bridges over that stream, rejoined me at Mount Airey early in the forenoon of the 17th. The only thing now left for us to do was the destruction of the far-famed salt-works. The commands of Gillem, Cooly, and Witcher had been for some time in Tazewell county, waiting to open up a communication with the cavalry of Forrest, through Middle Tennessee. These commands had been recalled by Breckinridge, and united with the remnants of Duke's, and with such home-guards as were available, constituted the garrison of Saltville. Had he remained with this force within the very strong fortifications which surrounded the salt-works, it would have been very difficult if not impossible for us to have taken the place; but, as I had hoped, he followed us, and on our return we met him in a strong position near Marion. Burbridge with two brigades was in the advance, and receiving repeated applications from him for re-enforcements, I pushed forward past the column to the front and assumed the immediate control of his command, which I retained until the end of the engagement which ensued. Night coming on, and the troops of Burbridge being very much disarranged, I determined to postpone any further offensive operations until the following morning, and spent the fore part of the night in getting things straightened out. In the morning, upon attempting to advance, we were met with a spirited resistance, and in sufficient force to assure me that Breckinridge had his whole command with him. Buckley's brigade, provided it had carried out my instructions, should be at the Seven Mile ford in the afternoon, and Gillem I sent around the left of the enemy, thus cutting him off from the salt-works and compelling him to fight it out where he was, or seek safety in flight. Brisk skirmishing was kept up during the day, with considerable loss on both sides, and as soon as night set in Breckinridge, as I afterwards learned, finding himself nearly surrounded and cut off from Saltville, withdrew by the road leading over the mountains into North Carolina and escaped. I sent the twelfth Ohio regiment next morning in pursuit of him. They captured his caissons and some wagons, but finding the road blockaded with trees and other obstructions, I concluded it would be but a waste of time to pursue him, and that night concentrated my whole force near Glade springs, preparatory to an attack on the salt-works next day. At daylight in the morning General Burbridge was directed to take the most direct road, entering the town on the north; General Gillem was directed to follow a more circuitous route, which entered the town on the south; and both were instructed to make a vigorous and persistent attack, with the view of securing the place that day or before re-enforcements could arrive from Lynchburg. I myself accompanied the column of Gillem, the head of which approached to within fifteen hundred yards of Fort Breckinridge. About 3 p. m. I directed Gillem to put a gun (one of the two which he had selected out of the eight he had previously captured at Wytheville and from Vaux) in position and open on the enemy, with the view of notifying Burbridge where he was and what was being done, and sent a staff officer to Burbridge with directions for him to attack at once and with the utmost vigor. I received in reply the assurance that he would attack in half an hour. Night, however, overtook us, and nothing of material advantage had as yet been accomplished. I now directed Colonel Stacy with his regiment, the thirteenth Tennessee cavalry, to make a detour to the left, dash into the town, commence

burning, shouting, &c., and make as much confusion as possible. My instructions were carried out by Colonel Stacy in the most satisfactory manner; a portion of his regiment he set to work burning the town, and with the rest he dashed up the steep hill on which Fort Breckinridge is situated, over the rifle-pits, and into the gorge of the work, capturing two guns, two commissioned officers, and several privates, without the loss of a man, and with but two horses killed. This was a signal for a general stampede of the enemy, and by 11 o'clock in the night all the works were evacuated and in the possession of Colonel Stacy, and the town of Saltville was in flames. At dawn of the day following I received a message from General Burbridge, through one of his staff officers, that at 4 o'clock a. m. his advance guard had reached the town of Saltville, and reported that the enemy had first burned and then evacuated the place the night before. The whole of the day and night of the 21st was devoted to the destruction and demolition of the buildings, kettles, masonry, machinery, pumps, wells, stores, material and supplies of all kinds, and a more desolate-looking sight can hardly be conceived than was presented to our eyes on the morning of the 22d of December by the salt-works in ruins. Our work being completed, we had yet before us a long and arduous march across rivers, swollen by the recent and almost continuous rains, along roads which had become nearly impassable, and over mountains slippery with ice and covered with snow. I sent General Burbridge with his command back to Lexington, Kentucky, and gave him the choice of routes by which he would return. He chose the one *via* the Big Sandy. General Gillem with his command was ordered back to Knoxville, returning *via* the Poor Valley and the west side of the Holston river.

The following is a resumé of the principal objects accomplished by the expedition: Duke's command was badly whipped by Gillem at Kingsport, and his wagon train captured; also eighty-four prisoners, including Colonel Morgan, then temporarily in command, and sent to Knoxville. Bristol was captured by Burbridge, and all the railroad depot, five railroad trains filled with supplies, about a thousand stand of arms, and a large amount of fixed ammunition, wagons, ambulances, &c., were destroyed, and seventeen commissioned officers and two hundred and sixty privates captured and sent to Knoxville. Abingdon, with one gun and a limited amount of supplies, was captured by Burbridge. Major Harrison, commanding twelfth Kentucky, captured two railroad trains near Glade springs, destroyed all the railroad bridges from that point up to Marion, the large iron-works near Marion, and captured several hundred fine horses. The lead-works in Wythe county were captured and completely destroyed by Colonel Buckley's brigade. Gillem's brigade, re-enforced by the eleventh Kentucky and the eleventh Michigan cavalry, of Burbridge's command, captured Marion, drove Vaughn from that point beyond Wytheville, destroyed all the railroad bridges from Marion to Reedy creek; captured and destroyed Wytheville, with all its depots and stores, embracing twenty-five thousand rounds of fixed ammunition, a large amount of ammunition for small-arms, pack-saddles, harness, and other quartermaster's stores, a large amount of subsistence and medical supplies, several hundred wagons and ambulances, serviceable and unserviceable, fifteen caissons, and ten pieces of field artillery, two locomotives, and several cars; quite a large number of horses and mules were also captured; — commissioned officers and one hundred and ninety-eight enlisted men were captured and paroled; Breckinridge was driven into North Carolina by the operations of the whole command, Wade's, and Brown's brigades, however, having done all the fighting on that occasion. In the capture of Saltville and the works surrounding it, though the whole force under my command was present, to Colonel Stacy and the thirteenth Tennessee cavalry is due the credit of having acted the most conspicuous part. Had Burbridge's force on the right acted with equal vigor we should, without doubt, have captured the whole garrison. In addition

to the destruction of the salt works we captured here eight pieces of artillery and a large amount of artillery and small-arms, ammunition, two locomotives, and quite a number of horses and mules. I see it officially reported in the rebel papers that ninety-two thousand bushels of salt were at the works when we arrived there; also, that one hundred and twenty-eight good kettles remain, and seven hundred and eighty-eight were broken. The wells, instead of not being seriously damaged, as stated in the official report, were by the use of bomb-shells, railroad iron, spikes, nails, &c., put in such a condition as to render it impossible to use them until they were cleared out; and all, including the engineers at the works, are of the opinion that it will be much cheaper and more expedient to bore new wells than to clear out the old ones. The engines and pumps were also destroyed and the structures all burned to the ground. Though it can hardly be said that we captured any wagons, yet a large number came out of the country with us, as likewise did no inconsiderable number of refugees. I must not forget to mention that four newspaper presses were destroyed, and also that General Burbridge succeeded in gaining possession of the telegraph office and operator at Bristol, a circumstance which proved of great advantage to us, as we were enabled to ascertain the locality and strength of the enemy's forces, the orders that had been issued, and to be made acquainted with his impressions in regard to us and our movements. On my return my instructions to the rear-guard were to reduce the country to such a condition as to render it difficult for the enemy to follow us in any force. Sustenance for man and beast was obtained from the country through which we passed, and was ample, considering the season of the year, the continued rains and snow, and the condition of the roads consequent thereon. Our marching during the operations was very creditable, having averaged forty-two and a half miles every twenty-four hours. Of the conduct of the command I cannot speak in terms too high of praise, and with but few exceptions each and all merit the approbation of the government, and have my sincerest thanks. Notwithstanding the terms of service of some had expired, they were among the most willing in the performance of their arduous duties; and though others had as yet never been mustered into service, their conduct was all that could have been expected of veterans. Neither danger, long marches, sleepless nights, hunger, nor hardship, brought forth a complaint, and the utmost harmony and good feeling prevailed throughout. Each felt that from the field in which he was employed a rich and abundant harvest could be reaped, and worked with all his might and main.

In addition to the officers whose names have been mentioned in the foregoing report, I wish to call your special attention to Major M. W. Keigh, aide-de-camp, Captain Robert Morron, assistant adjutant general, Lieutenant R. Williams, ordnance officer, and Captain J. B. Roberts, tenth Michigan cavalry, commanding scouts and couriers, as being young officers of unusual merit, and to each of whom I am under many obligations. There are others who deserve, and doubtless will receive, special notice from their immediate commanders.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE STONEMAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SCHOFIELD,  
*Commanding Army of the Ohio.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Nashville, Tenn., June 1, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the operations of my command from the date of the last report made by me, January 20, as follows:

General A. J. Smith's corps at that period was with me at Eastport

Mississippi; four divisions of General Wilson's cavalry were encamped on the opposite or north bank of the Tennessee river, at Waterloo and Gravelly springs, Alabama, and the 4th corps, Major General Stanley commanding, was stationed at Huntsville, Alabama. This, with the ordinary garrisons of the country, composed my command. The general-in-chief of the army having given up the intention of my continuing the campaign against the enemy in Mississippi and Alabama, I received an order by telegraph from Major General Halleck, chief of staff, to send General A. J. Smith's command and five thousand (5,000) of General Wilson's cavalry, by river, to report to Major General Canby, at New Orleans, for the purpose of taking part in an expedition at that time preparing to operate against Mobile. Smith's corps started from Eastport on the 6th of February, and Knipe's division of cavalry left Nashville on the 12th. About the period of the departure of Smith's corps, information was received from various sources to the effect that part of the scattered remnants of Hood's army, viz., Cheatham's and Lee's corps, were on their way from Mississippi to South Carolina, moving *via* Selma and Montgomery, Alabama, to re-enforce that portion of the enemy's army operating against General Sherman. There remained in central Mississippi, under General Taylor, but one corps of the enemy's infantry and about seven thousand of Forrest's cavalry; the headquarters of the command being at Meridian, Mississippi.

On the 6th of February, a communication was received from Lieutenant General Grant, directing an expedition commanded by General Stoneman to be sent from East Tennessee to penetrate North Carolina, and well down towards Columbia, South Carolina, to destroy the enemy's railroads and military resources in that section, and visit a portion of the State beyond the control or reach of General Sherman's column. As the movement was to be merely for the purpose of destruction, directions were given General Stoneman to evade any heavy engagements with the enemy's forces.

Again, on the 13th of February, General Grant telegraphed me to prepare a cavalry expedition of about ten thousand strong to penetrate northern Alabama, acting as a co-operative force to the movement on Mobile by General Canby. Before leaving Eastport, Mississippi, I had directed General Wilson to get his command in readiness for just such a campaign of which the above was simply an outline, my instructions being for him to move on Selma, Montgomery, and Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and to capture those places if possible, after accomplishing which he was to operate against any of the enemy's forces in the direction of Mississippi, Mobile, or Macon, as circumstances might demand. The bad state of the roads, combined with the condition of the horses of his command after completing the severe campaign in pursuit of Hood, prevented any movement for the time being, and it was only on the 22d of March that General Wilson, with Upton's, Long's, and McCook's divisions, could leave Chickasaw, Alabama. Hatch's division remained at Eastport, Mississippi, and R. W. Johnson's at Pulaski, Tennessee, it not being possible to mount them fully to hold the country and prevent guerilla depredations. When General Sherman was organizing his army for its march to the Atlantic sea-board in November, he issued an order directing me to assume control of all the forces of the military division of the Mississippi not present with him and the main army in Georgia. Based on that order all the operations of the troops within the limits of the above-mentioned military division have, during the interval, been made under my immediate direction, and I have been held responsible for their faithful execution.

On the 30th of March General Wilson's cavalry reached Elyton, after an extremely difficult, toilsome, and exhausting march on account of bad roads, swollen streams, and the rough nature of the country, which had also been almost entirely stripped of all subsistence for man or beast. At Elyton, Croxton's brigade of McCook's division was detached and sent to capture and destroy Tuscaloosa, and then marched to rejoin the main body near Selma. With



the remainder of his command General Wilson pushed rapidly forward to Montevallo, where he destroyed five (5) extensive iron-works, and other valuable property. On the outskirts of the town the enemy's cavalry was found in force, attacked, routed, and pursued through Plantersville, leaving in our possession three (3) pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners.

At 3 p. m. on the 2d of April General Wilson reached the immediate vicinity of Selma, and rapidly formed Upton's and Long's divisions to attack the defenses of the town; Long attacking on the Summerfield road, and Upton across swamp deemed impassable by the enemy. Dismounting two regiments from each of the brigades of Colonels Miller and Minty, General Long and those two officers, gallantly leading their men in person, charged across an open field five hundred yards wide, over a stockade, which they tore up as they passed, through the ditch and over the enemy's parapets, sweeping everything before them. Our loss was forty-six killed and two hundred wounded, Colonel Dobbs, fourth Ohio, among the former, and General Long, Colonels Miller and McCormick, among the latter. General Upton met with less resistance than Long, entered the enemy's works and the town, and captured many prisoners. In the darkness and confusion following the assault, Generals Forrest, Buford, Adams, Armstrong and others made their escape; Lieutenant General Dick Taylor had left earlier in the afternoon. As the fruits of victory, however, there remained twenty-six guns and twenty-seven hundred prisoners, besides large amounts of ordnance and other property of great value; twenty-five thousand bales of cotton had already been destroyed by the enemy.

General Wilson remained at Selma from the 2d to the 10th of April, resting his command and completing the destruction of the immense workshops, arsenals, and foundries, and waiting for Croxton to rejoin from his expedition to Tuscaloosa, it having been ascertained, through the enemy, that he had captured Tuscaloosa and was moving to Selma *via* Eutaw.

On the 10th General Wilson crossed the Alabama river and moved towards Montgomery, receiving the surrender of that town, without a contest, on the 12th. The enemy burned eighty-five thousand bales of cotton before evacuating. At Montgomery five steamboats, several locomotives, one armory, and several foundries were destroyed.

On the 14th operations were resumed by Upton's division moving through Mount Meigs and Tuskegee towards Columbus, Georgia, and Colonel Lagrange with three regiments of his brigade, of McCook's division, marching along the railroad to West Point *via* Opelika.

On the 16th General Upton with about four hundred dismounted men assaulted and carried the breastworks of Columbus, saving by the impetuosity of his attack the bridges, over the Chattahoochee, and capturing fifty-two field guns in position, besides one thousand two hundred prisoners. The rebel ram Jackson, nearly ready for sea and carrying an armament of six seven-inch guns, fell into our hands and were destroyed, as well as the navy yard, foundries, the arsenal and armory, sword and pistol factory, accoutrement shops, paper-mills, four cotton factories, fifteen locomotives, two hundred cars and an immense amount of cotton; all of which were burned. The same day, the 16th of April, Lagrange captured Fort Taylor at West Point, above Columbus, on the Chattahoochee, after assaulting it on three sides, the defence being stubborn. Three hundred prisoners, three guns, and several battle-flags were taken, besides a large quantity of supplies.

On the 18th the march towards Macon was resumed, Minty's (late Long's) division leading. By a forced march the bridges across Flint river, fifty-four miles from Columbus, were secured, compelling the abandonment, by the enemy, of five field-guns and a large amount of machinery; forty prisoners were captured and two cotton factories destroyed.

At 6 p. m. on the 20th of April the authorities of Macon, under protest, sur-

rendered the city to the seventeenth Indiana, Colonel Minty's advance regiment, claiming, under the provisions of an armistice then reported existing between the forces of Generals Sherman and Johnston, that the capture was contrary to the usages of war. General Wilson, not being on hand when this surrender was made, when the case was reported to him, with admirable good judgment declined to recognize the validity of the claim asserted, as the city had been taken possession of by one of his subordinates before he (General Wilson) could be advised of the existence of an armistice, and he therefore held as prisoners of war Major Generals Howell Cobb and G. W. Smith, and Brigadier Generals Mackall, Robertson, and Mercer.

On the 21st General Wilson was notified by General Sherman from Raleigh, North Carolina, over the enemy's telegraph wires and through the headquarters of General Joseph Johnston, that the reported armistice was a reality, and that he was to cease further operations.

To return to General Stoneman's expedition from East Tennessee: Owing to the difficulty of procuring animals for his command and the bad condition of the roads, General Stoneman was only able to start from Knoxville about the 20th of March, simultaneously with General Wilson's departure from Chickasaw, Alabama. In the mean time General Sherman had captured Columbia, South Carolina, and was moving northward into North Carolina. About this period reports reached me of the possibility of the evacuation of Lee's army at Richmond and Petersburg, Virginia, and in that event of his forcing a passage through East Tennessee *via* Lynchburg and Knoxville. To guard against that contingency Stoneman was sent towards Lynchburg to destroy the railroad and military resources of that section and of western North Carolina. The 4th army corps was ordered to move from Huntsville, Alabama, as far up into East Tennessee as it could supply itself, repairing the railroad as it advanced, forming, in conjunction with Tillson's division of infantry, a strong support for General Stoneman's cavalry column in case it should find more of the enemy than it could conveniently handle and be obliged to fall back. With three brigades, Brown's, Miller's, and Palmer's, commanded by General Gillem, General Stoneman moved *via* Morristown, Bull gap, and thence eastward up the Waltuga river, and across Iron mountain to Boone, North Carolina, which he entered on the 1st of April after killing or capturing about seventy-five horse guards. From Boone he crossed the Blue Ridge and went to Wilksboro', on the Yadkin, where supplies were obtained in abundance, after which he changed his course towards southwestern Virginia. A detachment was sent to Wytheville and another to Salem to destroy the enemy's depots at those places and the railroad, whilst the main body marched on Christiansburg and captured the place. The railroad to the eastward and westward of the town was destroyed for a considerable distance; the party sent to Wytheville captured that place, after some fighting, and burned the railroad bridges over New river and several creeks, as well as the depot of supplies, and the detachment sent to Salem did the same, and proceeded to within four miles of Lynchburg, destroying as they advanced. A railroad was never more thoroughly dismantled than was the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad from Wytheville to near Lynchburg. Concentrating his command, General Stoneman returned to North Carolina *via* Jacksonville and Taylorsville, and went to Germantown, where Palmer's brigade was sent to Salem, North Carolina, to destroy the large cotton factories located there and burn the bridges on the railroad between Greensboro' and Danville, and between Greensboro' and the Yadkin river, which was most thoroughly accomplished, after some fighting, by which we captured about four hundred prisoners. At Salem 7,000 bales of cotton were burned by our forces. From Germantown the main body moved south to Salisbury, where they found about 3,000 of the enemy defending the place and drawn up in line of battle, behind Grant's creek, to await Stoneman's attack. Without hesitation a general charge was made by our men, resulting in the cap-

ture of all the enemy's artillery, (fourteen pieces,) and 1,364 prisoners; the remainder scattered and were pursued. During the two days following, the troops were engaged destroying the immense depots of supplies of all kinds in Salisbury, and burning all the bridges, for several miles, on all the railroads leading out of the town.

On the afternoon of April 13 the command moved westward to Statesville and Lenoir, at which latter point General Stoneman left the troops to be disposed of by General Gillem, and proceeded with the prisoners and captured artillery to East Tennessee, reporting his arrival, on the 19th, at Greenville, and detailing the disposition of his troops, which was as follows: Palmer's brigade, with headquarters at Lincolnton, North Carolina, to scout down the Catawba river towards Charlotte; Brown's brigade, with headquarters at Morgantown, to connect with Palmer down the Catawba; and Miller's brigade, with General Gillem, was to take post at Ashville, with directions to open up communications through to Greenville, East Tennessee. The object in leaving the cavalry on the other side of the mountains was to obstruct, intercept, or disperse any troops of the enemy going south, and to capture trains. General Gillem followed the directions given him, and marched on Ashville with Miller's brigade, but was opposed at Swananoa gap by a considerable force of the enemy. Leaving sufficient of his force to amuse them, with the balance he moved by way of Howard's gap, gained the enemy's rear, and surprised and captured his artillery, after which he made his appearance in front of Ashville, where he was met by a flag of truce on the 23d, with the intelligence of the truce existing between Generals Sherman and Johnston, and bearing an order from General Sherman to General Stoneman for the latter to go to the railroad station at Dunham's or Hillsboro', nearly two hundred miles distant, whereas the distance to Greenville, East Tennessee, was but sixty. Coming to the conclusion that the order was issued by General Sherman under the impression that the cavalry division was still at Salisbury or Statesville, General Gillem determined to move to Greenville. The rebel General Martin, with whom he communicated under flag of truce, demanded the rendition of the artillery captured, which, of course, could not be granted, and in return General Gillem requested the rebel commander to furnish his troops with three days' rations, as by the terms of the armistice they were required to withdraw. Had it not been for this, Ashville and its garrison would have fallen into our hands. Up to that period I had not been officially notified of the existence of any armistice between the forces of Generals Sherman and Johnston, and the information only reached me through my sub-commanders, Generals Wilson and Stoneman, from Macon, Georgia, and Greenville, East Tennessee, almost simultaneously. The question naturally arose in my mind whether the troops acting under my direction, by virtue of General Sherman's Special Field Order No. 105, series of 1864, directing me to assume control of all the forces of the military division of the Mississippi, "not absolutely in the presence of the general-in-chief," were to be bound by an armistice or agreement made at a distance of several hundred miles from where those troops were operating and of which they were advised through an enemy, then in such straitened circumstances that any ruse, honorable at least in war, was likely to be practiced by him to relieve himself from his difficult position. Then again, General Sherman was operating with a movable column beyond the limits of his territorial command, viz., the military division of the Mississippi, and far away from all direct communication with it, whereas "the troops not absolutely in the presence of the general-in-chief" were operating under special instructions and not even in co-operation with General Sherman against Johnston, but, on the contrary, General Stoneman was dismantling the country to obstruct Lee's retreat, and General Wilson was moving independently in Georgia or co-operating with General Canby. Before I could come to any conclusion how I should proceed under the circumstances, and without disrespect to my superior officer, General Sherman, Secre-

tary Stanton telegraphed to me from Washington on the 27th of April, and through me to my sub-commanders, to disregard all orders except those coming from General Grant or myself, and to resume hostilities at once, sparing no pains to press the enemy firmly, at the same time notifying me that General Sherman's negotiations with Johnston had been disapproved. Based on that notification the following dispositions were made with a view of capturing President Davis and party, who, on the cessation of the armistice, had started south from Charlotte, North Carolina, with an escort variously estimated at from five hundred to two thousand picked cavalry, to endeavor to make his way to the trans-Mississippi. General Stoneman was directed to send the brigades of Miller, Brown, and Palmer, then in western North Carolina, to concentrate at Anderson, South Carolina, and scout down the Savannah river to Augusta, Georgia, if possible, in search of the fugitives; General Gillem being absent, Colonel Palmer, fifteenth Pennsylvania cavalry, took command of the expedition. By rapid marching they succeeded in reaching and crossing the Savannah river, in advance of Davis, and so disposed the command as to effectually cut off his retreat towards Mississippi, and forced him to alter his route towards the Atlantic coast. General Wilson at Macon, Georgia, was also notified of the action taken at Washington on General Sherman's negotiations with Johnston, and he was directed to resume hostilities at once, especially to endeavor to intercept Davis. Scarcely were the above orders issued and in process of execution when notification reached me of the surrender by Johnston of all the enemy's forces east of the Chattahoochee river. General Wilson received similar notification from General Sherman, direct through the enemy's territory, and immediately took measures to receive the surrender of the enemy's establishments at Atlanta and Augusta, and to occupy those points, detailing, for that purpose, Brevet Major General Upton, with his division; General McCook was sent with a force to occupy Tallahassee, Florida, and to receive the surrender of the troops in that vicinity. Thus a cordon of cavalry, more or less continuous, was extended across the State of Georgia, from northwest to southeast, and communication established through the late so-called confederacy. With characteristic energy Generals Wilson and Palmer had handbills printed and profusely circulated in all directions throughout the country offering the President's reward for Davis's apprehension, and nothing could exceed the watchfulness exhibited by their commands.

On the 3d of May Davis dismissed his escort at Washington, Georgia, and accompanied by about half a dozen followers, set out to endeavor to pass our lines. Nothing definite was learned of the whereabouts of the fugitives until on the evening of the 7th of May, the first Wisconsin cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Harnden commanding, with a hundred and fifty men, ascertained at Dublin, on the Oconee river, fifty-five miles southeast from Macon, that Davis and party had crossed the river at that point during the day, and had moved out on the Jacksonville road.

At daylight on the 8th Colonel Harnden continued the pursuit, finding the camp occupied by Davis on the evening previous between the forks of Alligator creek, which was reached just four hours after it had been vacated. The trail was pursued as far as the ford over Gum Swamp creek, Pulaski county, when darkness rendered it too indistinct to follow, and the command encamped for the night, having marched forty miles that day.

On the 9th Colonel Harnden pushed on to the Ocmulgee river, crossed at Brown's ferry, and went to Abbeville, where he ascertained Davis's train had left that place at 1 a. m. that same day and had gone towards Irwinsville, in Irwin county. With this information Colonel Harnden moved rapidly on towards the latter town, halting within a short distance of it to wait for daylight in order to make certain of the capture. Before leaving Abbeville, Colonel Harnden learning of the approach from the direction of Hawkinsville of the fourth Michigan cavalry, Colonel Pritchard commanding, went to meet that officer, and

informed him of his close pursuit of Davis; Colonel Pritchard stating, in reply, that he had been sent to Abbeville also to watch for Davis. After Colonel Harnden's departure Colonel Pritchard, with part of his command, started for Irwinsville by a more direct route than that used by the detachment of the first Wisconsin, arriving at Irwinsville at 2 a. m. on the 10th, where, on inquiry, it was ascertained that there was a camp about a mile from town on the other road leading to Abbeville. Approaching cautiously for fear it might be our own men, Colonel Pritchard sent a dismounted party to interpose between it and Abbeville, and then waited for daylight to move forward and surprise the occupants. Daylight appearing, a rapid advance was made and the encampment surprised, resulting in the capture of Jefferson Davis and family, John H. Reagan, postmaster general of the so-called confederacy, two aides-de-camp, the private secretary of Davis, four other officers, and eleven enlisted men. Almost immediately after the completion of the above movement, Colonel Harnden's men coming down the Abbeville road were hailed by the party sent out during the night by Colonel Pritchard to secure the capture of the camp, and on being challenged, answered "friends," but fell back under the impression they had come upon an enemy, whereupon shots were exchanged, before the real position of affairs could be ascertained, resulting in the loss on one side of two men killed and one wounded, and of three wounded on the other. Considerable feeling was caused by the manner in which the fourth Michigan effected the apprehension of Davis, to the detriment of Colonel Harnden's party, but great credit is justly due and should be given to the first Wisconsin cavalry for the persistency of its pursuit, and it is only to be regretted they did not arrive on the ground in time to reap the benefit of their labors. For the full particulars of the operations of both detachments I have the pleasure to refer you to the reports of Lieutenant Colonel Harnden, first Wisconsin, and Captain Hathaway, fourth Michigan. With the surrender of Johnston's army to General Sherman all the detachments of the confederate armies east of the Chattahoochee signified their willingness to surrender, except a few guerilla bands who were outlawed, special directions being given to grant all such no quarter.

On the 7th of May, notification was received by me *via* Eastport and Meridian, Mississippi, of the surrender of General Taylor's army to General Canby at Citronella, Alabama, on the 4th. No armed force of the enemy east of the Mississippi remaining to interfere, I gave orders for the occupation by my forces of such portions of the reclaimed territory as it was necessary to hold while telegraphic and railroad communication was being restored, to the accomplishment of which the people of the country zealously lent their assistance.

*May 16.*—General Grant through his chief of staff, General Rawlings, directed me to order to some point north of the Tennessee river all of Wilson's cavalry except four thousand veterans, who are to remain at Macon, Augusta, and Atlanta, Georgia; those returning to be concentrated at some convenient point in Tennessee or Kentucky, preparatory to being mustered out, or otherwise disposed of. All convalescents and others about the hospitals throughout my command not requiring medical treatment have, by virtue of General Order No. 77, been mustered out of service. The quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance departments have all been reduced to the smallest scale consistent with the demands of the service. During the past three months the defences of all the posts within my command have been thoroughly inspected by Brigadier General Tower, inspector of fortifications military division of Mississippi, whose reports, with drawings attached, I have the honor to forward herewith. For detailed accounts of the operations of the commands of Generals Stoneman and Wilson, I invite the attention of the Lieutenant General commanding to the reports of those officers, as well as to those of their subordinates, Generals Gillem, Palmer, and others. They have brought the cavalry arm of the service to a state of efficiency unequalled in any other army, for long and difficult marches

through the enemy's country, and particularly for self-reliance and fortitude in assaulting strong positions which might well cause hesitation in veteran infantry. Herewith I have the honor to forward the report of Brevet Brigadier General J. G. Parkhurst, provost marshal general of my command, giving the number of prisoners and deserters registered at his office during the period of which the foregoing treats.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Major General U. S. Army, Commanding.*

Brig. Gen'l J. A. RAWLINGS,

*Chief of Staff, United States Army.*

*Report of prisoners of war received at the office of the provost marshal general, department of the Cumberland, from January 21 to May 31, inclusive, 1865.*

Captured.	Colonels.	Lieut. colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Surgeons.	Assistant surgeons.	Chaplains.	Non-commissioned officers.	Privates.	Grand total.
January 21 to 31 .....	---	---	1	2	6	---	---	---	5	85	-----
February .....	---	---	1	2	6	---	3	---	17	102	-----
March .....	---	2	1	3	6	3	1	1	9	93	-----
April .....	1	---	3	17	26	---	---	---	61	584	-----
May .....	---	---	---	3	10	---	---	---	8	60	-----
Total .....	1	2	6	27	54	3	4	1	100	924	1,122

*no of rebel deserters received at Nashville, Tennessee, from January 21 to May 9, inclusive, 1865.*

Received.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Grand total.
January 21 to 31 .....	18	355	-----
February .....	23	786	-----
March .....	23	608	-----
April .....	18	578	-----
May 1 to 9 .....	8	334	-----
Total .....	90	2,661	2,751

*Report of confederate officers and enlisted men who voluntarily surrendered themselves, and who have taken the oath of allegiance and been allowed to return to their homes, from May 10 to May 31, inclusive, 1865.*

Officers .....	486
Enlisted men .....	3,559
Total .....	4,045

*Report of rebel deserters received and disposed of at Chattanooga office from January 21 to May 31, inclusive, 1865.*

Received.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Grand total.
January 21 to 31 .....	-----	21	-----
February .....	4	103	-----
March .....	10	422	-----
April .....	8	519	-----
May .....	32	1,477	-----
Total.....	54	2,542	2,596

Respectfully forwarded for the information of the major general commanding.

J. G. PARKHURST,

*Brevet Brig. General and Provost Marshal General, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

*Office Provost Marshal General, Nashville, June 8, 1865.*

#### HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,

DISTRICT OF EAST TENNESSEE,

*Greenville, Tennessee, April 25, 1865.*

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the camp, district of East Tennessee, from the 21st of March up to the present date. To prevent repetition I will merely say that from the time the division left Morristown on the 23d of March, until the 17th of April, Major General Stoneman, commanding the district of East Tennessee, accompanied the division, and that its movements were made in compliance with his instructions.

On the 18th of March, in compliance with orders from headquarters of the district of East Tennessee, I assumed command of this division. At that time but one brigade (Miller's third brigade) was at Knoxville.

On the 22d the division was concentrated at Mossy creek.

On the 23d the division moved to Morristown, Tennessee, where five days' rations, one day's forage, (corn,) and four horseshoes and nails, were issued to each man of the command.

At daylight on the morning of the 24th Colonel Miller, with his brigade (the third,) moved in the road towards Bristol, with orders to take the north or Snapp's Ferry road, at Bull's gap, and by a rapid march by Fall branch to get on the railroad between Jonesboro' and Carter's station, and thus get in the rear of the portion of the enemy's forces reported in the vicinity of Jonesboro'. Colonel Miller was accompanied by a telegraph operator. The other two brigades from Bull's gap took the general or Ball's Mill road, while General Tilson with the infantry train moved by the main or southern road by way of Greenville. Nothing of interest transpired on the 24th.

On the 25th we encamped ten (10) miles west of Jonesboro', the train came up, and the first and second brigades drew all the rations the men could carry conveniently.

On the 26th the command moved, cutting loose from all incumbrances in the way of trains. One wagon, an ambulance, and four guns, with their caissons,

were the only carriages that accompanied the expedition. At 12 m. we passed through Jonesboro', and learned from Colonel Miller that he complied with his instructions, but that in consequence of injuries to the railroad bridge over the Watauga, there had been no trains south of the river for some days'; that rebel General Jackson had fallen back the previous night in great haste, and that the country was full of rebel stragglers and deserters, and that he had killed and captured some of the former. In compliance with his instructions, Colonel Miller then moved to Elizabethtown.

On the 26th a portion of the command encamped on Buffalo creek, and the remainder at Doe River cave, it being necessary to scatter the command in order to procure forage. On the 27th Colonel Miller was ordered to concentrate his brigade and follow the division on the following day.

On the 27th the command moved up the Watauga river, and after halting for a short time near the mouth of Roane's creek to feed, marched until 12 p. m., when we bivouacked on the eastern slope of the Iron mountain until daylight, when the march was resumed.

About 10 a. m. on the 28th, when approaching the town of Boone, it was learned that there was a meeting of the home guard in that town to take place on that day. Major Keogh, aide-de-camp to Major General Stoneman, went forward with a detachment of the twelfth Kentucky volunteer cavalry, surprised and routed the rebels, killing nine and capturing sixty-eight. Much credit is due Major Keogh and the gallant officers and men of the twelfth Kentucky cavalry engaged in this affair. At Boone the command separated, General Stoneman with Palmer's brigade (first) going by way of Deep gap to Wilkesboro', while I, with Brown's brigade (second) and the artillery, moved towards the place by the Flat Gap road. Miller had instructions to follow me. At 9 p. m. Brown's brigade arrived at Patterson's factory, at the foot of the Blue Ridge, and found an ample supply of corn and bacon. I remained in rear to give my personal attention to the artillery, which did not arrive at the factory until 7 a. m.

On the 29th, after feeding and resting, the march was resumed at 11 a. m. A guard having been left in charge of the forage and subsistence until the arrival of Colonel Miller, who had orders, after supplying his command, to destroy the remainder and burn the factory, the order was executed. Late in the afternoon I arrived at the intersection of the road I was on with the one on which General Stoneman was moving, a few minutes after the general passed. That night the twelfth Ohio cavalry drove the enemy from Wilkesboro', compelling them to leave their stores and a number of horses behind. In order to obtain forage it was found necessary to move the tenth Michigan cavalry and fifteenth Tennessee cavalry to the north side of the Yadkin.

Early on the following morning (30th) the twelfth Ohio crossed, but before the artillery could reach the ford the river became so much swollen by the heavy rain of the previous night that it was found to be impassable, and moving four miles to the east of Wilkesboro', we encamped.

On the 31st the river continued impassable; we moved four miles further east, where forage was abundant. Colonel Miller's brigade rejoined this day.

*April 1.*—Marched to Jonesboro'.

*April 2.*—Crossed the Yadkin at Jonesville and marched to Mount Airy by way of Dobson. Arrived at Mount Airy about 10 p. m., learned that a train of wagons had left that place at 3 p. m., going in the direction of Hillsville, Virginia. Colonel Palmer was directed to send a detachment in pursuit, with orders to follow until he captured the train. An officer of the fifteenth Tennessee cavalry had charge of the pursuing party, and after reaching the top of the Blue Ridge, halted until the remainder of the command came up next morning.

The command marched from Mount Airy at daylight on the morning of April 3, and arrived at Hillsville, Virginia, at 1 p. m., where the failure of the party sent in pursuit of the rebel wagons was learned. Another party was sent, with



orders to capture the train at all hazards. In a few hours the officer in charge of the party reported that he had possession of seventeen (17) wagons and one (1) forge. The wagons were loaded with forage, which was fed to Brown's brigade, the animals turned over to the quartermaster's department, and the wagons burned. From Hillsville, Colonel Miller, commanding third brigade, was ordered to take five hundred (500) picked men from his brigade and proceed by way of Porter's ford on New river to Wytheville, and destroy the railroad bridge over Reedy creek and at Max meadows, together with the depot of supplies at Wytheville. After feeding in the vicinity of Hillsville the march was resumed at sunset in the direction of Jacksonville. Shortly after our advance came upon a force of rebels, which was charged and driven several miles. At 12 p. m. the command bivouacked in the vicinity of a tithe depot of hay.

The march was resumed at daylight on the morning of the 4th, and arrived at Jacksonville at 10 a. m., where another tithe depot of hay and corn furnished an ample supply for our animals. At this point Major Wagner, fifteenth Tennessee cavalry, with two hundred and fifty (250) picked men, was detached, with orders to proceed to Salem, Virginia, and from that point to destroy the railroad bridges as far east as possible, and then rejoin the command wherever it might be. At 2 p. m. the march was resumed in the direction of Christiansburg, at which we arrived at 12 p. m.

On the morning of the 5th Colonel Palmer, commanding first brigade, was ordered to destroy the railroad track east of Christiansburg, while Brown's brigade did the same to the west. The eleventh Kentucky cavalry was sent to take possession of the railroad bridge and ferries over New river, and the tenth Michigan cavalry to destroy the bridges over the Roanoke; both these regiments performed the duty assigned them promptly and effectually. At this time at least ninety (90) miles of the Virginia and Tennessee railroad was in our possession, viz., from Wytheville to Salem.

During the 6th the command was actively engaged in destroying the railroad, and by 4 p. m. of that day the bridges over New river had been disabled by cutting away two bents. The iron and cross-ties for twenty (20) miles east of Budge were destroyed, as well as numerous bridges on the Roanoke river, and our horses had been refreshed by two days' rest. Colonel Miller reported that he had destroyed the bridges at Reedy creek and Max meadows, and a large depot of commissary, quartermaster, and ordnance supplies, among which were a large amount of ammunition and ten thousand pounds of powder; and that in compliance with his instructions he had crossed the New river at Porter's ferry, and awaited further orders. Colonel Miller reported that he had been attacked by the enemy with infantry and cavalry at Wytheville, but had repulsed them, and withdrew with a loss of thirty-five (35) men killed, wounded, and missing. He was directed to move to Hillsville, and thence to Taylorsville, Virginia.

At 10 p. m. on the evening of the 6th the command moved out of Christiansburg in the direction of Jacksonville, at which place we arrived at 10 a. m. on the 7th. Colonel Palmer, commanding the first brigade, had been directed to send the tenth Michigan cavalry directly from its position on the railroad to Martinsville, Virginia. By some misunderstanding of the order he marched by way of Kennedy's gap, with his entire brigade, to Martinsville. At 2 p. m. the march was resumed, and at 10 p. m. we arrived at Taylorsville, Virginia.

Remained at Taylorsville during the 8th. Miller's brigade joined at 10 a. m. Orders were sent to Palmer to move his brigade to Danbury, North Carolina.

Marched to Danbury on the 9th; found abundance of tithe corn. Palmer's brigade joined the tenth Michigan cavalry on approaching Martinsville; had found it occupied by two hundred and fifty (250) of Wheeler's rebel cavalry, whom they attacked and drove out, killing and wounding several, and capturing twenty (20) horses, losing one officer killed, and five men wounded.

On the 10th we moved south, arriving at Germantown at 12 m. The number

of negroes who were following the column had reached to such an extent as to endanger the safety of the command in case it should become closely engaged with the enemy. Several hundred were sent from this point to East Tennessee, under a sufficient guard for their protection. They all reached their destination in safety, and most of those fit for military service, I have since learned, are now in Colonel Bartlett's one hundred and nineteenth regiment United States colored infantry. From Germantown Colonel Palmer was detached with his brigade, and instructed to proceed to Salem and destroy the large factories engaged in making clothing for the rebel army, and thence send out parties to destroy the railroad south of Greensboro', and that one party should attempt to cut the road between Greensboro' and Danville, and after executing these orders to withdraw across the Yadkin at Shallow ford. The remainder of the division moved at 4 p. m. by way of Bethania, and arrived at Shallow ford at daylight on the 11th. The detachment of the enemy guarding the ford were taken by surprise, made but a feeble resistance and fled, leaving upwards of a hundred new muskets in our hands. From Shallow ford our march was directly south. When near Mocksville the advance came upon a small party of the enemy, which was at once charged and dispersed. At 8 p. m. we bivouacked on the road twelve (12) miles north of Salisbury.

At 12.30 a. m. on the 12th we were again in motion, Miller's brigade in advance. Three miles from our resting place we came to the South Yadkin, a deep and rapid stream, with but few fords. It was expected that the passage of this stream would be disputed, but such was not the case. A few rebels were on the north side of the stream; they crossed and offered no resistance to our passage. One-fourth of a mile south of the stream the road forked, both branches leading to Salisbury; the west road was chosen for the main column, as being in better condition. One battalion of the twelfth Kentucky cavalry was sent by the eastern or old road, with orders to make a determined demonstration of crossing Grant creek, two (2) miles from Salisbury, and, if successful, to attack the forces defending the upper bridge in rear. Just at daylight our advance guard came upon the enemy's pickets, which were pushed back to the bridge over Grant creek, just before reaching which our troops were opened upon by both artillery and infantry stationed on the Salisbury side of the stream. A close reconnoissance discovered the fact that the flooring had been removed from two spans of the bridge, and piled on the enemy's side. The trains could be heard distinctly leaving Salisbury, on both the South Carolina and Morgantown railroad. Miller's and Brown's brigades were closed up, and a section of Reagan's battery ordered forward. Just as Brown's brigade had been formed, I received an order from Major General Stoneman to send one hundred (100) men to ford Grant creek,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles above the bridge, cut the railroad, capture a train, if possible, and then get in rear of Salisbury, and annoy the enemy as much as possible. The eleventh Kentucky was selected for this purpose, Lieutenant Colonel Slater commanding, and Captain Morrow, of General Stoneman's staff, accompanying the detachment. About the same time Major Donnelly, of the thirteenth Tennessee cavalry, with about one hundred (100) men, was ordered to cross the stream lower, while Lieutenant Colonel Smith, acting assistant inspector general, with a party of dismounted men, crossed still lower. Major Keogh, of General Stoneman's staff, afterwards joined the eleventh Kentucky cavalry, and gallantly led it during the charge. So soon as the parties sent across the river became engaged, and the rattling fire of the eleventh Kentucky cavalry (Spencer's rifles) announced that the enemy's left had been turned, I ordered Colonel Miller to advance on the main road. The flooring of the bridge was found to have been taken up, but was laid by a detachment of the eighth and thirteenth Tennessee cavalry, and Miller's brigade charged across. The enemy by this time were falling back along their entire line. Brigadier General Brown was ordered forward to support Colonel Miller, who continued to press

them. Their retreat soon became a rout. At the intersection of the road upon which we were advancing with the Statesville road, Keogh, who had been joined by Major Sawyer's battalion, eighth Tennessee cavalry, joined Miller, having charged and captured all the artillery the enemy had used against our right flank. The pursuit was kept up as long as the enemy retained a semblance of organization, and until those who escaped capture had scattered and concealed themselves in the woods. The enemy's force was ascertained to have about three thousand (3,000,) commanded by Major General W. M. Gardner, with eighteen pieces of artillery, in charge of Colonel J. C. Pemberton, (late Lieutenant General Pemberton.) The fruits of this victory were eighteen pieces of artillery, with caissons, forges, and battery wagons, complete; seventeen (17) stands of colors, and between twelve and thirteen hundred (1,200 and 1,300) prisoners, and the possession of the town, with its immense depots and arsenals, and the Salisbury prison. Miller's brigade was recalled from the pursuit, and ordered to destroy the railroad eastward, at the same time Major Hambright, provost marshal, and Major Barnes, of my staff, were ordered to secure the prisoners, and ascertain the locality and amount of stores, with a view to their destruction. Colonel Palmer, with his brigade, came up late in the afternoon, and reported that he had been entirely successful, having destroyed two large factories, seven thousand (7,000) bales of cotton, cut the railroad once north of Greensboro', and in three places between that place and the Yadkin river, and captured over four hundred (400) prisoners; and that Major Wagner, who was detached at Jacksonsville, had also rejoined and reported the destruction of all bridges on the Tennessee and Virginia railroad to within four (4) miles of Lynchburg, Virginia. Colonel Palmer was directed to destroy the railroad south of Salisbury, in the direction of Charlotte.

At 2 p. m. on the 13th Major Barnes reported the destruction of all rebel supplies to be complete. From the preceding afternoon up to this time the air had been constantly rent by the reports of exploding shells, and burning magazines for miles around. The locality of the city was marked during the day by a column of dense smoke, and at night by the glare from burning stores. Major Barnes reported having destroyed the following stores: 10,000 stand of arms; 1,000,000 pounds of ammunition, (small;) 10,000 pounds of ammunition, (artillery;) 6,000 pounds of powder; 3 magazines; 6 depots; 10,000 bushels of corn; 75,000 suits of uniform clothing; 250,000 blankets, English manufacture; 20,000 pounds of leather; 6,000 pounds of bacon; 100,000 pounds of salt; 20,000 pounds of sugar; 27,000 pounds of rice; 10,000 pounds of saltpetre; 50,000 bushels of wheat; 80 barrels of turpentine; 15,000,000 dollars of confederate money; a lot of medical stores, which the medical director said was worth over one hundred thousand dollars in gold.

The work of destruction complete, the command marched from Salisbury at 3 p. m. on the 13th, bringing away eleven (11) of the eighteen (18) pieces of captured artillery; the remaining seven (7) pieces were destroyed and abandoned for lack of animals to bring them off.

On the 15th the command reached Lenoir, and as it had been determined to send the captured artillery and prisoners to East Tennessee from this point, the 16th was occupied in returning the prisoners and refitting the artillery.

On the 17th Major General Stoneman left the command. Up to this time General Stoneman had been with the division, and, as stated in the beginning of this report, all movements were made in accordance with his plans. Colonel Palmer, whose brigade was at Statesville, was ordered to establish his headquarters at Lincolnton, and watch the line of the Catawba. With Miller's and Brown's brigades I moved towards Morgantown, and when arriving at the Catawba river,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles east of that place, the bridge was discovered to be torn up, the ford blockaded, and the passage of the river disputed by Major General McCowen, with about three hundred (300) men and one piece of artillery. Major

Kenner, eighth Tennessee cavalry, was sent up the river about two (2) miles to cross and get in the enemy's rear; another battalion of the same regiment was dismounted and placed as near the bridge as shelter could be found. The second shot from our artillery dismounted the rebel gun, a few more discharges drove them from their rifle-pits, when the dismounted battalion under Captain Dentor, eighth Tennessee, charged across the bridge on the sleepers, and drove the rebels from the ford. The rebels lost several killed, and we captured one piece of artillery, and about fifty (50) prisoners. The broken axle of the piece was replaced from caisson, and the piece brought away. At Morgantown large supplies of corn and bacon were found.

On the 19th I moved towards Ashville, by way of Swananoa gap, reaching the gap on the 20th. I found it effectually blockaded and defended by about five hundred (500) men with four (4) pieces of artillery.

Leaving Colonel Miller to deceive the enemy by feints, on the 21st I moved to Rutherford, forty (40) miles from Swananoa gap, and by sundown on the 22d I had passed the Blue Ridge, at Howard's gap, with but slight resistance, and was in the enemy's rear.

At daylight on the 23d the advance entered Andersonville. Here I ascertained that the enemy had learned that I had left Swananoa gap, and had been in Andersonville the previous day with four (4) pieces of artillery, but being able to hear nothing of us, had returned towards Ashville late in the afternoon. I immediately ordered Colonel Slater, commanding eleventh Kentucky cavalry, to pursue, attack, and capture this artillery at all hazards. The eleventh Michigan was ordered to the eleventh Kentucky. At 12 o'clock m. the colonel reported he had overtaken the artillery twelve (12) miles from Hendersonville, charged and captured the four (4) pieces and seventy (70) of its infantry guard.

At Hendersonville about three hundred stand of arms were captured. I also heard from Colonel Palmer that he had received my order to move to Rutherford, but after concentrating for the move, had been informed by General Echols, of the rebel army, of the existence of the truce, and therefore had not moved. He was directed to comply with the previous order, and establish his headquarters at Rutherford. I regarded the possession of one of the gaps of the Blue Ridge as being absolutely necessary to the safety of my command.

At 12 o'clock m. I left Hendersonville, intending to attack Ashville the same evening. At 3 p. m. I received a flag of truce from General Martin, at Ashville, stating that he had official notification of the truce. Later in the evening another flag of truce informed me that General Martin would meet me next morning at 11 a. m. I received an official announcement from General Sherman of the existence of the truce.

General Sherman's order to General Stoneman to come to the railroad at Durham's station, or Hillsboro', was received at 11 p. m. Being thoroughly convinced that the order had been given by General Sherman in the belief that the cavalry division was at or near Salisbury, when in fact it would have required a march of above two hundred (200) miles to have reached Durham's station, and but sixty (60) to our base at Greenville, Tennessee, after mature consideration I determined to march to the latter place; and accordingly, when I met General Martin, under flag of truce, on the morning of the 24th, I announced to him my decision to march to Greenville, and at the same time suggested to him that it would be a great relief to the people if he could supply me with three (3) days' rations, and thus avoid the necessity of stripping the citizens of their scanty supplies. The general agreed to my proposition, and furnished three (3) days' rations of meal, and all the meat they had on hand. At this meeting General Martin demanded the restoration of the battery captured the preceding day, basing his claim on the fact that the capture had been made after the date of agreement between Generals Sherman and Johnston, though its existence might have been unknown to him and myself. Of course I declined restoring the

battery, which, with the piece captured at Morgantown, will arrive at this place on the 28th. But for the armistice it would have been easy to capture Ashville and its garrison. Colonel Palmer reports that after leaving Statesville he paroled over two thousand (2,000) prisoners.

On the 25th Brown's and Miller's brigades marched towards Greenville, while orders were given for Palmer to proceed by way of Waynesville and Quallatown down the Little Tennessee.

I cannot close this report without remarking on the complete surprise of the rebels at every point at which we appeared. When the expedition crossed the Blue Ridge into North Carolina they were convinced that Salisbury was the point of intended attack. By turning due north from Jonesville the enemy were completely surprised, and the Tennessee and Virginia railroad at our mercy. By the destruction of that road the enemy lost three (3) trains, and were compelled to destroy upwards of two hundred (200) wagons, and spike and abandon twenty-one (21) pieces of artillery. The greater part of the troops thus cut off returned to Kentucky, under Generals Cosley and Geltner, and surrendered themselves to the federal authorities. When marching south the demonstration of Colonel Palmer in the direction of Danville and Greensboro', by Martinsville, the enemy withdrew several thousand of their troops from Salisbury before they discovered the real point of attack. The road being cut in five different places south of Danville, and despite their efforts to re-enforce it, Salisbury, with its immense depots and magazines, fell into our hands. A division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry arrived at Salisbury the day after our departure. While all their available force and artillery was at Swananoa gap a brigade was passed to their rear, surprising and capturing most of their force. Our captures amount to twenty-five (25) pieces of artillery taken in action, and twenty-one (21) that they were forced to abandon in southwest Virginia—total forty-six (46;) above six thousand (6,000) prisoners, and seventeen (17) battle-flags.

In conclusion I beg to recommend the following officers to the especial consideration of the War Department: Colonel W. J. Palmer, for his uniform gallantry and zeal and ability in the management of his brigade; Colonel J. K. Miller, the same, and especially for his gallantry at Salisbury, for which I respectfully and earnestly recommend him for the brevet of brigadier general; Major Sanders, for gallantry in the charge at Salisbury; Colonel Trawbridge, for gallantry and energy in his attack on High Point, where he was opposed by superior numbers; Lieutenant Colonel Slater, for his distinguished gallantry in charging and capturing the enemy's battery near Ashville, April 23d; Major Wagner, fifteenth Pennsylvania cavalry, for the gallantry and ability displayed by him in the management of his battalion while detached from his regiment and brigade in the direction of Lynchburg and Danville; Major Modena, twelfth Ohio, for gallantry in capturing and destroying the bridges over Catawba when defended by a superior force and two (2) pieces of artillery; Lieutenant Colonel Stacy, thirteenth Tennessee cavalry, for his uniform gallantry, particularly at Salisbury.

I beg to recommend to special notice my staff Lieutenant Colonel Israel C. Smith, acting assistant inspector general, for his uniform gallantry and efficiency, particularly at Salisbury, for promotion to colonel by brevet. For the same reasons I recommend Major S. C. Hambright, tenth Tennessee cavalry, provost marshal division, and Major J. K. Barnes, twelfth Kentucky cavalry, Captain W. J. Patterson, battery E, first Tennessee light artillery, acting assistant adjutant general, and Captain W. R. Tracy, commissary subsistence United States volunteers, Lieutenant D. M. Nelson, aide-de-camp, ninth Tennessee cavalry, Lieutenants Malaby and Rice, signal officers, and Surgeon A. L. Caniet, medical director.

Upon First Lieutenant J. M. Reagan, commanding battery E, first Tennessee light artillery, devolved the laborious duty of commanding his battery. His management of it, whether on long and tedious marches with broken-down

horses, or on the battle-field, was such as to challenge the admiration of the entire command, and often elicited the praise of the major general commanding. I would earnestly recommend his promotion to major by brevet. Brigade commanders will send in recommendations of such officers as have distinguished themselves.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALVAN C. GILLEM,

*Brig. Gen. U. S. Volunteers, Commanding Division.*

Major G. M. BASCOM,

*Assistant Adjutant General,*

*Headquarters District East Tennessee, Knoxville.*

#### HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS,

MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*Macon, Ga., June 29, 1865.*

GENERAL: My last general report of operations, dated at Gravelly Spring, Alabama, February 8, 1865, completed the history of the cavalry corps, military division of the Mississippi, from its organization to that date. In pursuance of instructions from General Thomas, I was authorized, after the escape of Hood to the south side of the Tennessee river, to assemble the available force of the corps in the vicinity of Eastport, at the head of steamboat navigation on the Tennessee river, for the purpose of completing the organization and putting the troops in the best possible condition for early active operations. By his direction, after transferring the seventh Ohio and fifth Iowa from the sixth division, it was ordered to Pulaski with a view to its remaining in Tennessee for local operations. No reports have since been received of its services.

On the 24th of January La Grange's and Watkins's brigades of the first division, after a fatiguing march, arrived at Waterloo landing, on the northwestern corner of Alabama. They had been detained in Kentucky, under General McCook, for the purpose of ridding that State of a band of rebel cavalry under Lyon. In pursuance of previous orders the third brigade of this division was then distributed between the first and second brigades. Brevet Brigadier General Watkins, at his own request, was ordered to Nashville to report to Brigadier General R. W. Johnson, commanding sixth division, for assignment to the command of a brigade in that division. About the same time the second division, Brigadier General Eli Long commanding, and newly mounted and equipped, arrived from Louisville, having marched from that place, a distance of three hundred and eighty-five (385) miles, in mid-winter, over bad roads, with scanty supplies of forage, in twenty-eight (28) days. Soon after the Winslow brigade, of the fourth division, arrived by steam transports from the same place. The second brigade of the division was then organized by joining the first Ohio (transferred from the second division) with the fifth Iowa and seventh Ohio, (transferred from the sixth division.) Brevet Brigadier General A. J. Alexander, a young officer of courage and administrative ability, was assigned to the command. Brigadier General B. H. Grierson had been originally assigned to the command of this division, but failing to use due diligence in assembling and preparing it for the field, he was replaced by Brevet Major General E. Upton, an officer of rare merit and experience. The corps were all cantoned on the north bank of the Tennessee river; Long's, Upton's, and Hatch's divisions, and Hammond's brigade, of Knipe's division, at Gravelly Spring, and McCook's division at Waterloo. The aggregate force was about twenty-two thousand (22,000) men, thirteen thousand of whom were armed with Spencer carbines and rifles; sixteen thousand (16,000) were well mounted on horses,

simply requiring a few weeks' rest, feed, and attention, to become fit for active service; the balance were poorly armed and dismounted.

On the 3d of February I received instructions to send a division of five thousand cavalry to General Canby. After consultation with General Thomas it was decided to send Knipe's division, but in order to furnish it with horses it was found necessary to dismount part of the command remaining behind. General Hatch's division, composed of most excellent troops, had, under its gallant commander, won great distinction during the recent campaign, but having the largest number of dismounted men, and having been constantly in service from the beginning of the war, I thought it best to take the horses from it necessary to mount the troops about to leave; I wished to give it an opportunity to rest, furnish it a remount of fresh horses, equipments, and arms, and hoped thereby to make it a model in drill, discipline, and equipment, as it had already made itself in dash, constancy, and cheerful performance of duty.

On the 3d of February the mounted portion of the seventh division embarked at Waterloo on transports for Vicksburg; the dismounted portion, with such horses as could be obtained, followed from Nashville, under the direct command of General Knipe, as soon as transportation could be furnished. Brevet Brigadier General J. Hammond had been relieved, by direction of the chief surgeon, from the command of a brigade in this division, after having earned great credit with it in the battle about Nashville and the pursuit of Hood from Tennessee. These changes left under my immediate command seventeen thousand men, requiring about five thousand horses to furnish a complete remount. As the troops arrived at Gravelly Spring they were assigned to camps as close together as the circumstances of ground, water, and contiguity to the landings would permit. The mild climate, rocky soil, and the rolling surface of the country rendered this altogether the best locality that could have been found for recuperating and preparing both men and horses for an early spring campaign. The camps were laid out with regularity; comfortable quarters for the men and shelter for the horses were constructed without delay. Roads were made to the landings, and supplies of forage, rations, clothing, equipments, and ammunition were furnished in great abundance. A thorough system of instructions for men and officers was instituted, and every necessary effort was made to bring the corps to the highest possible state of efficiency. I transmit herewith a topographical sketch, showing the situation of the camps and their arrangement. The plan of that constructed by General Hammond, and afterwards occupied by a part of General Upton's division, I regard the best arrangement of a cavalry cantonment yet devised. The influence of the system adopted on the subsequent career of the corps cannot be overestimated. The final victory over Forrest and the rebel cavalry was won by patient industry and instruction while in the cantonments of Gravelly Spring and Waterloo. The great fault in our cavalry system had previously been overwork in detachments, and the absence of instructive organization and the uniformity of equipment.

On the 23d of February General Thomas arrived at Eastport with instructions, directing me to fit out an expedition of five or six thousand cavalry "for the purpose of making a demonstration upon Tuscaloosa and Selma," in favor of General Canby's operations against Mobile and central Alabama. After consultation, in which I expressed a belief in the capacity of my command to *capture* those places and conduct from the latter most important operations, General Thomas gave me permission to move with my entire available mounted force, and authorized me to pursue such a course as I might see proper, keeping in view the general object of the impending campaign. The instructions of Lieutenant General Grant, transmitted to me by General Thomas, after directing me to be ready to march as soon as General Canby's movement had begun, allowed me the amplest discretion as an independent commander. It was at first intended that the expedition should begin its movements by

the 4th of March, but heavy rain-storms setting in, the Tennessee river became much swollen, and the roads impassable.

Lieutenant General Grant having directed all the surplus horses purchased in the west to be sent to General Canby, there were no means left in the hands of the cavalry bureau to mount Hatch's division. I therefore directed him to turn over his few remaining horses to General Upton, and continue the instruction of his command at Eastport. It was expected that the supply departments would soon be able to furnish him horses and Spencer carbines, so as to enable him to take the field and join the corps somewhere in Alabama or Georgia. By a voluntary arrangement between Brevet Brigadier General D. E. Coon, commanding the second brigade of Hatch's division, and Brigadier General Croxton, the former also turned over to the latter all the Spencer carbines then in the brigade. By these means the troops of the first, second, and fourth divisions, with the exception of a few hundred, were armed with the Spencer carbines; and all had arms using cartridges with metallic cases. The heavy rains continued, in consequence of which the river overflowed its banks, and destroyed a large quantity of grain accumulated for the horses at Chickasaw landing. The steamboats could not reach the highlands except by working their way through the woods and fields, until the river subsided to its natural banks. The crossing was, therefore, delayed until the 18th instant. A light canvas pontoon train of thirty boats, with the fixtures complete, transported by fifty six-mule wagons, and in charge of a battalion of the twelfth Missouri cavalry, Major J. M. Hubbard commanding, was also got ready to accompany the expedition. The entire train, in charge of Captain W. E. Brown, acting chief quartermaster, numbered not far from two hundred and fifty wagons, escorted by fifteen hundred dismounted men of the three divisions. These men were organized into battalions, and commanded by Major (*now* Colonel) Archer. At daylight on the 22d of March, all the preliminary arrangements having been perfected, and the order of march having been designated, the movement began. The entire valley of the Tennessee having been devastated by two years of warfare, was quite as destitute of army supplies as the hill country south of it. In all directions, for one hundred and twenty miles, there was almost absolute destitution. It was, therefore, necessary to scatter the troops over a wide extent of country, and march as rapidly as circumstances would permit. This was rendered safe by the fact that Forrest's forces were at that time near West Point, Mississippi, one hundred and fifty miles southwest of Eastport, while Roddy's occupied Montevallo, on the Alabama and Tennessee river railroad, nearly the same distance to the southeast. By starting on diverging roads the enemy was left in doubt as to our real object, and compelled to watch equally Columbus, Tuscaloosa, and Selma. Upton's divisions, followed by his train, marched rapidly by the most easterly route, passing by Barton's station, Throgmorton's mills, Russellville, Mount Hope, and Jasper, to Sander's ferry, on the west fork of the Black Warrior river. Long's division marched by the way of Cherokee station and Frankfort, but being encumbered by the pontoon train, and having mistaken the road by which it should have ascended the mountain, was considerably delayed in reaching Russellville. From this place it marched directly south by the Tuscaloosa road until it crossed Upper Bear creek; thence turned to the eastward by the head of Buttahatchie creek, crossed Byler's road, near Thorn Hill, and struck Black Water creek about twenty-five miles from Jasper. The crossing of the last-mentioned stream, and the road for six miles beyond, were as bad as could be, but by industry everything was forced through to Jasper, and the ford on the Warrior, with but little loss of time. McCook's division pursued the same route to Bear creek, on the Tuscaloosa road, but instead of turning to the eastward at that place, continued the march towards Tuscaloosa, as far as Eldridge, and thence east to Jasper. In this order the different divisions arrived at and crossed the two forks of the Black Warrior



river. The ford on the West branch was extremely difficult of approach as well as of passage, the country on both sides very rugged, and six or seven hundred feet above, the bed of the stream was entirely destitute of ———; the stream itself was, at the time, likely to become entirely impassable by the rain which threatened to occur at any moment. I had also heard at Jasper on the 27th that a part of Forrest's force, under Chalmers, was marching by the way of Bridgeville towards Tuscaloosa, and knew that by the time the direction of our movement had been discovered it would be but a short time till the balance of the rebel cavalry would push in the same direction. I therefore directed my division commanders to replenish the haversacks, see that the pack-animals were fully laden, to leave all the wagons except the artillery, and march with the greatest possible rapidity *via* Elyton to Montevallo. I felt confident that the enemy would not relinquish his efforts to check the movement of the troops, in the hope of destroying our supply train. I therefore left it between the two streams, with instructions to push on as far as Elyton, where it would receive further orders. By great energy on the part of commanding officers, the two branches of the Warrior were crossed, each division losing a few horses, but no men. At Elyton, on the evening of the 30th, I directed General McCook to detach Croxton's brigade, with orders to move on Tuscaloosa as rapidly as possible, burn the public stores, military school, bridges, foundries, and factories at that place, and return towards the main column, by the way of Centreville road, and rejoin it at or in the vicinity of Selma. Besides covering our trains, and inflicting a heavy blow upon the enemy, I hoped by this detachment to develop any movement on his part intended to intercept my main column. General Upton's division encountered a few rebel cavalry at Elyton, but pushed them rapidly across the Cahawba river to Montevallo. The rebels having felled trees into the ford, and otherwise obstructed it, the railroad bridge near Hillsboro' was flooded over by General Winslow. General Upton crossed his division and pushed on rapidly to Montevallo, where he arrived late on the evening of the 30th. Long and McCook marched by the same route. In this region General Upton's division destroyed the Red Mountain, Central, Bibb, and Columbiana iron-works, Cahawba rolling-mills, five collieries, and much valuable property. All of these establishments were of great extent and in full operation.

I arrived at Montevallo at 1 p. m., March 31, when I found Upton's division ready to resume the march. Directly after, the enemy made his appearance on the Selma road. By my direction, General Upton moved his division out at once, General Alexander's brigade in advance. After a sharp fight and handsome charge, General Alexander drove the rebel cavalry, a part of Crossland's Kentucky brigade, and Roddy's division, rapidly and in great confusion towards Randolph; the enemy endeavoring to make a stand at a creek four or five miles south of Montevallo. General Upton placed in position and opened Rodney's battery I, fourth United States artillery, and passing Winslow's brigade to the front, they again made a hasty retreat, closely pursued and repeatedly charged by Winslow's advance. About fifty prisoners were taken with their arms and accoutrements, and much other loose materials were abandoned. The gallantry of men and officers had been most conspicuous throughout the day, and had resulted already in the establishment of a moral supremacy for the corps. Upton's division bivouacked fourteen miles south of Montevallo, and at dawn of the next day, April 1, pushed forward to Randolph. At this point, in pursuance of the order of march for the day, General Upton turned to the east, for the purpose of going by the way of old Maplesville, and thence by the old Selma road, while General Long was instructed to push forward on the new road. At Randolph, General Upton captured a rebel courier just from Centreville, and from his person took two despatches, one from Brigadier General W. H. Jackson, commanding one of Forrest's divisions, and the other from Major Anderson, Forrest's chief of staff. From the first I learned that Forrest, with a part of his

command, was in my front; this had also been obtained from prisoners; that Jackson, with his division and all the wagons and artillery of the rebel cavalry, was marching from Tuscaloosa, *via* Trion, towards Centreville, and had encamped the night before at Hill's plantation, three miles beyond Scottsboro'; that Croxton, with the brigade detached at Elyton, had struck Jackson's rear-guard at Trion, and interposed himself between it and the train; that Jackson had discovered this, and intended to attack Croxton at daylight April 1. I learned from the other despatch that Chalmer's had also arrived at Marion, Alabama, and had been ordered to cross to the east side of the Cahawba, near that place, for the purpose of joining Forrest in my front, or in the works at Selma. I also learned that a force of dismounted men were stationed at Centreville with orders to hold the bridge over the Cahawba at that place as long as possible, and in no event to let it fall into our hands. Shortly after the interception of these, I received a despatch from Croxton, written from Trion the night before, informing me that he had struck Jackson's rear, and instead of pushing on towards Tuscaloosa, as he was ordered, he would follow up and endeavor to bring him to an engagement, hoping thereby to prevent his junction with Forrest. With this information in my possession, I directed McCook to strengthen the battalion previously ordered to Centreville by a regiment, and to follow at once with LaGrange's entire brigade, leaving all pack-trains and wagons with the main column, so that he could march with the utmost possible celerity, and after seizing the Centreville bridge, and leaving it under protection of a sufficient guard, to cross the Cahawba and continue his march by the Scottsboro' roads towards Trion. His orders were to attack and break up Jackson's forces, form a junction with Croxton, if practicable, and rejoin the corps with his entire division by the Centreville road to Selma. Although he did not leave Randolph till nearly 11 o'clock a. m., and the distance to Scottsville was nearly forty miles, I hoped by this movement to do more than secure the Centreville bridge, and prevent Jackson from joining the forces in front of the main column. Having then taken care of the right flank, and anticipated Forrest in his intention to play his old game of getting upon the rear of his opponent, I gave directions to Long and Upton to allow him no rest, but push him towards Selma with the utmost spirit and rapidity. These officers, comprehending the situation, pressed forward with admirable zeal and activity upon the roads which have been previously indicated. The advance of both divisions encountered small parties of the enemy, but drove them back to their main force at Ebenezer church, six miles north of Plantersville. Forrest had chosen a position on the north bank of Bogler's creek, and disposed of his force for battle, his right resting on Mulberry creek, and his left on a high wooded ridge, with four pieces of artillery, to sweep the Randolph road, upon which Long's division was advancing, and two on the Maplesville road. He had under his command, in line, Armstrong's brigade, of Chalmers's division, Roddy's division, Crossland's Kentucky brigade, and a battalion of three hundred infantry, just arrived from Selma, in all about five thousand men. Part of his front was covered by a slashing of pine tree and rail barricades. As soon as General Long discovered the enemy in strength close upon the main body, he re-enforced his advance guard (a battalion of the seventy-second Indiana mounted infantry) by the balance of the regiment, dismounted, and formed it on the left of the road. Pushing it forward, the enemy was broken and driven back. At this juncture he ordered forward four companies of the seventeenth Indiana, Lieutenant Colonel Frank White commanding. With drawn sabres, this gallant battalion drove the enemy in confusion into the main line, dashed against that, broke through it, rode over the rebel guns, crushing the wheels of one piece, and finally turned to the left and cut its way out, leaving one officer and sixteen men in the enemy's hands, either killed or wounded. In this charge Captain Taylor, seventeenth Indiana, lost his life, after having led his men into the very midst of the enemy, and engaged in a running fight of two hundred yards with Forrest in person.

General Alexander's brigade had the advance of Upton's division, and when within three miles of Ebenezer church, heard the firing and cheers of Long's men on the right, pushed forward at the trot, and soon came upon the enemy. General Alexander hastily deployed his brigade, mostly on the right of the road, with the intention of connecting with Long's left, and as soon as everything was in readiness, pushed forward his line, dismounted. In less than an hour, although the resistance was determined, the position was carried by a gallant charge, and the rebels completely routed. Alexander's brigade captured two guns and about two hundred prisoners, while one gun fell into the hands of General Long's division. Winslow's brigade immediately passed to the front and took up the pursuit, but could not again bring the rebels to a stand. The whole corps bivouacked at sundown about Plantersville, nineteen miles from Selma, with almost constant fighting. The enemy had been driven since morning twenty-four miles.

At daylight of the 2d, Long's division took the advance, closely followed by Upton. Having obtained a well drawn sketch and complete description of the defences of Selma, I directed General Long, marching by the flanks of brigades, to approach the city and cross to the Summerville road, without exposing his men, and to develop his line as soon as he should arrive in front of the works. General Upton was directed to move on the Range Line road, sending a squadron on the Burnsville road. Lieutenant Rundlebrook, with a battalion of the fourth United States cavalry, was instructed to move down the railroad, burning stations, trestle, and bridges, as far as Burnsville. By rapid marching, without opposition, the troops were all in sight of the town, and mostly in position by 4 p. m. As I approached the city, I perceived that my information was generally correct; I therefore made a reconnoissance of the works from left to right, for the purpose of satisfying myself entirely as to the true point of attack and the probable chance of success. I directed General Long to assault the enemy's works by moving diagonally across the road upon which his troops were posted, while General Upton, at his own request, with a picket force of three hundred men, was directed to penetrate the swamp upon his left, break through the line covered by it, and turn the enemy's right; the balance of his division to conform to the movement.

The signal for the advance was to be the discharge of a single gun from Rodney's battery, to be given as soon as Upton's turning movement had developed itself. Before this plan could be carried into execution, and while waiting for the signal to advance, General Long was informed that a strong force of rebel cavalry had begun skirmishing with his rear, and threatened a general attack upon his pack-train and led horses. He had left a force of six companies well posted at the creek, in anticipation of this movement, afterwards ascertained to have been made by Chalmers, in obedience to the instructions of Forrest. This force was at Marion the day before, and was expected on the road from that place. Fearing that this affair might compromise our assault upon the main position, General Long, (having already strengthened the rear by another regiment,) with admirable judgment, determined to make the assault at once, and without waiting for the signal gave the order to advance. The troops dismounted, sprang forward with confident alacrity, and in less than fifteen minutes, without even stopping, wavering, or faltering, had swept over the works and driven the rebels in confusion towards the city. I arrived on that part of the field just after the works were carried, at once notified General Upton of the success, and ordered him to push in as rapidly as possible; directed Colonel Minty (now in command of the second division) to gather his men for a new advance; ordered Colonel Vail, commanding the seventeenth Indiana, to place his own regiment and the fourth Ohio in line inside the works; hurried up the fourth United States cavalry, Lieutenant O'Connell commanding, the Board of Trade battery, Captain Robinson commanding, and renewed the attack. The rebels had occupied a new line, but partially finished, on the edge of the city. A most gallant charge by the

fourth United States cavalry was repulsed, but rapidly re-formed on the left. It was now quite dark; Upton's division advancing at the same time, a new charge was made by the fourth Ohio, seventeenth Indiana, and fourth cavalry, dismounted. The troops, inspired by the wildest enthusiasm, swept everything before them, and penetrated the city in all directions. During the first part of the action, the Chicago Board of Trade battery had occupied a commanding position, and steadily replied to the enemy's guns. I regarded the capture of Selma the most remarkable achievement in the history of modern cavalry, and one admirably illustrative of its new powers and tendencies. That it may be fully understood, particular attention is invited to the following facts: The fortifications assaulted and carried consisted of a bastioned line, on a radius of nearly three miles, extending from the Alabama river, below, to the same above the city. The part west of the city is covered by a miry, deep, and almost impassable creek; that on the east side by a swamp, extending from the river almost to the Summerfield road, and entirely impracticable for mounted men at all times. General Upton ascertained by a personal reconnoissance that dismounted men might, with great difficulty, work through it on the left of the Range Line road. The profile of that part of the line assaulted is as follows: height of parapet six to eight feet; thickness eight feet; depth of ditch five feet; width from ten to fifteen feet; height of stockade on the glacis five feet; sunk into the earth four feet. The ground over which the troops advanced is an open field, generally level, sloping slightly towards the works, but intersected by one ravine and marshy soil, which both the right and left of Long's line experienced some difficulty in crossing. The distance which the troops charged, exposed to the enemy's fire of artillery and musketry, was six hundred yards. Particular attention is invited to that part of General Long's report which describes the assault. He states that the number actually engaged in the charge was one thousand five hundred and fifty officers and men. The portion of the line assaulted was manned by Armstrong's brigade, regarded as the best in Forrest's corps, and reported by him at more than fifteen hundred men. The loss from Long's division was forty killed, two hundred and sixty wounded, and seven missing. General Long was wounded in the head, Colonels Miller and McCormick in the leg, and Colonel Biggs in the breast. I doubt if the history of this or any other war will show another instance in which a line of works so strongly constructed, and as well defended as this, by musketry and artillery, has been stormed and carried by a single line of men without support. Too much credit cannot be accorded to General Long, Colonels Minty, Miller, and Vail, or to the gallant officers and men under their command. I submit, herewith, a map of Selma and its defences, surveyed and drawn by Captain H. E. Noyes, second United States cavalry, and aide-de-camp. The immediate fruits of our victory were thirty-one field guns and one 30-pounder Parrott, which had been used against us; two thousand seven hundred prisoners, including one hundred and fifty officers; a number of colors, and immense quantities of stores of every kind. Generals Forrest, Armstrong, Roddy, and Adams escaped with a number of men, under cover of darkness, either by the Burnsville and river roads, or by swimming the Alabama river. A portion of Upton's division pursued on the Burnsville road until long after midnight, capturing four guns and many prisoners. I estimated the entire garrison, including the militia of the city and surrounding country, at seven thousand men; the entire force under my command, engaged and in supporting distance, was nine thousand men and eight guns. As soon as the troops could be assembled and got into camp, I assigned Brevet Brigadier General Winslow to the command of the city, with orders to destroy everything that could possibly benefit the rebel cause; directed General Upton to march at daylight with his division, for the purpose of drawing Chalmers to the west side of the Cahawba, to open communication with McCook, expected from Centreville, and in conjunction with the latter, to bring in the train. The capture of Selma having put

us in possession of the enemy's general depot in the southwest, was a vital blow to their cause, and secured to us the certainty of going in whatever direction might be found most advantageous. I gave directions to Lieutenant Haywood, fourth Michigan cavalry, engineer officer on my staff, to employ all the resources of the shops in the city in construction of pontoons, with the intention of laying a bridge and crossing to the south side of the Alabama river, as soon as I could satisfy myself in regard to General Canby's success in the operations against Mobile.

On April 5th Upton and McCook arrived with the train, but nothing definite had been heard of Croxton. McCook had been entirely successful in his operations against Centreville, but on reaching Scottsboro', found Jackson well posted, with a force he thought too strong to attack. After a sharp skirmish he had retired to Centreville, burned the Scottsboro' cotton factories and Cahawba bridge, and returned towards Selma, satisfied that Croxton had taken care of himself and gone in a new direction.

On the 6th of April, having ordered Major Hubbard to lay a bridge over the Alabama with the utmost despatch, I went to Cahawba to see General Forrest, who had agreed to meet me there under flag of truce, for the purpose of arranging an exchange of prisoners. I was not long in discovering that I need not expect liberality in this matter, and that Forrest hoped to recapture the men of his command in my possession. During our conversation he informed me that Croxton had had an engagement with Wirt Adams, near Bridgeville, forty miles southwest of Tuscaloosa, two days before. Thus assured of Croxton's success and safety, I determined to lose no further time in crossing to the south side of the Alabama. I had also satisfied myself in the mean time that Canby had an ample force to take Mobile and march to central Alabama. I therefore returned to Selma, and urged every one to the utmost exertions. The river was quite full and rising, the weather unsettled and rainy, but by the greatest exertions night and day on the part of Major Hubbard and his battalion, General Upton, General Alexander, and my own staff, the bridge, eight hundred and seventy feet long, was constructed, and the command all crossed by daylight of the 10th. So swift and deep was the river that the bridge was swept away three times; General Alexander narrowly escaped with his life; boats were capsized, and men precipitated into the stream; but the operation was finally terminated with complete success. The report of Major Hubbard, transmitted herewith, will give additional details of interest. Before leaving the city General Winslow destroyed the arsenals, foundries, arms, stores, and military munitions of every kind. The enemy had previously burned twenty-five thousand bales of cotton. Having the entire corps, except Croxton's brigade, on the south side of the river, and being satisfied that the rebels could receive no advantage by attempting to again occupy Selma, so thoroughly had everything in it been destroyed, I determined to move by the way of Montgomery into Georgia, and after breaking up railroads and destroying stores and army supplies in that State, to march thence as rapidly as possible to the theatre of operations in North Carolina and Virginia. Enough horses were secured at Selma and on the march to that place to mount all of our dismounted men. In order to disencumber the column of every unnecessary impediment, I ordered the surplus wagons to be destroyed, and all of the bridge train except enough for twelve days. The main object for which the latter was brought had been secured by our passage of the Alabama. I also directed the column to be cleared of all contraband negroes, and such of the able-bodied ones as were able to enlist to be organized into regiments, one to each division. Efficient officers were assigned to these commands and great pains taken to prevent them becoming burdensome. How well they succeeded can be understood from the fact that, in addition to subsisting themselves upon the country, they marched upon one occasion forty-five miles, and frequently as much as thirty-five, in one day. In the march from Selma, La Grange's

brigade of McCook's division was given the advance. The recent rains had rendered the roads quite muddy, and a small body of rebel cavalry, in falling back before La Grange, destroyed several bridges, so that our progress was necessarily slow.

At 7 a. m., April 12, the advanced guard reached Montgomery and received the surrender of the city from the mayor and council. General Adams, with a small force, after falling back before us to the city, burned ninety thousand bales of cotton stored there, and continued his retreat to Mount Meigs, on the Columbus road. Five guns and large quantities of small-arms, stores, &c., were left in our hands and destroyed. General McCook assigned Colonel Cooper, fourth Kentucky cavalry, to the command of the city, and immediately began the destruction of the public stores. Major Weston, of the fourth Kentucky, with a small detachment of his regiment, made a rapid march towards Wetumpka, swam the Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers, captured five steamboats and their cargoes, which were taken to Montgomery and destroyed.

Early on the 14th the march was resumed. I instructed Brevet Major General Upton to move with his own division directly upon Columbus, and to order La Grange, with his brigade, to make a rapid movement on West Point, destroying the railroad bridges along the line of his march. I hoped to secure a crossing of the Chattahoochie at one or the other of the places. Minty followed Upton by the way of Tuskegee; McCook, with a part of his division, remained a few hours at Montgomery to complete the destruction of the public stores. Shortly after leaving his camp near Montgomery, La Grange struck a force of rebels under Beaufort and Clanton, but drove them in confusion, capturing about one hundred and fifty prisoners.

About 2 p. m. of the 16th, General Upton's advance, a part of Alexander's brigade, struck the enemy's pickets on the road, and drove them rapidly through Girard to the lower bridge over the Chattahoochie, at Columbus. The rebels hastily set fire to it, and thereby prevented its capture. After securing a position on the lower Montgomery road, General Upton detached a force to push around to the bridge at the factory, three miles above the city. He then made a reconnoissance in person, and found the enemy strongly posted in a line of works covering all the bridges, with a large number of guns in position on both sides of the river. He had already determined to move Winslow's brigade to the Opelika or Summerville road, and assault the works on that side without waiting for the arrival of the second division. I reached the head of Winslow's brigade, of the fourth division, at 4 o'clock, and found the troops marching to the positions assigned them by General Upton. Through an accident, Winslow did not arrive at his position until after dark; but General Upton proposed to make the assault in the night, and coinciding with his judgment, I ordered the attack. Three hundred men of the third Iowa cavalry, Colonel Noble commanding, were dismounted, and after a slight skirmish moved forward and formed across the road under a heavy fire of artillery. The fourth Iowa and tenth Missouri were held in readiness to support the assaulting party. At 8 p. m., just as the troops were ready, the enemy at a short distance opened a heavy fire of musketry, and with a four-gun battery began throwing grape and canister. Generals Upton and Winslow, in person, directed the movement; the troops dashed forward, opened a withering fire from their Spencers, pushed through a slashing and abatis, and pressed the rebel line back to their outworks, supposed at first to be the main line. During all this time the rebel guns threw out a perfect storm of canister and grape, but without avail. General Upton sent two companies of the tenth Missouri, Captain Glassen commanding, to follow up the success of the dismounted men and get possession of the bridge. They passed through the inner line of works, and, under cover of darkness, before the rebels knew it, had reached the bridge leading into Columbus. As soon as everything could be got up to the position occupied by the dismounted

men, General Upton pressed forward again, swept away all opposition, took possession of the foot and railroad bridges, and stationed guards throughout the city. Twelve hundred prisoners, fifty-two field-guns in position for use against us, and large quantities of arms and stores fell into our hands. Our loss was only twenty-four killed and wounded. Colonel C. A. L. Lamar, of General Cobb's staff, formerly owner of the Wanderer, slave-trader, was killed. The splendid gallantry and steadiness of General Upton, Brevet Brigadier General Winslow, and all the officers and men engaged in this night attack, is worthy of the highest commendation. The rebel force was over three thousand men. They could not believe they had been dislodged from their strong fortifications by an attack of three hundred men. When it is remembered that this operation gave to us the city of Columbus, the key to Georgia—400 miles from our starting-point—and that it was conducted by cavalry, without any inspiration from the great events which had transpired in Virginia, it will not be considered insignificant, although shorn of its importance. General Winslow was assigned to the command of the city. His report will give interesting details in regard to the stores, railroad transportation, gunboats, armories, arsenals, and workshops destroyed. After much sharp skirmishing and hard marching, which resulted in the capture of fourteen wagons and a number of prisoners, La Grange's advance reached the vicinity of West Point at 10 a. m., April 16. With Beck's eighteenth Indiana battery, and the second and fourth Indiana cavalry, the enemy were kept occupied until the arrival of the balance of the brigade. Having thoroughly reconnoitred the ground, detachments of the first Wisconsin, second Indiana, and seventh Kentucky cavalry, dismounted, and prepared to assault Fort Tyler, covering the bridge. Colonel La Grange describes it as a remarkably strong bastioned earthwork, thirty-five yards square, surrounded by a ditch twelve feet wide and ten feet deep, situated on a commanding eminence, protected by an imperfect abatis, and mounting two 32-pounders and two field guns. At 1 p. m. the charge was sounded, and the brave detachment on the three sides of the work rushed forward to the assault, drove the rebel skirmishers into the fort, and followed, under a withering fire of musketry and grape, to the edge of the ditch. This was found impassable, but, without falling back, Colonel La Grange posted sharpshooters to keep down the enemy, and organized parties to gather materials for bridges. As soon as this had been done he sounded the charge again. The detachments sprang forward again, laid the bridges, and rushed forward over the parapets into the work, capturing the entire garrison—in all 265 men. General Tyler, commanding officer, with 18 men and officers, killed, and 28 severely wounded. Three guns and 500 stand of small-arms fell into our hands. Our loss was 7 killed and 29 wounded. Simultaneously with the advance upon the fort, the fourth Indiana dashed through the town, secured both bridges over the Chattahoochee, scattered a superior force of cavalry, which had just arrived, and burned five engines and trains. Colonel La Grange highly commends the accuracy and steadiness of Captain Beck in the use of his artillery. I cannot speak too warmly of the intrepidity, good management, and soldierly ability displayed by Colonel La Grange in this affair, nor too strongly recommend the steadiness, dash, and courage of his officers and men. Captain Ross S. Hill, commanding the second Indiana, dangerously wounded in the assault, and previously wounded at Scottsboro', and Lieutenant Colonel Harnden, commanding the first Wisconsin, slightly wounded, were noticeably conspicuous, and I trust will receive the promotion for which they have been recommended. Colonel La Grange destroyed at this place two bridges, nineteen locomotives, and two hundred and forty-five cars, loaded with quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance stores. Before leaving he established a hospital for the wounded of both sides, and left with the mayor an ample supply of stores to provide for all their wants.

Early on the morning of the 17th he resumed his march towards Macon,

passing through La Grange, Griffen, and Forsyth, and breaking the railroads at these places. He would have reached his destination by noon of the 20th but for delay caused by an order to wait for the fourth Kentucky cavalry, which had gone through Columbus.

The afternoon of the 17th I directed Colonel Minty to resume the march with his division on the Thomaston road, towards Macon, and to send a detachment forward that night to seize the double bridges over Flint river. Captain Van Antwerp, of my staff, accompanied this party. He speaks in the highest terms of the dash with which Captain Hudson, fourth Michigan cavalry, discharged the duties assigned him. By 7 a. m. the next day he had reached the bridges, fifty-five miles from Columbus, scattered the party defending them, and took forty prisoners. Before leaving Columbus, General Winslow destroyed the rebel ram Jackson, nearly ready for sea, mounting six 7-inch guns, burned fifteen locomotives, two hundred and fifty cars, the railroad bridge and foot-bridges, one hundred and fifteen thousand bales of cotton, four cotton factories, the navy yard, foundry, armory, sword and pistol factory, accoutrement shops, three paper mills, over a hundred thousand rounds of artillery ammunition, besides immense stores of which no account could be taken. The rebels abandoned and burned the gunboat Chattahoochee, twelve miles below Columbus.

On the morning of the 18th the whole command resumed the march on the route pursued by the second division.

On the evening of the 20th, when within twenty miles of Macon, the advance guard, composed of the seventeenth Indiana mounted infantry, Colonel White commanding, encountered about two hundred rebel cavalry on the road, but drove them rapidly back towards the city, and saved the Echconnee and Tobesafke bridges. Colonel White deserves great credit for the boldness and skill with which he conducted his command. When within thirteen miles of Macon he met a flag of truce in charge of Brigadier General Robertson, of the rebel army, bearing a written communication addressed to the commanding officers, United States forces. Colonel White halted the flag and his advance, and sent the communication to Colonel Minty, commanding the division. After reading it Colonel Minty forwarded it to me, gave instructions to Colonel White to renew his advance, after waiting five minutes for the flag of truce to get out of the way, and sent a note to General Robertson informing him of his action. I received the communication at 6 p. m., nineteen miles from Macon, and, upon examination, found that it was a letter from General Howell Cobb, commanding the rebel forces at Macon. The following is a true copy of the original :

“HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT TENNESSEE AND GEORGIA,

*“Macon, April 20, 1865.*

“GENERAL : I have just received from General G. T. Beauregard, my immediate commander, a telegraphic despatch, of which the following is a copy :

“‘GREENSBORO’, April 19, 1865,

*“via Columbia 19, via Augusta 20.*

“Major General H. COBB :

“Inform general commanding enemy’s forces in your front that a truce for the purpose of a final settlement was greed upon yesterday, between Generals Johnston and Sherman, applicable to all forces under their command. A message to that effect from General Sherman will be sent him as soon as practicable. The contending forces are to occupy their present position, forty-eight hours’ notice being given on the event of the resumption of hostilities.

“G. T. BEAUREGARD,

*“General, Second in Command.*



"My force being a portion of General Johnston's command, I proceed at once to execute the terms of the armistice, and have accordingly issued orders for the carrying out of the same. I will meet you at any intermediate point, between our respective lines, for the purpose of making the necessary arrangements for a more perfect enforcement of the armistice. This communication will be handed to you by Brigadier General F. H. Robinson.

"I am, general, very respectfully, yours,

"HOWELL COBB,

"Major General Commanding, &c.

"The COMMANDING GENERAL

"of the United States Forces."

Without giving entire credence to the communication, I rode rapidly to the front, accompanied by several officers of my staff, determined to halt the advance at the defences of the city and see General Cobb, so as to satisfy myself entirely in regard to every point before consenting to acknowledge the armistice. But before I could overtake the advance, or arrest it through an order carried by a staff officer, Colonel White had dashed into the city and received its surrender. The garrison made a slight show of resistance, but laid down their arms promptly at the summons of Colonel White. General Cobb protested at what he professed to regard a violation of the alleged armistice, forgetting that my subordinates could neither acknowledge him as a channel of communication nor assume the responsibility of suspending their operations. I arrived at Macon at 8 p. m., and had an interview with General Cobb, during which he renewed his protest, insisting that I should acknowledge the existence of the armistice and withdraw my troops to the point at which they were met by the flag of truce. While I had no reason to doubt that an arrangement had been entered into by General Johnston and Major General Sherman in the terms asserted, I could not acknowledge its application to my command, or its obligation upon me, until notified to that effect by specific instructions from proper authority authentically transmitted. My force, although known as the cavalry corps of the military division of the Mississippi, organized under General Sherman's orders, had not served under his direct command since I separated from him at Gaylesville, Alabama, in October, 1864. He at that time directed me to report to Major General Thomas, with my troops, for the purpose of completing the reorganization and assisting in the operations against Hood and Forrest. From that time until my arrival at this place all of my operations were conducted under instructions either directly from General Thomas, or transmitted through him from Lieutenant General Grant. But I fully expected to join the armies operating in the Carolinas and Virginia, and therefore to be under and receive my instructions from General Sherman, whenever I should establish communications with him. I therefore felt it my duty to obey whatever instructions General Sherman might send me, unless they would clearly injure the cause of arms. No orders having yet been received by me, I accordingly informed General Cobb, without questioning the existence of an armistice, or that it might be applicable to my forces, that I could not acknowledge the justice of his protest, but must regard all the acts of my command which had transpired that evening, or which might transpire before the official propagation of the armistice, legitimate acts of warfare. I further informed him, without any regard to the principle just asserted, that I had used all diligence in endeavoring to halt the advance of my troops until I could obtain satisfactory information, and should therefore not withdraw from the city, but continue to hold it, and consider the garrison, including the generals, prisoners of war until my conduct was disapproved by competent authority after full investigation of the case. I was permitted to send to General Sherman by telegraph a despatch in the following terms :

"HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS MILITARY DIVISION MISSISSIPPI,

"*Macon, Georgia, April 20, 1865—9 p. m.*

"Major General W. T. SHERMAN,

"*through Headquarters General Beauregard, Greensboro, N. C. :*

"My advance received the surrender of this city this evening. General Cobb had previously sent me, under flag of truce, a copy of a telegram from General Beauregard declaring the existence of an armistice between all the troops under your command and those under Johnston. Without questioning the authenticity of this despatch, or its application to my command, I could not communicate orders to my advance in time to prevent the capture of the place. I shall, therefore, hold its garrison, including Major Generals G. W. Smith and Cobb, and Brigadier General Mackall, prisoners of war. Please send me orders. I shall remain here a reasonable length of time to hear from you."

Fearing that it might be tampered with by the rebel telegraph operators, I had it put in cipher, in which shape, I have reason to believe, it reached its destination. The original was materially changed. I have seen in the newspapers what purported to be the reply of General Sherman, directing me to withdraw from the city and release my prisoners. No such despatch ever reached me, and had it done so in the most unquestionable form, I should have obeyed it with great reluctance, and not until I had received every possible assurance that the case had been fully understood.

At 6 p. m. on the 21st I received the following message from General Sherman, and though not in reply to mine, I regarded it as convincing proof that an armistice had actually been agreed upon :

"HEADQUARTERS, GREENSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA,

"*April 21, 1865—2 p. m.*

"Major General WILSON, *Commanding Cavalry Army U. S.,*

"*through Major General H. Cobb :*

"The following is a copy of a communication just received, which will be sent you to-day by an officer :

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

"*Raleigh, April 20, 1865.*

"Major General WILSON,

"*Commanding Cavalry United States Army, in Georgia :*

"General Joseph E. Johnston has agreed with me for a universal suspension of hostilities, looking to a peace over the whole surface of our country. I feel assured that it will be made perfect in a few days. You will therefore desist from further acts of war and devastation until you hear that hostilities are resumed. For the convenience of supplying your command, you may either contract for supplies down about Fort Valley or the old Chattahoochee arsenal, or, if you are south of West Point, Georgia, in the neighborhood of Rome or Kingston, opening up communication and a route of supplies with Chattanooga and Cleveland. Report to me your position through General Johnston, as also round by sea. You may also advise General Canby of your position, and the substance of this, which I have also sent round by sea.

"W. T. SHERMAN,

"*Major General Commanding.*"

"Please communicate above to the federal commander.

"J. E. JOHNSTON."

I therefore issued the necessary orders to carry it into effect, and determined to suspend operations until I received orders to renew them, or until circumstances, apparent to me, should seem to justify independent action. General

Cobb gave me every assistance in his power in the collection of supplies for my command. He directed his quartermasters and commissaries throughout the State, particularly in southwestern Georgia, to ship their grain and provisions to me, and this before any terms of capitulation had been made known to him or myself. I had about seventeen thousand men, besides prisoners, and twenty-two thousand animals to feed, and to have been compelled to forage for them would have resulted in the devastation of the entire country in the vicinity of the city.

On the 30th of April General Croxton, with his brigade, last heard of through General Forrest, arrived at Forsyth, and the next day marched to this place. After having skirmished with Jackson's force, estimated correctly at two thousand six hundred men, near Trion, on the morning of April 2, he determined to effect by strategy what he could not expect to do by fighting, having with him only eleven hundred men. He therefore marched rapidly towards Johnson's ferry, on the Black Warrior river, forty miles above Tuscaloosa, threw Jackson completely off his guard by a simulated flight, crossed his brigade to the west side of the river, and turned towards Northport, where he arrived at 9 p. m., April 4. About midnight, fearing that his presence must become known, he surprised the force stationed on the bridge and crossed into Tuscaloosa. He captured three guns, one hundred and fifty prisoners, and after daylight scattered the militia and State cadets, destroyed the military school, and the stores and public works. He remained at that place until the 5th trying to communicate with General McCook, or to hear from me, but without success. Knowing that Jackson and Chalmers were both on the west side of the Cahawba, he thought it too hazardous to attempt a march by the way of Centreville, and therefore decided to move towards Eutaw, in the hope of crossing the Warrior lower down and breaking the railroad between Selma and Demopolis. Accordingly he abandoned Tuscaloosa, burned the bridge over the Black Warrior, and struck off to the southeast. When within seven miles of Eutaw he heard of the arrival at that place of Wirt Adams's division of cavalry, numbering two thousand six hundred men. Fearing to risk an engagement with a superior force, backed by the militia, he countermarched and moved again in the direction of Tuscaloosa, leaving it to the right, passed on through Jasper, recrossed the west fork of the Warrior river at Hailby's mill, marched nearly due east by the way of Mount Pension and Trussville, crossed the Coosa at Truss and Collins's ferries, and marched to Talladega. Near this place he met and scattered a force of rebels under General Hill, captured one hundred and fifty prisoners and one gun, and moved on towards Blue mountain, the terminus of the Alabama and Tennessee railroad. After destroying all the iron-works and factories left by us in northern Alabama and Georgia, he continued his march by Carrolton, Newman, and Forsyth to this place. He had no knowledge of my movements except what he got from rumor, but fully expected to form a junction with me at this place or at Augusta. The admirable judgment and sagacity displayed by General Croxton throughout his march of over six hundred and fifty miles in thirty days, as well as the good conduct and endurance of his command, are worthy of the highest commendation. For the details of his operations I respectfully refer to his report, herewith.

On the 30th of April I received notice of the final capitulation of the rebel forces east of the Chattahoochee, and the next day, by the hands of Colonel Woodall, the order of the Secretary of War annulling the first armistice, directing the resumption of hostilities, and the capture of the rebel chiefs. I had been previously advised of Davis's movements, and had given the necessary instructions to secure a clue to the route he intended following, with the hope of finally effecting his capture. I directed General Upton to proceed in person to Augusta, and ordered General Winslow, with the fourth division, to march to Atlanta for the purpose of carrying the terms of the convention, as well as to make such a

disposition of his forces covering the country northward from Forsyth to Marietta, so as to secure the arrest of Jefferson Davis and party. I directed General Croxton, commanding the first division, to distribute it along the line of the Ocmulgee, connecting with the fourth division, and extending southward to this place. Colonel Minty, commanding the second division, was directed to extend his troops along the line of the Ocmulgee and Altamaha rivers as far as Jacksonville. General McCook, with about five hundred men of his division, was sent to Tallahassee, Florida, with orders to receive the surrender of the rebels in that State, and to watch the country to the north and eastward. In addition to this, troops from the first and second divisions were directed to watch the Flint river crossings, and small parties were stationed at the principal railroad stations from Atlanta to Eufaula, as well as Columbus, West Point, and Talladega. By these means I confidently expected to arrest all large parties of fugitives and soldiers, and by a thorough system of scouts hoped to obtain timely information of the movements of important personages.

The pursuit and capture of Jefferson Davis has already been reported. A. H. Stephens, vice-president, Mr. Mallory, secretary of the navy to the rebel government, and B. H. Hill, senator from Georgia, were arrested by General Upton's command and sent forward in accordance with the instructions of the Secretary of War.

By reference to the reports herewith, it will be seen that since leaving the Tennessee river the troops under my command have marched an average of five hundred and twenty-five miles in twenty-eight days, captured five fortified cities, twenty-three stand of colors, two hundred and eighty-eight pieces of artillery, and six thousand eight hundred and twenty prisoners, including five generals; have captured and destroyed two gunboats, ninety-nine thousand stand of small-arms, seven iron-works, seven foundries, seven machine shops, two rolling mills, five collieries, thirteen factories, four nitre works, one military university, three Confederate States arsenals and contents, navy yard and contents, one powder magazine and contents, one naval armory and contents, five steamboats, thirty-five locomotives, five hundred and sixty-five cars, three railroad bridges, two hundred and thirty-five thousand bales of cotton, and immense quantities of quartermasters', commissary, and ordnance stores, of which no account could be taken, and have paroled fifty-nine thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight prisoners, including six thousand one hundred and thirty-four commissioned officers. Our total loss was thirteen officers and eighty-six men killed; thirty-nine officers and five hundred and fifty-nine men wounded, and seven officers and twenty one men missing.

I cannot close this report without calling attention to the remarkable discipline, endurance, and enthusiasm displayed throughout the campaign. Men, officers, regiments, brigades, and divisions seemed to vie with each other in the promptitude and cheerfulness with which they obeyed every order. The march from Montgomery to this place, a distance of two hundred and fifteen miles, was made between the 14th and 20th of April, and involving the passage of the Chattahoochee river at two important points, both strongly fortified and well defended, is especially worthy of notice. The destruction of iron-works, foundries, arsenals, supplies, ammunition, and provisions in Alabama and Georgia, as well as the means of transporting the same to both the armies under Taylor and Johnston, was an irreparable blow to the rebel cause. The railways converging at Atlanta, and particularly those by which the immense supplies of grain and meat were drawn from southwestern Georgia and central Alabama, were firmly under our control. The final collapse of the entire southern confederacy east of the Mississippi became simply a question of time. Fully appreciating the damage already done, I had determined to make a thorough destruction not only of them, but of everything else beneficial to the rebels which might be encountered on the march to North Carolina and Virginia. It will be remembered that

my corps began the march from the Tennessee river with something more than twelve thousand mounted men and one thousand five hundred dismounted. When it arrived here every man was well mounted, and the command supplied with all the surplus animals that could be desired. I have already called attention, in a previous communication, to the great merit of Brevet Major General Upton and Brigadier General Long, commanding divisions, and Brigadier General Croxton, Brevet Brigadier Generals Winslow and Alexander, and Colonels Minty, Miller, and La Grange, commanding brigades. I have seen these officers tested in every conceivable way, and regard them worthy of the highest honor their country can bestow.

For many interesting details and special mention of subordinate officers I respectfully refer to the reports herewith submitted. The accompanying maps and plans were prepared under the direction of Lieutenant Haywood, of my staff, and will materially assist in understanding the foregoing narrative of the campaign.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

\* J. H. WILSON,

*Brevet Major General.*

Brigadier General WM. D. WHIPPLE,

*Chief of Staff and Assistant Adjutant General,*

*Headquarters Department of the Cumberland.*

#### PALMER'S PURSUIT OF JEFFERSON DAVIS.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION, DISTRICT OF EAST TENNESSEE,

*Athens, Ga., May 6, 1865.*

MAJOR: I had reached the vicinity of Cowpens battle-field, South Carolina, on April 29, when I received the order to endeavor to intercept Jefferson Davis, his cabinet, and the confederate specie. I had already ascertained that Davis, and the money, with an escort of four brigades of cavalry, under Duke, Ferguson, and Dibbrill, with scattered detachments of Vaughn's, Hanie's and Butler's commands, all of which had evaded the terms of surrender of Johnston to Sherman, were moving from Yorkville, South Carolina, and had crossed Smith's ford of Broad river, towards Unionville and Abbeville, South Carolina, with the intention of going through to the trans-Mississippi department. Secretaries Breckinridge, Benjamin, and most of the cabinet, with a large number of generals, also Governor Harris, of Tennessee, accompanied Davis. Vice-President Stephens was not along, and he is believed to be now at Crawfordsville, Georgia, where he resides, and where he declares his intention of remaining, no matter what may be his fate. Jefferson Davis and his escort had remained at Charlotte during the armistice, but left there immediately on its termination, and passed through Yorkville on the morning of the 28th. Davis himself, with a small party, crossed Broad river at Pinckneyville ferry, but the cavalry went around by Smith's ford. One of my regiments, the twelfth Ohio, ran into the rear-guard of his escort at that ford and captured ten prisoners, from whom definite information was obtained. The specie was in wagons, and was contained in about one hundred boxes of gold and sixty kegs of silver. Prisoners thought there was about ten millions of specie in all. The cavalry escort, numbering in all at that time from three to four thousand men, had been promised their back pay in specie on arriving at the Mississippi river, as an inducement for them to remain true to their chief, but in spite of this bribe, as soon as they found we were on their track their men dropped out rapidly. Finding that the advance of Davis's escort had two days the start of us, and were well

mounted, and having but one brigade with me, and there being several considerable rivers to cross on the way to Georgia, at which small parties could successfully hold the fords and ferries, and destroy bridges, while the main body of the enemy was pushing on westward, I determined not to pursue on the direct line, but to strike by way of Spartansburg and Golden Grove for the head of the Savannah river, near Anderson, which would enable me to effect a junction with the other two brigades of the division, which had marched from Ashville, North Carolina, towards Anderson, and also to cross the head-waters of the Savannah river at Hatten's ford. Below this point there was no crossing of the Savannah, except by ferries and the pontoon bridge at Petersburg, at mouth of Broad river, in Georgia. I felt satisfied that Davis and his party would cross at this pontoon, and I hoped to intercept them at Athens, Georgia. The fifteenth Pennsylvania cavalry, which I had pushed towards Abbeville from Spartansburg, on May 1, to reconnoitre and ascertain whether the enemy was aiming for Augusta or not, captured some of Davis's escort near the Saluda river, and ascertained from them and citizens that the enemy was concentrating at Abbeville; that Davis was with them, and that all would probably march *via* the pontoon bridge for Athens, Georgia. I reached Athens, Georgia, on the afternoon of the 4th, with my entire division, and found that I had succeeded in throwing the command entirely in front of the enemy, all of whom were between Athens and the Savannah river. I immediately pushed out a force to guard the fords and ferries of Broad river, and sent the thirteenth Tennessee cavalry to Lexington, with directions to send a detachment to Elberton, and another to Washington, Georgia, to guard the roads leading north, west, and south, and from the pontoon bridge of Broad river. Fearing that Davis would abandon his escort and endeavor to make time by taking the railroad train at Washington for Atlanta or West Point, I sent a party to cut the railroad between Atlanta and Augusta, at Madison, and also to communicate with General Wilson, commanding the cavalry corps at Macon, Georgia. This party carried General Thomas's cipher despatches to General Wilson. I also sent a small party by railroad to Augusta, to communicate with General Upton, of Wilson's cavalry, who had just reached that point with his staff, but without troops. Yesterday afternoon I got reliable information of deserters from Davis's escort just from Washington, confirmed by despatches from Colonel Stacy, of the thirteenth Tennessee cavalry, and also from the party sent to Augusta, that Jefferson Davis had given over at Abbeville, South Carolina, on ascertaining that our forces were moving to intercept him, the idea of cutting his way through to the Mississippi, and that he had abandoned his large cavalry escort near the Savannah river, and had pushed rapidly on with General Duke, and about thirty-five men, to Washington, which he reached on the morning of the 3d instant, intending thence to travel incognito; also that some time during the 3d, or early the next morning, Davis had left Washington with a small party, by railroad, for Atlanta, but had abandoned the railroad at Union Point, and gone southward on horseback. The specie had not yet reached Washington, as far as I can learn, when Davis left that place. A detachment of my troops entered Washington yesterday morning, and ascertained that a large portion of the cavalry escort, under Dibbrill, was still back towards the Savannah river, where it was waiting to surrender on demand. Colonel Breckinridge, with about five hundred men, had just left Washington, taking the road to Macon, where he said he was going to surrender. The remainder of the four brigades had been disbanded either at Abbeville, South Carolina, at the Savannah river, or at Washington, Georgia. Before leaving Washington they distributed specie among the men at the rate of \$35 to each private soldier, and I presume more to the officers. I have not yet been able to ascertain what has become of the balance of the specie, but presume it has either been concealed or shipped by railroad westward, in which latter event it will be stopped either by my party on the railroad, at

Madison, or by Colonel Eggleston, of Wilson's cavalry, who reached Atlanta on the morning of the 4th. I have ordered Colonel Stacy to pursue Colonel Breckinridge's party, (as it is evident they only wish to get off with their specie pay,) also to find out, if possible, what has become of the balance of the money. I have also sent Colonel Trowbridge, with the tenth Michigan cavalry, to Madison and Eatonton, with directions to guard the ferries and bridges of the Oconee river south, to Milledgeville, and to intercept or pursue Davis or the party of Breckinridge, if he can gain the slightest clue. I have also sent the twelfth Ohio cavalry, Colonel Bently, to Monroe, Covington, and Lawrenceville, to prevent anything slipping through in that direction, in case it should get between Athens and Colonel Trowbridge. The fifteenth Pennsylvania I hold here to move in any direction that the information received from the different quarters may warrant. I have also communicated the latest information to General Wilson, at Macon, and have suggested that small parties from his command should guard the fords, ferries, and bridges on the Ockmulgee south to Jacksonville, and on Flint river from Jonesboro' to Albany, and also, if practicable, on the Chattahoochee and elsewhere in Alabama. I think it is the intention of Jeff. Davis to get around to the southward of Macon. I have sent General Brown's brigade to the cross-roads, fords, &c., from Athens northward to the head of the Savannah river, and Colonel Miller is doing the same from Lexington to Danielsville. This is for the purpose of intercepting the disbanded officers and soldiers of Davis's escort, depriving them of their arms and horses, and making prisoners of the officers. The privates are so numerous, we are obliged to informally parol them. I shall send Colonel Brown's and Colonel Miller's brigades, after this duty is over, to Greenville, South Carolina, from which place I recommend that they be recalled to Knoxville. Forage being scarce here, and General Wilson having a large cavalry force throughout this State, I would request authority, after the pursuit of Davis is over, to move with my own brigade to some point or points in South Carolina where forage can be obtained. I believe there is no United States cavalry in that State. I would use one regiment to guard the fords and ferries of the Savannah river from Raban gap to Petersburg pontoon bridge, for the purpose of arresting straggling parties of disbanded officers and soldiers who are going home or to the trans-Mississippi department, with arms in their hands and without paroles. If any of our troops be at Augusta, they could do the same thing from Petersburg southward. I would recommend that Colonel Kirk be directed to blockade effectually all the gaps in the Blue Ridge, from Raban gap eastward to Swanuanoa gap, and that he be recalled to East Tennessee to prevent his men from pillaging and committing excesses now that hostilities have ceased. There is evidently no further necessity of General Tillson's infantry remaining in the mountains. He requested me to send word whether there was or no. I have communicated directly with him, but sent this by way of Dalton, which is the nearest railroad point. The reason I recommend that Brown's and Miller's brigades be immediately recalled to East Tennessee, is because their officers, for the most part, have lost all control over their men. A large number of the men and some of the officers devote themselves exclusively to pillaging and destroying property. General Brown appears to have given them *carte blanche* in South Carolina, and they are now so entirely destitute of discipline that it cannot be restored in the field, and while the command is living on the country.

I am, major, your obedient servant,

WM. J. PALMER,

*Colonel, and Bvt. Brig. General Com'dg Division.*

Major BASCOM,

*Asst. Adjt. General, Headquarters of General Stoneman.*

HEADQUARTERS CAV. DIV., DIST. EAST TENNESSEE,  
*Howell's Ford, near Warsaw, on the Chattahoochee, May 12— 5 p. m.*

MAJOR: After my last despatch to you from Athens *via* Ashville, I got reliable information from a scout, disguised as a confederate soldier, who stated, positively, that he had travelled with him for a day; that Davis was one and a half mile from Willis's ferry, on the Oconee river, a short distance above the mouth of the Apalachee, moving westward. This was at four o'clock in the morning of the 7th instant. The scout left him at that point to report to me at Athens, and on the way, eight miles northwest of where he had left Davis's party near Salem, he states that he met General Bragg, with about a hundred men, most of whom were without arms, and five wagons. He travelled with Bragg some distance towards Farlow's bridge, over the Apalachee, and then to Athens. A detachment of the 15th Pennsylvania cavalry, sent in pursuit, succeeded in capturing General Bragg below Concord, west of Monticello, on the night of the 9th instant, with his wife, three staff officers, one ambulance, and three wagons. There was no specie in the wagons, but an assortment of provisions, horse equipments, papers, wines, &c. The lieutenant, in violation of orders, paroled Bragg, to report to General Wilson, at Macon; he stating that he was not trying to escape, but was simply going to his home in Alabama. He had, however, passed around a detachment of my command at Madison, and had evaded another detachment at Covington, and I have no doubt, whatever, but that he was a candidate for the trans-Mississippi department, and that he had been with Davis a very short time before. A detachment of the twelfth Ohio cavalry, which I had stationed at Monroe, while pursuing a party which they took to be Davis, also captured, at Conger's station, west of the Yellow river, on the morning of the 9th instant, Major General Wheeler, three of his staff, and eleven privates. Wheeler had a forged parole on his person, and tried to pass himself off as Lieutenant Sharp, stating that he had been paroled; when sent to me he made a very poor story, stating that he wanted to be paroled, and go to his home in Augusta. As I had no doubt, whatever, but that he was a trans-Mississippi man, and had been recently with Davis, I stripped him and his staff of their horses and side-arms, and sent them to the commander of the United States forces at Augusta, with a statement of the facts.

On the morning of the 8th instant, while searching for Davis near the fork of the Apalachee and Oconee rivers, Colonel Betts, fifteenth Pennsylvania cavalry, captured seven wagons, hid in the woods, which contained \$188,000 in coin, \$1,588,000 in bank notes, bonds, &c., of various southern States, and about \$4,000,000 of confederate money, besides considerable specie, plate, and other valuables belonging to private citizens of Macon. The main portion of the above property comprised the assets of the Georgia Central Railroad and Banking Company, which had been moved out of Macon at the approach of General Wilson. The wagons also contained the private baggage, maps, and official papers of General Beauregard, and the same of General Pillow. Nothing was disturbed, and I sent the whole in by railroad to Augusta, in charge of Captain Patterson, assistant adjutant general, to be delivered to the commanding officer of the United States forces to await the action of the government. Colonel Miller, whom I had sent to Greensboro', reports that Davis had passed through there, but it is possible that he may not have crossed the Oconee river, but deflected south to cross it below Milledgeville. Colonel Stacy, however, who was sent in pursuit from Washington, and who marched by way of Crawfordville and Sparta to a point opposite Milledgeville, reports that he could find no trace of him in that direction. I have had the whole country thoroughly searched from Washington west to the Chattahoochee river, and from Athens and Lawrenceville south to Milledgeville, Monticello, and McDonough. My belief is that Davis has not yet crossed the Chattahoochee river, but that he is lying by until



search shall have ceased. This belt, however, is so thoroughly exhausted of corn that I have determined to send Brown's and Miller's brigades, under General Brown, to the line of the Savannah river from Dooley's ferry, near Lincolntown, northward to Knox's bridge, on the Tugalo, to feed there as long as practicable without starving the people, and to arrest stray parties of armed confederates going westward. These orders were sent to General Brown yesterday, with instructions as soon as forage becomes scarce to move to Greenville, South Carolina, and vicinity, to await orders from you. With the first brigade, which is as much as I can feed on this route, I have determined to march rapidly across the belt exhausted by the campaign against Atlanta, and place it west of the Coosa river for the purpose of guarding that line from Will's valley south to Wilsonville, on the Talladega and Salem railroad. The tenth Michigan, now at McDonough, has been directed to cross the Chattahoochee at Franklin, thence to march *via* Talladega, to cross the Coosa at Clanche's ferry. The fifteenth Pennsylvania cavalry, now near Decatur, has been directed to march *via* Atlanta and Campbellton to Jacksonville, and from there to Ashville west of the Coosa. With the twelfth Ohio I shall start from here to-morrow morning, and march by Van Wert and Cedartown to Bennettsville on Will's creek. Each of the three columns will carry along enough forage and rations from the Chattahoochee (the fifteenth Pennsylvania from Atlanta) to take it across the exhausted belt, excepting the tenth Michigan, which will scarcely find it necessary to do so. On arriving west of the Coosa all intersecting and cross-roads will be guarded from Croxville and Will's valley south to Wilsonville, on the Talladega railroad. The tenth Michigan will communicate with United States forces at Montgomery, and I request that the line from Wilsonville to Montgomery be guarded by them. I have received no orders from you since the one to follow Davis until I believed further search useless, and I am acting upon that. The shortest way to communicate with me at Bennettsville will be probably by telegraph to Huntsville, thence by courier, or if the gunboats are running on the Tennessee river, the shortest way will be by courier from Guntersville to Bennettsville. I shall endeavor to communicate by that route when I get west of the Coosa. In regard to the confederate specie I am satisfied that Davis has not any considerable amount with him. Major Millsap, of Major General Loring's staff, states that in the council of war held in General Johnston's army, General Johnston called on Secretary Breckinridge for specie to pay his army, they not having been paid for more than a year. In presence of the entire council Breckinridge replied that the government had not more than sixty thousand dollars actually belonging to it; that forty thousand dollars was on hand; that twenty thousand dollars was or would be transferred to the commissary department for the purchase of provisions. It is estimated that the confederate government may have had in its possession some 32,000,000 dollars the property of different southern banks, including those of New Orleans, removed from various points to avoid capture; it having been the original intention to return these funds when the danger of its falling into our hands should have passed away. As Davis passed through North Carolina the funds belonging to the banks of that State were, it is said, left at Charlotte, at the instance of Governor Vance. That belonging to South Carolina banks was no doubt left at or near Abbeville, and that belonging to Georgia and New Orleans was either left and concealed at Washington, or shipped by railroad from that point. The soldiers and people were impressed with the idea that Mr. Davis had a very large amount of government specie with him, and they were becoming exasperated that it was not distributed in payment of the troops. It was probably as much to appease this feeling as anything else that prompted the payment of specie to Dibrell's cavalry, and at the time these were the only troops not formally surrendered or disbanded. This payment probably took most of the public funds. It seems probable that little specie crossed the Savannah river, for if Davis felt it necessary to have a division of cavalry to

guard his train. he would not be apt to move that train without guard, when he found it impracticable to take his cavalry escort across the Savannah river. General Bragg states that no specie came this side of Washington, Georgia. I also have the honor to report that General Iverson was captured by a detachment of the twelfth Ohio near his home at Lawrenceville. As I had good reasons to believe that he was not a trans-Mississippi man, and it being difficult to take him with us, I paroled him. A detachment of my command which passed through Crawfordsville a few days ago found Mr. Alexander H. Stephens at his home. Howell Cobb is at his home in Athens. The people all want peace and provisions, and appear strongly opposed to the trans-Mississippi scheme of Davis. There is a disposition everywhere on the part of the poor people and the poorer class of returned soldiers towards agrarian riots. I have a telegram of the 7th from Major General Wilson at Macon, stating that it is quite certain that Dick Taylor has capitulated. I had determined to parole Dibbrell's division, taking from them their horses and arms, but found that General Wilson had already sent a paroling officer from Augusta to attend to their case.

I am, major, yours respectfully,

WILLIAM J. PALMER,

*Colonel, and Brevet Brigadier General Commanding.*

Major BASCOM, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

P. S.—After waiting long enough along the Coosa to catch Davis or become convinced that further search is useless by my command, I would propose to go to Huntsville, Alabama, (if not required further in the cotton States,) as being the nearest railroad point that I could march to and obtain forage *en route*.

WILLIAM J. PALMER.

#### HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION OF EAST TENNESSEE,

*Near Coxville, Will's Valley, May 17, 1865.*

MAJOR: I have the honor to report, that I have the first brigade placed along the line of Will's valley and the Coosa river, from Van Buren, in Will's valley, to Willsonville, near the crossing of the Coosa by the Talladega (or Montevallo) railroad. I shall move in the morning to Sumpterville, on the Tennessee river, with one company of the fifteenth Pennsylvania cavalry, and establish my headquarters there until I hear from you, which I hope to do by the gunboats on arriving at that point. I find forage much less abundant along this line, particularly from Ashville to Van Buren, than I expected, and I think it will be impossible for the brigade to remain many days in its present position without exhausting the country, whose inhabitants will already find great difficulty in getting food enough to last them until the next crop is gathered. I have communicated with you from Athens *via* Dalton, from Athens *via* Ashville, from the Chattahoochee *via* Dalton, and from Euharley *via* Resaca, since I received any despatch from your headquarters. In moving through the country I have found it advisable to parole some five thousand rebel soldiers who are in the vicinity of their homes, many of them unable to report at the paroling stations regularly provided, or ignorant of where they should report. I would respectfully suggest that if necessary an order be issued under the proper date authorizing me to give these paroles, so that there may be no doubt concerning their legitimacy. Until I reached the vicinity of Jacksonville and Groshen, Alabama, I met nowhere in the south any disposition towards guerilla warfare. Most of the soldiers had returned peaceably to their ploughs; at Jacksonville, however, ten of Wheeler's cavalry captured

two of my men and stripped them of their horses and arms, and subsequently captured Major Garner, of the fifteenth Pennsylvania, who had remained behind for a short time with four men at Jacksonville, to finish patrolling some soldiers. They threatened to kill the major, but were prevented by the citizens until the four men came up, when the rebels were driven off with a loss of several horses and one man wounded. In the district I have traversed since leaving Athens, Georgia, the poorer classes will be apt to suffer for provisions until the wheat crop is gathered, unless the rich divide with them, which they show but little inclination to do anywhere in the south. I do not think it advisable that any authority should be granted by military commanders for the formation of armed police bodies for local protection in the south, as such authority will in most cases, I think, militate against the poor whites and negroes, who are and always have been our friends, in favor of the wealthy, who have always been and still are our enemies. No protection should be afforded that cannot be given by garrisons of our troops. There is an abundance of corn in southwestern Georgia and southern Alabama to feed these poor people if the railroads were repaired. The new corn crop is so promising everywhere that I think there will be a large surplus the coming year. All the suffering for food that will occur in the south will occur within the next three or four months. I find on further inquiry that General Bragg and staff were not released, but sent under an escort of a sergeant and ten men of the fifteenth Pennsylvania cavalry to report to General Wilson. You have no doubt before this received information of the capture of Jeff. Davis, of which I was apprised day before yesterday by the enclosed despatch from Colonel Trowbridge, of the tenth Michigan. There was still some doubt of the matter, but I seized the information as entirely reliable, as I have had it confirmed from various sources. Davis appears to have been captured at Ironton, south of Milledgeville, on the 11th instant, by Colonel Pritchard, of the fourth Michigan cavalry, and to have passed through Atlanta for Augusta on the morning of the 14th instant. I enclose a letter from General Wilson, dated at Macon, on the 9th, showing the dispositions he had made to arrest Davis. The proclamation he refers to I had printed in Athens, and have posted it in handbills everywhere from the Oconee to the Coosa, and from Altoona south to Talladega. If Davis is captured, the only object in the first brigade remaining along its present line would be to arrest other fugitive parties. I sent a company of the fifteenth Pennsylvania cavalry yesterday morning from Jacksonville to Montgomery, Alabama, to communicate with the commanding officer of the forces at that point. I have managed to keep tolerably mounted thus far, but unless my animals are rested soon, I fear the first brigade will become rapidly dismounted. I would therefore recommend that as soon as it is thought the brigade is no longer needed along this line, it be ordered to Huntsville, Alabama, to recruit. It would probably be difficult to march to Chattanooga in consequence of the scarcity of forage on the road leading thereto. General Brown with his own and Miller's brigade is now posted along the line of the Savannah river, but was ordered to move to Greenville, South Carolina, and vicinity, (under General Stoneman's previous instructions,) as soon as forage should become scarce along the Savannah. General Brown remained near Washington, Georgia, with one brigade until the paroling of Dibbrell's command, (Davis's escort,) some 3,000 in number, was completed by an officer sent from General Wilson for that purpose. One brigade of Grierson's cavalry is at Talladega.

I am, major, yours respectfully,

WM. J. PALMER,

*Colonel and Brevet Brigadier General Commanding.*

Major BASCOM,

*Asst. Adj. General, Headquarters Dis't of East Tennessee.*

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION, DIST. OF EAST TENNESSEE,  
*Huntsville, Ala., May 24, 1865.*

MAJOR: I have the honor to append to the reports I have hitherto furnished of the operations of this cavalry division, since I assumed command, the following:

1st. The rebel cavalry force which started with Jefferson Davis from Charlotte, North Carolina, to escort him to the trans-Mississippi department, and which was intercepted by us on the line of the Savannah river, consisted of Dibbrell's division and Ferguson's brigade of Wheeler's corps, Duke's brigade, and all of Vaughn's command that had not previously deserted, and Butler's division of Hampton's corps. The last did not attempt to cross the Savannah river, but disbanded in South Carolina near the river. Ferguson's brigade, consisting chiefly of Georgians, and numbering about one thousand, after crossing the Savannah was allowed to march to Macon, where it surrendered to General Wilson. The remaining four brigades, commanded by Dibbrell, and numbering about two thousand five hundred men, surrendered at the Petersburg pontoon bridge, on the Savannah river, on finding that they were intercepted—Davis, at that point, having come to the determination to get away with a few men.

2d. A large portion of the rebel soldiers, paroled at different posts in the south were without arms, some saying that they had thrown them away, others that they had left them with their commands when given furloughs, &c. It is a question worthy of consideration whether by proclamations of commanding officers such arms should not be ordered to be delivered up within a certain limited period, as I am satisfied that in most cases these men have their arms at their homes.

3d. I desire to recommend for honorable mention and promotion the following officers of my command, to wit:

*In the fifteenth Pennsylvania cavalry.*—Lieutenant Colonel Charles M. Betts, commanding regiment, for gallant conduct in charging and capturing a South Carolina battalion of cavalry, with its commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Johnson, in front of Greensboro', on the morning of April 11, 1865; also for thoroughly preserving the discipline of his regiment on an active campaign, during which the troops were compelled to live exclusively on the country. Adjutant Josiah C. Reiff, for gallantry in the above-mentioned charge in front of Greensboro', in which he wounded with the sabre and captured Lieutenant Colonel Johnson, commanding battalion of sixth South Carolina cavalry; also for skill and success throughout the campaign in getting acquainted with and in clearly reporting the movements of the enemy. Major William Wagner, for skill and good conduct in having with his battalion of two hundred and fifty men destroyed the Virginia railroad from thirty miles east of Christiansburg to within three miles of Lynchburg, and thence succeeding in withdrawing his command, in the face of a superior force with the loss of but one man, and in joining his regiment at Statesville, North Carolina. Major A. B. Garner, for gallantry and skill in having, with his battalion of one hundred men, destroyed the railroad bridge over Reedy fork, between Danville and Greensboro', on the morning of the 11th April, evading superior forces of the enemy. Captain Adam Kramer, for skill and gallantry in having destroyed the important railroad bridge over Deep river, between Greensboro' and Salisbury, on the morning of April 11th; also for destroying a large quantity of arms and munitions of war and railroad trains, with their contents, first defeating a superior force of the enemy. Sergeant Selden L. Wilson, for skill and gallantry in having with ten men destroyed the railroad bridge over South Buffalo creek, within a few miles south of Greensboro', driving off the guard.

*In the twelfth Ohio cavalry.*—Lieutenant Colonel Bentley, for meritorious conduct and gallantry throughout the campaign for keeping his regiment at all

times efficient and under good discipline. I earnestly recommend his promotion. He is entirely competent to command a brigade. Major Moderwell, for gallantry and skill in having with his battalion of two hundred and fifty men destroyed the large covered railroad bridge, one thousand one hundred and twenty-seven feet long, over the Catawba river, south of Charlotte, passing around a cavalry force sent out to delay him, and capturing the garrison of sixty men at the bridge, with two pieces of artillery; also for successfully withdrawing his command in the face of a brigade of rebel cavalry under General Ferguson, which reached the bridge from Charlotte before Major Moderwell left it, but too late to save any part of it. Captain Hunter, for spirit and efficiency as an officer shown throughout the campaign.

*In the tenth Michigan cavalry.*—Colonel L. S. Trowbridge, for skill and gallantry in resisting the attack of Ferguson's brigade upon his regiment near Lexington, North Carolina, on the morning of the 11th of April, inflicting a loss of sixty in killed and wounded upon the enemy, his own loss being trivial. The gallant resistance thus made protected and covered the detachments of my brigade which were destroying the railroad at High Point, Deep river, and elsewhere; also for efficiency as a commanding officer in steadily improving the discipline of his regiment from the time of its entering North Carolina. Major Standish, for gallantry on the occasion of the attack of Ferguson's brigade near Lexington, North Carolina, and for general efficiency as an officer shown throughout the campaign. Captain ———, for skill and gallantry in having with his squadron, on the morning of the 11th of April, captured the post of High Point, on the railroad between Greensboro' and Salisbury, destroying the track, telegraph, and a large quantity of supplies and railroad trains loaded with quartermaster stores.

I also acknowledge my indebtedness for faithful and efficient service, throughout the campaign, to all the officers of my staff, but especially to Captain Henry McAllester, acting assistant adjutant general, and to Lieutenant Charles S. Hinchman, assistant commissary of subsistence, the last for activity and success in keeping his brigade at all times well supplied with rations from the country in the authorized manner, thus preventing to a great extent irregular foraging.

I am, major, yours respectfully,

WILLIAM J. PALMER,

*Brevet Brigadier General Commanding Division.*

Major BASCOM,

*Asst. Adjt. General, Headquarters Dist. of East Tennessee.*

Since the date of my last official report, (June 1, 1865,) my command has gradually been reduced to a very small force, barely sufficient to guard the public property left to its care. In June, 1865, the 4th army corps, concentrated about Nashville, was, by direction of Lieutenant General Grant, sent to New Orleans to report to Major General Sheridan. The 14th and 20th army corps, formerly of my command, but which had been detached to form part of the column which marched with General Sherman from Atlanta, were at Louisville preparing for muster out of service, when the 4th corps was sent to New Orleans. When mustered out the 14th and 20th corps showed a strength of fifty-seven thousand five hundred and four (57,504) commissioned officers and enlisted men. The cavalry command has been similarly disposed of.

On the 20th June, 1865, I assumed command of the military division of the Tennessee, comprising the department of Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida; subsequently Florida was taken out and Mississippi added. The work of reducing the military establishments within my command was vigorously carried out, so that by the 1st of February, 1866, the effective force in the five States embraced in my command amounted to but twenty thousand

five hundred and sixty-four men, divided up as follows: department of Kentucky, 2,883; department of Tennessee, 4,555; department of Georgia, 2,350; department of Alabama, 6,332; department of Mississippi, 4,444.

From the 1st of June, 1865, to the 1st of January, 1866, there were mustered out of the United States service within my command four thousand five hundred and six commissioned officers and one hundred and twenty thousand seven hundred and fifty-one enlisted men, besides sixteen regiments of cavalry, strength not known. In January, 1866, a further reduction was made of five hundred and seventy-seven commissioned officers and sixteen thousand seven hundred and eighty-two enlisted men by muster-out.

Thousands of employé's (citizens) have been discharged from the quartermaster, commissary, ordnance, and medical departments, and an immense amount of property has been disposed of by sale and otherwise, realizing in most instances a handsome return of the original investments by the government. The work of reduction is still going on.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major General United States Army*









